import python-pillow-5.1.1-16.el8

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2021-10-05 15:42:08 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 9bcc43900d
commit 3ccb8aabb8
13 changed files with 1084 additions and 10 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 7a0aea5806d57e0e7c5187fbc9c2937a16e0bca1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Soroos <eric-github@soroos.net>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 00:17:53 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE CVE-2020-35655 - Read Overflow in PCX Decoding.
* Don't trust the image to specify a buffer size
---
src/PIL/PcxImagePlugin.py | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/PIL/PcxImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/PcxImagePlugin.py
index 564713a..17bbd18 100644
--- a/src/PIL/PcxImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/PcxImagePlugin.py
@@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ class PcxImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile):
version = i8(s[1])
bits = i8(s[3])
planes = i8(s[65])
- stride = i16(s, 66)
+ ignored_stride = i16(s, 66)
logger.debug("PCX version %s, bits %s, planes %s, stride %s",
- version, bits, planes, stride)
+ version, bits, planes, ignored_stride)
self.info["dpi"] = i16(s, 12), i16(s, 14)
@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ class PcxImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile):
self.mode = mode
self.size = bbox[2]-bbox[0], bbox[3]-bbox[1]
+ # don't trust the passed in stride. Calculate for ourselves.
+ # CVE-2020-35653
+ stride = (self.size[0] * bits + 7) // 8
+ stride += stride % 2
+
bbox = (0, 0) + self.size
logger.debug("size: %sx%s", *self.size)
--
2.29.2

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@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
From f276de1139ec16395dc8b382860fb58e331fbd53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Soroos <eric-github@soroos.net>
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 23:07:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix for SGI Decode buffer overrun CVE-2020-35655
* Independently found by a contributor and sent to Tidelift, and by Google's OSS Fuzz.
---
src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
index eb8fc84..c256169 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
@@ -107,11 +107,27 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
int err = 0;
int status;
+ /* size check */
+ if (im->xsize > INT_MAX / im->bands ||
+ im->ysize > INT_MAX / im->bands) {
+ return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ }
+
/* Get all data from File descriptor */
c = (SGISTATE*)state->context;
_imaging_seek_pyFd(state->fd, 0L, SEEK_END);
c->bufsize = _imaging_tell_pyFd(state->fd);
c->bufsize -= SGI_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+ c->tablen = im->bands * im->ysize;
+ /* below, we populate the starttab and lentab into the bufsize,
+ each with 4 bytes per element of tablen
+ Check here before we allocate any memory
+ */
+ if (c->bufsize < 8*c->tablen) {
+ return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ }
+
ptr = malloc(sizeof(UINT8) * c->bufsize);
if (!ptr) {
return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
@@ -129,18 +145,11 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
state->ystep = 1;
}
- if (im->xsize > INT_MAX / im->bands ||
- im->ysize > INT_MAX / im->bands) {
- err = IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
- goto sgi_finish_decode;
- }
-
/* Allocate memory for RLE tables and rows */
free(state->buffer);
state->buffer = NULL;
/* malloc overflow check above */
state->buffer = calloc(im->xsize * im->bands, sizeof(UINT8) * 2);
- c->tablen = im->bands * im->ysize;
c->starttab = calloc(c->tablen, sizeof(UINT32));
c->lengthtab = calloc(c->tablen, sizeof(UINT32));
if (!state->buffer ||
--
2.29.2
From 18aa14484fa63dabcafea63cf0b7bfb4066e979c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Soroos <eric-github@soroos.net>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 09:57:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Make the SGI code return -1 as an error flag, error in
state
---
src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
index c256169..2259159 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
/* size check */
if (im->xsize > INT_MAX / im->bands ||
im->ysize > INT_MAX / im->bands) {
- return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ return -1;
}
/* Get all data from File descriptor */
@@ -125,12 +126,14 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
Check here before we allocate any memory
*/
if (c->bufsize < 8*c->tablen) {
- return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;
+ return -1;
}
ptr = malloc(sizeof(UINT8) * c->bufsize);
if (!ptr) {
- return IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
+ return -1;
}
_imaging_seek_pyFd(state->fd, SGI_HEADER_SIZE, SEEK_SET);
_imaging_read_pyFd(state->fd, (char*)ptr, c->bufsize);
@@ -178,7 +181,7 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
if (c->rleoffset + c->rlelength > c->bufsize) {
state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;
- return -1;
+ goto sgi_finish_decode;
}
/* row decompression */
@@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
