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import redis-6.2.7-1.module+el8.7.0+15197+cc495aeb

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2022-11-08 01:31:09 -05:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 1b73a5a44c
commit a48937d889
11 changed files with 48 additions and 1317 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SOURCES/redis-6.0.9.tar.gz
SOURCES/redis-6.2.7.tar.gz
SOURCES/redis-doc-8d4bf9b.tar.gz

2
.redis.metadata
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
416ab41ac74be959ad4192462eecaa8ba9a6d3b7 SOURCES/redis-6.0.9.tar.gz
b01ef3f117c9815dea41bf2609e489a03c3a5ab1 SOURCES/redis-6.2.7.tar.gz
45ec7c3b4a034891252507febace7e25ee64b4d9 SOURCES/redis-doc-8d4bf9b.tar.gz

29
SOURCES/0002-install-redis-check-rdb-as-a-symlink-instead-of-dupl.patch
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@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 79ed52edf84676786e5817cddb8914c5925144c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Remi Collet <fedora@famillecollet.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 17:23:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] install redis-check-rdb as a symlink instead of
duplicating the binary
---
src/Makefile | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
index 2a68649..585c95b 100644
--- a/src/Makefile
+++ b/src/Makefile
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ install: all
$(REDIS_INSTALL) $(REDIS_SERVER_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)
$(REDIS_INSTALL) $(REDIS_BENCHMARK_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)
$(REDIS_INSTALL) $(REDIS_CLI_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)
- $(REDIS_INSTALL) $(REDIS_CHECK_RDB_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)
- $(REDIS_INSTALL) $(REDIS_CHECK_AOF_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)
@ln -sf $(REDIS_SERVER_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)/$(REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME)
+ @ln -sf $(REDIS_SERVER_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)/$(REDIS_CHECK_RDB_NAME)
+ @ln -sf $(REDIS_SERVER_NAME) $(INSTALL_BIN)/$(REDIS_CHECK_AOF_NAME)
uninstall:
rm -f $(INSTALL_BIN)/{$(REDIS_SERVER_NAME),$(REDIS_BENCHMARK_NAME),$(REDIS_CLI_NAME),$(REDIS_CHECK_RDB_NAME),$(REDIS_CHECK_AOF_NAME),$(REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME)}
--
2.24.1

27
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-26477.patch
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@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
From 394614a5f91d88380f480c4610926a865b5b0f16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 08:32:31 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-29477)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.
(cherry picked from commit f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9)
---
src/t_string.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c
index 4886f7e44388..5310a297db16 100644
--- a/src/t_string.c
+++ b/src/t_string.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
/* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the
* LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so
* we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */
- uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
+ uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
#define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))]
/* Start building the LCS table. */

140
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-32626.patch
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@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
From 666ed7facf4524bf6d19b11b20faa2cf93fdf591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "meir@redislabs.com" <meir@redislabs.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 2021 14:27:18 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid memory write on lua stack overflow
{CVE-2021-32626}
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When LUA call our C code, by default, the LUA stack has room for 20
elements. In most cases, this is more than enough but sometimes it's not
and the caller must verify the LUA stack size before he pushes elements.
On 3 places in the code, there was no verification of the LUA stack size.
On specific inputs this missing verification could have lead to invalid
memory write:
1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', one might return a nested reply that will
explode the LUA stack.
2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType', the Redis reply might be deep enough
   to explode the LUA stack (notice that currently there is no such
   command in Redis that returns such a nested reply, but modules might
   do it)
3. On 'ldbRedis', one might give a command with enough arguments to
   explode the LUA stack (all the arguments will be pushed to the LUA
   stack)
This commit is solving all those 3 issues by calling 'lua_checkstack' and
verify that there is enough room in the LUA stack to push elements. In
case 'lua_checkstack' returns an error (there is not enough room in the
LUA stack and it's not possible to increase the stack), we will do the
following:
1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', we will return an error to the user.
2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType' we will exit with panic (we assume this
scenario is rare because it can only happen with a module).
3. On 'ldbRedis', we return an error.
---
src/scripting.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/scripting.c b/src/scripting.c
index dea5f516561..afa6adb0c47 100644
--- a/src/scripting.c
+++ b/src/scripting.c
@@ -128,6 +128,16 @@ void sha1hex(char *digest, char *script, size_t len) {
*/
char *redisProtocolToLuaType(lua_State *lua, char* reply) {
+
+ if (!lua_checkstack(lua, 5)) {
+ /*
+ * Increase the Lua stack if needed, to make sure there is enough room
+ * to push 5 elements to the stack. On failure, exit with panic.
+         * Notice that we need, in the worst case, 5 elements because redisProtocolToLuaType_Aggregate
+         * might push 5 elements to the Lua stack.*/
+ serverPanic("lua stack limit reach when parsing redis.call reply");
+ }
+
char *p = reply;
switch(*p) {
@@ -220,6 +230,11 @@ char *redisProtocolToLuaType_Aggregate(lua_State *lua, char *reply, int atype) {
if (atype == '%') {
p = redisProtocolToLuaType(lua,p);
} else {
+ if (!lua_checkstack(lua, 1)) {
+ /* Notice that here we need to check the stack again because the recursive
+ * call to redisProtocolToLuaType might have use the room allocated in the stack */
+ serverPanic("lua stack limit reach when parsing redis.call reply");
+ }
lua_pushboolean(lua,1);
}
lua_settable(lua,-3);
@@ -339,6 +354,17 @@ void luaSortArray(lua_State *lua) {
/* Reply to client 'c' converting the top element in the Lua stack to a
* Redis reply. As a side effect the element is consumed from the stack. */
void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
+
+ if (!lua_checkstack(lua, 4)) {
+ /* Increase the Lua stack if needed to make sure there is enough room
+ * to push 4 elements to the stack. On failure, return error.
+         * Notice that we need, in the worst case, 4 elements because returning a map might
+ * require push 4 elements to the Lua stack.*/
+ addReplyErrorFormat(c, "reached lua stack limit");
+ lua_pop(lua,1); // pop the element from the stack
+ return;
+ }
+
int t = lua_type(lua,-1);
switch(t) {
@@ -362,6 +388,7 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
* field. */
/* Handle error reply. */
+ // we took care of the stack size on function start
lua_pushstring(lua,"err");
lua_gettable(lua,-2);
t = lua_type(lua,-1);
@@ -407,6 +434,7 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
if (t == LUA_TTABLE) {
int maplen = 0;
void *replylen = addReplyDeferredLen(c);
+ /* we took care of the stack size on function start */
lua_pushnil(lua); /* Use nil to start iteration. */
while (lua_next(lua,-2)) {
/* Stack now: table, key, value */
@@ -429,6 +457,7 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
if (t == LUA_TTABLE) {
int setlen = 0;
void *replylen = addReplyDeferredLen(c);
+ /* we took care of the stack size on function start */
lua_pushnil(lua); /* Use nil to start iteration. */
while (lua_next(lua,-2)) {
/* Stack now: table, key, true */
@@ -448,6 +477,7 @@ void luaReplyToRedisReply(client *c, lua_State *lua) {
void *replylen = addReplyDeferredLen(c);
int j = 1, mbulklen = 0;
while(1) {
+ /* we took care of the stack size on function start */
lua_pushnumber(lua,j++);
lua_gettable(lua,-2);
t = lua_type(lua,-1);
@@ -2506,6 +2536,17 @@ void ldbEval(lua_State *lua, sds *argv, int argc) {
void ldbRedis(lua_State *lua, sds *argv, int argc) {
int j, saved_rc = server.lua_replicate_commands;
+ if (!lua_checkstack(lua, argc + 1)) {
+ /* Increase the Lua stack if needed to make sure there is enough room
+ * to push 'argc + 1' elements to the stack. On failure, return error.
+         * Notice that we need, in worst case, 'argc + 1' elements because we push all the arguments
+         * given by the user (without the first argument) and we also push the 'redis' global table and
+         * 'redis.call' function so:
+         * (1 (redis table)) + (1 (redis.call function)) + (argc - 1 (all arguments without the first)) = argc + 1*/
+ ldbLogRedisReply("max lua stack reached");
+ return;
+ }
+
lua_getglobal(lua,"redis");
lua_pushstring(lua,"call");
lua_gettable(lua,-2); /* Stack: redis, redis.call */

