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Update to 6.13 and upstream fixes

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- Update the sources to 6.13
- Add important fixes from the upstream
- Remove Provides: jitterentropy-rngd as it was retired in f29.
- Resolves: rhbz#1965318

Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Vladis Dronov 2021-06-16 20:11:48 +02:00
parent 921287d0c6
commit 9a6943f11c
14 changed files with 778 additions and 932 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +1 @@
/rng-tools-6.12.tar.gz /rng-tools-6.13.tar.gz

45
0001-Use-AM_PROG_AR-over-AC_CHECK_TOOLS.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 16b728f9a5bb138386fa770de817ec244a158be5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Seifert <soap@gentoo.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 22:15:06 +0200
Subject: Use `AM_PROG_AR` over `AC_CHECK_TOOLS`
* `AM_PROG_AR` is the canonical way to detect the archiver
and includes workarounds for Cygwin.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
configure.ac | 3 +--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 0df9347..5dc334d 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
*.o
/.deps/
/aclocal.m4
+/ar-lib
/autom4te.cache/
/compile
/config.guess
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b4f2cb..1cb7fd7 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -62,10 +62,9 @@ AM_PROG_AS
dnl Checks for programs
AC_PROG_CC
AC_PROG_RANLIB
+AM_PROG_AR
AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
-AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar gar], :)
-
AX_PTHREAD
AM_CONDITIONAL([RDRAND], [test $target_cpu = x86_64 -o $target_cpu = i686])
--
2.26.3

52
0003-AC_CANONICAL_TARGET-AC_CANONICAL_HOST.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 3adf2613e262efbda0a3455e59c8cb3390271563 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Seifert <soap@gentoo.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 22:15:12 +0200
Subject: `AC_CANONICAL_TARGET` -> `AC_CANONICAL_HOST`
* `AC_CANONICAL_TARGET` is the type of system for which code
will be produced, not on which it will run. This is a common
confusion with Autoconf's target triplet.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
configure.ac | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 1cb7fd7..0fe06fc 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ dnl Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Suite 500, Boston, MA 02110-1335 USA
AC_INIT(rng-tools, 6.13, [Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>])
AC_PREREQ(2.52)
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([rngd.c])
-AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_CANONICAL_TARGET dnl required for broken AX_PTHREAD
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign])
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([rng-tools-config.h])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
@@ -67,14 +68,14 @@ AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
AX_PTHREAD
-AM_CONDITIONAL([RDRAND], [test $target_cpu = x86_64 -o $target_cpu = i686])
-AS_IF([test $target_cpu = x86_64 -o $target_cpu = i686], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RDRAND],1,[Enable RDRAND])],[])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([RDRAND], [test $host_cpu = x86_64 || $host_cpu = i686])
+AS_IF([test $host_cpu = x86_64 || $host_cpu = i686], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RDRAND],1,[Enable RDRAND])],[])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([DARN], [test $target_cpu = powerpc64le])
-AS_IF([test $target_cpu = powerpc64le], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DARN],1,[Enable DARN])],[])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([DARN], [test $host_cpu = powerpc64le])
+AS_IF([test $host_cpu = powerpc64le], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DARN],1,[Enable DARN])],[])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([RNDR], [test $target_cpu = aarch64])
-AS_IF([test $target_cpu = aarch64], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RNDR],1,[Enable RNDR])],[])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([RNDR], [test $host_cpu = aarch64])
+AS_IF([test $host_cpu = aarch64], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RNDR],1,[Enable RNDR])],[])
AM_CONDITIONAL([JITTER], [false])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(jitterentropy,
--
2.26.3

69
0004-Fix-logic-in-ossl_aes_random_key.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 73e81dc78ddb6f1bc0d8750c1a9e19e6cc123d48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 09:16:25 +0200
Subject: Fix logic in ossl_aes_random_key()
- Using sizeof is correct for arr[], but is not correct for *ptr. read() here
makes a 8-bytes read (on 64-bit arch). It should read AES_BLOCK bytes instead,
as callers of ossl_aes_random_key() imply.
Covscan emits the following warning:
Error: SIZEOF_MISMATCH (CWE-398): [#def1]
rng-tools-6.12/ossl_helpers.c:51: suspicious_sizeof: Passing argument "key" of
type "unsigned char *" and argument "8UL /* sizeof (key) */" to function "read"
is suspicious.
51|-> int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
- According to the following warning, mark r as not used explicitly:
Error: CLANG_WARNING: [#def2]
rng-tools-6.12/ossl_helpers.c:51:7: warning[deadcode.DeadStores]: Value stored
to 'r' during its initialization is never read
51|-> int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
- Add volatile to stack_junk to avoid possible compiler optimization. This does
not silence "Uninitialized variable: stack_junk" covscan warning.
- Remove a check for pepper == NULL where it is not needed.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
ossl_helpers.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ossl_helpers.c b/ossl_helpers.c
index c3c1fbb..9569b74 100644
--- a/ossl_helpers.c
+++ b/ossl_helpers.c
@@ -42,22 +42,23 @@ void ossl_aes_random_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *pepper)
0x00,0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,
0x80,0x90,0xa0,0xb0,0xc0,0xd0,0xe0,0xf0
}; /* AES data reduction key */
- unsigned char stack_junk[AES_BLOCK];
+ volatile unsigned char stack_junk[AES_BLOCK];
int fd, i;
/* Try getting some randomness from the kernel */
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
- int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
+ int r __attribute__((unused));
+ r = read(fd, key, AES_BLOCK);
close(fd);
}
/* Mix in our default key */
- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK; i++)
key[i] ^= default_key[i];
/* Mix in stack junk */
- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK; i++)
key[i] ^= stack_junk[i];
/* Spice it up if we can */
--
2.26.3

