diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 65d9de8..c76fff1 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1 +1 @@ -SOURCES/Python-3.8.16-noexe.tar.xz +SOURCES/Python-3.8.17-noexe.tar.xz diff --git a/.python38.metadata b/.python38.metadata index 596d6f6..060653b 100644 --- a/.python38.metadata +++ b/.python38.metadata @@ -1 +1 @@ -ec97523b167d5b0e915b37e58f03da6384b15caa SOURCES/Python-3.8.16-noexe.tar.xz +5ecdca78a141bb6d7e13732920886affd7338fca SOURCES/Python-3.8.17-noexe.tar.xz diff --git a/SOURCES/00189-use-rpm-wheels.patch b/SOURCES/00189-use-rpm-wheels.patch index 15021bf..521efef 100644 --- a/SOURCES/00189-use-rpm-wheels.patch +++ b/SOURCES/00189-use-rpm-wheels.patch @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ index b291e9a..798d0f4 100644 __all__ = ["version", "bootstrap"] _PACKAGE_NAMES = ('setuptools', 'pip') -_SETUPTOOLS_VERSION = "56.0.0" --_PIP_VERSION = "22.0.4" +-_PIP_VERSION = "23.0.1" + +_WHEEL_DIR = "/usr/share/python38-wheels/" + diff --git a/SOURCES/00397-tarfile-filter.patch b/SOURCES/00397-tarfile-filter.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..135c595 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/00397-tarfile-filter.patch @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +From f36519078bde3cce4328c03fffccb846121fb5bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Viktorin +Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 20:23:03 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix symlink handling for tarfile.data_filter + +--- + Doc/library/tarfile.rst | 5 +++++ + Lib/tarfile.py | 9 ++++++++- + Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Doc/library/tarfile.rst b/Doc/library/tarfile.rst +index 00f3070324e..e0511bfeb64 100644 +--- a/Doc/library/tarfile.rst ++++ b/Doc/library/tarfile.rst +@@ -740,6 +740,11 @@ A ``TarInfo`` object has the following public data attributes: + Name of the target file name, which is only present in :class:`TarInfo` objects + of type :const:`LNKTYPE` and :const:`SYMTYPE`. + ++ For symbolic links (``SYMTYPE``), the linkname is relative to the directory ++ that contains the link. ++ For hard links (``LNKTYPE``), the linkname is relative to the root of ++ the archive. ++ + + .. attribute:: TarInfo.uid + :type: int +diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py +index df4e41f7a0d..d62323715b4 100755 +--- a/Lib/tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py +@@ -802,7 +802,14 @@ def _get_filtered_attrs(member, dest_path, for_data=True): + if member.islnk() or member.issym(): + if os.path.isabs(member.linkname): + raise AbsoluteLinkError(member) +- target_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(dest_path, member.linkname)) ++ if member.issym(): ++ target_path = os.path.join(dest_path, ++ os.path.dirname(name), ++ member.linkname) ++ else: ++ target_path = os.path.join(dest_path, ++ member.linkname) ++ target_path = os.path.realpath(target_path) + if os.path.commonpath([target_path, dest_path]) != dest_path: + raise LinkOutsideDestinationError(member, target_path) + return new_attrs +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +index 2eda7fc4cea..79fc35c2895 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +@@ -3337,10 +3337,12 @@ def __exit__(self, *exc): + self.bio = None + + def add(self, name, *, type=None, symlink_to=None, hardlink_to=None, +- mode=None, **kwargs): ++ mode=None, size=None, **kwargs): + """Add a member to the test archive. Call within `with`.""" + name = str(name) + tarinfo = tarfile.TarInfo(name).replace(**kwargs) ++ if size is not None: ++ tarinfo.size = size + if mode: + tarinfo.mode = _filemode_to_int(mode) + if symlink_to is not None: +@@ -3416,7 +3418,8 @@ def check_context(self, tar, filter): + raise self.raised_exception + self.assertEqual(self.expected_paths, set()) + +- def expect_file(self, name, type=None, symlink_to=None, mode=None): ++ def expect_file(self, name, type=None, symlink_to=None, mode=None, ++ size=None): + """Check a single file. See check_context.""" + if self.raised_exception: + raise self.raised_exception +@@ -3445,6 +3448,8 @@ def expect_file(self, name, type=None, symlink_to=None, mode=None): + self.assertTrue(path.is_fifo()) + else: + raise NotImplementedError(type) ++ if size is not None: ++ self.assertEqual(path.stat().st_size, size) + for parent in path.parents: + self.expected_paths.discard(parent) + +@@ -3649,6 +3654,22 @@ def test_sly_relative2(self): + + """['"].