.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3.tar.gz
-SOURCES/rsync-patches-3.1.3.tar.gz
+SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5.tar.gz
+SOURCES/rsync-patches-3.2.5.tar.gz

.rsync.metadata

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-82e7829c0b3cefbd33c233005341e2073c425629 SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3.tar.gz
-74c16510a18ef43d797f9ceba6150f0862568cc0 SOURCES/rsync-patches-3.1.3.tar.gz
+26baded8871b9e2406add210cdbfa744c94642d2 SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5.tar.gz
+db897ede46e509347a84ca4e0cb02c452eeabdbe SOURCES/rsync-patches-3.2.5.tar.gz

SOURCES/rsync-3.0.6-iconv-logging.patch

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index 34a013b..1aca728 100644
---- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -377,10 +377,13 @@ output_msg:
- 				filtered_fwrite(f, convbuf, outbuf.len, 0);
- 				outbuf.len = 0;
- 			}
--			if (!ierrno || ierrno == E2BIG)
--				continue;
--			fprintf(f, "\\#%03o", CVAL(inbuf.buf, inbuf.pos++));
--			inbuf.len--;
-+			/* Log one byte of illegal/incomplete sequence and continue with
-+			 * the next character. Check that the buffer is non-empty for the
-+			 * sake of robustness. */
-+			if ((ierrno == EILSEQ || ierrno == EINVAL) && inbuf.len) {
-+				fprintf(f, "\\#%03o", CVAL(inbuf.buf, inbuf.pos++));
-+				inbuf.len--;
-+			}
- 		}
- 	} else
- #endif

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.2-remove-symlinks.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
-index 03e4aadd..9b432ed9 100644
---- a/sender.c
-+++ b/sender.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern int logfile_format_has_i;
- extern int want_xattr_optim;
- extern int csum_length;
- extern int append_mode;
-+extern int copy_links;
- extern int io_error;
- extern int flist_eof;
- extern int allowed_lull;
-@@ -138,17 +139,16 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
- 		return;
- 	f_name(file, fname);
- 
--	if (do_lstat(fname, &st) < 0) {
-+	if ((copy_links ? do_stat(fname, &st) : do_lstat(fname, &st)) < 0) {
- 		failed_op = "re-lstat";
- 		goto failed;
- 	}
- 
--	if (S_ISREG(file->mode) /* Symlinks & devices don't need this check: */
--	 && (st.st_size != F_LENGTH(file) || st.st_mtime != file->modtime
-+	if (st.st_size != F_LENGTH(file) || st.st_mtime != file->modtime
- #ifdef ST_MTIME_NSEC
- 	 || (NSEC_BUMP(file) && (uint32)st.ST_MTIME_NSEC != F_MOD_NSEC(file))
- #endif
--	)) {
-+	) {
- 		rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "ERROR: Skipping sender remove for changed file: %s\n", fname);
- 		return;
- 	}

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.2-vvv-hang.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
-index 999c34e5..ceff3784 100644
---- a/io.c
-+++ b/io.c
-@@ -954,8 +954,17 @@ int send_msg(enum msgcode code, const char *buf, size_t len, int convert)
- 	} else
- #endif
- 		needed = len + 4 + 3;
--	if (iobuf.msg.len + needed > iobuf.msg.size)
--		perform_io(needed, PIO_NEED_MSGROOM);
-+	if (iobuf.msg.len + needed > iobuf.msg.size) {
-+		if (!am_receiver)
-+			perform_io(needed, PIO_NEED_MSGROOM);
-+		else { /* We allow the receiver to increase their iobuf.msg size to avoid a deadlock. */
-+			size_t old_size = iobuf.msg.size;
-+			restore_iobuf_size(&iobuf.msg);
-+			realloc_xbuf(&iobuf.msg, iobuf.msg.size * 2);
-+			if (iobuf.msg.pos + iobuf.msg.len > old_size)
-+				memcpy(iobuf.msg.buf + old_size, iobuf.msg.buf, iobuf.msg.pos + iobuf.msg.len - old_size);
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	pos = iobuf.msg.pos + iobuf.msg.len; /* Must be set after any flushing. */
- 	if (pos >= iobuf.msg.size)
-@@ -1176,7 +1185,7 @@ int read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
- 
- #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
- 	if (flags & RL_CONVERT && iconv_buf.size < bufsiz)
--		realloc_xbuf(&iconv_buf, bufsiz + 1024);
-+		realloc_xbuf(&iconv_buf, ROUND_UP_1024(bufsiz) + 1024);
- #endif
- 
-   start:

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-append-check.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-commit bd17c2a4e237ca1f38544db65053ecfea6054009
-Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
-Date:   Thu Sep 24 13:17:45 2020 +0200
-
-    Skip files for transfer that has been truncated during negotiation
-
-diff --git a/rsync.1 b/rsync.1
-index 6cabd44..855dd47 100644
---- a/rsync.1
-+++ b/rsync.1
-@@ -1004,8 +1004,10 @@ This causes rsync to update a file by appending data onto
- the end of the file, which presumes that the data that already exists on
- the receiving side is identical with the start of the file on the sending
- side.  If a file needs to be transferred and its size on the receiver is
--the same or longer than the size on the sender, the file is skipped.  This
--does not interfere with the updating of a file\(cq\&s non\-content attributes
-+the same or longer than the size on the sender, the file is skipped. It
-+also skips any files whose size on the sending side gets shorter during
-+the send negotiations (rsync warns about a "diminished" file when this
-+happens). This does not interfere with the updating of a file\(cq\&s non\-content attributes
- (e.g. permissions, ownership, etc.) when the file does not need to be
- transferred, nor does it affect the updating of any non\-regular files.
- Implies \fB\-\-inplace\fP.
-diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
-index 1cc28a1..e22eadd 100644
---- a/sender.c
-+++ b/sender.c
-@@ -379,6 +379,16 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+		if (append_mode > 0 && st.st_size < F_LENGTH(file)) {
-+			rprintf(FWARNING, "skipped diminished file: %s\n",
-+				full_fname(fname));
-+			free_sums(s);
-+			close(fd);
-+			if (protocol_version >= 30)
-+				send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
- 		if (st.st_size) {
- 			int32 read_size = MAX(s->blength * 3, MAX_MAP_SIZE);
- 			mbuf = map_file(fd, st.st_size, read_size, s->blength);

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-covscan.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
-index fbbfd8ba..235afa82 100644
---- a/util.c
-+++ b/util.c
-@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int ofd, mode_t mode)
- 		if (robust_unlink(dest) && errno != ENOENT) {
- 			int save_errno = errno;
- 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "unlink %s", full_fname(dest));
-+			close(ifd);
- 			errno = save_errno;
- 			return -1;
- 		}
-diff --git a/lib/pool_alloc.c b/lib/pool_alloc.c
-index 5856d591..a70a3f1a 100644
---- a/lib/pool_alloc.c
-+++ b/lib/pool_alloc.c
-@@ -49,15 +49,15 @@ pool_create(size_t size, size_t quantum, void (*bomb)(const char *), int flags)
- {
- 	struct alloc_pool *pool;
- 
--	if (!(pool = new0(struct alloc_pool)))
--		return NULL;
--
- 	if ((MINALIGN & (MINALIGN - 1)) != 0) {
- 		if (bomb)
- 			(*bomb)("Compiler error: MINALIGN is not a power of 2\n");
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (!(pool = new0(struct alloc_pool)))
-+		return NULL;
-+
- 	if (!size)
- 		size = POOL_DEF_EXTENT;
- 	if (!quantum)
-diff --git a/batch.c b/batch.c
-index 21c632fc..1ab66e90 100644
---- a/batch.c
-+++ b/batch.c
-@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static void write_filter_rules(int fd)
- void write_batch_shell_file(int argc, char *argv[], int file_arg_cnt)
- {
- 	int fd, i, len, err = 0;
--	char *p, filename[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char *p, *p2, filename[MAXPATHLEN];
- 
- 	stringjoin(filename, sizeof filename,
- 		   batch_name, ".sh", NULL);
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void write_batch_shell_file(int argc, char *argv[], int file_arg_cnt)
- 				err = 1;
- 		}
- 	}
--	if (!(p = check_for_hostspec(argv[argc - 1], &p, &i)))
-+	if (!(p = check_for_hostspec(argv[argc - 1], &p2, &i)))
- 		p = argv[argc - 1];
- 	if (write(fd, " ${1:-", 6) != 6
- 	 || write_arg(fd, p) < 0)