44
0005-Fix-a-read-returning-zero-case-in-init_entropy_sourc.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 8659477ea65b1617332efee6da4c533137870577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 09:00:42 +0200
Subject: Fix a read() returning zero case in init_entropy_source()
Covscan warns about this with:
Error: CHECKED_RETURN (CWE-252): [#def3]
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_entsource.c:185: check_return: "read(int, void *,
size_t)" returns the number of bytes read, but it is ignored.
185|-> if (read(rngavail_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
Add a check for a zero return. While this should not happen, lets just
handle the case, also to silence covscan.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
rngd_entsource.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rngd_entsource.c b/rngd_entsource.c
index f54ee40..e5b7d43 100644
--- a/rngd_entsource.c
+++ b/rngd_entsource.c
@@ -182,13 +182,14 @@ int init_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
return 1;
}
- if (read(rngavail_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
+ int ret = read(rngavail_fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ret < 0) {
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_DEBUG, "Error reading sysfs file: %s\n", RNG_AVAIL);
close(rngavail_fd);
return 1;
}
- if (strncmp(buf, "\n", 1) == 0) {
+ if (ret == 0 || strncmp(buf, "\n", 1) == 0) {
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_DEBUG, "No available rng device\n");
close(rngavail_fd);
return 1;
--
2.26.3

78
0006-Fix-minor-possibilities-of-using-a-NULL-pointer.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From e4a94ad5d4ea8e5663f1e5d71669317b16105945 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 13:11:19 +0200
Subject: Fix minor possibilities of using a NULL pointer
Fix the following covscan warnings by performing a check for a NULL:
1) Add a check for NULL to message_entsrc macro:
Error: GCC_ANALYZER_WARNING (CWE-688):
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_rdrand.c: scope_hint: In function 'init_drng_entropy_source'
rng-tools-6.12/rngd.h:186:9: warning[-Wanalyzer-possible-null-argument]: use of
possibly-NULL '____buf' where non-null expected
/usr/include/stdio.h:334:12: note: argument 1 of 'sprintf' must be non-null
184| size_t ____neededmsg = snprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ##args) + 1; \
185| char *____buf = malloc(____neededpfx + ____neededmsg); \
186|-> sprintf(____buf, "[%-6s]: " fmt, src->rng_sname, ##args); \
2) Move memset() in xread_tpm() to a proper place:
Error: NULL_RETURNS (CWE-476): [#def3]
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_entsource.c:96: returned_null: "malloc" returns "NULL"
(checked 89 out of 95 times).
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_entsource.c:96: var_assigned: Assigning: "temp_buf" =
"NULL" return value from "malloc".
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_entsource.c:97: dereference: Dereferencing a pointer
that might be "NULL" "temp_buf" when calling "memset".
96| temp_buf = (unsigned char *) malloc(size + TPM_GET_RNG_OVERHEAD);
97|-> memset(temp_buf, 0, (size+TPM_GET_RNG_OVERHEAD));
98| if (temp_buf == NULL) {
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
rngd.h | 8 +++++---
rngd_entsource.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rngd.h b/rngd.h
index 6208b95..7d65f3c 100644
--- a/rngd.h
+++ b/rngd.h
@@ -184,9 +184,11 @@ extern bool quiet;
size_t ____neededpfx = snprintf(NULL, 0, "[%-6s]: ", src->rng_sname); \
size_t ____neededmsg = snprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ##args) + 1; \
char *____buf = malloc(____neededpfx + ____neededmsg); \
- sprintf(____buf, "[%-6s]: " fmt, src->rng_sname, ##args); \
- message(priority, "%s", ____buf); \
- free(____buf); \
+ if (____buf) { \
+ sprintf(____buf, "[%-6s]: " fmt, src->rng_sname, ##args); \
+ message(priority, "%s", ____buf); \
+ free(____buf); \
+ } \
} while (0)
extern bool do_reseed;
diff --git a/rngd_entsource.c b/rngd_entsource.c
index e5b7d43..b7ebd15 100644
--- a/rngd_entsource.c
+++ b/rngd_entsource.c
@@ -94,12 +94,13 @@ int xread_tpm(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
}
temp_buf = (unsigned char *) malloc(size + TPM_GET_RNG_OVERHEAD);
- memset(temp_buf, 0, (size+TPM_GET_RNG_OVERHEAD));
if (temp_buf == NULL) {
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_ERR|LOG_INFO,"No memory for TPM buffer\n");
close(ent_src->rng_fd);
return -1;
}
+ memset(temp_buf, 0, (size+TPM_GET_RNG_OVERHEAD));
+
/* 32 bits has been reserved for random byte size */
rng_cmd[13] = (unsigned char)(size & 0xFF);
rng_cmd[12] = (unsigned char)((size >> 8) & 0xFF);
--
2.26.3

