9a6943f11c
- Update the sources to 6.13 - Add important fixes from the upstream - Remove Provides: jitterentropy-rngd as it was retired in f29. - Resolves: rhbz#1965318 Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
70 lines
2.2 KiB
Diff
70 lines
2.2 KiB
Diff
From 73e81dc78ddb6f1bc0d8750c1a9e19e6cc123d48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
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Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 09:16:25 +0200
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Subject: Fix logic in ossl_aes_random_key()
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- Using sizeof is correct for arr[], but is not correct for *ptr. read() here
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makes a 8-bytes read (on 64-bit arch). It should read AES_BLOCK bytes instead,
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as callers of ossl_aes_random_key() imply.
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Covscan emits the following warning:
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Error: SIZEOF_MISMATCH (CWE-398): [#def1]
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rng-tools-6.12/ossl_helpers.c:51: suspicious_sizeof: Passing argument "key" of
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type "unsigned char *" and argument "8UL /* sizeof (key) */" to function "read"
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is suspicious.
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51|-> int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
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- According to the following warning, mark r as not used explicitly:
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Error: CLANG_WARNING: [#def2]
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rng-tools-6.12/ossl_helpers.c:51:7: warning[deadcode.DeadStores]: Value stored
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to 'r' during its initialization is never read
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51|-> int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
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- Add volatile to stack_junk to avoid possible compiler optimization. This does
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not silence "Uninitialized variable: stack_junk" covscan warning.
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- Remove a check for pepper == NULL where it is not needed.
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Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
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---
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ossl_helpers.c | 9 +++++----
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ossl_helpers.c b/ossl_helpers.c
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index c3c1fbb..9569b74 100644
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--- a/ossl_helpers.c
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+++ b/ossl_helpers.c
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@@ -42,22 +42,23 @@ void ossl_aes_random_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *pepper)
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0x00,0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,
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0x80,0x90,0xa0,0xb0,0xc0,0xd0,0xe0,0xf0
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}; /* AES data reduction key */
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- unsigned char stack_junk[AES_BLOCK];
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+ volatile unsigned char stack_junk[AES_BLOCK];
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int fd, i;
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/* Try getting some randomness from the kernel */
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fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
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if (fd >= 0) {
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- int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
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+ int r __attribute__((unused));
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+ r = read(fd, key, AES_BLOCK);
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close(fd);
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}
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/* Mix in our default key */
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- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
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+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK; i++)
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key[i] ^= default_key[i];
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/* Mix in stack junk */
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- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
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+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK; i++)
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key[i] ^= stack_junk[i];
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/* Spice it up if we can */
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--
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2.26.3
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