781
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-32627.patch
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@ -1,781 +0,0 @@
From f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 12:10:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations
(CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
---
src/geo.c | 5 +-
src/listpack.c | 2 +-
src/quicklist.c | 17 ++++-
src/rdb.c | 36 ++++++---
src/server.h | 2 +-
src/t_hash.c | 13 +++-
src/t_list.c | 30 ++++++++
src/t_stream.c | 48 +++++++++---
src/t_zset.c | 43 +++++++----
src/ziplist.c | 17 ++++-
src/ziplist.h | 1 +
tests/support/util.tcl | 18 ++++-
tests/unit/violations.tcl | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 files changed, 339 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/unit/violations.tcl
diff --git a/src/geo.c b/src/geo.c
index 5c505441486c..a8710cd8b3ae 100644
--- a/src/geo.c
+++ b/src/geo.c
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ void georadiusGeneric(client *c, int flags) {
robj *zobj;
zset *zs;
int i;
- size_t maxelelen = 0;
+ size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
if (returned_items) {
zobj = createZsetObject();
@@ -650,13 +650,14 @@ void georadiusGeneric(client *c, int flags) {
size_t elelen = sdslen(gp->member);
if (maxelelen < elelen) maxelelen = elelen;
+ totelelen += elelen;
znode = zslInsert(zs->zsl,score,gp->member);
serverAssert(dictAdd(zs->dict,gp->member,&znode->score) == DICT_OK);
gp->member = NULL;
}
if (returned_items) {
- zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(zobj,maxelelen);
+ zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(zobj,maxelelen,totelelen);
setKey(c,c->db,storekey,zobj);
decrRefCount(zobj);
notifyKeyspaceEvent(NOTIFY_ZSET,"georadiusstore",storekey,
diff --git a/src/listpack.c b/src/listpack.c
index f8c34429ec1e..6c111e83e029 100644
--- a/src/listpack.c
+++ b/src/listpack.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int lpEncodeGetType(unsigned char *ele, uint32_t size, unsigned char *intenc, ui
} else {
if (size < 64) *enclen = 1+size;
else if (size < 4096) *enclen = 2+size;
- else *enclen = 5+size;
+ else *enclen = 5+(uint64_t)size;
return LP_ENCODING_STRING;
}
}
diff --git a/src/quicklist.c b/src/quicklist.c
index 52e3988f59b1..c4bf5274eb05 100644
--- a/src/quicklist.c
+++ b/src/quicklist.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
*/
#include <string.h> /* for memcpy */
+#include "redisassert.h"
#include "quicklist.h"
#include "zmalloc.h"
#include "ziplist.h"
@@ -43,11 +44,16 @@
#define REDIS_STATIC static
#endif
-/* Optimization levels for size-based filling */
+/* Optimization levels for size-based filling.
+ * Note that the largest possible limit is 16k, so even if each record takes
+ * just one byte, it still won't overflow the 16 bit count field. */
static const size_t optimization_level[] = {4096, 8192, 16384, 32768, 65536};
/* Maximum size in bytes of any multi-element ziplist.
- * Larger values will live in their own isolated ziplists. */
+ * Larger values will live in their own isolated ziplists.
+ * This is used only if we're limited by record count. when we're limited by
+ * size, the maximum limit is bigger, but still safe.
+ * 8k is a recommended / default size limit */
#define SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT 8192
/* Minimum ziplist size in bytes for attempting compression. */
@@ -449,6 +455,8 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowInsert(const quicklistNode *node,
unsigned int new_sz = node->sz + sz + ziplist_overhead;
if (likely(_quicklistNodeSizeMeetsOptimizationRequirement(new_sz, fill)))
return 1;
+ /* when we return 1 above we know that the limit is a size limit (which is
+ * safe, see comments next to optimization_level and SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT) */
else if (!sizeMeetsSafetyLimit(new_sz))
return 0;
else if ((int)node->count < fill)
@@ -468,6 +476,8 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowMerge(const quicklistNode *a,
unsigned int merge_sz = a->sz + b->sz - 11;
if (likely(_quicklistNodeSizeMeetsOptimizationRequirement(merge_sz, fill)))
return 1;
+ /* when we return 1 above we know that the limit is a size limit (which is
+ * safe, see comments next to optimization_level and SIZE_SAFETY_LIMIT) */
else if (!sizeMeetsSafetyLimit(merge_sz))
return 0;
else if ((int)(a->count + b->count) <= fill)
@@ -487,6 +497,7 @@ REDIS_STATIC int _quicklistNodeAllowMerge(const quicklistNode *a,
* Returns 1 if new head created. */
int quicklistPushHead(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
quicklistNode *orig_head = quicklist->head;
+ assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (likely(
_quicklistNodeAllowInsert(quicklist->head, quicklist->fill, sz))) {
quicklist->head->zl =
@@ -510,6 +521,7 @@ int quicklistPushHead(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
* Returns 1 if new tail created. */
int quicklistPushTail(quicklist *quicklist, void *value, size_t sz) {
quicklistNode *orig_tail = quicklist->tail;
+ assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (likely(
_quicklistNodeAllowInsert(quicklist->tail, quicklist->fill, sz))) {
quicklist->tail->zl =
@@ -852,6 +864,7 @@ REDIS_STATIC void _quicklistInsert(quicklist *quicklist, quicklistEntry *entry,
int fill = quicklist->fill;
quicklistNode *node = entry->node;
quicklistNode *new_node = NULL;
+ assert(sz < UINT32_MAX); /* TODO: add support for quicklist nodes that are sds encoded (not zipped) */
if (!node) {
/* we have no reference node, so let's create only node in the list */
diff --git a/src/rdb.c b/src/rdb.c
index ecd2c0e9870a..11cc41b56240 100644
--- a/src/rdb.c
+++ b/src/rdb.c
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
} else if (rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_ZSET_2 || rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_ZSET) {
/* Read list/set value. */
uint64_t zsetlen;
- size_t maxelelen = 0;
+ size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
zset *zs;
if ((zsetlen = rdbLoadLen(rdb,NULL)) == RDB_LENERR) return NULL;
@@ -1598,6 +1598,7 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
/* Don't care about integer-encoded strings. */
if (sdslen(sdsele) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(sdsele);
+ totelelen += sdslen(sdsele);
znode = zslInsert(zs->zsl,score,sdsele);
dictAdd(zs->dict,sdsele,&znode->score);
@@ -1605,8 +1606,11 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
/* Convert *after* loading, since sorted sets are not stored ordered. */
if (zsetLength(o) <= server.zset_max_ziplist_entries &&
- maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
- zsetConvert(o,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
+ maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value &&
+ ziplistSafeToAdd(NULL, totelelen))
+ {
+ zsetConvert(o,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
+ }
} else if (rdbtype == RDB_TYPE_HASH) {
uint64_t len;
int ret;