*moo['"], which is outside the """ + + "destination") + ++ def test_deep_symlink(self): ++ with ArchiveMaker() as arc: ++ arc.add('targetdir/target', size=3) ++ arc.add('linkdir/hardlink', hardlink_to='targetdir/target') ++ arc.add('linkdir/symlink', symlink_to='../targetdir/target') ++ ++ for filter in 'tar', 'data', 'fully_trusted': ++ with self.check_context(arc.open(), filter): ++ self.expect_file('targetdir/target', size=3) ++ self.expect_file('linkdir/hardlink', size=3) ++ if support.can_symlink(): ++ self.expect_file('linkdir/symlink', size=3, ++ symlink_to='../targetdir/target') ++ else: ++ self.expect_file('linkdir/symlink', size=3) ++ + def test_modes(self): + # Test how file modes are extracted + # (Note that the modes are ignored on platforms without working chmod) +-- +2.41.0 + +From dc84087083c5ad99a5016e8349c96d9654a08f46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Viktorin +Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 17:24:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706: Add filters for tarfile + extraction (downstream) + +Add and test RHEL-specific ways of configuring the default behavior: environment +variable and config file. +--- + Lib/tarfile.py | 42 +++++++++++++ + Lib/test/test_shutil.py | 3 +- + Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py +index 5291622ab8e..12ab00d748a 100755 +--- a/Lib/tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py +@@ -72,6 +72,13 @@ __all__ = ["TarFile", "TarInfo", "is_tarfile", "TarError", "ReadError", + "ENCODING", "USTAR_FORMAT", "GNU_FORMAT", "PAX_FORMAT", + "DEFAULT_FORMAT", "open"] + ++# If true, use the safer (but backwards-incompatible) 'tar' extraction filter, ++# rather than 'fully_trusted', by default. ++# The emitted warning is changed to match. ++_RH_SAFER_DEFAULT = True ++ ++# System-wide configuration file ++_CONFIG_FILENAME = '/etc/python/tarfile.cfg' + + #--------------------------------------------------------- + # tar constants +@@ -2188,6 +2195,41 @@ class TarFile(object): + if filter is None: + filter = self.extraction_filter + if filter is None: ++ name = os.environ.get('PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER') ++ if name is None: ++ try: ++ file = bltn_open(_CONFIG_FILENAME) ++ except FileNotFoundError: ++ pass ++ else: ++ import configparser ++ conf = configparser.ConfigParser( ++ interpolation=None, ++ comment_prefixes=('#', ), ++ ) ++ with file: ++ conf.read_file(file) ++ name = conf.get('tarfile', ++ 'PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER', ++ fallback='') ++ if name: ++ try: ++ filter = _NAMED_FILTERS[name] ++ except KeyError: ++ raise ValueError(f"filter {filter!r} not found") from None ++ self.extraction_filter = filter ++ return filter ++ if _RH_SAFER_DEFAULT: ++ warnings.warn( ++ 'The default behavior of tarfile extraction has been ' ++ + 'changed to disallow common exploits ' ++ + '(including CVE-2007-4559). ' ++ + 'By default, absolute/parent paths are disallowed ' ++ + 'and some mode bits are cleared. ' ++ + 'See https://access.redhat.com/articles/7004769 ' ++ + 'for more details.', ++ RuntimeWarning) ++ return tar_filter + return fully_trusted_filter + if isinstance(filter, str): + raise TypeError( +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py +index 5cef59ea9c6..73fffe0fd33 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py +@@ -1494,7 +1494,8 @@ class TestShutil(unittest.TestCase): + def check_unpack_tarball(self, format): + self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='fully_trusted') + self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='data') +- with support.check_no_warnings(self): ++ with support.check_warnings( ++ ('.*CVE-2007-4559', RuntimeWarning)): + self.check_unpack_archive(format) + + def test_unpack_archive_tar(self): +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +index 03be10b1fee..15df6a9ced6 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + import os + import io + from hashlib import sha256 +-from contextlib import contextmanager ++from contextlib import contextmanager, ExitStack + from random import Random + import pathlib + import shutil +@@ -2744,7 +2744,11 @@ class NoneInfoExtractTests(ReadTest): + tar = tarfile.open(tarname, mode='r', encoding="iso8859-1") + cls.control_dir = pathlib.Path(TEMPDIR) / "extractall_ctrl" + tar.errorlevel = 0 +- tar.extractall(cls.control_dir, filter=cls.extraction_filter) ++ with ExitStack() as cm: ++ if cls.extraction_filter is None: ++ cm.enter_context(warnings.catch_warnings()) ++ warnings.simplefilter(action="ignore", category=RuntimeWarning) ++ tar.extractall(cls.control_dir, filter=cls.extraction_filter) + tar.close() + cls.control_paths = set( + p.relative_to(cls.control_dir) +@@ -3407,7 +3411,8 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase): + """Ensure the default filter does not warn (like in 3.12)""" + with ArchiveMaker() as arc: + arc.add('foo') +- with support.check_no_warnings(self): ++ with support.check_warnings( ++ ('.