167 lines
4.8 KiB
Diff
167 lines
4.8 KiB
Diff
From c7ae38df696e4be432fd418c670dcea892b910a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 19:01:27 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 056/116] virtiofsd: sandbox mount namespace
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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RH-Author: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Message-id: <20200127190227.40942-53-dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Patchwork-id: 93504
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O-Subject: [RHEL-AV-8.2 qemu-kvm PATCH 052/112] virtiofsd: sandbox mount namespace
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Bugzilla: 1694164
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RH-Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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RH-Acked-by: Sergio Lopez Pascual <slp@redhat.com>
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From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Use a mount namespace with the shared directory tree mounted at "/" and
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no other mounts.
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This prevents symlink escape attacks because symlink targets are
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resolved only against the shared directory and cannot go outside it.
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peng Tao <tao.peng@linux.alibaba.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 5baa3b8e95064c2434bd9e2f312edd5e9ae275dc)
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Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
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---
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tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 89 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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index e2e2211..0570453 100644
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--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
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@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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+#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/xattr.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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@@ -1943,6 +1944,58 @@ static void print_capabilities(void)
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printf("}\n");
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}
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+/* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
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+static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
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+{
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+ int oldroot;
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+ int newroot;
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+
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+ oldroot = open("/", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
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+ if (oldroot < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ newroot = open(source, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
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+ if (newroot < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s): %m\n", source);
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fchdir(newroot) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "fchdir(newroot): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (syscall(__NR_pivot_root, ".", ".") < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "pivot_root(., .): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fchdir(oldroot) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "fchdir(oldroot): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (mount("", ".", "", MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(., MS_SLAVE | MS_REC): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (umount2(".", MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(., MNT_DETACH): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fchdir(newroot) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "fchdir(newroot): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ close(newroot);
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+ close(oldroot);
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+}
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+
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static void setup_proc_self_fd(struct lo_data *lo)
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{
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lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
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@@ -1952,6 +2005,39 @@ static void setup_proc_self_fd(struct lo_data *lo)
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}
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}
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+/*
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+ * Make the source directory our root so symlinks cannot escape and no other
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+ * files are accessible.
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+ */
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+static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
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+{
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+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) != 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNS): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC | MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/, MS_REC|MS_PRIVATE): %m\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (mount(source, source, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
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+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(%s, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n", source, source);
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ setup_pivot_root(source);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Lock down this process to prevent access to other processes or files outside
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+ * source directory. This reduces the impact of arbitrary code execution bugs.
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+ */
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+static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo)
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+{
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+ setup_mount_namespace(lo->source);
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+}
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+
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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struct fuse_args args = FUSE_ARGS_INIT(argc, argv);
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@@ -2052,6 +2138,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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}
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lo.root.fd = open(lo.source, O_PATH);
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+
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if (lo.root.fd == -1) {
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fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(\"%s\", O_PATH): %m\n", lo.source);
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exit(1);
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@@ -2075,6 +2162,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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/* Must be after daemonize to get the right /proc/self/fd */
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setup_proc_self_fd(&lo);
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+ setup_sandbox(&lo);
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+
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/* Block until ctrl+c or fusermount -u */
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ret = virtio_loop(se);
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--
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1.8.3.1
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