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Resolves: RHEL-33393 RHEL-63070
This commit is contained in:
Michal Domonkos 2025-01-13 12:19:06 +01:00
parent 9f20dbe8a5
commit 9caa0d20bb
3 changed files with 266 additions and 1 deletions
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215
0001-Report-unsafe-symlinks-during-installation-as-a-spec.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
From fb192da52f3f390793dbaffe66c6148f497a8023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 11:03:10 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Report unsafe symlinks during installation as a specific
case
RPM refuses to follow non root owned symlinks pointing to files owned by
another user for security reasons. This case was lumped in with
O_DIRECTORY behavior, leading to confusing error message as the symlink
often indeed points at a directory. Emit a more meaningful error message
when encountering unsafe symlinks.
We already detect the error condition in the main if block here, might
as well set the error code right there and then so we don't need to
redetect later. We previously only tested for the unsafe link condition
when our O_DIRECTORY equivalent was set, but that seems wrong. Probably
doesn't matter with the existing callers, but we really must not
follow those unsafe symlinks no matter what.
Co-authored-by: Florian Festi <ffesti@redhat.com>
Backported from commits:
14516542c113560dc0070df2f9102568a7a71b58
535eacc96ae6fe5289a2917bb0af43e491b0f4f4
Tests are excluded from this backport since they would need significant
rework, the use case will be covered by Beaker.
Fixes: RHEL-33393
---
lib/fsm.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
lib/rpmfi.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
index 9dd50b784..720d4a2ec 100644
--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct filedata_s {
* things around needlessly
*/
static const char * fileActionString(rpmFileAction a);
-static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir);
+static int fsmOpenat(int *fdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir);
static int fsmClose(int *wfdp);
/** \ingroup payload
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ static int fsmLink(int odirfd, const char *opath, int dirfd, const char *path)
#ifdef WITH_CAP
static int cap_set_fileat(int dirfd, const char *path, cap_t fcaps)
{
- int rc = -1;
- int fd = fsmOpenat(dirfd, path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
- if (fd >= 0) {
+ int fd = -1;
+ int rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, dirfd, path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
+ if (!rc) {
rc = cap_set_fd(fd, fcaps);
fsmClose(&fd);
}
@@ -299,12 +299,12 @@ static int fsmMkdir(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode)
return rc;
}
-static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+static int fsmOpenat(int *wfdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
{
struct stat lsb, sb;
int sflags = flags | O_NOFOLLOW;
int fd = openat(dirfd, path, sflags);
- int ffd = fd;
+ int rc = 0;
/*
* Only ever follow symlinks by root or target owner. Since we can't
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
* it could've only been the link owner or root.
*/
if (fd < 0 && errno == ELOOP && flags != sflags) {
- ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
+ int ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
if (ffd >= 0) {
if (fstatat(dirfd, path, &lsb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) {
if (fstat(ffd, &sb) == 0) {
@@ -322,17 +322,26 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
}
}
}
- if (ffd != fd)
+ /* Symlink with non-matching owners */
+ if (ffd != fd) {
close(ffd);
+ rc = RPMERR_INVALID_SYMLINK;
+ }
}
}
/* O_DIRECTORY equivalent */
- if (dir && ((fd != ffd) || (fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
- errno = ENOTDIR;
+ if (!rc && dir && fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
+ rc = RPMERR_ENOTDIR;
+
+ if (!rc && fd < 0)
+ rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
+
+ if (rc)
fsmClose(&fd);
- }
- return fd;
+
+ *wfdp = fd;
+ return rc;
}
static int fsmDoMkDir(rpmPlugins plugins, int dirfd, const char *dn,
@@ -351,9 +360,7 @@ static int fsmDoMkDir(rpmPlugins plugins, int dirfd, const char *dn,
rc = fsmMkdir(dirfd, dn, mode);
if (!rc) {
- *fdp = fsmOpenat(dirfd, dn, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 1);
- if (*fdp == -1)
- rc = RPMERR_ENOTDIR;
+ rc = fsmOpenat(fdp, dirfd, dn, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 1);
}
if (!rc) {
@@ -378,47 +385,44 @@ static int ensureDir(rpmPlugins plugins, const char *p, int owned, int create,
char *sp = NULL, *bn;
char *apath = NULL;
int oflags = O_RDONLY;
- int rc = 0;
if (*dirfdp >= 0)
- return rc;
+ return 0;
- int dirfd = fsmOpenat(-1, "/", oflags, 1);
+ int dirfd = -1;
+ int rc = fsmOpenat(&dirfd, -1, "/", oflags, 1);
int fd = dirfd; /* special case of "/" */
char *path = xstrdup(p);
char *dp = path;
while ((bn = strtok_r(dp, "/", &sp)) != NULL) {
- fd = fsmOpenat(dirfd, bn, oflags, 1);
+ rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, dirfd, bn, oflags, 1);
/* assemble absolute path for plugins benefit, sigh */
apath = rstrscat(&apath, "/", bn, NULL);
- if (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT && create) {
+ if (rc && errno == ENOENT && create) {
mode_t mode = S_IFDIR | (_dirPerms & 07777);
rc = fsmDoMkDir(plugins, dirfd, bn, apath, owned, mode, &fd);
}
fsmClose(&dirfd);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- dirfd = fd;
- } else {
- if (!quiet) {
- rpmlog(RPMLOG_ERR, _("failed to open dir %s of %s: %s\n"),
- bn, p, strerror(errno));
- }
- rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
+ if (rc)
break;
- }
+ dirfd = fd;
dp = NULL;
}
if (rc) {
+ if (!quiet) {
+ char *msg = rpmfileStrerror(rc);
+ rpmlog(RPMLOG_ERR, _("failed to open dir %s of %s: %s\n"),
+ bn, p, msg);
+ free(msg);
+ }
fsmClose(&fd);
fsmClose(&dirfd);
- } else {
- rc = 0;
}
*dirfdp = dirfd;
@@ -1025,10 +1029,8 @@ setmeta:
/* Only follow safe symlinks, and never on temporary files */
if (fp->suffix)
flags |= AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW;
- fd = fsmOpenat(di.dirfd, fp->fpath, flags,
+ rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, di.dirfd, fp->fpath, flags,
S_ISDIR(fp->sb.st_mode));
- if (fd < 0)
- rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
}
if (!rc && fp->setmeta) {
diff --git a/lib/rpmfi.c b/lib/rpmfi.c
index b5223a43f..e8e3ea294 100644
--- a/lib/rpmfi.c
+++ b/lib/rpmfi.c
@@ -2436,6 +2436,7 @@ char * rpmfileStrerror(int rc)
case RPMERR_DIGEST_MISMATCH: s = _("Digest mismatch"); break;
case RPMERR_INTERNAL: s = _("Internal error"); break;
case RPMERR_UNMAPPED_FILE: s = _("Archive file not in header"); break;
+ case RPMERR_INVALID_SYMLINK: s = _("Unsafe symlink"); break;
case RPMERR_ENOENT: s = strerror(ENOENT); break;
case RPMERR_ENOTEMPTY: s = strerror(ENOTEMPTY); break;
case RPMERR_EXIST_AS_DIR:
--
2.47.1