}
if (status == -1) {
state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;
- return -1;
+ goto sgi_finish_decode;
} else if (status == 1) {
goto sgi_finish_decode;
}
@@ -211,7 +214,8 @@ sgi_finish_decode: ;
free(c->lengthtab);
free(ptr);
if (err != 0){
- return err;
+ state->errcode=err;
+ return -1;
}
return state->count - c->bufsize;
}
--
2.29.2

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@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
From 9c781aa2020eef838284dcb348f4528f3c3cc1ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 09:06:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] CVE-2021-25287_25288
---
src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c b/src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c
index 9140e00..fdbd0c0 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ j2ku_gray_l(opj_image_t *in, const JPEG2KTILEINFO *tileinfo,
if (shift < 0)
offset += 1 << (-shift - 1);
+ /* csiz*h*w + offset = tileinfo.datasize */
switch (csiz) {
case 1:
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
@@ -557,8 +558,10 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
opj_dparameters_t params;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE color_space;
j2k_unpacker_t unpack = NULL;
- size_t buffer_size = 0;
- unsigned n;
+ size_t buffer_size = 0, tile_bytes = 0;
+ unsigned n, tile_height, tile_width;
+ int total_component_width = 0;
+
stream = opj_stream_create(BUFFER_SIZE, OPJ_TRUE);
@@ -703,8 +706,62 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
tile_info.x1 = (tile_info.x1 + correction) >> context->reduce;
tile_info.y1 = (tile_info.y1 + correction) >> context->reduce;
+ /* Check the tile bounds; if the tile is outside the image area,
+ or if it has a negative width or height (i.e. the coordinates are
+ swapped), bail. */
+ if (tile_info.x0 >= tile_info.x1
+ || tile_info.y0 >= tile_info.y1
+ || tile_info.x0 < image->x0
+ || tile_info.y0 < image->y0
+ || tile_info.x1 - image->x0 > im->xsize
+ || tile_info.y1 - image->y0 > im->ysize) {
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+ state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+ goto quick_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (tile_info.nb_comps != image->numcomps) {
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+ state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+ goto quick_exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Sometimes the tile_info.datasize we get back from openjpeg
+ is less than sum(comp_bytes)*w*h, and we overflow in the
+ shuffle stage */
+
+ tile_width = tile_info.x1 - tile_info.x0;
+ tile_height = tile_info.y1 - tile_info.y0;
+
+ /* Total component width = sum (component_width) e.g, it's
+ legal for an la file to have a 1 byte width for l, and 4 for
+ a. and then a malicious file could have a smaller tile_bytes
+ */
+
+ for (n=0; n < tile_info.nb_comps; n++) {
+ // see csize /acsize calcs
+ int csize = (image->comps[n].prec + 7) >> 3;
+ csize = (csize == 3) ? 4 : csize;
+ total_component_width += csize;
+ }
+ if ((tile_width > UINT_MAX / total_component_width) ||
+ (tile_height > UINT_MAX / total_component_width) ||
+ (tile_width > UINT_MAX / (tile_height * total_component_width)) ||
+ (tile_height > UINT_MAX / (tile_width * total_component_width))) {
+
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+ state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+ goto quick_exit;
+ }
+
+ tile_bytes = tile_width * tile_height * total_component_width;
+
+ if (tile_bytes > tile_info.data_size) {
+ tile_info.data_size = tile_bytes;
+ }
+
if (buffer_size < tile_info.data_size) {
- /* malloc check ok, tile_info.data_size from openjpeg */
+ /* malloc check ok, overflow and tile size sanity check above */
UINT8 *new = realloc (state->buffer, tile_info.data_size);
if (!new) {
state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_MEMORY;
@@ -715,6 +772,7 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
buffer_size = tile_info.data_size;
}
+
if (!opj_decode_tile_data(codec,
tile_info.tile_index,
(OPJ_BYTE *)state->buffer,
@@ -725,20 +783,6 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
goto quick_exit;
}
- /* Check the tile bounds; if the tile is outside the image area,
- or if it has a negative width or height (i.e. the coordinates are
- swapped), bail. */
- if (tile_info.x0 >= tile_info.x1
- || tile_info.y0 >= tile_info.y1
- || tile_info.x0 < image->x0
- || tile_info.y0 < image->y0
- || tile_info.x1 - image->x0 > im->xsize
- || tile_info.y1 - image->y0 > im->ysize) {
- state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
- state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
- goto quick_exit;
- }
-
unpack(image, &tile_info, state->buffer, im);
}
--
2.31.1

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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From c558baf01a97aed376a67ff4641f1c3c864ae3f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 17:55:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] CVE-2021-25290
---
src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c b/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c
index f292da3..d17b557 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ tsize_t _tiffReadProc(thandle_t hdata, tdata_t buf, tsize_t size) {