185
0007-Small-bug-and-warning-fixes-per-covscan-report.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
From 2d244c6b5aea8f1a8e70307540d9d95b8111a242 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 14:04:27 +0200
Subject: Small bug and warning fixes per covscan report
- Fix a strncpy() bug.
- Remove unused variables.
- A small formatting fix.
- Fix signedness warnings.
- Add parenthesis to definitions of CHUNK_SIZE.
- Adjust default_watermark() so wm is set to a default value in all cases.
Also add logging the same way it was done in init_kernel_rng().
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
rngd_darn.c | 4 ++--
rngd_jitter.c | 3 +--
rngd_linux.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
rngd_rdrand.c | 2 --
rngd_rndr.c | 2 +-
rngd_rtlsdr.c | 6 +++---
stats.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rngd_darn.c b/rngd_darn.c
index bc8edec..5254195 100644
--- a/rngd_darn.c
+++ b/rngd_darn.c
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ static uint64_t get_darn();
static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src, bool allow_reinit);
static size_t copy_avail_rand_to_buf(unsigned char *buf, size_t size, size_t copied);
-#define CHUNK_SIZE AES_BLOCK * 8
+#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8)
#define RDRAND_ROUNDS 512 /* 512:1 data reduction */
-#define THRESH_BITS 14
+#define THRESH_BITS 14
/* ossl AES context */
static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
diff --git a/rngd_jitter.c b/rngd_jitter.c
index b68c791..7403c02 100644
--- a/rngd_jitter.c
+++ b/rngd_jitter.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int pipefds[2];
unsigned char *aes_buf;
-static char key[AES_BLOCK];
+static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(128)));
static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
@@ -322,7 +322,6 @@ int validate_jitter_options(struct rng *ent_src)
int delay = ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_RETRY_DELAY].int_val;
int rcount = ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_RETRY_COUNT].int_val;
int soft_timer = ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_FORCE_INT_TIMER].int_val;
- int num_threads = ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_THREADS].int_val;
/* Need at least one thread to do this work */
if (!threads) {
diff --git a/rngd_linux.c b/rngd_linux.c
index cf4fcdf..c52c62d 100644
--- a/rngd_linux.c
+++ b/rngd_linux.c
@@ -56,22 +56,35 @@ extern int kent_pool_size;
/*
* Get the default watermark
*/
+
+#define DEFAULT_WATERMARK_GUESS 4096
+
int default_watermark(void)
{
FILE *f;
- unsigned int wm; /* Default guess */
+ unsigned int wm;
f = fopen("/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize", "r");
- if (!f)
+ if (!f) {
+ wm = DEFAULT_WATERMARK_GUESS;
+ message(LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "can't open /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
goto err;
- /*
- * Default to 4096 if fscanf fails
- */
- if(fscanf(f,"%u", &wm) < 1)
- wm = 4096;
+ }
+
+ /* Use DEFAULT_WATERMARK_GUESS if fscanf fails */
+ if(fscanf(f,"%u", &wm) < 1) {
+ wm = DEFAULT_WATERMARK_GUESS;
+ message(LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "can't read /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+err:
kent_pool_size = wm;
wm = wm*3/4;
-err:
+ message(LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "kernel entropy pool size: %d pool watermark: %d",
+ kent_pool_size, wm);
+
if (f)
fclose(f);
return wm;
@@ -153,7 +166,7 @@ int random_add_entropy(void *buf, size_t size)
} else
write(random_fd, buf, size);
- return ent->ent_count;
+ return ent->ent_count;
}
diff --git a/rngd_rdrand.c b/rngd_rdrand.c
index cba27a9..caa9d05 100644
--- a/rngd_rdrand.c
+++ b/rngd_rdrand.c
@@ -243,8 +243,6 @@ int init_drng_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
const uint32_t features_ebx7_rdseed = 1 << 18;
uint32_t max_cpuid_leaf;
unsigned char xkey[AES_BLOCK]; /* Material to XOR into the key */
- int fd;
- int i;
if (!x86_has_cpuid())
return 1; /* No CPUID instruction */
diff --git a/rngd_rndr.c b/rngd_rndr.c
index 176ce90..79bf2ce 100644
--- a/rngd_rndr.c
+++ b/rngd_rndr.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char iv_buf[AES_BLOCK];
-#define CHUNK_SIZE AES_BLOCK * 8
+#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8)
static unsigned char aes_buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
static size_t aes_buf_pos;
#define REKEY_BITS 8
diff --git a/rngd_rtlsdr.c b/rngd_rtlsdr.c
index 949c8b0..5371905 100644
--- a/rngd_rtlsdr.c
+++ b/rngd_rtlsdr.c
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@
#include "rngd.h"
#include "ossl_helpers.h"
-#define RAW_BUF_SZ 4096
+#define RAW_BUF_SZ 4096
-#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
+#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
static rtlsdr_dev_t *radio = NULL;
-static char raw_buffera[RAW_BUF_SZ];
+static unsigned char raw_buffera[RAW_BUF_SZ];
static int freq_min;
static int freq_max;
static int sample_min;
diff --git a/stats.c b/stats.c
index 5c4036a..a172a35 100644
--- a/stats.c
+++ b/stats.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void scale_mult_unit(char *unit, int unitsize,
if (mult)
snprintf(unit, unitsize, "%ci%s", multchar[mult-1], baseunit);
else
- strncpy(unit, baseunit, unitsize);
+ strncpy(unit, baseunit, unitsize-1);
}
/* Computes elapsed time in microseconds */
--
2.26.3

54
0008-Fix-a-minor-memory-leak-in-rngd_jitter.c.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From 05505f04b9146e3f1225c182d3fdfc2fb51a633f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 09:35:21 +0200
Subject: Fix a minor memory leak in rngd_jitter.c
While a leak is short-lived until a process memory is freed, fix it anyway.
Error: GCC_ANALYZER_WARNING (CWE-401):
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c:396:66: warning[-Wanalyzer-malloc-leak]:
leak of 'aes_buf'
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c:35: included_from: Included from here.
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c:394:17: note: in expansion of macro 'message_entsrc'
Error: GCC_ANALYZER_WARNING (CWE-401): [#def4]
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c: scope_hint: In function 'init_jitter_entropy_source'
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c:396:66: warning[-Wanalyzer-malloc-leak]: leak of 'aes_buf'
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_jitter.c:394:17: note: in expansion of macro 'message_entsrc'
394| message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_CONS|LOG_INFO, "Initializing AES buffer\n");
395| aes_buf = malloc(tdata[0].buf_sz);
396|-> ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_USE_AES].int_val = 0;
397| if (xread_jitter(key, AES_BLOCK, ent_src)) {
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
rngd_jitter.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rngd_jitter.c b/rngd_jitter.c
index 7403c02..ea29436 100644
--- a/rngd_jitter.c
+++ b/rngd_jitter.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static struct thread_data *tdata;
static pthread_t *threads;
int pipefds[2];
-unsigned char *aes_buf;
+unsigned char *aes_buf = NULL;
static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(128)));
@@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ void close_jitter_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
close(pipefds[0]);
free(tdata);
free(threads);
+ free(aes_buf);
if (ossl_ctx) {
ossl_aes_exit(ossl_ctx);
ossl_ctx = NULL;
}
}
-
--
2.26.3