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2018-25032.patch

@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
-From 5c44459c3b28a9bd3283aaceab7c615f8020c531 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
-Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 22:09:22 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix a bug that can crash deflate on some input when using
- Z_FIXED.
-
-This bug was reported by Danilo Ramos of Eideticom, Inc. It has
-lain in wait 13 years before being found! The bug was introduced
-in zlib 1.2.2.2, with the addition of the Z_FIXED option. That
-option forces the use of fixed Huffman codes. For rare inputs with
-a large number of distant matches, the pending buffer into which
-the compressed data is written can overwrite the distance symbol
-table which it overlays. That results in corrupted output due to
-invalid distances, and can result in out-of-bound accesses,
-crashing the application.
-
-The fix here combines the distance buffer and literal/length
-buffers into a single symbol buffer. Now three bytes of pending
-buffer space are opened up for each literal or length/distance
-pair consumed, instead of the previous two bytes. This assures
-that the pending buffer cannot overwrite the symbol table, since
-the maximum fixed code compressed length/distance is 31 bits, and
-since there are four bytes of pending space for every three bytes
-of symbol space.
----
- deflate.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- deflate.h | 25 +++++++++----------
- trees.c   | 50 +++++++++++--------------------------
- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/zlib/deflate.c b/zlib/deflate.c
-index 425babc00..19cba873a 100644
---- a/zlib/deflate.c
-+++ b/zlib/deflate.c
-@@ -255,11 +255,6 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
-     int wrap = 1;
-     static const char my_version[] = ZLIB_VERSION;
- 
--    ushf *overlay;
--    /* We overlay pending_buf and d_buf+l_buf. This works since the average
--     * output size for (length,distance) codes is <= 24 bits.
--     */
--
-     if (version == Z_NULL || version[0] != my_version[0] ||
-         stream_size != sizeof(z_stream)) {
-         return Z_VERSION_ERROR;
-@@ -329,9 +324,47 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
- 
-     s->lit_bufsize = 1 << (memLevel + 6); /* 16K elements by default */
- 
--    overlay = (ushf *) ZALLOC(strm, s->lit_bufsize, sizeof(ush)+2);
--    s->pending_buf = (uchf *) overlay;
--    s->pending_buf_size = (ulg)s->lit_bufsize * (sizeof(ush)+2L);
-+    /* We overlay pending_buf and sym_buf. This works since the average size
-+     * for length/distance pairs over any compressed block is assured to be 31
-+     * bits or less.
-+     *
-+     * Analysis: The longest fixed codes are a length code of 8 bits plus 5
-+     * extra bits, for lengths 131 to 257. The longest fixed distance codes are
-+     * 5 bits plus 13 extra bits, for distances 16385 to 32768. The longest
-+     * possible fixed-codes length/distance pair is then 31 bits total.
-+     *
-+     * sym_buf starts one-fourth of the way into pending_buf. So there are
-+     * three bytes in sym_buf for every four bytes in pending_buf. Each symbol
-+     * in sym_buf is three bytes -- two for the distance and one for the
-+     * literal/length. As each symbol is consumed, the pointer to the next
-+     * sym_buf value to read moves forward three bytes. From that symbol, up to
-+     * 31 bits are written to pending_buf. The closest the written pending_buf
-+     * bits gets to the next sym_buf symbol to read is just before the last
-+     * code is written. At that time, 31*(n-2) bits have been written, just
-+     * after 24*(n-2) bits have been consumed from sym_buf. sym_buf starts at
-+     * 8*n bits into pending_buf. (Note that the symbol buffer fills when n-1
-+     * symbols are written.) The closest the writing gets to what is unread is
-+     * then n+14 bits. Here n is lit_bufsize, which is 16384 by default, and
-+     * can range from 128 to 32768.
-+     *
-+     * Therefore, at a minimum, there are 142 bits of space between what is
-+     * written and what is read in the overlain buffers, so the symbols cannot
-+     * be overwritten by the compressed data. That space is actually 139 bits,
-+     * due to the three-bit fixed-code block header.
-+     *
-+     * That covers the case where either Z_FIXED is specified, forcing fixed
-+     * codes, or when the use of fixed codes is chosen, because that choice
-+     * results in a smaller compressed block than dynamic codes. That latter
-+     * condition then assures that the above analysis also covers all dynamic
-+     * blocks. A dynamic-code block will only be chosen to be emitted if it has
-+     * fewer bits than a fixed-code block would for the same set of symbols.
-+     * Therefore its average symbol length is assured to be less than 31. So
-+     * the compressed data for a dynamic block also cannot overwrite the
-+     * symbols from which it is being constructed.
-+     */
-+
-+    s->pending_buf = (uchf *) ZALLOC(strm, s->lit_bufsize, 4);
-+    s->pending_buf_size = (ulg)s->lit_bufsize * 4;
- 
-     if (s->window == Z_NULL || s->prev == Z_NULL || s->head == Z_NULL ||
-         s->pending_buf == Z_NULL) {
-@@ -340,8 +373,12 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
-         deflateEnd (strm);
-         return Z_MEM_ERROR;
-     }
--    s->d_buf = overlay + s->lit_bufsize/sizeof(ush);
--    s->l_buf = s->pending_buf + (1+sizeof(ush))*s->lit_bufsize;
-+    s->sym_buf = s->pending_buf + s->lit_bufsize;
-+    s->sym_end = (s->lit_bufsize - 1) * 3;
-+    /* We avoid equality with lit_bufsize*3 because of wraparound at 64K
-+     * on 16 bit machines and because stored blocks are restricted to
-+     * 64K-1 bytes.
-+     */
- 
-     s->level = level;
-     s->strategy = strategy;
-@@ -552,7 +589,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflatePrime (strm, bits, value)
- 
-     if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
-     s = strm->state;
--    if ((Bytef *)(s->d_buf) < s->pending_out + ((Buf_size + 7) >> 3))
-+    if (s->sym_buf < s->pending_out + ((Buf_size + 7) >> 3))
-         return Z_BUF_ERROR;
-     do {
-         put = Buf_size - s->bi_valid;
-@@ -1113,7 +1150,6 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
- #else
-     deflate_state *ds;
-     deflate_state *ss;
--    ushf *overlay;
- 
- 
-     if (source == Z_NULL || dest == Z_NULL || source->state == Z_NULL) {
-@@ -1133,8 +1169,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
-     ds->window = (Bytef *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->w_size, 2*sizeof(Byte));
-     ds->prev   = (Posf *)  ZALLOC(dest, ds->w_size, sizeof(Pos));
-     ds->head   = (Posf *)  ZALLOC(dest, ds->hash_size, sizeof(Pos));
--    overlay = (ushf *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->lit_bufsize, sizeof(ush)+2);
--    ds->pending_buf = (uchf *) overlay;
-+    ds->pending_buf = (uchf *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->lit_bufsize, 4);
- 
-     if (ds->window == Z_NULL || ds->prev == Z_NULL || ds->head == Z_NULL ||
-         ds->pending_buf == Z_NULL) {
-@@ -1148,8 +1183,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
-     zmemcpy(ds->pending_buf, ss->pending_buf, (uInt)ds->pending_buf_size);
- 
-     ds->pending_out = ds->pending_buf + (ss->pending_out - ss->pending_buf);
--    ds->d_buf = overlay + ds->lit_bufsize/sizeof(ush);
--    ds->l_buf = ds->pending_buf + (1+sizeof(ush))*ds->lit_bufsize;
-+    ds->sym_buf = ds->pending_buf + ds->lit_bufsize;
- 
-     ds->l_desc.dyn_tree = ds->dyn_ltree;
-     ds->d_desc.dyn_tree = ds->dyn_dtree;
-@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ local block_state deflate_fast(s, flush)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
-         return finish_done;
-     }
--    if (s->last_lit)
-+    if (s->sym_next)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
-     return block_done;
- }
-@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ local block_state deflate_slow(s, flush)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
-         return finish_done;
-     }
--    if (s->last_lit)
-+    if (s->sym_next)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
-     return block_done;
- }
-@@ -1987,7 +1987,7 @@ local block_state deflate_rle(s, flush)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
-         return finish_done;
-     }
--    if (s->last_lit)
-+    if (s->sym_next)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
-     return block_done;
- }
-@@ -2026,7 +2026,7 @@ local block_state deflate_huff(s, flush)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
-         return finish_done;
-     }
--    if (s->last_lit)
-+    if (s->sym_next)
-         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
-     return block_done;
- }
-diff --git a/zlib/deflate.h b/zlib/deflate.h
-index 23ecdd312..d4cf1a98b 100644
---- a/zlib/deflate.h
-+++ b/zlib/deflate.h
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ typedef struct internal_state {
-     /* Depth of each subtree used as tie breaker for trees of equal frequency
-      */
- 
--    uchf *l_buf;          /* buffer for literals or lengths */
-+    uchf *sym_buf;        /* buffer for distances and literals/lengths */
- 
-     uInt  lit_bufsize;
-     /* Size of match buffer for literals/lengths.  There are 4 reasons for
-@@ -239,13 +239,8 @@ typedef struct internal_state {
-      *   - I can't count above 4
-      */
- 
--    uInt last_lit;      /* running index in l_buf */
--
--    ushf *d_buf;
--    /* Buffer for distances. To simplify the code, d_buf and l_buf have
--     * the same number of elements. To use different lengths, an extra flag
--     * array would be necessary.
--     */
-+    uInt sym_next;      /* running index in sym_buf */
-+    uInt sym_end;       /* symbol table full when sym_next reaches this */
- 
-     ulg opt_len;        /* bit length of current block with optimal trees */
-     ulg static_len;     /* bit length of current block with static trees */
-@@ -317,20 +317,22 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_stored_block OF((deflate_state *s, charf *buf,
- 
- # define _tr_tally_lit(s, c, flush) \
-   { uch cc = (c); \
--    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = 0; \
--    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = cc; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = 0; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = 0; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = cc; \
-     s->dyn_ltree[cc].Freq++; \
--    flush = (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1); \
-+    flush = (s->sym_next == s->sym_end); \
-    }
- # define _tr_tally_dist(s, distance, length, flush) \
-   { uch len = (length); \
-     ush dist = (distance); \
--    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = dist; \
--    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = len; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist >> 8; \
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = len; \
-     dist--; \
-     s->dyn_ltree[_length_code[len]+LITERALS+1].Freq++; \
-     s->dyn_dtree[d_code(dist)].Freq++; \
--    flush = (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1); \
-+    flush = (s->sym_next == s->sym_end); \
-   }
- #else
- # define _tr_tally_lit(s, c, flush) flush = _tr_tally(s, 0, c)
-diff --git a/zlib/trees.c b/zlib/trees.c
-index 4f4a65011..decaeb7c3 100644
---- a/zlib/trees.c
-+++ b/zlib/trees.c
-@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ local void init_block(s)
- 
-     s->dyn_ltree[END_BLOCK].Freq = 1;
-     s->opt_len = s->static_len = 0L;
--    s->last_lit = s->matches = 0;
-+    s->sym_next = s->matches = 0;
- }
- 
- #define SMALLEST 1
-@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
- 
-         Tracev((stderr, "\nopt %lu(%lu) stat %lu(%lu) stored %lu lit %u ",
-                 opt_lenb, s->opt_len, static_lenb, s->static_len, stored_len,
--                s->last_lit));
-+                s->sym_next / 3));
- 
-         if (static_lenb <= opt_lenb) opt_lenb = static_lenb;
- 
-@@ -1017,8 +1017,9 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
-     unsigned dist;  /* distance of matched string */
-     unsigned lc;    /* match length-MIN_MATCH or unmatched char (if dist==0) */
- {
--    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = (ush)dist;
--    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = (uch)lc;
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist;
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist >> 8;
-+    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = lc;
-     if (dist == 0) {
-         /* lc is the unmatched char */
-         s->dyn_ltree[lc].Freq++;
-@@ -1033,30 +1034,7 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
-         s->dyn_ltree[_length_code[lc]+LITERALS+1].Freq++;
-         s->dyn_dtree[d_code(dist)].Freq++;
-     }
--
--#ifdef TRUNCATE_BLOCK
--    /* Try to guess if it is profitable to stop the current block here */
--    if ((s->last_lit & 0x1fff) == 0 && s->level > 2) {
--        /* Compute an upper bound for the compressed length */
--        ulg out_length = (ulg)s->last_lit*8L;
--        ulg in_length = (ulg)((long)s->strstart - s->block_start);
--        int dcode;
--        for (dcode = 0; dcode < D_CODES; dcode++) {
--            out_length += (ulg)s->dyn_dtree[dcode].Freq *
--                (5L+extra_dbits[dcode]);
--        }
--        out_length >>= 3;
--        Tracev((stderr,"\nlast_lit %u, in %ld, out ~%ld(%ld%%) ",
--               s->last_lit, in_length, out_length,
--               100L - out_length*100L/in_length));
--        if (s->matches < s->last_lit/2 && out_length < in_length/2) return 1;
--    }
--#endif
--    return (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1);
--    /* We avoid equality with lit_bufsize because of wraparound at 64K
--     * on 16 bit machines and because stored blocks are restricted to
--     * 64K-1 bytes.
--     */
-+    return (s->sym_next == s->sym_end);
- }
- 
- /* ===========================================================================
-@@ -1069,13 +1047,14 @@ local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
- {
-     unsigned dist;      /* distance of matched string */
-     int lc;             /* match length or unmatched char (if dist == 0) */
--    unsigned lx = 0;    /* running index in l_buf */
-+    unsigned sx = 0;    /* running index in sym_buf */
-     unsigned code;      /* the code to send */
-     int extra;          /* number of extra bits to send */
- 
--    if (s->last_lit != 0) do {
--        dist = s->d_buf[lx];
--        lc = s->l_buf[lx++];
-+    if (s->sym_next != 0) do {
-+        dist = s->sym_buf[sx++] & 0xff;
-+        dist += (unsigned)(s->sym_buf[sx++] & 0xff) << 8;
-+        lc = s->sym_buf[sx++];
-         if (dist == 0) {
-             send_code(s, lc, ltree); /* send a literal byte */
-             Tracecv(isgraph(lc), (stderr," '%c' ", lc));
-@@ -1100,11 +1079,10 @@ local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
-             }
-         } /* literal or match pair ? */
- 
--        /* Check that the overlay between pending_buf and d_buf+l_buf is ok: */
--        Assert((uInt)(s->pending) < s->lit_bufsize + 2*lx,
--               "pendingBuf overflow");
-+        /* Check that the overlay between pending_buf and sym_buf is ok: */
-+        Assert(s->pending < s->lit_bufsize + sx, "pendingBuf overflow");
- 
--    } while (lx < s->last_lit);
-+    } while (sx < s->sym_next);
- 
-     send_code(s, END_BLOCK, ltree);
- }

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2022-37434.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/zlib/inflate.c b/zlib/inflate.c
-index e43abd9..bd33c19 100644
---- a/zlib/inflate.c
-+++ b/zlib/inflate.c
-@@ -740,8 +740,9 @@ int flush;
-                 if (copy > have) copy = have;
-                 if (copy) {
-                     if (state->head != Z_NULL &&
--                        state->head->extra != Z_NULL) {
--                        len = state->head->extra_len - state->length;
-+                        state->head->extra != Z_NULL &&
-+                        (len = state->head->extra_len - state->length) <
-+			    state->head->extra_max) {
-                         zmemcpy(state->head->extra + len, next,
-                                 len + copy > state->head->extra_max ?
-                                 state->head->extra_max - len : copy);

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2025-10158.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 797e17fc4a6f15e3b1756538a9f812b63942686f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2025 17:26:53 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] fixed an invalid access to files array
-
-this was found by Calum Hutton from Rapid7. It is a real bug, but
-analysis shows it can't be leverged into an exploit. Worth fixing
-though.
-
-Many thanks to Calum and Rapid7 for finding and reporting this
----
- sender.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
-index a4d46c39e..b1588b701 100644
---- a/sender.c
-+++ b/sender.c
-@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
- 
- 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
- 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
-+		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- 		else
- 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
- 		if (F_PATHNAME(file)) {

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2025-4638.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/zlib/inftrees.c b/zlib/inftrees.c
-index 44d89cf2..571e8100 100644
---- a/zlib/inftrees.c
-+++ b/zlib/inftrees.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned short FAR *work;
-     code FAR *next;             /* next available space in table */
-     const unsigned short FAR *base;     /* base value table to use */
-     const unsigned short FAR *extra;    /* extra bits table to use */
--    int end;                    /* use base and extra for symbol > end */
-+    unsigned match;             /* use base and extra for symbol >= match */
-     unsigned short count[MAXBITS+1];    /* number of codes of each length */
-     unsigned short offs[MAXBITS+1];     /* offsets in table for each length */
-     static const unsigned short lbase[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 base */
-@@ -181,19 +181,17 @@ unsigned short FAR *work;
-     switch (type) {
-     case CODES:
-         base = extra = work;    /* dummy value--not used */
--        end = 19;
-+        match = 20;
-         break;
-     case LENS:
-         base = lbase;
--        base -= 257;
-         extra = lext;
--        extra -= 257;
--        end = 256;
-+        match = 257;
-         break;
-     default:            /* DISTS */
-         base = dbase;
-         extra = dext;
--        end = -1;
-+        match = 0;
-     }
- 
-     /* initialize state for loop */
-@@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ unsigned short FAR *work;
-     for (;;) {
-         /* create table entry */
-         here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
--        if ((int)(work[sym]) < end) {
-+        if (work[sym] + 1u < match) {
-             here.op = (unsigned char)0;
-             here.val = work[sym];
-         }
--        else if ((int)(work[sym]) > end) {
--            here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym]]);
--            here.val = base[work[sym]];
-+        else if (work[sym] >= match) {
-+            here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym] - match]);
-+            here.val = base[work[sym] - match];
-         }
-         else {
-             here.op = (unsigned char)(32 + 64);         /* end of block */

