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a1bf0daa6c
policycoreutils/policycoreutils-sepolgen.patch
Daniel J Walsh a1bf0daa6c * Wed Dec 16 2009 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2.0.78-5 
- If restorecond running as a user has no files to watch then it should exit.  (NFS Homedirs)
2009-12-16 13:21:49 +00:00

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diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/access.py policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/access.py
--- nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/access.py 2009-05-18 13:53:14.000000000 -0400
+++ policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/access.py 2009-12-08 17:05:49.000000000 -0500
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"""
import refpolicy
+from selinux import audit2why
def is_idparam(id):
"""Determine if an id is a paramater in the form $N, where N is
@@ -85,6 +86,8 @@
self.obj_class = None
self.perms = refpolicy.IdSet()
self.audit_msgs = []
+ self.type = audit2why.TERULE
+ self.bools = []
# The direction of the information flow represented by this
# access vector - used for matching
@@ -127,7 +130,7 @@
return self.to_string()
def to_string(self):
- return "allow %s %s : %s %s;" % (self.src_type, self.tgt_type,
+ return "allow %s %s:%s %s;" % (self.src_type, self.tgt_type,
self.obj_class, self.perms.to_space_str())
def __cmp__(self, other):
@@ -253,20 +256,22 @@
for av in l:
self.add_av(AccessVector(av))
- def add(self, src_type, tgt_type, obj_class, perms, audit_msg=None):
+ def add(self, src_type, tgt_type, obj_class, perms, audit_msg=None, avc_type=audit2why.TERULE, bools=[]):
"""Add an access vector to the set.
"""
tgt = self.src.setdefault(src_type, { })
cls = tgt.setdefault(tgt_type, { })
- if cls.has_key(obj_class):
- access = cls[obj_class]
+ if cls.has_key((obj_class, avc_type)):
+ access = cls[obj_class, avc_type]
else:
access = AccessVector()
access.src_type = src_type
access.tgt_type = tgt_type
access.obj_class = obj_class
- cls[obj_class] = access
+ access.bools = bools
+ access.type = avc_type
+ cls[obj_class, avc_type] = access
access.perms.update(perms)
if audit_msg:
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/audit.py
--- nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py 2009-12-01 15:46:50.000000000 -0500
+++ policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/audit.py 2009-12-08 17:05:49.000000000 -0500
@@ -23,6 +23,27 @@
# Convenience functions
+def get_audit_boot_msgs():
+ """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from the audit
+ log. This function uses ausearch and requires that the current
+ process have sufficient rights to run ausearch.
+
+ Returns:
+ string contain all of the audit messages returned by ausearch.
+ """
+ import subprocess
+ import time
+ fd=open("/proc/uptime", "r")
+ off=float(fd.read().split()[0])
+ fd.close
+ s = time.localtime(time.time() - off)
+ date = time.strftime("%D/%Y", s).split("/")
+ bootdate="%s/%s/%s" % (date[0], date[1], date[3])
+ boottime = time.strftime("%X", s)
+ output = subprocess.Popen(["/sbin/ausearch", "-m", "AVC,USER_AVC,MAC_POLICY_LOAD,DAEMON_START,SELINUX_ERR", "-ts", bootdate, boottime],
+ stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0]
+ return output
+
def get_audit_msgs():
"""Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from the audit
log. This function uses ausearch and requires that the current
@@ -47,6 +68,17 @@
stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0]
return output
+def get_log_msgs():
+ """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from /var/log/messages.
+
+ Returns:
+ string contain all of the audit messages returned by /var/log/messages.
+ """
+ import subprocess
+ output = subprocess.Popen(["/bin/grep", "avc", "/var/log/messages"],
+ stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0]
+ return output
+
# Classes representing audit messages
class AuditMessage:
@@ -106,6 +138,7 @@
if fields[0] == "path":
self.path = fields[1][1:-1]
return
+import selinux.audit2why as audit2why
class AVCMessage(AuditMessage):
"""AVC message representing an access denial or granted message.
@@ -146,6 +179,8 @@
self.path = ""
self.accesses = []
self.denial = True
+ self.type = audit2why.TERULE
+ self.bools = []
def __parse_access(self, recs, start):
# This is kind of sucky - the access that is in a space separated
@@ -205,7 +240,25 @@
if not found_src or not found_tgt or not found_class or not found_access:
raise ValueError("AVC message in invalid format [%s]\n" % self.message)
-
+ self.analyze()
+
+ def analyze(self):
+ tcontext = self.tcontext.to_string()
+ scontext = self.scontext.to_string()
+ self.type, self.bools = audit2why.analyze(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, self.accesses);
+ if self.type == audit2why.NOPOLICY:
+ raise ValueError("Must call policy_init first")
+ if self.type == audit2why.BADTCON:
+ raise ValueError("Invalid Target Context %s\n" % tcontext)
+ if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON:
+ raise ValueError("Invalid Source Context %s\n" % scontext)
+ if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON:
+ raise ValueError("Invalid Type Class %s\n" % self.tclass)
+ if self.type == audit2why.BADPERM:
+ raise ValueError("Invalid permission %s\n" % " ".join(self.accesses))
+ if self.type == audit2why.BADCOMPUTE:
+ raise ValueError("Error during access vector computation")
+
class PolicyLoadMessage(AuditMessage):
"""Audit message indicating that the policy was reloaded."""