233
0009-Brush-up-rngd_nistbeacon.c.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
From c87d4f8616c42a921cec37e8758e71f5651c727f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 14:37:28 +0200
Subject: Brush up rngd_nistbeacon.c
1) Fix a possile NULL dereference in get_nist_record() and update_active_cert().
It may happen in an unlikely case when curl_easy_setopt(CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION)
fails but curl_easy_perform() succeeds.
Also adjust error handling and logging. This way a libcurl instance is properly
cleaned up in all cases.
This fixes code for the following warnings. NULL pointer warning still stays,
as covscan does not recognize parse_nist_json_block() as a callback.
Error: CHECKED_RETURN (CWE-252): [#def13]
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_nistbeacon.c:582: check_return: Calling "curl_easy_setopt(curl,
_curl_opt, certurl)" without checking return value. This library function may fail
and return an error code.
581| certurl = strcat(certurl, block.certificateIdString);
582|-> curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, certurl);
Error: CLANG_WARNING: [#def19]
rng-tools-6.12/rngd_nistbeacon.c:622:32: warning[core.NonNullParamChecker]: Null
pointer passed to 1st parameter expecting 'nonnull'
622|-> activeCertId = strndup(block.certificateId, be32toh(block.certificateIdLen));
2) Remove unused variables from parse_nist_json_block().
3) Fix a signedness warning for nist_rand_buf and block.signatureValue.
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
rngd_nistbeacon.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rngd_nistbeacon.c b/rngd_nistbeacon.c
index 5d51d44..51e3458 100644
--- a/rngd_nistbeacon.c
+++ b/rngd_nistbeacon.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int get_nist_record(struct rng *ent_src);
static size_t nist_buf_avail = 0;
static size_t nist_buf_ptr = 0;
-static char nist_rand_buf[NIST_BUF_SIZE];
+static unsigned char nist_rand_buf[NIST_BUF_SIZE];
static char errbuf[120];
int cfp;
@@ -275,23 +275,18 @@ static void get_json_byte_array(json_t *parent, char *key, char **val, uint32_t
}
/*
- * Note, I'm making the assumption that the entire xml block gets returned
+ * Note, I'm making the assumption that the entire xml block gets returned
* in a single call here, which I should fix
*/
static size_t parse_nist_json_block(char *ptr, size_t size, size_t nemb, void *userdata)
{
size_t idx;
json_t *jidx;
- xmlTextReaderPtr reader;
- int ret = 1;
- const char *name;
- size_t realsize = size * nemb;
- char *xml = (char *)ptr;
- json_t *json, *pulse, *values, *obj;
+ size_t realsize = size * nemb;
+ json_t *json, *pulse, *obj;
json_error_t jsonerror;
struct rng *ent_src = userdata;
-
json = json_loads(ptr, size, &jsonerror);
if (!json) {
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "Unparseable JSON\n");
@@ -532,7 +527,8 @@ static int validate_nist_block(struct rng *ent_src)
goto out;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mdctx, block.signatureValue, be32toh(block.signatureValueLen), pubkey) < 1) {
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mdctx, (unsigned char *)block.signatureValue,
+ be32toh(block.signatureValueLen), pubkey) < 1) {
unsigned long err;
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON| LOG_ERR, "Unable to validate signature on message\n");
while( (err = ERR_get_error()) != 0 ) {
@@ -566,7 +562,8 @@ static size_t copy_nist_certificate(char *ptr, size_t size, size_t nemb, void *u
return size * nemb;
}
-static void update_active_cert() {
+static void update_active_cert(struct rng *ent_src)
+{
CURL *curl;
CURLcode res;
char *certurl;
@@ -574,24 +571,46 @@ static void update_active_cert() {
free(activeCert);
activeCert = NULL;
-
+
curl = curl_easy_init();
- if (!curl)
+ if (!curl) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "update_active_cert(): curl_easy_init() failed\n");
return;
+ }
certurl = alloca(urlsize);
- if (!certurl)
- return;
+ if (!certurl) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "update_active_cert(): alloca() failed\n");
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
strcpy(certurl, NIST_CERT_BASE_URL);
certurl = strcat(certurl, block.certificateIdString);
- curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, certurl);
- curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, copy_nist_certificate);
+
+ res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, certurl);
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "update_active_cert(): curl_easy_setopt(URL) failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
+ res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, copy_nist_certificate);
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "update_active_cert(): curl_easy_setopt(WRITEFUNC) failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
- if (res != CURLE_OK) {
- fprintf(stderr, "curl_easy_perform() failed in cert update: %s\n",
- curl_easy_strerror(res));
- }
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "update_active_cert(): curl_easy_perform() failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ }
+
+out_curl:
curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
return;
}
@@ -603,42 +622,62 @@ static int get_nist_record(struct rng *ent_src)
int rc = 1;
curl = curl_easy_init();
-
- if (!curl)
+ if (!curl) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "get_nist_record(): curl_easy_init() failed\n");
goto out;
+ }
- curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, NIST_RECORD_URL);
- curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, parse_nist_json_block);
- curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, ent_src);
+ res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, NIST_RECORD_URL);
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "get_nist_record(): curl_easy_setopt(URL) failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
+ res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, parse_nist_json_block);
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "get_nist_record(): curl_easy_setopt(WRITEFUNC) failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
+ res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, ent_src);
+ if (res != CURLE_OK) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "get_nist_record(): curl_easy_setopt(WRITEDATA) failed: %s\n",
+ curl_easy_strerror(res));
+ goto out_curl;
+ }
+ /* parse_nist_json_block() runs here as a callback */
res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
if (res != CURLE_OK) {
- fprintf(stderr, "curl_easy_perform() failed: %s\n",
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR,
+ "get_nist_record(): curl_easy_perform() failed: %s\n",
curl_easy_strerror(res));
- goto out;
+ goto out_curl;
}
- curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
-
lastpulse = block.pulseIndex;
if (!activeCertId || memcmp(activeCertId, block.certificateId, be32toh(block.certificateIdLen))) {
free(activeCertId);
activeCertId = strndup(block.certificateId, be32toh(block.certificateIdLen));
- update_active_cert();
+ update_active_cert(ent_src);
}
if (validate_nist_block(ent_src)) {
- message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "Received block failed validation\n");
- goto out;
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_ERR, "Received block failed validation\n");
+ goto out_curl;
}
-
rc = 0;
+out_curl:
+ curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
out:
return rc;
-
}
/*
--
2.26.3

33
rng-tools-1-Improve-rngd-console-output-readability.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From d989f5690037eb2162eeea7352a7f8eeecc7989b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikolai Kostrigin <nickel@altlinux.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 15:11:42 +0300
Subject: Improve rngd console output readability
Prevent messing "None" status message with next section header:
"[...]
Entropy sources that are available but disabled
NoneAvailable and enabled entropy sources:
4: NIST Network Entropy Beacon (nist)
[...]"
Signed-off-by: Nikolai Kostrigin <nickel@altlinux.org>
---
rngd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rngd.c b/rngd.c
index c770259..7d31e68 100644
--- a/rngd.c
+++ b/rngd.c
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
entropy_sources[i].failed_init = false;
}
if (!found)
- message(LOG_CONS|LOG_INFO, "None");
+ message(LOG_CONS|LOG_INFO, "None\n");
msg_squash = true;
} else
message(LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO, "Initializing available sources\n");
--
2.26.3

26
rng-tools-2-try-to-build-with-rtlsdr-by-default.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
From e00e2155ad04f8b3a964fd482bddd8c27b5b9999 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 23:50:47 +0200
Subject: try to build with rtlsdr by default
Fixes #125
---
configure.ac | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0e04cb8..c4f15d4 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([rtlsdr],
AS_HELP_STRING([--without-rtlsdr],
[Disable rtlsdr support. ]),
[],
- [with_rtlsdr=no]
+ [with_rtlsdr=check]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([libargp],
--
2.26.3

864
rng-tools-3-Create-helpers-for-openssl-AES-use.patch
View File

@ -1,864 +0,0 @@
From 0f0580f3ae98fecf41de4a0346f5e11f390418b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@amazon.com>
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 13:46:42 +1000
Subject: Create helpers for openssl AES use
This moves the openssl code that is duplicated in several sources
to some helpers. This also fixes the use of "strlen" on raw random
data which probably didn't do what someone thought it did ...
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@amazon.com>
---
Makefile.am | 2 +-
ossl_helpers.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
ossl_helpers.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++
rngd_darn.c | 90 +++++-----------------------------
rngd_jitter.c | 73 +++------------------------
rngd_nistbeacon.c | 84 ++++++-------------------------
rngd_rdrand.c | 93 +++++------------------------------
rngd_rtlsdr.c | 54 +++++++-------------
8 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ossl_helpers.c
create mode 100644 ossl_helpers.h
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index fbeff32..6f938bc 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ man_MANS = rngd.8 rngtest.1
noinst_LIBRARIES = librngd.a
rngd_SOURCES = rngd.h rngd.c rngd_entsource.h rngd_entsource.c \
- rngd_linux.h rngd_linux.c util.c
+ rngd_linux.h rngd_linux.c util.c ossl_helpers.c
if NISTBEACON
rngd_SOURCES += rngd_nistbeacon.c
diff --git a/ossl_helpers.c b/ossl_helpers.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3c1fbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ossl_helpers.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * ossl_helpers.c -- Helper wrappers around openssl functions
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Suite 500, Boston, MA 02110-1335 USA
+ */
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
+
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+struct ossl_aes_ctx
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c;
+ const unsigned char *key;
+ const unsigned char *iv;
+};
+
+void ossl_aes_random_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *pepper)
+{
+ static unsigned char default_key[AES_BLOCK] = {
+ 0x00,0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,
+ 0x80,0x90,0xa0,0xb0,0xc0,0xd0,0xe0,0xf0
+ }; /* AES data reduction key */
+ unsigned char stack_junk[AES_BLOCK];
+ int fd, i;
+
+ /* Try getting some randomness from the kernel */
+ fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ int r = read(fd, key, sizeof key);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Mix in our default key */
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
+ key[i] ^= default_key[i];
+
+ /* Mix in stack junk */
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
+ key[i] ^= stack_junk[i];
+
+ /* Spice it up if we can */
+ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK && pepper; i++)
+ key[i] ^= pepper[i];
+}
+
+
+struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_aes_init(const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx;
+
+ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (!ctx)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx->c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx->c) {
+ free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->key = key;
+ ctx->iv = iv;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void ossl_aes_exit(struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->c);
+ free(ctx);
+}
+
+int ossl_aes_encrypt(struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx,
+ unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len,
+ unsigned char *ciphertext)
+{
+ int len, ciphertext_len;
+
+ if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->c, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ctx->key, ctx->iv))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
+ * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
+ */
+ if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx->c, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ ciphertext_len = len;
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
+ * this stage.
+ */
+ if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx->c, ciphertext + len, &len))
+ return 0;
+ ciphertext_len += len;
+
+ return ciphertext_len;
+}
+
diff --git a/ossl_helpers.h b/ossl_helpers.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e21e331
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ossl_helpers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * ossl_helpers.h -- Helper wrappers around openssl functions
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Suite 500, Boston, MA 02110-1335 USA
+ */
+
+#ifndef OSSL_HELPERS__H
+#define OSSL_HELPERS__H
+
+#define AES_BLOCK 16
+
+struct ossl_aes_ctx;
+
+extern int ossl_aes_encrypt(struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx,
+ unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len,
+ unsigned char *ciphertext);
+
+extern struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_aes_init(const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv);
+extern void ossl_aes_exit(struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx);
+extern void ossl_aes_random_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *pepper);
+
+static inline int ossl_aes_mangle(struct ossl_aes_ctx *ctx, unsigned char *data,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ int ciphertext_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffer for ciphertext. Ensure the buffer is long enough for the
+ * ciphertext which may be longer than the plaintext, depending on the
+ * algorithm and mode.
+ *
+ * For AES, one extra AES block should be sufficient.
+ */
+ unsigned char ciphertext[size + AES_BLOCK];
+
+ /* Encrypt the plaintext */
+ ciphertext_len = ossl_aes_encrypt(ctx, data, size, ciphertext);
+ if (!ciphertext_len)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(data, ciphertext, size);
+ return ciphertext_len;
+}
+
+#endif /* OSSL_HELPERS__H */
diff --git a/rngd_darn.c b/rngd_darn.c
index f6b9cd4..bc8edec 100644
--- a/rngd_darn.c
+++ b/rngd_darn.c
@@ -29,15 +29,12 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <sys/auxv.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
#include "rngd.h"
#include "fips.h"
#include "exits.h"
#include "rngd_entsource.h"
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
#define min(x,y) ({ \
typeof(x) _x = (x); \
@@ -49,18 +46,13 @@ static uint64_t get_darn();
static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src, bool allow_reinit);
static size_t copy_avail_rand_to_buf(unsigned char *buf, size_t size, size_t copied);
-#define AES_BLOCK 16
#define CHUNK_SIZE AES_BLOCK * 8
#define RDRAND_ROUNDS 512 /* 512:1 data reduction */
-
-static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK] = {
- 0x00,0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,
- 0x80,0x90,0xa0,0xb0,0xc0,0xd0,0xe0,0xf0
-}; /* AES data reduction key */
-
#define THRESH_BITS 14
-static EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+/* ossl AES context */
+static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
+static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char iv_buf[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char darn_rand_buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
