import UBI openssl-1.1.1k-14.el8_6

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1g-hobbled.tar.xz
+SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz

.openssl.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-b55517bdc9aa61627a9896c1a3a156d5f6a4348f SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1g-hobbled.tar.xz
+6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz

SOURCES/ectest.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
@@ -1425,6 +1425,87 @@ static int ec_point_hex2point_test(int id)
     return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * check the EC_METHOD respects the supplied EC_GROUP_set_generator G
+ */
+static int custom_generator_test(int id)
+{
+    int ret = 0, nid, bsize;
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+    EC_POINT *G2 = NULL, *Q1 = NULL, *Q2 = NULL;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *k = NULL;
+    unsigned char *b1 = NULL, *b2 = NULL;
+
+    /* Do some setup */
+    nid = curves[id].nid;
+    TEST_note("Curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    if (!TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* expected byte length of encoded points */
+    bsize = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    bsize = 2 * bsize + 1;
+
+    if (!TEST_ptr(k = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+        /* fetch a testing scalar k != 0,1 */
+        || !TEST_true(BN_rand(k, EC_GROUP_order_bits(group) - 1,
+                              BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+        /* make k even */
+        || !TEST_true(BN_clear_bit(k, 0))
+        || !TEST_ptr(G2 = EC_POINT_new(group))
+        || !TEST_ptr(Q1 = EC_POINT_new(group))
+        /* Q1 := kG */
+        || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_mul(group, Q1, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        /* pull out the bytes of that */
+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q1,
+                                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL,
+                                           0, ctx), bsize)
+        || !TEST_ptr(b1 = OPENSSL_malloc(bsize))
+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q1,
+                                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, b1,
+                                           bsize, ctx), bsize)
+        /* new generator is G2 := 2G */
+        || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_dbl(group, G2, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group),
+                                   ctx))
+        || !TEST_true(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, G2,
+                                             EC_GROUP_get0_order(group),
+                                             EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group)))
+        || !TEST_ptr(Q2 = EC_POINT_new(group))
+        || !TEST_true(BN_rshift1(k, k))
+        /* Q2 := k/2 G2 */
+        || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_mul(group, Q2, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q2,
+                                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL,
+                                           0, ctx), bsize)
+        || !TEST_ptr(b2 = OPENSSL_malloc(bsize))
+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q2,
+                                           POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, b2,
+                                           bsize, ctx), bsize)
+        /* Q1 = kG = k/2 G2 = Q2 should hold */
+        || !TEST_int_eq(CRYPTO_memcmp(b1, b2, bsize), 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q1);
+    EC_POINT_free(Q2);
+    EC_POINT_free(G2);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(b1);
+    OPENSSL_free(b2);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 int setup_tests(void)
@@ -1452,6 +1533,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
 
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(check_named_curve_from_ecparameters, crv_len);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(ec_point_hex2point_test, crv_len);
+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(custom_generator_test, crv_len);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
     return 1;
 }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.0-issuer-hash.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.0-pre5/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash openssl-1.1.0-pre5/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
---- openssl-1.1.0-pre5/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash	2016-07-18 15:16:32.788881100 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.0-pre5/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c	2016-07-18 15:17:16.671871840 +0200
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_has
- 
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
-     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-         goto err;

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2020-1971.patch

@@ -1,713 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-index 613f9ae713..cc0a59ca4c 100644
---- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
-      "asn1_item_embed_d2i"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, 0),
-      "asn1_item_embed_new"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, 0), "ASN1_item_ex_i2d"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D, 0),
-      "asn1_item_flags_i2d"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO, 0), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"},
-@@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = {
-     "asn1 sig parse error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE), "bad template"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),
-     "bmpstring is wrong length"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
-diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-index 2332b204ed..1021705f43 100644
---- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-@@ -182,6 +182,15 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
-                                      tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-         p = *in;
-         /* Just read in tag and class */
-         ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
-@@ -199,6 +208,7 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
-             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-         /* Check tag matches bit map */
-         if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
-             /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
-@@ -215,6 +225,15 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
-         return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
-             goto auxerr;
-         if (*pval) {
-diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
-index d600c7a538..52a051d5b1 100644
---- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
-@@ -103,9 +103,25 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
-         return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-         return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
-             return 0;
-         i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 0b5873ebbc..815460b24f 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP:206:ASN1_item_d2i_fp
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP:191:ASN1_item_dup
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I:120:asn1_item_embed_d2i
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW:121:asn1_item_embed_new
-+ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D:144:ASN1_item_ex_i2d
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D:118:asn1_item_flags_i2d
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO:192:ASN1_item_i2d_bio
- ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP:193:ASN1_item_i2d_fp
-@@ -1771,6 +1772,7 @@ ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR:203:asn1 parse error
- ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR:204:asn1 sig parse error
- ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR:100:aux error
- ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER:102:bad object header
-+ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE:230:bad template
- ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:214:bmpstring is wrong length
- ASN1_R_BN_LIB:105:bn lib
- ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:106:boolean is wrong length
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-index 23e3bc4565..6f0a347cce 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(OTHERNAME) = {
- IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME)
- 
- ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = {
--        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0),
--        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1)
-+        /* DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so use explicit tagging */
-+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0),
-+        ASN1_EXP(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1)
- } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME)
- 
- IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME)
-@@ -57,6 +58,37 @@ GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a)
-                                     (char *)a);
- }
- 
-+static int edipartyname_cmp(const EDIPARTYNAME *a, const EDIPARTYNAME *b)
-+{
-+    int res;
-+
-+    if (a == NULL || b == NULL) {
-+        /*
-+         * Shouldn't be possible in a valid GENERAL_NAME, but we handle it
-+         * anyway. OTHERNAME_cmp treats NULL != NULL so we do the same here
-+         */
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+    if (a->nameAssigner == NULL && b->nameAssigner != NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+    if (a->nameAssigner != NULL && b->nameAssigner == NULL)
-+        return 1;
-+    /* If we get here then both have nameAssigner set, or both unset */
-+    if (a->nameAssigner != NULL) {
-+        res = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->nameAssigner, b->nameAssigner);
-+        if (res != 0)
-+            return res;
-+    }
-+    /*
-+     * partyName is required, so these should never be NULL. We treat it in
-+     * the same way as the a == NULL || b == NULL case above
-+     */
-+    if (a->partyName == NULL || b->partyName == NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+
-+    return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->partyName, b->partyName);
-+}
-+
- /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
- int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
- {
-@@ -66,8 +98,11 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
-         return -1;
-     switch (a->type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
-+        break;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other);
-+        result = edipartyname_cmp(a->d.ediPartyName, b->d.ediPartyName);
-         break;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-@@ -114,8 +149,11 @@ void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value)
- {
-     switch (type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        a->d.x400Address = value;
-+        break;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        a->d.other = value;
-+        a->d.ediPartyName = value;
-         break;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-@@ -149,8 +187,10 @@ void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(const GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype)
-         *ptype = a->type;
-     switch (a->type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        return a->d.x400Address;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        return a->d.other;
-+        return a->d.ediPartyName;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-         return a->d.otherName;
-diff --git a/include/openssl/asn1err.h b/include/openssl/asn1err.h
-index faed5a5518..e1ad1fefec 100644
---- a/include/openssl/asn1err.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/asn1err.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@
- #ifndef HEADER_ASN1ERR_H
- # define HEADER_ASN1ERR_H
- 
--# ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H
--#  include <openssl/symhacks.h>
--# endif
-+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
- 
- # ifdef  __cplusplus
- extern "C"
-@@ -53,6 +51,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP                             191
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I                       120
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW                       121
-+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D                          144
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D                       118
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO                         192
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP                          193
-@@ -145,6 +144,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
- # define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR                      204
- # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR                                 100
- # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER                         102
-+# define ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE                              230
- # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                 214
- # define ASN1_R_BN_LIB                                    105
- # define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                   106
-diff --git a/test/asn1_decode_test.c b/test/asn1_decode_test.c
-index 369023d5f1..94a22c6682 100644
---- a/test/asn1_decode_test.c
-+++ b/test/asn1_decode_test.c
-@@ -160,6 +160,41 @@ static int test_uint64(void)
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+    ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString;
-+} INVALIDTEMPLATE;
-+
-+ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = {
-+    /*
-+     * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging -
-+     * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid.
-+     */
-+    ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12)
-+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+
-+/* Empty sequence for invalid template test */
-+static unsigned char t_invalid_template[] = {
-+    0x30, 0x03,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
-+    0x0c, 0x01, 0x41             /* UTF8String, length 1, "A" */
-+};
-+
-+static int test_invalid_template(void)
-+{
-+    const unsigned char *p = t_invalid_template;
-+    INVALIDTEMPLATE *tmp = d2i_INVALIDTEMPLATE(NULL, &p,
-+                                               sizeof(t_invalid_template));
-+
-+    /* We expect a NULL pointer return */
-+    if (TEST_ptr_null(tmp))
-+        return 1;
-+
-+    INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(tmp);
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
- #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L
-@@ -169,5 +204,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
-     ADD_TEST(test_uint32);
-     ADD_TEST(test_int64);
-     ADD_TEST(test_uint64);
-+    ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template);
-     return 1;
- }
-diff --git a/test/asn1_encode_test.c b/test/asn1_encode_test.c
-index ed920a4d66..afbd18be6f 100644
---- a/test/asn1_encode_test.c
-+++ b/test/asn1_encode_test.c
-@@ -856,6 +856,38 @@ static int test_uint64(void)
-     return test_intern(&uint64_test_package);
- }
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+    ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString;
-+} INVALIDTEMPLATE;
-+
-+ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = {
-+    /*
-+     * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging -
-+     * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid.
