import UBI python-jinja2-2.10.1-5.el8_10

SOURCES/CVE-2024-22195.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From c4695c78dc41d206a6c79878dea177d6188896b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Calum Hutton <calum.hutton@snyk.io>
+Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 12:08:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] xmlattr filter disallows keys with spaces
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py |  6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
+index 267dddd..d473058 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -150,11 +150,15 @@ def do_lower(s):
+     return soft_unicode(s).lower()
+ 
+ 
++_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++
++
+ @evalcontextfilter
+ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+-    All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
+-    escaped:
++
++    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
++    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
+ 
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+ 
+@@ -174,11 +178,19 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+     """
+-    rv = u' '.join(
+-        u'%s="%s"' % (escape(key), escape(value))
+-        for key, value in iteritems(d)
+-        if value is not None and not isinstance(value, Undefined)
+-    )
++    items = []
++
++    for key, value in d.items():
++        if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
++            continue
++
++        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++
++        items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
++
++    rv = " ".join(items)
++
+     if autospace and rv:
+         rv = u' ' + rv
+     if _eval_ctx.autoescape:
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
+index 8962ced..911d10a 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
+@@ -389,6 +389,12 @@ class TestFilter(object):
+         assert 'bar="23"' in out
+         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ 
++    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
++        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
++            env.from_string(
++                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
++            ).render()
++
+     def test_sort1(self, env):
+         tmpl = env.from_string(
+             '{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}')
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

SOURCES/CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 5d0b496b29214838494b1d65bd04718113911450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 May 2024 13:43:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py     | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
+index d473058..3e33f57 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -150,15 +150,23 @@ def do_lower(s):
+     return soft_unicode(s).lower()
+ 
+ 
+-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
++# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
++_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
+ 
+ 
+ @evalcontextfilter
+ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+ 
+-    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+-    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
++    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
++    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
++
++    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
++    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
++    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
++    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
++    first.
+ 
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+ 
+@@ -184,8 +192,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+             continue
+ 
+-        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+-            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
+ 
+         items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
+index 911d10a..153356d 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.10.1/tests/test_filters.py
+@@ -389,11 +389,12 @@ class TestFilter(object):
+         assert 'bar="23"' in out
+         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ 
+-    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
+-        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
+-            env.from_string(
+-                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
+-            ).render()
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
++    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env: Environment, sep: str) -> None:
++        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
++            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
++                key=f"class{sep}onclick=alert(1)"
++            )
+ 
+     def test_sort1(self, env):
+         tmpl = env.from_string(
+-- 
+2.45.0
+

SPECS/python-jinja2.spec

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        2.10.1
-Release:        3%{?dist}
+Release:        5%{?dist}
 Summary:        General purpose template engine
 Group:          Development/Languages
 License:        BSD
@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%
 # Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928707
 Patch0:         CVE-2020-28493.patch
 
+# Security fix for CVE-2024-22195
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/7dd3680e6eea0d77fde024763657aa4d884ddb23
+Patch1:         CVE-2024-22195.patch
+
+# Security fix for CVE-2024-34064
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
+Patch2:         CVE-2024-34064.patch
+
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
 %description
@@ -116,6 +124,9 @@ environments.
 %setup -qc -n Jinja2-%{version}
 
 %patch0 -p1
+%patch1 -p1
+%patch2 -p1
+
 
 # cleanup
 find Jinja2-%{version} -name '*.pyo' -o -name '*.pyc' -delete
@@ -217,6 +228,14 @@ popd
 
 
 %changelog
+* Tue May 07 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.10.1-5
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-34064
+Resolves: RHEL-35651
+
+* Tue Jan 30 2024 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 2.10.1-4
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-22195
+Resolves: RHEL-21347
+
 * Fri Mar 12 2021 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.10.1-3
 - Fix CVE-2020-28493: ReDOS vulnerability due to the sub-pattern
 Resolves: rhbz#1928707