@@ -72,15 +64,10 @@ static size_t rand_bytes_served = 0;
static int init_openssl(struct rng *ent_src)
{
- unsigned char xkey[AES_BLOCK];
- int i;
uint64_t darn_val;
+ int i;
- /*
- * Use stack junk to create a key, shuffle it a bit
- */
- for (i=0; i< sizeof(key); i++)
- key[i] ^= xkey[i];
+ ossl_aes_random_key(key, NULL);
darn_val = get_darn();
if (darn_val == ULONG_MAX)
@@ -92,13 +79,11 @@ static int init_openssl(struct rng *ent_src)
return 1;
memcpy(&iv_buf[8], &darn_val, sizeof(uint64_t));
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- /* Clean up */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
- return 1;
-
+ if (ossl_ctx != NULL)
+ ossl_aes_exit(ossl_ctx);
+ ossl_ctx = ossl_aes_init(key, iv_buf);
+ if (!ossl_ctx)
+ return 1;
rand_bytes_served = 0;
if (refill_rand(ent_src, false))
return 1;
@@ -109,56 +94,6 @@ static int init_openssl(struct rng *ent_src)
return 0;
}
-static int osslencrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key,
- unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext)
-{
- int len;
-
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
- return 0;
- /*
- * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
- * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
- return 0;
-
- ciphertext_len = len;
-
- /*
- * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
- * this stage.
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len))
- return 0;
- ciphertext_len += len;
-
- return ciphertext_len;
-}
-
-static inline int openssl_mangle(unsigned char *tmp, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
-{
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /*
- * Buffer for ciphertext. Ensure the buffer is long enough for the
- * ciphertext which may be longer than the plaintext, depending on the
- * algorithm and mode.
- */
- unsigned char ciphertext[CHUNK_SIZE * RDRAND_ROUNDS];
-
- /* Encrypt the plaintext */
- ciphertext_len = osslencrypt (tmp, size, key, iv_buf,
- ciphertext);
- if (!ciphertext_len)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(tmp, ciphertext, size);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src, bool allow_reinit)
{
int i;
@@ -172,9 +107,8 @@ static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src, bool allow_reinit)
return 1;
}
- if (openssl_mangle(darn_rand_buf, CHUNK_SIZE, ent_src)) {
+ if (ossl_aes_mangle(ossl_ctx, darn_rand_buf, CHUNK_SIZE) < 0)
return 1;
- }
} else {
uint64_t *ptr = (uint64_t *)darn_rand_buf;
for (i = 0; i < CHUNK_SIZE/sizeof(uint64_t); i++) {
diff --git a/rngd_jitter.c b/rngd_jitter.c
index c803f0d..133c7e4 100644
--- a/rngd_jitter.c
+++ b/rngd_jitter.c
@@ -27,9 +27,6 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "rng-tools-config.h"
@@ -39,9 +36,9 @@
#include "fips.h"
#include "exits.h"
#include "rngd_entsource.h"
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
/* Read data from the drng in chunks of 128 bytes for AES scrambling */
-#define AES_BLOCK 16
#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
#define RDRAND_ROUNDS 512 /* 512:1 data reduction */
@@ -71,65 +68,7 @@ unsigned char *aes_buf;
static char key[AES_BLOCK];
static unsigned char iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(128)));
-
-static int osslencrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key,
- unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-
- int len;
-
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /* Create and initialise the context */
- if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
- return 0;
-
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
- return 0;
- /*
- * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
- * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
- return 0;
-
- ciphertext_len = len;
-
- /*
- * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
- * this stage.
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len))
- return 0;
- ciphertext_len += len;
-
- /* Clean up */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return ciphertext_len;
-}
-
-static inline int openssl_mangle(unsigned char *tmp, struct rng *ent_src)
-{
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /*
- * Buffer for ciphertext. Ensure the buffer is long enough for the
- * ciphertext which may be longer than the plaintext, depending on the
- * algorithm and mode.
- */
- unsigned char ciphertext[CHUNK_SIZE * RDRAND_ROUNDS];
-
- /* Encrypt the plaintext */
- ciphertext_len = osslencrypt (tmp, strlen(tmp), key, iv_buf,
- ciphertext);
- if (!ciphertext_len)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(tmp, ciphertext, strlen(tmp));
- return 0;
-}
+static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
int xread_jitter(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
{
@@ -152,7 +91,7 @@ try_again:
while(need) {
request = (need >= current->buf_sz) ? current->buf_sz : need;
memcpy(buf, &aes_buf[total], request);
- openssl_mangle(aes_buf, ent_src);
+ ossl_aes_mangle(ossl_ctx, aes_buf, request);
need -= request;
total += request;
}
@@ -462,6 +401,7 @@ int init_jitter_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
} else {
/* re-enable AES */
ent_src->rng_options[JITTER_OPT_USE_AES].int_val = 1;
+ ossl_ctx = ossl_aes_init(key, iv_buf);
}
xread_jitter(aes_buf, tdata[0].buf_sz, ent_src);
} else {
@@ -511,6 +451,9 @@ void close_jitter_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
close(pipefds[0]);
free(tdata);
free(threads);
- return;
+ if (ossl_ctx) {
+ ossl_aes_exit(ossl_ctx);
+ ossl_ctx = NULL;
+ }
}
diff --git a/rngd_nistbeacon.c b/rngd_nistbeacon.c
index 5195d33..5d51d44 100644
--- a/rngd_nistbeacon.c
+++ b/rngd_nistbeacon.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include "fips.h"
#include "exits.h"
#include "rngd_entsource.h"
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
#define NIST_RECORD_URL "https://beacon.nist.gov/beacon/2.0/pulse/last"
#define NIST_CERT_BASE_URL "https://beacon.nist.gov/beacon/2.0/certificate/"
@@ -133,75 +134,11 @@ X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
uint64_t lastpulse = 0;
-#define AES_BLOCK 16
#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
#define RDRAND_ROUNDS 512 /* 512:1 data reduction */
-static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK] = {0,};
-
-static int osslencrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key,
- unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-
- int len;
-
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /* Create and initialise the context */
- if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
- return 0;
-
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
- return 0;
- /*
- * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
- * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
- return 0;
-
- ciphertext_len = len;
-
- /*
- * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
- * this stage.
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len))
- return 0;
- ciphertext_len += len;
-
- /* Clean up */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return ciphertext_len;
-}
-
-static inline int openssl_mangle(unsigned char *tmp, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
-{
- unsigned char xkey[AES_BLOCK]; /* Material to XOR into the key */
- unsigned char iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
- int i;
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /*
- * Buffer for ciphertext. Ensure the buffer is long enough for the
- * ciphertext which may be longer than the plaintext, depending on the
- * algorithm and mode.
- */
- unsigned char ciphertext[CHUNK_SIZE * RDRAND_ROUNDS];
-
- for(i=0; i < AES_BLOCK; i++)
- key[i] = key[i] ^ xkey[i];
-
- /* Encrypt the plaintext */
- ciphertext_len = osslencrypt (tmp, size, key, iv_buf,
- ciphertext);