-+     */
-+    ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12)
-+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE)
-+
-+static int test_invalid_template(void)
-+{
-+    INVALIDTEMPLATE *temp = INVALIDTEMPLATE_new();
-+    int ret;
-+
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(temp))
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    ret = i2d_INVALIDTEMPLATE(temp, NULL);
-+
-+    INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(temp);
-+
-+    /* We expect the i2d operation to fail */
-+    return ret < 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
- #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L
-@@ -866,5 +898,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
-     ADD_TEST(test_uint32);
-     ADD_TEST(test_int64);
-     ADD_TEST(test_uint64);
-+    ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template);
-     return 1;
- }
-diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
-index 86f3829aed..4c8af92ce9 100644
---- a/test/v3nametest.c
-+++ b/test/v3nametest.c
-@@ -359,8 +359,352 @@ static int call_run_cert(int i)
-     return failed == 0;
- }
- 
-+struct gennamedata {
-+    const unsigned char der[22];
-+    size_t derlen;
-+} gennames[] = {
-+    {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     SEQUENCE {}
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00
-+        },
-+        21
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     [APPLICATION 0] {}
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x60, 0x00
-+        },
-+        21
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        22
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        22
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "b" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        22
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     BOOLEAN { TRUE }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff
-+        },
-+        22
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [0] {
-+        *   OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     BOOLEAN { FALSE }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
-+            0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00
-+        },
-+        22
-+    }, {
-+        /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */
-+        {
-+            0x81, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */
-+        {
-+            0x81, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */
-+        {
-+            0x82, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */
-+        {
-+            0x82, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [4] {
-+        *   SEQUENCE {
-+        *     SET {
-+        *       SEQUENCE {
-+        *         # commonName
-+        *         OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 }
-+        *         UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *       }
-+        *     }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
-+            0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        16
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [4] {
-+        *   SEQUENCE {
-+        *     SET {
-+        *       SEQUENCE {
-+        *         # commonName
-+        *         OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 }
-+        *         UTF8String { "b" }
-+        *       }
-+        *     }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
-+            0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        16
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [5] {
-+        *   [1] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        7
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [5] {
-+        *   [1] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "b" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        7
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [5] {
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String {}
-+        *   }
-+        *   [1] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa5, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        11
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [5] {
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        *   [1] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01,
-+            0x61
-+        },
-+        12
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+        * [5] {
-+        *   [0] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "b" }
-+        *   }
-+        *   [1] {
-+        *     UTF8String { "a" }
-+        *   }
-+        * }
-+        */
-+        {
-+            0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01,
-+            0x61
-+        },
-+        12
-+    }, {
-+        /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */
-+        {
-+            0x86, 0x01, 0x61
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */
-+        {
-+            0x86, 0x01, 0x62
-+        },
-+        3
-+    }, {
-+        /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111` } */
-+        {
-+            0x87, 0x04, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11
-+        },
-+        6
-+    }, {
-+        /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222`} */
-+        {
-+            0x87, 0x04, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22
-+        },
-+        6
-+    }, {
-+        /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111111111111111111111111111` } */
-+        {
-+            0x87, 0x10, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11,
-+            0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11
-+        },
-+        18
-+    }, {
-+        /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222222222222222222222222222` } */
-+        {
-+            0x87, 0x10, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22,
-+            0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22
-+        },
-+        18
-+    }, {
-+        /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } */
-+        {
-+            0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84,
-+            0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01
-+        },
-+        15
-+    }, {
-+        /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } */
-+        {
-+            0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84,
-+            0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
-+        },
-+        15
-+    }
-+};
-+
-+static int test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp(void)
-+{
-+    size_t i, j;
-+    GENERAL_NAME **namesa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesa)
-+                                           * OSSL_NELEM(gennames));
-+    GENERAL_NAME **namesb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesb)
-+                                           * OSSL_NELEM(gennames));
-+    int testresult = 0;
-+
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(namesa) || !TEST_ptr(namesb))
-+        goto end;
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) {
-+        const unsigned char *derp = gennames[i].der;
-+
-+        /*
-+         * We create two versions of each GENERAL_NAME so that we ensure when
-+         * we compare them they are always different pointers.
-+         */
-+        namesa[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen);
-+        derp = gennames[i].der;
-+        namesb[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen);
-+        if (!TEST_ptr(namesa[i]) || !TEST_ptr(namesb[i]))
-+            goto end;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Every name should be equal to itself and not equal to any others. */
-+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) {
-+        for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); j++) {
-+            if (i == j) {
-+                if (!TEST_int_eq(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0))
-+                    goto end;
-+            } else {
-+                if (!TEST_int_ne(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0))
-+                    goto end;
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+    testresult = 1;
-+
-+ end:
-+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) {
-+        if (namesa != NULL)
-+            GENERAL_NAME_free(namesa[i]);
-+        if (namesb != NULL)
-+            GENERAL_NAME_free(namesb[i]);
-+    }
-+    OPENSSL_free(namesa);
-+    OPENSSL_free(namesb);
-+
-+    return testresult;
-+}
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
-     ADD_ALL_TESTS(call_run_cert, OSSL_NELEM(name_fns));
-+    ADD_TEST(test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp);
-     return 1;
- }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:04:24.781522476 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-03-25 15:04:24.792522584 +0100
-@@ -1136,6 +1136,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigne
-     /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
-     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
-     s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-+    s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = 0;
- 
-     return 1;
- }
-@@ -1145,6 +1146,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, un
-     /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
-     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs);
-     s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL;
-+    s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen = 0;
- 
-     return 1;
- }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:59:52.226408743 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t	2021-03-25 16:07:25.528618852 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
- $proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3");
- $proxy->reneg(1);
- $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
--plan tests => 3;
-+plan tests => 4;
- ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Basic renegotiation");
- 
- #Test 2: Client does not send the Reneg SCSV. Reneg should fail
-@@ -77,6 +77,20 @@ SKIP: {
-        "Check ClientHello version is the same");
- }
- 
-+SKIP: {
-+    skip "TLSv1.2 disabled", 1
-+        if disabled("tls1_2");
-+
-+    #Test 4: Test for CVE-2021-3449. client_sig_algs instead of sig_algs in
-+    #        resumption ClientHello
-+    $proxy->clear();
-+    $proxy->filter(\&sigalgs_filter);
-+    $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_2");
-+    $proxy->reneg(1);
-+    $proxy->start();
-+    ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "client_sig_algs instead of sig_algs");
-+}
-+
- sub reneg_filter
- {
-     my $proxy = shift;
-@@ -95,4 +109,24 @@ sub reneg_filter
-             $message->repack();
-         }
-     }
-+}
-+
-+sub sigalgs_filter
-+{
-+    my $proxy = shift;
-+    my $cnt = 0;
-+
-+    # We're only interested in the second ClientHello message
-+    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
-+        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
-+            next if ($cnt++ == 0);
-+
-+            my $sigs = pack "C10", 0x00, 0x08,
-+                            # rsa_pkcs_sha{256,384,512,1}
-+                            0x04, 0x01,  0x05, 0x01,  0x06, 0x01,  0x02, 0x01;
-+            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS_CERT, $sigs);
-+            $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS);
-+            $message->repack();
-+        }
-+    }
- }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
---- openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:59:19.648106296 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm	2021-03-25 16:04:25.623947880 +0100
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- #
- # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ sub ciphersuite
- }
- 
- #Update all the underlying records with the modified data from this message
--#Note: Only supports re-encrypting for TLSv1.3
-+#Note: Only supports TLSv1.3 and ETM encryption.