TRACE(("_tiffReadProc: %d \n", (int)size));
dump_state(state);
+ if (state->loc > state->eof) {
+ TIFFError("_tiffReadProc", "Invalid Read at loc %d, eof: %d", state->loc, state->eof);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
to_read = min(size, min(state->size, (tsize_t)state->eof) - (tsize_t)state->loc);
TRACE(("to_read: %d\n", (int)to_read));
--
2.30.2

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
From f60b6ae79d3c2e759f54bb4acb62b4c49f89fef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 17:59:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] CVE-2021-25292
---
src/PIL/PdfParser.py | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/PIL/PdfParser.py b/src/PIL/PdfParser.py
index b6938fd..189aed8 100644
--- a/src/PIL/PdfParser.py
+++ b/src/PIL/PdfParser.py
@@ -562,8 +562,9 @@ class PdfParser:
whitespace_or_hex = br"[\000\011\012\014\015\0400-9a-fA-F]"
whitespace_optional = whitespace + b"*"
whitespace_mandatory = whitespace + b"+"
+ whitespace_optional_no_nl = br"[\000\011\014\015\040]*" # no "\012" aka "\n"
newline_only = br"[\r\n]+"
- newline = whitespace_optional + newline_only + whitespace_optional
+ newline = whitespace_optional_no_nl + newline_only + whitespace_optional_no_nl
re_trailer_end = re.compile(whitespace_mandatory + br"trailer" + whitespace_optional + br"\<\<(.*\>\>)" + newline
+ br"startxref" + newline + br"([0-9]+)" + newline + br"%%EOF" + whitespace_optional + br"$", re.DOTALL)
re_trailer_prev = re.compile(whitespace_optional + br"trailer" + whitespace_optional + br"\<\<(.*?\>\>)" + newline
--
2.30.2

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@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
From 1312c5426e7dd84e396ef2ff35aa09b64d92d382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 19:33:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] CVE-2021-25293
---
src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
index 2259159..85af456 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/SgiRleDecode.c
@@ -25,13 +25,60 @@ static void read4B(UINT32* dest, UINT8* buf)
*dest = (UINT32)((buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
}
-static int expandrow(UINT8* dest, UINT8* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
+/*
+ SgiRleDecoding is done in a single channel row oriented set of RLE chunks.
+
+ * The file is arranged as
+ - SGI Header
+ - Rle Offset Table
+ - Rle Length Table
+ - Scanline Data
+
+ * Each RLE atom is c->bpc bytes wide (1 or 2)
+
+ * Each RLE Chunk is [specifier atom] [ 1 or n data atoms ]
+
+ * Copy Atoms are a byte with the high bit set, and the low 7 are
+ the number of bytes to copy from the source to the
+ destination. e.g.
+
+ CBBBBBBBB or 0CHLHLHLHLHLHL (B=byte, H/L = Hi low bytes)
+
+ * Run atoms do not have the high bit set, and the low 7 bits are
+ the number of copies of the next atom to copy to the
+ destination. e.g.:
+
+ RB -> BBBBB or RHL -> HLHLHLHLHL
+
+ The upshot of this is, there is no way to determine the required
+ length of the input buffer from reloffset and rlelength without
+ going through the data at that scan line.
+
+ Furthermore, there's no requirement that individual scan lines
+ pointed to from the rleoffset table are in any sort of order or
+ used only once, or even disjoint. There's also no requirement that
+ all of the data in the scan line area of the image file be used
+
+ */
+
+static int expandrow(UINT8* dest, UINT8* src, int n, int z, int xsize, UINT8 *end_of_buffer)
{
+ /*
+ * n here is the number of rlechunks
+ * z is the number of channels, for calculating the interleave
+ * offset to go to RGBA style pixels
+ * xsize is the row width
+ * end_of_buffer is the address of the end of the input buffer
+ */
+
UINT8 pixel, count;
int x = 0;
for (;n > 0; n--)
{
+ if (src > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
pixel = *src++;
if (n == 1 && pixel != 0)
return n;
@@ -43,6 +90,9 @@ static int expandrow(UINT8* dest, UINT8* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
}
x += count;
if (pixel & RLE_COPY_FLAG) {
+ if (src + count > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
while(count--) {
*dest = *src++;
dest += z;
@@ -50,6 +100,9 @@ static int expandrow(UINT8* dest, UINT8* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
}
else {
+ if (src > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
pixel = *src++;
while (count--) {
*dest = pixel;
@@ -61,7 +114,7 @@ static int expandrow(UINT8* dest, UINT8* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
return 0;
}
-static int expandrow2(UINT16* dest, UINT16* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
+static int expandrow2(UINT16* dest, UINT16* src, int n, int z, int xsize, UINT8 *end_of_buffer)
{
UINT8 pixel, count;
@@ -69,6 +122,9 @@ static int expandrow2(UINT16* dest, UINT16* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
for (;n > 0; n--)
{
+ if (src + 1 > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
pixel = ((UINT8*)src)[1];
++src;
if (n == 1 && pixel != 0)
@@ -81,12 +137,18 @@ static int expandrow2(UINT16* dest, UINT16* src, int n, int z, int xsize)
}
x += count;
if (pixel & RLE_COPY_FLAG) {
+ if (src + 2 * count > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
while(count--) {
*dest = *src++;