- if (!ciphertext_len)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(tmp, ciphertext, size);
- return 0;
-}
+static unsigned char mangle_key[AES_BLOCK];
+static unsigned char mangle_iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
+static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src)
{
@@ -220,7 +157,7 @@ static int refill_rand(struct rng *ent_src)
}
if (block.pulseIndex == lastpulse) {
if (ent_src->rng_options[NIST_OPT_USE_AES].int_val) {
- if (openssl_mangle(nist_rand_buf, NIST_BUF_SIZE, ent_src) != 0) {
+ if (ossl_aes_mangle(ossl_ctx, nist_rand_buf, NIST_BUF_SIZE) < 0) {
message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON|LOG_DEBUG, "Failed mangle\n");
return 1;
}
@@ -712,6 +649,17 @@ int init_nist_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
int rc;
memset(&block, 0, sizeof (struct nist_data_block));
+ if (ent_src->rng_options[NIST_OPT_USE_AES].int_val) {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+
+ ossl_aes_random_key(mangle_key, NULL);
+ for (i = 0, p = mangle_iv_buf; i < 8; i++, p += AES_BLOCK)
+ ossl_aes_random_key(p, NULL);
+
+ ossl_ctx = ossl_aes_init(mangle_key, mangle_iv_buf);
+ }
+
rc = refill_rand(ent_src);
if (!rc) {
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_WARNING, "WARNING: NIST Randomness beacon "
diff --git a/rngd_rdrand.c b/rngd_rdrand.c
index b1f597c..cba27a9 100644
--- a/rngd_rdrand.c
+++ b/rngd_rdrand.c
@@ -37,24 +37,22 @@
#include <syslog.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stddef.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "rngd.h"
#include "fips.h"
#include "exits.h"
#include "rngd_entsource.h"
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
/* Read data from the drng in chunks of 128 bytes for AES scrambling */
-#define AES_BLOCK 16
#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
#define RDRAND_ROUNDS 512 /* 512:1 data reduction */
-static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK] = {
- 0x00,0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,
- 0x80,0x90,0xa0,0xb0,0xc0,0xd0,0xe0,0xf0
-}; /* AES data reduction key */
+/* AES data reduction key */
+static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
+
+/* ossl AES context */
+static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
/* Struct for CPUID return values */
struct cpuid {
@@ -142,65 +140,6 @@ static void cpuid(unsigned int leaf, unsigned int subleaf, struct cpuid *out)
static unsigned char iv_buf[CHUNK_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(128)));
static int have_aesni, have_rdseed;
-static int osslencrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key,
- unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-
- int len;
-
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /* Create and initialise the context */
- if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
- return 0;
-
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
- return 0;
- /*
- * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
- * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
- return 0;
-
- ciphertext_len = len;
-
- /*
- * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
- * this stage.
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len))
- return 0;
- ciphertext_len += len;
-
- /* Clean up */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return ciphertext_len;
-}
-
-static inline int openssl_mangle(unsigned char *tmp, struct rng *ent_src)
-{
- int ciphertext_len;
-
- /*
- * Buffer for ciphertext. Ensure the buffer is long enough for the
- * ciphertext which may be longer than the plaintext, depending on the
- * algorithm and mode.
- */
- unsigned char ciphertext[CHUNK_SIZE * RDRAND_ROUNDS];
-
- /* Encrypt the plaintext */
- ciphertext_len = osslencrypt (tmp, strlen(tmp), key, iv_buf,
- ciphertext);
- if (!ciphertext_len)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(tmp, ciphertext, strlen(tmp));
- return 0;
-}
-
int xread_drng_with_aes(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
{
static unsigned char rdrand_buf[CHUNK_SIZE * RDRAND_ROUNDS]
@@ -227,7 +166,7 @@ int xread_drng_with_aes(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
x86_aes_mangle(rdrand_buf, iv_buf);
data = iv_buf;
chunk = CHUNK_SIZE;
- } else if (!openssl_mangle(rdrand_buf, ent_src)) {
+ } else if (ossl_aes_mangle(ossl_ctx, rdrand_buf, AES_BLOCK) >= 0) {
data = rdrand_buf +
AES_BLOCK * (RDRAND_ROUNDS - 1);
chunk = AES_BLOCK;
@@ -288,9 +227,6 @@ int xread_drng(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
static int init_aesni(const void *key)
{
- if (!have_aesni)
- return 1;
-
x86_aes_expand_key(key);
return 0;
}
@@ -335,21 +271,16 @@ int init_drng_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
/* Randomize the AES data reduction key the best we can */
if (x86_rdrand_bytes(xkey, sizeof xkey) != sizeof xkey)
return 1;
-
- fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- read(fd, key, sizeof key);
- close(fd);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof key; i++)
- key[i] ^= xkey[i];
+ ossl_aes_random_key(key, xkey);
/* Initialize the IV buffer */
if (x86_rdrand_bytes(iv_buf, CHUNK_SIZE) != CHUNK_SIZE)
return 1;
- init_aesni(key);
+ if (have_aesni)
+ init_aesni(key);
+ else
+ ossl_ctx = ossl_aes_init(key, iv_buf);
if (have_rdseed)
message_entsrc(ent_src,LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO, "Enabling RDSEED rng support\n");
diff --git a/rngd_rtlsdr.c b/rngd_rtlsdr.c
index 73046cd..949c8b0 100644
--- a/rngd_rtlsdr.c
+++ b/rngd_rtlsdr.c
@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "rngd.h"
+#include "ossl_helpers.h"
#define RAW_BUF_SZ 4096
#define CHUNK_SIZE (AES_BLOCK*8) /* 8 parallel streams */
-#define AES_BLOCK 16
static rtlsdr_dev_t *radio = NULL;
static char raw_buffera[RAW_BUF_SZ];
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ static int sample_min;
static int sample_max;
static int gain = 200;
+/* AES data reduction key */
+static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
+static unsigned char iv[CHUNK_SIZE];
+static struct ossl_aes_ctx *ossl_ctx;
+
+
static int get_random_freq()
{
int range = freq_max - freq_min;
@@ -97,7 +103,13 @@ int init_rtlsdr_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON, "%d: %s %s\n", i, vendor, product);
}
- /*
+ ossl_ctx = ossl_aes_init(key, iv);
+ if (!ossl_ctx) {
+ message_entsrc(ent_src, LOG_DAEMON, "Failed to setup openssl\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Get our default sample rate and freq settings, as well as the devid
* to use
*/
@@ -144,51 +156,19 @@ void close_rtlsdr_entropy_source(struct rng *ent_src)
{
if (radio)
rtlsdr_close(radio);
- return;
+ if (ossl_ctx)
+ ossl_aes_exit(ossl_ctx);
}
static size_t condition_buffer(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t insize, size_t outsize)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- static unsigned char key[AES_BLOCK];
- unsigned char iv[CHUNK_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(128)));
- int len;
- size_t ciphertext_len = 0;
-
/*
* Setup our key and iv
*/
memcpy(key, in, AES_BLOCK);
memcpy(iv, &in[AES_BLOCK], CHUNK_SIZE);
- /* Create and initialise the context */
- if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
- return 0;
-
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
- goto out;
- /*
- * Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
- * EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &len, in, insize))
- goto out;
-
- ciphertext_len = len;
-
- /*
- * Finalise the encryption. Further ciphertext bytes may be written at
- * this stage.
- */
- if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, &len))
- return 0;
- ciphertext_len += len;
-
-out:
- /* Clean up */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return ciphertext_len;
+ return ossl_aes_encrypt(ossl_ctx, in, insize, out);
}
int xread_rtlsdr(void *buf, size_t size, struct rng *ent_src)
--
2.26.3