@@ -1635,21 +1639,25 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
return NULL;
}
- /* Add pair to ziplist */
- o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)field,
- sdslen(field), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
- o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)value,
- sdslen(value), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
-
/* Convert to hash table if size threshold is exceeded */
if (sdslen(field) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value ||
- sdslen(value) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value)
+ sdslen(value) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value ||
+ !ziplistSafeToAdd(o->ptr, sdslen(field)+sdslen(value)))
{
- sdsfree(field);
- sdsfree(value);
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
+ ret = dictAdd((dict*)o->ptr, field, value);
+ if (ret == DICT_ERR) {
+ rdbExitReportCorruptRDB("Duplicate hash fields detected");
+ }
break;
}
+
+ /* Add pair to ziplist */
+ o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)field,
+ sdslen(field), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
+ o->ptr = ziplistPush(o->ptr, (unsigned char*)value,
+ sdslen(value), ZIPLIST_TAIL);
+
sdsfree(field);
sdsfree(value);
}
@@ -1726,6 +1734,10 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
while ((zi = zipmapNext(zi, &fstr, &flen, &vstr, &vlen)) != NULL) {
if (flen > maxlen) maxlen = flen;
if (vlen > maxlen) maxlen = vlen;
+ if (!ziplistSafeToAdd(zl, (size_t)flen + vlen)) {
+ rdbExitReportCorruptRDB("Hash zipmap too big (%u)", flen);
+ }
+
zl = ziplistPush(zl, fstr, flen, ZIPLIST_TAIL);
zl = ziplistPush(zl, vstr, vlen, ZIPLIST_TAIL);
}
diff --git a/src/server.h b/src/server.h
index 530355421a8d..38774bbc2fa7 100644
--- a/src/server.h
+++ b/src/server.h
@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ unsigned char *zzlFirstInRange(unsigned char *zl, zrangespec *range);
unsigned char *zzlLastInRange(unsigned char *zl, zrangespec *range);
unsigned long zsetLength(const robj *zobj);
void zsetConvert(robj *zobj, int encoding);
-void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen);
+void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen, size_t totelelen);
int zsetScore(robj *zobj, sds member, double *score);
unsigned long zslGetRank(zskiplist *zsl, double score, sds o);
int zsetAdd(robj *zobj, double score, sds ele, int *flags, double *newscore);
diff --git a/src/t_hash.c b/src/t_hash.c
index 8e79432a4fbd..3cdfdd169abf 100644
--- a/src/t_hash.c
+++ b/src/t_hash.c
@@ -39,17 +39,22 @@
* as their string length can be queried in constant time. */
void hashTypeTryConversion(robj *o, robj **argv, int start, int end) {
int i;
+ size_t sum = 0;
if (o->encoding != OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST) return;
for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
- if (sdsEncodedObject(argv[i]) &&
- sdslen(argv[i]->ptr) > server.hash_max_ziplist_value)
- {
+ if (!sdsEncodedObject(argv[i]))
+ continue;
+ size_t len = sdslen(argv[i]->ptr);
+ if (len > server.hash_max_ziplist_value) {
hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
- break;
+ return;
}
+ sum += len;
}
+ if (!ziplistSafeToAdd(o->ptr, sum))
+ hashTypeConvert(o, OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
}
/* Get the value from a ziplist encoded hash, identified by field.
diff --git a/src/t_list.c b/src/t_list.c
index 4f0bd7b81a5d..621b6932759e 100644
--- a/src/t_list.c
+++ b/src/t_list.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#include "server.h"
+#define LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE ((1ull<<32)-1024)
+
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* List API
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
@@ -196,6 +198,14 @@ void listTypeConvert(robj *subject, int enc) {
void pushGenericCommand(client *c, int where) {
int j, pushed = 0;
+
+ for (j = 2; j < c->argc; j++) {
+ if (sdslen(c->argv[j]->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
robj *lobj = lookupKeyWrite(c->db,c->argv[1]);
if (lobj && lobj->type != OBJ_LIST) {
@@ -277,6 +287,11 @@ void linsertCommand(client *c) {
return;
}
+ if (sdslen(c->argv[4]->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((subject = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[1],shared.czero)) == NULL ||
checkType(c,subject,OBJ_LIST)) return;
@@ -344,6 +359,11 @@ void lsetCommand(client *c) {
long index;
robj *value = c->argv[3];
+ if (sdslen(value->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((getLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[2], &index, NULL) != C_OK))
return;
@@ -510,6 +530,11 @@ void lposCommand(client *c) {
int direction = LIST_TAIL;
long rank = 1, count = -1, maxlen = 0; /* Count -1: option not given. */
+ if (sdslen(ele->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
+ return;
+ }
+
/* Parse the optional arguments. */
for (int j = 3; j < c->argc; j++) {
char *opt = c->argv[j]->ptr;
@@ -610,6 +635,11 @@ void lremCommand(client *c) {
long toremove;
long removed = 0;
+ if (sdslen(obj->ptr) > LIST_MAX_ITEM_SIZE) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Element too large");
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((getLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[2], &toremove, NULL) != C_OK))
return;
diff --git a/src/t_stream.c b/src/t_stream.c
index 43b67e8826ca..30411388697f 100644
--- a/src/t_stream.c
+++ b/src/t_stream.c
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
#define STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_DELETED (1<<0) /* Entry is deleted. Skip it. */
#define STREAM_ITEM_FLAG_SAMEFIELDS (1<<1) /* Same fields as master entry. */
+/* Don't let listpacks grow too big, even if the user config allows it.
+ * doing so can lead to an overflow (trying to store more than 32bit length
+ * into the listpack header), or actually an assertion since lpInsert
+ * will return NULL. */
+#define STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE (1<<30)
+
void streamFreeCG(streamCG *cg);
void streamFreeNACK(streamNACK *na);
size_t streamReplyWithRangeFromConsumerPEL(client *c, stream *s, streamID *start, streamID *end, size_t count, streamConsumer *consumer);
@@ -191,8 +197,11 @@ int streamCompareID(streamID *a, streamID *b) {
*
* The function returns C_OK if the item was added, this is always true
* if the ID was generated by the function. However the function may return
- * C_ERR if an ID was given via 'use_id', but adding it failed since the
- * current top ID is greater or equal. */
+ * C_ERR in several cases:
+ * 1. If an ID was given via 'use_id', but adding it failed since the
+ * current top ID is greater or equal. errno will be set to EDOM.
+ * 2. If a size of a single element or the sum of the elements is too big to
+ * be stored into the stream. errno will be set to ERANGE. */
int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_id, streamID *use_id) {
/* Generate the new entry ID. */
