* Wed Aug 21 2024 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 6.2.0-52.el8

- kvm-nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch [RHEL-52611] - kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch [RHEL-52611] - kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch [RHEL-52611] - kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch [RHEL-52611] - kvm-vnc-increase-max-display-size.patch [RHEL-50854] - Resolves: RHEL-52611 (CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z]) - Resolves: RHEL-50854 (vnc: increase max display size to 4K)
2024-08-21 02:35:14 -04:00 · 2024-08-21 02:35:14 -04:00 · d711ee4a23
commit d711ee4a23
parent f0343b3901
6 changed files with 747 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch
+++ b/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From adfddc25c82576458442f61efb913e44d83bcbd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 13:53:00 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Cap default max-connections to
+ 100
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+RH-Author: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+RH-MergeRequest: 388: nbd/server: fix CVE-2024-7409 (qemu crash on nbd-server-stop) [rhel-8.10.z]
+RH-Jira: RHEL-52611
+RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
+RH-Commit: [2/4] 1f5d88d5644c46cbb957778254a993930b9d86dc (ebblake/qemu-kvm)
+
+Allowing an unlimited number of clients to any web service is a recipe
+for a rudimentary denial of service attack: the client merely needs to
+open lots of sockets without closing them, until qemu no longer has
+any more fds available to allocate.
+
+For qemu-nbd, we default to allowing only 1 connection unless more are
+explicitly asked for (-e or --shared); this was historically picked as
+a nice default (without an explicit -t, a non-persistent qemu-nbd goes
+away after a client disconnects, without needing any additional
+follow-up commands), and we are not going to change that interface now
+(besides, someday we want to point people towards qemu-storage-daemon
+instead of qemu-nbd).
+
+But for qemu proper, and the newer qemu-storage-daemon, the QMP
+nbd-server-start command has historically had a default of unlimited
+number of connections, in part because unlike qemu-nbd it is
+inherently persistent until nbd-server-stop.  Allowing multiple client
+sockets is particularly useful for clients that can take advantage of
+MULTI_CONN (creating parallel sockets to increase throughput),
+although known clients that do so (such as libnbd's nbdcopy) typically
+use only 8 or 16 connections (the benefits of scaling diminish once
+more sockets are competing for kernel attention).  Picking a number
+large enough for typical use cases, but not unlimited, makes it
+slightly harder for a malicious client to perform a denial of service
+merely by opening lots of connections withot progressing through the
+handshake.
+
+This change does not eliminate CVE-2024-7409 on its own, but reduces
+the chance for fd exhaustion or unlimited memory usage as an attack
+surface.  On the other hand, by itself, it makes it more obvious that
+with a finite limit, we have the problem of an unauthenticated client
+holding 100 fds opened as a way to block out a legitimate client from
+being able to connect; thus, later patches will further add timeouts
+to reject clients that are not making progress.
+
+This is an INTENTIONAL change in behavior, and will break any client
+of nbd-server-start that was not passing an explicit max-connections
+parameter, yet expects more than 100 simultaneous connections.  We are
+not aware of any such client (as stated above, most clients aware of
+MULTI_CONN get by just fine on 8 or 16 connections, and probably cope
+with later connections failing by relying on the earlier connections;
+libvirt has not yet been passing max-connections, but generally
+creates NBD servers with the intent for a single client for the sake
+of live storage migration; meanwhile, the KubeSAN project anticipates
+a large cluster sharing multiple clients [up to 8 per node, and up to
+100 nodes in a cluster], but it currently uses qemu-nbd with an
+explicit --shared=0 rather than qemu-storage-daemon with
+nbd-server-start).
+
+We considered using a deprecation period (declare that omitting
+max-parameters is deprecated, and make it mandatory in 3 releases -
+then we don't need to pick an arbitrary default); that has zero risk
+of breaking any apps that accidentally depended on more than 100
+connections, and where such breakage might not be noticed under unit
+testing but only under the larger loads of production usage.  But it
+does not close the denial-of-service hole until far into the future,
+and requires all apps to change to add the parameter even if 100 was
+good enough.  It also has a drawback that any app (like libvirt) that
+is accidentally relying on an unlimited default should seriously
+consider their own CVE now, at which point they are going to change to
+pass explicit max-connections sooner than waiting for 3 qemu releases.