dest += z;
}
}
else {
+ if (src + 2 > end_of_buffer) {
+ return -1;
+ }
while (count--) {
*dest = *src;
dest += z;
@@ -136,8 +198,10 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
return -1;
}
_imaging_seek_pyFd(state->fd, SGI_HEADER_SIZE, SEEK_SET);
- _imaging_read_pyFd(state->fd, (char*)ptr, c->bufsize);
-
+ if (_imaging_read_pyFd(state->fd, (char *)ptr, c->bufsize) != c->bufsize) {
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_UNKNOWN;
+ return -1;
+ }
/* decoder initialization */
state->count = 0;
@@ -168,8 +232,6 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
for (c->tabindex = 0, c->bufindex = c->tablen * sizeof(UINT32); c->tabindex < c->tablen; c->tabindex++, c->bufindex+=4)
read4B(&c->lengthtab[c->tabindex], &ptr[c->bufindex]);
- state->count += c->tablen * sizeof(UINT32) * 2;
-
/* read compressed rows */
for (c->rowno = 0; c->rowno < im->ysize; c->rowno++, state->y += state->ystep)
{
@@ -177,19 +239,21 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
{
c->rleoffset = c->starttab[c->rowno + c->channo * im->ysize];
c->rlelength = c->lengthtab[c->rowno + c->channo * im->ysize];
- c->rleoffset -= SGI_HEADER_SIZE;
- if (c->rleoffset + c->rlelength > c->bufsize) {
+ // Check for underflow of rleoffset-SGI_HEADER_SIZE
+ if (c->rleoffset < SGI_HEADER_SIZE) {
state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;
goto sgi_finish_decode;
}
+ c->rleoffset -= SGI_HEADER_SIZE;
+
/* row decompression */
if (c->bpc ==1) {
- status = expandrow(&state->buffer[c->channo], &ptr[c->rleoffset], c->rlelength, im->bands, im->xsize);
+ status = expandrow(&state->buffer[c->channo], &ptr[c->rleoffset], c->rlelength, im->bands, im->xsize, &ptr[c->bufsize-1]);
}
else {
- status = expandrow2(&state->buffer[c->channo * 2], &ptr[c->rleoffset], c->rlelength, im->bands, im->xsize);
+ status = expandrow2(&state->buffer[c->channo * 2], &ptr[c->rleoffset], c->rlelength, im->bands, im->xsize, &ptr[c->bufsize-1]);
}
if (status == -1) {
state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;
@@ -198,7 +262,6 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
goto sgi_finish_decode;
}
- state->count += c->rlelength;
}
/* store decompressed data in image */
@@ -206,7 +269,6 @@ ImagingSgiRleDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state,
}
- c->bufsize++;
sgi_finish_decode: ;
@@ -217,5 +279,5 @@ sgi_finish_decode: ;
state->errcode=err;
return -1;
}
- return state->count - c->bufsize;
+ return 0;
}
--
2.30.2

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@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 357fef8b4bd076e3a15e7ffc58a475626794c7e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 19:41:58 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] CVE-2021-27921_27922_27923
---
src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py | 1 +
src/PIL/IcnsImagePlugin.py | 2 ++
src/PIL/IcoImagePlugin.py | 1 +
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
index ec358db..d56d46c 100644
--- a/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ class BLP1Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
data = jpeg_header + data
data = BytesIO(data)
image = JpegImageFile(data)
+ Image._decompression_bomb_check(image.size)
self.tile = image.tile # :/
self.fd = image.fp
self.mode = image.mode
diff --git a/src/PIL/IcnsImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/IcnsImagePlugin.py
index b382a73..2292584 100644
--- a/src/PIL/IcnsImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/IcnsImagePlugin.py
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ def read_png_or_jpeg2000(fobj, start_length, size):
if sig[:8] == b'\x89PNG\x0d\x0a\x1a\x0a':
fobj.seek(start)
im = PngImagePlugin.PngImageFile(fobj)
+ Image._decompression_bomb_check(im.size)
return {"RGBA": im}
elif sig[:4] == b'\xff\x4f\xff\x51' \
or sig[:4] == b'\x0d\x0a\x87\x0a' \
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ def read_png_or_jpeg2000(fobj, start_length, size):
jp2kstream = fobj.read(length)
f = io.BytesIO(jp2kstream)
im = Jpeg2KImagePlugin.Jpeg2KImageFile(f)
+ Image._decompression_bomb_check(im.size)
if im.mode != 'RGBA':
im = im.convert('RGBA')
return {"RGBA": im}
diff --git a/src/PIL/IcoImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/IcoImagePlugin.py
index 2b6d1e0..30412ad 100644
--- a/src/PIL/IcoImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/IcoImagePlugin.py
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ class IcoFile(object):
if data[:8] == PngImagePlugin._MAGIC:
# png frame
im = PngImagePlugin.PngImageFile(self.buf)
+ Image._decompression_bomb_check(im.size)
else:
# XOR + AND mask bmp frame
im = BmpImagePlugin.DibImageFile(self.buf)
--
2.30.2

View File

@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
From 7fe3dff241c11206616bf6229be898854ce0d066 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 11:33:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-28675
---
src/PIL/ImageFile.py | 12 ++++++++++--
src/PIL/PsdImagePlugin.py | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/PIL/ImageFile.py b/src/PIL/ImageFile.py
index 1a3c4aa..2cef9ee 100644
--- a/src/PIL/ImageFile.py
+++ b/src/PIL/ImageFile.py
@@ -522,12 +522,18 @@ def _safe_read(fp, size):
:param fp: File handle. Must implement a <b>read</b> method.
