From ad6da4ad665ad178e6453a25033644b7a7020c13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Remi Collet Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 08:57:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] fix low/moderate CVEs Resolves: RHEL-66589 --- .gitignore | 16 +- ...22-31631.patch => php-cve-2022-31631.patch | 38 +- php-cve-2023-0567.patch | 188 +++++ php-cve-2023-0568.patch | 98 +++ php-cve-2023-0662.patch | 143 ++++ php-cve-2023-3247.patch | 152 +++++ php-cve-2023-3823.patch | 89 +++ php-cve-2023-3824.patch | 644 ++++++++++++++++++ php-cve-2024-2756.patch | 193 ++++++ php-cve-2024-3096.patch | 81 +++ php-cve-2024-5458.patch | 180 +++++ php-cve-2024-8925.patch | 227 ++++++ php-cve-2024-8926.patch | 210 ++++++ php-cve-2024-8927.patch | 57 ++ php-cve-2024-9026.patch | 245 +++++++ php.spec | 79 ++- 16 files changed, 2611 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) rename php-CVE-2022-31631.patch => php-cve-2022-31631.patch (67%) create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-0567.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-0568.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-0662.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-3247.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-3823.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2023-3824.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-2756.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-3096.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-5458.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-8925.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-8926.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-8927.patch create mode 100644 php-cve-2024-9026.patch diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index a3c1cb7..c8a5a2f 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,17 +1,5 @@ clog -php*.bz2 -php-5*.xz -php-7.0*.xz -php-7.1*.xz -php-7.2*.xz -php-7.3*.xz -php-8.0*.xz -php-8.0*.xz.asc -/php-7.4.6.tar.xz -/php-7.4.6.tar.xz.asc -/php-7.4.19.tar.xz -/php-7.4.19.tar.xz.asc -/php-7.4.30.tar.xz -/php-7.4.30.tar.xz.asc +php-8.*.xz +php-8.*.xz.asc /php-7.4.33.tar.xz /php-7.4.33.tar.xz.asc diff --git a/php-CVE-2022-31631.patch b/php-cve-2022-31631.patch similarity index 67% rename from php-CVE-2022-31631.patch rename to php-cve-2022-31631.patch index 3627c23..4826efc 100644 --- a/php-CVE-2022-31631.patch +++ b/php-cve-2022-31631.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ From 7cb160efe19d3dfb8b92629805733ea186b55050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Christoph M. Becker" Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 17:20:23 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix #81740: PDO::quote() may return unquoted string +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix #81740: PDO::quote() may return unquoted string `sqlite3_snprintf()` expects its first parameter to be `int`; we need to avoid overflow. @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ to avoid overflow. create mode 100644 ext/pdo_sqlite/tests/bug81740.phpt diff --git a/ext/pdo_sqlite/sqlite_driver.c b/ext/pdo_sqlite/sqlite_driver.c -index 0595bd09fe..54f9d05e1e 100644 +index 0595bd09feb..54f9d05e1e2 100644 --- a/ext/pdo_sqlite/sqlite_driver.c +++ b/ext/pdo_sqlite/sqlite_driver.c @@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ static char *pdo_sqlite_last_insert_id(pdo_dbh_t *dbh, const char *name, size_t @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ index 0595bd09fe..54f9d05e1e 100644 *quotedlen = strlen(*quoted); diff --git a/ext/pdo_sqlite/tests/bug81740.phpt b/ext/pdo_sqlite/tests/bug81740.phpt new file mode 100644 -index 0000000000..99fb07c304 +index 00000000000..99fb07c3048 --- /dev/null +++ b/ext/pdo_sqlite/tests/bug81740.phpt @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ @@ -50,3 +50,35 @@ index 0000000000..99fb07c304 +?> +--EXPECT-- +bool(false) +-- +2.38.1 + +From 7328f3a0344806b846bd05657bdce96e47810bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 09:24:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] NEWS + +--- + NEWS | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 8a8c0c9285d..03e8c839c77 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ++ ++Backported from 8.0.27 ++ ++- PDO/SQLite: ++ . Fixed bug #81740 (PDO::quote() may return unquoted string). ++ (CVE-2022-31631) (cmb) ++ + 03 Nov 2022, PHP 7.4.33 + + - GD: +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-0567.patch b/php-cve-2023-0567.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62296ce --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-0567.patch @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +From 7437aaae38cf4b3357e7580f9e22fd4a403b6c23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20D=C3=BCsterhus?= +Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 21:15:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] crypt: Fix validation of malformed BCrypt hashes +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +PHP’s implementation of crypt_blowfish differs from the upstream Openwall +version by adding a “PHP Hack”, which allows one to cut short the BCrypt salt +by including a `$` character within the characters that represent the salt. + +Hashes that are affected by the “PHP Hack” may erroneously validate any +password as valid when used with `password_verify` and when comparing the +return value of `crypt()` against the input. + +The PHP Hack exists since the first version of PHP’s own crypt_blowfish +implementation that was added in 1e820eca02dcf322b41fd2fe4ed2a6b8309f8ab5. + +No clear reason is given for the PHP Hack’s existence. This commit removes it, +because BCrypt hashes containing a `$` character in their salt are not valid +BCrypt hashes. + +(cherry picked from commit c840f71524067aa474c00c3eacfb83bd860bfc8a) +--- + ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c | 8 -- + .../tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt | 82 +++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c b/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c +index c1f945f29ed..aa7e1bc2e68 100644 +--- a/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c ++++ b/ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c +@@ -376,7 +376,6 @@ static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = { + #define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \ + { \ + tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \ +- if (tmp == '$') break; /* PHP hack */ \ + if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \ + tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \ + if (tmp > 63) return -1; \ +@@ -404,13 +403,6 @@ static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size) + *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4; + } while (dptr < end); + +- if (end - dptr == size) { +- return -1; +- } +- +- while (dptr < end) /* PHP hack */ +- *dptr++ = 0; +- + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..32e335f4b08 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/standard/tests/crypt/bcrypt_salt_dollar.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ ++--TEST-- ++bcrypt correctly rejects salts containing $ ++--FILE-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++string(8) "$2y$04$$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(9) "$2y$04$0$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(10) "$2y$04$00$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(11) "$2y$04$000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(12) "$2y$04$0000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(13) "$2y$04$00000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(14) "$2y$04$000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(15) "$2y$04$0000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(16) "$2y$04$00000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(17) "$2y$04$000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(18) "$2y$04$0000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(19) "$2y$04$00000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(20) "$2y$04$000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(21) "$2y$04$0000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(22) "$2y$04$00000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(23) "$2y$04$000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(24) "$2y$04$0000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(25) "$2y$04$00000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(26) "$2y$04$000000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(27) "$2y$04$0000000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(28) "$2y$04$00000000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(29) "$2y$04$000000000000000000000$" ++string(2) "*0" ++bool(false) ++string(30) "$2y$04$0000000000000000000000$" ++string(60) "$2y$04$000000000000000000000u2a2UpVexIt9k3FMJeAVr3c04F5tcI8K" ++bool(false) +-- +2.39.1 + +From ed0281b588a6840cb95f3134a4e68847a3be5bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20D=C3=BCsterhus?= +Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 22:13:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] crypt: Fix possible buffer overread in php_crypt() + +(cherry picked from commit a92acbad873a05470af1a47cb785a18eadd827b5) +--- + ext/standard/crypt.c | 1 + + ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt | 8 ++++++++ + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/standard/crypt.c b/ext/standard/crypt.c +index 92430b69f77..04487f3fe5a 100644 +--- a/ext/standard/crypt.c ++++ b/ext/standard/crypt.c +@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ PHPAPI zend_string *php_crypt(const char *password, const int pass_len, const ch + } else if ( + salt[0] == '$' && + salt[1] == '2' && ++ salt[2] != 0 && + salt[3] == '$') { + char output[PHP_MAX_SALT_LEN + 1]; + +diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..085bc8a2390 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_short.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ ++--TEST-- ++Test that password_hash() does not overread buffers when a short hash is passed ++--FILE-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++bool(false) +-- +2.39.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-0568.patch b/php-cve-2023-0568.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e2ba19 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-0568.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 887cd0710ad856a0d22c329b6ea6c71ebd8621ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 19:28:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Fix array overrun when appending slash to paths + +Fix it by extending the array sizes by one character. As the input is +limited to the maximum path length, there will always be place to append +the slash. As the php_check_specific_open_basedir() simply uses the +strings to compare against each other, no new failures related to too +long paths are introduced. +We'll let the DOM and XML case handle a potentially too long path in the +library code. + +(cherry picked from commit ec10b28d64decbc54aa1e585dce580f0bd7a5953) +--- + ext/dom/document.c | 2 +- + ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c | 2 +- + main/fopen_wrappers.c | 6 +++--- + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ext/dom/document.c b/ext/dom/document.c +index b478e1a1aab..e683eb8f701 100644 +--- a/ext/dom/document.c ++++ b/ext/dom/document.c +@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ static xmlDocPtr dom_document_parser(zval *id, int mode, char *source, size_t so + int validate, recover, resolve_externals, keep_blanks, substitute_ent; + int resolved_path_len; + int old_error_reporting = 0; +- char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1]; + + if (id != NULL) { + intern = Z_DOMOBJ_P(id); +diff --git a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c +index 06f569949ce..ecc81ad1470 100644 +--- a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c ++++ b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c +@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, XML) + xmlreader_object *intern = NULL; + char *source, *uri = NULL, *encoding = NULL; + int resolved_path_len, ret = 0; +- char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char *directory=NULL, resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1]; + xmlParserInputBufferPtr inputbfr; + xmlTextReaderPtr reader; + +diff --git a/main/fopen_wrappers.c b/main/fopen_wrappers.c +index 27135020fa3..90de040a218 100644 +--- a/main/fopen_wrappers.c ++++ b/main/fopen_wrappers.c +@@ -138,10 +138,10 @@ PHPAPI ZEND_INI_MH(OnUpdateBaseDir) + */ + PHPAPI int php_check_specific_open_basedir(const char *basedir, const char *path) + { +- char resolved_name[MAXPATHLEN]; +- char resolved_basedir[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char resolved_name[MAXPATHLEN + 1]; ++ char resolved_basedir[MAXPATHLEN + 1]; + char local_open_basedir[MAXPATHLEN]; +- char path_tmp[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char path_tmp[MAXPATHLEN + 1]; + char *path_file; + size_t resolved_basedir_len; + size_t resolved_name_len; +-- +2.39.1 + +From 614468ce4056c0ef93aae09532dcffdf65b594b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 11:46:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] NEWS + +--- + NEWS | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 03e8c839c77..8157a20d4b3 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.0.28 ++ ++- Core: ++ . Fixed bug #81744 (Password_verify() always return true with some hash). ++ (CVE-2023-0567). (Tim Düsterhus) ++ . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code). ++ (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche) ++ + Backported from 8.0.27 + + - PDO/SQLite: +-- +2.39.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-0662.patch b/php-cve-2023-0662.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a18a88 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-0662.patch @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +From 3a2fdef1ae38881110006616ee1f0534b082ca45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Zelenka +Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 14:11:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix repeated warning for file uploads limit exceeding + +--- + main/rfc1867.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/main/rfc1867.c b/main/rfc1867.c +index edef19c16d6..4931b9aeefb 100644 +--- a/main/rfc1867.c ++++ b/main/rfc1867.c +@@ -922,7 +922,10 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */ + skip_upload = 1; + } else if (upload_cnt <= 0) { + skip_upload = 1; +- sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded"); ++ if (upload_cnt == 0) { ++ --upload_cnt; ++ sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Maximum number of allowable file uploads has been exceeded"); ++ } + } + + /* Return with an error if the posted data is garbled */ +-- +2.39.1 + +From 8ec78d28d20c82c75c4747f44c52601cfdb22516 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Zelenka +Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 14:31:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] Introduce max_multipart_body_parts INI + +This fixes GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv DOS vulnerabality by limitting number of +parsed multipart body parts as currently all parts were always parsed. +--- + main/main.c | 1 + + main/rfc1867.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/main/main.c b/main/main.c +index 0b33b2b56c9..d8c465988cc 100644 +--- a/main/main.c ++++ b/main/main.c +@@ -836,6 +836,7 @@ PHP_INI_BEGIN() + PHP_INI_ENTRY("disable_functions", "", PHP_INI_SYSTEM, NULL) + PHP_INI_ENTRY("disable_classes", "", PHP_INI_SYSTEM, NULL) + PHP_INI_ENTRY("max_file_uploads", "20", PHP_INI_SYSTEM|PHP_INI_PERDIR, NULL) ++ PHP_INI_ENTRY("max_multipart_body_parts", "-1", PHP_INI_SYSTEM|PHP_INI_PERDIR, NULL) + + STD_PHP_INI_BOOLEAN("allow_url_fopen", "1", PHP_INI_SYSTEM, OnUpdateBool, allow_url_fopen, php_core_globals, core_globals) + STD_PHP_INI_BOOLEAN("allow_url_include", "0", PHP_INI_SYSTEM, OnUpdateBool, allow_url_include, php_core_globals, core_globals) +diff --git a/main/rfc1867.c b/main/rfc1867.c +index 4931b9aeefb..1b212c93325 100644 +--- a/main/rfc1867.c ++++ b/main/rfc1867.c +@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */ + void *event_extra_data = NULL; + unsigned int llen = 0; + int upload_cnt = INI_INT("max_file_uploads"); ++ int body_parts_cnt = INI_INT("max_multipart_body_parts"); + const zend_encoding *internal_encoding = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(); + php_rfc1867_getword_t getword; + php_rfc1867_getword_conf_t getword_conf; +@@ -715,6 +716,11 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */ + return; + } + ++ if (body_parts_cnt < 0) { ++ body_parts_cnt = PG(max_input_vars) + upload_cnt; ++ } ++ int body_parts_limit = body_parts_cnt; ++ + /* Get the boundary */ + boundary = strstr(content_type_dup, "boundary"); + if (!boundary) { +@@ -799,6 +805,11 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */ + char *pair = NULL; + int end = 0; + ++ if (--body_parts_cnt < 0) { ++ php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Multipart body parts limit exceeded %d. To increase the limit change max_multipart_body_parts in php.ini.", body_parts_limit); ++ goto fileupload_done; ++ } ++ + while (isspace(*cd)) { + ++cd; + } +-- +2.39.1 + +From 472db3ee3a00ac00d36019eee0b3b7362334481c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 09:14:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] NEWS + +--- + NEWS | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 8157a20d4b3..c1668368818 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ Backported from 8.0.28 + . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code). + (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche) + ++- FPM: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv (DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart ++ request body). (CVE-2023-0662) (Jakub Zelenka) ++ + Backported from 8.0.27 + + - PDO/SQLite: +-- +2.39.1 + +From c04f310440a906fc4ca885f4ecf6e3e4cd36edc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 11:47:22 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix NEWS, not FPM specific + +--- + NEWS | 2 -- + 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index c1668368818..3f8739eae78 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ Backported from 8.0.28 + (CVE-2023-0567). (Tim Düsterhus) + . Fixed bug #81746 (1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code). + (CVE-2023-0568). (Niels Dossche) +- +-- FPM: + . Fixed bug GHSA-54hq-v5wp-fqgv (DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart + request body). (CVE-2023-0662) (Jakub Zelenka) + +-- +2.39.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-3247.patch b/php-cve-2023-3247.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e23aebf --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-3247.patch @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From 0cfca9aa1395271833848daec0bace51d965531d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2023 15:05:03 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix missing randomness check and insufficient random bytes + for SOAP HTTP Digest +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +If php_random_bytes_throw fails, the nonce will be uninitialized, but +still sent to the server. The client nonce is intended to protect +against a malicious server. See section 5.10 and 5.12 of RFC 7616 [1], +and bullet point 2 below. + +Tim pointed out that even though it's the MD5 of the nonce that gets sent, +enumerating 31 bits is trivial. So we have still a stack information leak +of 31 bits. + +Furthermore, Tim found the following issues: +* The small size of cnonce might cause the server to erroneously reject + a request due to a repeated (cnonce, nc) pair. As per the birthday + problem 31 bits of randomness will return a duplication with 50% + chance after less than 55000 requests and nc always starts counting at 1. +* The cnonce is intended to protect the client and password against a + malicious server that returns a constant server nonce where the server + precomputed a rainbow table between passwords and correct client response. + As storage is fairly cheap, a server could precompute the client responses + for (a subset of) client nonces and still have a chance of reversing the + client response with the same probability as the cnonce duplication. + + Precomputing the rainbow table for all 2^31 cnonces increases the rainbow + table size by factor 2 billion, which is infeasible. But precomputing it + for 2^14 cnonces only increases the table size by factor 16k and the server + would still have a 10% chance of successfully reversing a password with a + single client request. + +This patch fixes the issues by increasing the nonce size, and checking +the return value of php_random_bytes_throw(). In the process we also get +rid of the MD5 hashing of the nonce. + +[1] RFC 7616: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616 + +Co-authored-by: Tim Düsterhus +(cherry picked from commit 126d517ce240e9f638d9a5eaa509eaca49ef562a) +--- + NEWS | 6 ++++++ + ext/soap/php_http.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- + 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 3f8739eae7..7c07635cad 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.0.29 ++ ++- Soap: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-76gg-c692-v2mw (Missing error check and insufficient random ++ bytes in HTTP Digest authentication for SOAP). (nielsdos, timwolla) ++ + Backported from 8.0.28 + + - Core: +diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c +index ee3dcbdc9a..e3a9afdbe9 100644 +--- a/ext/soap/php_http.c ++++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c +@@ -666,18 +666,23 @@ int make_http_soap_request(zval *this_ptr, + if ((digest = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1)) != NULL) { + if (Z_TYPE_P(digest) == IS_ARRAY) { + char HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9]; +- zend_long nonce; ++ unsigned char nonce[16]; + PHP_MD5_CTX md5ctx; + unsigned char hash[16]; + +- php_random_bytes_throw(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); +- nonce &= 0x7fffffff; ++ if (UNEXPECTED(php_random_bytes_throw(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)) != SUCCESS)) { ++ ZEND_ASSERT(EG(exception)); ++ php_stream_close(stream); ++ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1); ++ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1); ++ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1); ++ smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z); ++ smart_str_free(&soap_headers); ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +- PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx); +- snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), ZEND_LONG_FMT, nonce); +- PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce)); +- PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx); +- make_digest(cnonce, hash); ++ php_hash_bin2hex(cnonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); ++ cnonce[32] = 0; + + if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc")-1)) != NULL && + Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) { +From 40439039c224bb8cdebd1b7b3d03b8cc11e7cce7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 18:05:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix GH-11382 add missing hash header for bin2hex + +--- + ext/soap/php_http.