import UBI openssl-1.1.1k-14.el8_6

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
  static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  #endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-+#endif
  static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
@@ -20,11 +18,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
          tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
          final_ec_pt_formats
      },
-@@ -1164,6 +1165,17 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
+@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
  }
  #endif
  
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 +{
 +	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
@@ -33,7 +30,6 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
 +
 +	    return 1;
 +}
-+#endif
 +
  static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
  {

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
+that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
+value even if it is excessively large.
+
+There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
+OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
+perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
+new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
+
+An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
+obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
+Service attack.
+
+The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
+similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
+DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
+
+CVE-2023-3446
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  | 3 ++-
+ include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
+ include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
+ 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+         return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
+      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
+ DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
+ DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
+ DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
++DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+ #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
+ # endif
++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
++# endif
+ 
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
+ 
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
+ #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
+ #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
++#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
+ obviously invalid
+
+If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
+is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
+
+We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
+q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
+q value.
+
+Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
+such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
+computations.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-3817
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
+ /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
+ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ {
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     if (t2 == NULL)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    if (dh->q) {
++    if (dh->q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
+
+We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
+DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
+
+This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
+
+It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
+differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
+sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
+DH_check_pub_key().
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
+Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 10 ++++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 ++++--
+ include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
+ 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
++         * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
++         * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
++        ok = 1;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+         goto err;
+     }
++
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+     if (FIPS_mode()
+         && (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
+ # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+ 
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
+ # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
++/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
++# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ 
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD                             202
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+From d1d4b56fe0c9a4200276d630f62108e1165e0990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 10:53:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Backport openssl: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread from 3.2
+
+Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
+entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
+have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
+called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
+will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
+should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
+
+We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
+same for the server list while we are about it.
+
+CVE-2024-5535
+
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
+Merged from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717.
+
+Backported-by: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> 
+we did't ported test changes because rely on internal testing framework.
+
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 28 +++++++----
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c                           | 64 +++++++++++++++----------
+ ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c            | 30 +++++++++++-
+ ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c            |  3 +-
+ 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+index e90caec..a3f8dfd 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+                            const unsigned char *server,
+                            unsigned int server_len,
+                            const unsigned char *client,
+-                           unsigned int client_len)
++                           unsigned int client_len);
+  void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                              unsigned *len);
+ 
+@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
+ set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
+ protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
+-B<protos_len>.
++B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
++protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
+ server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
+@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
+ described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
+ matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
+ in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
+-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
+-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
+-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
++B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
++least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
++
++The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
++callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
++item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
++B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
++the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
++must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
++SSL_select_next_proto().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
+ client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
+@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
+ The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
+ server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
+ callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
+-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
+-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
++select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
++fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
++B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
++parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
+ when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
+ =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
+ 
+ No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
+-B<out>, B<outlen>.
++B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
++B<client> is invalid).
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index c71c686..21e6c45 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -2739,38 +2739,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                           unsigned int server_len,
+                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+-    unsigned int i, j;
+-    const unsigned char *result;
+-    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
++    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
++            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
++            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
++        *out = NULL;
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
++     * a match.
++     */
++    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
++    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
+ 
+     /*
+      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+      */
+-    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+-        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+-            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+-                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+-                /* We found a match */
+-                result = &server[i];
+-                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+-                goto found;
++    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
++       while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
++            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
++                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
++            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
++                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
++                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
++                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
++                        /* We found a match */
++                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
++                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
++                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
++                    }
++                }
++                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
++            } else {
++                /* This should never happen */
++                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+             }
+-            j += client[j];
+-            j++;
+         }
+-        i += server[i];
+-        i++;
++        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
+     }
+ 
+-    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+-    result = client;
+-    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+-
+- found:
+-    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+-    *outlen = result[0];
+-    return status;
+-}
++    /*
++     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
++     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
++     */
++    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++ } 
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+index ce8a757..cfde733 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+@@ -1585,8 +1585,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+     if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+                                   PACKET_data(pkt),
+                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+-                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
+-             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
++                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
++           || selected_len == 0) {           
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                         size_t chainidx)
+ {
+     size_t len;
++    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
++    int valid = 0;
+ 
+     /* We must have requested it. */
+     if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
+@@ -1637,6 +1639,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, 
++                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
++        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
++            continue;
++        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
++            /* Valid protocol found */
++            valid = 1;
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (!valid) {
++        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
++                 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+     s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+     if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+index 3c7395c..4e3cbf8 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+@@ -1559,9 +1559,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+         }
+         s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
++        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+     }
+ 
+-    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
++    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

SPECS/openssl.spec

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.1.1k
-Release: 9%{?dist}
+Release: 14%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -92,6 +92,16 @@ Patch101: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
 Patch102: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
 Patch103: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
 Patch104: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
+# OpenSSL 1.1.1v CVEs
+Patch105: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
+Patch106: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
+Patch107: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
+# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2/RHEL 9
+# Proper fix for CVE-2020-25659
+Patch108: openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
+# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2
+# Fix for CVE-2024-5535
+Patch109: openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -221,6 +231,11 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4450
 %patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0215
 %patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0286
+%patch105 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3446
+%patch106 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3817
+%patch107 -p1 -b .cve-2023-5678
+%patch108 -p1 -b .pkcs15imprejection
+%patch109 -p1 -b .cve-2024-5535
 
 %build
 # Figure out which flags we want to use.
@@ -504,33 +519,52 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
+* Tue Sep 17 2024 Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-14
+- Backport fix SSL_select_next proto from OpenSSL 3.2
+  Fix CVE-2024-5535 
+  Resolves: RHEL-45654
+
+* Thu Nov 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-12
+- Backport implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 to RHEL-8 series
+  (a proper fix for CVE-2020-25659)
+  Resolves: RHEL-17694
+
+* Wed Nov 15 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-11
+- Fix CVE-2023-5678: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking
+  excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow
+  Resolves: RHEL-16536
+
+* Thu Oct 19 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-10
+- Fix CVE-2023-3446: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters
+  Resolves: RHEL-14243
+- Fix CVE-2023-3817: Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
+  Resolves: RHEL-14237
+
+* Thu May 04 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
 - Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
   Resolves: CVE-2022-4304
 - Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex
   Resolves: CVE-2022-4450
 - Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF
   Resolves: CVE-2023-0215
+
+* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
 - Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
   Resolves: CVE-2023-0286
 
-* Thu Jul 21 2022 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
-- Fix no-ec build
-  Resolves: rhbz#2071020
-
 * Tue Jul 05 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-7
 - Fix CVE-2022-2097: AES OCB fails to encrypt some bytes on 32-bit x86
   Resolves: CVE-2022-2097
 - Update expired certificates used in the testsuite
-  Resolves: rhbz#2092462
+  Resolves: rhbz#2100554
 - Fix CVE-2022-1292: openssl: c_rehash script allows command injection
-  Resolves: rhbz#2090372
+  Resolves: rhbz#2090371
 - Fix CVE-2022-2068: the c_rehash script allows command injection
-  Resolves: rhbz#2098279
+  Resolves: rhbz#2098278
 
 * Wed Mar 23 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-6
 - Fixes CVE-2022-0778 openssl: Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
-- Resolves: rhbz#2067146
+- Resolves: rhbz#2067145
 
 * Tue Nov 16 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-5
 - Fixes CVE-2021-3712 openssl: Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings