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From 24603488c43a7cbaffcff7e69a72ad9bb4604acf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 14:08:31 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-43804
---
src/urllib3/util/retry.py | 2 +-
test/test_retry.py | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/urllib3/util/retry.py b/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
index 02429ee..c4a687c 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ class Retry(object):
RETRY_AFTER_STATUS_CODES = frozenset([413, 429, 503])
- DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST = frozenset(['Authorization'])
+ DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST = frozenset(['Cookie', 'Authorization'])
#: Maximum backoff time.
BACKOFF_MAX = 120
diff --git a/test/test_retry.py b/test/test_retry.py
index 7546c43..b6d52bf 100644
--- a/test/test_retry.py
+++ b/test/test_retry.py
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class TestRetry(object):
def test_retry_default_remove_headers_on_redirect(self):
retry = Retry()
- assert list(retry.remove_headers_on_redirect) == ['authorization']
+ assert retry.remove_headers_on_redirect == {'authorization', 'cookie'}
def test_retry_set_remove_headers_on_redirect(self):
retry = Retry(remove_headers_on_redirect=['x-api-secret'])
--
2.41.0

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From 6f6011442b255b6c135c294500cf4d404f594d8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 10:21:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Security fix for CVE-2023-45803
---
src/urllib3/_collections.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
src/urllib3/connectionpool.py | 5 +++++
src/urllib3/poolmanager.py | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/urllib3/_collections.py b/src/urllib3/_collections.py
index 34f2381..86fc900 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/_collections.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/_collections.py
@@ -260,6 +260,24 @@ class HTTPHeaderDict(MutableMapping):
else:
return vals[1:]
+ def _prepare_for_method_change(self):
+ """
+ Remove content-specific header fields before changing the request
+ method to GET or HEAD according to RFC 9110, Section 15.4.
+ """
+ content_specific_headers = [
+ "Content-Encoding",
+ "Content-Language",
+ "Content-Location",
+ "Content-Type",
+ "Content-Length",
+ "Digest",
+ "Last-Modified",
+ ]
+ for header in content_specific_headers:
+ self.discard(header)
+ return self
+
# Backwards compatibility for httplib
getheaders = getlist
getallmatchingheaders = getlist
diff --git a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
index f7a8f19..ad6303c 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ from .connection import (
HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection, VerifiedHTTPSConnection,
HTTPException, BaseSSLError,
)
+from ._collections import HTTPHeaderDict
from .request import RequestMethods
from .response import HTTPResponse
@@ -679,7 +680,11 @@ class HTTPConnectionPool(ConnectionPool, RequestMethods):
redirect_location = redirect and response.get_redirect_location()
if redirect_location:
if response.status == 303:
+ # Change the method according to RFC 9110, Section 15.4.4.
method = 'GET'
+ # And lose the body not to transfer anything sensitive.
+ body = None
+ headers = HTTPHeaderDict(headers)._prepare_for_method_change()
try:
retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=response, _pool=self)
diff --git a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
index 32bd973..37557f9 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import collections
import functools
import logging
-from ._collections import RecentlyUsedContainer
+from ._collections import HTTPHeaderDict, RecentlyUsedContainer
from .connectionpool import HTTPConnectionPool, HTTPSConnectionPool
from .connectionpool import port_by_scheme
from .exceptions import LocationValueError, MaxRetryError, ProxySchemeUnknown
@@ -330,9 +330,12 @@ class PoolManager(RequestMethods):
# Support relative URLs for redirecting.
redirect_location = urljoin(url, redirect_location)
- # RFC 7231, Section 6.4.4
if response.status == 303:
+ # Change the method according to RFC 9110, Section 15.4.4.
method = 'GET'
+ # And lose the body not to transfer anything sensitive.