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c +index e3a9afdbe9f..912b8e341d8 100644 +--- a/ext/soap/php_http.c ++++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include "ext/standard/base64.h" + #include "ext/standard/md5.h" + #include "ext/standard/php_random.h" ++#include "ext/hash/php_hash.h" + + static char *get_http_header_value_nodup(char *headers, char *type, size_t *len); + static char *get_http_header_value(char *headers, char *type); +-- +2.40.1 + +From f3021d66d7bb42d2578530cc94f9bde47e58eb10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 08:47:55 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] add cve + +--- + NEWS | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 7c07635cade..899644b3d63 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ Backported from 8.0.29 + + - Soap: + . Fixed bug GHSA-76gg-c692-v2mw (Missing error check and insufficient random +- bytes in HTTP Digest authentication for SOAP). (nielsdos, timwolla) ++ bytes in HTTP Digest authentication for SOAP). ++ (CVE-2023-3247) (nielsdos, timwolla) + + Backported from 8.0.28 + +-- +2.40.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-3823.patch b/php-cve-2023-3823.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a795564 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-3823.patch @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From c398fe98c044c8e7c23135acdc38d4ef7bedc983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:25:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Fix buffer mismanagement in phar_dir_read() + +Fixes GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv. + +(cherry picked from commit 80316123f3e9dcce8ac419bd9dd43546e2ccb5ef) +--- + ext/phar/dirstream.c | 15 ++++++++------ + ext/phar/tests/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phpt | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ext/phar/tests/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/phar/dirstream.c b/ext/phar/dirstream.c +index 4710703c70e..490b14528f1 100644 +--- a/ext/phar/dirstream.c ++++ b/ext/phar/dirstream.c +@@ -91,25 +91,28 @@ static int phar_dir_seek(php_stream *stream, zend_off_t offset, int whence, zend + */ + static ssize_t phar_dir_read(php_stream *stream, char *buf, size_t count) /* {{{ */ + { +- size_t to_read; + HashTable *data = (HashTable *)stream->abstract; + zend_string *str_key; + zend_ulong unused; + ++ if (count != sizeof(php_stream_dirent)) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + if (HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTENT == zend_hash_get_current_key(data, &str_key, &unused)) { + return 0; + } + + zend_hash_move_forward(data); +- to_read = MIN(ZSTR_LEN(str_key), count); + +- if (to_read == 0 || count < ZSTR_LEN(str_key)) { ++ php_stream_dirent *dirent = (php_stream_dirent *) buf; ++ ++ if (sizeof(dirent->d_name) <= ZSTR_LEN(str_key)) { + return 0; + } + +- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(php_stream_dirent)); +- memcpy(((php_stream_dirent *) buf)->d_name, ZSTR_VAL(str_key), to_read); +- ((php_stream_dirent *) buf)->d_name[to_read + 1] = '\0'; ++ memset(dirent, 0, sizeof(php_stream_dirent)); ++ PHP_STRLCPY(dirent->d_name, ZSTR_VAL(str_key), sizeof(dirent->d_name), ZSTR_LEN(str_key)); + + return sizeof(php_stream_dirent); + } +diff --git a/ext/phar/tests/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phpt b/ext/phar/tests/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..4e12f05fb62 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/phar/tests/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv (Buffer overflow and overread in phar_dir_read()) ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--INI-- ++phar.readonly=0 ++--FILE-- ++startBuffering(); ++$phar->addFromString(str_repeat('A', PHP_MAXPATHLEN - 1), 'This is the content of file 1.'); ++$phar->addFromString(str_repeat('B', PHP_MAXPATHLEN - 1).'C', 'This is the content of file 2.'); ++$phar->stopBuffering(); ++ ++$handle = opendir('phar://' . __DIR__ . '/GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv.phar'); ++var_dump(strlen(readdir($handle))); ++// Must not be a string of length PHP_MAXPATHLEN+1 ++var_dump(readdir($handle)); ++closedir($handle); ++?> ++--CLEAN-- ++ ++--EXPECTF-- ++int(%d) ++bool(false) +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/php-cve-2023-3824.patch b/php-cve-2023-3824.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b8b9c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2023-3824.patch @@ -0,0 +1,644 @@ +From b3758bd21223b97c042cae7bd26a66cde081ea98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 17:33:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Sanitize libxml2 globals before parsing + +Fixes GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr. + +To parse a document with libxml2, you first need to create a parsing context. +The parsing context contains parsing options (e.g. XML_NOENT to substitute +entities) that the application (in this case PHP) can set. +Unfortunately, libxml2 also supports providing default set options. +For example, if you call xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1) then the XML_NOENT +option will be added to the parsing options every time you create a parsing +context **even if the application never requested XML_NOENT**. + +Third party extensions can override these globals, in particular the +substitute entity global. This causes entity substitution to be +unexpectedly active. + +Fix it by setting the parsing options to a sane known value. +For API calls that depend on global state we introduce +PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS() and PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(). +For other APIs that work directly with a context we introduce +php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(). + +(cherry picked from commit c283c3ab0ba45d21b2b8745c1f9c7cbfe771c975) +--- + ext/dom/document.c | 15 ++++++++ + ext/dom/documentfragment.c | 2 ++ + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ + ext/libxml/php_libxml.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ + ext/simplexml/simplexml.c | 6 ++++ + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ + ext/soap/php_xml.c | 2 ++ + ext/xml/compat.c | 2 ++ + ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c | 9 +++++ + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 35 ++++++++++++++++++ + ext/xsl/xsltprocessor.c | 9 +++-- + 11 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt + create mode 100644 ext/simplexml/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt + create mode 100644 ext/xmlreader/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/dom/document.c b/ext/dom/document.c +index e683eb8f701..989b5b3dd24 100644 +--- a/ext/dom/document.c ++++ b/ext/dom/document.c +@@ -1459,6 +1459,7 @@ static xmlDocPtr dom_document_parser(zval *id, int mode, char *source, size_t so + options |= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS; + } + ++ php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(ctxt); + xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options); + + ctxt->recovery = recover; +@@ -1759,7 +1760,9 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_xinclude) + + DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern); + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(xinclude); + err = xmlXIncludeProcessFlags(docp, (int)flags); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(xinclude); + + /* XML_XINCLUDE_START and XML_XINCLUDE_END nodes need to be removed as these + are added via xmlXIncludeProcess to mark beginning and ending of xincluded document +@@ -1799,6 +1802,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_validate) + + DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern); + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(validate); + cvp = xmlNewValidCtxt(); + + cvp->userData = NULL; +@@ -1810,6 +1814,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_validate) + } else { + RETVAL_FALSE; + } ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(validate); + + xmlFreeValidCtxt(cvp); + +@@ -1844,14 +1849,18 @@ static void _dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type + + DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern); + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(new_parser_ctxt); ++ + switch (type) { + case DOM_LOAD_FILE: + if (CHECK_NULL_PATH(source, source_len)) { ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(new_parser_ctxt); + php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema file source"); + RETURN_FALSE; + } + valid_file = _dom_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN); + if (!valid_file) { ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(new_parser_ctxt); + php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema file source"); + RETURN_FALSE; + } +@@ -1872,6 +1881,7 @@ static void _dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type + parser); + sptr = xmlSchemaParse(parser); + xmlSchemaFreeParserCtxt(parser); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(new_parser_ctxt); + if (!sptr) { + php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid Schema"); + RETURN_FALSE; +@@ -1890,11 +1900,13 @@ static void _dom_document_schema_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type + valid_opts |= XML_SCHEMA_VAL_VC_I_CREATE; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(validate); + xmlSchemaSetValidOptions(vptr, valid_opts); + xmlSchemaSetValidErrors(vptr, php_libxml_error_handler, php_libxml_error_handler, vptr); + is_valid = xmlSchemaValidateDoc(vptr, docp); + xmlSchemaFree(sptr); + xmlSchemaFreeValidCtxt(vptr); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(validate); + + if (is_valid == 0) { + RETURN_TRUE; +@@ -1965,12 +1977,14 @@ static void _dom_document_relaxNG_validate(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int typ + return; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(parse); + xmlRelaxNGSetParserErrors(parser, + (xmlRelaxNGValidityErrorFunc) php_libxml_error_handler, + (xmlRelaxNGValidityWarningFunc) php_libxml_error_handler, + parser); + sptr = xmlRelaxNGParse(parser); + xmlRelaxNGFreeParserCtxt(parser); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(parse); + if (!sptr) { + php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid RelaxNG"); + RETURN_FALSE; +@@ -2069,6 +2083,7 @@ static void dom_load_html(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int mode) /* {{{ */ + ctxt->sax->error = php_libxml_ctx_error; + ctxt->sax->warning = php_libxml_ctx_warning; + } ++ php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(ctxt); + if (options) { + htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, (int)options); + } +diff --git a/ext/dom/documentfragment.c b/ext/dom/documentfragment.c +index 9b222586ac5..711c42f939d 100644 +--- a/ext/dom/documentfragment.c ++++ b/ext/dom/documentfragment.c +@@ -131,7 +131,9 @@ PHP_METHOD(domdocumentfragment, appendXML) { + } + + if (data) { ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(parse); + err = xmlParseBalancedChunkMemory(nodep->doc, NULL, NULL, 0, (xmlChar *) data, &lst); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(parse); + if (err != 0) { + RETURN_FALSE; + } +diff --git a/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt b/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..b28afd4694e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr (libxml global state entity loader bypass) ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++ %bork;]>"; ++ ++libxml_use_internal_errors(true); ++ ++function parseXML($xml) { ++ $doc = new DOMDocument(); ++ @$doc->loadXML($xml); ++ $doc->createDocumentFragment()->appendXML("&bork;"); ++ foreach (libxml_get_errors() as $error) { ++ var_dump(trim($error->message)); ++ } ++} ++ ++parseXML($xml); ++zend_test_override_libxml_global_state(); ++parseXML($xml); ++ ++echo "Done\n"; ++ ++?