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Update to Python 3.12.14

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Resolves: RHEL-227201
This commit is contained in:
Karolina Surma 2026-08-13 11:37:38 +02:00 committed by Lumir Balhar
parent fa397d12a4
commit da4d10868e
13 changed files with 54 additions and 921 deletions
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38
00397-tarfile-filter.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
From ddd8064257a1916726b784d43f18e889ea1634f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From e4f5d016df1811c2f42b33faa197f3295cf2cb61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com> From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 11:40:37 +0200 Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:03:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706: Add filters for tarfile extraction Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706: Add filters for tarfile extraction
(downstream) (downstream)
MIME-Version: 1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0
@ -11,14 +11,15 @@ Add and test RHEL-specific ways of configuring the default behavior: environment
variable and config file. variable and config file.
Co-Authored-By: Tomáš Hrnčiar <thrnciar@redhat.com> Co-Authored-By: Tomáš Hrnčiar <thrnciar@redhat.com>
Co-Authored-By: Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
--- ---
Lib/tarfile.py | 47 +++++++++++-- Lib/tarfile.py | 47 +++++++++++--
Lib/test/test_shutil.py | 2 +- Lib/test/test_shutil.py | 2 +-
Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) 3 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
index e1487e3..89b6843 100755 index 053adc0..386643d 100755
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py --- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py +++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ __all__ = ["TarFile", "TarInfo", "is_tarfile", "TarError", "ReadError", @@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ __all__ = ["TarFile", "TarInfo", "is_tarfile", "TarError", "ReadError",
@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ index e1487e3..89b6843 100755
#--------------------------------------------------------- #---------------------------------------------------------
# tar constants # tar constants
@@ -2218,11 +2225,41 @@ class TarFile(object): @@ -2300,11 +2307,41 @@ class TarFile(object):
if filter is None: if filter is None:
filter = self.extraction_filter filter = self.extraction_filter
if filter is None: if filter is None:
@ -83,10 +84,10 @@ index e1487e3..89b6843 100755
if isinstance(filter, str): if isinstance(filter, str):
raise TypeError( raise TypeError(
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py diff --git a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py
index 7bc5d12..88b4bdb 100644 index b7be547..e022392 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py --- a/Lib/test/test_shutil.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_shutil.py
@@ -2096,7 +2096,7 @@ class TestArchives(BaseTest, unittest.TestCase): @@ -2089,7 +2089,7 @@ class TestArchives(BaseTest, unittest.TestCase):
self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='fully_trusted') self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='fully_trusted')
self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='data') self.check_unpack_archive(format, filter='data')
with warnings_helper.check_warnings( with warnings_helper.check_warnings(
@ -96,10 +97,10 @@ index 7bc5d12..88b4bdb 100644
def test_unpack_archive_tar(self): def test_unpack_archive_tar(self):
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644 index 062b366..596c9a9 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py --- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
@@ -727,7 +727,17 @@ class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest): @@ -728,7 +728,17 @@ class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest):
tarfile.open(tarname, encoding="iso8859-1") as tar tarfile.open(tarname, encoding="iso8859-1") as tar
): ):
directories = [t for t in tar if t.isdir()] directories = [t for t in tar if t.isdir()]
@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644
tar.extractall(DIR, directories) tar.extractall(DIR, directories)
# check that the stacklevel of the deprecation warning is correct: # check that the stacklevel of the deprecation warning is correct:
self.assertEqual(cm.filename, __file__) self.assertEqual(cm.filename, __file__)
@@ -740,7 +750,17 @@ class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest): @@ -741,7 +751,17 @@ class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest):
tarfile.open(tarname, encoding="iso8859-1") as tar tarfile.open(tarname, encoding="iso8859-1") as tar
): ):
tarinfo = tar.getmember(dirtype) tarinfo = tar.getmember(dirtype)
@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644
tar.extract(tarinfo, path=DIR) tar.extract(tarinfo, path=DIR)
# check that the stacklevel of the deprecation warning is correct: # check that the stacklevel of the deprecation warning is correct:
self.assertEqual(cm.filename, __file__) self.assertEqual(cm.filename, __file__)
@@ -3144,8 +3164,8 @@ class NoneInfoExtractTests(ReadTest): @@ -3235,8 +3255,8 @@ class NoneInfoExtractTests(ReadTest):
tar.errorlevel = 0 tar.errorlevel = 0
with ExitStack() as cm: with ExitStack() as cm:
if cls.extraction_filter is None: if cls.extraction_filter is None:
@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644
tar.extractall(cls.control_dir, filter=cls.extraction_filter) tar.extractall(cls.control_dir, filter=cls.extraction_filter)
tar.close() tar.close()
cls.control_paths = set( cls.control_paths = set(
@@ -3966,7 +3986,7 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase): @@ -4505,7 +4525,7 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase):
with ArchiveMaker() as arc: with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
arc.add('foo') arc.add('foo')
with warnings_helper.check_warnings( with warnings_helper.check_warnings(
@ -157,9 +158,9 @@ index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644
with self.check_context(arc.open(), None): with self.check_context(arc.open(), None):
self.expect_file('foo') self.expect_file('foo')
@@ -4136,6 +4156,123 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase): @@ -4690,6 +4710,122 @@ class TestExtractionFilters(unittest.TestCase):
self.expect_exception(TypeError) # errorlevel is not int with self.assertRaises(tarfile.ReadError):
tar.getmembers()
+ @contextmanager + @contextmanager
+ def rh_config_context(self, config_lines=None): + def rh_config_context(self, config_lines=None):
@ -277,10 +278,9 @@ index 3fbd25e..9aa727e 100644
+ ): + ):
+ self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir) + self.check_trusted_default(tar, tempdir)
+ +
+
class OverwriteTests(archiver_tests.OverwriteTests, unittest.TestCase): class OverwriteTests(archiver_tests.OverwriteTests, unittest.TestCase):
testdir = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "testoverwrite") testdir = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "testoverwrite")
-- --
2.44.0 2.55.0