@@ -206,7 +215,23 @@ int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_
* or return an error. Automatically generated IDs might
* overflow (and wrap-around) when incrementing the sequence
part. */
- if (streamCompareID(&id,&s->last_id) <= 0) return C_ERR;
+ if (streamCompareID(&id,&s->last_id) <= 0) {
+ errno = EDOM;
+ return C_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* Avoid overflow when trying to add an element to the stream (listpack
+ * can only host up to 32bit length sttrings, and also a total listpack size
+ * can't be bigger than 32bit length. */
+ size_t totelelen = 0;
+ for (int64_t i = 0; i < numfields*2; i++) {
+ sds ele = argv[i]->ptr;
+ totelelen += sdslen(ele);
+ }
+ if (totelelen > STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE) {
+ errno = ERANGE;
+ return C_ERR;
+ }
/* Add the new entry. */
raxIterator ri;
@@ -265,9 +290,10 @@ int streamAppendItem(stream *s, robj **argv, int64_t numfields, streamID *added_
* if we need to switch to the next one. 'lp' will be set to NULL if
* the current node is full. */
if (lp != NULL) {
- if (server.stream_node_max_bytes &&
- lp_bytes >= server.stream_node_max_bytes)
- {
+ size_t node_max_bytes = server.stream_node_max_bytes;
+ if (node_max_bytes == 0 || node_max_bytes > STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE)
+ node_max_bytes = STREAM_LISTPACK_MAX_SIZE;
+ if (lp_bytes + totelelen >= node_max_bytes) {
lp = NULL;
} else if (server.stream_node_max_entries) {
int64_t count = lpGetInteger(lpFirst(lp));
@@ -1267,11 +1293,13 @@ void xaddCommand(client *c) {
/* Append using the low level function and return the ID. */
if (streamAppendItem(s,c->argv+field_pos,(c->argc-field_pos)/2,
- &id, id_given ? &id : NULL)
- == C_ERR)
+ &id, id_given ? &id : NULL) == C_ERR)
{
- addReplyError(c,"The ID specified in XADD is equal or smaller than the "
- "target stream top item");
+ if (errno == EDOM)
+ addReplyError(c,"The ID specified in XADD is equal or smaller than "
+ "the target stream top item");
+ else
+ addReplyError(c,"Elements are too large to be stored");
return;
}
addReplyStreamID(c,&id);
diff --git a/src/t_zset.c b/src/t_zset.c
index d0ffe2f8b20a..b44f9551cc33 100644
--- a/src/t_zset.c
+++ b/src/t_zset.c
@@ -1238,15 +1238,18 @@ void zsetConvert(robj *zobj, int encoding) {
}
/* Convert the sorted set object into a ziplist if it is not already a ziplist
- * and if the number of elements and the maximum element size is within the
- * expected ranges. */
-void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen) {
+ * and if the number of elements and the maximum element size and total elements size
+ * are within the expected ranges. */
+void zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(robj *zobj, size_t maxelelen, size_t totelelen) {
if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST) return;
zset *zset = zobj->ptr;
if (zset->zsl->length <= server.zset_max_ziplist_entries &&
- maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
- zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
+ maxelelen <= server.zset_max_ziplist_value &&
+ ziplistSafeToAdd(NULL, totelelen))
+ {
+ zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_ZIPLIST);
+ }
}
/* Return (by reference) the score of the specified member of the sorted set
@@ -1355,20 +1358,28 @@ int zsetAdd(robj *zobj, double score, sds ele, int *flags, double *newscore) {
}
return 1;
} else if (!xx) {
- /* Optimize: check if the element is too large or the list
+ /* check if the element is too large or the list
* becomes too long *before* executing zzlInsert. */
- zobj->ptr = zzlInsert(zobj->ptr,ele,score);
- if (zzlLength(zobj->ptr) > server.zset_max_ziplist_entries ||
- sdslen(ele) > server.zset_max_ziplist_value)
+ if (zzlLength(zobj->ptr)+1 > server.zset_max_ziplist_entries ||
+ sdslen(ele) > server.zset_max_ziplist_value ||
+ !ziplistSafeToAdd(zobj->ptr, sdslen(ele)))
+ {
zsetConvert(zobj,OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST);
- if (newscore) *newscore = score;
- *flags |= ZADD_ADDED;
- return 1;
+ } else {
+ zobj->ptr = zzlInsert(zobj->ptr,ele,score);
+ if (newscore) *newscore = score;
+ *flags |= ZADD_ADDED;
+ return 1;
+ }
} else {
*flags |= ZADD_NOP;
return 1;
}
- } else if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST) {
+ }
+
+ /* Note that the above block handling ziplist would have either returned or
+ * converted the key to skiplist. */
+ if (zobj->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_SKIPLIST) {
zset *zs = zobj->ptr;
zskiplistNode *znode;
dictEntry *de;
@@ -2180,7 +2191,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
zsetopsrc *src;
zsetopval zval;
sds tmp;
- size_t maxelelen = 0;
+ size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
robj *dstobj;
zset *dstzset;
zskiplistNode *znode;
@@ -2304,6 +2315,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
tmp = zuiNewSdsFromValue(&zval);
znode = zslInsert(dstzset->zsl,score,tmp);
dictAdd(dstzset->dict,tmp,&znode->score);
+ totelelen += sdslen(tmp);
if (sdslen(tmp) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(tmp);
}
}
@@ -2340,6 +2352,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
/* Remember the longest single element encountered,
* to understand if it's possible to convert to ziplist
* at the end. */
+ totelelen += sdslen(tmp);
if (sdslen(tmp) > maxelelen) maxelelen = sdslen(tmp);
/* Update the element with its initial score. */
dictSetKey(accumulator, de, tmp);
@@ -2380,7 +2393,7 @@ void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
if (dbDelete(c->db,dstkey))
touched = 1;
if (dstzset->zsl->length) {
- zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(dstobj,maxelelen);
+ zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(dstobj,maxelelen,totelelen);
dbAdd(c->db,dstkey,dstobj);
addReplyLongLong(c,zsetLength(dstobj));
signalModifiedKey(c,c->db,dstkey);
diff --git a/src/ziplist.c b/src/ziplist.c
index 5933d19151b0..582eed2c9b4a 100644
--- a/src/ziplist.c
+++ b/src/ziplist.c
@@ -265,6 +265,17 @@
ZIPLIST_LENGTH(zl) = intrev16ifbe(intrev16ifbe(ZIPLIST_LENGTH(zl))+incr); \
}
+/* Don't let ziplists grow over 1GB in any case, don't wanna risk overflow in
+ * zlbytes*/
+#define ZIPLIST_MAX_SAFETY_SIZE (1<<30)
+int ziplistSafeToAdd(unsigned char* zl, size_t add) {
+ size_t len = zl? ziplistBlobLen(zl): 0;
+ if (len + add > ZIPLIST_MAX_SAFETY_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
/* We use this function to receive information about a ziplist entry.
* Note that this is not how the data is actually encoded, is just what we
* get filled by a function in order to operate more easily. */
@@ -586,7 +597,8 @@ unsigned char *ziplistNew(void) {
}
/* Resize the ziplist. */
-unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, unsigned int len) {
+unsigned char *ziplistResize(unsigned char *zl, size_t len) {
+ assert(len < UINT32_MAX);
zl = zrealloc(zl,len);
ZIPLIST_BYTES(zl) = intrev32ifbe(len);
zl[len-1] = ZIP_END;