> ++--EXPECT-- ++string(25) "Entity 'bork' not defined" ++string(25) "Entity 'bork' not defined" ++string(25) "Entity 'bork' not defined" ++Done +diff --git a/ext/libxml/php_libxml.h b/ext/libxml/php_libxml.h +index cf936e95de1..92028d5703e 100644 +--- a/ext/libxml/php_libxml.h ++++ b/ext/libxml/php_libxml.h +@@ -121,6 +121,42 @@ PHP_LIBXML_API void php_libxml_shutdown(void); + ZEND_TSRMLS_CACHE_EXTERN() + #endif + ++/* Other extension may override the global state options, these global options ++ * are copied initially to ctxt->options. Set the options to a known good value. ++ * See libxml2 globals.c and parserInternals.c. ++ * The unique_name argument allows multiple sanitizes and restores within the ++ * same function, even nested is necessary. */ ++#define PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(unique_name) \ ++ int xml_old_loadsubset_##unique_name = xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue; \ ++ xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = 0; \ ++ int xml_old_validate_##unique_name = xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue; \ ++ xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue = 0; \ ++ int xml_old_pedantic_##unique_name = xmlPedanticParserDefault(0); \ ++ int xml_old_substitute_##unique_name = xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(0); \ ++ int xml_old_linenrs_##unique_name = xmlLineNumbersDefault(0); \ ++ int xml_old_blanks_##unique_name = xmlKeepBlanksDefault(1); ++ ++#define PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(unique_name) \ ++ xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = xml_old_loadsubset_##unique_name; \ ++ xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue = xml_old_validate_##unique_name; \ ++ (void) xmlPedanticParserDefault(xml_old_pedantic_##unique_name); \ ++ (void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(xml_old_substitute_##unique_name); \ ++ (void) xmlLineNumbersDefault(xml_old_linenrs_##unique_name); \ ++ (void) xmlKeepBlanksDefault(xml_old_blanks_##unique_name); ++ ++/* Alternative for above, working directly on the context and not setting globals. ++ * Generally faster because no locking is involved, and this has the advantage that it sets the options to a known good value. */ ++static zend_always_inline void php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) ++{ ++ ctxt->loadsubset = 0; ++ ctxt->validate = 0; ++ ctxt->pedantic = 0; ++ ctxt->replaceEntities = 0; ++ ctxt->linenumbers = 0; ++ ctxt->keepBlanks = 1; ++ ctxt->options = 0; ++} ++ + #else /* HAVE_LIBXML */ + #define libxml_module_ptr NULL + #endif +diff --git a/ext/simplexml/simplexml.c b/ext/simplexml/simplexml.c +index 2cdff0e648d..101a9d8fd8c 100644 +--- a/ext/simplexml/simplexml.c ++++ b/ext/simplexml/simplexml.c +@@ -2194,7 +2194,9 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_file) + RETURN_FALSE; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(read_file); + docp = xmlReadFile(filename, NULL, (int)options); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(read_file); + + if (!docp) { + RETURN_FALSE; +@@ -2248,7 +2250,9 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_string) + RETURN_FALSE; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(read_memory); + docp = xmlReadMemory(data, (int)data_len, NULL, NULL, (int)options); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(read_memory); + + if (!docp) { + RETURN_FALSE; +@@ -2298,7 +2302,9 @@ SXE_METHOD(__construct) + return; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(read_file_or_memory); + docp = is_url ? xmlReadFile(data, NULL, (int)options) : xmlReadMemory(data, (int)data_len, NULL, NULL, (int)options); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(read_file_or_memory); + + if (!docp) { + ((php_libxml_node_object *)sxe)->document = NULL; +diff --git a/ext/simplexml/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt b/ext/simplexml/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..2152e012328 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/simplexml/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr (libxml global state entity loader bypass) ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++ %bork;]>"; ++ ++libxml_use_internal_errors(true); ++zend_test_override_libxml_global_state(); ++ ++echo "--- String test ---\n"; ++simplexml_load_string($xml); ++echo "--- Constructor test ---\n"; ++new SimpleXMLElement($xml); ++echo "--- File test ---\n"; ++file_put_contents("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp", $xml); ++simplexml_load_file("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp"); ++ ++echo "Done\n"; ++ ++?> ++--CLEAN-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++--- String test --- ++--- Constructor test --- ++--- File test --- ++Done +diff --git a/ext/soap/php_xml.c b/ext/soap/php_xml.c +index 18a266179b7..1bb7fa00a37 100644 +--- a/ext/soap/php_xml.c ++++ b/ext/soap/php_xml.c +@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseFile(const char *filename) + if (ctxt) { + zend_bool old; + ++ php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(ctxt); + ctxt->keepBlanks = 0; + ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace; + ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment; +@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size) + if (ctxt) { + zend_bool old; + ++ php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(ctxt); + ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace; + ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment; + ctxt->sax->warning = NULL; +diff --git a/ext/xml/compat.c b/ext/xml/compat.c +index fc4525650fc..57eb00dd429 100644 +--- a/ext/xml/compat.c ++++ b/ext/xml/compat.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include "php.h" + #if defined(HAVE_LIBXML) && (defined(HAVE_XML) || defined(HAVE_XMLRPC)) && !defined(HAVE_LIBEXPAT) + #include "expat_compat.h" ++#include "ext/libxml/php_libxml.h" + + typedef struct _php_xml_ns { + xmlNsPtr nsptr; +@@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate_MM(const XML_Char *encoding, const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *m + return NULL; + } + ++ php_libxml_sanitize_parse_ctxt_options(parser->parser); + xmlCtxtUseOptions(parser->parser, XML_PARSE_OLDSAX); + + parser->parser->replaceEntities = 1; +diff --git a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c +index ecc81ad1470..51d6bb9c9f2 100644 +--- a/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c ++++ b/ext/xmlreader/php_xmlreader.c +@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ static xmlRelaxNGPtr _xmlreader_get_relaxNG(char *source, size_t source_len, siz + return NULL; + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(parse); + if (error_func || warn_func) { + xmlRelaxNGSetParserErrors(parser, + (xmlRelaxNGValidityErrorFunc) error_func, +@@ -312,6 +313,7 @@ static xmlRelaxNGPtr _xmlreader_get_relaxNG(char *source, size_t source_len, siz + } + sptr = xmlRelaxNGParse(parser); + xmlRelaxNGFreeParserCtxt(parser); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(parse); + + return sptr; + } +@@ -881,7 +883,9 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, open) + valid_file = _xmlreader_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN ); + + if (valid_file) { ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(reader_for_file); + reader = xmlReaderForFile(valid_file, encoding, options); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(reader_for_file); + } + + if (reader == NULL) { +@@ -958,7 +962,9 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, setSchema) + + intern = Z_XMLREADER_P(id); + if (intern && intern->ptr) { ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(schema); + retval = xmlTextReaderSchemaValidate(intern->ptr, source); ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(schema); + + if (retval == 0) { + RETURN_TRUE; +@@ -1082,6 +1088,7 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, XML) + } + uri = (char *) xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) resolved_path); + } ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(text_reader); + reader = xmlNewTextReader(inputbfr, uri); + + if (reader != NULL) { +@@ -1100,9 +1107,11 @@ PHP_METHOD(xmlreader, XML) + xmlFree(uri); + } + ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(text_reader); + return; + } + } ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(text_reader); + } + + if (uri) { +diff --git a/ext/xmlreader/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt b/ext/xmlreader/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..e9ffb04c2bb +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/xmlreader/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr (libxml global state entity loader bypass) ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++ %bork;]>"; ++ ++libxml_use_internal_errors(true); ++zend_test_override_libxml_global_state(); ++ ++echo "--- String test ---\n"; ++$reader = XMLReader::xml($xml); ++$reader->read(); ++echo "--- File test ---\n"; ++file_put_contents("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp", $xml); ++$reader = XMLReader::open("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp"); ++$reader->read(); ++ ++echo "Done\n"; ++ ++?