:param size: Number of bytes to read.
- :returns: A string containing up to <i>size</i> bytes of data.
+ :returns: A string containing <i>size</i> bytes of data.
+
+ Raises an OSError if the file is truncated and the read can not be completed
+
"""
if size <= 0:
return b""
if size <= SAFEBLOCK:
- return fp.read(size)
+ data = fp.read(size)
+ if len(data) < size:
+ raise OSError("Truncated File Read")
+ return data
data = []
while size > 0:
block = fp.read(min(size, SAFEBLOCK))
@@ -535,6 +541,8 @@ def _safe_read(fp, size):
break
data.append(block)
size -= len(block)
+ if sum(len(d) for d in data) < size:
+ raise OSError("Truncated File Read")
return b"".join(data)
diff --git a/src/PIL/PsdImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/PsdImagePlugin.py
index fe2a2ff..add9996 100644
--- a/src/PIL/PsdImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/PsdImagePlugin.py
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
__version__ = "0.4"
+import io
+
from . import Image, ImageFile, ImagePalette
from ._binary import i8, i16be as i16, i32be as i32
@@ -114,7 +116,8 @@ class PsdImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile):
end = self.fp.tell() + size
size = i32(read(4))
if size:
- self.layers = _layerinfo(self.fp)
+ _layer_data = io.BytesIO(ImageFile._safe_read(self.fp, size))
+ self.layers = _layerinfo(_layer_data, size)
self.fp.seek(end)
#
@@ -164,11 +167,20 @@ class PsdImageFile(ImageFile.ImageFile):
Image.Image.load(self)
-def _layerinfo(file):
+def _layerinfo(fp, ct_bytes):
# read layerinfo block
layers = []
- read = file.read
- for i in range(abs(i16(read(2)))):
+
+ def read(size):
+ return ImageFile._safe_read(fp, size)
+
+ ct = i16(read(2))
+
+ # sanity check
+ if ct_bytes < (abs(ct) * 20):
+ raise SyntaxError("Layer block too short for number of layers requested")
+
+ for i in range(abs(ct)):
# bounding box
y0 = i32(read(4))
@@ -179,7 +191,8 @@ def _layerinfo(file):
# image info
info = []
mode = []
- types = list(range(i16(read(2))))
+ ct_types = i16(read(2))
+ types = list(range(ct_types))
if len(types) > 4:
continue
@@ -212,7 +225,7 @@ def _layerinfo(file):
size = i32(read(4)) # length of the extra data field
combined = 0
if size:
- data_end = file.tell() + size
+ data_end = fp.tell() + size
length = i32(read(4))
if length:
@@ -220,12 +233,12 @@ def _layerinfo(file):
mask_x = i32(read(4))
mask_h = i32(read(4)) - mask_y
mask_w = i32(read(4)) - mask_x
- file.seek(length - 16, 1)
+ fp.seek(length - 16, 1)
combined += length + 4
length = i32(read(4))
if length:
- file.seek(length, 1)
+ fp.seek(length, 1)
combined += length + 4
length = i8(read(1))
@@ -235,7 +248,7 @@ def _layerinfo(file):
name = read(length).decode('latin-1', 'replace')
combined += length + 1
- file.seek(data_end)
+ fp.seek(data_end)
layers.append((name, mode, (x0, y0, x1, y1)))
# get tiles
@@ -243,7 +256,7 @@ def _layerinfo(file):
for name, mode, bbox in layers:
tile = []
for m in mode:
- t = _maketile(file, m, bbox, 1)
+ t = _maketile(fp, m, bbox, 1)
if t:
tile.extend(t)
layers[i] = name, mode, bbox, tile
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From cedb7ba568161021bc2f2f48af95fcf33e262f77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 09:30:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] CVE-2021-28676
---
src/libImaging/FliDecode.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libImaging/FliDecode.c b/src/libImaging/FliDecode.c
index 72ba138..9181b8b 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/FliDecode.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/FliDecode.c
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ ImagingFliDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state, UINT8* buf, int bytes)
return -1;
}
advance = I32(ptr);
+ if (advance == 0 ) {
+ // If there's no advance, we're in in infinite loop
+ state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+ return -1;
+ }
ptr += advance;
bytes -= advance;
}