@@ -898,6 +910,9 @@ unsigned char *ziplistMerge(unsigned char **first, unsigned char **second) {
/* Combined zl length should be limited within UINT16_MAX */
zllength = zllength < UINT16_MAX ? zllength : UINT16_MAX;
+ /* larger values can't be stored into ZIPLIST_BYTES */
+ assert(zlbytes < UINT32_MAX);
+
/* Save offset positions before we start ripping memory apart. */
size_t first_offset = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_TAIL_OFFSET(*first));
size_t second_offset = intrev32ifbe(ZIPLIST_TAIL_OFFSET(*second));
diff --git a/src/ziplist.h b/src/ziplist.h
index 964a47f6dc29..f6ba6c8be47d 100644
--- a/src/ziplist.h
+++ b/src/ziplist.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ unsigned char *ziplistFind(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *vstr, unsigned int v
unsigned int ziplistLen(unsigned char *zl);
size_t ziplistBlobLen(unsigned char *zl);
void ziplistRepr(unsigned char *zl);
+int ziplistSafeToAdd(unsigned char* zl, size_t add);
#ifdef REDIS_TEST
int ziplistTest(int argc, char *argv[]);
diff --git a/tests/support/util.tcl b/tests/support/util.tcl
index 970d63314fd6..343912ac0049 100644
--- a/tests/support/util.tcl
+++ b/tests/support/util.tcl
@@ -109,7 +109,23 @@ proc wait_done_loading r {
# count current log lines in server's stdout
proc count_log_lines {srv_idx} {
- set _ [exec wc -l < [srv $srv_idx stdout]]
+ set _ [string trim [exec wc -l < [srv $srv_idx stdout]]]
+}
+
+# returns the number of times a line with that pattern appears in a file
+proc count_message_lines {file pattern} {
+ set res 0
+ # exec fails when grep exists with status other than 0 (when the patter wasn't found)
+ catch {
+ set res [string trim [exec grep $pattern $file 2> /dev/null | wc -l]]
+ }
+ return $res
+}
+
+# returns the number of times a line with that pattern appears in the log
+proc count_log_message {srv_idx pattern} {
+ set stdout [srv $srv_idx stdout]
+ return [count_message_lines $stdout $pattern]
}
# verify pattern exists in server's sdtout after a certain line number
diff --git a/tests/unit/violations.tcl b/tests/unit/violations.tcl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d87b9236528e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/violations.tcl
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# These tests consume massive amounts of memory, and are not
+# suitable to be executed as part of the normal test suite
+set ::str500 [string repeat x 500000000] ;# 500mb
+
+# Utility function to write big argument into redis client connection
+proc write_big_bulk {size} {
+ r write "\$$size\r\n"
+ while {$size >= 500000000} {
+ r write $::str500
+ incr size -500000000
+ }
+ if {$size > 0} {
+ r write [string repeat x $size]
+ }
+ r write "\r\n"
+}
+
+# One XADD with one huge 5GB field
+# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {XADD one huge field} {
+ r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r write "*5\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
+ r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
+ r flush
+ catch {r read} err
+ assert_match {*too large*} $err
+ r xlen S1
+ } {0}
+}
+
+# One XADD with one huge (exactly nearly) 4GB field
+# This uncovers the overflow in lpEncodeGetType
+# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {XADD one huge field - 1} {
+ r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r write "*5\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
+ r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 4294967295 ;#4gb-1
+ r flush
+ catch {r read} err
+ assert_match {*too large*} $err
+ r xlen S1
+ } {0}
+}
+
+# Gradually add big stream fields using repeated XADD calls
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {several XADD big fields} {
+ r config set stream-node-max-bytes 0
+ for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
+ r xadd stream * 1 $::str500 2 $::str500
+ }
+ r ping
+ r xlen stream
+ } {10}
+}
+
+# Add over 4GB to a single stream listpack (one XADD command)
+# Expected to fail resulting in an empty stream
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {single XADD big fields} {
+ r write "*23\r\n\$4\r\nXADD\r\n\$1\r\nS\r\n\$1\r\n*\r\n"
+ for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
+ r write "\$1\r\n$j\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 500000000 ;#500mb
+ }
+ r flush
+ catch {r read} err
+ assert_match {*too large*} $err
+ r xlen S
+ } {0}
+}
+
+# Gradually add big hash fields using repeated HSET calls
+# This reproduces the overflow in the call to ziplistResize
+# Object will be converted to hashtable encoding
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ r config set hash-max-ziplist-value 1000000000 ;#1gb
+ test {hash with many big fields} {
+ for {set j 0} {$j<10} {incr j} {
+ r hset h $j $::str500
+ }
+ r object encoding h
+ } {hashtable}
+}
+
+# Add over 4GB to a single hash field (one HSET command)
+# Object will be converted to hashtable encoding
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {hash with one huge field} {
+ catch {r config set hash-max-ziplist-value 10000000000} ;#10gb
+ r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r write "*4\r\n\$4\r\nHSET\r\n\$2\r\nH1\r\n"
+ r write "\$1\r\nA\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
+ r flush
+ r read
+ r object encoding H1
+ } {hashtable}
+}
+
+# Add over 4GB to a single list member (one LPUSH command)
+# Currently unsupported, and expected to fail rather than being truncated
+# Expected to fail resulting in a non-existing list
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {list with one huge field} {
+ r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r write "*3\r\n\$5\r\nLPUSH\r\n\$2\r\nL1\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
+ r flush
+ catch {r read} err
+ assert_match {*too large*} $err
+ r exists L1
+ } {0}
+}
+
+# SORT which attempts to store an element larger than 4GB into a list.
+# Currently unsupported and results in an assertion instead of truncation
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {SORT adds huge field to list} {
+ r config set proto-max-bulk-len 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r config set client-query-buffer-limit 10000000000 ;#10gb
+ r write "*3\r\n\$3\r\nSET\r\n\$2\r\nS1\r\n"
+ write_big_bulk 5000000000 ;#5gb
+ r flush
+ r read
+ assert_equal [r strlen S1] 5000000000
+ r set S2 asdf
+ r sadd myset 1 2
+ r mset D1 1 D2 2
+ catch {r sort myset by D* get S* store mylist}
+ # assert_equal [count_log_message 0 "crashed by signal"] 0 - not suitable for 6.0
+ assert_equal [count_log_message 0 "ASSERTION FAILED"] 1
+ }
+}
+
+# SORT which stores an integer encoded element into a list.
+# Just for coverage, no news here.
+start_server [list overrides [list save ""] ] {
+ test {SORT adds integer field to list} {
+ r set S1 asdf
+ r set S2 123 ;# integer encoded
+ assert_encoding "int" S2
+ r sadd myset 1 2
+ r mset D1 1 D2 2
+ r sort myset by D* get S* store mylist
+ r llen mylist
+ } {2}
+}