+Finally, if our changed default breaks an app, that app can always
+pass in an explicit max-parameters with a larger value.
+
+It is also intentional that the HMP interface to nbd-server-start is
+not changed to expose max-connections (any client needing to fine-tune
+things should be using QMP).
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-12-eblake@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+[ericb: Expand commit message to summarize Dan's argument for why we
+break corner-case back-compat behavior without a deprecation period]
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit c8a76dbd90c2f48df89b75bef74917f90a59b623)
+Conflicts:
+	qapi/block-export.json - context (no multi-conn, older format)
+Jira: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-52611
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c | 3 ++-
+ blockdev-nbd.c                 | 8 ++++++++
+ include/block/nbd.h            | 7 +++++++
+ qapi/block-export.json         | 4 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
+index 2ac4aedfff..32a666b5dc 100644
+--- a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
+++ b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
+@@ -411,7 +411,8 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
+         goto exit;
+     }
+ 
+-    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, 0, &local_err);
+    nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS,
+                     &local_err);
+     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
+     if (local_err != NULL) {
+         goto exit;
+diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
+index b9e8dc78f3..4bd90bac16 100644
+--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
+@@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
+ 
+ void nbd_server_start_options(NbdServerOptions *arg, Error **errp)
+ {
+    if (!arg->has_max_connections) {
+        arg->max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+    }
+
+     nbd_server_start(arg->addr, arg->tls_creds, arg->tls_authz,
+                      arg->max_connections, errp);
+ }
+@@ -183,6 +187,10 @@ void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
+ {
+     SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
+ 
+    if (!has_max_connections) {
+        max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+    }
+
+     nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, max_connections, errp);
+     qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
+ }
+diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
+index b71a297249..a31c34a8a6 100644
+--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
+@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
+  */
+ #define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+ 
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS: Number of client sockets to allow at
+ * once; must be large enough to allow a MULTI_CONN-aware client like
+ * nbdcopy to create its typical number of 8-16 sockets.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS 100
+
+ /* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
+ 
+ struct NBDOption {
+diff --git a/qapi/block-export.json b/qapi/block-export.json
+index c1b92ce1c1..181d7238fe 100644
+--- a/qapi/block-export.json
+++ b/qapi/block-export.json
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ #             recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active.
+ #             If missing, it will default to denying access (since 4.0).
+ # @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the same
+-#                   time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 0)
+#                   time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 100)
+ #
+ # Since: 4.2
+ ##
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
+ #             recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active.
+ #             If missing, it will default to denying access (since 4.0).
+ # @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the same
+-#                   time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 0)
+#                   time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 100)
+ #
+ # Returns: error if the server is already running.
+ #
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch
+++ b/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch
@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+From 4ab086cdf9a5842c49f3fe59baff1747d863b97a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 12:23:13 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Close stray clients at
+ server-stop
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+RH-Author: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+RH-MergeRequest: 388: nbd/server: fix CVE-2024-7409 (qemu crash on nbd-server-stop) [rhel-8.10.z]
+RH-Jira: RHEL-52611
+RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
+RH-Commit: [4/4] 92a20764dbee3cf94181cab412d90cbf92b4a417 (ebblake/qemu-kvm)
+
+A malicious client can attempt to connect to an NBD server, and then
+intentionally delay progress in the handshake, including if it does
+not know the TLS secrets.  Although the previous two patches reduce
+this behavior by capping the default max-connections parameter and
+killing slow clients, they did not eliminate the possibility of a
+client waiting to close the socket until after the QMP nbd-server-stop
+command is executed, at which point qemu would SEGV when trying to
+dereference the NULL nbd_server global which is no longer present.
+This amounts to a denial of service attack.  Worse, if another NBD
+server is started before the malicious client disconnects, I cannot
+rule out additional adverse effects when the old client interferes
+with the connection count of the new server (although the most likely
+is a crash due to an assertion failure when checking
+nbd_server->connections > 0).
+
+For environments without this patch, the CVE can be mitigated by
+ensuring (such as via a firewall) that only trusted clients can
+connect to an NBD server.  Note that using frameworks like libvirt
+that ensure that TLS is used and that nbd-server-stop is not executed
+while any trusted clients are still connected will only help if there
+is also no possibility for an untrusted client to open a connection
+but then stall on the NBD handshake.
