rpms/patch
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
805be3927d
patch/patch-CVE-2015-1196.patch

213 lines
5.5 KiB
Diff
Raw Blame History

diff -up patch-2.7.1/src/pch.c.CVE-2015-1196 patch-2.7.1/src/pch.c
--- patch-2.7.1/src/pch.c.CVE-2015-1196 2012-09-22 18:44:33.000000000 +0100
+++ patch-2.7.1/src/pch.c 2015-01-20 13:29:14.304859557 +0000
@@ -387,29 +387,6 @@ skip_hex_digits (char const *str)
return s == str ? NULL : s;
}
-/* Check if we are in the root of a particular filesystem namespace ("/" on
- UNIX or a particular drive's root on DOS-like systems). */
-static bool
-cwd_is_root (char const *name)
-{
- unsigned int prefix_len = FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (name);
- char root[prefix_len + 2];
- struct stat st;
- dev_t root_dev;
- ino_t root_ino;
-
- memcpy (root, name, prefix_len);
- root[prefix_len] = '/';
- root[prefix_len + 1] = 0;
- if (stat (root, &st))
- return false;
- root_dev = st.st_dev;
- root_ino = st.st_ino;
- if (stat (".", &st))
- return false;
- return root_dev == st.st_dev && root_ino == st.st_ino;
-}
-
static bool
name_is_valid (char const *name)
{
diff -up patch-2.7.1/src/util.c.CVE-2015-1196 patch-2.7.1/src/util.c
--- patch-2.7.1/src/util.c.CVE-2015-1196 2012-09-22 21:09:10.000000000 +0100
+++ patch-2.7.1/src/util.c 2015-01-20 13:29:14.305859561 +0000
@@ -422,6 +422,60 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const str
}
}
+static bool
+symlink_target_is_valid (char const *target, char const *to)
+{
+ bool is_valid;
+
+ if (IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (to))
+ is_valid = true;
+ else if (IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (target))
+ is_valid = false;
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned int depth = 0;
+ char const *t;
+
+ is_valid = true;
+ t = to;
+ while (*t)
+ {
+ while (*t && ! ISSLASH (*t))
+ t++;
+ if (ISSLASH (*t))
+ {
+ while (ISSLASH (*t))
+ t++;
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ t = target;
+ while (*t)
+ {
+ if (*t == '.' && *++t == '.' && (! *++t || ISSLASH (*t)))
+ {
+ if (! depth--)
+ {
+ is_valid = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ while (*t && ! ISSLASH (*t))
+ t++;
+ depth++;
+ }
+ while (ISSLASH (*t))
+ t++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allow any symlink target if we are in the filesystem root. */
+ return is_valid || cwd_is_root (to);
+}
+
/* Move a file FROM (where *FROM_NEEDS_REMOVAL is nonzero if FROM
needs removal when cleaning up at the end of execution, and where
*FROMST is FROM's status if known),
@@ -465,6 +519,13 @@ move_file (char const *from, bool *from_
read_fatal ();
buffer[size] = 0;
+ if (! symlink_target_is_valid (buffer, to))
+ {
+ fprintf (stderr, "symbolic link target '%s' is invalid\n",
+ buffer);
+ fatal_exit (0);
+ }
+
if (! backup)
{
if (unlink (to) == 0)
@@ -1660,3 +1721,26 @@ int stat_file (char const *filename, str
return xstat (filename, st) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
}
+
+/* Check if we are in the root of a particular filesystem namespace ("/" on
+ UNIX or a particular drive's root on DOS-like systems). */
+bool
+cwd_is_root (char const *name)
+{
+ unsigned int prefix_len = FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (name);
+ char root[prefix_len + 2];
+ struct stat st;
+ dev_t root_dev;
+ ino_t root_ino;
+
+ memcpy (root, name, prefix_len);
+ root[prefix_len] = '/';
+ root[prefix_len + 1] = 0;
+ if (stat (root, &st))
+ return false;
+ root_dev = st.st_dev;
+ root_ino = st.st_ino;
+ if (stat (".", &st))
+ return false;
+ return root_dev == st.st_dev && root_ino == st.st_ino;
+}
diff -up patch-2.7.1/src/util.h.CVE-2015-1196 patch-2.7.1/src/util.h
--- patch-2.7.1/src/util.h.CVE-2015-1196 2012-09-21 21:21:16.000000000 +0100
+++ patch-2.7.1/src/util.h 2015-01-20 13:29:14.306859564 +0000
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum file_id_type lookup_file_id (struct
void set_queued_output (struct stat const *, bool);
bool has_queued_output (struct stat const *);
int stat_file (char const *, struct stat *);
+bool cwd_is_root (char const *);
enum file_attributes {
FA_TIMES = 1,
diff -up patch-2.7.1/tests/symlinks.CVE-2015-1196 patch-2.7.1/tests/symlinks
--- patch-2.7.1/tests/symlinks.CVE-2015-1196 2012-09-19 02:18:42.000000000 +0100
+++ patch-2.7.1/tests/symlinks 2015-01-20 13:29:14.306859564 +0000
@@ -146,6 +146,59 @@ ncheck 'test ! -L symlink'
# --------------------------------------------------------------
+# Patch should not create symlinks which point outside the working directory.
+
+cat > symlink-target.diff <<EOF
+diff --git a/dir/foo b/dir/foo
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000..cad2309
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/dir/foo
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++../foo
+\ No newline at end of file
+EOF
+
+check 'patch -p1 < symlink-target.diff || echo "Status: $?"' <<EOF
+patching symbolic link dir/foo
+EOF
+
+cat > bad-symlink-target1.diff <<EOF
+diff --git a/bar b/bar
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000..cad2309
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/bar
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++/bar
+\ No newline at end of file
+EOF
+
+check 'patch -p1 < bad-symlink-target1.diff || echo "Status: $?"' <<EOF
+patching symbolic link bar
+symbolic link target '/bar' is invalid
+Status: 2
+EOF
+
+cat > bad-symlink-target2.diff <<EOF
+diff --git a/baz b/baz
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000..cad2309
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/baz
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++../baz
+\ No newline at end of file
+EOF
+
+check 'patch -p1 < bad-symlink-target2.diff || echo "Status: $?"' <<EOF
+patching symbolic link baz
+symbolic link target '../baz' is invalid
+Status: 2
+EOF
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------
+
# The backup file of a new symlink is an empty regular file.
check 'patch -p1 --backup < create-symlink.diff || echo "Status: $?"' <<EOF
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink