diff --git a/IO-Socket-SSL-2.021-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch b/IO-Socket-SSL-2.021-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dea2cc0..0000000 --- a/IO-Socket-SSL-2.021-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ ---- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm -+++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm -@@ -92,9 +92,7 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS = ( - #SSL_verifycn_name => undef, # use from PeerAddr/PeerHost - do not override in set_args_filter_hack 'use_defaults' - SSL_npn_protocols => undef, # meaning depends whether on server or client side - SSL_alpn_protocols => undef, # list of protocols we'll accept/send, for example ['http/1.1','spdy/3.1'] -- SSL_cipher_list => -- 'EECDH+AESGCM+ECDSA EECDH+AESGCM EECDH+ECDSA +AES256 EECDH EDH+AESGCM '. -- 'EDH ALL +SHA +3DES !RC4 !LOW !EXP !eNULL !aNULL !DES !MD5 !PSK !SRP', -+ SSL_cipher_list => 'DEFAULT', - ); - - my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = ( -@@ -104,42 +102,6 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = ( - SSL_ca_file => undef, - SSL_ca_path => undef, - -- # older versions of F5 BIG-IP hang when getting SSL client hello >255 bytes -- # http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/000/sol13037.html -- # http://guest:guest@rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2771 -- # Debian works around this by disabling TLSv1_2 on the client side -- # Chrome and IE11 use TLSv1_2 but use only a few ciphers, so that packet -- # stays small enough -- # The following list is taken from IE11, except that we don't do RC4-MD5, -- # RC4-SHA is already bad enough. Also, we have a different sort order -- # compared to IE11, because we put ciphers supporting forward secrecy on top -- -- SSL_cipher_list => join(" ", -- qw( -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA -- ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA -- ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 -- ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA -- ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA -- DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256 -- DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA -- DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256 -- DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA -- AES128-SHA256 -- AES128-SHA -- AES256-SHA256 -- AES256-SHA -- EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA -- DES-CBC3-SHA -- RC4-SHA -- ), -- # just to make sure, that we don't accidentally add bad ciphers above -- "!EXP !LOW !eNULL !aNULL !DES !MD5 !PSK !SRP" -- ) - ); - - # set values inside _init to work with perlcc, RT#95452 ---- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod -+++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod -@@ -968,12 +968,8 @@ documentation (L undef, SSL_verifycn_scheme => undef, # fallback cn verification SSL_verifycn_publicsuffix => undef, # fallback default list verification -@@ -2179,7 +2179,7 @@ sub new { +@@ -2183,7 +2183,7 @@ sub new { $ssl_op |= &Net::SSLeay::OP_SINGLE_DH_USE; $ssl_op |= &Net::SSLeay::OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE if $can_ecdh; diff --git a/IO-Socket-SSL-2.026-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch b/IO-Socket-SSL-2.026-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa5500d --- /dev/null +++ b/IO-Socket-SSL-2.026-use-system-default-cipher-list.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm ++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm +@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS = ( + SSL_npn_protocols => undef, # meaning depends whether on server or client side + SSL_alpn_protocols => undef, # list of protocols we'll accept/send, for example ['http/1.1','spdy/3.1'] + +- # https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS, 2016/04/20 +- # "Old backward compatibility" for best compatibility +- # .. "Most ciphers that are not clearly broken and dangerous to use are supported" +- SSL_cipher_list => 'ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:DES-CBC3-SHA:HIGH:SEED:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!RSAPSK:!aDH:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:!SRP', ++ # Use system-wide default cipher list to support use of system-wide ++ # crypto policy (#1076390, #1127577, CPAN RT#97816) ++ # https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy ++ SSL_cipher_list => 'DEFAULT', + ); + + my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = ( +@@ -106,63 +106,6 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = ( + SSL_ca_file => undef, + SSL_ca_path => undef, + +- # older versions of F5 BIG-IP hang when getting SSL client hello >255 bytes +- # http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/000/sol13037.html +- # http://guest:guest@rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2771 +- # Ubuntu worked around this by disabling TLSv1_2 on the client side for +- # a while. Later a padding extension was added to OpenSSL to work around +- # broken F5 but then IronPort croaked because it did not understand this +- # extension so it was disabled again :( +- # Firefox, Chrome and IE11 use TLSv1_2 but use only a few ciphers, so +- # that packet stays small enough. We try the same here. +- +- SSL_cipher_list => join(" ", +- +- # SSLabs report for Chrome 48/OSX. +- # This also includes the fewer ciphers Firefox uses. +- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256', +- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256', +- 'DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256', +- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305', +- 'ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305', +- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA', +- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA', +- 'DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA', +- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA', +- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA', +- 'DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA', +- 'AES128-GCM-SHA256', +- 'AES256-SHA', +- 'AES128-SHA', +- 'DES-CBC3-SHA', +- +- # IE11/Edge has some more ciphers, notably SHA384 and DSS +- # we don't offer the *-AES128-SHA256 and *-AES256-SHA384 non-GCM +- # ciphers IE/Edge offers because they look like a large mismatch +- # between a very strong HMAC and a comparably weak (but sufficient) +- # encryption. Similar all browsers which do SHA384 can do ECDHE +- # so skip the DHE*SHA384 ciphers. +- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384', +- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384', +- # 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384', +- # 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384', +- # 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256', +- # 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256', +- # 'DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384', +- # 'AES256-GCM-SHA384', +- 'AES256-SHA256', +- # 'AES128-SHA256', +- 'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256', +- # 'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256', +- 'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA', +- 'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA', +- 'EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA', +- +- # Just to make sure, that we don't accidentally add bad ciphers above. +- # This includes dropping RC4 which is no longer supported by modern +- # browsers and also excluded in the SSL libraries of Python and Ruby. +- "!EXP !MEDIUM !LOW !eNULL !aNULL !RC4 !DES !MD5 !PSK !SRP" +- ) + ); + + # set values inside _init to work with perlcc, RT#95452 +--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod ++++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod +@@ -968,12 +968,8 @@ documentation (L - 2.026-1 +- Update to 2.026 + - Upstream's default cipher lists updated (we use system default though) +- Update patches as needed + * Mon Apr 4 2016 Paul Howarth - 2.025-1 - Update to 2.025 - Resolved memleak if SSL_crl_file was used (CPAN RT#113257, CPAN RT#113530) diff --git a/sources b/sources index fb59f8e..b607d7b 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1 +1 @@ -675664fbe0a48b5844f916761323b5ce IO-Socket-SSL-2.025.tar.gz +9e7614fd4cc8206ebb1032b7b3c4be70 IO-Socket-SSL-2.026.tar.gz