117
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-32675.patch
View File

@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
From 5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2021 17:31:39 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of
memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
---
src/networking.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
src/server.c | 9 ++-------
src/server.h | 1 +
tests/unit/auth.tcl | 16 ++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/networking.c b/src/networking.c
index a61678dab2b..b02397c96f4 100644
--- a/src/networking.c
+++ b/src/networking.c
@@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ void linkClient(client *c) {
raxInsert(server.clients_index,(unsigned char*)&id,sizeof(id),c,NULL);
}
+int authRequired(client *c) {
+ /* Check if the user is authenticated. This check is skipped in case
+ * the default user is flagged as "nopass" and is active. */
+ int auth_required = (!(DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_NOPASS) ||
+ (DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_DISABLED)) &&
+ !c->authenticated;
+ return auth_required;
+}
+
client *createClient(connection *conn) {
client *c = zmalloc(sizeof(client));
@@ -1744,6 +1753,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid multibulk length");
setProtocolError("invalid mbulk count",c);
return C_ERR;
+ } else if (ll > 10 && authRequired(c)) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated multibulk length");
+ setProtocolError("unauth mbulk count", c);
+ return C_ERR;
}
c->qb_pos = (newline-c->querybuf)+2;
@@ -1791,6 +1804,10 @@ int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid bulk length");
setProtocolError("invalid bulk length",c);
return C_ERR;
+ } else if (ll > 16384 && authRequired(c)) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Protocol error: unauthenticated bulk length");
+ setProtocolError("unauth bulk length", c);
+ return C_ERR;
}
c->qb_pos = newline-c->querybuf+2;
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index 93148f8e3ed..c8768b1824b 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -3590,13 +3590,8 @@ int processCommand(client *c) {
int is_denyloading_command = !(c->cmd->flags & CMD_LOADING) ||
(c->cmd->proc == execCommand && (c->mstate.cmd_inv_flags & CMD_LOADING));
- /* Check if the user is authenticated. This check is skipped in case
- * the default user is flagged as "nopass" and is active. */
- int auth_required = (!(DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_NOPASS) ||
- (DefaultUser->flags & USER_FLAG_DISABLED)) &&
- !c->authenticated;
- if (auth_required) {
- /* AUTH and HELLO and no auth modules are valid even in
+ if (authRequired(c)) {
+ /* AUTH and HELLO and no auth commands are valid even in
* non-authenticated state. */
if (!(c->cmd->flags & CMD_NO_AUTH)) {
rejectCommand(c,shared.noautherr);
diff --git a/src/server.h b/src/server.h
index a16f2885829..530355421a8 100644
--- a/src/server.h
+++ b/src/server.h
@@ -1743,6 +1743,7 @@ void protectClient(client *c);
void unprotectClient(client *c);
void initThreadedIO(void);
client *lookupClientByID(uint64_t id);
+int authRequired(client *c);
#ifdef __GNUC__
void addReplyErrorFormat(client *c, const char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/tests/unit/auth.tcl b/tests/unit/auth.tcl
index 9080d4bf7e9..530ca7c8d91 100644
--- a/tests/unit/auth.tcl
+++ b/tests/unit/auth.tcl
@@ -24,4 +24,20 @@ start_server {tags {"auth"} overrides {requirepass foobar}} {
r set foo 100
r incr foo
} {101}
+
+ test {For unauthenticated clients multibulk and bulk length are limited} {
+ set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0 $::tls]
+ $rr write "*100\r\n"
+ $rr flush
+ catch {[$rr read]} e
+ assert_match {*unauthenticated multibulk length*} $e
+ $rr close
+
+ set rr [redis [srv "host"] [srv "port"] 0 $::tls]
+ $rr write "*1\r\n\$100000000\r\n"
+ $rr flush
+ catch {[$rr read]} e
+ assert_match {*unauthenticated bulk length*} $e
+ $rr close
+ }
}