*CVE-2007-4559', RuntimeWarning)): + with self.check_context(arc.open(), None): + self.expect_file('foo') + +@@ -3577,6 +3582,119 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase): + self.expect_exception(TypeError) # errorlevel is not int + + ++ @contextmanager ++ def rh_config_context(self, config_lines=None): ++ """Set up for testing various ways of overriding the default filter ++ ++ return a triple with: ++ - temporary directory ++ - EnvironmentVarGuard() ++ - a test archive for use with check_* methods below ++ ++ If config_lines is given, write them to the config file. Otherwise ++ the config file is missing. ++ """ ++ tempdir = pathlib.Path(TEMPDIR) / 'tmp' ++ configfile = tempdir / 'tarfile.cfg' ++ with ArchiveMaker() as arc: ++ arc.add('good') ++ arc.add('ugly', symlink_to='/etc/passwd') ++ arc.add('../bad') ++ with ExitStack() as cm: ++ cm.enter_context(support.temp_dir(tempdir)) ++ cm.enter_context(support.swap_attr(tarfile, '_CONFIG_FILENAME', str(configfile))) ++ env = cm.enter_context(support.EnvironmentVarGuard()) ++ tar = cm.enter_context(arc.open()) ++ if config_lines is not None: ++ with configfile.open('w') as f: ++ for line in config_lines: ++ print(line, file=f) ++ yield tempdir, env, tar ++ ++ def check_rh_default_behavior(self, tar, tempdir): ++ """Check RH default: warn and refuse to extract dangerous files.""" ++ with ExitStack() as cm: ++ cm.enter_context(support.check_warnings( ++ ('.*CVE-2007-4559', RuntimeWarning))) ++ cm.enter_context(self.assertRaises(tarfile.OutsideDestinationError)) ++ tar.extractall(tempdir / 'outdir') ++ ++ def check_trusted_default(self, tar, tempdir): ++ """Check 'fully_trusted' is configured as the default filter.""" ++ with support.check_no_warnings(self): ++ tar.extractall(tempdir / 'outdir') ++ self.assertTrue((tempdir / 'outdir/good').exists()) ++ self.assertEqual(os.readlink(str(tempdir / 'outdir/ugly')), ++ '/etc/passwd') ++ self.assertTrue((tempdir / 'bad').exists()) ++ ++ def test_rh_default_no_conf(self): ++ with self.rh_config_context() as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ self.check_rh_default_behavior(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_rh_default_from_file(self): ++ lines = ['[tarfile]', 'PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER=fully_trusted'] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_rh_empty_config_file(self): ++ """Empty config file -> default behavior""" ++ lines = [] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ self.check_rh_default_behavior(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_empty_config_section(self): ++ """Empty section in config file -> default behavior""" ++ lines = ['[tarfile]'] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ self.check_rh_default_behavior(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_rh_default_empty_config_option(self): ++ """Empty option value in config file -> default behavior""" ++ lines = ['[tarfile]', 'PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER='] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ self.check_rh_default_behavior(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_bad_config_option(self): ++ """Bad option value in config file -> ValueError""" ++ lines = ['[tarfile]', 'PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER=unknown!'] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ with self.assertRaises(ValueError): ++ tar.extractall(tempdir / 'outdir') ++ ++ def test_default_from_envvar(self): ++ with self.rh_config_context() as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ env['PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER'] = 'fully_trusted' ++ self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_empty_envvar(self): ++ """Empty env variable -> default behavior""" ++ with self.rh_config_context() as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ env['PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER'] = '' ++ self.check_rh_default_behavior(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_bad_envvar(self): ++ with self.rh_config_context() as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ env['PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER'] = 'unknown!' ++ with self.assertRaises(ValueError): ++ tar.extractall(tempdir / 'outdir') ++ ++ def test_envvar_overrides_file(self): ++ lines = ['[tarfile]', 'PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER=data'] ++ with self.rh_config_context(lines) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ env['PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER'] = 'fully_trusted' ++ self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ def test_monkeypatch_overrides_envvar(self): ++ with self.rh_config_context(None) as (tempdir, env, tar): ++ env['PYTHON_TARFILE_EXTRACTION_FILTER'] = 'data' ++ with support.swap_attr( ++ tarfile.TarFile, 'extraction_filter', ++ staticmethod(tarfile.fully_trusted_filter) ++ ): ++ self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir) ++ ++ + def setUpModule(): + support.unlink(TEMPDIR) + os.makedirs(TEMPDIR) +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/00399-cve-2023-24329.patch b/SOURCES/00399-cve-2023-24329.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3ee32d2..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/00399-cve-2023-24329.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,222 +0,0 @@ -From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Miss Islington (bot)" - <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 03:42:37 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] 00399: CVE-2023-24329 - -gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508) - -`urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595. - -This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%20any%20leading%20and%20trailing%20C0%20control%20or%20space%20from%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329). - -(cherry picked from commit d7f8a5fe07b0ff3a419ccec434cc405b21a5a304) -(cherry picked from commit 2f630e1ce18ad2e07428296532a68b11dc66ad10) -(cherry picked from commit 610cc0ab1b760b2abaac92bd256b96191c46b941) -(cherry picked from commit f48a96a28012d28ae37a2f4587a780a5eb779946) - -Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii -Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] ---- - Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst | 38 +++++++++++- - Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 61 ++++++++++++++++++- - Lib/urllib/parse.py | 12 ++++ - ...-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst | 3 + - 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst - -diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst -index a6cfc5d3dc..7dda121f26 100644 ---- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst -+++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst -@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. - ParseResult(scheme='http', netloc='www.cwi.nl:80', path='/%7Eguido/Python.html', - params='', query='', fragment='') - -+ .. warning:: -+ -+ :func:`urlparse` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing -+ security ` for details. - - .. versionchanged:: 3.2 - Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities. -@@ -312,8 +316,14 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. - ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is - decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised. - -- Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline -- ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL. -+ Following some of the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, leading C0 -+ control and space characters are stripped from the URL. ``\n``, -+ ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are removed from the URL at any position. -+ -+ .. warning:: -+ -+ :func:`urlsplit` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing -+ security ` for details. - - .. versionchanged:: 3.6 - Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of -@@ -326,6 +336,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. - .. versionchanged:: 3.8.10 - ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL. - -+ .. versionchanged:: 3.8.17 -+ Leading WHATWG C0 control and space characters are stripped from the URL. -+ - .. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser - - .. function:: urlunsplit(parts) -@@ -402,6 +415,27 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. - or ``scheme://host/path``). If *url* is not a wrapped URL, it is returned - without changes. - -+.. _url-parsing-security: -+ -+URL parsing security -+-------------------- -+ -+The :func:`urlsplit` and :func:`urlparse` APIs do not perform **validation** of -+inputs. They may not raise errors on inputs that other applications consider -+invalid. They may also succeed on some inputs that might not be considered -+URLs elsewhere. Their purpose is for practical functionality rather than -+purity. -+ -+Instead of raising an exception on unusual input, they may instead return some -+component parts as empty strings. Or components may contain more than perhaps -+they should. -+ -+We recommend that users of these APIs where the values may be used anywhere -+with security implications code defensively. Do some verification within your -+code before trusting a returned component part. Does that ``scheme`` make -+sense? Is that a sensible ``path``? Is there anything strange about that -+``hostname``? etc. -+ - .. _parsing-ascii-encoded-bytes: - - Parsing ASCII Encoded Bytes -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py -index 0f99130f5d..0ad3bf128b 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py -@@ -660,6 +660,65 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase): - self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") - self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment") - -+ def test_urlsplit_strip_url(self): -+ noise = bytes(range(0, 0x20 + 1)) -+ base_url = "http://User:Pass@www.python.org:080/doc/?query=yes#frag" -+ -+ url = noise.decode("utf-8") + base_url -+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) -+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http") -+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "User:Pass@www.python.org:080") -+ self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/") -+ self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=yes") -+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "frag") -+ self.assertEqual(p.username, "User") -+ self.assertEqual(p.password, "Pass") -+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org") -+ self.assertEqual(p.port, 80) -+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url) -+ -+ url = noise + base_url.encode("utf-8") -+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) -+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http") -+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"User:Pass@www.python.org:080") -+ self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/doc/") -+ self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=yes") -+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"frag") -+ self.assertEqual(p.username, b"User") -+ self.assertEqual(p.password, b"Pass") -+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org") -+ self.assertEqual(p.port, 80) -+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url.encode("utf-8")) -+ -+ # Test that trailing space is preserved as some applications rely on -+ # this within query strings. -+ query_spaces_url = "https://www.python.org:88/doc/?query= " -+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(noise.decode("utf-8") + query_spaces_url) -+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") -+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org:88") -+ self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/") -+ self.assertEqual(p.query, "query= ") -+ self.assertEqual(p.port, 88) -+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), query_spaces_url) -+ -+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit("www.pypi.org ") -+ # That "hostname" gets considered a "path" due to the -+ # trailing space and our existing logic... YUCK... -+ # and re-assembles via geturl aka unurlsplit into the original. -+ # django.core.validators.URLValidator (at least through v3.2) relies on -+ # this, for better or worse, to catch it in a ValidationError via its -+ # regular expressions. -+ # Here we test the basic round trip concept of such a trailing space. -+ self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlunsplit(p), "www.pypi.org ") -+ -+ # with scheme as cache-key -+ url = "//www.python.org/" -+ scheme = noise.decode("utf-8") + "https" + noise.decode("utf-8") -+ for _ in range(2): -+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme) -+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") -+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/") -+ - def test_attributes_bad_port(self): - """Check handling of invalid ports.""" - for bytes in (False, True): -@@ -667,7 +726,7 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase): - for port in ("foo", "1.5", "-1", "0x10"): - with self.subTest(bytes=bytes, parse=parse, port=port): - netloc = "www.example.net:" + port -- url = "http://" + netloc -+ url = "http://" + netloc + "/" - if bytes: - netloc = netloc.encode("ascii") - url = url.encode("ascii") -diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py -index f0d9d4d803..979e6d2127 100644 ---- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py -+++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py -@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ currently not entirely compliant with this RFC due to defacto - scenarios for parsing, and for backward compatibility purposes, some - parsing quirks from older RFCs are retained. The testcases in - test_urlparse.py provides a good indicator of parsing behavior. -+ -+The WHATWG URL Parser spec should also be considered. We are not compliant with -+it either due to existing user code API behavior expectations (Hyrum's Law). -+It serves as a useful guide when making changes. - """ - - import re -@@ -77,6 +81,10 @@ scheme_chars = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' - '0123456789' - '+-.') - -+# Leading and trailing C0 control and space to be stripped per WHATWG spec. -+# == "".join([chr(i) for i in range(0, 0x20 + 1)]) -+_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = '\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\t\n\x0b\x0c\r\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f ' -+ - # Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec - _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n'] - -@@ -431,6 +439,10 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True): - url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme) - url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url) - scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme) -+ # Only lstrip url as some applications rely on preserving trailing space. -+ # (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser would strip both) -+ url = url.lstrip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE) -+ scheme = scheme.strip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE) - allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments) - key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme) - cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None) -diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000000..e57ac4ed3a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst -@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ -+:func:`urllib.parse.urlsplit` now strips leading C0 control and space -+characters following the specification for URLs defined by WHATWG in -+response to CVE-2023-24329. Patch by Illia Volochii. diff --git a/SPECS/python38.spec b/SPECS/python38.spec index 71635aa..bac3497 100644 --- a/SPECS/python38.spec +++ b/SPECS/python38.spec @@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/ # WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version, # remember to update the python3-docs package as well -%global general_version %{pybasever}.16 +%global general_version %{pybasever}.17 #global prerel ... %global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel} Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}} -Release: 1%{?dist}.1 +Release: 2%{?dist} License: Python # Exclude i686 arch. Due to a modularity issue it's being added to the @@ -382,15 +382,15 @@ Patch359: 00359-CVE-2021-23336.patch # Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue46811 Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch -# 00399 # -# CVE-2023-24329 -# -# gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508) -# -# `urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595. -# -# This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%%20any%%20leading%%20and%%20trailing%%20C0%%20control%%20or%%20space%%20from%%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329). -Patch399: 00399-cve-2023-24329.patch +# 00397 # +# Add filters for tarfile extraction (CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706) +# First patch fixes determination of symlink targets, which were treated +# as relative to the root of the archive, +# rather than the directory containing the symlink. +# Not yet upstream as of this writing. +# The second patch is Red Hat configuration, see KB for documentation: +# - https://access.redhat.com/articles/7004769 +Patch397: 00397-tarfile-filter.patch # (New patches go here ^^^) # @@ -515,8 +515,8 @@ Summary: Python runtime libraries Requires: python38-setuptools-wheel Requires: python38-pip-wheel %else -Provides: bundled(python38-pip) = 19.2.3 -Provides: bundled(python38-setuptools) = 41.2.0 +Provides: bundled(python38-pip) = 23.0.1 +Provides: bundled(python38-setuptools) = 56.0.0 %endif %{?python_provide:%python_provide python38-libs} @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ The debug runtime additionally supports debug builds of C-API extensions Requires: python38-setuptools-wheel Requires: python38-pip-wheel %else -Provides: bundled(python38-pip) = 21.1.1 +Provides: bundled(python38-pip) = 23.0.1 Provides: bundled(python38-setuptools) = 56.0.0 %endif @@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ rm Lib/ensurepip/_bundled/*.whl %patch353 -p1 %patch359 -p1 %patch378 -p1 -%patch399 -p1 +%patch397 -p1 # Remove files that should be generated by the build # (This is after patching, so that we can use patches directly from upstream) @@ -1132,6 +1132,11 @@ touch %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/python3-config touch %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/python3-debug touch %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/python3-debug-config +# Strip the LTO bytecode from python.o +# Based on the fedora brp-strip-lto scriptlet +# https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/redhat-rpm-config/blob/9dd5528cf9805ebfe31cff04fe7828ad06a6023f/f/brp-strip-lto +find %{buildroot} -type f -name 'python.o' -print0 | xargs -0 \ +bash -c "strip -p -R .gnu.lto_* -R .gnu.debuglto_* -N __gnu_lto_v1 \"\$@\"" ARG0 # ====================================================== # Checks for packaging issues @@ -1838,9 +1843,19 @@ fi # ====================================================== %changelog -* Wed May 31 2023 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.8.16-1.1 +* Wed Aug 09 2023 Petr Viktorin - 3.8.17-2 +- Fix symlink handling in the fix for CVE-2023-24329 +Resolves: rhbz#263261 + +* Mon Aug 07 2023 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.8.17-1 +- Update to 3.8.17 - Security fix for CVE-2023-24329 -Resolves: rhbz#2173917 +- Add filters for tarfile extraction (CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706) +Resolves: rhbz#2173917, rhbz#263261 + +* Tue Jul 18 2023 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.8.16-2 +- Strip the LTO bytecode from python.o +Resolves: rhbz#2213526 * Tue Dec 13 2022 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.8.16-1 - Update to 3.8.16