> ++--CLEAN-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++--- String test --- ++--- File test --- ++Done +diff --git a/ext/xsl/xsltprocessor.c b/ext/xsl/xsltprocessor.c +index 079920d0ffa..2d95b2ff4bb 100644 +--- a/ext/xsl/xsltprocessor.c ++++ b/ext/xsl/xsltprocessor.c +@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(xsl_xsltprocessor_import_stylesheet) + xmlDoc *doc = NULL, *newdoc = NULL; + xsltStylesheetPtr sheetp, oldsheetp; + xsl_object *intern; +- int prevSubstValue, prevExtDtdValue, clone_docu = 0; ++ int clone_docu = 0; + xmlNode *nodep = NULL; + zval *cloneDocu, member, rv; + +@@ -421,13 +421,12 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(xsl_xsltprocessor_import_stylesheet) + stylesheet document otherwise the node proxies will be a mess */ + newdoc = xmlCopyDoc(doc, 1); + xmlNodeSetBase((xmlNodePtr) newdoc, (xmlChar *)doc->URL); +- prevSubstValue = xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1); +- prevExtDtdValue = xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue; ++ PHP_LIBXML_SANITIZE_GLOBALS(parse); ++ xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1); + xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = XML_DETECT_IDS | XML_COMPLETE_ATTRS; + + sheetp = xsltParseStylesheetDoc(newdoc); +- xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(prevSubstValue); +- xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = prevExtDtdValue; ++ PHP_LIBXML_RESTORE_GLOBALS(parse); + + if (!sheetp) { + xmlFreeDoc(newdoc); +-- +2.41.0 + +From ef1d507acf7be23d7624dc3c891683b2218feb51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 07:22:33 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] NEWS + +--- + NEWS | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 899644b3d63..4f88029a7d6 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.0.30 ++ ++- Libxml: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr (Security issue with external entity loading ++ in XML without enabling it). (CVE-2023-3823) (nielsdos, ilutov) ++ ++- Phar: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-jqcx-ccgc-xwhv (Buffer mismanagement in phar_dir_read()). ++ (CVE-2023-3824) (nielsdos) ++ + Backported from 8.0.29 + + - Soap: +-- +2.41.0 + +From 24e669e790e6aebd219c9a9fa19017455c8646b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 07:37:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] backport zend_test changes + (zend_test_override_libxml_global_state) + +--- + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 1 + + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 1 + + ...xml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt | 5 +++-- + ext/zend_test/test.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt b/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +index b28afd4694e..7fc2a249ac7 100644 +--- a/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt ++++ b/ext/dom/tests/libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.phpt +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ GHSA-3qrf-m4j2-pcrr (libxml global state entity loader bypass) + if (!extension_loaded('libxml')) die('skip libxml extension not available'); + if (!extension_loaded('dom')) die('skip dom extension not available'); + if (!extension_loaded('zend-test')) die('skip zend-test extension not available'); ++if (!function_exists('zend_test_override_libxml_global_state')) die('skip not for Windows'); + ?> + --FILE-- + + --FILE-- + + --FILE-- + read(); + echo "--- File test ---\n"; + file_put_contents("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp", $xml); +-$reader = XMLReader::open("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp"); ++$reader = @XMLReader::open("libxml_global_state_entity_loader_bypass.tmp"); + $reader->read(); + + echo "Done\n"; +diff --git a/ext/zend_test/test.c b/ext/zend_test/test.c +index 4f81adc6ac1..cdfc15571c0 100644 +--- a/ext/zend_test/test.c ++++ b/ext/zend_test/test.c +@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ + #include "ext/standard/info.h" + #include "php_test.h" + ++#if defined(HAVE_LIBXML) && !defined(PHP_WIN32) ++# include ++# include ++#endif ++ + static zend_class_entry *zend_test_interface; + static zend_class_entry *zend_test_class; + static zend_class_entry *zend_test_child_class; +@@ -48,6 +53,20 @@ ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO_EX(arginfo_zend_leak_variable, 0, 0, 1) + ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, variable) + ZEND_END_ARG_INFO() + ++#if defined(HAVE_LIBXML) && !defined(PHP_WIN32) ++static ZEND_FUNCTION(zend_test_override_libxml_global_state) ++{ ++ ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_NONE(); ++ ++ xmlLoadExtDtdDefaultValue = 1; ++ xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue = 1; ++ (void) xmlPedanticParserDefault(1); ++ (void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1); ++ (void) xmlLineNumbersDefault(1); ++ (void) xmlKeepBlanksDefault(0); ++} ++#endif ++ + ZEND_FUNCTION(zend_test_func) + { + /* dummy */ +@@ -297,6 +316,9 @@ static const zend_function_entry zend_test_functions[] = { + ZEND_FE(zend_terminate_string, arginfo_zend_terminate_string) + ZEND_FE(zend_leak_bytes, NULL) + ZEND_FE(zend_leak_variable, arginfo_zend_leak_variable) ++#if defined(HAVE_LIBXML) && !defined(PHP_WIN32) ++ ZEND_FE(zend_test_override_libxml_global_state, NULL) ++#endif + ZEND_FE_END + }; + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-2756.patch b/php-cve-2024-2756.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d927518 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-2756.patch @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +From a6c1c62a25ac23b08a86af11d68f0e2eaafc102b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2024 21:04:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Fix GHSA-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4: __Host-/__Secure- cookie bypass + due to partial CVE-2022-31629 fix + +The check happened too early as later code paths may perform more +mangling rules. Move the check downwards right before adding the actual +variable. + +(cherry picked from commit 093c08af25fb323efa0c8e6154aa9fdeae3d3b53) +(cherry picked from commit 2e07a3acd7a6b53c55325b94bed97748d7697b53) +--- + ext/standard/tests/ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4.phpt | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++ + main/php_variables.c | 41 +++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..77fcb680894 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/standard/tests/ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ ++--TEST-- ++ghsa-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4 (__Host-/__Secure- cookie bypass due to partial CVE-2022-31629 fix) ++--COOKIE-- ++..Host-test=ignore_1; ++._Host-test=ignore_2; ++.[Host-test=ignore_3; ++_.Host-test=ignore_4; ++__Host-test=ignore_5; ++_[Host-test=ignore_6; ++[.Host-test=ignore_7; ++[_Host-test=ignore_8; ++[[Host-test=ignore_9; ++..Host-test[]=ignore_10; ++._Host-test[]=ignore_11; ++.[Host-test[]=ignore_12; ++_.Host-test[]=ignore_13; ++__Host-test[]=legitimate_14; ++_[Host-test[]=legitimate_15; ++[.Host-test[]=ignore_16; ++[_Host-test[]=ignore_17; ++[[Host-test[]=ignore_18; ++..Secure-test=ignore_1; ++._Secure-test=ignore_2; ++.[Secure-test=ignore_3; ++_.Secure-test=ignore_4; ++__Secure-test=ignore_5; ++_[Secure-test=ignore_6; ++[.Secure-test=ignore_7; ++[_Secure-test=ignore_8; ++[[Secure-test=ignore_9; ++..Secure-test[]=ignore_10; ++._Secure-test[]=ignore_11; ++.[Secure-test[]=ignore_12; ++_.Secure-test[]=ignore_13; ++__Secure-test[]=legitimate_14; ++_[Secure-test[]=legitimate_15; ++[.Secure-test[]=ignore_16; ++[_Secure-test[]=ignore_17; ++[[Secure-test[]=ignore_18; ++--FILE-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++array(3) { ++ ["__Host-test"]=> ++ array(1) { ++ [0]=> ++ string(13) "legitimate_14" ++ } ++ ["_"]=> ++ array(2) { ++ ["Host-test["]=> ++ string(13) "legitimate_15" ++ ["Secure-test["]=> ++ string(13) "legitimate_15" ++ } ++ ["__Secure-test"]=> ++ array(1) { ++ [0]=> ++ string(13) "legitimate_14" ++ } ++} +diff --git a/main/php_variables.c b/main/php_variables.c +index 18f6b65a6c5..e971d497337 100644 +--- a/main/php_variables.c ++++ b/main/php_variables.c +@@ -65,6 +65,21 @@ static zend_always_inline void php_register_variable_quick(const char *name, siz + zend_string_release_ex(key, 0); + } + ++/* Discard variable if mangling made it start with __Host-, where pre-mangling it did not start with __Host- ++ * Discard variable if mangling made it start with __Secure-, where pre-mangling it did not start with __Secure- */ ++static zend_bool php_is_forbidden_variable_name(const char *mangled_name, size_t mangled_name_len, const char *pre_mangled_name) ++{ ++ if (mangled_name_len >= sizeof("__Host-")-1 && strncmp(mangled_name, "__Host-", sizeof("__Host-")-1) == 0 && strncmp(pre_mangled_name, "__Host-", sizeof("__Host-")-1) != 0) { ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (mangled_name_len >= sizeof("__Secure-")-1 && strncmp(mangled_name, "__Secure-", sizeof("__Secure-")-1) == 0 && strncmp(pre_mangled_name, "__Secure-", sizeof("__Secure-")-1) != 0) { ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + PHPAPI void php_register_variable_ex(char *var_name, zval *val, zval *track_vars_array) + { + char *p = NULL; +@@ -115,20 +130,6 @@ PHPAPI void php_register_variable_ex(char *var_name, zval *val, zval *track_vars + } + var_len = p - var; + +- /* Discard variable if mangling made it start with __Host-, where pre-mangling it did not start with __Host- */ +- if (strncmp(var, "__Host-", sizeof("__Host-")-1) == 0 && strncmp(var_name, "__Host-", sizeof("__Host-")-1) != 0) { +- zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); +- free_alloca(var_orig, use_heap); +- return; +- } +- +- /* Discard variable if mangling made it start with __Secure-, where pre-mangling it did not start with __Secure- */ +- if (strncmp(var, "__Secure-", sizeof("__Secure-")-1) == 0 && strncmp(var_name, "__Secure-", sizeof("__Secure-")-1) != 0) { +- zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); +- free_alloca(var_orig, use_heap); +- return; +- } +- + if (var_len==0) { /* empty variable name, or variable name with a space in it */ + zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); + free_alloca(var_orig, use_heap); +@@ -226,6 +227,12 @@ PHPAPI void php_register_variable_ex(char *var_name, zval *val, zval *track_vars + return; + } + } else { ++ if (php_is_forbidden_variable_name(index, index_len, var_name)) { ++ zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); ++ free_alloca(var_orig, use_heap); ++ return; ++ } ++ + gpc_element_p = zend_symtable_str_find(symtable1, index, index_len); + if (!gpc_element_p) { + zval tmp; +@@ -263,6 +270,12 @@ plain_var: + zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); + } + } else { ++ if (php_is_forbidden_variable_name(index, index_len, var_name)) { ++ zval_ptr_dtor_nogc(val); ++ free_alloca(var_orig, use_heap); ++ return; ++ } ++ + zend_ulong idx; + + /* +-- +2.44.0 + +From dcdd49ef3bfbd8ccc778850d6a0f9b98adf625d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 08:59:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] NEWS + +(cherry picked from commit 366cc249b7d54707572beb7096e8f6c65ee79719) +--- + NEWS | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 4f88029a7d6..d63aadc6851 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.1.28 ++ ++- Standard: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4 (__Host-/__Secure- cookie bypass due to ++ partial CVE-2022-31629 fix). (CVE-2024-2756) (nielsdos) ++ + Backported from 8.0.30 + + - Libxml: +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-3096.patch b/php-cve-2024-3096.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a1f20a --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-3096.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 4a7ceb9d6427f8d368f1a8739267b1f8310ec201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Zelenka +Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 15:27:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix bug GHSA-q6x7-frmf-grcw: password_verify can + erroneously return true + +Disallow null character in bcrypt password + +(cherry picked from commit 0ba5229a3f7572846e91c8f5382e87785f543826) +(cherry picked from commit 81794c73068d9a44bf109bbcc9793e7b56a1c051) +--- + ext/standard/password.c | 5 +++++ + ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_errors.phpt | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ext/standard/password.c b/ext/standard/password.c +index 9fe7fb1a422..af80670246a 100644 +--- a/ext/standard/password.c ++++ b/ext/standard/password.c +@@ -260,6 +260,11 @@ static zend_string* php_password_bcrypt_hash(const zend_string *password, zend_a + zval *zcost; + zend_long cost = PHP_PASSWORD_BCRYPT_COST; + ++ if (memchr(ZSTR_VAL(password), '\0', ZSTR_LEN(password))) { ++ php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Bcrypt password must not contain null character"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + if (options && (zcost = zend_hash_str_find(options, "cost", sizeof("cost")-1)) != NULL) { + cost = zval_get_long(zcost); + } +diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_errors.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_errors.phpt +index a0826080e62..f95b72670ae 100644 +--- a/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_errors.phpt ++++ b/ext/standard/tests/password/password_bcrypt_errors.phpt +@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ var_dump(password_hash("foo", PASSWORD_BCRYPT, array("salt" => 123))); + + var_dump(password_hash("foo", PASSWORD_BCRYPT, array("cost" => "foo"))); + ++var_dump(password_hash("null\0password", PASSWORD_BCRYPT)); ++ + ?> + --EXPECTF-- + Warning: password_hash(): Invalid bcrypt cost parameter specified: 3 in %s on line %d +@@ -41,3 +43,7 @@ NULL + + Warning: password_hash(): Invalid bcrypt cost parameter specified: 0 in %s on line %d + NULL ++ ++Warning: password_hash(): Bcrypt password must not contain null character in %s on line %d ++NULL ++ +-- +2.44.0 + +From 027bdbc636632be49ecfad8d4191509faacb34ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 09:01:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] NEWS + +(cherry picked from commit 24f77904ee2259d722559f129f96a1f145a2367b) +--- + NEWS | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index d63aadc6851..96a33c21637 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Backported from 8.1.28 + - Standard: + . Fixed bug GHSA-wpj3-hf5j-x4v4 (__Host-/__Secure- cookie bypass due to + partial CVE-2022-31629 fix). (CVE-2024-2756) (nielsdos) ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-h746-cjrr-wfmr (password_verify can erroneously return true, ++ opening ATO risk). (CVE-2024-3096) (Jakub Zelenka) + + Backported from 8.0.30 + +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-5458.patch b/php-cve-2024-5458.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64a1a78 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-5458.patch @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +From 08be64e40197fc12dca5f802d16748d9c3cb4cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 22:25:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix GHSA-w8qr-v226-r27w + +We should not early-out with success status if we found an ipv6 +hostname, we should keep checking the rest of the conditions. +Because integrating the if-check of the ipv6 hostname in the +"Validate domain" if-check made the code hard to read, I extracted the +condition out to a separate function. This also required to make +a few pointers const in order to have some clean code. + +(cherry picked from commit 4066610b47e22c24cbee91be434a94357056a479) +--- + ext/filter/logical_filters.c | 35 ++++++++++--------- + ext/filter/tests/ghsa-w8qr-v226-r27w.phpt | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ext/filter/tests/ghsa-w8qr-v226-r27w.phpt + +diff --git a/ext/filter/logical_filters.c b/ext/filter/logical_filters.c +index e5e87c01568..9c86ad072cc 100644 +--- a/ext/filter/logical_filters.c ++++ b/ext/filter/logical_filters.c +@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ + #define FORMAT_IPV4 4 + #define FORMAT_IPV6 6 + +-static int _php_filter_validate_ipv6(char *str, size_t str_len, int ip[8]); ++static int _php_filter_validate_ipv6(const char *str, size_t str_len, int ip[8]); + + static int php_filter_parse_int(const char *str, size_t str_len, zend_long *ret) { /* {{{ */ + zend_long ctx_value; +@@ -571,6 +571,14 @@ static int is_userinfo_valid(zend_string *str) + return 1; + } + ++static zend_bool php_filter_is_valid_ipv6_hostname(const char *s, size_t l) ++{ ++ const char *e = s + l; ++ const char *t = e - 1; ++ ++ return *s == '[' && *t == ']' && _php_filter_validate_ipv6(s + 1, l - 2, NULL); ++} ++ + void php_filter_validate_url(PHP_INPUT_FILTER_PARAM_DECL) /* {{{ */ + { + php_url *url; +@@ -596,7 +604,7 @@ void php_filter_validate_url(PHP_INPUT_FILTER_PARAM_DECL) /* {{{ */ + + if (url->scheme != NULL && + (zend_string_equals_literal_ci(url->scheme, "http") || zend_string_equals_literal_ci(url->scheme, "https"))) { +- char *e, *s, *t; ++ const char *s; + size_t l; + + if (url->host == NULL) { +@@ -605,17 +613,14 @@ void php_filter_validate_url(PHP_INPUT_FILTER_PARAM_DECL) /* {{{ */ + + s = ZSTR_VAL(url->host); + l = ZSTR_LEN(url->host); +- e = s + l; +- t = e - 1; +- +- /* An IPv6 enclosed by square brackets is a valid hostname */ +- if (*s == '[' && *t == ']' && _php_filter_validate_ipv6((s + 1), l - 2, NULL)) { +- php_url_free(url); +- return; +- } + +- // Validate domain +- if (!_php_filter_validate_domain(ZSTR_VAL(url->host), l, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME)) { ++ if ( ++ /* An IPv6 enclosed by square brackets is a valid hostname.*/ ++ !php_filter_is_valid_ipv6_hostname(s, l) && ++ /* Validate domain. ++ * This includes a loose check for an IPv4 address. */ ++ !_php_filter_validate_domain(ZSTR_VAL(url->host), l, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME) ++ ) { + php_url_free(url); + RETURN_VALIDATION_FAILED + } +@@ -749,15 +754,15 @@ static int _php_filter_validate_ipv4(char *str, size_t str_len, int *ip) /* {{{ + } + /* }}} */ + +-static int _php_filter_validate_ipv6(char *str, size_t str_len, int ip[8]) /* {{{ */ ++static int _php_filter_validate_ipv6(const char *str, size_t str_len, int ip[8]) /* {{{ */ + { + int compressed_pos = -1; + int blocks = 0; + int num, n, i; + char *ipv4; +- char *end; ++ const char *end; + int ip4elm[4]; +- char *s = str; ++ const char *s = str; + + if (!memchr(str, ':', str_len)) { + return 0; +diff --git a/ext/filter/tests/ghsa-w8qr-v226-r27w.phpt b/ext/filter/tests/ghsa-w8qr-v226-r27w.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..0092408ee5a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ext/filter/tests/ghsa-w8qr-v226-r27w.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-w8qr-v226-r27w ++--EXTENSIONS-- ++filter ++--FILE-- ++ ++--EXPECT-- ++--- These ones should fail --- ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++bool(false) ++--- These ones should work --- ++string(21) "http://test@127.0.0.1" ++string(50) "http://test@[2001:db8:3333:4444:5555:6666:1.2.3.4]" ++string(17) "http://test@[::1]" +-- +2.45.1 + +From ec1d5e6468479e64acc7fb8cb955f053b64ea9a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 16:48:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] NEWS + +(cherry picked from commit a1ff81b786bd519597e770795be114f5171f0648) +--- + NEWS | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 8058eff0256..34ad33cf5c4 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.1.29 ++ ++- Filter: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-w8qr-v226-r27w (Filter bypass in filter_var FILTER_VALIDATE_URL). ++ (CVE-2024-5458) (nielsdos) ++ + Backported from 8.1.28 + + - Standard: +-- +2.45.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-8925.patch b/php-cve-2024-8925.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f219a24 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-8925.patch @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +From a24ac172f52e75101913f3946cfa5515f723c99f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Arnaud Le Blanc +Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2024 15:22:07 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Fix GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32 + +multipart/form-data boundaries larger than the read buffer result in erroneous +parsing, which violates data integrity. + +Limit boundary size, as allowed by RFC 1521: + + Encapsulation boundaries [...] must be no longer than 70 characters, not + counting the two leading hyphens. + +We correctly parse payloads with boundaries of length up to +FILLUNIT-strlen("\r\n--") bytes, so allow this for BC. + +(cherry picked from commit 19b49258d0c5a61398d395d8afde1123e8d161e0) +(cherry picked from commit 2b0daf421c162376892832588eccdfa9a286ed09) +--- + main/rfc1867.c | 7 ++ + tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc | 3 + + tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc + create mode 100644 tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt + +diff --git a/main/rfc1867.c b/main/rfc1867.c +index 1b212c93325..43ccce120c3 100644 +--- a/main/rfc1867.c ++++ b/main/rfc1867.c +@@ -759,6 +759,13 @@ SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) /* {{{ */ + boundary_len = boundary_end-boundary; + } + ++ /* Boundaries larger than FILLUNIT-strlen("\r\n--") characters lead to ++ * erroneous parsing */ ++ if (boundary_len > FILLUNIT-strlen("\r\n--")) { ++ sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Boundary too large in multipart/form-data POST data"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* Initialize the buffer */ + if (!(mbuff = multipart_buffer_new(boundary, boundary_len))) { + sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Unable to initialize the input buffer"); +diff --git a/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..adf72a361a2 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++ ++--FILE-- ++ '1', ++ 'CONTENT_TYPE' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=$boundary", ++ 'CONTENT_LENGTH' => strlen($body), ++ 'REQUEST_METHOD' => 'POST', ++ 'SCRIPT_FILENAME' => __DIR__ . '/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc', ++ ]); ++ ++ $spec = [ ++ 0 => ['pipe', 'r'], ++ 1 => STDOUT, ++ 2 => STDOUT, ++ ]; ++ ++ $pipes = []; ++ ++ print "Starting...\n"; ++ ++ $handle = proc_open($cmd, $spec, $pipes, getcwd(), $env); ++ ++ fwrite($pipes[0], $body); ++ ++ $status = proc_close($handle); ++ ++ print "\n"; ++} ++ ++for ($offset = -1; $offset <= 1; $offset++) { ++ test(FILLUNIT - strlen("\r\n--") + $offset); ++} ++ ++?> ++--EXPECTF-- ++Boundary len: 5115 ++Starting... ++X-Powered-By: %s ++Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ++ ++Hello world ++array(1) { ++ ["koko"]=> ++ string(5124) "BBB ++--AAA%sCCC" ++} ++ ++Boundary len: 5116 ++Starting... ++X-Powered-By: %s ++Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ++ ++Hello world ++array(1) { ++ ["koko"]=> ++ string(5125) "BBB ++--AAA%sCCC" ++} ++ ++Boundary len: 5117 ++Starting... ++X-Powered-By: %s ++Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ++ ++
++Warning: Boundary too large in multipart/form-data POST data in Unknown on line 0
