qemu-kvm/kvm-virtiofsd-Drop-membership-of-all-supplementary-group.patch
Miroslav Rezanina 9769489cb1 * Mon Feb 07 2022 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 6.2.0-7
- kvm-qemu-storage-daemon-Add-vhost-user-blk-help.patch [bz#1962088]
- kvm-qemu-storage-daemon-Fix-typo-in-vhost-user-blk-help.patch [bz#1962088]
- kvm-virtiofsd-Drop-membership-of-all-supplementary-group.patch [bz#2046201]
- kvm-block-rbd-fix-handling-of-holes-in-.bdrv_co_block_st.patch [bz#2034791]
- kvm-block-rbd-workaround-for-ceph-issue-53784.patch [bz#2034791]
- Resolves: bz#1962088
  ([QSD] wrong help message for the fuse)
- Resolves: bz#2046201
  (CVE-2022-0358 qemu-kvm: QEMU: virtiofsd: potential privilege escalation via CVE-2018-13405 [rhel-9.0])
- Resolves: bz#2034791
  (Booting from Local Snapshot Core Dumped Whose Backing File Is Based on RBD)
2022-02-07 06:52:23 -05:00

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3.4 KiB
Diff

From 846192d22a1ddfa87682bb0b67febef5c30c9743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 13:51:14 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups
(CVE-2022-0358)
RH-Author: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
RH-MergeRequest: 66: c9s: virtiofsd security fix - drop secondary groups
RH-Commit: [1/1] cdf3b0405ea3369933e76761890f16b040641036 (redhat/centos-stream/src/qemu-kvm)
RH-Bugzilla: 2046201
RH-Acked-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
RH-Acked-by: Sergio Lopez <None>
RH-Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <None>
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is
not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch
uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing
supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not
normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir
This sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into
this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test
$ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it,
get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is
privilege escalation.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044863
Fixes: CVE-2022-0358
Reported-by: JIETAO XIAO <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YfBGoriS38eBQrAb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Fixed missing {}'s style nit
(cherry picked from commit 449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca)
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 64b5b4fbb1..b3d0674f6d 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <syslog.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include "qemu/cutils.h"
#include "passthrough_helpers.h"
@@ -1161,6 +1162,30 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name)
#define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid
#endif
+static void drop_supplementary_groups(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = getgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it */
+ ret = setgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with
* ownership of caller.
@@ -3926,6 +3951,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
qemu_init_exec_dir(argv[0]);
+ drop_supplementary_groups();
+
pthread_mutex_init(&lo.mutex, NULL);
lo.inodes = g_hash_table_new(lo_key_hash, lo_key_equal);
lo.root.fd = -1;
--
2.27.0