- sub repack
- {
-     my $self = shift;
-@@ -490,15 +490,38 @@ sub repack
-         # (If a length override is ever needed to construct invalid packets,
-         #  use an explicit override field instead.)
-         $rec->decrypt_len(length($rec->decrypt_data));
--        $rec->len($rec->len + length($msgdata) - $old_length);
--        # Only support re-encryption for TLSv1.3.
--        if (TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13() && $rec->encrypted()) {
--            #Add content type (1 byte) and 16 tag bytes
--            $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data
--                .pack("C", TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE).("\0"x16));
-+		# Only support re-encryption for TLSv1.3 and ETM.
-+        if ($rec->encrypted()) {
-+            if (TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13()) {
-+                #Add content type (1 byte) and 16 tag bytes
-+                $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data
-+                    .pack("C", TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE).("\0"x16));
-+            } elsif ($rec->etm()) {
-+                my $data = $rec->decrypt_data;
-+                #Add padding
-+                my $padval = length($data) % 16;
-+                $padval = 15 - $padval;
-+                for (0..$padval) {
-+                    $data .= pack("C", $padval);
-+                }
-+
-+                #Add MAC. Assumed to be 20 bytes
-+                foreach my $macval (0..19) {
-+                    $data .= pack("C", $macval);
-+                }
-+
-+                if ($rec->version() >= TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_1) {
-+                    #Explicit IV
-+                    $data = ("\0"x16).$data;
-+                }
-+                $rec->data($data);
-+            } else {
-+                die "Unsupported encryption: No ETM";
-+            }
-         } else {
-             $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data);
-         }
-+        $rec->len(length($rec->data));
- 
-         #Update the fragment len in case we changed it above
-         ${$self->message_frag_lens}[0] = length($msgdata)

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.bypass-strict-flag openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.bypass-strict-flag	2021-03-25 15:04:24.786522525 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2021-03-25 15:14:01.392910477 +0100
-@@ -509,15 +509,19 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_S
-                 ret = 1;
-             break;
-         }
--        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
-+        if (ret > 0
-+            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
-             /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
-             ret = check_curve(x);
--            if (ret < 0)
-+            if (ret < 0) {
-                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
--            else if (ret == 0)
-+                ret = 0;
-+            } else if (ret == 0) {
-                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
-+            }
-         }
--        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
-+        if (ret > 0
-+            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
-             && x->ex_pathlen != -1
-             && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
-             ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c.bypass-strict-flag openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c.bypass-strict-flag	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c	2021-03-25 15:04:24.793522594 +0100
-@@ -125,10 +125,22 @@ static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(
- 
-     i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
- 
--    if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
-+    if (i != 0 || X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) != X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    /* repeat with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT */
-+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(sctx);
-+    X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT);
-+
-+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
-+
-+    if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)
-         /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
-         ret = 1;
--    }
-+
-  err:
-     X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
-     X509_free(x);

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From a3f4cd5019b60649f6eb216ebe99caa43cd96f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:40:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] BIO_lookup_ex: use AI_ADDRCONFIG only if explicit host name
+ is given
+
+The flag only affects which record types are queried (A or AAAA, or
+both), and when node is NULL, it prevents getaddrinfo returning the
+right address associated with the loopback interface.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/bio/b_addr.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
+index b023bbda40..ea15601f3d 100644
+--- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
++++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
+@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
+         hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
+ # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
+ #  ifdef AF_UNSPEC
+-        if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
++        if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC)
+ #  endif
+             hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+ # endif
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+ #endif
++static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+ static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+ static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
+@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_de
+         TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
+         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+         | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+-        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
++        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
+         tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
+         final_ec_pt_formats
+     },
+@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
++{
++	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
++	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
++	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
++
++	    return 1;
++}
++
+ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+ {
+     s->ext.use_etm = 0;

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
+
+The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
+
+This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
+
+Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+From b5fcb7e133725b8b2eb66f63f5142710ed63a6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation of BN_mod_sqrt()
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ doc/man3/BN_add.pod | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+From 3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a negative testcase for BN_mod_sqrt
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/bntest.c                          | 11 ++++++++++-
+ test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+index 1723d5ded5a8..53b0f559855c 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ /*
+  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
+  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
+- * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
++ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
++ * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
+  */
+ {
+     BIGNUM *ret = in;
+@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+             goto vrfy;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
+-        i = 1;
+-        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
+-            goto end;
+-        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
+-            i++;
+-            if (i == e) {
+-                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
+-                goto end;
++        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
++        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
++            if (i == 1) {
++                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
++                    goto end;
++
++            } else {
++                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
++                    goto end;
+             }
+-            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
+-                goto end;
++            if (BN_is_one(t))
++                break;
++        }
++        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
++        if (i >= e) {
++            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
++            goto end;
+         }
+ 
+         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
+diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
+index dccd4790ede7..1f5e37a4d183 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ =head1 NAME
+ 
+ BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
+-BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
++BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
+ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
+ 
+ =head1 SYNOPSIS
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
+ 
+  int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ 
++ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
++
+  int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ 
+  int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+@@ -87,6 +89,12 @@ L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>.
+ BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
+ result in I<r>.
+ 
++BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I<a> such that
++C<in^2 = a (mod p)>. The modulus I<p> must be a
++prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned.
++The result is stored into I<in> which can be NULL. The result will be
++newly allocated in that case.
++
+ BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
+ (C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
+ BN_mul().
+@@ -108,7 +116,10 @@ the arguments.
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+-For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
++The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I<p> is
++not a prime), or NULL.
++
++For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
+ value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
+ The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+ 
+diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
+index 390dd800733e..1cab660bcafb 100644
+--- a/test/bntest.c
++++ b/test/bntest.c
+@@ -1729,8 +1729,17 @@ static int file_modsqrt(STANZA *s)
+             || !TEST_ptr(ret2 = BN_new()))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (BN_is_negative(mod_sqrt)) {
++        /* A negative testcase */
++        if (!TEST_ptr_null(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx)))
++            goto err;
++
++        st = 1;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     /* There are two possible answers. */
+-    if (!TEST_true(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
++    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
+             || !TEST_true(BN_sub(ret2, p, ret)))
+         goto err;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
+index 5ea4d031f271..e28cc6bfb02e 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
+@@ -2799,3 +2799,15 @@ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
+ ModSqrt = a1d52989f12f204d3d2167d9b1e6c8a6174c0c786a979a5952383b7b8bd186
+ A = 2eee37cf06228a387788188e650bc6d8a2ff402931443f69156a29155eca07dcb45f3aac238d92943c0c25c896098716baa433f25bd696a142f5a69d5d937e81
+ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
++
++# Negative testcases for BN_mod_sqrt()
++
++# This one triggers an infinite loop with unfixed implementation
++# It should just fail.
++ModSqrt = -1
++A = 20a7ee
++P = 460201
++
++ModSqrt = -1
++A = 65bebdb00a96fc814ec44b81f98b59fba3c30203928fa5214c51e0a97091645280c947b005847f239758482b9bfc45b066fde340d1fe32fc9c1bf02e1b2d0ed
++P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:40:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] c_rehash: Do not use shell to invoke openssl
+
+Except on VMS where it is safe.
+
+This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23]
+---
+ tools/c_rehash.in | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
+index fa7c6c9fef91..83c1cc80e08a 100644
+--- a/tools/c_rehash.in
++++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
+@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ sub check_file {
+ 	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
+ }
+ 
++sub compute_hash {
++    my $fh;
++    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {
++        # VMS uses the open through shell
++        # The file names are safe there and list form is unsupported
++        if (!open($fh, "-|", join(' ', @_))) {
++            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
++            return;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (!open($fh, "-|", @_)) {
++            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
++            return;
++        }
++    }
++    return (<$fh>, <$fh>);
++}
+ 
+ # Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
+ # the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
+@@ -161,10 +178,12 @@ sub check_file {
+ 
+ sub link_hash_cert {
+ 		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		$fname =~ s/\"/\\\"/g;
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
++		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
++						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++						   "-in", $fname);
+ 		chomp $hash;
+ 		chomp $fprint;
++		return if !$hash;
+ 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+ 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+ 		my $suffix = 0;
+@@ -202,10 +221,12 @@ sub link_hash_cert {
+ 
+ sub link_hash_crl {
+ 		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
++		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
++						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++						   "-in", $fname);
+ 		chomp $hash;
+ 		chomp $fprint;
++		return if !$hash;
+ 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+ 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+ 		my $suffix = 0;

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+From 9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Fiala <daniel@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:11:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix file operations in c_rehash.