++Hello world ++array(0) { ++} ++ +-- +2.46.1 + +From 2fd1b83817d20523e72bef3ad524cd5797f51acf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Zelenka +Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 18:54:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Skip GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32 test on Windows + +(cherry picked from commit c70e25630832fa10d421328eed2b8e1a36af7a64) +(cherry picked from commit c75683864f6e4188439e8ca2adbb05824918be12) +--- + tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt +index af819163705..29bcb6557d5 100644 +--- a/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt ++++ b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt +@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32 + if (!getenv('TEST_PHP_CGI_EXECUTABLE')) { + die("skip php-cgi not available"); + } ++if (substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3) == 'WIN') { ++ die("skip not for Windows in CI - probably resource issue"); ++} + ?> + --FILE-- + +Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 15:49:03 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 11/11] adapt GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32 test for 7.x + +--- + tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt +index 29bcb6557d5..a1ead918ff3 100644 +--- a/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt ++++ b/tests/basic/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.phpt +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ function test($boundaryLen) { + getenv('TEST_PHP_CGI_EXECUTABLE'), + '-C', + '-n', ++ '-dlog_errors=1', + __DIR__ . '/GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32.inc', + ]; + +@@ -92,11 +93,10 @@ array(1) { + + Boundary len: 5117 + Starting... ++PHP Warning: Boundary too large in multipart/form-data POST data in Unknown on line 0 + X-Powered-By: %s + Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 + +-
+-Warning: Boundary too large in multipart/form-data POST data in Unknown on line 0
+ Hello world + array(0) { + } +-- +2.46.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-8926.patch b/php-cve-2024-8926.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5baaa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-8926.patch @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +From fb718aa6f2117933566bb7bb2f70b2b0d9a9c08f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Ehrhardt +Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2024 20:24:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Fix GHSA-3qgc-jrrr-25jv + +--- + sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++- + sapi/cgi/tests/ghsa-3qgc-jrrr-25jv.phpt | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 sapi/cgi/tests/ghsa-3qgc-jrrr-25jv.phpt + +diff --git a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +index a36f426d266..8d1342727dc 100644 +--- a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c ++++ b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +@@ -1827,8 +1827,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + } + } + ++ /* Apache CGI will pass the query string to the command line if it doesn't contain a '='. ++ * This can create an issue where a malicious request can pass command line arguments to ++ * the executable. Ideally we skip argument parsing when we're in cgi or fastcgi mode, ++ * but that breaks PHP scripts on Linux with a hashbang: `#!/php-cgi -d option=value`. ++ * Therefore, this code only prevents passing arguments if the query string starts with a '-'. ++ * Similarly, scripts spawned in subprocesses on Windows may have the same issue. */ + if((query_string = getenv("QUERY_STRING")) != NULL && strchr(query_string, '=') == NULL) { +- /* we've got query string that has no = - apache CGI will pass it to command line */ + unsigned char *p; + decoded_query_string = strdup(query_string); + php_url_decode(decoded_query_string, strlen(decoded_query_string)); +@@ -1838,6 +1843,22 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + if(*p == '-') { + skip_getopt = 1; + } ++ ++ /* On Windows we have to take into account the "best fit" mapping behaviour. */ ++#ifdef PHP_WIN32 ++ if (*p >= 0x80) { ++ wchar_t wide_buf[1]; ++ wide_buf[0] = *p; ++ char char_buf[4]; ++ size_t wide_buf_len = sizeof(wide_buf) / sizeof(wide_buf[0]); ++ size_t char_buf_len = sizeof(char_buf) / sizeof(char_buf[0]); ++ if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, wide_buf, wide_buf_len, char_buf, char_buf_len, NULL, NULL) == 0 ++ || char_buf[0] == '-') { ++ skip_getopt = 1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + free(decoded_query_string); + } + +diff --git a/sapi/cgi/tests/ghsa-3qgc-jrrr-25jv.phpt b/sapi/cgi/tests/ghsa-3qgc-jrrr-25jv.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..fd2fcdfbf89 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/sapi/cgi/tests/ghsa-3qgc-jrrr-25jv.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ ++--TEST-- ++GHSA-3qgc-jrrr-25jv ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++'; ++file_put_contents($filename, $script); ++ ++$php = get_cgi_path(); ++reset_env_vars(); ++ ++putenv("SERVER_NAME=Test"); ++putenv("SCRIPT_FILENAME=$filename"); ++putenv("QUERY_STRING=%ads"); ++putenv("REDIRECT_STATUS=1"); ++ ++passthru("$php -s"); ++ ++?> ++--CLEAN-- ++ ++--EXPECTF-- ++X-Powered-By: PHP/%s ++Content-type: %s ++ ++hello world +-- +2.46.1 + +From a634d3f5169c884715d9e26ac213ecf2a25c3666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Ehrhardt +Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 20:09:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 03/11] NEWS: Add backports from 8.1.29 + +--- + NEWS | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 34ad33cf5c4..a96518695fb 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -3,10 +3,18 @@ PHP NEWS + + Backported from 8.1.29 + ++- CGI: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-3qgc-jrrr-25jv (Bypass of CVE-2012-1823, Argument Injection ++ in PHP-CGI). (CVE-2024-4577) (nielsdos) ++ + - Filter: + . Fixed bug GHSA-w8qr-v226-r27w (Filter bypass in filter_var FILTER_VALIDATE_URL). + (CVE-2024-5458) (nielsdos) + ++- Standard: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-9fcc-425m-g385 (Bypass of CVE-2024-1874). ++ (CVE-2024-5585) (nielsdos) ++ + Backported from 8.1.28 + + - Standard: +-- +2.46.1 + +From 1158d06f0b20532ab7309cb20f0be843f9662e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 19:49:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Fix GHSA-p99j-rfp4-xqvq + +It's no use trying to work around whatever the operating system and Apache +do because we'll be fighting that until eternity. +Change the skip_getopt condition such that when we're running in +CGI or FastCGI mode we always skip the argument parsing. +This is a BC break, but this seems to be the only way to get rid of this +class of issues. + +(cherry picked from commit abcfd980bfa03298792fd3aba051c78d52f10642) +(cherry picked from commit 2d2552e092b6ff32cd823692d512f126ee629842) +--- + sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c | 26 ++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +index 8d1342727dc..a2761aafd7b 100644 +--- a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c ++++ b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +@@ -1777,7 +1777,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + int status = 0; + #endif + char *query_string; +- char *decoded_query_string; + int skip_getopt = 0; + + #if defined(SIGPIPE) && defined(SIG_IGN) +@@ -1832,10 +1831,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + * the executable. Ideally we skip argument parsing when we're in cgi or fastcgi mode, + * but that breaks PHP scripts on Linux with a hashbang: `#!/php-cgi -d option=value`. + * Therefore, this code only prevents passing arguments if the query string starts with a '-'. +- * Similarly, scripts spawned in subprocesses on Windows may have the same issue. */ ++ * Similarly, scripts spawned in subprocesses on Windows may have the same issue. ++ * However, Windows has lots of conversion rules and command line parsing rules that ++ * are too difficult and dangerous to reliably emulate. */ + if((query_string = getenv("QUERY_STRING")) != NULL && strchr(query_string, '=') == NULL) { ++#ifdef PHP_WIN32 ++ skip_getopt = cgi || fastcgi; ++#else + unsigned char *p; +- decoded_query_string = strdup(query_string); ++ char *decoded_query_string = strdup(query_string); + php_url_decode(decoded_query_string, strlen(decoded_query_string)); + for (p = (unsigned char *)decoded_query_string; *p && *p <= ' '; p++) { + /* skip all leading spaces */ +@@ -1844,22 +1848,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + skip_getopt = 1; + } + +- /* On Windows we have to take into account the "best fit" mapping behaviour. */ +-#ifdef PHP_WIN32 +- if (*p >= 0x80) { +- wchar_t wide_buf[1]; +- wide_buf[0] = *p; +- char char_buf[4]; +- size_t wide_buf_len = sizeof(wide_buf) / sizeof(wide_buf[0]); +- size_t char_buf_len = sizeof(char_buf) / sizeof(char_buf[0]); +- if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, wide_buf, wide_buf_len, char_buf, char_buf_len, NULL, NULL) == 0 +- || char_buf[0] == '-') { +- skip_getopt = 1; +- } +- } +-#endif +- + free(decoded_query_string); ++#endif + } + + while (!skip_getopt && (c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 2)) != -1) { +-- +2.46.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-8927.patch b/php-cve-2024-8927.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed1e4cf --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-8927.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From c7308ba7cd0533501b40eba255602bb5e085550f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 21:28:26 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 06/11] Fix GHSA-94p6-54jq-9mwp + +Apache only generates REDIRECT_STATUS, so explicitly check for that +if the server name is Apache, don't allow other variable names. +Furthermore, redirect.so and Netscape no longer exist, so +remove those entries as we can't check their server name anymore. + +We now also check for the configuration override *first* such that it +always take precedence. This would allow for a mitigation path if +something like this happens in the future. + +(cherry picked from commit 48808d98f4fc2a05193cdcc1aedd6c66816450f1) +(cherry picked from commit 8aa748ee0657cdee8d883ba50d04b68bc450f686) +--- + sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +index a2761aafd7b..ebce6302b93 100644 +--- a/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c ++++ b/sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c +@@ -1939,18 +1939,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + + /* check force_cgi after startup, so we have proper output */ + if (cgi && CGIG(force_redirect)) { +- /* Apache will generate REDIRECT_STATUS, +- * Netscape and redirect.so will generate HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS. +- * redirect.so and installation instructions available from +- * http://www.koehntopp.de/php. +- * -- kk@netuse.de +- */ +- if (!getenv("REDIRECT_STATUS") && +- !getenv ("HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS") && +- /* this is to allow a different env var to be configured +- * in case some server does something different than above */ +- (!CGIG(redirect_status_env) || !getenv(CGIG(redirect_status_env))) +- ) { ++ /* This is to allow a different environment variable to be configured ++ * in case the we cannot auto-detect which environment variable to use. ++ * Checking this first to allow user overrides in case the environment ++ * variable can be set by an untrusted party. */ ++ const char *redirect_status_env = CGIG(redirect_status_env); ++ if (!redirect_status_env) { ++ /* Apache will generate REDIRECT_STATUS. */ ++ redirect_status_env = "REDIRECT_STATUS"; ++ } ++ ++ if (!getenv(redirect_status_env)) { + zend_try { + SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 400; + PUTS("Security Alert! The PHP CGI cannot be accessed directly.