+
+Given the previous patches, it would be possible to guarantee that no
+clients remain connected by having nbd-server-stop sleep for longer
+than the default handshake deadline before finally freeing the global
+nbd_server object, but that could make QMP non-responsive for a long
+time.  So intead, this patch fixes the problem by tracking all client
+sockets opened while the server is running, and forcefully closing any
+such sockets remaining without a completed handshake at the time of
+nbd-server-stop, then waiting until the coroutines servicing those
+sockets notice the state change.  nbd-server-stop now has a second
+AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED (the first is indirectly through the
+blk_exp_close_all_type() that disconnects all clients that completed
+handshakes), but forced socket shutdown is enough to progress the
+coroutines and quickly tear down all clients before the server is
+freed, thus finally fixing the CVE.
+
+This patch relies heavily on the fact that nbd/server.c guarantees
+that it only calls nbd_blockdev_client_closed() from the main loop
+(see the assertion in nbd_client_put() and the hoops used in
+nbd_client_put_nonzero() to achieve that); if we did not have that
+guarantee, we would also need a mutex protecting our accesses of the
+list of connections to survive re-entrancy from independent iothreads.
+
+Although I did not actually try to test old builds, it looks like this
+problem has existed since at least commit 862172f45c (v2.12.0, 2017) -
+even back when that patch started using a QIONetListener to handle
+listening on multiple sockets, nbd_server_free() was already unaware
+that the nbd_blockdev_client_closed callback can be reached later by a
+client thread that has not completed handshakes (and therefore the
+client's socket never got added to the list closed in
+nbd_export_close_all), despite that patch intentionally tearing down
+the QIONetListener to prevent new clients.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Ivanov <alexander.ivanov@virtuozzo.com>
+Fixes: CVE-2024-7409
+CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-14-eblake@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3e7ef738c8462c45043a1d39f702a0990406a3b3)
+Conflicts:
+ - blockdev-nbd.c:
+   - qemu_in_main_thread() not backported, but only used in assertions so
+     safe to drop
+   - AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED() not backported, use AIO_WAIT_WHILE() like
+     blk_exp_close_all_type()
+Jira: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-52611
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ blockdev-nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
+index 4bd90bac16..87839c180b 100644
+--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
+@@ -21,12 +21,18 @@
+ #include "io/channel-socket.h"
+ #include "io/net-listener.h"
+ 
+typedef struct NBDConn {
+    QIOChannelSocket *cioc;
+    QLIST_ENTRY(NBDConn) next;
+} NBDConn;
+
+ typedef struct NBDServerData {
+     QIONetListener *listener;
+     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+     char *tlsauthz;
+     uint32_t max_connections;
+     uint32_t connections;
+    QLIST_HEAD(, NBDConn) conns;
+ } NBDServerData;
+ 
+ static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
+@@ -46,6 +52,14 @@ bool nbd_server_is_running(void)
+ 
+ static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
+ {
+    NBDConn *conn = nbd_client_owner(client);
+
+    assert(nbd_server);
+
+    object_unref(OBJECT(conn->cioc));
+    QLIST_REMOVE(conn, next);
+    g_free(conn);
+
+     nbd_client_put(client);
+     assert(nbd_server->connections > 0);
+     nbd_server->connections--;
+@@ -55,14 +69,20 @@ static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
+ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
+                        gpointer opaque)
+ {
+    NBDConn *conn = g_new0(NBDConn, 1);
+
+    assert(nbd_server);
+     nbd_server->connections++;
+    object_ref(OBJECT(cioc));
+    conn->cioc = cioc;
+    QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&nbd_server->conns, conn, next);
+     nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
+ 
+     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
+     /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
+     nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+                    nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
+-                   nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
+                   nbd_blockdev_client_closed, conn);
+ }
+ 
+ static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
+@@ -76,12 +96,25 @@ static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
+ 
+ static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
+ {
+    NBDConn *conn, *tmp;
+
+     if (!server) {
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+    /*
+     * Forcefully close the listener socket, and any clients that have
+     * not yet disconnected on their own.