+ kw["body"] = None
+ kw["headers"] = HTTPHeaderDict(kw["headers"])._prepare_for_method_change()
retries = kw.get('retries')
if not isinstance(retries, Retry):
--
2.43.0

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From 584378407efb03cef247320b541388f460cb72a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 12:40:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2024-37891
---
src/urllib3/util/retry.py | 2 +-
test/test_retry.py | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/urllib3/util/retry.py b/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
index c4a687c..8b86956 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/util/retry.py
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ class Retry(object):
RETRY_AFTER_STATUS_CODES = frozenset([413, 429, 503])
- DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST = frozenset(['Cookie', 'Authorization'])
+ DEFAULT_REDIRECT_HEADERS_BLACKLIST = frozenset(['Cookie', 'Authorization', 'Proxy-Authorization'])
#: Maximum backoff time.
BACKOFF_MAX = 120
diff --git a/test/test_retry.py b/test/test_retry.py
index c6bba74..a525028 100644
--- a/test/test_retry.py
+++ b/test/test_retry.py
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class TestRetry(object):
def test_retry_default_remove_headers_on_redirect(self):
retry = Retry()
- assert retry.remove_headers_on_redirect == {'authorization', 'cookie'}
+ assert retry.remove_headers_on_redirect == {'authorization', 'proxy-authorization', 'cookie'}
def test_retry_set_remove_headers_on_redirect(self):
retry = Retry(remove_headers_on_redirect=['x-api-secret'])
--
2.45.2

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@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
From dbb1dc2ef9a6c36e7b9139151d4db2ffab69eceb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 16:41:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Security fix for CVE-2025-66418
* Add a hard-coded limit for the decompression chain
* Reuse new list
(cherry picked from commit 24d7b67eac89f94e11003424bcf0d8f7b72222a8)
---
changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst | 4 ++++
src/urllib3/response.py | 12 +++++++++++-
test/test_response.py | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
diff --git a/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst b/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6646eaa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Fixed a security issue where an attacker could compose an HTTP response with
+virtually unlimited links in the ``Content-Encoding`` header, potentially
+leading to a denial of service (DoS) attack by exhausting system resources
+during decoding. The number of allowed chained encodings is now limited to 5.
diff --git a/src/urllib3/response.py b/src/urllib3/response.py
index 60bd98c9..ba366eef 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/response.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/response.py
@@ -163,8 +163,18 @@ class MultiDecoder(object):
they were applied.
"""
+ # Maximum allowed number of chained HTTP encodings in the
+ # Content-Encoding header.
+ max_decode_links = 5
+
def __init__(self, modes):
- self._decoders = [_get_decoder(m.strip()) for m in modes.split(',')]
+ encodings = [m.strip() for m in modes.split(",")]
+ if len(encodings) > self.max_decode_links:
+ raise DecodeError(
+ "Too many content encodings in the chain: "
+ f"{len(encodings)} > {self.max_decode_links}"
+ )
+ self._decoders = [_get_decoder(e) for e in encodings]
def flush(self):
return self._decoders[0].flush()
diff --git a/test/test_response.py b/test/test_response.py
index 347276e8..bd083b7f 100644
--- a/test/test_response.py
+++ b/test/test_response.py
@@ -467,6 +467,16 @@ class TestResponse(object):
assert r.read(9 * 37) == b"foobarbaz" * 37
assert r.read() == b""
+ def test_read_multi_decoding_too_many_links(self):
+ fp = BytesIO(b"foo")
+ with pytest.raises(
+ DecodeError, match="Too many content encodings in the chain: 6 > 5"
+ ):
+ HTTPResponse(
+ fp,
+ headers={"content-encoding": "gzip, deflate, br, zstd, gzip, deflate"},
+ )
+
def test_body_blob(self):
resp = HTTPResponse(b'foo')
assert resp.data == b'foo'
--
2.52.0

1262
SOURCES/CVE-2025-66471.patch Normal file

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From 5474aa5a56209bf0378201d8305584a0f51f91c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ousret <ahmed.tahri@cloudnursery.dev>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 01:40:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Prevent issue in HTTPResponse().read() when
decoded_content is True and then False Provided it has initialized eligible
decoder(decompressor) and did decode once
(cherry picked from commit cefd1dbba6a20ea4f017e6e472f9ada3a8a743e0)
---
changelog/2800.bugfix.rst | 1 +
src/urllib3/response.py | 13 +++++++++++++
test/test_response.py | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 changelog/2800.bugfix.rst
diff --git a/changelog/2800.bugfix.rst b/changelog/2800.bugfix.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9dcf1eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog/2800.bugfix.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Prevented issue in HTTPResponse().read() when decoded_content is True and then False.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/urllib3/response.py b/src/urllib3/response.py
index ba366eef..6c8823be 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/response.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/response.py
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
self.reason = reason
self.strict = strict
self.decode_content = decode_content
+ self._has_decoded_content = False
self.retries = retries
self.enforce_content_length = enforce_content_length
@@ -481,12 +482,19 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
"""
Decode the data passed in and potentially flush the decoder.