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2026-41035.patch

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
-index f732fb15..b1b4217e 100644
---- a/xattrs.c
-+++ b/xattrs.c
-@@ -917,8 +917,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
- 		rxa->num = num;
- 	}
- 
--	if (need_sort && count > 1)
--		qsort(temp_xattr.items, count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
-+	if (need_sort && temp_xattr.count > 1)
-+		qsort(temp_xattr.items, temp_xattr.count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
- 
- 	ndx = rsync_xal_store(&temp_xattr); /* adds item to rsync_xal_l */
- 

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-fix-cve-2026-29518-regressions.patch

@@ -1,610 +0,0 @@
-From ba9dd4ec47c6e49f21e5905a91af68aad3c4678e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Sun, 24 May 2026 08:48:42 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 61/81] receiver: fix absolute --partial-dir delta resume
- (false verification)
-
-A delta (--no-whole-file) resume whose basis is an absolute --partial-dir
-looped forever on exit code 23 ("failed verification -- update put into
-partial-dir"), stranding the correct data in the partial-dir and never
-populating the destination.
-
-Cause: an absolute --partial-dir makes the basis path absolute, but the
-receiver opened it with secure_relative_open(NULL, fnamecmp, ...), which by
-design rejects an absolute relpath (EINVAL). The basis fd was then -1, so
-receive_data() mapped no basis and (because the matched-block sum_update() is
-guarded by "if (mapbuf)") computed the whole-file verification checksum over
-the literal data only -> a spurious mismatch every run. (The data itself was
-correct, since the in-place update leaves the matched basis bytes in place.)
-Under a non-chroot daemon the in-place write went through the same call and
-failed outright.
-
-Fix: add secure_basis_open(), which treats an operator-trusted absolute basis
-path as (trusted directory + confined leaf) -- the same way secure_relative_open
-already trusts an absolute basedir while keeping O_NOFOLLOW on the leaf -- and
-use it for both the basis read and the inplace-partial write. The strict
-"reject absolute relpath" contract of secure_relative_open is left intact.
-
-Defense-in-depth: receive_data() now treats a block-match token with no mapped
-basis as a protocol inconsistency (it can only arise from a basis that the
-generator opened but the receiver could not), failing cleanly instead of
-silently dropping those bytes from the verify checksum or the output.
-
-Thanks to @sylvain-ilm for the report (#724, #725).
-
-Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
-(cherry picked from commit eee05c177aeef1abc6e421e47cbf4af9a8135eb5)
----
- receiver.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
-index 89d2515b..56341a68 100644
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -83,6 +83,44 @@ static int updating_basis_or_equiv;
- #define MAX_UNIQUE_NUMBER 999999
- #define MAX_UNIQUE_LOOP 100
- 
-+/* Open a basis/output path that may legitimately be an operator-trusted
-+ * ABSOLUTE path -- e.g. an absolute --partial-dir ("a directory reserved for
-+ * partial-dir work") or --backup-dir. secure_relative_open() deliberately
-+ * rejects an absolute relpath, so feeding it the whole absolute partialptr
-+ * (with a NULL basedir) returns EINVAL: the basis fd is then -1, no basis is
-+ * mapped, and receive_data() omits every matched block from the whole-file
-+ * verification checksum -> a spurious "failed verification" that strands the
-+ * (correct) data in the partial-dir forever.
-+ *
-+ * The operator's directory is trusted; only the leaf basename is peer-supplied.
-+ * So when basedir is NULL and relpath is absolute, split it into its directory
-+ * (trusted) and leaf and confine just the leaf -- exactly how secure_relative_
-+ * open already trusts an absolute basedir while O_NOFOLLOW-confining the leaf.
-+ * Anything else is a straight pass-through that preserves the strict contract. */
-+static int secure_basis_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
-+{
-+	if (!basedir && relpath && *relpath == '/') {
-+		const char *slash = strrchr(relpath, '/');
-+		const char *leaf = slash + 1;
-+		char dirbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
-+		const char *dir;
-+		if (slash == relpath)
-+			dir = "/";
-+		else {
-+			size_t dlen = slash - relpath;
-+			if (dlen >= sizeof dirbuf) {
-+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+				return -1;
-+			}
-+			memcpy(dirbuf, relpath, dlen);
-+			dirbuf[dlen] = '\0';
-+			dir = dirbuf;
-+		}
-+		return secure_relative_open(dir, leaf, flags, mode);
-+	}
-+	return secure_relative_open(basedir, relpath, flags, mode);
-+}
-+
- /* get_tmpname() - create a tmp filename for a given filename
-  *
-  * If a tmpdir is defined, use that as the directory to put it in.  Otherwise,
-@@ -364,6 +402,18 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
- 
- 		stats.matched_data += len;
- 
-+		/* A block match can only be honored if we actually mapped the
-+		 * basis. If we didn't (basis open failed), the sender should
-+		 * never have been told a basis existed -- treat it as a protocol
-+		 * inconsistency rather than silently omitting these bytes from
-+		 * the verification checksum (which yields a spurious failure) or
-+		 * leaving a hole in the output. */
-+		if (!mapbuf) {
-+			rprintf(FERROR, "got a block match with no basis file for %s [%s]\n",
-+				full_fname(fname), who_am_i());
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+		}
-+
- 		if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
- 			rprintf(FINFO,
- 				"chunk[%d] of size %ld at %s offset=%s%s\n",
-@@ -793,8 +843,9 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
- 				fnamecmp = fname;
- 		}
- 
--		/* open the file */
--		fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
-+		/* open the file (secure_basis_open tolerates an operator-trusted
-+		 * absolute fnamecmp, e.g. an absolute --partial-dir basis) */
-+		fd1 = secure_basis_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
- 
- 		if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
- 			if (fnamecmp != fname) {
-@@ -884,7 +935,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
- 			 * attacker could switch a directory to a symlink between
- 			 * path validation and file open. */
- 			if (use_secure_symlinks)
--				fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
-+				fd2 = secure_basis_open(NULL, fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
- 			else
- 				fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
- 			if (fd2 == -1) {
--- 
-2.53.0
-
-From ab7d8e9df3dd1f2d2acc56c49c7d0c70420f8883 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 20:48:10 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 63/81] sender: open a module-root-absolute path for a `path =
- /` module (#897)
-
-A daemon module with path=/ makes F_PATHNAME absolute, so the secure_path built
-for the content open starts with '/'.  secure_relative_open() rejects an
-absolute relpath with EINVAL, so a use-chroot=no daemon with path=/ could not
-send any file ('failed to open ...: Invalid argument (22)') -- a regression
-from 3.4.2.  Strip leading slashes to a module-relative path; resolution stays
-confined beneath module_dir.
-
-Thanks to @moonlitbugs for the report (#897).
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9886a06610370b3219ea9a29753388e261f4853d)
----
- sender.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
-index 033f87e5..32913af0 100644
---- a/sender.c
-+++ b/sender.c
-@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
- 			 * Reconstruct the full path relative to module_dir
- 			 * from F_PATHNAME (path) and f_name (fname). */
- 			char secure_path[MAXPATHLEN];
-+			const char *relp;
- 			int slen = snprintf(secure_path, sizeof secure_path, "%s%s%s", path, slash, fname);
- 			if (slen >= (int)sizeof secure_path) {
- 				io_error |= IOERR_GENERAL;
-@@ -371,7 +372,13 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
- 					send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
- 				continue;
- 			}
--			fd = secure_relative_open(module_dir, secure_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
-+			/* A module with `path = /` makes F_PATHNAME absolute, so the
-+			 * joined path starts with '/'; strip leading slashes to a
-+			 * module-relative path that secure_relative_open accepts (#897). */
-+			relp = secure_path;
-+			while (*relp == '/')
-+				relp++;
-+			fd = secure_relative_open(module_dir, relp, O_RDONLY, 0);
- 		} else {
- 			fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
- 		}
--- 
-2.53.0
-
-From 57128940b1c63c726cdedd5a4531d2ff1ed7c5e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 20:48:10 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 64/81] syscall/receiver: honour a relative alt-basis dir on a
- daemon receiver (#915)
-
-The symlink-race hardening routed the receiver's basis open through
-secure_relative_open(), which rejects any '..' -- so a sibling
---link-dest=../01 on a use-chroot=no daemon was silently ignored and every file
-re-transferred (#915/#928, a regression from 3.4.1).
-
-Narrow the confinement to the sanitizing daemon (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) and
-re-anchor it at the module root, the real trust boundary: secure_relative_open()
-prefixes the cwd's module-relative path (from rsync's logical curr_dir[], a
-guaranteed lexical prefix of module_dir) and resolves beneath module_dir, so
-RESOLVE_BENEATH permits an in-module '..' climb while still rejecting one that
-escapes the module.  secure_basis_open() opens with a bare do_open() in the
-non-sanitizing cases.  t_stub.c gains weak curr_dir[]/curr_dir_len for the
-helpers (via #pragma weak on non-GNU compilers, where rsync.h erases
-__attribute__).
-
-Two tests: link-dest-relative-basis asserts the in-module '..' is honoured;
-link-dest-module-escape asserts a --link-dest=../../OUTSIDE climb that leaves
-the module is refused (not hard-linked to an outside file).  See upstream
-PR #930.
-
-Thanks to @fufu65 (#915) and @JetAppsClark (#928) for the reports.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 948edffb43b56216bcc9932955481ef80a6a69f1)
----
- receiver.c | 23 +++++++++++++-
- syscall.c  | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- t_stub.c   |  2 ++
- util1.c    |  4 +--
- 4 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
-index 56341a68..e199914f 100644
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -99,6 +99,27 @@ static int updating_basis_or_equiv;
-  * Anything else is a straight pass-through that preserves the strict contract. */
- static int secure_basis_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
- {
-+	extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
-+
-+	/* The confined resolver is only needed for the sanitizing daemon
-+	 * (am_daemon && !am_chrooted, i.e. use_secure_symlinks).  Local /
-+	 * remote-shell mode has no module boundary, and "use chroot = yes" makes
-+	 * the kernel root the boundary, so there an alt-dest basis like
-+	 * --link-dest=../01 must resolve against the cwd as a bare open did before
-+	 * the hardening (confining it would reject the legitimate sibling "..",
-+	 * #915). */
-+	if (!am_daemon || am_chrooted) {
-+		if (basedir) {
-+			char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
-+			if (pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath) >= sizeof fullpath) {
-+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+				return -1;
-+			}
-+			return do_open(fullpath, flags, mode);
-+		}
-+		return do_open(relpath, flags, mode);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (!basedir && relpath && *relpath == '/') {
- 		const char *slash = strrchr(relpath, '/');
- 		const char *leaf = slash + 1;
-@@ -859,7 +880,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
- 				/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
- 				basedir = basis_dir[0];
- 				fnamecmp = fname;
--				fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
-+				fd1 = secure_basis_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
-index 47777350..4f456807 100644
---- a/syscall.c
-+++ b/syscall.c
-@@ -1761,13 +1761,68 @@ static int secure_relative_open_resolve_beneath(const char *basedir, const char
- }
- #endif
- 
-+/* The logical current directory (maintained by change_dir() in util1.c).
-+ * Defined here -- rather than in util1.c -- so the test helpers that link
-+ * syscall.o but not util1.o (tls, trimslash) get the definition without a
-+ * weak-symbol fallback, which is not portable to PE/COFF targets (Cygwin). */
-+char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
-+unsigned int curr_dir_len;
-+
- int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
- {
-+	extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
-+	extern char *module_dir;
-+	extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
-+	char modrel_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	int reanchored = 0;
-+
- 	if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') {
- 		// must be a relative path
- 		errno = EINVAL;
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+
-+	/* Sanitizing daemon only (am_daemon && !am_chrooted).  Here we have chdir'd
-+	 * into a sub-dir of the module (the transfer destination), so a relative
-+	 * alt-dest like "../01" may legitimately climb to a sibling that is still
-+	 * inside the module (#915).  Confining beneath the cwd would reject that
-+	 * climb.  Re-anchor at the module root -- the real trust boundary -- by
-+	 * prefixing the cwd's module-relative path (from rsync's logical curr_dir[],
-+	 * a guaranteed lexical prefix of module_dir, unlike getcwd()) and resolving
-+	 * beneath module_dir; RESOLVE_BENEATH then allows in-module climbs and still
-+	 * rejects escapes.  Only for paths that contain "..".  module_dirlen is 0 for
-+	 * a `path = /` module (clientserver.c), so we gate on module_dir, not its
-+	 * length, to cover that case too -- the prefix check below treats
-+	 * module_dirlen 0 as "module root is /". */
-+	if (am_daemon && !am_chrooted
-+	 && module_dir && module_dir[0] == '/'
-+	 && (basedir == NULL || basedir[0] != '/')
-+	 && (path_has_dotdot_component(relpath)
-+	  || (basedir && path_has_dotdot_component(basedir)))) {
-+		const char *p;
-+		int n;
-+		if (curr_dir_len >= module_dirlen
-+		 && strncmp(curr_dir, module_dir, module_dirlen) == 0
-+		 && (curr_dir[module_dirlen] == '\0' || curr_dir[module_dirlen] == '/')) {
-+			for (p = curr_dir + module_dirlen; *p == '/'; p++) {}
-+			if (basedir)
-+				n = snprintf(modrel_buf, sizeof modrel_buf, "%s%s%s/%s",
-+					     p, *p ? "/" : "", basedir, relpath);
-+			else
-+				n = snprintf(modrel_buf, sizeof modrel_buf, "%s%s%s",
-+					     p, *p ? "/" : "", relpath);
-+			if (n < 0 || n >= (int)sizeof modrel_buf) {
-+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+				return -1;
-+			}
-+			basedir = module_dir;	/* absolute, operator-trusted anchor */
-+			relpath = modrel_buf;
-+			reanchored = 1;
-+		}
-+		/* else: cwd not under module root as expected -- fall through to the
-+		 * front-door rejection below (fail safe). */
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Reject any path with a literal ".." component (bare "..",
- 	 * "../foo", "foo/..", "foo/../bar", "subdir/.."). The previous
- 	 * substring-based check caught only "../" prefix and "/../"
-@@ -1776,14 +1831,19 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo
- 	 * and pre-5.6 Linux. RESOLVE_BENEATH on Linux/FreeBSD/macOS
- 	 * catches some of these in-kernel with EXDEV, but the front
- 	 * door must reject them consistently with EINVAL across all
--	 * platforms so callers can rely on the validation. */
--	if (path_has_dotdot_component(relpath)) {
--		errno = EINVAL;
--		return -1;
--	}
--	if (basedir && basedir[0] != '/' && path_has_dotdot_component(basedir)) {
--		errno = EINVAL;
--		return -1;
-+	 * platforms so callers can rely on the validation.  Skipped for a
-+	 * re-anchored path: its ".." is deliberate, stays within the module,
-+	 * and is adjudicated by RESOLVE_BENEATH below (the portable fallback
-+	 * re-rejects it -- see there). */
-+	if (!reanchored) {
-+		if (path_has_dotdot_component(relpath)) {
-+			errno = EINVAL;
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+		if (basedir && basedir[0] != '/' && path_has_dotdot_component(basedir)) {
-+			errno = EINVAL;
-+			return -1;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef __linux__
-@@ -1800,6 +1860,21 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo
- 	return secure_relative_open_resolve_beneath(basedir, relpath, flags, mode);
- #endif
- 
-+	/* Portable fallback only (no kernel RESOLVE_BENEATH): the per-component
-+	 * O_NOFOLLOW walk below can't adjudicate ".." safely, so reject it here --
-+	 * even for a re-anchored path.  This re-breaks --link-dest=../01 on
-+	 * openat2/O_RESOLVE_BENEATH-less platforms (NetBSD/OpenBSD/Solaris/Cygwin/
-+	 * pre-5.6 Linux), trading function for safety; on the kernel paths above
-+	 * RESOLVE_BENEATH already allowed the in-module climb. */
-+	if (path_has_dotdot_component(relpath)) {
-+		errno = EINVAL;
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if (basedir && basedir[0] != '/' && path_has_dotdot_component(basedir)) {
-+		errno = EINVAL;
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
- #if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY) || !defined(AT_FDCWD)
- 	// really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
- 	if (!basedir) {
-diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
-index 36c1b68c..12361057 100644
---- a/util.c
-+++ b/util.c
-@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
- 
- int sanitize_paths = 0;
- 
--char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
--unsigned int curr_dir_len;
-+extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];   /* defined in syscall.c */
-+extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
- int curr_dir_depth; /* This is only set for a sanitizing daemon. */
- 
- /* Set a fd into nonblocking mode. */
--- 
-2.53.0
-
-From 005d118f2d25ceaf7680f5b7bb92d70bacf97660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: pterror <pterrorbird@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 17:24:05 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 75/81] receiver: fix NULL deref on the delta discard path
-
-receive_data() crashed a receiver that was merely DISCARDING a file's
-delta stream. discard_receive_data() calls receive_data() with
-fname == NULL and fd == -1, so size_r == 0 and mapbuf == NULL. A normal
-block-MATCH token (against a block the basis and source share) then
-reaches the !mapbuf branch added in 31fbb17d ("receiver: fix absolute
---partial-dir delta resume"), which calls full_fname(fname). full_fname()
-dereferences its argument unconditionally (util1.c: `if (*fn == '/')`),
-so fname == NULL faults there -> receiver SIGSEGV.
-
-This is a normal-operation crash with a stock cooperating sender, not an
-adversarial one. The generator hands the sender real block sums whenever
-the basis is readable and we're in delta mode; the receiver only decides
-to discard afterwards, when its output cannot be produced -- e.g. the
-destination directory is not writable (mkstemp fails), the basis turns
-out to be a directory, or a --partial-dir resume is skipped. A MATCH
-token arriving during that discard hit the NULL deref.
-
-The 31fbb17d branch is correct only for a REAL output transfer (fd != -1,
-fname valid): there, a block match with no mapped basis is a genuine
-protocol inconsistency (the generator promised a basis the receiver could
-not open), and honoring it would silently omit those bytes from the
-verification checksum or leave a hole, so hard-erroring -- and
-full_fname(fname) -- is right. It conflated that with the discard path.
-
-The discriminator is fd, not mapbuf: on the discard path fd == -1 always;
-on the real-output inconsistency fd != -1. Scope the "no basis file"
-protocol error to fd != -1 (where fname is non-NULL and full_fname is
-safe) and, on the discard path (fd == -1), absorb the matched bytes
-benignly (offset += len; continue) -- symmetric with the literal-token
-handling just above, and restoring the pre-31fbb17d behavior. The
-real-transfer inconsistency check is preserved unchanged.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 26f13bc148a0aa5d00496543cdfe6024fa269a11)
----
- receiver.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
-index e199914f..e1f1fb38 100644
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -423,16 +423,32 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
- 
- 		stats.matched_data += len;
- 
--		/* A block match can only be honored if we actually mapped the
--		 * basis. If we didn't (basis open failed), the sender should
--		 * never have been told a basis existed -- treat it as a protocol
--		 * inconsistency rather than silently omitting these bytes from
--		 * the verification checksum (which yields a spurious failure) or
--		 * leaving a hole in the output. */
-+		/* A block match with no mapped basis is a protocol inconsistency
-+		 * ONLY when we are actually producing output (fd != -1): the
-+		 * generator told the sender a basis existed but the receiver could
-+		 * not open it, so honoring the match would silently omit these
-+		 * bytes from the verification checksum (a spurious failure) or
-+		 * leave a hole in the output. Fail cleanly in that case.
-+		 *
-+		 * On the DISCARD path (fd == -1, fname == NULL) there is no output
-+		 * and no verification: discard_receive_data() deliberately drains a
-+		 * delta the receiver never intends to write (basis fstat failed,
-+		 * basis is a directory, output open failed, batch skip, ...). The
-+		 * sender does not know the data is being discarded and streams an
-+		 * ordinary delta, so a match token here is NORMAL protocol, not
-+		 * malformed. Absorb it benignly (advance the offset and continue),
-+		 * as the pre-existing "if (mapbuf)" guards did before this check was
-+		 * added in 31fbb17d -- erroring would wrongly break legitimate
-+		 * transfers, and full_fname(fname) with fname==NULL would
-+		 * dereference NULL (a receiver crash on a normal transfer). */
- 		if (!mapbuf) {
--			rprintf(FERROR, "got a block match with no basis file for %s [%s]\n",
--				full_fname(fname), who_am_i());
--			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+			if (fd != -1) {
-+				rprintf(FERROR, "got a block match with no basis file for %s [%s]\n",
-+					full_fname(fname), who_am_i());
-+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+			}
-+			offset += len;
-+			continue;
- 		}
- 
- 		if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
--- 
-2.53.0
-
-From 0a5fa00fdcbacbebb89daca0ae68ae320f22dc74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 16:48:16 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH 46/81] receiver: add parent_ndx<0 guard, mirroring 797e17f
-
-Commit 797e17f ("fixed an invalid access to files array") added a
-parent_ndx < 0 guard to send_files() in sender.c, but the visually-
-identical block in recv_files() in receiver.c was not updated. A
-malicious rsync:// server can therefore drive any connecting client
-into the same out-of-bounds dir_flist->files[-1] read followed by a
-file_struct dereference in f_name() one line later.
-
-Reach: protocol-30+ default (inc_recurse) makes flist.c:2745 set
-parent_ndx = -1 on the first received flist when the sender omits a
-leading "." entry; rsync.c flist_for_ndx() does not reject ndx == 0
-in that state because the range check evaluates 0 < 0 = false; and
-read_ndx_and_attrs() only validates ndx with the ITEM_TRANSFER bit
-set, so iflags=ITEM_IS_NEW (or any other non-transfer iflag word)
-bypasses the check.
-
-Apply the same guard receiver-side. Confirmed: the same PoC (a
-minimal Python rsyncd that handshakes with CF_INC_RECURSE, sends a
-no-leading-"." flist, and emits ndx=0 with ITEM_IS_NEW) crashes
-unpatched 3.4.2 with SEGV_MAPERR si_addr=0x4101a-class in the
-receiver child; with this guard it exits cleanly with code 2
-(RERR_PROTOCOL).
-
-The attack surface delta over the sender variant is large:
-the original was malicious-client -> daemon, this is
-malicious-server -> any rsync client doing a normal rsync://
-or remote-shell pull.
-
-Reported by Pratham Gupta (alchemy1729).
-
-Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
----
- generator.c | 4 ++++
- io.c        | 3 +++
- receiver.c  | 7 ++++++-
- sender.c    | 2 ++
- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
-index b80eb2e3..38f5ad33 100644
---- a/generator.c
-+++ b/generator.c
-@@ -2146,6 +2146,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
- 			if (send_failed)
- 				ndx = get_hlink_num();
- 			flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
-+			if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
-+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- 			file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
- 			assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
- 			if (send_failed)
-@@ -2174,6 +2176,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
- 
- 			flist = cur_flist;
- 			cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
-+			if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
-+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- 
- 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
- 			if (solo_file)
-diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
-index 8d1cf7f2..2d94c1f4 100644
---- a/io.c
-+++ b/io.c
-@@ -1090,6 +1090,9 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
- {
- 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
- 
-+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
-+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+
- 	if (remove_source_files) {
- 		active_filecnt--;
- 		active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
-diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
-index 63e5cedb..0a993e0f 100644
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -467,7 +467,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
- static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
- {
- 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
--	struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
-+	struct file_struct *file;
-+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
-+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
- 
- 	rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
- 		is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
-@@ -604,6 +607,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
- 
- 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
- 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
-+		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- 		else
- 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
- 		fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
-diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
-index 99f431fe..033f87e5 100644
---- a/sender.c
-+++ b/sender.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
- 		return;
- 
- 	flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
-+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
-+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
- 	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
- 	if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
- 		return;
--- 
-2.53.0
-

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-fix-cve-2026-43618.patch

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-From 9ec57dd61762175a5fef11b66f36cbe6bd451178 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:10:59 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] token: harden compressed-token decoding against integer
- overflow
-
-The receiver's three compressed-token decoders --
-recv_deflated_token (zlib), recv_zstd_token, and
-recv_compressed_token (lz4) -- accumulated rx_token (a 32-bit
-signed counter) without overflow checking. A malicious sender
-could craft a compressed-token stream that walked rx_token past
-INT32_MAX, with careful manipulation leaking process memory
-contents to the wire (environment variables, passwords, heap
-pointers, library pointers -- significantly weakening ASLR
-and facilitating further exploitation).
-
-Cap rx_token at MAX_TOKEN_INDEX = 0x7ffffffe. Fold the
-bookkeeping into recv_compressed_token_num() and
-recv_compressed_token_run() shared by all three decoders. Reject
-negative or out-of-range token values explicitly. Also cap the
-simple_recv_token literal-block length at the source: any
-wire-supplied length > CHUNK_SIZE is ill-formed (the matching
-simple_send_token never writes a chunk larger than CHUNK_SIZE),
-so reject before looping on attacker-controlled bytes.
-
-Reach: an authenticated daemon connection with compression
-enabled (the default for protocols >= 30 when both peers
-advertise it). Disabling compression on the daemon
-("refuse options = compress" in rsyncd.conf) is the available
-workaround.
-
-Reporter: Omar Elsayed (seks99x).
-
-Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
----
- receiver.c | 11 ++++++++-
- token.c    | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
-index 6044836..59f9759 100644
---- a/receiver.c
-+++ b/receiver.c
-@@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
-+	while (1) {
-+		data = NULL;
-+		i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
-+		if (i == 0)
-+			break;
-+
- 		if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
- 			show_progress(offset, total_size);
- 
-@@ -313,6 +318,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
- 			maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
- 
- 		if (i > 0) {
-+			if (!data) {
-+				rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
-+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+			}
- 			if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
- 				rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
- 					i, big_num(offset));
-diff --git a/token.c b/token.c
-index f1299ee..fb722a5 100644
---- a/token.c
-+++ b/token.c
-@@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ static int32 simple_recv_token(int f, char **data)
- 		int32 i = read_int(f);
- 		if (i <= 0)
- 			return i;
-+		/* simple_send_token caps each literal chunk at CHUNK_SIZE;
-+		 * reject anything larger so a hostile peer cannot drive the
-+		 * read_buf below past our static CHUNK_SIZE buffer. */
-+		if (i > CHUNK_SIZE) {
-+			rprintf(FERROR, "invalid uncompressed token length %ld [%s]\n",
-+				(long)i, who_am_i());
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+		}
- 		residue = i;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -441,9 +449,52 @@ static char *cbuf;
- static char *dbuf;
- 
- /* for decoding runs of tokens */
-+#define MAX_TOKEN_INDEX ((int32)0x7ffffffe)
-+
- static int32 rx_token;
- static int32 rx_run;
- 
-+static NORETURN void invalid_compressed_token(void)
-+{
-+	rprintf(FERROR, "invalid token number in compressed stream\n");
-+	exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+}
-+
-+static int32 recv_compressed_token_num(int f, int32 flag)
-+{
-+	if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
-+		int32 incr = flag & 0x3f;
-+		if (rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - incr)
-+			invalid_compressed_token();
-+		rx_token += incr;
-+		flag >>= 6;
-+	} else {
-+		rx_token = read_int(f);
-+		if (rx_token < 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
-+			invalid_compressed_token();
-+	}
-+
-+	if (flag & 1) {
-+		rx_run = read_byte(f);
-+		rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
-+		if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - rx_run)
-+			invalid_compressed_token();
-+		recv_state = r_running;
-+	}
-+
-+	return -1 - rx_token;
-+}
-+
-+static int32 recv_compressed_token_run(void)
-+{
-+	if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token >= MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
-+		invalid_compressed_token();
-+	++rx_token;
-+	if (--rx_run == 0)
-+		recv_state = r_idle;
-+	return -1 - rx_token;
-+}
-+
- /* Receive a deflated token and inflate it */
- static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
- {
-@@ -535,17 +586,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
- 			}
- 
- 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
--			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
--				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
--				flag >>= 6;
--			} else
--				rx_token = read_int(f);
--			if (flag & 1) {
--				rx_run = read_byte(f);
--				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
--				recv_state = r_running;
--			}
--			return -1 - rx_token;
-+			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
- 
- 		case r_inflating:
- 			rx_strm.next_out = (Bytef *)dbuf;
-@@ -565,10 +606,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
- 			break;
- 
- 		case r_running:
--			++rx_token;
--			if (--rx_run == 0)
--				recv_state = r_idle;
--			return -1 - rx_token;
-+			return recv_compressed_token_run();
- 		}
- 	}
- }
--- 
-2.52.0
-

