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Security fixes for CVE-2026-1502, CVE-2026-4786, CVE-2026-6100, CVE-2026-2297, CVE-2026-3644, CVE-2026-4224

Browse Source 
Resolves: RHEL-167886, RHEL-168120
This commit is contained in:
Charalampos Stratakis 2026-04-16 05:33:50 +02:00
parent 327b224ca0
commit b2be1494ec
7 changed files with 550 additions and 1 deletions
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107
00479-cve-2026-1502.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seth Larson <seth@python.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 10:21:42 -0500
Subject: 00479: CVE-2026-1502
Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/client.py | 11 ++++-
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst | 2 +
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index 70451d67d4..7db4807b30 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -972,13 +972,22 @@ def _wrap_ipv6(self, ip):
return ip
def _tunnel(self):
+ if _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(self._tunnel_host):
+ raise ValueError('Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters %r'
+ % (self._tunnel_host,))
connect = b"CONNECT %s:%d %s\r\n" % (
self._wrap_ipv6(self._tunnel_host.encode("idna")),
self._tunnel_port,
self._http_vsn_str.encode("ascii"))
headers = [connect]
for header, value in self._tunnel_headers.items():
- headers.append(f"{header}: {value}\r\n".encode("latin-1"))
+ header_bytes = header.encode("latin-1")
+ value_bytes = value.encode("latin-1")
+ if not _is_legal_header_name(header_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header_bytes,))
+ if _is_illegal_header_value(value_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (value_bytes,))
+ headers.append(b"%s: %s\r\n" % (header_bytes, value_bytes))
headers.append(b"\r\n")
# Making a single send() call instead of one per line encourages
# the host OS to use a more optimal packet size instead of
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index e46dac0077..e027d930d9 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -369,6 +369,51 @@ def test_invalid_headers(self):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
conn.putheader(name, value)
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_headers(self):
+ cases = (
+ ('Invalid\r\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\rName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\r\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\rInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ (' InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\tInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid:Name', 'ValidValue'),
+ (':InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\r\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\rValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r\n'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\n'),
+ )
+ for name, value in cases:
+ with self.subTest((name, value)):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel('tunnel', headers={
+ name: value
+ })
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_host(self):
+ cases = (
+ 'invalid\r.host',
+ '\ninvalid.host',
+ 'invalid.host\r\n',
+ 'invalid.host\x00',
+ 'invalid host',
+ )
+ for tunnel_host in cases:
+ with self.subTest(tunnel_host):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel(tunnel_host)
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
body = (
b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n'
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4993633b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Reject CR/LF characters in tunnel request headers for the
+HTTPConnection.set_tunnel() method.

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00480-cve-2026-4786.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 20:02:52 +0100
Subject: 00480: CVE-2026-4786
Fix webbrowser `%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
---
Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 9 +++++++++
Lib/webbrowser.py | 5 +++--
.../2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst | 2 ++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
index 60f094fd6a..e900c0212b 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
@@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ def test_open_new_tab(self):
options=[],
arguments=[URL])
+ def test_reject_action_dash_prefixes(self):
+ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME)
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action--incognito')
+ # new=1: action is "--new-window", so "%action" itself expands to
+ # a dash-prefixed flag even with no dash in the original URL.
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action', new=1)
+
class EdgeCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py
index 0bdb644d7d..79d410bcae 100755
--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py
@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
- self._check_url(url)
if new == 0:
action = self.remote_action
elif new == 1:
@@ -282,7 +281,9 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
raise Error("Bad 'new' parameter to open(); " +
"expected 0, 1, or 2, got %s" % new)
- args = [arg.replace("%s", url).replace("%action", action)
+ self._check_url(url.replace("%action", action))
+
+ args = [arg.replace("%action", action).replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.remote_args]
args = [arg for arg in args if arg]
success = self._invoke(args, True, autoraise, url)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45cdeebe1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+A bypass in :mod:`webbrowser` allowed URLs prefixed with ``%action`` to pass
+the dash-prefix safety check.

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00482-cve-2026-6100.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 02:14:54 +0100
Subject: 00482: CVE-2026-6100
Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
---
.../Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst | 5 +++++
Modules/_bz2module.c | 1 +
Modules/_lzmamodule.c | 1 +
Modules/zlibmodule.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9502189ab1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix a dangling input pointer in :class:`lzma.LZMADecompressor`,
+:class:`bz2.BZ2Decompressor`, and internal :class:`!zlib._ZlibDecompressor`
+when memory allocation fails with :exc:`MemoryError`, which could let a
+subsequent :meth:`!decompress` call read or write through a stale pointer to
+the already-released caller buffer.
diff --git a/Modules/_bz2module.c b/Modules/_bz2module.c
index 97bd44b4ac..a732e89d55 100644
--- a/Modules/_bz2module.c
+++ b/Modules/_bz2module.c
@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ decompress(BZ2Decompressor *d, char *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ bzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
index 7bbd6569aa..103a6ef86c 100644
--- a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
+++ b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
@@ -1114,6 +1114,7 @@ decompress(Decompressor *d, uint8_t *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ lzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/Modules/zlibmodule.c b/Modules/zlibmodule.c
index f94c57e4c8..9759593b6a 100644
--- a/Modules/zlibmodule.c
+++ b/Modules/zlibmodule.c
@@ -1645,6 +1645,7 @@ decompress(ZlibDecompressor *self, uint8_t *data,
return result;
error:
+ self->zst.next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}

33
00483-cve-2026-2297.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 19:55:52 +0000
Subject: 00483: CVE-2026-2297
Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
---
Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py | 2 +-
.../Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
diff --git a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
index 9b8a8dfc5a..6e4a087a10 100644
--- a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
+++ b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ def get_filename(self, fullname):
def get_data(self, path):
"""Return the data from path as raw bytes."""
- if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
+ if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, SourcelessFileLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
with _io.open_code(str(path)) as file:
return file.read()
else:
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dcdb44d4fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fixes :cve:`2026-2297` by ensuring that ``SourcelessFileLoader`` uses
+:func:`io.open_code` when opening ``.pyc`` files.

146
00484-cve-2026-3644.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:43:43 +0000
Subject: 00484: CVE-2026-3644
Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <victor.stinner@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/cookies.py | 24 ++++++++++--
Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst | 4 ++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/cookies.py b/Lib/http/cookies.py
index d0a69cbe19..63d119ad46 100644
--- a/Lib/http/cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/http/cookies.py
@@ -335,9 +335,16 @@ def update(self, values):
key = key.lower()
if key not in self._reserved:
raise CookieError("Invalid attribute %r" % (key,))
+ if _has_control_character(key, val):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in "
+ f"cookies {key!r} {val!r}")
data[key] = val
dict.update(self, data)
+ def __ior__(self, values):
+ self.update(values)
+ return self
+
def isReservedKey(self, K):
return K.lower() in self._reserved
@@ -363,9 +370,15 @@ def __getstate__(self):
}
def __setstate__(self, state):
- self._key = state['key']
- self._value = state['value']
- self._coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ key = state['key']
+ value = state['value']
+ coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ if _has_control_character(key, value, coded_value):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies "
+ f"{key!r} {value!r} {coded_value!r}")
+ self._key = key
+ self._value = value
+ self._coded_value = coded_value
def output(self, attrs=None, header="Set-Cookie:"):
return "%s %s" % (header, self.OutputString(attrs))
@@ -377,13 +390,16 @@ def __repr__(self):
def js_output(self, attrs=None):
# Print javascript
+ output_string = self.OutputString(attrs)
+ if _has_control_character(output_string):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies")
return """
<script type="text/javascript">
<!-- begin hiding
document.cookie = \"%s\";
// end hiding -->
</script>
- """ % (self.OutputString(attrs).replace('"', r'\"'))
+ """ % (output_string.replace('"', r'\"'))
def OutputString(self, attrs=None):
# Build up our result
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
index f196bcc48e..2478a6c630 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
@@ -573,6 +573,14 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel["path"] = c0
+ # .__setstate__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': c0, 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': c0, 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': c0})
+
# .setdefault()
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.setdefault("path", c0)
@@ -587,6 +595,18 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.set("path", "val", c0)
+ # .update()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({"path": c0})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({c0: "val"})
+
+ # .__ior__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {"path": c0}
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {c0: "val"}
+
def test_control_characters_output(self):
# Tests that even if the internals of Morsel are modified
# that a call to .output() has control character safeguards.
@@ -607,6 +627,24 @@ def test_control_characters_output(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
cookie.output()
+ # Tests that .js_output() also has control character safeguards.
+ for c0 in support.control_characters_c0():
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._key = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._coded_value = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
def load_tests(loader, tests, pattern):
tests.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(cookies))
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e53a932d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Reject control characters in :class:`http.cookies.Morsel`
+:meth:`~http.cookies.Morsel.update` and
+:meth:`~http.cookies.BaseCookie.js_output`.
+This addresses :cve:`2026-3644`.

