import python2-pip-9.0.3-18.module+el8.3.0+7707+eb4bba01

SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From 7917dbda14ef64a5e7fdea48383a266577484ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Orsava <torsava@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 12:51:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIX #6413 pip install <url> allow directory traversal
+ (tests)
+
+---
+ tests/unit/test_download.py | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/unit/test_download.py b/tests/unit/test_download.py
+index ee4b11c..15f99ec 100644
+--- a/tests/unit/test_download.py
++++ b/tests/unit/test_download.py
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ import hashlib
+ import os
++import sys
+ from io import BytesIO
+ from shutil import rmtree, copy
+ from tempfile import mkdtemp
+@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ import pip
+ from pip.exceptions import HashMismatch
+ from pip.download import (
+     PipSession, SafeFileCache, path_to_url, unpack_http_url, url_to_path,
++    _download_http_url, parse_content_disposition, sanitize_content_filename,
+     unpack_file_url,
+ )
+ from pip.index import Link
+@@ -123,6 +125,89 @@ def test_unpack_http_url_bad_downloaded_checksum(mock_unpack_file):
+         rmtree(download_dir)
+ 
+ 
++@pytest.mark.parametrize("filename, expected", [
++    ('dir/file', 'file'),
++    ('../file', 'file'),
++    ('../../file', 'file'),
++    ('../', ''),
++    ('../..', '..'),
++    ('/', ''),
++])
++def test_sanitize_content_filename(filename, expected):
++    """
++    Test inputs where the result is the same for Windows and non-Windows.
++    """
++    assert sanitize_content_filename(filename) == expected
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize("filename, win_expected, non_win_expected", [
++    ('dir\\file', 'file', 'dir\\file'),
++    ('..\\file', 'file', '..\\file'),
++    ('..\\..\\file', 'file', '..\\..\\file'),
++    ('..\\', '', '..\\'),
++    ('..\\..', '..', '..\\..'),
++    ('\\', '', '\\'),
++])
++def test_sanitize_content_filename__platform_dependent(
++    filename,
++    win_expected,
++    non_win_expected
++):
++    """
++    Test inputs where the result is different for Windows and non-Windows.
++    """
++    if sys.platform == 'win32':
++        expected = win_expected
++    else:
++        expected = non_win_expected
++    assert sanitize_content_filename(filename) == expected
++
++
++@pytest.mark.parametrize("content_disposition, default_filename, expected", [
++    ('attachment;filename="../file"', 'df', 'file'),
++])
++def test_parse_content_disposition(
++    content_disposition,
++    default_filename,
++    expected
++):
++    actual = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename)
++    assert actual == expected
++
++
++def test_download_http_url__no_directory_traversal(tmpdir):
++    """
++    Test that directory traversal doesn't happen on download when the
++    Content-Disposition header contains a filename with a ".." path part.
++    """
++    mock_url = 'http://www.example.com/whatever.tgz'
++    contents = b'downloaded'
++    link = Link(mock_url)
++
++    session = Mock()
++    resp = MockResponse(contents)
++    resp.url = mock_url
++    resp.headers = {
++        # Set the content-type to a random value to prevent
++        # mimetypes.guess_extension from guessing the extension.
++        'content-type': 'random',
++        'content-disposition': 'attachment;filename="../out_dir_file"'
++    }
++    session.get.return_value = resp
++
++    download_dir = tmpdir.join('download')
++    os.mkdir(download_dir)
++    file_path, content_type = _download_http_url(
++        link,
++        session,
++        download_dir,
++        hashes=None,
++    )
++    # The file should be downloaded to download_dir.
++    actual = os.listdir(download_dir)
++    assert actual == ['out_dir_file']
++
++
+ @pytest.mark.skipif("sys.platform == 'win32'")
+ def test_path_to_url_unix():
+     assert path_to_url('/tmp/file') == 'file:///tmp/file'
+-- 
+2.25.4
+

SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 8044d9f2fbcb09f09a62b26ac1d8a134976bb2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: gzpan123 <gzpan123@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:25:45 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] FIX #6413 pip install <url> allow directory traversal
+
+---
+ news/6413.bugfix |  3 +++
+ pip/download.py  | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 news/6413.bugfix
+
+diff --git a/news/6413.bugfix b/news/6413.bugfix
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..68d0a72
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/news/6413.bugfix
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++Prevent ``pip install <url>`` from permitting directory traversal if e.g.
++a malicious server sends a ``Content-Disposition`` header with a filename
++containing ``../`` or ``..\\``.
+diff --git a/pip/download.py b/pip/download.py
+index 039e55a..b3d169b 100644
+--- a/pip/download.py
++++ b/pip/download.py
+@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ __all__ = ['get_file_content',
+            'is_url', 'url_to_path', 'path_to_url',
+            'is_archive_file', 'unpack_vcs_link',
+            'unpack_file_url', 'is_vcs_url', 'is_file_url',
+-           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url']
++           'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url',
++           'parse_content_disposition', 'sanitize_content_filename']
+ 
+ 
+ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+@@ -824,6 +825,29 @@ def unpack_url(link, location, download_dir=None,
+         write_delete_marker_file(location)
+ 
+ 
++def sanitize_content_filename(filename):
++    # type: (str) -> str
++    """
++    Sanitize the "filename" value from a Content-Disposition header.
++    """
++    return os.path.basename(filename)
++
++
++def parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename):
++    # type: (str, str) -> str
++    """
++    Parse the "filename" value from a Content-Disposition header, and
++    return the default filename if the result is empty.
++    """
++    _type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)
++    filename = params.get('filename')
++    if filename:
++        # We need to sanitize the filename to prevent directory traversal
++        # in case the filename contains ".." path parts.
++        filename = sanitize_content_filename(filename)
++    return filename or default_filename
++
++
+ def _download_http_url(link, session, temp_dir, hashes):
+     """Download link url into temp_dir using provided session"""
+     target_url = link.url.split('#', 1)[0]
+@@ -864,10 +888,7 @@ def _download_http_url(link, session, temp_dir, hashes):
+     # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess
+     content_disposition = resp.headers.get('content-disposition')
+     if content_disposition:
+-        type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition)
+-        # We use ``or`` here because we don't want to use an "empty" value
+-        # from the filename param.
+-        filename = params.get('filename') or filename
++        filename = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, filename)
+     ext = splitext(filename)[1]
+     if not ext:
+         ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(content_type)
+-- 
+2.25.4
+

SPECS/python2-pip.spec

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 Name:           python2-%{srcname}
 # When updating, update the bundled libraries versions bellow!
 Version:        9.0.3
-Release:        16%{?dist}
+Release:        18%{?dist}
 Summary:        A tool for installing and managing Python 2 packages
 
 Group:          Development/Libraries
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/%{srcname}/%{sr
 # git clone https://github.com/pypa/pip && cd pip
 # git checkout 9.0.1 && tar -czvf ../pip-9.0.1-tests.tar.gz tests/
 %if %{with tests}
-Source1:        pip-9.0.1-tests.tar.gz
+Source1:        pip-%{version}-tests.tar.gz
 %endif
 # Manpage generated by sphinx from source tarball
 # cd pip-9.0.3/docs && make man && cp _build/man/pip.1 ../../pip2.1
@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ Patch7:         CVE-2019-11324.patch
 # https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/4851
 Patch8:         CVE-2018-18074.patch
 
+# Patch for pip install <url> allow directory traversal, leading to arbitrary file write
+# - Upstream PR: https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/6418/files
+# - Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1870184
+# Patch9 fixes the issue
+# Patch10 adds unit tests for the issue
+Patch9:         pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch
+Patch10:        pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch
+
 BuildRequires:  python2-devel
 BuildRequires:  python2-setuptools
 %if %{with tests}
@@ -218,9 +226,14 @@ popd
 pushd pip/_vendor/requests
 %patch8 -p1
 popd
+%patch9 -p1
+%if %{with tests}
+%patch10 -p1
+%endif
 
 # this goes together with patch4
 rm pip/_vendor/certifi/*.pem
+rm pip/_vendor/requests/*.pem
 sed -i '/\.pem$/d' pip.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
 
 sed -i '1d' pip/__init__.py
@@ -343,6 +356,14 @@ py.test-%{python2_version} -m 'not network'
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Aug 19 2020 Tomas Orsava <torsava@redhat.com> - 9.0.3-18
+- Patch for pip install <url> allow directory traversal, leading to arbitrary file write
+Resolves: rhbz#1870184
+
+* Mon Mar 16 2020 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 9.0.3-17
+- Remove unused CA bundle from the bundled requests library
+Resolves: rhbz#1775194
+
 * Tue Jan 14 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 9.0.3-16
 - Add four new patches for CVEs in bundled urllib3 and requests
 CVE-2018-20060, CVE-2019-11236, CVE-2019-11324, CVE-2018-18074