"""
+ if not decode_content and self._has_decoded_content:
+ raise RuntimeError(
+ "Calling read(decode_content=False) is not supported after "
+ "read(decode_content=True) was called."
+ )
+
if max_length is None or flush_decoder:
max_length = -1
try:
if decode_content and self._decoder:
data = self._decoder.decompress(data, max_length=max_length)
+ self._has_decoded_content = True
except (IOError, zlib.error) as e:
content_encoding = self.headers.get('content-encoding', '').lower()
raise DecodeError(
@@ -670,6 +678,11 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.IOBase):
else:
# do not waste memory on buffer when not decoding
if not decode_content:
+ if self._has_decoded_content:
+ raise RuntimeError(
+ "Calling read(decode_content=False) is not supported after "
+ "read(decode_content=True) was called."
+ )
return data
decoded_data = self._decode(
diff --git a/test/test_response.py b/test/test_response.py
index bd083b7f..4b04e409 100644
--- a/test/test_response.py
+++ b/test/test_response.py
@@ -560,6 +560,41 @@ class TestResponse(object):
while not br.closed:
br.read(5)
+ def test_read_with_illegal_mix_decode_toggle(self):
+ compress = zlib.compressobj(6, zlib.DEFLATED, -zlib.MAX_WBITS)
+ data = compress.compress(b"foo")
+ data += compress.flush()
+
+ fp = BytesIO(data)
+
+ resp = HTTPResponse(
+ fp, headers={"content-encoding": "deflate"}, preload_content=False
+ )
+
+ assert resp.read(1) == b"f"
+
+ with pytest.raises(
+ RuntimeError,
+ match=(
+ r"Calling read\(decode_content=False\) is not supported after "
+ r"read\(decode_content=True\) was called"
+ ),
+ ):
+ resp.read(1, decode_content=False)
+
+ def test_read_with_mix_decode_toggle(self):
+ compress = zlib.compressobj(6, zlib.DEFLATED, -zlib.MAX_WBITS)
+ data = compress.compress(b"foo")
+ data += compress.flush()
+
+ fp = BytesIO(data)
+
+ resp = HTTPResponse(
+ fp, headers={"content-encoding": "deflate"}, preload_content=False
+ )
+ resp.read(1, decode_content=False)
+ assert resp.read(1, decode_content=True) == b"o"
+
def test_streaming(self):
fp = BytesIO(b'foo')
resp = HTTPResponse(fp, preload_content=False)
--
2.52.0
From 018e71279b1b9ba9319943dbe47762d2dad631d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2026 18:07:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Security fix for CVE-2026-21441
* Stop decoding response content during redirects needlessly
* Rename the new query parameter
* Add a changelog entry
(cherry picked from commit 8864ac407bba8607950025e0979c4c69bc7abc7b)
---
CHANGES.rst | 3 +++
dummyserver/handlers.py | 8 +++++++-
src/urllib3/connectionpool.py | 6 +++++-
test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES.rst b/CHANGES.rst
index cf315aaf..5673a58e 100644
--- a/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/CHANGES.rst
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ Backports
compressed HTTP content ("decompression bombs") leading to excessive resource
consumption even when a small amount of data was requested. Reading small
chunks of compressed data is safer and much more efficient now.