+     */
+     qio_net_listener_disconnect(server->listener);
+     object_unref(OBJECT(server->listener));
+    QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(conn, &server->conns, next, tmp) {
+        qio_channel_shutdown(QIO_CHANNEL(conn->cioc), QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH,
+                             NULL);
+    }
+
+    AIO_WAIT_WHILE(NULL, server->connections > 0);
+
+     if (server->tlscreds) {
+         object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
+     }
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch
+++ b/kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From faac5261d5a9af155950c4e7779c5a4721562824 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 16:05:08 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Drop non-negotiating clients
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+RH-Author: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+RH-MergeRequest: 388: nbd/server: fix CVE-2024-7409 (qemu crash on nbd-server-stop) [rhel-8.10.z]
+RH-Jira: RHEL-52611
+RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
+RH-Commit: [3/4] 8c39829f8efbded9af018a4b915af266a55a793a (ebblake/qemu-kvm)
+
+A client that opens a socket but does not negotiate is merely hogging
+qemu's resources (an open fd and a small amount of memory); and a
+malicious client that can access the port where NBD is listening can
+attempt a denial of service attack by intentionally opening and
+abandoning lots of unfinished connections.  The previous patch put a
+default bound on the number of such ongoing connections, but once that
+limit is hit, no more clients can connect (including legitimate ones).
+The solution is to insist that clients complete handshake within a
+reasonable time limit, defaulting to 10 seconds.  A client that has
+not successfully completed NBD_OPT_GO by then (including the case of
+where the client didn't know TLS credentials to even reach the point
+of NBD_OPT_GO) is wasting our time and does not deserve to stay
+connected.  Later patches will allow fine-tuning the limit away from
+the default value (including disabling it for doing integration
+testing of the handshake process itself).
+
+Note that this patch in isolation actually makes it more likely to see
+qemu SEGV after nbd-server-stop, as any client socket still connected
+when the server shuts down will now be closed after 10 seconds rather
+than at the client's whims.  That will be addressed in the next patch.
+
+For a demo of this patch in action:
+$ qemu-nbd -f raw -r -t -e 10 file &
+$ nbdsh --opt-mode -c '
+H = list()
+for i in range(20):
+  print(i)
+  H.insert(i, nbd.NBD())
+  H[i].set_opt_mode(True)
+  H[i].connect_uri("nbd://localhost")
+'
+$ kill $!
+
+where later connections get to start progressing once earlier ones are
+forcefully dropped for taking too long, rather than hanging.
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-13-eblake@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+[eblake: rebase to changes earlier in series, reduce scope of timer]
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit b9b72cb3ce15b693148bd09cef7e50110566d8a0)
+Conflicts:
+	nbd/server.c - context with different aiocontext locking
+        nbd/trace-events - context with no client-connection.c
+Jira: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-52611
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ nbd/server.c     | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ nbd/trace-events |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
+index cc1b6838bf..1265068f70 100644
+--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
+@@ -2701,22 +2701,48 @@ static void nbd_client_receive_next_request(NBDClient *client)
+     }
+ }
+ 
+static void nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void *opaque)
+{
+    QIOChannel *ioc = opaque;
+
+    trace_nbd_handshake_timer_cb();
+    qio_channel_shutdown(ioc, QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH, NULL);
+}
+
+ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
+ {
+     NBDClient *client = opaque;
+     Error *local_err = NULL;
+    QEMUTimer *handshake_timer = NULL;
+ 
+     qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
+ 
+-    /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
+    /*
+     * Create a timer to bound the time spent in negotiation. If the
+     * timer expires, it is likely nbd_negotiate will fail because the
+     * socket was shutdown.