102
00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch
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@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 03:02:15 +0200
Subject: 00464: Enable PAC and BTI protections for aarch64
Apply protection against ROP/JOP attacks for aarch64 on asm_trampoline.S
The BTI flag must be applied in the assembler sources for this class
of attacks to be mitigated on newer aarch64 processors.
Upstream PR: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/130864/files
The upstream patch is incomplete but only for the case where
frame pointers are not used on 3.13+.
Since on Fedora we always compile with frame pointers the BTI/PAC
hardware protections can be enabled without losing Perf unwinding.
---
Python/asm_trampoline.S | 4 +++
Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h
diff --git a/Python/asm_trampoline.S b/Python/asm_trampoline.S
index 341d0bbe51..ae882660b5 100644
--- a/Python/asm_trampoline.S
+++ b/Python/asm_trampoline.S
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+#include "asm_trampoline_aarch64.h"
+
.text
.globl _Py_trampoline_func_start
# The following assembly is equivalent to:
@@ -20,10 +22,12 @@ _Py_trampoline_func_start:
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__AARCH64EL__) && !defined(__ILP32__)
// ARM64 little endian, 64bit ABI
// generate with aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc 12.1
+ SIGN_LR
stp x29, x30, [sp, -16]!
mov x29, sp
blr x3
ldp x29, x30, [sp], 16
+ VERIFY_LR
ret
#endif
.globl _Py_trampoline_func_end
diff --git a/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h b/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b0ec4a7dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef ASM_TRAMPOLINE_AARCH_64_H_
+#define ASM_TRAMPOLINE_AARCH_64_H_
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ * - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101028/0012/5--Feature-test-macros
+ * - https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/aaelf64/aaelf64.rst
+ */
+
+#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT) && __ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT == 1
+ #define BTI_J hint 36 /* bti j: for jumps, IE br instructions */
+ #define BTI_C hint 34 /* bti c: for calls, IE bl instructions */
+ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI 1 /* bit 0 GNU Notes is for BTI support */
+#else
+ #define BTI_J
+ #define BTI_C
+ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT)
+ #if __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT & 1
+ #define SIGN_LR hint 25 /* paciasp: sign with the A key */
+ #define VERIFY_LR hint 29 /* autiasp: verify with the A key */
+ #elif __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT & 2
+ #define SIGN_LR hint 27 /* pacibsp: sign with the b key */
+ #define VERIFY_LR hint 31 /* autibsp: verify with the b key */
+ #endif
+ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH 2 /* bit 1 GNU Notes is for PAC support */
+#else
+ #define SIGN_LR BTI_C
+ #define VERIFY_LR
+ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH 0
+#endif
+
+/* Add the BTI and PAC support to GNU Notes section */
+#if GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI != 0 || GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH != 0
+ .pushsection .note.gnu.property, "a"; /* Start a new allocatable section */
+ .balign 8; /* align it on a byte boundry */
+ .long 4; /* size of "GNU\0" */
+ .long 0x10; /* size of descriptor */
+ .long 0x5; /* NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 */
+ .asciz "GNU";
+ .long 0xc0000000; /* GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND */
+ .long 4; /* Four bytes of data */
+ .long (GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI|GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH); /* BTI or PAC is enabled */
+ .long 0; /* padding for 8 byte alignment */
+ .popsection; /* end the section */
+#endif
+
+#endif

