From 4dad0e9abbc843fba4e5fee6e7aa1b0db13f5898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Eugenio=20P=C3=A9rez?= Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 15:27:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/32] hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit RH-Author: Eugenio Pérez RH-MergeRequest: 108: Net Control Virtqueue shadow Support RH-Commit: [3/27] ae196903eb1a7aebbf999100e997cf82e5024cb6 (eperezmartin/qemu-kvm) RH-Bugzilla: 1939363 RH-Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella RH-Acked-by: Cindy Lu RH-Acked-by: Laurent Vivier Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1939363 Upstream Status: git://git.qemu.org/qemu.git commit d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7 Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Date: Thu May 12 19:57:46 2022 +0200 hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2() Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538 The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint, whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64 to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow. Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper. Acked-by: Jason Wang Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Message-Id: <20220512175747.142058-6-eperezma@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez --- hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c index 099e65036d..633de61513 100644 --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c @@ -1458,7 +1458,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } iov_cnt = elem->out_num; - iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num); + iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, + sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num); s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl)); iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl)); if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) { diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c index dcd80b904d..0e31e3cc04 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num; @@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num; - in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); + in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); in_iov = in_iov_copy; if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req)) -- 2.31.1