def __init__(self, message):
@@ -285,6 +338,9 @@
def __initialize(self):
self.avc_msgs = []
+ self.constraint_msgs = []
+ self.dontaudit_msgs = []
+ self.rbac_msgs = []
self.compute_sid_msgs = []
self.invalid_msgs = []
self.policy_load_msgs = []
@@ -314,7 +370,7 @@
elif i == "security_compute_sid:":
msg = ComputeSidMessage(line)
found = True
- elif i == "type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD" or i == "type=1403":
+ elif i == "type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD":
msg = PolicyLoadMessage(line)
found = True
elif i == "type=AVC_PATH":
@@ -442,16 +498,17 @@
audit logs parsed by this object.
"""
av_set = access.AccessVectorSet()
+
for avc in self.avc_msgs:
if avc.denial != True and only_denials:
continue
if avc_filter:
if avc_filter.filter(avc):
av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass,
- avc.accesses, avc)
+ avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, bools=avc.bools)
else:
av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass,
- avc.accesses, avc)
+ avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, bools=avc.bools)
return av_set
class AVCTypeFilter:
@@ -477,5 +534,3 @@
if self.regex.match(avc.tcontext.type):
return True
return False
-
-
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/policygen.py
--- nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py 2008-09-12 11:48:15.000000000 -0400
+++ policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/policygen.py 2009-12-16 08:20:45.000000000 -0500
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
import access
import interfaces
import matching
+import selinux.audit2why as audit2why
+from setools import *
# Constants for the level of explanation from the generation
# routines
@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@
self.moduel = module
else:
self.module = refpolicy.Module()
-
+ self.domains = None
def set_gen_refpol(self, if_set=None, perm_maps=None):
"""Set whether reference policy interfaces are generated.
@@ -144,8 +146,35 @@
def __add_allow_rules(self, avs):
for av in avs:
rule = refpolicy.AVRule(av)
+ rule.comment = ""
if self.explain:
rule.comment = refpolicy.Comment(explain_access(av, verbosity=self.explain))
+ if av.type == audit2why.ALLOW:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy\n"
+ if av.type == audit2why.DONTAUDIT:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc has a dontaudit rule in the current policy\n"
+ if av.type == audit2why.BOOLEAN:
+ if len(av.bools) > 1:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc can be allowed using one of the these booleans:\n# %s\n" % ", ".join(map(lambda x: av.bools[0][0], av.bools))
+ else:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean '%s'\n" % av.bools[0][0]
+
+ if av.type == audit2why.CONSTRAINT:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc is a constraint violation. You will need to add an attribute to either the source or target type to make it work.\n"
+ if av.type == audit2why.TERULE:
+ if "write" in av.perms:
+ if "dir" in av.obj_class or "open" in av.perms:
+ if not self.domains:
+ self.domains = seinfo(ATTRIBUTE, name="domain")[0]["types"]
+ types=[]
+ for i in map(lambda x: x[TCONTEXT], sesearch([ALLOW], {SCONTEXT: av.src_type, CLASS: av.obj_class, PERMS: av.perms})):
+ if i not in self.domains:
+ types.append(i)
+ if len(types) == 1:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! The source type '%s' can write to a '%s' of the following type:\n# %s\n" % ( av.src_type, av.obj_class, ", ".join(types))
+ elif len(types) >= 1:
+ rule.comment += "#!!!! The source type '%s' can write to a '%s' of the following types:\n# %s\n" % ( av.src_type, av.obj_class, ", ".join(types))
+
self.module.children.append(rule)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/refparser.py
--- nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py 2009-10-29 15:21:39.000000000 -0400
+++ policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/refparser.py 2009-12-08 17:05:49.000000000 -0500
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@
def list_headers(root):
modules = []
support_macros = None
- blacklist = ["init.if", "inetd.if", "uml.if", "thunderbird.if"]
+ blacklist = ["uml.if", "thunderbird.if", "unconfined.if"]
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(root):
for name in filenames:
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/refpolicy.py policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/refpolicy.py
--- nsasepolgen/src/sepolgen/refpolicy.py 2009-10-29 15:21:39.000000000 -0400
+++ policycoreutils-2.0.78/sepolgen-1.0.19/src/sepolgen/refpolicy.py 2009-12-08 17:05:49.000000000 -0500
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@
return "attribute %s;" % self.name
# Classes representing rules
+import selinux.audit2why as audit2why
class AVRule(Leaf):
"""SELinux access vector (AV) rule.
@@ -426,15 +427,17 @@
self.tgt_types = IdSet()
self.obj_classes = IdSet()
self.perms = IdSet()
- self.rule_type = self.ALLOW
+ self.rule_type = audit2why.TERULE
if av:
self.from_av(av)
def __rule_type_str(self):
- if self.rule_type == self.ALLOW:
+ if self.rule_type == audit2why.TERULE:
return "allow"
- elif self.rule_type == self.DONTAUDIT:
+ elif self.rule_type == audit2why.DONTAUDIT:
return "dontaudit"
+ elif self.rule_type == audit2why.CONSTRAINT:
+ return "#constraint allow"
else:
return "auditallow"
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