105
00478-cve-2026-4519.patch
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@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pinky <pinky00ch@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 01:02:37 +0530
Subject: 00478: CVE-2026-4519
Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-146360)
(cherry picked from commit 82a24a4442312bdcfc4c799885e8b3e00990f02b)
Co-authored-by: Seth Michael Larson <seth@python.org>
---
Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 5 +++++
Lib/webbrowser.py | 12 ++++++++++++
.../2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst | 1 +
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
index 2d695bc883..60f094fd6a 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ def test_open(self):
options=[],
arguments=[URL])
+ def test_reject_dash_prefixes(self):
+ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME)
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open(f"--key=val {URL}")
+
class BackgroundBrowserCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py
index 13b9e85f9e..0bdb644d7d 100755
--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py
@@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ def open_new(self, url):
def open_new_tab(self, url):
return self.open(url, 2)
+ @staticmethod
+ def _check_url(url):
+ """Ensures that the URL is safe to pass to subprocesses as a parameter"""
+ if url and url.lstrip().startswith("-"):
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid URL: {url}")
+
class GenericBrowser(BaseBrowser):
"""Class for all browsers started with a command
@@ -175,6 +181,7 @@ def __init__(self, name):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.args]
try:
@@ -195,6 +202,7 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.args]
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
try:
if sys.platform[:3] == 'win':
p = subprocess.Popen(cmdline)
@@ -260,6 +268,7 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
if new == 0:
action = self.remote_action
elif new == 1:
@@ -350,6 +359,7 @@ class Konqueror(BaseBrowser):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
# XXX Currently I know no way to prevent KFM from opening a new win.
if new == 2:
action = "newTab"
@@ -554,6 +564,7 @@ def register_standard_browsers():
class WindowsDefault(BaseBrowser):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
try:
os.startfile(url)
except OSError:
@@ -638,6 +649,7 @@ def _name(self, val):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
if self.name == 'default':
script = 'open location "%s"' % url.replace('"', '%22') # opens in default browser
else:
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f27eae99a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Reject leading dashes in URLs passed to :func:`webbrowser.open`

