import UBI python-jinja2-2.11.3-7.el9_5

SOURCES/0005-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+From c3ea7d7def695cf09a07117b808da47639833954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 11:48:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2024-56326
+
+---
+ src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ tests/test_security.py | 17 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index cfd7993..da26866 100644
+--- a/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import operator
+ import types
+ import warnings
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+ 
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -153,16 +154,6 @@ class _MagicFormatMapping(abc.Mapping):
+         return len(self._kwargs)
+ 
+ 
+-def inspect_format_method(callable):
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-    if isinstance(obj, string_types):
+-        return obj
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args):
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -394,6 +385,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -411,6 +405,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -426,34 +423,44 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def format_string(self, s, args, kwargs, format_func=None):
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value):
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, s.escape)
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++        f_self = value.__self__
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++        str_type = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument %d given"
+-                    % (len(args) + (kwargs is not None))
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = None
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-        kwargs = _MagicFormatMapping(args, kwargs)
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(__self, __context, __obj, *args, **kwargs):  # noqa: B902
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/tests/test_security.py b/tests/test_security.py
+index 7e8974c..2e2af69 100644
+--- a/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -208,3 +208,20 @@ class TestStringFormatMap(object):
+             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
+         )
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.48.0
+

SPECS/python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        2.11.3
-Release:        6%{?dist}
+Release:        7%{?dist}
 Summary:        General purpose template engine
 License:        BSD
 URL:            https://palletsprojects.com/p/jinja/
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ Patch3:         0003-CVE-2024-22195.patch
 # Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
 Patch4:         0004-CVE-2024-34064.patch
 
+# Security fix for CVE-2024-56326
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7
+# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2333856
+# Patch backported from upstream without changelog and typing.
+Patch5:         0005-CVE-2024-56326.patch
+
 %if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} > 7
 # Enable python3 build by default
 %bcond_without python3
@@ -190,6 +196,10 @@ PYTHONPATH=$(pwd)/src %{__python3} -m pytest tests
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jan 22 2025 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.11.3-7
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-56326
+Resolves: RHEL-74690
+
 * Tue May 07 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.11.3-6
 - Security fix for CVE-2024-34064
 Resolves: RHEL-35653