+
+CVE-2022-2068
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7]
+---
+ tools/c_rehash.in | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
+index cfd18f5da110..9d2a6f6db73b 100644
+--- a/tools/c_rehash.in
++++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
+@@ -104,52 +104,78 @@ foreach (@dirlist) {
+ }
+ exit($errorcount);
+ 
++sub copy_file {
++    my ($src_fname, $dst_fname) = @_;
++
++    if (open(my $in, "<", $src_fname)) {
++        if (open(my $out, ">", $dst_fname)) {
++            print $out $_ while (<$in>);
++            close $out;
++        } else {
++            warn "Cannot open $dst_fname for write, $!";
++        }
++        close $in;
++    } else {
++        warn "Cannot open $src_fname for read, $!";
++    }
++}
++
+ sub hash_dir {
+-	my %hashlist;
+-	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
+-	chdir $_[0];
+-	opendir(DIR, ".");
+-	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
+-	closedir DIR;
+-	if ( $removelinks ) {
+-		# Delete any existing symbolic links
+-		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
+-			if (-l $_) {
+-				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
+-				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
+-		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
+-		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
+-		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
+-			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
+-			next;
+-		}
+-		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
+-		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
+-	}
++    my $dir = shift;
++    my %hashlist;
++
++    print "Doing $dir\n";
++
++    if (!chdir $dir) {
++        print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot chdir to '$dir', $!\n";
++        return;
++    }
++
++    opendir(DIR, ".") || print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot opendir '.', $!\n";
++    my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
++    closedir DIR;
++    if ( $removelinks ) {
++        # Delete any existing symbolic links
++        foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
++            if (-l $_) {
++                print "unlink $_\n" if $verbose;
++                unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
++        # Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
++        my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
++        if (!$cert && !$crl) {
++            print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
++            next;
++        }
++        link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
++        link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
++    }
++
++    chdir $pwd;
+ }
+ 
+ sub check_file {
+-	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
+-	my $fname = $_[0];
+-	open IN, $fname;
+-	while(<IN>) {
+-		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
+-			my $hdr = $1;
+-			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
+-				$is_cert = 1;
+-				last if ($is_crl);
+-			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
+-				$is_crl = 1;
+-				last if ($is_cert);
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-	close IN;
+-	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
++    my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
++    my $fname = $_[0];
++
++    open(my $in, "<", $fname);
++    while(<$in>) {
++        if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
++            my $hdr = $1;
++            if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
++                $is_cert = 1;
++                last if ($is_crl);
++            } elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
++                $is_crl = 1;
++                last if ($is_cert);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    close $in;
++    return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
+ }
+ 
+ sub compute_hash {
+@@ -177,76 +203,48 @@ sub compute_hash {
+ # certificate fingerprints
+ 
+ sub link_hash_cert {
+-		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
+-						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
+-						   "-in", $fname);
+-		chomp $hash;
+-		chomp $fprint;
+-		return if !$hash;
+-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+-		my $suffix = 0;
+-		# Search for an unused hash filename
+-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
+-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+-			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
+-				return;
+-			}
+-			$suffix++;
+-		}
+-		$hash .= ".$suffix";
+-		if ($symlink_exists) {
+-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+-		} else {
+-			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
+-                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
+-                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
+-                                close $out;
+-                            } else {
+-                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
+-                            }
+-                            close $in;
+-                        } else {
+-                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
+-                        }
+-		}
+-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
++    link_hash($_[0], 'cert');
+ }
+ 
+ # Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
+ 
+ sub link_hash_crl {
+-		my $fname = $_[0];
+-		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
+-						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
+-						   "-in", $fname);
+-		chomp $hash;
+-		chomp $fprint;
+-		return if !$hash;
+-		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
+-		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
+-		my $suffix = 0;
+-		# Search for an unused hash filename
+-		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
+-			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
+-			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
+-				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
+-				return;
+-			}
+-			$suffix++;
+-		}
+-		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
+-		if ($symlink_exists) {
+-			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
+-		} else {
+-			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
+-			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
+-                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
+-		}
+-		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
++    link_hash($_[0], 'crl');
++}
++
++sub link_hash {
++    my ($fname, $type) = @_;
++    my $is_cert = $type eq 'cert';
++
++    my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl,
++                                       $is_cert ? "x509" : "crl",
++                                       $is_cert ? $x509hash : $crlhash,
++                                       "-fingerprint", "-noout",
++                                       "-in", $fname);
++    chomp $hash;
++    chomp $fprint;
++    return if !$hash;
++    $fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
++    $fprint =~ tr/://d;
++    my $suffix = 0;
++    # Search for an unused hash filename
++    my $crlmark = $is_cert ? "" : "r";
++    while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"}) {
++        # Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
++        if ($hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
++            my $what = $is_cert ? 'certificate' : 'CRL';
++            print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate $what $fname\n";
++            return;
++        }
++        $suffix++;
++    }
++    $hash .= ".$crlmark$suffix";
++    if ($symlink_exists) {
++        print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
++        symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
++    } else {
++        print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
++        copy_file($fname, $hash);
++    }
++    $hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
+ }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:00:22 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
+that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
+"grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
+be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
+
+As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
+length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
+can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
+there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
+this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
+the remaining zero to five blocks.
+
+Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
+error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
+equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
+chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
+there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
+then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
+fall-through is intended.
+
+The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
+of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
+`out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
+those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
+also incorrect.
+
+The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
+aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
+
+This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
+
+Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
+Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431]
+---
+ crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+index fe2b26542ab6..812758e02e04 100644
+--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
++++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+ 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+-	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
++	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
+ 
+ &set_label("short");
+ 	&add		($len,16*6);
+@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
+ 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
+ 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
+ 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
+-	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
++	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
+ 
+ &set_label("short");
+ 	&add		($len,16*6);
+From 9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:02:37 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] AES OCB test vectors
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Add test vectors for AES OCB for x86 AES-NI multiple of 96 byte issue.
+
+Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
+Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06]
+---
+ test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
+index 1c02ea1e9c2d..e12670d9a4b4 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
+@@ -1188,6 +1188,56 @@ Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B21
+ Operation = DECRYPT
+ Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
+ 
++#Test vectors generated to validate aesni_ocb_encrypt on x86
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = C14DFF7D62A13C4A3422456207453190
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B819333
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = D47D84F6FF912C79B6A4223AB9BE2DB8
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC204
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = 41970D13737B7BD1B5FBF49ED4412CA5
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = BE0228651ED4E48A11BDED68D953F3A0
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = 17BC6E10B16E5FDC52836E7D589518C7
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = E84AAC18666116990A3A37B3A5FC55BD
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED
++
++Cipher = aes-128-ocb
++Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
++IV = 000000000001020304050607
++Tag = 3E5EA7EE064FE83B313E28D411E91EAD
++Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D
++Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED48D9E09F452F8E6FBEB76A3DED47611C
++
+ Title = AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007
+ 
+ # Using the same key twice for encryption is always banned.