67
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-32687.patch
View File

@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
From a30d367a71b7017581cf1ca104242a3c644dec0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2021 15:42:17 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix Integer overflow issue with intsets (CVE-2021-32687)
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration parameter to a very large value and constructing specially
crafted commands to manipulate sets
---
src/intset.c | 4 +++-
src/rdb.c | 4 +++-
src/t_set.c | 5 ++++-
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/intset.c b/src/intset.c
index 19f6562ed69c..3f8b754e3a3e 100644
--- a/src/intset.c
+++ b/src/intset.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "intset.h"
#include "zmalloc.h"
#include "endianconv.h"
+#include "redisassert.h"
/* Note that these encodings are ordered, so:
* INTSET_ENC_INT16 < INTSET_ENC_INT32 < INTSET_ENC_INT64. */
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ intset *intsetNew(void) {
/* Resize the intset */
static intset *intsetResize(intset *is, uint32_t len) {
- uint32_t size = len*intrev32ifbe(is->encoding);
+ uint64_t size = (uint64_t)len*intrev32ifbe(is->encoding);
+ assert(size <= SIZE_MAX - sizeof(intset));
is = zrealloc(is,sizeof(intset)+size);
return is;
}
diff --git a/src/rdb.c b/src/rdb.c
index 82b4cf5065d1..ecd2c0e9870a 100644
--- a/src/rdb.c
+++ b/src/rdb.c
@@ -1518,7 +1518,9 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key) {
if ((len = rdbLoadLen(rdb,NULL)) == RDB_LENERR) return NULL;
/* Use a regular set when there are too many entries. */
- if (len > server.set_max_intset_entries) {
+ size_t max_entries = server.set_max_intset_entries;
+ if (max_entries >= 1<<30) max_entries = 1<<30;
+ if (len > max_entries) {
o = createSetObject();
/* It's faster to expand the dict to the right size asap in order
* to avoid rehashing */
diff --git a/src/t_set.c b/src/t_set.c
index f32565e41102..eea45c8df2d8 100644
--- a/src/t_set.c
+++ b/src/t_set.c
@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ int setTypeAdd(robj *subject, sds value) {
if (success) {
/* Convert to regular set when the intset contains
* too many entries. */
- if (intsetLen(subject->ptr) > server.set_max_intset_entries)
+ size_t max_entries = server.set_max_intset_entries;
+ /* limit to 1G entries due to intset internals. */
+ if (max_entries >= 1<<30) max_entries = 1<<30;
+ if (intsetLen(subject->ptr) > max_entries)
setTypeConvert(subject,OBJ_ENCODING_HT);
return 1;
}

91
SOURCES/redis-CVE-2021-41099.patch
View File

@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
Backported for 6.0.9
From c992857618db99776917f10bf4f2345a5fdc78b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yossi Gottlieb <yossigo@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 15:41:32 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow (CVE-2021-21309). (#8522)
On 32-bit systems, setting the proto-max-bulk-len config parameter to a high value may result with integer overflow and a subsequent heap overflow when parsing an input bulk (CVE-2021-21309).
This fix has two parts:
Set a reasonable limit to the config parameter.
Add additional checks to prevent the problem in other potential but unknown code paths.
(cherry picked from commit d32f2e9999ce003bad0bd2c3bca29f64dcce4433)
---
src/config.c | 2 +-
src/sds.c | 3 +++
src/zmalloc.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/sds.c b/src/sds.c
index dc664ca9bc4f..4dbb41d2b703 100644
--- a/src/sds.c
+++ b/src/sds.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ sds sdsnewlen(const void *init, size_t initlen) {
int hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type);
unsigned char *fp; /* flags pointer. */
+ assert(initlen + hdrlen + 1 > initlen); /* Catch size_t overflow */
sh = s_malloc(hdrlen+initlen+1);
if (sh == NULL) return NULL;
if (init==SDS_NOINIT)
@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
len = sdslen(s);
sh = (char*)s-sdsHdrSize(oldtype);
newlen = (len+addlen);
+ assert(newlen > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (newlen < SDS_MAX_PREALLOC)
newlen *= 2;
else
@@ -227,6 +229,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
if (type == SDS_TYPE_5) type = SDS_TYPE_8;
hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type);
+ assert(hdrlen + newlen + 1 > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (oldtype==type) {
newsh = s_realloc(sh, hdrlen+newlen+1);
if (newsh == NULL) return NULL;
From c6ad876774f3cc11e32681ea02a2eead00f2c521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: YiyuanGUO <yguoaz@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 10:20:35 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in _sdsMakeRoomFor (CVE-2021-41099)
---
src/sds.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sds.c b/src/sds.c
index 4dbb41d2b703..a43a1a5cbeed 100644
--- a/src/sds.c
+++ b/src/sds.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void sdsclear(sds s) {
sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
void *sh, *newsh;
size_t avail = sdsavail(s);
- size_t len, newlen;
+ size_t len, newlen, reqlen;
char type, oldtype = s[-1] & SDS_TYPE_MASK;
int hdrlen;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
len = sdslen(s);
sh = (char*)s-sdsHdrSize(oldtype);
- newlen = (len+addlen);
+ reqlen = newlen = (len+addlen);
assert(newlen > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (newlen < SDS_MAX_PREALLOC)
newlen *= 2;
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) {
if (type == SDS_TYPE_5) type = SDS_TYPE_8;
hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type);
- assert(hdrlen + newlen + 1 > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */
+ assert(hdrlen + newlen + 1 > reqlen); /* Catch size_t overflow */
if (oldtype==type) {
newsh = s_realloc(sh, hdrlen+newlen+1);
if (newsh == NULL) return NULL;