46
0002-Fix-FA_TOUCH-ed-files-getting-removed-on-failed-upda.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 9eedcd6b770154a8d853db30b49d411823d64c44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 14:50:35 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix FA_TOUCH'ed files getting removed on failed update
On install/update, most files are laid down with a temporary suffix
and if the update fails, removing those at the end of the loop is
the right thing to do. However FA_TOUCH'ed files were already there,
we only update their metadata, and we better not remove them!
AFAICS this all versions since rpm >= 4.14 in one way or the other.
If %_minimize_writes is enabled then it affects way more than just
unmodified config files.
The test is a simplified version of pam update failing in the original
report. Technically, --nomtime should not be needed for the test
verification but we don't even try to restore the metadata on failure,
and fixing that is way out of scope here.
Backported from commits:
027ef640b33b38ca257bb301bb302e9c71d43c27
Tests are excluded from this backport since they would need significant
rework, the use case will be covered by Beaker.
Fixes: RHEL-63070
---
lib/fsm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
index 720d4a2ec..91155c13c 100644
--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ setmeta:
if (ensureDir(NULL, rpmfiDN(fi), 0, 0, 1, &di.dirfd))
continue;
- if (fp->stage > FILE_NONE && !fp->skip) {
+ if (fp->stage > FILE_NONE && !fp->skip && fp->action != FA_TOUCH) {
(void) fsmRemove(di.dirfd, fp->fpath, fp->sb.st_mode);
}
}
--
2.47.1

6
rpm.spec
View File

@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ Patch146: 0001-Fix-potential-use-of-uninitialized-pgp-struct.patch
Patch147: 0001-Add-SourceLicense-tag-to-spec-syntax.patch
Patch148: 0001-Talk-about-rpmsign-in-the-rpmsign-man-page.patch
Patch149: 0001-Allow-parametric-macros-to-opt-out-of-option-process.patch
Patch150: 0001-Report-unsafe-symlinks-during-installation-as-a-spec.patch
Patch151: 0002-Fix-FA_TOUCH-ed-files-getting-removed-on-failed-upda.patch
# These are not yet upstream
Patch906: rpm-4.7.1-geode-i686.patch
@ -667,8 +669,10 @@ fi
%doc doc/librpm/html/*
%changelog
* Tue Nov 12 2024 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 4.16.1.3-37
* Mon Jan 13 2025 Michal Domonkos <mdomonko@redhat.com> - 4.16.1.3-37
- Allow parametric macros to opt out of option processing (RHEL-67161)
- Report unsafe symlinks during installation as a specific case (RHEL-33393)
- Fix FA_TOUCH'ed files getting removed on failed update (RHEL-63070)
* Wed Nov 06 2024 Michal Domonkos <mdomonko@redhat.com> - 4.16.1.3-36
- Improve newly added %%patch warning/error messages (RHEL-6294)