import patch-2.7.6-11.el8

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2020-01-21 17:59:32 -05:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 6b89862020
commit a4847dd0ba
4 changed files with 194 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
diff -up patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c.CVE-2018-20969 patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c
--- patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c.CVE-2018-20969 2019-09-02 15:40:09.087994204 +0200
+++ patch-2.7.6/src/pch.c 2019-09-02 15:42:23.486485786 +0200
@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
*outname_needs_removal = true;
copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
}
- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
- outname);
fflush (stdout);
pid = fork();
@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
else if (pid == 0)
{
dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
+ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
+ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL);
_exit (2);
}
else

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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
commit dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a
Author: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Mon Jul 15 16:21:48 2019 +0200
Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
that consistently for input files.
* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
--- a/src/inp.c
+++ b/src/inp.c
@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
size_t buffered = 0, n;
+ int ifd;
+
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
static void
plan_b (char const *filename)
{
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
int ifd;
FILE *ifp;
int c;
@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
if (instat.st_size == 0)
filename = NULL_DEVICE;
- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
|| ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
safe_unlink (bakname);
- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
static void
copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
{
+ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
int fromfd;
ssize_t i;
- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
{
@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
else
{
assert (S_ISREG (mode));
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
to_dir_known_to_exist);
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
void
append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
{
+ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
int tofd;
- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
+ if (! follow_symlinks)
+ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
if (close (tofd) != 0)

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
commit b7b028a77bd855f6f56b17c8837fc1cca77b469d
Author: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
Date: Fri Jun 28 00:30:25 2019 +0200
Abort when cleaning up fails
When a fatal error triggers during cleanup, another attempt will be made to
clean up, which will likely lead to the same fatal error. So instead, bail out
when that happens.
src/patch.c (cleanup): Bail out when called recursively.
(main): There is no need to call output_files() before cleanup() as cleanup()
already does that.
diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c
index 4616a48..02fd982 100644
--- a/src/patch.c
+++ b/src/patch.c
@@ -685,7 +685,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
}
if (outstate.ofp && (ferror (outstate.ofp) || fclose (outstate.ofp) != 0))
write_fatal ();
- output_files (NULL);
cleanup ();
delete_files ();
if (somefailed)
@@ -1991,7 +1990,6 @@ void
fatal_exit (int sig)
{
cleanup ();
-
if (sig)
exit_with_signal (sig);
@@ -2011,6 +2009,12 @@ remove_if_needed (char const *name, bool *needs_removal)
static void
cleanup (void)
{
+ static bool already_cleaning_up;
+
+ if (already_cleaning_up)
+ return;
+ already_cleaning_up = true;
+
remove_if_needed (TMPINNAME, &TMPINNAME_needs_removal);
remove_if_needed (TMPOUTNAME, &TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal);
remove_if_needed (TMPPATNAME, &TMPPATNAME_needs_removal);

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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Summary: Utility for modifying/upgrading files
Name: patch
Version: 2.7.6
Release: 8%{?dist}
Release: 11%{?dist}
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/patch/patch.html
Group: Development/Tools
@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ Patch1: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6951.patch
Patch2: patch-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
Patch3: patch-2.7.6-gcc8.patch
Patch4: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6952.patch
Patch5: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-20969.patch
Patch6: patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636-symlinks.patch
Patch7: patch-2.7.x-abort_when_cleaning_up_fails.patch
Patch100: patch-selinux.patch
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
BuildRequires: libattr-devel
@ -45,6 +48,15 @@ applications.
# CVE-2018-6952, Double free of memory
%patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2018-6952
# CVE-2018-20969, do_ed_script in pch.c does not block strings beginning with a ! character
%patch5 -p1 -b .CVE-2018-20969
# CVE-2019-13636, Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
%patch6 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-13636
# bz#1665928, Abort when cleaning up fails
%patch7 -p1 -b .abort_when_cleaning_up_fails
# SELinux support.
%patch100 -p1 -b .selinux
@ -71,6 +83,16 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%{_mandir}/*/*
%changelog
* Tue Nov 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-11
- Related: #1733565, apply the patch correctly
* Tue Nov 19 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-10
- CVE-2019-13636 , Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
- Resolves: #1665928, patch has a huge error output and segfaults when the file to be patched does not exist
* Mon Sep 02 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-9
- CVE-2018-20969, invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
* Tue Nov 27 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 2.7.6-8
- Added virtual provides for bundled gnulib library