98
00485-cve-2026-4224.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 21:46:06 +0000
Subject: 00485: CVE-2026-4224
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Co-authored-by: Bénédikt Tran <10796600+picnixz@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
...6-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst | 4 ++++
Modules/pyexpat.c | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
index 38f951573f..37d9086f40 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ def test_change_size_2(self):
parser.Parse(xml2, True)
self.assertEqual(self.n, 4)
+class ElementDeclHandlerTest(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_deeply_nested_content_model(self):
+ # This should raise a RecursionError and not crash.
+ # See https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/145986.
+ N = 500_000
+ data = (
+ b'<!DOCTYPE root [\n<!ELEMENT root '
+ + b'(a, ' * N + b'a' + b')' * N
+ + b'>\n]>\n<root/>\n'
+ )
+
+ parser = expat.ParserCreate()
+ parser.ElementDeclHandler = lambda _1, _2: None
+ with support.infinite_recursion():
+ with self.assertRaises(RecursionError):
+ parser.Parse(data)
+
+
class MalformedInputTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test1(self):
xml = b"\0\r\n"
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79536d1fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+:mod:`xml.parsers.expat`: Fixed a crash caused by unbounded C recursion when
+converting deeply nested XML content models with
+:meth:`~xml.parsers.expat.xmlparser.ElementDeclHandler`.
+This addresses :cve:`2026-4224`.
diff --git a/Modules/pyexpat.c b/Modules/pyexpat.c
index 79492ca5c4..8673540f35 100644
--- a/Modules/pyexpat.c
+++ b/Modules/pyexpat.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#endif
#include "Python.h"
+#include "pycore_ceval.h" // _Py_EnterRecursiveCall()
#include "pycore_runtime.h" // _Py_ID()
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -578,6 +579,10 @@ static PyObject *
conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
PyObject *(*conv_string)(const XML_Char *))
{
+ if (_Py_EnterRecursiveCall(" in conv_content_model")) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
PyObject *result = NULL;
PyObject *children = PyTuple_New(model->numchildren);
int i;
@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
conv_string);
if (child == NULL) {
Py_XDECREF(children);
- return NULL;
+ goto done;
}
PyTuple_SET_ITEM(children, i, child);
}
@@ -597,6 +602,8 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
model->type, model->quant,
conv_string,model->name, children);
}
+done:
+ _Py_LeaveRecursiveCall();
return result;
}

42
python3.12.spec
View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
#global prerel ...
%global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel}
Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}}
Release: 1%{?dist}
Release: 2%{?dist}
License: Python-2.0.1
@ -459,6 +459,42 @@ Patch475: 00475-cve-2025-15367.patch
# Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-146360)
Patch478: 00478-cve-2026-4519.patch
# 00479 # 97404b2cf62e545c2d41be7ccfed4e74da9ee665
# CVE-2026-1502
#
# Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Patch479: 00479-cve-2026-1502.patch
# 00480 # 6f4eef3ba4d9818a53698e994550ee8db17a1e2e
# CVE-2026-4786
#
# Fix webbrowser `%%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
Patch480: 00480-cve-2026-4786.patch
# 00482 # 69f14bc306fc62400d45565faa980b77858b9151
# CVE-2026-6100
#
# Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
Patch482: 00482-cve-2026-6100.patch
# 00483 # 577c595137ce6ff92158ddaf2d7b7ea86437825d
# CVE-2026-2297
#
# Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
Patch483: 00483-cve-2026-2297.patch
# 00484 # 8b5133c1ab17a060cd134bea2a4b6e1831c47fed
# CVE-2026-3644
#
# Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Patch484: 00484-cve-2026-3644.patch
# 00485 # 12a5b206676927bcee131ab4f2bd6783d2f5914a
# CVE-2026-4224
#
# Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Patch485: 00485-cve-2026-4224.patch
# (New patches go here ^^^)
#
# When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@ -1830,6 +1866,10 @@ CheckPython optimized
# ======================================================
%changelog
* Thu Apr 16 2026 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.12.13-2
- Security fixes for CVE-2026-1502, CVE-2026-4786, CVE-2026-6100, CVE-2026-2297, CVE-2026-3644, CVE-2026-4224
Resolves: RHEL-167886, RHEL-168120
* Thu Apr 16 2026 Tomáš Hrnčiar <thrnciar@redhat.com> - 3.12.13-1
- Update to 3.12.13
- Security fixes for CVE-2025-6075, CVE-2025-13837, CVE-2025-15282, CVE-2025-59375, CVE-2026-0672