107
00479-cve-2026-1502.patch
View File

@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seth Larson <seth@python.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 10:21:42 -0500
Subject: 00479: CVE-2026-1502
Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/client.py | 11 ++++-
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst | 2 +
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index 70451d67d4..7db4807b30 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -972,13 +972,22 @@ def _wrap_ipv6(self, ip):
return ip
def _tunnel(self):
+ if _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(self._tunnel_host):
+ raise ValueError('Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters %r'
+ % (self._tunnel_host,))
connect = b"CONNECT %s:%d %s\r\n" % (
self._wrap_ipv6(self._tunnel_host.encode("idna")),
self._tunnel_port,
self._http_vsn_str.encode("ascii"))
headers = [connect]
for header, value in self._tunnel_headers.items():
- headers.append(f"{header}: {value}\r\n".encode("latin-1"))
+ header_bytes = header.encode("latin-1")
+ value_bytes = value.encode("latin-1")
+ if not _is_legal_header_name(header_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header_bytes,))
+ if _is_illegal_header_value(value_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (value_bytes,))
+ headers.append(b"%s: %s\r\n" % (header_bytes, value_bytes))
headers.append(b"\r\n")
# Making a single send() call instead of one per line encourages
# the host OS to use a more optimal packet size instead of
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index e46dac0077..e027d930d9 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -369,6 +369,51 @@ def test_invalid_headers(self):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
conn.putheader(name, value)
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_headers(self):
+ cases = (
+ ('Invalid\r\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\rName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\r\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\rInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ (' InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\tInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid:Name', 'ValidValue'),
+ (':InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\r\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\rValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r\n'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\n'),
+ )
+ for name, value in cases:
+ with self.subTest((name, value)):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel('tunnel', headers={
+ name: value
+ })
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_host(self):
+ cases = (
+ 'invalid\r.host',
+ '\ninvalid.host',
+ 'invalid.host\r\n',
+ 'invalid.host\x00',
+ 'invalid host',
+ )
+ for tunnel_host in cases:
+ with self.subTest(tunnel_host):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel(tunnel_host)
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
body = (
b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n'
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4993633b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Reject CR/LF characters in tunnel request headers for the
+HTTPConnection.set_tunnel() method.

64
00480-cve-2026-4786.patch
View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 20:02:52 +0100
Subject: 00480: CVE-2026-4786
Fix webbrowser `%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
---
Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 9 +++++++++
Lib/webbrowser.py | 5 +++--
.../2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst | 2 ++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
index 60f094fd6a..e900c0212b 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
@@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ def test_open_new_tab(self):
options=[],
arguments=[URL])
+ def test_reject_action_dash_prefixes(self):
+ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME)
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action--incognito')
+ # new=1: action is "--new-window", so "%action" itself expands to
+ # a dash-prefixed flag even with no dash in the original URL.
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action', new=1)
+
class EdgeCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py
index 0bdb644d7d..79d410bcae 100755
--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py
@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
- self._check_url(url)
if new == 0:
action = self.remote_action
elif new == 1:
@@ -282,7 +281,9 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
raise Error("Bad 'new' parameter to open(); " +
"expected 0, 1, or 2, got %s" % new)
- args = [arg.replace("%s", url).replace("%action", action)
+ self._check_url(url.replace("%action", action))
+
+ args = [arg.replace("%action", action).replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.remote_args]
args = [arg for arg in args if arg]
success = self._invoke(args, True, autoraise, url)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45cdeebe1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+A bypass in :mod:`webbrowser` allowed URLs prefixed with ``%action`` to pass
+the dash-prefix safety check.

61
00482-cve-2026-6100.patch
View File

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 02:14:54 +0100
Subject: 00482: CVE-2026-6100
Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
---
.../Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst | 5 +++++
Modules/_bz2module.c | 1 +
Modules/_lzmamodule.c | 1 +
Modules/zlibmodule.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9502189ab1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix a dangling input pointer in :class:`lzma.LZMADecompressor`,
+:class:`bz2.BZ2Decompressor`, and internal :class:`!zlib._ZlibDecompressor`
+when memory allocation fails with :exc:`MemoryError`, which could let a
+subsequent :meth:`!decompress` call read or write through a stale pointer to
+the already-released caller buffer.
diff --git a/Modules/_bz2module.c b/Modules/_bz2module.c
index 97bd44b4ac..a732e89d55 100644
--- a/Modules/_bz2module.c
+++ b/Modules/_bz2module.c
@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ decompress(BZ2Decompressor *d, char *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ bzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
index 7bbd6569aa..103a6ef86c 100644
--- a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
+++ b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
@@ -1114,6 +1114,7 @@ decompress(Decompressor *d, uint8_t *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ lzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/Modules/zlibmodule.c b/Modules/zlibmodule.c
index f94c57e4c8..9759593b6a 100644
--- a/Modules/zlibmodule.c
+++ b/Modules/zlibmodule.c
@@ -1645,6 +1645,7 @@ decompress(ZlibDecompressor *self, uint8_t *data,
return result;
error:
+ self->zst.next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}