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-ignore-missing.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-commit af6118d98b3482cbcfc223bf2a0777bc19eccb02
-Author: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
-Date:   Sun Apr 26 18:02:17 2020 -0700
-
-    Allow a missing parent dir when --delete-missing-args was specified.
-
-diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
-index 3c50f63f..b90c7ccd 100644
---- a/generator.c
-+++ b/generator.c
-@@ -1277,10 +1277,16 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
- 			 && (*dn != '.' || dn[1]) /* Avoid an issue with --relative and the "." dir. */
- 			 && (!prior_dir_file || strcmp(dn, f_name(prior_dir_file, NULL)) != 0)
- 			 && flist_find_name(cur_flist, dn, 1) < 0) {
--				rprintf(FERROR,
--					"ABORTING due to invalid path from sender: %s/%s\n",
--					dn, file->basename);
--				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+				/* The --delete-missing-args option can actually put invalid entries into
-+				 * the file list, so if that option was specified, we'll just complain about
-+				 * it and allow it. */
-+				if (missing_args == 2 && file->mode == 0)
-+					rprintf(FERROR, "WARNING: parent dir is absent in the file list: %s\n", dn);
-+				else {
-+					rprintf(FERROR, "ABORTING due to invalid path from sender: %s/%s\n",
-+						dn, file->basename);
-+					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-+				}
- 			}
- 			if (relative_paths && !implied_dirs
- 			 && do_stat(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
-@@ -1383,7 +1389,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
- 			added_perms = 0;
- 		if (is_dir < 0) {
- 			if (!(preserve_times & PRESERVE_DIR_TIMES))
--				return;
-+				goto cleanup;
- 			/* In inc_recurse mode we want to make sure any missing
- 			 * directories get created while we're still processing
- 			 * the parent dir (which allows us to touch the parent
-@@ -1525,7 +1531,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
- 					"ignoring unsafe symlink \"%s\" -> \"%s\"\n",
- 					fname, sl);
- 			}
--			return;
-+			goto cleanup;
- 		}
- 		if (statret == 0) {
- 			char lnk[MAXPATHLEN];

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-missing-xattr-filter.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/exclude.c.old b/exclude.c
-index 232249f..2f6dccc 100644
---- a/exclude.c.old
-+++ b/exclude.c
-@@ -1575,6 +1575,8 @@ char *get_rule_prefix(filter_rule *rule, const char *pat, int for_xfer,
- 	}
- 	if (rule->rflags & FILTRULE_EXCLUDE_SELF)
- 		*op++ = 'e';
-+	if (rule->rflags & FILTRULE_XATTR)
-+		*op++ = 'x';
- 	if (rule->rflags & FILTRULE_SENDER_SIDE
- 	    && (!for_xfer || protocol_version >= 29))
- 		*op++ = 's';

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-skip-compress.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/loadparm.c b/loadparm.c
-index 029f358f..534e7b63 100644
---- a/loadparm.c
-+++ b/loadparm.c
-@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
- };
- 
- /* Initialise the Default all_vars structure. */
--static void reset_all_vars(void)
-+void reset_daemon_vars(void)
- {
- 	memcpy(&Vars, &Defaults, sizeof Vars);
- }
-@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ int lp_load(char *pszFname, int globals_only)
- {
- 	bInGlobalSection = True;
- 
--	reset_all_vars();
-+	reset_daemon_vars();
- 
- 	/* We get sections first, so have to start 'behind' to make up. */
- 	iSectionIndex = -1;
-diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
-index 1328c504..9af9e5d3 100644
---- a/main.c
-+++ b/main.c
-@@ -1681,6 +1681,10 @@ int main(int argc,char *argv[])
- 
- 	memset(&stats, 0, sizeof(stats));
- 
-+	/* Even a non-daemon runs needs the default config values to be set, e.g.
-+	 * lp_dont_compress() is queried when no --skip-compress option is set. */
-+	reset_daemon_vars();
-+
- 	if (argc < 2) {
- 		usage(FERROR);
- 		exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-sparse-block.patch

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
-index b183e20..72d6076 100644
---- a/fileio.c
-+++ b/fileio.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #define ALIGNED_LENGTH(len) ((((len) - 1) | (ALIGN_BOUNDRY-1)) + 1)
- 
- extern int sparse_files;
-+extern int sparse_files_block_size;
- 
- OFF_T preallocated_len = 0;
- 
-@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ int write_file(int f, int use_seek, OFF_T offset, const char *buf, int len)
- 	while (len > 0) {
- 		int r1;
- 		if (sparse_files > 0) {
--			int len1 = MIN(len, SPARSE_WRITE_SIZE);
-+			int len1 = MIN(len, sparse_files_block_size ? sparse_files_block_size : SPARSE_WRITE_SIZE);
- 			r1 = write_sparse(f, use_seek, offset, buf, len1);
- 			offset += r1;
- 		} else {
-diff --git a/options.c b/options.c
-index 195672e..d08c05a 100644
---- a/options.c
-+++ b/options.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ int remove_source_files = 0;
- int one_file_system = 0;
- int protocol_version = PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- int sparse_files = 0;
-+long sparse_files_block_size = 0;
- int preallocate_files = 0;
- int do_compression = 0;
- int def_compress_level = NOT_SPECIFIED;
-@@ -717,6 +718,7 @@ void usage(enum logcode F)
-   rprintf(F,"     --fake-super            store/recover privileged attrs using xattrs\n");
- #endif
-   rprintf(F," -S, --sparse                turn sequences of nulls into sparse blocks\n");
-+  rprintf(F,"     --sparse-block=SIZE     set block size used to handle sparse files\n");
- #ifdef SUPPORT_PREALLOCATION
-   rprintf(F,"     --preallocate           allocate dest files before writing them\n");
- #else
-@@ -927,6 +929,7 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
-   {"sparse",          'S', POPT_ARG_VAL,    &sparse_files, 1, 0, 0 },
-   {"no-sparse",        0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &sparse_files, 0, 0, 0 },
-   {"no-S",             0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &sparse_files, 0, 0, 0 },
-+  {"sparse-block",     0,  POPT_ARG_LONG,   &sparse_files_block_size, 0, 0, 0 },
-   {"preallocate",      0,  POPT_ARG_NONE,   &preallocate_files, 0, 0, 0},
-   {"inplace",          0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &inplace, 1, 0, 0 },
-   {"no-inplace",       0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &inplace, 0, 0, 0 },
-diff --git a/options.c b/options.c
-index b12da55..5a27452 100644
---- a/options.c
-+++ b/options.c
-@@ -2606,6 +2606,12 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
- 		args[ac++] = arg;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (sparse_files_block_size) {
-+		if (asprintf(&arg, "--sparse-block=%lu", sparse_files_block_size) < 0)
-+			goto oom;
-+		args[ac++] = arg;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (io_timeout) {
- 		if (asprintf(&arg, "--timeout=%d", io_timeout) < 0)
- 			goto oom;
-diff --git a/rsync.yo b/rsync.yo
---- a/rsync.yo
-+++ b/rsync.yo
-@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ to the detailed description below for a complete description.  verb(
-      --super                 receiver attempts super-user activities
-      --fake-super            store/recover privileged attrs using xattrs
-  -S, --sparse                turn sequences of nulls into sparse blocks
-+     --sparse-block=SIZE     set block size used to handle sparse files
-      --preallocate           allocate dest files before writing
-  -n, --dry-run               perform a trial run with no changes made
-  -W, --whole-file            copy files whole (w/o delta-xfer algorithm)
-@@ -1299,6 +1300,15 @@ If combined with bf(--sparse), the file will only have sparse blocks (as
- opposed to allocated sequences of null bytes) if the kernel version and
- filesystem type support creating holes in the allocated data.
-
-+dit(bf(--sparse-block=SIZE)) Change the block size used to handle sparse files
-+to SIZE bytes.  This option only has an effect if the bf(--sparse) (bf(-S))
-+option was also specified.  The default block size used by rsync to detect a
-+file hole is 1024 bytes; when the receiver writes data to the destination file
-+and option bf(--sparse) is used, rsync checks every 1024-bytes chunk to detect
-+if they are actually filled with data or not.  With certain filesystems,
-+optimized to receive data streams for example, enlarging this block size can
-+strongly increase performance.  The option can be used to tune this block size.
-+
- dit(bf(-n, --dry-run)) This makes rsync perform a trial run that doesn't
- make any changes (and produces mostly the same output as a real run).  It
- is most commonly used in combination with the bf(-v, --verbose) and/or
-diff --git a/rsync.1 b/rsync.1
-index 855dd47..1d7af3c 100644
---- a/rsync.1
-+++ b/rsync.1
-@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ to the detailed description below for a complete description.
-      \-\-super                 receiver attempts super\-user activities
-      \-\-fake\-super            store/recover privileged attrs using xattrs
-  \-S, \-\-sparse                turn sequences of nulls into sparse blocks
-+     \-\-sparse-block=SIZE      set block size used to handle sparse files
-      \-\-preallocate           allocate dest files before writing
-  \-n, \-\-dry\-run               perform a trial run with no changes made
-  \-W, \-\-whole\-file            copy files whole (w/o delta\-xfer algorithm)
-@@ -1493,6 +1493,16 @@ If combined with \fB\-\-sparse\fP, the file will only have sparse blocks (as
- opposed to allocated sequences of null bytes) if the kernel version and
- filesystem type support creating holes in the allocated data.
- .IP 
-+.IP "\fB\-\-sparse\-block=SIZE\fP"
-+Change the block size used to handle sparse files
-+to SIZE bytes.  This option only has an effect if the \fB\-\-sparse\fP (\fB\-S\fP)
-+option was also specified.  The default block size used by rsync to detect a
-+file hole is 1024 bytes; when the receiver writes data to the destination file
-+and option \fB\-\-sparse\fP is used, rsync checks every 1024\-bytes chunk to detect
-+if they are actually filled with data or not.  With certain filesystems,
-+optimized to receive data streams for example, enlarging this block size can
-+strongly increase performance.  The option can be used to tune this block size.
-+.IP
- .IP "\fB\-n, \-\-dry\-run\fP"
- This makes rsync perform a trial run that doesn\(cq\&t
- make any changes (and produces mostly the same output as a real run).  It

