Fix CVE-2026-9538: cap per-entry declared size to prevent memory DoS

Backport upstream fix (commit f9af014) for CVE-2026-9538 which
adds a $MAX_FILE_SIZE cap (default 1 GiB) checked per entry
in _read_tar() to defend against attacker-controlled size-field
memory denial of service. A malicious tar archive with a small
compressed payload but a huge declared entry size could trigger
multi-GB memory allocation before the read completes.

CVE: CVE-2026-9538
Upstream patches:
 - f9af014260.patch
Resolves: RHEL-191919

This commit was backported by Ymir, a Red Hat Enterprise Linux software maintenance AI agent.

Assisted-by: Ymir
This commit is contained in:
RHEL Packaging Agent 2026-08-03 08:43:56 +00:00
parent 3af7e02570
commit 8771fc464c
2 changed files with 84 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From fab9cd792f450b74f8dc6041572fb927454d673c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stig Palmquist <stig@stig.io>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 19:11:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Cpan entry size during read
Cap entry size during read to defend against attacker-controlled
size-field memory DoS
The tar header's 12-byte size field is attacker-controlled. Archive::Tar's
non-skip extract path at Tar.pm:501 allocates a Perl scalar of the declared
size before returning the read-short error, allowing a few-KB compressed
archive declaring a 100 GB inner entry to trigger immediate multi-GB
allocation. The existing $EXTRACT_BLOCK_SIZE is an output-side syswrite
chunk size, not an input cap.
Add $MAX_FILE_SIZE (default 1 GiB) checked once per entry, gating both the
chunked-skip and full-slurp branches. Set to 0 to disable the cap.
Signed-off-by: Chris 'BinGOs' Williams <chris@bingosnet.co.uk>
---
lib/Archive/Tar.pm | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/Archive/Tar.pm b/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
index c21e216..a34c80d 100644
--- a/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
+++ b/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use strict;
use vars qw[$DEBUG $error $VERSION $WARN $FOLLOW_SYMLINK $CHOWN $CHMOD
$DO_NOT_USE_PREFIX $HAS_PERLIO $HAS_IO_STRING $SAME_PERMISSIONS
$INSECURE_EXTRACT_MODE $ZERO_PAD_NUMBERS @ISA @EXPORT $RESOLVE_SYMLINK
- $EXTRACT_BLOCK_SIZE
+ $EXTRACT_BLOCK_SIZE $MAX_FILE_SIZE
];
@ISA = qw[Exporter];
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ $INSECURE_EXTRACT_MODE = 0;
$ZERO_PAD_NUMBERS = 0;
$RESOLVE_SYMLINK = $ENV{'PERL5_AT_RESOLVE_SYMLINK'} || 'speed';
$EXTRACT_BLOCK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
+$MAX_FILE_SIZE = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
BEGIN {
use Config;
@@ -444,6 +445,14 @@ sub _read_tar {
my $block = BLOCK_SIZE->( $entry->size );
+ if ( $MAX_FILE_SIZE && $entry->size > $MAX_FILE_SIZE ) {
+ $self->_error( qq[Entry '] . $entry->full_path .
+ qq[' declared size ] . $entry->size .
+ qq[ bytes exceeds \$Archive::Tar::MAX_FILE_SIZE ] .
+ qq[($MAX_FILE_SIZE); refusing to allocate] );
+ next LOOP;
+ }
+
$data = $entry->get_content_by_ref;
my $skip = 0;
@@ -2218,6 +2227,13 @@ cannot be arbitrarily large since some operating systems limit the number of
bytes that can be written in one call to C<write(2)>, so if this is too large,
extraction may fail with an error.
+=head2 $Archive::Tar::MAX_FILE_SIZE
+
+This variable holds an upper bound on the per-entry declared size that
+C<Archive::Tar> will accept when reading an archive. Entries whose header
+claims a larger size are refused with an error before any read allocation.
+Defaults to 1 GiB. Set to 0 to disable the cap.
+
=cut
=head1 FAQ

View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
Name: perl-Archive-Tar
Version: 3.02
Release: 513%{?dist}
Release: 514%{?dist}
Summary: A module for Perl manipulation of .tar files
License: GPL-1.0-or-later OR Artistic-1.0-Perl
URL: https://metacpan.org/release/Archive-Tar
@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ Patch0: Archive-Tar-2.02-Do-not-sleep-in-Makefile.PL.patch
# https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/17c873492a05eddc0de18c1485e0b2cccd5a9158
# https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/484f71ea0189ed46690f50dc7ee71d4b8bc0e70f
Patch1: perl-Archive-Tar-3.02-RHEL-181653.patch
# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-191919
# CVE-2026-9538
# https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/f9af01426038e29d9578825a0cd3626946ab08c7
Patch2: perl-Archive-Tar-3.02-CVE-2026-9538.patch
BuildArch: noarch
# Most of the BRS are needed only for tests, compression support at run-time
# is optional soft dependency.
@ -113,6 +117,7 @@ with "%{_libexecdir}/%{name}/test".
%setup -q -n Archive-Tar-%{version}
%patch -P0 -p1
%patch -P1 -p1
%patch -P2 -p1
# Help generators to recognize Perl scripts
for F in t/*.t; do
@ -164,6 +169,11 @@ make test
%{_libexecdir}/%{name}
%changelog
* Mon Aug 03 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 3.02-514
- Fix memory DoS via attacker-controlled tar entry size field
(CVE-2026-9538)
Resolves: RHEL-191919
* Wed Jul 29 2026 RHEL Packaging Agent <redhat-ymir-agent@redhat.com> - 3.02-513
- Fix symlink and hardlink path traversal in secure extract mode
(CVE-2026-42496, CVE-2026-42497)