33
00483-cve-2026-2297.patch
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 19:55:52 +0000
Subject: 00483: CVE-2026-2297
Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
---
Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py | 2 +-
.../Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
diff --git a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
index 9b8a8dfc5a..6e4a087a10 100644
--- a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
+++ b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ def get_filename(self, fullname):
def get_data(self, path):
"""Return the data from path as raw bytes."""
- if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
+ if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, SourcelessFileLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
with _io.open_code(str(path)) as file:
return file.read()
else:
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dcdb44d4fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fixes :cve:`2026-2297` by ensuring that ``SourcelessFileLoader`` uses
+:func:`io.open_code` when opening ``.pyc`` files.

146
00484-cve-2026-3644.patch
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@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:43:43 +0000
Subject: 00484: CVE-2026-3644
Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <victor.stinner@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/cookies.py | 24 ++++++++++--
Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst | 4 ++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/cookies.py b/Lib/http/cookies.py
index d0a69cbe19..63d119ad46 100644
--- a/Lib/http/cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/http/cookies.py
@@ -335,9 +335,16 @@ def update(self, values):
key = key.lower()
if key not in self._reserved:
raise CookieError("Invalid attribute %r" % (key,))
+ if _has_control_character(key, val):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in "
+ f"cookies {key!r} {val!r}")
data[key] = val
dict.update(self, data)
+ def __ior__(self, values):
+ self.update(values)
+ return self
+
def isReservedKey(self, K):
return K.lower() in self._reserved
@@ -363,9 +370,15 @@ def __getstate__(self):
}
def __setstate__(self, state):
- self._key = state['key']
- self._value = state['value']
- self._coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ key = state['key']
+ value = state['value']
+ coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ if _has_control_character(key, value, coded_value):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies "
+ f"{key!r} {value!r} {coded_value!r}")
+ self._key = key
+ self._value = value
+ self._coded_value = coded_value
def output(self, attrs=None, header="Set-Cookie:"):
return "%s %s" % (header, self.OutputString(attrs))
@@ -377,13 +390,16 @@ def __repr__(self):
def js_output(self, attrs=None):
# Print javascript
+ output_string = self.OutputString(attrs)
+ if _has_control_character(output_string):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies")
return """
<script type="text/javascript">
<!-- begin hiding
document.cookie = \"%s\";
// end hiding -->
</script>
- """ % (self.OutputString(attrs).replace('"', r'\"'))
+ """ % (output_string.replace('"', r'\"'))
def OutputString(self, attrs=None):
# Build up our result
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
index f196bcc48e..2478a6c630 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
@@ -573,6 +573,14 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel["path"] = c0
+ # .__setstate__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': c0, 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': c0, 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': c0})
+
# .setdefault()
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.setdefault("path", c0)
@@ -587,6 +595,18 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.set("path", "val", c0)
+ # .update()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({"path": c0})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({c0: "val"})
+
+ # .__ior__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {"path": c0}
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {c0: "val"}
+
def test_control_characters_output(self):
# Tests that even if the internals of Morsel are modified
# that a call to .output() has control character safeguards.
@@ -607,6 +627,24 @@ def test_control_characters_output(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
cookie.output()
+ # Tests that .js_output() also has control character safeguards.
+ for c0 in support.control_characters_c0():
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._key = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._coded_value = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
def load_tests(loader, tests, pattern):
tests.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(cookies))
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e53a932d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Reject control characters in :class:`http.cookies.Morsel`
+:meth:`~http.cookies.Morsel.update` and
+:meth:`~http.cookies.BaseCookie.js_output`.
+This addresses :cve:`2026-3644`.