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-trust-sender.patch

@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c
-index d36a105e..da25661b 100644
---- a/exclude.c
-+++ b/exclude.c
-@@ -33,18 +33,15 @@ extern int recurse;
- extern int local_server;
- extern int prune_empty_dirs;
- extern int ignore_perishable;
--extern int old_style_args;
- extern int relative_paths;
- extern int delete_mode;
- extern int delete_excluded;
- extern int cvs_exclude;
- extern int sanitize_paths;
- extern int protocol_version;
--extern int read_batch;
--extern int list_only;
-+extern int trust_sender_args;
- extern int module_id;
- 
--extern char *filesfrom_host;
- extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
- extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
- extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
-@@ -55,6 +52,7 @@ filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
- filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
- 
- int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
-+int trust_sender_args = 0;
- int trust_sender_filter = 0;
- 
- /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
-@@ -377,7 +375,7 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
- 	int slash_cnt = 0;
- 	const char *cp;
- 	char *p;
--	if (am_server || old_style_args || list_only || read_batch || filesfrom_host != NULL)
-+	if (trust_sender_args)
- 		return;
- 	if (partial_string_len) {
- 		arg_len = strlen(arg);
-diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
-index 6721ceb7..9ebfbea7 100644
---- a/main.c
-+++ b/main.c
-@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
- extern BOOL shutting_down;
- extern int backup_dir_len;
- extern int basis_dir_cnt;
--extern int trust_sender_filter;
- extern struct stats stats;
- extern char *stdout_format;
- extern char *logfile_format;
-@@ -636,7 +635,6 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
- #ifdef ICONV_CONST
- 		setup_iconv();
- #endif
--		trust_sender_filter = 1;
- 	} else if (local_server) {
- 		/* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
- 		 * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
-diff --git a/options.c b/options.c
-index e7a9fcae..4feeb7e0 100644
---- a/options.c
-+++ b/options.c
-@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
- extern int local_server;
- extern int sanitize_paths;
- extern int daemon_over_rsh;
-+extern int trust_sender_args;
-+extern int trust_sender_filter;
- extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
- extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
- extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
-@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ int preserve_atimes = 0;
- static int daemon_opt;   /* sets am_daemon after option error-reporting */
- static int omit_dir_times = 0;
- static int omit_link_times = 0;
-+int trust_sender = 0;
- static int F_option_cnt = 0;
- static int modify_window_set;
- static int itemize_changes = 0;
-@@ -788,6 +791,7 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
-   {"protect-args",    's', POPT_ARG_VAL,    &protect_args, 1, 0, 0},
-   {"no-protect-args",  0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &protect_args, 0, 0, 0},
-   {"no-s",             0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &protect_args, 0, 0, 0},
-+  {"trust-sender",     0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &trust_sender, 1, 0, 0},
-   {"numeric-ids",      0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &numeric_ids, 1, 0, 0 },
-   {"no-numeric-ids",   0,  POPT_ARG_VAL,    &numeric_ids, 0, 0, 0 },
-   {"usermap",          0,  POPT_ARG_STRING, 0, OPT_USERMAP, 0, 0 },
-@@ -2465,6 +2469,11 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	if (trust_sender || am_server || read_batch)
-+		trust_sender_args = trust_sender_filter = 1;
-+	else if (old_style_args || filesfrom_host != NULL)
-+		trust_sender_args = 1;
-+
- 	am_starting_up = 0;
- 
- 	return 1;
-@@ -2438,9 +2438,7 @@ char *safe_arg(const char *opt, const char *arg)
- 	char *ret;
- 	if (!protect_args && old_style_args < 2 && (!old_style_args || (!is_filename_arg && opt != SPLIT_ARG_WHEN_OLD))) {
- 		const char *f;
--		if (!old_style_args && *arg == '~' 
--				&& ((relative_paths && !strstr(arg, "/./")) 
--				|| !strchr(arg, '/'))) {
-+		if (!trust_sender_args && *arg == '~' && (relative_paths || !strchr(arg, '/'))) {
- 			extras++;
- 			escape_leading_tilde = 1;
- 		}
-diff --git a/rsync.1.old b/rsync.1
-index 839f5ad..6882cf5 100644
---- a/rsync.1.old
-+++ b/rsync.1
-@@ -182,9 +182,39 @@ particular rsync daemon by leaving off the module name:
- \f(CWrsync somehost.mydomain.com::\fP
- .RE
- 
--.PP 
--See the following section for more details.
--.PP 
-+.SH "MULTI-HOST SECURITY"
-+
-+.PP
-+Rsync takes steps to ensure that the file requests that are shared in a
-+transfer are protected against various security issues.  Most of the potential
-+problems arise on the receiving side where rsync takes steps to ensure that the
-+list of files being transferred remains within the bounds of what was
-+requested.
-+.PP
-+Toward this end, rsync 3.1.2 and later have aborted when a file list contains
-+an absolute or relative path that tries to escape out of the top of the
-+transfer.  Also, beginning with version 3.2.5, rsync does two more safety
-+checks of the file list to (1) ensure that no extra source arguments were added
-+into the transfer other than those that the client requested and (2) ensure
-+that the file list obeys the exclude rules that we sent to the sender.
-+.PP
-+For those that don't yet have a 3.2.5 client rsync, it is safest to do a copy
-+into a dedicated destination directory for the remote files rather than
-+requesting the remote content get mixed in with other local content.  For
-+example, doing an rsync copy into your home directory is potentially unsafe on
-+an older rsync if the remote rsync is being controlled by a bad actor:
-+.PP
-+.RS
-+\f(CWrsync \-aiv host:dir1 ~\fP
-+.RE
-+.PP
-+A safer command would be:
-+.RS
-+\f(CWrsync \-aiv host:dir1 ~/host-files\fP
-+.RE
-+.PP
-+See the \fB\-\-trust\-sender\fP option for additional details.
-+
- .SH "ADVANCED USAGE"
- 
- .PP 
-@@ -519,6 +549,7 @@ to the detailed description below for a complete description.
-  \-0, \-\-from0                 all *from/filter files are delimited by 0s
-      \-\-old\-args              disable the modern arg-protection idiom
-  \-s, \-\-protect\-args          no space\-splitting; wildcard chars only
-+     \-\-trust\-sender          trust the remote sender's file list
-      \-\-address=ADDRESS       bind address for outgoing socket to daemon
-      \-\-port=PORT             specify double\-colon alternate port number
-      \-\-sockopts=OPTIONS      specify custom TCP options
-@@ -2119,6 +2150,49 @@ This option conflicts with the \fB\-\-old\-args\fP option.
- Note that this option is incompatible with the use of the restricted rsync
- script (`rrsync`) since it hides options from the script's inspection.
- .IP
-+.IP "\fB\-\-trust\-sender\fP"
-+This option disables two extra validation checks that a local client
-+performs on the file list generated by a remote sender.  This option should
-+only be used if you trust the sender to not put something malicious in the
-+file list (something that could possibly be done via a modified rsync, a
-+modified shell, or some other similar manipulation).
-+.IP
-+Normally, the rsync client (as of version 3.2.5) runs two extra validation
-+checks when pulling files from a remote rsync:
-+.RS
-+.IP o
-+It verifies that additional arg items didn't get added at the top of the
-+transfer.
-+.IP o
-+It verifies that none of the items in the file list are names that should
-+have been excluded (if filter rules were specified).
-+.RE
-+.IP
-+Note that various options can turn off one or both of these checks if the
-+option interferes with the validation.  For instance:
-+.RS
-+.IP o
-+Using a per-directory filter file reads filter rules that only the server
-+knows about, so the filter checking is disabled.
-+.IP o
-+Using the \fB\-\-old\-args\fP option allows the sender to manipulate the
-+requested args, so the arg checking is disabled.
-+.IP o
-+Reading the files-from list from the server side means that the client
-+doesn't know the arg list, so the arg checking is disabled.
-+.IP o
-+Using \fB\-\-read\-batch\fP disables both checks since the batch file's
-+contents will have been verified when it was created.
-+.RE
-+.IP
-+This option may help an under-powered client server if the extra pattern
-+matching is slowing things down on a huge transfer.  It can also be used
-+work around a currently-unknown bug in the verification logic for a transfer
-+from a trusted sender.
-+.IP
-+When using this option it is a good idea to specify a dedicated destination
-+directory, as discussed in the \(dq\&MULTI-HOST SECURITY\(dq\& section.
-+.IP
- .IP "\fB\-T, \-\-temp\-dir=DIR\fP"
- This option instructs rsync to use DIR as a
- scratch directory when creating temporary copies of the files transferred

SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-xattr.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
-index 508649c0..3c549192 100644
---- a/xattrs.c
-+++ b/xattrs.c
-@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
- {
- 	rsync_xa_list *glst = rsync_xal_l.items;
- 	item_list *lst;
--	int ndx;
-+	int ndx, added_write_perm = 0;
- 
- 	if (dry_run)
- 		return 1; /* FIXME: --dry-run needs to compute this value */
-@@ -1084,10 +1084,23 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
- 	}
- #endif
- 
-+	/* If the target file lacks write permission, we try to add it
-+	 * temporarily so we can change the extended attributes. */
-+	if (!am_root
-+#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
-+	 && !S_ISLNK(sxp->st.st_mode)
-+#endif
-+	 && access(fname, W_OK) < 0
-+	 && do_chmod(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
-+		added_write_perm = 1;
-+
- 	ndx = F_XATTR(file);
- 	glst += ndx;
- 	lst = &glst->xa_items;
--	return rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
-+	int return_value = rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
-+	if (added_write_perm) /* remove the temporary write permission */
-+		do_chmod(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
-+	return return_value;
- }
- 
- #ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.2-runtests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/runtests.sh.old b/runtests.sh
+index ecb383e..1cd1d1a 100755
+--- a/runtests.sh.old
++++ b/runtests.sh
+@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ do
+ 
+     case "$testscript" in
+     *hardlinks*) TESTRUN_TIMEOUT=600 ;;
++    *default-acls*) continue ;;
+     *) TESTRUN_TIMEOUT=300 ;;
+     esac
+ 

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.3-filtering-rules.patch

@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ index 13c4253..232249f 100644
 +	int slash_cnt = 0;
  	const char *cp;
  	char *p;
- 	if (am_server || old_style_args || list_only || read_batch || filesfrom_host != NULL)
+ 	if (trust_sender_args)
 @@ -407,6 +413,7 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
- 		arg++;
+		arg++;
  	arg_len = strlen(arg);
  	if (arg_len) {
 +		char *new_pat;
@@ -287,21 +287,6 @@ index 13c4253..232249f 100644
  }
  
  /* This is only called by the client. */
-diff --git a/options.c b/options.c
-index afc33ce..4d0a1a6 100644
---- a/options.c
-+++ b/options.c
-@@ -2426,7 +2426,9 @@ char *safe_arg(const char *opt, const char *arg)
- 	char *ret;
- 	if (!protect_args && old_style_args < 2 && (!old_style_args || (!is_filename_arg && opt != SPLIT_ARG_WHEN_OLD))) {
- 		const char *f;
--		if (!old_style_args && *arg == '~' && (relative_paths || !strchr(arg, '/'))) {
-+		if (!old_style_args && *arg == '~' 
-+				&& ((relative_paths && !strstr(arg, "/./")) 
-+				|| !strchr(arg, '/'))) {
- 			extras++;
- 			escape_leading_tilde = 1;
- 		}
 diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
 index 630d685..8c2397b 100644
 --- a/flist.c

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12087.patch

@@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ index 464d556..087f9da 100644
 +	}
 +
  	flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
+ 	flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE);
  
- 	if (inc_recurse) {
 diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h
-index b357dad..bc9abac 100644
+index f8bd024..fbaf312 100644
 --- a/rsync.h
 +++ b/rsync.h
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
  #define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10)	/* receiver/generator */
  #define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */
  #define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12)	/* sender/receiver/generator */

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12088.patch

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ index 75e7201..d2e318e 100644
  test_unsafe dir/../..			from				unsafe
  test_unsafe dir/..//..			from				unsafe
  
-diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c
 index da50ff1..f260d39 100644
---- a/util.c
-+++ b/util.c
+--- a/util1.c
++++ b/util1.c
 @@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
   *
   * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12747.patch

@@ -11,16 +11,38 @@ index cb21882..66e8089 100644
  	if (fd == -1)
  		return;
  
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 087f9da..1783253 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist,
+ 
+ 	if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
+ 		if (st.st_size == 0) {
+-			int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++			int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+ 			if (fd >= 0) {
+ 				st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
+ 				close(fd);
 diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
 index 110db28..3f13bb9 100644
 --- a/generator.c
 +++ b/generator.c
+@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+ 
+ 	if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) {
+ 		/* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */
+-		if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0)
++		if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0)
+ 			real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp);
+ 	}
+ 
 @@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
  	}
  
  	/* open the file */
--	if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
-+	if ((fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
+-	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
++	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
  		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
  			full_fname(fnamecmp));
  	  pretend_missing:
@@ -29,9 +51,9 @@ index 8031b8f..edfbb21 100644
 --- a/receiver.c
 +++ b/receiver.c
 @@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
- 		if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
  			if (fnamecmp != fname) {
  				fnamecmp = fname;
+ 				fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
 -				fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
 +				fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
  			}
@@ -49,21 +71,21 @@ index 2bbff2f..a4d46c3 100644
 +		fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
  		if (fd == -1) {
  			if (errno == ENOENT) {
- 				enum logcode c = am_daemon
+ 				enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;
 diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
 index 47c5ea5..c55ae5f 100644
 --- a/syscall.c
 +++ b/syscall.c
 @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files;
- extern int preallocate_files;
  extern int preserve_perms;
  extern int preserve_executability;
+ extern int open_noatime;
 +extern int copy_links;
 +extern int copy_unsafe_links;
  
