import patch-2.7.6-11.el8

SOURCES/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-20969.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff -up patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c.CVE-2018-20969 patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c
+--- patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c.CVE-2018-20969	2019-09-02 15:40:09.087994204 +0200
++++ patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c	2019-09-02 15:42:23.486485786 +0200
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ 	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ 	  }
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+ 	fflush (stdout);
+ 
+ 	pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	else if (pid == 0)
+ 	  {
+ 	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+-	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++	    assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++	    execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char  *) NULL);
+ 	    _exit (2);
+ 	  }
+ 	else

SOURCES/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636-symlinks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+commit dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a
+Author: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 15 16:21:48 2019 +0200
+
+    Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+    
+    * src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+    append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+    the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks.  So far, we were only doing
+    that consistently for input files.
+    * src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+    with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+
+diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
+index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+     {
+       if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+         {
+-	  int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++	  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ 	  size_t buffered = 0, n;
++	  int ifd;
++
++	  if (! follow_symlinks)
++	    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++	  ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ 	  if (ifd < 0)
+ 	    pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ 
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+   int ifd;
+   FILE *ifp;
+   int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ 
+   if (instat.st_size == 0)
+     filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+-  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+       || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+     pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+   if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
+ 
+ 	  try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ 	  safe_unlink (bakname);
+-	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ 		pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++  int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+   int fromfd;
+   ssize_t i;
+ 
+-  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+   while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+     {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+   else
+     {
+       assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++      if (! follow_symlinks)
++	to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+       tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ 			  to_dir_known_to_exist);
+       copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++  int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+   int tofd;
+ 
+-  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+   copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+   if (close (tofd) != 0)

SOURCES/patch-2.7.x-abort_when_cleaning_up_fails.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+commit b7b028a77bd855f6f56b17c8837fc1cca77b469d
+Author: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 28 00:30:25 2019 +0200
+
+    Abort when cleaning up fails
+    
+    When a fatal error triggers during cleanup, another attempt will be made to
+    clean up, which will likely lead to the same fatal error.  So instead, bail out
+    when that happens.
+    src/patch.c (cleanup): Bail out when called recursively.
+    (main): There is no need to call output_files() before cleanup() as cleanup()
+    already does that.
+
+diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c
+index 4616a48..02fd982 100644
+--- a/src/patch.c
++++ b/src/patch.c
+@@ -685,7 +685,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+     }
+     if (outstate.ofp && (ferror (outstate.ofp) || fclose (outstate.ofp) != 0))
+       write_fatal ();
+-    output_files (NULL);
+     cleanup ();
+     delete_files ();
+     if (somefailed)
+@@ -1991,7 +1990,6 @@ void
+ fatal_exit (int sig)
+ {
+   cleanup ();
+-
+   if (sig)
+     exit_with_signal (sig);
+ 
+@@ -2011,6 +2009,12 @@ remove_if_needed (char const *name, bool *needs_removal)
+ static void
+ cleanup (void)
+ {
++  static bool already_cleaning_up;
++
++  if (already_cleaning_up)
++    return;
++  already_cleaning_up = true;
++
+   remove_if_needed (TMPINNAME, &TMPINNAME_needs_removal);
+   remove_if_needed (TMPOUTNAME, &TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal);
+   remove_if_needed (TMPPATNAME, &TMPPATNAME_needs_removal);

SPECS/patch.spec

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 Summary: Utility for modifying/upgrading files
 Name: patch
 Version: 2.7.6
-Release: 8%{?dist}
+Release: 11%{?dist}
 License: GPLv3+
 URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/patch/patch.html
 Group: Development/Tools
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ Patch1: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6951.patch
 Patch2: patch-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
 Patch3: patch-2.7.6-gcc8.patch
 Patch4: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6952.patch
+Patch5: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-20969.patch
+Patch6: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636-symlinks.patch
+Patch7: patch-2.7.x-abort_when_cleaning_up_fails.patch
 Patch100: patch-selinux.patch
 BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
 BuildRequires: libattr-devel
@@ -45,6 +48,15 @@ applications.
 # CVE-2018-6952, Double free of memory
 %patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2018-6952
 
+# CVE-2018-20969, do_ed_script in pch.c does not block strings beginning with a ! character
+%patch5 -p1 -b .CVE-2018-20969
+
+# CVE-2019-13636, Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+%patch6 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-13636
+
+# bz#1665928, Abort when cleaning up fails
+%patch7 -p1 -b .abort_when_cleaning_up_fails
+
 # SELinux support.
 %patch100 -p1 -b .selinux
 
@@ -71,6 +83,16 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Nov 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-11
+- Related: #1733565, apply the patch correctly
+
+* Tue Nov 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-10
+- CVE-2019-13636 , Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+- Resolves: #1665928, patch has a huge error output and segfaults when the file to be patched does not exist
+
+* Mon Sep 02 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-9
+- CVE-2018-20969, invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
 * Tue Nov 27 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-8
 - Added virtual provides for bundled gnulib library