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
+
+A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
+implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
+a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
+decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
+of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
+padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
+
+Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
+
+CVE-2022-4304
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
+ crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
+ crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
+ crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
+ crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
+ include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
+ include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
+ 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
+ 
+ #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER     32
+ 
+-struct bn_blinding_st {
+-    BIGNUM *A;
+-    BIGNUM *Ai;
+-    BIGNUM *e;
+-    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
+-    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+-    int counter;
+-    unsigned long flags;
+-    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
+-    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+-                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+-    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+-};
+-
+ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
+ {
+     BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
+index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
+@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
++    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
+     {0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
+index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
+@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
+     } cb;
+ };
+ 
++struct bn_blinding_st {
++    BIGNUM *A;
++    BIGNUM *Ai;
++    BIGNUM *e;
++    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
++    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
++    int counter;
++    unsigned long flags;
++    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
++    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
++                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
++    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
++};
++
+ /*-
+  * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
+  *
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
+index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/build.info
++++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
+@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
+         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
+         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
+         bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
+-        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
++        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
++        rsa_sup_mul.c
+ 
+ INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <stddef.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
++#include "internal/numbers.h"
++#include "internal/constant_time.h"
++#include "bn_local.h"
++
++# if BN_BYTES == 8
++typedef uint64_t limb_t;
++#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
++/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
++typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
++#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
++#  endif
++#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
++#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
++# elif BN_BYTES == 4
++typedef uint32_t limb_t;
++typedef uint64_t limb2_t;
++#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
++#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
++#  define HAVE_LIMB2_T
++# else
++#  error "Not supported"
++# endif
++
++/*
++ * For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
++ * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
++ * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
++ *                        A B C D E F
++ *                     x  I J K L M N
++ *                     --------------
++ *                                N*F
++ *                              N*E
++ *                            N*D
++ *                          N*C
++ *                        N*B
++ *                      N*A
++ *                              M*F
++ *                            M*E
++ *                          M*D
++ *                        M*C
++ *                      M*B
++ *                    M*A
++ *                            L*F
++ *                          L*E
++ *                        L*D
++ *                      L*C
++ *                    L*B
++ *                  L*A
++ *                          K*F
++ *                        K*E
++ *                      K*D
++ *                    K*C
++ *                  K*B
++ *                K*A
++ *                        J*F
++ *                      J*E
++ *                    J*D
++ *                  J*C
++ *                J*B
++ *              J*A
++ *                      I*F
++ *                    I*E
++ *                  I*D
++ *                I*C
++ *              I*B
++ *         +  I*A
++ *         ==========================
++ *                        N*B N*D N*F
++ *                    + N*A N*C N*E
++ *                    + M*B M*D M*F
++ *                  + M*A M*C M*E
++ *                  + L*B L*D L*F
++ *                + L*A L*C L*E
++ *                + K*B K*D K*F
++ *              + K*A K*C K*E
++ *              + J*B J*D J*F
++ *            + J*A J*C J*E
++ *            + I*B I*D I*F
++ *          + I*A I*C I*E
++ *
++ *                1+1 1+3 1+5
++ *              1+0 1+2 1+4
++ *              0+1 0+3 0+5
++ *            0+0 0+2 0+4
++ *
++ *            0 1 2 3 4 5 6
++ * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
++ * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
++ * limbs
++ */
++
++#if defined HAVE_LIMB2_T
++static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
++{
++    limb2_t t;
++    /*
++     * this is idiomatic code to tell compiler to use the native mul
++     * those three lines will actually compile to single instruction
++     */
++
++    t = (limb2_t)a * b;
++    *hi = t >> LIMB_BIT_SIZE;
++    *lo = (limb_t)t;
++}
++#elif (BN_BYTES == 8) && (defined _MSC_VER)
++/* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/intrinsics/umul128?view=msvc-170 */
++#pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
++static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
++{
++    *lo = _umul128(a, b, hi);
++}
++#else
++/*
++ * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
++ * high 64 bits of multiplication"
++ */
++static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
++{
++    limb_t a_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)a;
++    limb_t a_hi = a >> 32;
++    limb_t b_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)b;
++    limb_t b_hi = b >> 32;
++
++    limb_t p0 = a_low * b_low;
++    limb_t p1 = a_low * b_hi;
++    limb_t p2 = a_hi * b_low;
++    limb_t p3 = a_hi * b_hi;
++
++    uint32_t cy = (uint32_t)(((p0 >> 32) + (uint32_t)p1 + (uint32_t)p2) >> 32);
++
++    *lo = p0 + (p1 << 32) + (p2 << 32);
++    *hi = p3 + (p1 >> 32) + (p2 >> 32) + cy;
++}
++#endif
++
++/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
++static ossl_inline limb_t _add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
++{
++    limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
++    /*
++     * `c = a + b; if (c < a)` is idiomatic code that makes compilers