\n\n\ +-- +2.46.1 + diff --git a/php-cve-2024-9026.patch b/php-cve-2024-9026.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..997917b --- /dev/null +++ b/php-cve-2024-9026.patch @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +From 4a8b8fa2592bd8862adeacb5b2faacb30500b9f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Zelenka +Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 13:11:11 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/11] Fix GHSA-865w-9rf3-2wh5: FPM: Logs from childrens may + be altered + +(cherry picked from commit 1f8e16172c7961045c2b0f34ba7613e3f21cdee8) +(cherry picked from commit 22f4d3504d7613ce78bb96aa53cbfe7d672fa036) +--- + sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_stdio.c | 2 +- + .../log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt + create mode 100644 sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt + +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_stdio.c b/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_stdio.c +index ddedfb48c7c..9d87273314a 100644 +--- a/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_stdio.c ++++ b/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_stdio.c +@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ stdio_read: + if ((sizeof(FPM_STDIO_CMD_FLUSH) - cmd_pos) <= in_buf && + !memcmp(buf, &FPM_STDIO_CMD_FLUSH[cmd_pos], sizeof(FPM_STDIO_CMD_FLUSH) - cmd_pos)) { + zlog_stream_finish(log_stream); +- start = cmd_pos; ++ start = sizeof(FPM_STDIO_CMD_FLUSH) - cmd_pos; + } else { + zlog_stream_str(log_stream, &FPM_STDIO_CMD_FLUSH[0], cmd_pos); + } +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..52826320080 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ ++--TEST-- ++FPM: Buffered worker output plain log with msg with flush split position towards separator end ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++start(); ++$tester->expectLogStartNotices(); ++$tester->request()->expectEmptyBody(); ++$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1013) . "Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->terminate(); ++$tester->expectLogTerminatingNotices(); ++$tester->close(); ++ ++?> ++Done ++--EXPECT-- ++Done ++--CLEAN-- ++ +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..34905938553 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt +@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ ++--TEST-- ++FPM: Buffered worker output plain log with msg with flush split position towards separator start ++--SKIPIF-- ++ ++--FILE-- ++start(); ++$tester->expectLogStartNotices(); ++$tester->request()->expectEmptyBody(); ++$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1009) . "Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->terminate(); ++$tester->expectLogTerminatingNotices(); ++$tester->close(); ++ ++?> ++Done ++--EXPECT-- ++Done ++--CLEAN-- ++ +-- +2.46.1 + +From 1154fbd3ddfa418bf2492c5366adaefb47c47737 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 11:50:54 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 09/11] NEWS for 8.1.30 backports + +(cherry picked from commit af3fb385e7b328ab89db26ec712d89c7096f0743) +--- + NEWS | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index a96518695fb..62616d6312d 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -1,6 +1,23 @@ + PHP NEWS + ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| + ++Backported from 8.1.30 ++ ++- CGI: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-p99j-rfp4-xqvq (Bypass of CVE-2024-4577, Parameter Injection ++ Vulnerability). (CVE-2024-8926) (nielsdos) ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-94p6-54jq-9mwp (cgi.force_redirect configuration is ++ bypassable due to the environment variable collision). (CVE-2024-8927) ++ (nielsdos) ++ ++- FPM: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-865w-9rf3-2wh5 (Logs from childrens may be altered). ++ (CVE-2024-9026) (Jakub Zelenka) ++ ++- SAPI: ++ . Fixed bug GHSA-9pqp-7h25-4f32 (Erroneous parsing of multipart form data). ++ (CVE-2024-8925) (Arnaud) ++ + Backported from 8.1.29 + + - CGI: +-- +2.46.1 + +From bc574c256596abc4966e7f0e3e0913839092151e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Remi Collet +Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 15:48:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 10/11] adapt GHSA-865w-9rf3-2wh5 test for 7.x + +--- + sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt | 4 ++-- + sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt | 4 ++-- + sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc | 4 ++-- + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt +index 52826320080..bdd61782bfa 100644 +--- a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt ++++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-end.phpt +@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ $tester = new FPM\Tester($cfg, $code); + $tester->start(); + $tester->expectLogStartNotices(); + $tester->request()->expectEmptyBody(); +-$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1013) . "Quarkslab", decorated: false); +-$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1013) . "Quarkslab", true, false); ++$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", true, false); + $tester->terminate(); + $tester->expectLogTerminatingNotices(); + $tester->close(); +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt +index 34905938553..f3461e4a0c8 100644 +--- a/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt ++++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/log-bwp-msg-flush-split-sep-pos-start.phpt +@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ $tester = new FPM\Tester($cfg, $code); + $tester->start(); + $tester->expectLogStartNotices(); + $tester->request()->expectEmptyBody(); +-$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1009) . "Quarkslab", decorated: false); +-$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", decorated: false); ++$tester->expectLogLine(str_repeat('a', 1009) . "Quarkslab", true, false); ++$tester->expectLogLine("Quarkslab", true, false); + $tester->terminate(); + $tester->expectLogTerminatingNotices(); + $tester->close(); +diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc b/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc +index 7868afc4ac1..fe5f0c2fde7 100644 +--- a/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc ++++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc +@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ class Tester + * @param string $message + * @return bool + */ +- public function expectLogLine(string $message, bool $is_stderr = true) ++ public function expectLogLine(string $message, bool $is_stderr = true, bool $decorated = true) + { + $messageLen = strlen($message); + $limit = $messageLen > 1024 ? $messageLen + 16 : 1024; +@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ class Tester + $this->message("LOG LINE: " . ($logLines[0] ?? '')); + } + +- return $this->logTool->checkWrappedMessage($logLines, false, true, $is_stderr); ++ return $this->logTool->checkWrappedMessage($logLines, false, $decorated, $is_stderr); + } + + /** +-- +2.46.1 + diff --git a/php.spec b/php.spec index 7ad0584..4f535a1 100644 --- a/php.spec +++ b/php.spec @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Summary: PHP scripting language for creating dynamic web sites Name: php Version: %{upver}%{?rcver:~%{rcver}} -Release: 1%{?dist} +Release: 2%{?dist} # All files licensed under PHP version 3.01, except # Zend is licensed under Zend # TSRM is licensed under BSD @@ -108,7 +108,20 @@ Patch47: php-5.6.3-phpinfo.patch # Upstream fixes (100+) # Security fixes (200+) -Patch200: php-CVE-2022-31631.patch +Patch200: php-cve-2022-31631.patch +Patch201: php-cve-2023-0567.patch +Patch202: php-cve-2023-0568.patch +Patch203: php-cve-2023-0662.patch +Patch204: php-cve-2023-3247.patch +Patch205: php-cve-2023-3823.patch +Patch206: php-cve-2023-3824.patch +Patch207: php-cve-2024-2756.patch +Patch208: php-cve-2024-3096.patch +Patch209: php-cve-2024-5458.patch +Patch210: php-cve-2024-8925.patch +Patch211: php-cve-2024-8926.patch +Patch212: php-cve-2024-8927.patch +Patch213: php-cve-2024-9026.patch # Fixes for tests (300+) # Factory is droped from system tzdata @@ -703,25 +716,38 @@ in pure PHP. %setup -q -n php-%{upver}%{?rcver} -%patch1 -p1 -b .mpmcheck -%patch5 -p1 -b .includedir -%patch6 -p1 -b .embed -%patch8 -p1 -b .libdb +%patch -P1 -p1 -b .mpmcheck +%patch -P5 -p1 -b .includedir +%patch -P6 -p1 -b .embed +%patch -P8 -p1 -b .libdb -%patch42 -p1 -b .systzdata -%patch43 -p1 -b .headers +%patch -P42 -p1 -b .systzdata +%patch -P43 -p1 -b .headers %if 0%{?fedora} >= 18 || 0%{?rhel} >= 7 -%patch45 -p1 -b .ldap_r +%patch -P45 -p1 -b .ldap_r %endif -%patch47 -p1 -b .phpinfo +%patch -P47 -p1 -b .phpinfo # upstream patches # security patches -%patch200 -p1 -b .cve31631 +%patch -P200 -p1 -b .cve31631 +%patch -P201 -p1 -b .cve0567 +%patch -P202 -p1 -b .cve0568 +%patch -P203 -p1 -b .cve0662 +%patch -P204 -p1 -b .cve3247 +%patch -P205 -p1 -b .cve3823 +%patch -P206 -p1 -b .cve3824 +%patch -P207 -p1 -b .cve2756 +%patch -P208 -p1 -b .cve3096 +%patch -P209 -p1 -b .cve5458 +%patch -P210 -p1 -b .cve8925 +%patch -P211 -p1 -b .cve8926 +%patch -P212 -p1 -b .cve8927 +%patch -P213 -p1 -b .cve9026 # Fixes for tests -%patch300 -p1 -b .datetests +%patch -P300 -p1 -b .datetests # Prevent %%doc confusion over LICENSE files @@ -1508,6 +1534,35 @@ systemctl try-restart php-fpm.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || : %changelog +* Wed Nov 13 2024 Remi Collet - 7.4.33-2 +- fix low/moderate CVEs + RHEL-66589 +- Fix cgi.force_redirect configuration is bypassable due to the environment variable collision + CVE-2024-8927 +- Fix Logs from childrens may be altered + CVE-2024-9026 +- Fix Erroneous parsing of multipart form data + CVE-2024-8925 +- Fix filter bypass in filter_var FILTER_VALIDATE_URL + CVE-2024-5458 +- Fix __Host-/__Secure- cookie bypass due to partial CVE-2022-31629 fix + CVE-2024-2756 +- Fix password_verify can erroneously return true opening ATO risk + CVE-2024-3096 +- Fix Security issue with external entity loading in XML without enabling it + CVE-2023-3823 +- Fix Buffer mismanagement in phar_dir_read() + CVE-2023-3824 +- Fix Missing error check and insufficient random bytes in HTTP Digest + authentication for SOAP + CVE-2023-3247 +- fix #81744: Password_verify() always return true with some hash + CVE-2023-0567 +- fix #81746: 1-byte array overrun in common path resolve code + CVE-2023-0568 +- fix DOS vulnerability when parsing multipart request body + CVE-2023-0662 + * Fri Jan 13 2023 Remi Collet - 7.4.33-1 - rebase to 7.4.33 - fix: due to an integer overflow PDO::quote() may return unquoted string