openssl/openssl-1.1.1-upstream-sync.patch

commit 515c728dbaa92211d2eafb0041ab9fcd258fdc41
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Date:   Mon Sep 9 19:12:25 2019 +0200

    Fix potential memory leaks with BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER
    
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9833)
    
    (cherry picked from commit f28bc7d386b25fb75625d0c62c6b2e6d21de0d09)

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 1ce1181fc1..7cbf8de981 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
     unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
     const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
     point_conversion_form_t form;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *orig;
 
     if (params == NULL) {
         if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -496,8 +497,9 @@ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
-    ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order);
+    ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, orig = ret->order);
     if (ret->order == NULL) {
+        ret->order = orig;
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -505,8 +507,9 @@ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
     /* set the cofactor (optional) */
     tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
     if (tmp != NULL) {
-        ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor);
+        ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, orig = ret->cofactor);
         if (ret->cofactor == NULL) {
+            ret->cofactor = orig;
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
             goto err;
         }
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
index 089f2ae29f..ef2d64826f 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ static int extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor,
 static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 {
     ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *orig;
     BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
     int i, ret = 0;
 
@@ -298,9 +299,15 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
          */
         if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
             ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL ||
-            !BN_add_word(bn, 1) ||
-            (a_max_plus_one =
-             BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            !BN_add_word(bn, 1)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        if ((a_max_plus_one =
+                BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, orig = a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            a_max_plus_one = orig;
             X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL,
                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto done;
@@ -351,6 +358,7 @@ int X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid)
 static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 {
     ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *orig;
     BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
     int i, ret = 0;
 
@@ -416,9 +424,15 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
          */
         if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
             ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL ||
-            !BN_add_word(bn, 1) ||
-            (a_max_plus_one =
-             BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            !BN_add_word(bn, 1)) {
+            X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        if ((a_max_plus_one =
+                 BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, orig = a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) {
+            a_max_plus_one = orig;
             X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto done;
commit 86ed78676c660b553696cc10c682962522dfeb6c
Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Date:   Thu Sep 12 12:27:36 2019 +0200

    BIO_f_zlib: Properly handle BIO_CTRL_PENDING and BIO_CTRL_WPENDING calls.
    
    There can be data to write in output buffer and data to read that were
    not yet read in the input stream.
    
    Fixes #9866
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9877)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 6beb8b39ba8e4cb005c1fcd2586ba19e17f04b95)

diff --git a/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c b/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
index d688deee5f..7c1be358fd 100644
--- a/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
+++ b/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
@@ -598,6 +598,28 @@ static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
         BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
         break;
 
+    case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+        if (ctx->obuf == NULL)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (ctx->odone) {
+            ret = ctx->ocount;
+        } else {
+            ret = ctx->ocount;
+            if (ret == 0)
+                /* Unknown amount pending but we are not finished */
+                ret = 1;
+        }
+        if (ret == 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+
+    case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+        ret = ctx->zin.avail_in;
+        if (ret == 0)
+            ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
+        break;
+
     default:
         ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr);
         break;