98
00485-cve-2026-4224.patch
View File

@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 21:46:06 +0000
Subject: 00485: CVE-2026-4224
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Co-authored-by: Bénédikt Tran <10796600+picnixz@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
...6-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst | 4 ++++
Modules/pyexpat.c | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
index 38f951573f..37d9086f40 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ def test_change_size_2(self):
parser.Parse(xml2, True)
self.assertEqual(self.n, 4)
+class ElementDeclHandlerTest(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_deeply_nested_content_model(self):
+ # This should raise a RecursionError and not crash.
+ # See https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/145986.
+ N = 500_000
+ data = (
+ b'<!DOCTYPE root [\n<!ELEMENT root '
+ + b'(a, ' * N + b'a' + b')' * N
+ + b'>\n]>\n<root/>\n'
+ )
+
+ parser = expat.ParserCreate()
+ parser.ElementDeclHandler = lambda _1, _2: None
+ with support.infinite_recursion():
+ with self.assertRaises(RecursionError):
+ parser.Parse(data)
+
+
class MalformedInputTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test1(self):
xml = b"\0\r\n"
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79536d1fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+:mod:`xml.parsers.expat`: Fixed a crash caused by unbounded C recursion when
+converting deeply nested XML content models with
+:meth:`~xml.parsers.expat.xmlparser.ElementDeclHandler`.
+This addresses :cve:`2026-4224`.
diff --git a/Modules/pyexpat.c b/Modules/pyexpat.c
index 79492ca5c4..8673540f35 100644
--- a/Modules/pyexpat.c
+++ b/Modules/pyexpat.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#endif
#include "Python.h"
+#include "pycore_ceval.h" // _Py_EnterRecursiveCall()
#include "pycore_runtime.h" // _Py_ID()
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -578,6 +579,10 @@ static PyObject *
conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
PyObject *(*conv_string)(const XML_Char *))
{
+ if (_Py_EnterRecursiveCall(" in conv_content_model")) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
PyObject *result = NULL;
PyObject *children = PyTuple_New(model->numchildren);
int i;
@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
conv_string);
if (child == NULL) {
Py_XDECREF(children);
- return NULL;
+ goto done;
}
PyTuple_SET_ITEM(children, i, child);
}
@@ -597,6 +602,8 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
model->type, model->quant,
conv_string,model->name, children);
}
+done:
+ _Py_LeaveRecursiveCall();
return result;
}

114
00490-cve-2026-15308.patch
View File

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
From effae3f6f868409068cc0b7ab16fe8e4251352be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 20:40:22 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] gh-153030: Fix quadratic complexity in incremental parsing in
HTMLParser (GH-153031)
When an unterminated construct (e.g. a tag or comment) spanned many
feed() calls, rescanning the growing buffer and concatenating new data
onto it were both quadratic. New data is now accumulated in a list and
only joined and parsed once enough has piled up.
(cherry picked from commit bcf98ddbc40ec9b3ee87da0124a5660b19b7e606)
Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
Lib/html/parser.py | 32 +++++++++++++++++--
Lib/test/test_htmlparser.py | 20 ++++++++++++