23
rng-tools.spec
View File

@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
Summary: Random number generator related utilities Summary: Random number generator related utilities
Name: rng-tools Name: rng-tools
Version: 6.12 Version: 6.13
Release: 5%{?dist} Release: 1%{?dist}
License: GPLv2+ License: GPLv2+
URL: https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools URL: https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools
Source0: https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools/archive/v%{version}/rng-tools-%{version}.tar.gz Source0: https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools/archive/v%{version}/rng-tools-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -37,11 +37,15 @@ BuildRequires: libp11-devel
Requires(post): systemd Requires(post): systemd
Requires(preun): systemd Requires(preun): systemd
Requires(postun): systemd Requires(postun): systemd
Provides: jitterentropy-rngd
Patch1: rng-tools-1-Improve-rngd-console-output-readability.patch Patch1: 0001-Use-AM_PROG_AR-over-AC_CHECK_TOOLS.patch
Patch2: rng-tools-2-try-to-build-with-rtlsdr-by-default.patch Patch2: 0003-AC_CANONICAL_TARGET-AC_CANONICAL_HOST.patch
Patch3: rng-tools-3-Create-helpers-for-openssl-AES-use.patch Patch3: 0004-Fix-logic-in-ossl_aes_random_key.patch
Patch4: 0005-Fix-a-read-returning-zero-case-in-init_entropy_sourc.patch
Patch5: 0006-Fix-minor-possibilities-of-using-a-NULL-pointer.patch
Patch6: 0007-Small-bug-and-warning-fixes-per-covscan-report.patch
Patch7: 0008-Fix-a-minor-memory-leak-in-rngd_jitter.c.patch
Patch8: 0009-Brush-up-rngd_nistbeacon.c.patch
%description %description
Hardware random number generation tools. Hardware random number generation tools.
@ -95,6 +99,11 @@ udevadm trigger --sysname-match=hw_random --settle
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_udevrulesdir}/60-hwrng.rules %attr(0644,root,root) %{_udevrulesdir}/60-hwrng.rules
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Jun 16 2021 Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> - 6.13-1
- Update the sources to 6.13
- Add important fixes from the upstream
- Remove Provides: jitterentropy-rngd as it was retired in f29.
* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 6.12-5 * Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 6.12-5
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0 - Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
Related: rhbz#1971065 Related: rhbz#1971065
@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ udevadm trigger --sysname-match=hw_random --settle
- update to latest upstream (#1598608) - update to latest upstream (#1598608)
* Thu May 10 2018 Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com> * Thu May 10 2018 Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
- Update to latest upstream - Update to latest upstream
* Thu Feb 15 2018 Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> - 6.1-4 * Thu Feb 15 2018 Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> - 6.1-4
- Drop all attempts to 'fix' #1490632, revert spec to same as 6.1-1 - Drop all attempts to 'fix' #1490632, revert spec to same as 6.1-1

2
sources
View File

@ -1 +1 @@
SHA512 (rng-tools-6.12.tar.gz) = 56dd334b65dcec1456f8dbdbee5d83590de27cb6ee1b7715828b5316a913557fd178e264139dc92a82e09635ca15b1eb5f6169bfb4412fbe1b06ea28a5064c64 SHA512 (rng-tools-6.13.tar.gz) = def5f2dcdd1771e8fe5af9476de866ff89a225065416672165af6019cbb166f874fae936b3705221aa47dc13ae99fa63d054d7d49b612f3151cd922a0a129490