  #ifndef S_BLKSIZE
  # if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux
-@@ -575,3 +575,21 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
+@@ -714,3 +714,21 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
  
  	return fd;
  }
@@ -90,9 +112,9 @@ index 010cac5..e10619a 100644
 --- a/t_unsafe.c
 +++ b/t_unsafe.c
 @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
- int human_readable = 0;
- int preserve_perms = 0;
- int preserve_executability = 0;
+ int am_sender = 1;
+ int read_only = 0;
+ int list_only = 0;
 +int copy_links = 0;
 +int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
 +
@@ -104,9 +126,9 @@ index e6b0708..858f8f1 100644
 --- a/tls.c
 +++ b/tls.c
 @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0;
- int preserve_executability = 0;
- int preallocate_files = 0;
- int inplace = 0;
+ int link_times = 0;
+ int link_owner = 0;
+ int nsec_times = 0;
 +int safe_symlinks = 0;
 +int copy_links = 0;
 +int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
@@ -118,18 +140,18 @@ index 1ec928c..f2774cd 100644
 --- a/trimslash.c
 +++ b/trimslash.c
 @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0;
- int preserve_executability = 0;
- int preallocate_files = 0;
- int inplace = 0;
+ int am_sender = 1;
+ int read_only = 1;
+ int list_only = 0;
 +int copy_links = 0;
 +int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
  
  int
  main(int argc, char **argv)
-diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c
 index f260d39..d84bc41 100644
---- a/util.c
-+++ b/util.c
+--- a/util1.c
++++ b/util1.c
 @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
  	int len;   /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
  	OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-default-compression.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
+index e32600c..e1f7d41 100644
+--- a/NEWS.md
++++ b/NEWS.md
+@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
+        export LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
+    ```
+ 
+-   or if iconv translations are needed:
++   or maybe:
+ 
+    ```shell
+        if [ "${LC_ALL:-}" ]; then
+@@ -145,11 +145,6 @@
+  - Avoid a weird failure if you run a local copy with a (useless)
+    [`--rsh`](rsync.1#opt) option that contains a `V` in the command.
+ 
+- - Fixed a long-standing compression bug where the compression level of the
+-   first file transferred affected the level for all future files.  Also, the
+-   per-file compression skipping has apparently never worked, so it is now
+-   documented as being ineffective.
+-
+  - Fixed a truncate error when a `--write-devices` copy wrote a file onto a
+    device that was shorter than the device.
+ 
+diff --git a/rsync.1.md b/rsync.1.md
+index f29495f..d06f231 100644
+--- a/rsync.1.md
++++ b/rsync.1.md
+@@ -2658,6 +2658,9 @@ expand it.
+     ignore this weirdness unless the rsync server complains and tells you to
+     specify `-zz`.
+ 
++    See also the `--skip-compress` option for the default list of file suffixes
++    that will be transferred with no (or minimal) compression.
++
+ 0.  `--compress-choice=STR`, `--zc=STR`
+ 
+     This option can be used to override the automatic negotiation of the
+@@ -2703,8 +2706,8 @@ expand it.
+     >     rsync -aiv --zc=zstd --zl=22 host:src/ dest/
+ 
+     For zlib & zlibx compression the valid values are from 1 to 9 with 6 being
+-    the default.  Specifying `--zl=0` turns compression off, and specifying
+-    `--zl=-1` chooses the default level of 6.
++    the default.  Specifying 0 turns compression off, and specifying -1 chooses
++    the default of 6.
+ 
+     For zstd compression the valid values are from -131072 to 22 with 3 being
+     the default. Specifying 0 chooses the default of 3.
+@@ -2723,15 +2726,14 @@ expand it.
+ 
+ 0.  `--skip-compress=LIST`
+ 
+-    **NOTE:** no compression method currently supports per-file compression
+-    changes, so this option has no effect.
+-
+     Override the list of file suffixes that will be compressed as little as
+     possible.  Rsync sets the compression level on a per-file basis based on
+-    the file's suffix.  If the compression algorithm has an "off" level, then
+-    no compression occurs for those files.  Other algorithms that support
+-    changing the streaming level on-the-fly will have the level minimized to
+-    reduces the CPU usage as much as possible for a matching file.
++    the file's suffix.  If the compression algorithm has an "off" level (such
++    as zlib/zlibx) then no compression occurs for those files.  Other
++    algorithms that support changing the streaming level on-the-fly will have
++    the level minimized to reduces the CPU usage as much as possible for a
++    matching file.  At this time, only zlib & zlibx compression support this
++    changing of levels on a per-file basis.
+ 
+     The **LIST** should be one or more file suffixes (without the dot) separated
+     by slashes (`/`).  You may specify an empty string to indicate that no files
+diff --git a/rsyncd.conf.5.md b/rsyncd.conf.5.md
+index 8bcbec0..e28c27a 100644
+--- a/rsyncd.conf.5.md
++++ b/rsyncd.conf.5.md
+@@ -924,9 +924,8 @@ the values of parameters.  See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
+ 
+     >     refuse options = * !a !delete* delete-after
+ 
+-    A note on refusing "compress": it may be better to set the "[dont compress](#)"
+-    daemon parameter to "`*`" and ensure that `RSYNC_COMPRESS_LIST=zlib` is set
+-    in the environment of the daemon in order to disable compression silently
++    A note on refusing "compress": it may be better to set the "dont compress"
++    daemon parameter to "`*`" because that disables compression silently
+     instead of returning an error that forces the client to remove the `-z`
+     option.
+ 
+@@ -958,10 +957,6 @@ the values of parameters.  See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
+ 
+ 0.  `dont compress`
+ 
+-    **NOTE:** This parameter currently has no effect except in one instance: if
+-    it is set to "`*`" then it minimizes or disables compression for all files
+-    (for those that don't want to refuse the `--compress` option completely).
+-
+     This parameter allows you to select filenames based on wildcard patterns
+     that should not be compressed when pulling files from the daemon (no
+     analogous parameter exists to govern the pushing of files to a daemon).
+@@ -972,14 +967,14 @@ the values of parameters.  See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
+     The "dont compress" parameter takes a space-separated list of
+     case-insensitive wildcard patterns. Any source filename matching one of the
+     patterns will be compressed as little as possible during the transfer.  If
+-    the compression algorithm has an "off" level, then no compression occurs
+-    for those files.  If an algorithms has the ability to change the level in
+-    mid-stream, it will be minimized to reduce the CPU usage as much as
+-    possible.
++    the compression algorithm has an "off" level (such as zlib/zlibx) then no
++    compression occurs for those files.  Other algorithms have the level
++    minimized to reduces the CPU usage as much as possible.
+ 
+     See the `--skip-compress` parameter in the **rsync**(1) manpage for the
+-    list of file suffixes that are skipped by default if this parameter is not
+-    set.
++    list of file suffixes that are not compressed by default.  Specifying a
++    value for the "dont compress" parameter changes the default when the daemon
++    is the sender.
+ 
+ 0.  `early exec`, `pre-xfer exec`, `post-xfer exec`
+ 
+diff --git a/token.c b/token.c
+index c108b3a..f5a41c9 100644
+--- a/token.c
++++ b/token.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ extern char *skip_compress;
+ #define Z_INSERT_ONLY Z_SYNC_FLUSH
+ #endif
+ 
++static int compression_level; /* The compression level for the current file. */
+ static int skip_compression_level; /* The least possible compressing for handling skip-compress files. */
+ static int per_file_default_level; /* The default level that each new file gets prior to checking its suffix. */
+ 
+@@ -223,11 +224,9 @@ static void init_set_compression(void)
+ /* determine the compression level based on a wildcard filename list */
+ void set_compression(const char *fname)
+ {
+-#if 0 /* No compression algorithms currently allow mid-stream changing of the level. */
+ 	const struct suffix_tree *node;
+ 	const char *s;
+ 	char ltr;
+-#endif
+ 
+ 	if (!do_compression)
+ 		return;
+@@ -235,7 +234,6 @@ void set_compression(const char *fname)
+ 	if (!match_list)
+ 		init_set_compression();
+ 
+-#if 0
+ 	compression_level = per_file_default_level;
+ 
+ 	if (!*match_list && !suftree)
+@@ -272,9 +270,6 @@ void set_compression(const char *fname)
+ 		if (!(node = node->child))
+ 			return;
+ 	}
+-#else
+-	(void)fname;
+-#endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* non-compressing recv token */
+@@ -366,7 +361,7 @@ send_deflated_token(int f, int32 token, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T offset, in
+ 			tx_strm.next_in = NULL;
+ 			tx_strm.zalloc = NULL;
+ 			tx_strm.zfree = NULL;
+-			if (deflateInit2(&tx_strm, per_file_default_level,
++			if (deflateInit2(&tx_strm, compression_level,
+ 					 Z_DEFLATED, -15, 8,
+ 					 Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY) != Z_OK) {
+ 				rprintf(FERROR, "compression init failed\n");

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-rrsync-man.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 3cde955..06232f1 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ rsync$(EXEEXT): $(OBJS)
+ rrsync: support/rrsync
+ 	cp -p $(srcdir)/support/rrsync rrsync
+ 
++rrsync.1.md: support/rrsync.1.md
++	cp -p $(srcdir)/support/rrsync.1.md rrsync.1.md
++
+ $(OBJS): $(HEADERS)
+ $(CHECK_OBJS): $(HEADERS)
+ tls.o xattrs.o: lib/sysxattrs.h
+@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ rsyncd.conf.5: rsyncd.conf.5.md md-convert version.h Makefile
+ 	@$(srcdir)/maybe-make-man rsyncd.conf.5.md
+ 
+ rrsync.1: support/rrsync.1.md md-convert Makefile
+-	@$(srcdir)/maybe-make-man support/rrsync.1.md
++	@$(srcdir)/maybe-make-man rrsync.1.md
+ 
+ .PHONY: clean
+ clean: cleantests

SOURCES/rsync-3.2.5-ssh-askpass.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
+index 7222a83..630ca03 100644
+--- a/main.c
++++ b/main.c
+@@ -1743,7 +1743,9 @@ int main(int argc,char *argv[])
+ 	our_gid = MY_GID();
+ 	am_root = our_uid == ROOT_UID;
+ 
+-	unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
++	// DISPLAY should only be cleared if SSH_ASKPASS is empty
++	if (!getenv("SSH_ASKPASS"))
++		unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
+ 
+ 	memset(&stats, 0, sizeof(stats));
+ 

SOURCES/rsync-man.patch

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---- rsync-3.0.9/rsync.1   2011-09-23 18:42:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ rsync-3.0.9/rsync.1   2012-09-19 10:40:19.698802861 +0200
-@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@
-  \-o, \-\-owner                 preserve owner (super\-user only)
-  \-g, \-\-group                 preserve group
-      \-\-devices               preserve device files (super\-user only)
-+     \-\-copy-devices          copy device contents as regular file
-      \-\-specials              preserve special files
-  \-D                          same as \-\-devices \-\-specials
-  \-t, \-\-times                 preserve modification times

SPECS/rsync.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 %global _hardened_build 1
 
 %define isprerelease 0
+%define _lto_cflags %{nil}
 
 %if %isprerelease
 %define prerelease pre1
@@ -8,10 +9,9 @@
 
 Summary: A program for synchronizing files over a network
 Name: rsync
-Version: 3.1.3
-Release: 27%{?dist}
-Group: Applications/Internet
-URL: http://rsync.samba.org/
+Version: 3.2.5
+Release: 4%{?dist}
+URL: https://rsync.samba.org/
 
 Source0: https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/src/rsync-%{version}%{?prerelease}.tar.gz
 Source1: https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/src/rsync-patches-%{version}%{?prerelease}.tar.gz
@@ -21,54 +21,36 @@ Source4: rsyncd.conf
 Source5: rsyncd.sysconfig
 Source6: rsyncd@.service
 
-BuildRequires: libacl-devel, libattr-devel, autoconf, popt-devel, systemd
-#Requires: zlib
+BuildRequires: make
+BuildRequires: gcc
+BuildRequires: gcc-c++
+BuildRequires: libacl-devel
+BuildRequires: libattr-devel
+BuildRequires: autoconf
+BuildRequires: popt-devel
+BuildRequires: systemd
+BuildRequires: lz4-devel
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel
+BuildRequires: libzstd-devel
 #Added virtual provide for zlib due to https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Bundled_Libraries?rd=Packaging:Bundled_Libraries
 Provides: bundled(zlib) = 1.2.8
 License: GPLv3+
 
-Patch0: rsync-man.patch
-Patch1: rsync-3.0.6-iconv-logging.patch
-Patch2: rsync-3.1.3-covscan.patch
-Patch3: rsync-3.1.2-remove-symlinks.patch
-Patch4: rsync-3.1.2-vvv-hang.patch
-Patch5: rsync-3.1.3-ignore-missing.patch
-Patch6: rsync-3.1.3-append-check.patch
-Patch7: rsync-3.1.3-skip-compress.patch
-Patch8: rsync-3.1.3-xattr.patch
-Patch9: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2018-25032.patch
-Patch10: rsync-3.1.3-sparse-block.patch
-Patch11: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2022-29154.patch
-Patch12: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2022-37434.patch
-Patch13: rsync-3.1.3-filtering-rules.patch
-Patch14: rsync-3.1.3-missing-xattr-filter.patch
-Patch15: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12085.patch
-Patch16: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12087.patch
-Patch17: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12088.patch
-Patch18: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12747.patch
-# a fix for CVE-2016-9840 in zlib but marked as CVE-2025-4638 for a different component
-Patch19: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2025-4638.patch
-Patch20: rsync-3.1.3-trust-sender.patch
-Patch21: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2025-10158.patch
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/bb0a8118c2d2ab01140bac5e4e327e5e1ef90c9c
-Patch22: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2026-41035.patch
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/1a5ad81add1004354a3d8ba841b94ffe19cd2505
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/99b36291d06ca66229942c7a525a1f5566f10c85
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/72d1cf1c288e5c526e906db2edafbf3d55762668
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/61d987c54a472d88855c5fbef3a4c7b51696f93a
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/24852cda3db38e2f2cd78a13703373c77f75f4d5
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/d22b6bc7d1b1d7be9df1c0c6db1599cb7d5fd82c
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/39b3074a1ab18705cd685fe0659fc958c8cd3db5
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/a277a06b1017b4cf6bb0fe33d5823869ed02dfd9
-Patch23: rsync-3.1.3-fix-cve-2026-29518.patch
-# Backporting a couple of regression fixes
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/f6b39cca
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/5ce33659
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/3526884f
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/7192db98
-Patch24: rsync-3.1.3-fix-cve-2026-29518-regressions.patch
-# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a
-Patch25: rsync-3.1.3-fix-cve-2026-43618.patch
+#Added due to rhbz#1873975 - default-acls test fail on s390x due to libacl
+Patch1: rsync-3.2.2-runtests.patch
+#commonmark would be needed to generate manpage, so we simply copy it
+Patch2: rsync-3.2.5-rrsync-man.patch
+#A couple of fixes for the new filtering code
+Patch3: rsync-3.2.3-filtering-rules.patch
+Patch4: rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12085.patch
+Patch5: rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12087.patch
+Patch6: rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12088.patch
+Patch7: rsync-3.2.5-cve-2024-12747.patch
+# This is here for RHEL9 lifetime to avoid changes in defaults.
+# From RHEL10 this will have to be documented as a different
+# behaviour for compression.
+Patch8: rsync-3.2.5-default-compression.patch
+Patch9: rsync-3.2.5-ssh-askpass.patch
 
 %description
 Rsync uses a reliable algorithm to bring remote and host files into
@@ -88,6 +70,15 @@ Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 Rsync can be used to offer read only access to anonymous clients. This
 package provides the anonymous rsync service.
 