83
SOURCES/redis-config.patch
View File

@ -7,9 +7,10 @@ Revert: 90555566ed5cbd3e1c3df1293ba3bbf6098e34c3
See discussion about this breaking change in
https://github.com/redis/redis/issues/8051
--- redis-6.0.9/src/config.c 2020-10-27 08:12:01.000000000 +0100
+++ redis-6.0.8/src/config.c 2020-09-10 13:09:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -1568,62 +1568,60 @@
diff -up ./src/config.c.rev ./src/config.c
--- ./src/config.c.rev 2022-05-09 14:48:31.118296748 +0200
+++ ./src/config.c 2022-05-09 14:48:41.571163767 +0200
@@ -1605,62 +1605,60 @@ void rewriteConfigRemoveOrphaned(struct
dictReleaseIterator(di);
}
@ -41,39 +42,6 @@ https://github.com/redis/redis/issues/8051
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Config file full path is too long");
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return retval;
- }
-
-#ifdef _GNU_SOURCE
- fd = mkostemp(tmp_conffile, O_CLOEXEC);
-#else
- /* There's a theoretical chance here to leak the FD if a module thread forks & execv in the middle */
- fd = mkstemp(tmp_conffile);
-#endif
-
- if (fd == -1) {
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not create tmp config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- return retval;
- }
-
- while (offset < sdslen(content)) {
- written_bytes = write(fd, content + offset, sdslen(content) - offset);
- if (written_bytes <= 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR) continue; /* FD is blocking, no other retryable errors */
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Failed after writing (%zd) bytes to tmp config file (%s)", offset, strerror(errno));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- offset+=written_bytes;
- }
-
- if (fsync(fd))
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not sync tmp config file to disk (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else if (fchmod(fd, 0644) == -1)
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not chmod config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else if (rename(tmp_conffile, configfile) == -1)
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not rename tmp config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else {
- retval = 0;
- serverLog(LL_DEBUG, "Rewritten config file (%s) successfully", configfile);
+ int retval = 0;
+ int fd = open(configfile,O_RDWR|O_CREAT,0644);
+ int content_size = sdslen(content), padding = 0;
@ -86,8 +54,18 @@ https://github.com/redis/redis/issues/8051
+ if (fstat(fd,&sb) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1; /* errno set by fstat(). */
+ }
+
}
-#ifdef _GNU_SOURCE
- fd = mkostemp(tmp_conffile, O_CLOEXEC);
-#else
- /* There's a theoretical chance here to leak the FD if a module thread forks & execv in the middle */
- fd = mkstemp(tmp_conffile);
-#endif
-
- if (fd == -1) {
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not create tmp config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- return retval;
+ /* 2) Pad the content at least match the old file size. */
+ content_padded = sdsdup(content);
+ if (content_size < sb.st_size) {
@ -97,20 +75,38 @@ https://github.com/redis/redis/issues/8051
+ content_padded = sdsgrowzero(content_padded,sb.st_size);
+ content_padded[content_size] = '\n';
+ memset(content_padded+content_size+1,'#',padding-1);
+ }
+
}
- while (offset < sdslen(content)) {
- written_bytes = write(fd, content + offset, sdslen(content) - offset);
- if (written_bytes <= 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR) continue; /* FD is blocking, no other retryable errors */
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Failed after writing (%zd) bytes to tmp config file (%s)", offset, strerror(errno));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- offset+=written_bytes;
+ /* 3) Write the new content using a single write(2). */
+ if (write(fd,content_padded,strlen(content_padded)) == -1) {
+ retval = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
}
- if (fsync(fd))
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not sync tmp config file to disk (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else if (fchmod(fd, 0644 & ~server.umask) == -1)
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not chmod config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else if (rename(tmp_conffile, configfile) == -1)
- serverLog(LL_WARNING, "Could not rename tmp config file (%s)", strerror(errno));
- else {
- retval = 0;
- serverLog(LL_DEBUG, "Rewritten config file (%s) successfully", configfile);
- }
+ /* 4) Truncate the file to the right length if we used padding. */
+ if (padding) {
+ if (ftruncate(fd,content_size) == -1) {
+ /* Non critical error... */
+ }
}
+ }
cleanup:
+ sdsfree(content_padded);
@ -119,4 +115,3 @@ https://github.com/redis/redis/issues/8051
return retval;
}

26
SPECS/redis.spec
View File

@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
%global macrosdir %(d=%{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d; [ -d $d ] || d=%{_sysconfdir}/rpm; echo $d)
Name: redis
Version: 6.0.9
Release: 5%{?dist}
Version: 6.2.7
Release: 1%{?dist}
Summary: A persistent key-value database
# redis, jemalloc, linenoise, lzf, hiredis are BSD
# lua is MIT
@ -46,18 +46,10 @@ Source10: https://github.com/antirez/%{name}-doc/archive/%{doc_commit}/
# Update configuration for Fedora
# https://github.com/antirez/redis/pull/3491 - man pages
Patch0001: 0001-1st-man-pageis-for-redis-cli-redis-benchmark-redis-c.patch
# https://github.com/antirez/redis/pull/3494 - symlink
Patch0002: 0002-install-redis-check-rdb-as-a-symlink-instead-of-dupl.patch
# revert BC break
Patch0003: redis-config.patch
# Security patches
Patch100: redis-CVE-2021-26477.patch
Patch101: redis-CVE-2021-32687.patch
Patch102: redis-CVE-2021-32626.patch
Patch103: redis-CVE-2021-32627.patch
Patch104: redis-CVE-2021-41099.patch
Patch105: redis-CVE-2021-32675.patch
BuildRequires: gcc
%if %{with tests}
@ -75,7 +67,7 @@ Requires(post): systemd
Requires(preun): systemd
Requires(postun): systemd
# from deps/hiredis/hiredis.h
Provides: bundled(hiredis) = 0.14.0
Provides: bundled(hiredis) = 1.0.0
# from deps/jemalloc/VERSION
Provides: bundled(jemalloc) = 5.1.0
# from deps/lua/src/lua.h
@ -140,14 +132,7 @@ administration and development.
%setup -q
mv ../%{name}-doc-%{doc_commit} doc
%patch0001 -p1
%patch0002 -p1
%patch0003 -p1
%patch100 -p1 -b .cve-2011-29477
%patch101 -p1 -b .cve-2011-32687
%patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2011-32626
%patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2011-32627
%patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2011-41099
%patch105 -p1 -b .cve-2011-32675
%patch0003 -p1 -b .rev
mv deps/lua/COPYRIGHT COPYRIGHT-lua
mv deps/jemalloc/COPYING COPYING-jemalloc
@ -296,6 +281,9 @@ exit 0
%changelog
* Mon May 9 2022 Remi Collet <rcollet@redhat.com> - 6.2.7-1
- rebase to 6.2.7 #1999873
* Mon Oct 11 2021 Remi Collet <rcollet@redhat.com> - 6.0.9-5
- fix denial of service via Redis Standard Protocol (RESP) request
CVE-2021-32675