import perl-IO-Socket-SSL-2.073-1.el9

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.073.tar.gz

.perl-IO-Socket-SSL.metadata

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+442c23ee1d0476df788f8b0b0f5fe174f871d792 SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.073.tar.gz

SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.066-Test-client-performs-Post-Handshake-Authentication.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 6b05dc28e94e90ab4852c9977d7fbe66fec6cd48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 14:50:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Test client performs Post-Handshake-Authentication
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This test uses openssl tool because PHA is not yet supported by
+IO::Socket::SSL's server implementation. The openssl tool uses a fixed
+port. So the test can fail.
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
+---
+ MANIFEST       |  1 +
+ t/pha_client.t | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 t/pha_client.t
+
+diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST
+index 20cddb6..2b8328d 100644
+--- a/MANIFEST
++++ b/MANIFEST
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ t/mitm.t
+ t/multiple-cert-rsa-ecc.t
+ t/nonblock.t
+ t/npn.t
++t/pha_client.t
+ t/plain_upgrade_downgrade.t
+ t/protocol_version.t
+ t/public_suffix_lib_encode_idn.t
+diff --git a/t/pha_client.t b/t/pha_client.t
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..2413588
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/pha_client.t
+@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
++#!/usr/bin/perl
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++use Test::More;
++use IPC::Run ();
++use IO::Socket::SSL ();
++use Net::SSLeay ();
++use IO::Select ();
++
++if (system('openssl', 'version')) {
++    plan skip_all => 'openssl tool is not available';
++} elsif (!defined &Net::SSLeay::CTX_set_post_handshake_auth) {
++    plan skip_all => 'Net::SSLeay does not expose PHA';
++} else {
++    plan tests => 5;
++}
++
++my $port = 2000;
++my $ca_cert = 'certs/test-ca.pem';
++
++diag 'Starting a server';
++my ($server, $input, $stdout, $stderr);
++eval {
++    $server = IPC::Run::start(['openssl', 's_server', '-port', $port,
++            '-Verify', '1',
++            '-cert', 'certs/server-wildcard.pem',
++            '-key', 'certs/server-wildcard.pem', '-CAfile', $ca_cert],
++        \$input, \$stdout, \$stderr);
++    # subsequent \undef does not work
++    # <https://github.com/toddr/IPC-Run/issues/124>
++};
++if (!$server or $@) {
++    BAIL_OUT("Could not start a server: $@");
++}
++# openssl s_server does not return a non-zero exit code in case of bind(2) failure.
++while ($server->pumpable && $stdout !~ /\nACCEPT\n/) { $server->pump; }
++if ($stderr =~ /unable to bind socket/) {
++    $server->kill_kill;
++    BAIL_OUT("Could not start a server: $stderr");
++}
++ok($server, 'Server started');
++
++my $client = IO::Socket::SSL->new(
++    PeerHost => 'localhost',
++    PeerPort => $port,
++    SSL_verify_mode => IO::Socket::SSL::SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
++    SSL_verifycn_scheme => 'www',
++    SSL_verifycn_name => 'www.server.local',
++    SSL_ca_file => $ca_cert,
++    SSL_key_file => 'certs/client-key.pem',
++    SSL_cert_file => 'certs/client-cert.pem'
++);
++ok($client, 'Client connected');
++
++SKIP: {
++    skip "Connection failed: errno=$!, SSL errror=$IO::Socket::SSL::SSL_ERROR", 2
++        unless $client;
++    $client->blocking(0);
++
++    SKIP: {
++        # Ask openssl s_server for PHA request and wait for the result.
++        $input .= "c\n";
++        while ($server->pumpable &&
++            $stderr !~ /SSL_verify_client_post_handshake/ &&
++            $stdout !~ /SSL_do_handshake -> 1/
++        ) {
++            # Push the PHA command to the server and read outputs.
++            $server->pump;
++
++            # Client also must perform I/O to process the PHA request.
++            my $select = IO::Select->new($client);
++            while ($select->can_read(1)) {  # 1 second time-out because of
++                                            # blocking IPC::Run
++                my $retval = $client->read(my $buf, 1);
++                if (defined $buf and $buf eq 'c') {
++                    skip 'openssl tool does not support PHA command', 1;
++                }
++            }
++        }
++        ok($stdout =~ /SSL_do_handshake -> 1/, 'Client performed PHA');
++    }
++
++    ok($client->close, 'Client disconnected');
++}
++
++eval {
++    $server->kill_kill;
++};
++ok(!$@, 'Server terminated');
++
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.068-openssl-1.1.1e.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- Makefile.PL
++++ Makefile.PL
+@@ -68,12 +68,6 @@ if (my $compiled = eval {
+ 	die sprintf("API-different OpenSSL versions compiled in (0x%08x) vs linked (0x%08x)",
+ 	    $compiled,$linked);
+     }
+-
+-    # OpenSSL 1.1.1e introduced behavior changes breaking various code
+-    # will likely be reverted  in 1.1.1f - enforce to not use this version
+-    if ($linked == 0x1010105f) {
+-	die "detected OpenSSL 1.1.1e - please use a different version\n";
+-    }
+ }
+ 
+ # make sure that we have dualvar from the XS Version of Scalar::Util

SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.068-use-system-default-SSL-version.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ if ( defined &Net::SSLeay::CTX_set_min_p
+ # global defaults
+ my %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS = (
+     SSL_check_crl => 0,
+-    SSL_version => 'SSLv23:!SSLv3:!SSLv2', # consider both SSL3.0 and SSL2.0 as broken
++    SSL_version => '',
+     SSL_verify_callback => undef,
+     SSL_verifycn_scheme => undef,  # fallback cn verification
+     SSL_verifycn_publicsuffix => undef,  # fallback default list verification
+@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ sub new {
+ 
+     my $ssl_op = $DEFAULT_SSL_OP;
+ 
+-    my $ver;
++    my $ver = '';
+     for (split(/\s*:\s*/,$arg_hash->{SSL_version})) {
+ 	m{^(!?)(?:(SSL(?:v2|v3|v23|v2/3))|(TLSv1(?:_?[123])?))$}i
+ 	or croak("invalid SSL_version specified");
+--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
+@@ -1043,11 +1043,12 @@ All values are case-insensitive.  Instea
+ 'TLSv1_3' one can also use 'TLSv11', 'TLSv12', and 'TLSv13'.  Support for
+ 'TLSv1_1', 'TLSv1_2', and 'TLSv1_3' requires recent versions of Net::SSLeay
+ and openssl.
++The default SSL_version is defined by the underlying cryptographic library.
+ 
+ Independent from the handshake format you can limit to set of accepted SSL
+ versions by adding !version separated by ':'.
+ 
+-The default SSL_version is 'SSLv23:!SSLv3:!SSLv2' which means, that the
++For example, 'SSLv23:!SSLv3:!SSLv2' means that the
+ handshake format is compatible to SSL2.0 and higher, but that the successful
+ handshake is limited to TLS1.0 and higher, that is no SSL2.0 or SSL3.0 because
+ both of these versions have serious security issues and should not be used

SOURCES/IO-Socket-SSL-2.068-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
+@@ -202,77 +202,17 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS = (
+     SSL_npn_protocols => undef,    # meaning depends whether on server or client side
+     SSL_alpn_protocols => undef,   # list of protocols we'll accept/send, for example ['http/1.1','spdy/3.1']
+ 
+-    # https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS, 2019/03/05
+-    # "Old backward compatibility" for best compatibility
+-    # .. "Most ciphers that are not clearly broken and dangerous to use are supported"
+-    # slightly reordered to prefer AES since it is cheaper when hardware accelerated
+-    SSL_cipher_list => 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:DES-CBC3-SHA:HIGH:SEED:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!RSAPSK:!aDH:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:!SRP',
++    # Use system-wide default cipher list to support use of system-wide
++    # crypto policy (#1076390, #1127577, CPAN RT#97816)
++    # https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy
++    SSL_cipher_list => 'PROFILE=SYSTEM',
+ );
+ 
+ my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = (
+     %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS,
+     SSL_verify_mode => SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+-
+     SSL_ca_file => undef,
+     SSL_ca_path => undef,
+-
+-    # older versions of F5 BIG-IP hang when getting SSL client hello >255 bytes
+-    # http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/000/sol13037.html
+-    # http://guest:guest@rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2771
+-    # Ubuntu worked around this by disabling TLSv1_2 on the client side for
+-    # a while. Later a padding extension was added to OpenSSL to work around
+-    # broken F5 but then IronPort croaked because it did not understand this
+-    # extension so it was disabled again :(
+-    # Firefox, Chrome and IE11 use TLSv1_2 but use only a few ciphers, so
+-    # that packet stays small enough. We try the same here.
+-
+-    SSL_cipher_list => join(" ",
+-
+-	# SSLabs report for Chrome 48/OSX.
+-	# This also includes the fewer ciphers Firefox uses.
+-	'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
+-	'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
+-	'DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
+-	'ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305',
+-	'ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305',
+-	'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA',
+-	'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA',
+-	'DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA',
+-	'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA',
+-	'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA',
+-	'DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA',
+-	'AES128-GCM-SHA256',
+-	'AES256-SHA',
+-	'AES128-SHA',
+-	'DES-CBC3-SHA',
+-
+-	# IE11/Edge has some more ciphers, notably SHA384 and DSS
+-	# we don't offer the *-AES128-SHA256 and *-AES256-SHA384 non-GCM
+-	# ciphers IE/Edge offers because they look like a large mismatch
+-	# between a very strong HMAC and a comparably weak (but sufficient)
+-	# encryption. Similar all browsers which do SHA384 can do ECDHE
+-	# so skip the DHE*SHA384 ciphers.
+-	'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
+-	'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
+-	# 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384',
+-	# 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384',
+-	# 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256',
+-	# 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256',
+-	# 'DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
+-	# 'AES256-GCM-SHA384',
+-	'AES256-SHA256',
+-	# 'AES128-SHA256',
+-	'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256',
+-	# 'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256',
+-	'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA',
+-	'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA',
+-	'EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA',
+-
+-	# Just to make sure, that we don't accidentally add bad ciphers above.
+-	# This includes dropping RC4 which is no longer supported by modern
+-	# browsers and also excluded in the SSL libraries of Python and Ruby.
+-	"!EXP !MEDIUM !LOW !eNULL !aNULL !RC4 !DES !MD5 !PSK !SRP"
+-    )
+ );
+ 
+ # set values inside _init to work with perlcc, RT#95452
+--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
+@@ -1069,12 +1069,8 @@ documentation (L<https://www.openssl.org
+ for more details.
+ 
+ Unless you fail to contact your peer because of no shared ciphers it is
+-recommended to leave this option at the default setting. The default setting
+-prefers ciphers with forward secrecy, disables anonymous authentication and
+-disables known insecure ciphers like MD5, DES etc. This gives a grade A result
+-at the tests of SSL Labs.
+-To use the less secure OpenSSL builtin default (whatever this is) set
+-SSL_cipher_list to ''.
++recommended to leave this option at the default setting, which honors the
++system-wide PROFILE=SYSTEM cipher list.
+ 
+ In case different cipher lists are needed for different SNI hosts a hash can be
+ given with the host as key and the cipher suite as value, similar to