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 8ad7b436649c424e22689a8a874c1b0cd7c1c0fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 09:22:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] CVE-2021-28677
---
src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py
index b503487..5f5af15 100644
--- a/src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py
@@ -167,12 +167,12 @@ class PSFile(object):
self.fp.seek(offset, whence)
def readline(self):
- s = self.char or b""
+ s = [self.char or b""]
self.char = None
c = self.fp.read(1)
- while c not in b"\r\n":
- s = s + c
+ while (c not in b"\r\n") and len(c):
+ s.append(c)
c = self.fp.read(1)
self.char = self.fp.read(1)
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ class PSFile(object):
if self.char in b"\r\n":
self.char = None
- return s.decode('latin-1')
+ return b"".join(s).decode("latin-1")
def _accept(prefix):
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
From eaef29c3696cd021147e692360997f4c12377c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 09:19:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] CVE-2021-28678
---
src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py b/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
index d56d46c..846c83d 100644
--- a/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
+++ b/src/PIL/BlpImagePlugin.py
@@ -294,33 +294,36 @@ class _BLPBaseDecoder(ImageFile.PyDecoder):
raise IOError("Truncated Blp file")
return 0, 0
+ def _safe_read(self, length):
+ return ImageFile._safe_read(self.fd, length)
+
def _read_palette(self):
ret = []
for i in range(256):
try:
- b, g, r, a = struct.unpack("<4B", self.fd.read(4))
+ b, g, r, a = struct.unpack("<4B", self._safe_read(4))
except struct.error:
break
ret.append((b, g, r, a))
return ret
def _read_blp_header(self):
- self._blp_compression, = struct.unpack("<i", self.fd.read(4))
+ self._blp_compression, = struct.unpack("<i", self._safe_read(4))
- self._blp_encoding, = struct.unpack("<b", self.fd.read(1))
- self._blp_alpha_depth, = struct.unpack("<b", self.fd.read(1))
- self._blp_alpha_encoding, = struct.unpack("<b", self.fd.read(1))
- self._blp_mips, = struct.unpack("<b", self.fd.read(1))
+ self._blp_encoding, = struct.unpack("<b", self._safe_read(1))
+ self._blp_alpha_depth, = struct.unpack("<b", self._safe_read(1))
+ self._blp_alpha_encoding, = struct.unpack("<b", self._safe_read(1))
+ self._blp_mips, = struct.unpack("<b", self._safe_read(1))
- self.size = struct.unpack("<II", self.fd.read(8))
+ self.size = struct.unpack("<II", self._safe_read(8))
if self.magic == b"BLP1":
# Only present for BLP1
- self._blp_encoding, = struct.unpack("<i", self.fd.read(4))
- self._blp_subtype, = struct.unpack("<i", self.fd.read(4))
+ self._blp_encoding, = struct.unpack("<i", self._safe_read(4))
+ self._blp_subtype, = struct.unpack("<i", self._safe_read(4))
- self._blp_offsets = struct.unpack("<16I", self.fd.read(16 * 4))
- self._blp_lengths = struct.unpack("<16I", self.fd.read(16 * 4))
+ self._blp_offsets = struct.unpack("<16I", self._safe_read(16 * 4))
+ self._blp_lengths = struct.unpack("<16I", self._safe_read(16 * 4))
class BLP1Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
@@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ class BLP1Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
if self._blp_encoding in (4, 5):
data = bytearray()
palette = self._read_palette()
- _data = BytesIO(self.fd.read(self._blp_lengths[0]))
+ _data = BytesIO(self._safe_read(self._blp_lengths[0]))
while True:
try:
offset, = struct.unpack("<B", _data.read(1))
@@ -355,10 +358,10 @@ class BLP1Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
def _decode_jpeg_stream(self):
from PIL.JpegImagePlugin import JpegImageFile
- jpeg_header_size, = struct.unpack("<I", self.fd.read(4))
- jpeg_header = self.fd.read(jpeg_header_size)
- self.fd.read(self._blp_offsets[0] - self.fd.tell()) # What IS this?
- data = self.fd.read(self._blp_lengths[0])
+ jpeg_header_size, = struct.unpack("<I", self._safe_read(4))
+ jpeg_header = self._safe_read(jpeg_header_size)
+ self._safe_read(self._blp_offsets[0] - self.fd.tell()) # What IS this?