+%package rrsync
+Summary: A script to setup restricted rsync users via ssh logins
+BuildArch: noarch
+Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
+Requires: %{__python3}
+%description rrsync
+This subpackage provides rrsync script and its manpage. rrsync
+may be used to setup a restricted rsync users via ssh logins.
+
 %prep
 # TAG: for pre versions use
 
@@ -99,48 +90,28 @@ package provides the anonymous rsync service.
 %setup -q -b 1
 %endif
 
-#Needed for compatibility with previous patched rsync versions
-patch -p1 -i patches/acls.diff
-patch -p1 -i patches/xattrs.diff
-
-#Enable --copy-devices parameter
-patch -p1 -i patches/copy-devices.diff
-
-%patch0 -p1 -b .man
-%patch1 -p1 -b .iconv
-%patch2 -p1 -b .covscan
-%patch3 -p1 -b .symlinks
-%patch4 -p1 -b .vvv
-%patch5 -p1 -b .missing
-%patch6 -p1 -b .append
-%patch7 -p1 -b .skip-compress
-%patch8 -p1 -b .xattr
-%patch9 -p1 -b .cve-2018-25032
-%patch10 -p1 -b .spars-block
-%patch11 -p1 -b .cve-2022-29154
-%patch12 -p1 -b .cve-2022-37434
-%patch13 -p1 -b .filtering-rules
-%patch14 -p1 -b .xattr-filter
-%patch15 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12085
-%patch16 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12087
-%patch17 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12088
-%patch18 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12747
-%patch19 -p1 -b .cve-2025-4638
-%patch20 -p1 -b .trust-sender
-%patch21 -p1 -b .cve-2025-10158
-%patch22 -p1 -b .cve-2026-41035
-%patch23 -p1 -b .cve-2026-29518
-%patch24 -p1 -b .cve-2026-29518-regressions
-%patch25 -p1 -b .cve-2026-43618
+%patch 1 -p1 -b .runtests
+%patch 2 -p1 -b .rrsync-man
+%patch 3 -p1 -b .filtering-rules
+%patch 4 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12085
+%patch 5 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12087
+%patch 6 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12088
+%patch 7 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12747
+%patch 8 -p1 -b .default-compression
+%patch 9 -p1 -b .ssh-askpass
 
 %build
-%configure
+%configure --disable-xxhash --with-rrsync
 # --with-included-zlib=no temporary disabled because of #1043965
 
-make %{?_smp_mflags}
+%{make_build}
+
+%check
+make check
+chmod -x support/*
 
 %install
-%makeinstall INSTALLCMD='install -p' INSTALLMAN='install -p'
+%{make_install} INSTALLCMD='install -p' INSTALLMAN='install -p'
 
 install -D -m644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/rsyncd.service
 install -D -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/rsyncd.socket
@@ -148,26 +119,26 @@ install -D -m644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/rsyncd.conf
 install -D -m644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/rsyncd
 install -D -m644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/rsyncd@.service
 
-%check
-make check
-#scripts in support/* are needed to run upstream tests but after install these should not be executable
-chmod -x support/*
-
 %files
-%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
 %license COPYING
-%doc NEWS OLDNEWS README support/ tech_report.tex
+%doc support/ tech_report.tex
 %{_bindir}/%{name}
+%{_bindir}/%{name}-ssl
 %{_mandir}/man1/%{name}.1*
-
-%files daemon
+%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}-ssl.1*
 %{_mandir}/man5/rsyncd.conf.5*
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/rsyncd.conf
+
+%files daemon
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/rsyncd
 %{_unitdir}/rsyncd.socket
 %{_unitdir}/rsyncd.service
 %{_unitdir}/rsyncd@.service
 
+%files rrsync
+%{_bindir}/r%{name}
+%{_mandir}/man1/r%{name}.1*
+
 %post daemon
 %systemd_post rsyncd.service
 
@@ -178,86 +149,123 @@ chmod -x support/*
 %systemd_postun_with_restart rsyncd.service
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Jun 15 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-27
-- Integer overflow in compressed-token decoding (CVE-2026-43618)
-- Resolves: RHEL-174951
+* Thu Oct 09 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.5-4
+- Resolves: RHEL-104404 - Do not clear DISPLAY unconditionally
 
-* Thu May 28 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-26
-- Resolves: RHEL-174950 - CVE-2026-29518 - TOCTOU symlink race in
-  non-chrooted daemon modules
+* Wed Feb 05 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.5-3
+- Resolves: RHEL-70265 - Rebase rsync to 3.2.5
 
-* Tue May 05 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-25
-- Resolves: RHEL-169141 - CVE-2026-41035 - Use-after-free vulnerability in extended attribute handling
+* Wed Jan 29 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.5-2
+- Resolves: RHEL-70158 - Info Leak via Uninitialized Stack Contents
+- Resolves: RHEL-70208 - Path traversal vulnerability in rsync
+- Resolves: RHEL-70210 - --safe-links option bypass leads to path traversal
+- Resolves: RHEL-71657 - Race Condition in rsync Handling Symbolic Links
 
-* Wed Mar 11 2026 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-24
-- Resolves: RHEL-152887 - CVE-2025-10158 - Out of bounds array access via negative index
+* Mon Dec 09 2024 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-21
+- Resolves: RHEL-70265 - Rebase rsync to 3.2.5
+- Resolves: RHEL-67142 - Wrong progress reported by rsync when using copy-devices
+- Resolves: RHEL-29340 - Slowness in rsync due to extra validation steps.
+- Resolves: RHEL-18216 - rysnc script /usr/share/doc/rsync/support/rrsync is unsecure
 
-* Wed May 28 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-23
-- Resolves: RHEL-52004 - Slowness in rsync due to extra validation steps
+* Thu Oct 19 2023 Alex Iribarren <Alex.Iribarren@cern.ch> - 3.2.3-20
+- Resolves: RHEL-14228 - rsync regression with --delay-updates
 
-* Mon May 26 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-22
-- Resolves: RHEL-91519 - Improper Pointer Arithmetic in pcl
+* Wed Nov 02 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-19
+- Resolves: #2139349 - rsync error: protocol incompatibility when using rsync-3.2.3-18.el9
 
-* Tue Feb 04 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-21
-- Resolves: RHEL-70207 - Path traversal vulnerability in rsync
+* Thu Aug 25 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-18
+- Resolves: #2111177 - remote arbitrary files write inside the directories of connecting peers
 
-* Mon Feb 03 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-20
-- Resolves: RHEL-70207 - Path traversal vulnerability in rsync
-- Resolves: RHEL-70209 - --safe-links option bypass leads to path traversal
-- Resolves: RHEL-72502 - Race Condition in rsync Handling Symbolic Links
-- Resolves: RHEL-70157 - Info Leak via Uninitialized Stack Contents
+* Thu Aug 18 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-17
+- Resolves: #2116669 - zlib: a heap-based buffer over-read or buffer overflow in inflate in inflate.c via a large gzip header extra field
 
-* Wed Nov 02 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-19.1
-- Resolves: #2139118 - rsync-daemon fail on 3.1.3
+* Wed May 18 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-16
+- Related: #2081296 - Adding ci.fmf for separation of testing results
 
-* Thu Aug 18 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-19
-- Resolves: #2116668 - zlib: a heap-based buffer over-read or buffer overflow in inflate in inflate.c via a large gzip header extra field
+* Wed May 18 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-15
+- Related: #2081296 - Disabling STI
 
-* Mon Aug 15 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-18
-- Resolves: #2111175 - remote arbitrary files write inside the directories of connecting peers
+* Wed May 18 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-14
+- Resolves: #2071514 - A flaw found in zlib when compressing (not decompressing) certain inputs
 
-* Mon Aug 08 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-17
-- Related: #2043753 - New option should not be sent to the server every time
+* Wed May 11 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-13
+- Resolves: #2079639 - rsync --atimes doesn't work
 
-* Thu Jul 28 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-16
-- Resolves: #2043753 - [RFE] Improve defaults for sparse file buffering
+* Tue May 03 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-12
+- Resolves: #2081296 - Enable fmf tests in centos stream
 
-* Tue Apr 12 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-15
-- Resolves: #2071513 - A flaw in zlib-1.2.11 when compressing (not decompressing!) certain inputs
+* Tue Apr 26 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-11
+- Resolves: #2053198 - rsync segmentation fault
 
-* Mon Oct 11 2021 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-14
-- Related: #1907443 - Adding fmf plans to run tests with tmt
+* Fri Apr 22 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-10
+- Resolves: #2077431 - Read-only files that have changed xattrs fail to allow xattr changes
 
-* Mon Sep 27 2021 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-13
-- Resolves: #1907443 - Read-only files that have changed xattrs fail to allow xattr changes
+* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-9
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Fri Dec 18 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-12
-- Resolves: #1816528 - Defaults for --skip-compress are not working, everything is being compressed
+* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-8
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
+  Related: rhbz#1971065
 
-* Thu Nov 05 2020 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-11
-- Resolves: #1855981 - rsync segfaults in --append mode
+* Mon May 31 2021 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-7
+- Resolves: #1955008 - rsync segfaults in --append mode when file on sender is large (> 2GB) and gets truncated
 
-* Thu Nov 05 2020 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-10
-- Resolves: #1727093 - rsync: "ABORTING due to invalid path from sender"
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-6
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
 
-* Mon Aug 24 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-9
-- Resolves: #1667436 - rsyncd.service fails to start at boot if address is configured
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.2.3-5
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Wed Jun 10 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-8
-- Resolves: #1775561 - rsync 3.1.2 hangs when run with -vvv to sync a large repository
+* Tue Dec 08 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-4
+- Resolves: #1894485 - rsync is unable to set permissions when chrooted
+- Getting rid of deprecated makeinstall macro
 
-* Tue Oct 29 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-7
-- Resolves: #1693162 - remove-source-files fails with symlinks
+* Fri Nov 20 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-3
+- Disabling LTO as a temporary measure for rhbz#1898912
 
-* Tue Apr 16 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-6
-- Resolves: #1602683 - Please review important issues found by covscan
+* Thu Nov 19 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-2
+- Use make macros
+- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
 
-* Tue Apr 16 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-5
-- Resolves: #1656761 - [FJ8.0 Bug]: [REG] The rsync command is terminated with SIGSEGV
+* Mon Aug 31 2020 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.2.3-1
+- New version 3.2.3
+- Removed upstream patches acls.diff and xattrs.diff
 
-* Wed Oct 03 2018 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-4
-- Resolves: #1635631 - Remove --noatime option from rsync
-  Cleaning spec file
+* Sat Aug 01 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.2.2-3
+- Second attempt - Rebuilt for
+  https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.2.2-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jul 21 2020 Michal Ruprich <michalruprich@gmail.com> - 3.2.2-1
+- New version 3.2.2
+
+* Thu Jan 30 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-11
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Oct 10 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-10
+- Enabling upstream test suite during build rhbz#1533846
+
+* Fri Jul 26 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-9
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Apr 15 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-8
+- Resolves: #1452187 - move man page rsyncd.conf(5) from rsync-daemon to rsync package
+- Moving the config file as well
+
+* Tue Mar 19 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-7
+- Resolves: #1683737 - [abrt] rsync: utf8_internal_loop(): rsync killed by SIGSEGV
+
+* Sat Feb 02 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-6
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jan 02 2019 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-5
+- Fix for rhbz#1586346 - rsyncd.service fails to start at boot if address is configured
+
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
 
 * Fri Feb 09 2018 Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-3
 - Escape macros in %%changelog