+     */
+    if (client->handshake_max_secs > 0) {
+        handshake_timer = aio_timer_new(qemu_get_aio_context(),
+                                        QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME,
+                                        SCALE_NS,
+                                        nbd_handshake_timer_cb,
+                                        client->sioc);
+        timer_mod(handshake_timer,
+                  qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME) +
+                  client->handshake_max_secs * NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND);
+    }
+
+     if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
+         if (local_err) {
+             error_report_err(local_err);
+         }
+        timer_free(handshake_timer);
+         client_close(client, false);
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+    timer_free(handshake_timer);
+     nbd_client_receive_next_request(client);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/nbd/trace-events b/nbd/trace-events
+index c4919a2dd5..553546f1f2 100644
+--- a/nbd/trace-events
+++ b/nbd/trace-events
+@@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ nbd_co_receive_request_decode_type(uint64_t handle, uint16_t type, const char *n
+ nbd_co_receive_request_payload_received(uint64_t handle, uint32_t len) "Payload received: handle = %" PRIu64 ", len = %" PRIu32
+ nbd_co_receive_align_compliance(const char *op, uint64_t from, uint32_t len, uint32_t align) "client sent non-compliant unaligned %s request: from=0x%" PRIx64 ", len=0x%" PRIx32 ", align=0x%" PRIx32
+ nbd_trip(void) "Reading request"
+nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void) "client took too long to negotiate"
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/kvm-nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch
+++ b/kvm-nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch
@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From 0d204cb81aec2b13254a0bd53938f53bfea81cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 08:50:01 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] nbd/server: Plumb in new args to nbd_client_add()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+RH-Author: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+RH-MergeRequest: 388: nbd/server: fix CVE-2024-7409 (qemu crash on nbd-server-stop) [rhel-8.10.z]
+RH-Jira: RHEL-52611
+RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
+RH-Commit: [1/4] 292be8dd2df2a840b2200e31a27e9d17fdab91ad (ebblake/qemu-kvm)
+
+Upcoming patches to fix a CVE need to track an opaque pointer passed
+in by the owner of a client object, as well as request for a time
+limit on how fast negotiation must complete.  Prepare for that by
+changing the signature of nbd_client_new() and adding an accessor to
+get at the opaque pointer, although for now the two servers
+(qemu-nbd.c and blockdev-nbd.c) do not change behavior even though
+they pass in a new default timeout value.
+
+Suggested-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-11-eblake@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+[eblake: s/LIMIT/MAX_SECS/ as suggested by Dan]
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit fb1c2aaa981e0a2fa6362c9985f1296b74f055ac)
+Jira: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-52611
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ blockdev-nbd.c      |  6 ++++--
+ include/block/nbd.h | 11 ++++++++++-
+ nbd/server.c        | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
+ qemu-nbd.c          |  4 +++-
+ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
+index bdfa7ed3a5..b9e8dc78f3 100644
+--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
+@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
+     nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
+ 
+     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
+-    nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
+-                   nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
+    /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
+    nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+                   nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
+                   nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
+diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
+index 78d101b774..b71a297249 100644
+--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
+ 
+ extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
+ 
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS: Number of seconds in which client must
+ * succeed at NBD_OPT_GO before being forcefully dropped as too slow.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+
+ /* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
+ 
+ struct NBDOption {
+@@ -338,9 +344,12 @@ AioContext *nbd_export_aio_context(NBDExport *exp);
+ NBDExport *nbd_export_find(const char *name);
+ 
+ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+                    uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
+                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
+                     const char *tlsauthz,
+-                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
+                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+                    void *owner);
+void *nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client);
+ void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
+ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
+ 
+diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
+index 6db124cf53..cc1b6838bf 100644
+--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
+@@ -120,10 +120,12 @@ typedef struct NBDExportMetaContexts {
+ struct NBDClient {
+     int refcount;
+     void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated);
+    void *owner;
+ 
+     NBDExport *exp;
+     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
+     char *tlsauthz;
+    uint32_t handshake_max_secs;
+     QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */
+     QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
+ 
+@@ -2706,6 +2708,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
+ 
+     qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
+ 
+    /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
+     if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
+         if (local_err) {
+             error_report_err(local_err);
+@@ -2718,14 +2721,17 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc.
+ * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc and @owner.
+  * Begin servicing it in a coroutine.  When the connection closes, call
+- * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation.
+ * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation
+ * within @handshake_max_secs seconds (0 for unbounded).