+ data = self._safe_read(self._blp_lengths[0])
data = jpeg_header + data
data = BytesIO(data)
image = JpegImageFile(data)
@@ -380,7 +383,7 @@ class BLP2Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
# Uncompressed or DirectX compression
if self._blp_encoding == BLP_ENCODING_UNCOMPRESSED:
- _data = BytesIO(self.fd.read(self._blp_lengths[0]))
+ _data = BytesIO(self._safe_read(self._blp_lengths[0]))
while True:
try:
offset, = struct.unpack("<B", _data.read(1))
@@ -394,7 +397,7 @@ class BLP2Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
linesize = (self.size[0] + 3) // 4 * 8
for yb in range((self.size[1] + 3) // 4):
for d in decode_dxt1(
- self.fd.read(linesize),
+ self._safe_read(linesize),
alpha=bool(self._blp_alpha_depth)
):
data += d
@@ -402,13 +405,13 @@ class BLP2Decoder(_BLPBaseDecoder):
elif self._blp_alpha_encoding == BLP_ALPHA_ENCODING_DXT3:
linesize = (self.size[0] + 3) // 4 * 16
for yb in range((self.size[1] + 3) // 4):
- for d in decode_dxt3(self.fd.read(linesize)):
+ for d in decode_dxt3(self._safe_read(linesize)):
data += d
elif self._blp_alpha_encoding == BLP_ALPHA_ENCODING_DXT5:
linesize = (self.size[0] + 3) // 4 * 16
for yb in range((self.size[1] + 3) // 4):
- for d in decode_dxt5(self.fd.read(linesize)):
+ for d in decode_dxt5(self._safe_read(linesize)):
data += d
else:
raise BLPFormatError("Unsupported alpha encoding %r" % (
--
2.31.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
diff --git a/src/libImaging/Convert.c b/src/libImaging/Convert.c
index b3e48e5..cfed8ad 100644
--- a/src/libImaging/Convert.c
+++ b/src/libImaging/Convert.c
@@ -1338,9 +1338,8 @@ convert(Imaging imOut, Imaging imIn, const char *mode,
return (Imaging) ImagingError_ValueError("conversion not supported");
#else
{
- static char buf[256];
- /* FIXME: may overflow if mode is too large */
- sprintf(buf, "conversion from %s to %s not supported", imIn->mode, mode);
+ static char buf[100];
+ snprintf(buf, 100, "conversion from %.10s to %.10s not supported", imIn->mode, mode);
return (Imaging) ImagingError_ValueError(buf);
}
#endif
@@ -1394,9 +1393,13 @@ ImagingConvertTransparent(Imaging imIn, const char *mode,
}
#else
{
- static char buf[256];
- /* FIXME: may overflow if mode is too large */
- sprintf(buf, "conversion from %s to %s not supported in convert_transparent", imIn->mode, mode);
+ static char buf[100];
+ snprintf(
+ buf,
+ 100,
+ "conversion from %.10s to %.10s not supported in convert_transparent",
+ imIn->mode,
+ mode);
return (Imaging) ImagingError_ValueError(buf);
}
#endif

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
Name: python-%{srcname} Name: python-%{srcname}
Version: 5.1.1 Version: 5.1.1
Release: 12%{?dist} Release: 16%{?dist}
Summary: Python image processing library Summary: Python image processing library
# License: see http://www.pythonware.com/products/pil/license.htm # License: see http://www.pythonware.com/products/pil/license.htm
@ -32,14 +32,73 @@ Patch3: CVE-2020-5312_CVE-2019-16865.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1789535 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1789535
# https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a79b65c47c7dc6fe623aadf09aa6192fc54548f3 # https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a79b65c47c7dc6fe623aadf09aa6192fc54548f3
Patch4: CVE-2020-5311.patch Patch4: CVE-2020-5311.patch
# CVE-2020-11538 out-of-bounds reads/writes in the parsing of SGI image files in expandrow/expandrow2
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/4504/
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1852814
Patch5: CVE-2020-11538.patch
# CVE-2020-5313 out-of-bounds read in ImagingFliDecode when loading FLI images # CVE-2020-5313 out-of-bounds read in ImagingFliDecode when loading FLI images
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a09acd0decd8a87ccce939d5ff65dab59e7d365b?patch # Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a09acd0decd8a87ccce939d5ff65dab59e7d365b?patch
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1789532 # Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1789532
Patch6: CVE-2020-5313.patch Patch5: CVE-2020-5313.patch
# CVE-2020-11538 out-of-bounds reads/writes in the parsing of SGI image files in expandrow/expandrow2
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/4504/
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1852814
Patch6: CVE-2020-11538.patch
# CVE-2020-35653 decoding a crafted PCX file could result in buffer over-read
# Note that there is a wrong CVE number in the commit msg
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/2f409261eb1228e166868f8f0b5da5cda52e55bf
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1915432
Patch7: CVE-2020-35653.patch
# CVE-2020-35655 decoding crafted SGI RLE image files could result in buffer over-read
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/120eea2e4547a7d1826afdf01563035844f0b7d5
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-35653
Patch8: CVE-2020-35655.patch