...-07-04-17-00-00.gh-issue-153030.RovkP6.rst | 3 ++
3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-07-04-17-00-00.gh-issue-153030.RovkP6.rst
diff --git a/Lib/html/parser.py b/Lib/html/parser.py
index bfab3e64cd54027..c5d2340b712cd6c 100644
--- a/Lib/html/parser.py
+++ b/Lib/html/parser.py
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ def reset(self):
self.cdata_elem = None
self._support_cdata = True
self._escapable = True
+ self._pending = []
+ self._pending_len = 0
+ self._parse_threshold = 1
super().reset()
def feed(self, data):
@@ -146,11 +149,36 @@ def feed(self, data):
Call this as often as you want, with as little or as much text
as you want (may include '\n').
"""
- self.rawdata = self.rawdata + data
- self.goahead(0)
+ # Accumulate new data in a list and only join and parse it once
+ # enough has piled up. Rescanning an unparsed buffer (e.g. an
+ # unterminated tag) and concatenating onto it on every call would
+ # both be quadratic in the input size.
+ self._pending_len += len(data)
+ if self._pending_len < self._parse_threshold:
+ self._pending.append(data)
+ else:
+ if not self._pending:
+ self.rawdata += data
+ else:
+ self._pending.append(data)
+ self.rawdata += ''.join(self._pending)
+ self._pending.clear()
+ self._pending_len = 0
+ n = len(self.rawdata)
+ self.goahead(0)
+ if len(self.rawdata) < n:
+ # Some data was parsed; resume on the next call.
+ self._parse_threshold = 1
+ else:
+ # Nothing was parsed; wait until the buffer doubles.
+ self._parse_threshold = len(self.rawdata)
def close(self):
"""Handle any buffered data."""
+ if self._pending:
+ self.rawdata += ''.join(self._pending)
+ self._pending.clear()
+ self._pending_len = 0
self.goahead(1)
__starttag_text = None
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_htmlparser.py b/Lib/test/test_htmlparser.py
index 303c0baa87b026b..e6d92a7ec5166b7 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_htmlparser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_htmlparser.py
@@ -930,6 +930,26 @@ def check(source):
check("<![CDATA[" * 9 * n)
check("<!doctype" * 35 * n)
+ @support.requires_resource('cpu')
+ def test_incremental_no_quadratic_complexity(self):
+ # An unterminated construct fed in many small chunks used to take
+ # quadratic time, both to rescan and to concatenate the buffer.
+ # Now it takes a fraction of a second.
+ def check(prefix, chunk, suffix):
+ parser = html.parser.HTMLParser()
+ parser.feed(prefix)
+ for _ in range(200_000):
+ parser.feed(chunk)
+ parser.feed(suffix)
+ parser.close()
+ chunk = "a" * 64
+ check("<!--", chunk, "-->") # comment
+ check("<?", chunk, ">") # processing instruction
+ check("<!doctype ", chunk, ">") # doctype
+ check("<![CDATA[", chunk, "]]>") # CDATA section
+ check("<a href='", chunk, "'>") # start tag
+ check("<script>", chunk, "</script>") # RAWTEXT element
+
class AttributesTestCase(TestCaseBase):
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-07-04-17-00-00.gh-issue-153030.RovkP6.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-07-04-17-00-00.gh-issue-153030.RovkP6.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000000..d1d60593f4ba7d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-07-04-17-00-00.gh-issue-153030.RovkP6.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Fixed quadratic complexity in incremental parsing of long unterminated
+constructs (such as tags or comments) in :class:`html.parser.HTMLParser`,
+which could be exploited for a denial of service.

23
00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Karolina Surma <ksurma@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:38:26 +0200
Subject: 00494: Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated
It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture.
---
Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
index 96fc9ca574..6a3f5731a4 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ def test_large_content_length(self):
self.assertEqual(res.read(), b'%d %d' % (size, size) + self.linesep)
def test_large_content_length_truncated(self):
- with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', 0.001):
+ with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', support.LOOPBACK_TIMEOUT):
for w in range(18, 65):
size = 1 << w
headers = {'Content-Length' : str(size)}

80
python3.12.spec
View File

@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
# WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version, # WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version,
# remember to update the python3-docs package as well # remember to update the python3-docs package as well
%global general_version %{pybasever}.13 %global general_version %{pybasever}.14
#global prerel ... #global prerel ...
%global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel} %global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel}
Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}} Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}}
Release: 3%{?dist} Release: 1%{?dist}
License: Python-2.0.1 License: Python-2.0.1
@ -420,23 +420,6 @@ Patch397: 00397-tarfile-filter.patch
# stressed on OpenSSL 3.5. # stressed on OpenSSL 3.5.
Patch462: 00462-fix-pyssl_seterror-handling-ssl_error_syscall.patch Patch462: 00462-fix-pyssl_seterror-handling-ssl_error_syscall.patch
# 00464 # 1c713e02a26bf8865bb6421749d19d0766cac178
# Enable PAC and BTI protections for aarch64
#
# Apply protection against ROP/JOP attacks for aarch64 on asm_trampoline.S
#
# The BTI flag must be applied in the assembler sources for this class
# of attacks to be mitigated on newer aarch64 processors.
#
# Upstream PR: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/130864/
#
# The upstream patch is incomplete but only for the case where
# frame pointers are not used on 3.13+.
#
# Since we don't utilize frame pointers on RHEL and CS, Perf profiling
# will not show the Python functions, irrespective of this patch.
Patch464: 00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch
# 00474 # 837ddca0372fa87ff9cee47142200caa21e77def # 00474 # 837ddca0372fa87ff9cee47142200caa21e77def
# CVE-2025-15366 # CVE-2025-15366
# #
@ -453,58 +436,11 @@ Patch474: 00474-cve-2025-15366.patch
# (cherry-picked from commit b234a2b67539f787e191d2ef19a7cbdce32874e7) # (cherry-picked from commit b234a2b67539f787e191d2ef19a7cbdce32874e7)
Patch475: 00475-cve-2025-15367.patch Patch475: 00475-cve-2025-15367.patch
# 00478 # eb93352dc8e31f4d52546b84daad875e6ff7f29e # 00494 # 430aab133397ed44cc9ee621fd311e02fee317b5
# CVE-2026-4519 # Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated
# #
# Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-146360) # It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture.
Patch478: 00478-cve-2026-4519.patch Patch494: 00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch
# 00479 # 97404b2cf62e545c2d41be7ccfed4e74da9ee665
# CVE-2026-1502
#
# Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Patch479: 00479-cve-2026-1502.patch
# 00480 # 6f4eef3ba4d9818a53698e994550ee8db17a1e2e
# CVE-2026-4786
#
# Fix webbrowser `%%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
Patch480: 00480-cve-2026-4786.patch
# 00482 # 69f14bc306fc62400d45565faa980b77858b9151
# CVE-2026-6100
#
# Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
Patch482: 00482-cve-2026-6100.patch
# 00483 # 577c595137ce6ff92158ddaf2d7b7ea86437825d
# CVE-2026-2297
#
# Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
Patch483: 00483-cve-2026-2297.patch
# 00484 # 8b5133c1ab17a060cd134bea2a4b6e1831c47fed
# CVE-2026-3644
#
# Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Patch484: 00484-cve-2026-3644.patch
# 00485 # 12a5b206676927bcee131ab4f2bd6783d2f5914a
# CVE-2026-4224
#
# Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Patch485: 00485-cve-2026-4224.patch
# 00490 #
# CVE-2026-15308
#
# gh-153030: Fix quadratic complexity in incremental parsing in HTMLParser (GH-153031) (GH-153038)
#
# When an unterminated construct (e.g. a tag or comment) spanned many
# feed() calls, rescanning the growing buffer and concatenating new data
# onto it were both quadratic. New data is now accumulated in a list and
# only joined and parsed once enough has piled up.
Patch490: 00490-cve-2026-15308.patch
# (New patches go here ^^^) # (New patches go here ^^^)
# #
@ -1877,6 +1813,10 @@ CheckPython optimized
# ====================================================== # ======================================================
%changelog %changelog
* Thu Aug 13 2026 Karolina Surma <ksurma@redhat.com> - 3.12.14-1
- Update to Python 3.12.14
Resolves: RHEL-227201
* Mon Jul 20 2026 Lukáš Zachar <lzachar@redhat.com> - 3.12.13-3 * Mon Jul 20 2026 Lukáš Zachar <lzachar@redhat.com> - 3.12.13-3
- Security fix for CVE-2026-15308 - Security fix for CVE-2026-15308
Resolves: RHEL-193774 Resolves: RHEL-193774

4
sources
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SHA512 (Python-3.12.13.tar.xz) = e1eb66f0b34581f0155e3ce25ba72cf0b4b1107672ed0ad3e86bcfe616945c9204c41ffc492f32b1066b9154913ff88343038967ad8711dd05e6f2332fdb735b SHA512 (Python-3.12.14.tar.xz) = 9007399ffdd3a493c91a98cd7a6cb93acfb8de80f3be2f5480cda36f134d49b5043a60bc6b5c62ed18cc6a2e4e3c81cb7556ac5f337e2cd58ff3449a8099ed22
SHA512 (Python-3.12.13.tar.xz.asc) = 903fd3baa7e29891bb00fb159ec9c43804a71002c4cd38902d25bf4e5167f856b37d211a5b1098ee60e1ea41f8a10a1596dd2382edc6d7367d55dd4154807fc7 SHA512 (Python-3.12.14.tar.xz.asc) = 69cc4757f5d79ea46f9b632d5b34f9f16855cb1f767f77c827ad65546ba8f77b68e75a661ebc4e4f453edd7a98a73d916491597f67d4fed9c891aa599a869324