+  */
+ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+                    uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
+                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
+                     const char *tlsauthz,
+-                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
+                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+                    void *owner)
+ {
+     NBDClient *client;
+     Coroutine *co;
+@@ -2737,13 +2743,21 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+         object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
+     }
+     client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+    client->handshake_max_secs = handshake_max_secs;
+     client->sioc = sioc;
+     qio_channel_set_delay(QIO_CHANNEL(sioc), false);
+     object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
+     client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
+     object_ref(OBJECT(client->ioc));
+     client->close_fn = close_fn;
+    client->owner = owner;
+ 
+     co = qemu_coroutine_create(nbd_co_client_start, client);
+     qemu_coroutine_enter(co);
+ }
+
+void *
+nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client)
+{
+    return client->owner;
+}
+diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
+index c6c20df68a..f48abf379e 100644
+--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
+@@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
+ 
+     nb_fds++;
+     nbd_update_server_watch();
+-    nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed);
+    /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as command line option */
+    nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+                   tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ static void nbd_update_server_watch(void)
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/kvm-vnc-increase-max-display-size.patch
+++ b/kvm-vnc-increase-max-display-size.patch
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From a38e51982522910475ec051f81116639254a2955 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 30 May 2024 13:10:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] vnc: increase max display size
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+RH-Author: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+RH-MergeRequest: 391: vnc: increase max display size
+RH-Jira: RHEL-50854
+RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
+RH-Commit: [1/1] 8d79bbc6949ca7264f6701121b47e946eb8ac824
+
+Resolves:
+https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-50854
+
+It's 2024.  4k display resolutions are a thing these days.
+Raise width and height limits of the qemu vnc server.
+
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1596
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20240530111029.1726329-1-kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1f1736a8f16d27a99abd371caaeedc10e6411d15)
+Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+---
+ ui/vnc.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
+index a7149831f9..4d44957cc2 100644
+--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
+@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ typedef void VncSendHextileTile(VncState *vs,
+ 
+ /* VNC_MAX_WIDTH must be a multiple of VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT. */
+ 
+-#define VNC_MAX_WIDTH ROUND_UP(2560, VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT)
+-#define VNC_MAX_HEIGHT 2048
+#define VNC_MAX_WIDTH ROUND_UP(5120, VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT)
+#define VNC_MAX_HEIGHT 2160
+ 
+ /* VNC_DIRTY_BITS is the number of bits in the dirty bitmap. */
+ #define VNC_DIRTY_BITS (VNC_MAX_WIDTH / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT)
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/qemu-kvm.spec
+++ b/qemu-kvm.spec
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Obsoletes: %1-rhev <= %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Summary: QEMU is a machine emulator and virtualizer
 Name: qemu-kvm
 Version: 6.2.0
-Release: 51%{?rcrel}%{?dist}
+Release: 52%{?rcrel}%{?dist}
 # Epoch because we pushed a qemu-1.0 package. AIUI this can't ever be dropped
 Epoch: 15
 License: GPLv2 and GPLv2+ and CC-BY
@ -869,6 +869,16 @@ Patch353: kvm-hw-display-virtio-gpu-Protect-from-DMA-re-entrancy-b.patch
 Patch354: kvm-hw-char-virtio-serial-bus-Protect-from-DMA-re-entran.patch
 # For RHEL-32276 - CVE-2024-3446 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: QEMU: virtio: DMA reentrancy issue leads to double free vulnerability [rhel-8]
 Patch355: kvm-hw-virtio-virtio-crypto-Protect-from-DMA-re-entrancy.patch
+# For RHEL-52611 - CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z]
+Patch356: kvm-nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch
+# For RHEL-52611 - CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z]
+Patch357: kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch
+# For RHEL-52611 - CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z]
+Patch358: kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch
+# For RHEL-52611 - CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z]
+Patch359: kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch
+# For RHEL-50854 - vnc: increase max display size to 4K
+Patch360: kvm-vnc-increase-max-display-size.patch

 BuildRequires: wget
 BuildRequires: rpm-build
@ -2038,6 +2048,17 @@ sh %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/modules/kvm.modules &> /dev/null || :


 %changelog
+* Wed Aug 21 2024 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 6.2.0-52.el8
+- kvm-nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch [RHEL-52611]
+- kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch [RHEL-52611]
+- kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch [RHEL-52611]
+- kvm-nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch [RHEL-52611]
+- kvm-vnc-increase-max-display-size.patch [RHEL-50854]
+- Resolves: RHEL-52611
+  (CVE-2024-7409 virt:rhel/qemu-kvm: Denial of Service via Improper Synchronization in QEMU NBD Server During Socket Closure [rhel-8.10.z])
+- Resolves: RHEL-50854
+  (vnc: increase max display size to 4K)
+
 * Mon Jul 29 2024 Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com> - 6.2.0-51.el8
 - kvm-virtio-gpu-free-BHs-by-implementing-unrealize.patch [RHEL-32276]
 - kvm-virtio-gpu-reset-gfx-resources-in-main-thread.patch [RHEL-32276]