# CVE-2021-25290 negative-offset memcpy with an invalid size in TiffDecode.c
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/86f02f7c70862a0954bfe8133736d352db978eaa
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1934685
Patch9: CVE-2021-25290.patch
# CVE-2021-25292 backtracking regex in PDF parser could be used as a DOS attack
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/3bce145966374dd39ce58a6fc0083f8d1890719c
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-25292
Patch10: CVE-2021-25292.patch
# CVE-2021-25293 out-of-bounds read in SGIRleDecode.c
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/4853e522bddbec66022c0915b9a56255d0188bf9
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-25293
Patch11: CVE-2021-25293.patch
# CVE-2021-27921 reported size of a contained image is not properly checked for a BLP container
# CVE-2021-27922 reported size of a contained image is not properly checked for an ICNS container
# CVE-2021-27923 reported size of a contained image is not properly checked for an ICO container
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/480f6819b592d7f07b9a9a52a7656c10bbe07442
# Tracking bugs:
# - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-27921
# - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-27922
# - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-27923
Patch12: CVE-2021-27921_27922_27923.patch
# CVE-2021-25288 and 25287 out-of-bounds read in J2kDecode in j2ku_gray_i and j2ku_graya_la
# Upstream fixes this patch combines:
# - Original fix for the CVEs: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/3bf5eddb89afdf690eceaa52bc4d3546ba9a5f87
# - Older commit the fix is based on: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/cf6da6b79080a8c16984102fdc85f7ce28dca613
# Tracking bugs:
# - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-25287
# - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-25288
Patch13: CVE-2021-25287_25288.patch
# CVE-2021-28675 DoS in PsdImagePlugin
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/22e9bee4ef225c0edbb9323f94c26cee0c623497
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-28675
Patch14: CVE-2021-28675.patch
# CVE-2021-28676 infinite loop in FliDecode.c can lead to DoS
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/bb6c11fb889e6c11b0ee122b828132ee763b5856
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-28676
Patch15: CVE-2021-28676.patch
# CVE-2021-28677 DoS in the open phase via a malicious EPS file
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/5a5e6db0abf4e7a638fb1b3408c4e495a096cb92
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-28677
Patch16: CVE-2021-28677.patch
# CVE-2021-28678 improper check in BlpImagePlugin can lead to DoS
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/496245aa4365d0827390bd0b6fbd11287453b3a1
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-28678
Patch17: CVE-2021-28678.patch
# CVE-2021-34552: buffer overflow in Convert.c because it allow an attacker to pass
# controlled parameters directly into a convert function
# Upstream fix: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/5567
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1982378
Patch18: CVE-2021-34552.patch
BuildRequires: freetype-devel BuildRequires: freetype-devel
BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: gcc
@ -184,14 +243,32 @@ popd
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Jul 13 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-12 * Mon Aug 02 2021 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-16
- Fix for CVE-2020-5313 - Fix for CVE-2021-34552
Resolves: rhbz#1789532 Resolves: rhbz#1982378
* Mon Jul 13 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-11 * Mon Jun 14 2021 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-15
- Fixes for CVE-2021-25288, CVE-2021-25287, CVE-2021-28675, CVE-2021-28676,
CVE-2021-28677 and CVE-2021-28678
Resolves: rhbz#1958231, rhbz#1958226, rhbz#1958240, rhbz#1958252, rhbz#1958257, rhbz#1958263
* Fri Apr 09 2021 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-14
- Fixes for CVE-2021-25290, CVE-2021-25292, CVE-2021-25293, CVE-2021-27921
CVE-2021-27922, and CVE-2021-27923
Resolves: rhbz#1934685 rhbz#1934699 rhbz#1934705 rhbz#1935384 rhbz#1935396 rhbz#1935401
* Thu Feb 18 2021 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-13
- Fixes for CVE-2020-35653 and CVE-2020-35655
Resolves: rhbz#1915420 rhbz#1915432
* Mon Jul 13 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-12
- Fix for CVE-2020-11538 - Fix for CVE-2020-11538
Resolves: rhbz#1852814 Resolves: rhbz#1852814
* Wed Mar 04 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-11
- Fix for CVE-2020-5313
Resolves: rhbz#1789532
* Mon Feb 17 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-10 * Mon Feb 17 2020 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 5.1.1-10
- Bump and rebuild for gating to deliver CVE fixes - Bump and rebuild for gating to deliver CVE fixes
Resolves: rhbz#1789535 Resolves: rhbz#1789535