+- Fixed a high-severity security issue where decompression-bomb safeguards of
+ the streaming API were bypassed when HTTP redirects were followed.
+ (`GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99>`__)
1.24.2 (2019-04-17)
diff --git a/dummyserver/handlers.py b/dummyserver/handlers.py
index f570d881..c0dd4e4a 100644
--- a/dummyserver/handlers.py
+++ b/dummyserver/handlers.py
@@ -170,9 +170,15 @@ class TestingApp(RequestHandler):
status = request.params.get('status', '303 See Other')
if len(status) == 3:
status = '%s Redirect' % status.decode('latin-1')
+ compressed = request.params.get('compressed') == b'true'
headers = [('Location', target)]
- return Response(status=status, headers=headers)
+ if compressed:
+ headers.append(('Content-Encoding', 'gzip'))
+ data = gzip.compress(b'foo')
+ else:
+ data = b''
+ return Response(data, status=status, headers=headers)
def not_found(self, request):
return Response('Not found', status='404 Not Found')
diff --git a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
index ad6303c1..5f66cd25 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
@@ -671,7 +671,11 @@ class HTTPConnectionPool(ConnectionPool, RequestMethods):
try:
# discard any remaining response body, the connection will be
# released back to the pool once the entire response is read
- response.read()
+ response.read(
+ # Do not spend resources decoding the content unless
+ # decoding has already been initiated.
+ decode_content=response._has_decoded_content,
+ )
except (TimeoutError, HTTPException, SocketError, ProtocolError,
BaseSSLError, SSLError) as e:
pass
diff --git a/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py b/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py
index 5faa0638..a2673e05 100644
--- a/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py
+++ b/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py
@@ -413,6 +413,25 @@ class TestConnectionPool(HTTPDummyServerTestCase):
self.assertEqual(r.status, 200)
self.assertEqual(r.data, b'Dummy server!')
+ @mock.patch("urllib3.response.GzipDecoder.decompress")
+ def test_no_decoding_with_redirect_when_preload_disabled(
+ self, gzip_decompress
+ ):
+ """
+ Test that urllib3 does not attempt to decode a gzipped redirect
+ response when `preload_content` is set to `False`.
+ """
+ with HTTPConnectionPool(self.host, self.port) as pool:
+ # Three requests are expected: two redirects and one final / 200 OK.
+ response = pool.request(
+ "GET",
+ "/redirect",
+ fields={"target": "/redirect?compressed=true", "compressed": "true"},
+ preload_content=False,
+ )
+ assert response.status == 200
+ gzip_decompress.assert_not_called()
+
def test_bad_connect(self):
pool = HTTPConnectionPool('badhost.invalid', self.port)
try:
--
2.52.0

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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 5ec0de499b9166ca71c65ab04f2a7e4eb0d66fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: illia-v <illia-v@users.noreply.github.com>
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-44431: Remove sensitive headers in proxy pools too
Sensitive headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) were
already stripped when PoolManager handled cross-host redirects, but not
when a pool obtained via ProxyManager.connection_from_url() handled
redirects directly through connectionpool.urlopen(). This adds the same
header-stripping logic to connectionpool.py.
Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/5ec0de49
---
src/urllib3/connectionpool.py | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
index 5f66cd25..2b3a7f1c 100644
--- a/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/connectionpool.py
@@ -690,6 +690,17 @@ class HTTPConnectionPool(ConnectionPool, RequestMethods):
body = None
headers = HTTPHeaderDict(headers)._prepare_for_method_change()
+ # Strip headers marked as unsafe to forward to the redirected location.
+ # Check remove_headers_on_redirect to avoid a potential network call within
+ # self.is_same_host() which may use socket.gethostbyname() in the future.
+ if (retries.remove_headers_on_redirect
+ and not self.is_same_host(redirect_location)):
+ if not isinstance(headers, HTTPHeaderDict):
+ headers = HTTPHeaderDict(headers or {})
+ for header in list(six.iterkeys(headers)):
+ if header.lower() in retries.remove_headers_on_redirect:
+ headers.pop(header, None)
+
try:
retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=response, _pool=self)
except MaxRetryError:
--
2.52.0

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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: python-%{srcname} Name: python-%{srcname}
Version: 1.24.2 Version: 1.24.2
Release: 5%{?dist} Release: 10%{?dist}
Summary: Python HTTP library with thread-safe connection pooling and file post Summary: Python HTTP library with thread-safe connection pooling and file post
License: MIT License: MIT
@ -32,6 +32,40 @@ Patch2: Enable_TLS_1.3_post-handshake_authentication.patch
# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/pull/1800 # Resolved upstream: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/pull/1800
Patch3: CVE-2020-26137.patch Patch3: CVE-2020-26137.patch
# CVE-2023-43804
# Added the `Cookie` header to the list of headers to strip from
# requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers
# can be set via `Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect`.
# Tests backported only partially as we don't use the whole part of
# testing with dummyserver.
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2242493
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/01220354d389cd05474713f8c982d05c9b17aafb
Patch4: CVE-2023-43804.patch
# CVE-2023-45803
# Remove HTTP request body when request method is changed.
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-45803
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/4e98d57809dacab1cbe625fddeec1a290c478ea9
Patch5: CVE-2023-45803.patch
# CVE-2024-37891
# Added the `Proxy-Authorization` header to the list of headers to strip from requests
# when redirecting to a different host.
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2024-37891
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/40b6d1605814dd1db0a46e202d6e56f2e4c9a468
Patch6: CVE-2024-37891.patch
Patch7: CVE-2025-66471.patch
Patch8: CVE-2025-66418.patch
Patch9: CVE-2026-21441.patch
# CVE-2026-44431
# Sensitive headers were stripped on cross-host redirects by PoolManager but not
# by pools obtained via ProxyManager.connection_from_url(), allowing headers such
# as Authorization, Cookie and Proxy-Authorization to leak to the redirected host.
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/5ec0de49
Patch10: CVE-2026-44431.patch
%description %description
Python HTTP module with connection pooling and file POST abilities. Python HTTP module with connection pooling and file POST abilities.
@ -56,11 +90,7 @@ Python3 HTTP module with connection pooling and file POST abilities.
%prep %prep
%setup -q -n %{srcname}-%{version} %autosetup -p1 -n %{srcname}-%{version}
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
# Make sure that the RECENT_DATE value doesn't get too far behind what the current date is. # Make sure that the RECENT_DATE value doesn't get too far behind what the current date is.
# RECENT_DATE must not be older that 2 years from the build time, or else test_recent_date # RECENT_DATE must not be older that 2 years from the build time, or else test_recent_date
@ -136,6 +166,28 @@ popd
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Jun 03 2026 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-10
- Security fix for CVE-2026-44431
Resolves: RHEL-184858
* Wed Dec 17 2025 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-9
- Security fix for CVE-2025-66471
- Security fix for CVE-2025-66418
- Security fix for CVE-2026-21441
Resolves: RHEL-139410
* Mon Jul 01 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-8
- Security fix for CVE-2024-37891
Resolves: RHEL-45334
* Tue Dec 12 2023 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-7
- Security fix for CVE-2023-45803
Resolves: RHEL-16872
* Thu Oct 12 2023 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-6
- Security fix for CVE-2023-43804
Resolves: RHEL-11992
* Mon Nov 09 2020 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-5 * Mon Nov 09 2020 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 1.24.2-5
- Security fix for CVE-2020-26137 - Security fix for CVE-2020-26137
Resolves: rhbz#1883889 Resolves: rhbz#1883889