++     * use add with carry on assembly level
++     */
++
++    *ret = a + carry;
++    if (*ret < a)
++        carry1 = 1;
++    else
++        carry1 = 0;
++
++    t = *ret;
++    *ret = t + b;
++    if (*ret < t)
++        carry2 = 1;
++    else
++        carry2 = 0;
++
++    return carry1 + carry2;
++}
++
++/*
++ * add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
++ *
++ * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
++ * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
++ */
++static ossl_inline limb_t add(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
++{
++    limb_t c = 0;
++    ossl_ssize_t i;
++
++    for(i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
++        c = _add_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
++
++    return c;
++}
++
++/*
++ * return number of limbs necessary for temporary values
++ * when multiplying numbers n limbs large
++ */
++static ossl_inline size_t mul_limb_numb(size_t n)
++{
++    return  2 * n * 2;
++}
++
++/*
++ * multiply two numbers of the same size
++ *
++ * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
++ * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be mul_limb_numb(n) limbs
++ * long
++ */
++static void limb_mul(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
++{
++    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
++    size_t i, j, k;
++
++    r_odd = tmp;
++    r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
++
++    memset(ret, 0, 2 * n * sizeof(limb_t));
++
++    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++        for (k = 0; k < i + n + 1; k++) {
++            r_even[k] = 0;
++            r_odd[k] = 0;
++        }
++        for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
++            /*
++             * place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
++             * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
++             * limb multiplication result
++             */
++            if (j % 2 == 0)
++                _mul_limb(&r_even[i + j], &r_even[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
++            else
++                _mul_limb(&r_odd[i + j], &r_odd[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
++        }
++        /*
++         * skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
++         * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway)
++         */
++        add(ret, ret, r_even, n + i + 1);
++        add(ret, ret, r_odd, n + i + 1);
++    }
++}
++
++/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
++static ossl_inline void rshift1(limb_t *val, size_t n)
++{
++    limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
++    size_t i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++        shift_out = val[i] & 1;
++        val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE - 1) | (val[i] >> 1);
++        shift_in = shift_out;
++    }
++}
++
++/* extend the LSB of flag to all bits of limb */
++static ossl_inline limb_t mk_mask(limb_t flag)
++{
++    flag |= flag << 1;
++    flag |= flag << 2;
++    flag |= flag << 4;
++    flag |= flag << 8;
++    flag |= flag << 16;
++#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
++    flag |= flag << 32;
++#endif
++    return flag;
++}
++
++/*
++ * copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
++ * when flag == 0, then copies from b
++ * when flag == 1, then copies from a
++ */
++static ossl_inline void cselect(limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
++{
++    /*
++     * would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
++     * generates code with jumps
++     */
++    volatile limb_t mask;
++    size_t i;
++
++    mask = mk_mask(flag);
++    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
++        ret[i] = constant_time_select_64(mask, a[i], b[i]);
++#else
++        ret[i] = constant_time_select_32(mask, a[i], b[i]);
++#endif
++    }
++}
++
++static limb_t _sub_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
++{
++    limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
++    /*
++     * while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
++     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction
++     */
++
++    *ret = a - borrow;
++    if (*ret > a)
++        borrow1 = 1;
++    else
++        borrow1 = 0;
++
++    t = *ret;
++    *ret = t - b;
++    if (*ret > t)
++        borrow2 = 1;
++    else
++        borrow2 = 0;
++
++    return borrow1 + borrow2;
++}
++
++/*
++ * place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
++ * All arrays need to be n limbs long
++ */
++static limb_t sub(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
++{
++    limb_t borrow = 0;
++    ossl_ssize_t i;
++
++    for (i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
++        borrow = _sub_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
++
++    return borrow;
++}
++
++/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
++static ossl_inline size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum)
++{
++    return (anum + modnum) * 3;
++}
++
++/*
++ * calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
++ * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
++ * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
++ */
++static void mod(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
++               size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
++{
++    limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
++    limb_t res;
++    size_t i;
++
++    memset(tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++
++    atmp = tmp;
++    modtmp = &tmp[anum + modnum];
++    rettmp = &tmp[(anum + modnum) * 2];
++
++    for (i = modnum; i <modnum + anum; i++)
++        atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
++
++    for (i = 0; i < modnum; i++)
++        modtmp[i] = mod[i];
++
++    for (i = 0; i < anum * LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++) {
++        rshift1(modtmp, anum + modnum);
++        res = sub(rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
++        cselect(res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
++    }
++
++    memcpy(ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t) * modnum);
++}
++
++/* necessary size of tmp for a _mul_add_limb() call with provided anum */
++static ossl_inline size_t _mul_add_limb_numb(size_t anum)
++{
++    return 2 * (anum + 1);
++}
++
++/* multiply a by m, add to ret, return carry */
++static limb_t _mul_add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum,
++                           limb_t m, limb_t *tmp)
++{
++    limb_t carry = 0;
++    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
++    size_t i;
++
++    memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (anum + 1) * 2);
++
++    r_odd = tmp;
++    r_even = &tmp[anum + 1];
++
++    for (i = 0; i < anum; i++) {
++        /*
++         * place the results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays
++         * so that we have to worry about carry just once
++         */
++        if (i % 2 == 0)
++            _mul_limb(&r_even[i], &r_even[i + 1], a[i], m);
++        else
++            _mul_limb(&r_odd[i], &r_odd[i + 1], a[i], m);
++    }
++    /* assert: add() carry here will be equal zero */
++    add(r_even, r_even, r_odd, anum + 1);
++    /*
++     * while here it will not overflow as the max value from multiplication
++     * is -2 while max overflow from addition is 1, so the max value of
++     * carry is -1 (i.e. max int)
++     */
++    carry = add(ret, ret, &r_even[1], anum) + r_even[0];
++
++    return carry;
++}
++
++static ossl_inline size_t mod_montgomery_limb_numb(size_t modnum)
++{
++    return modnum * 2 + _mul_add_limb_numb(modnum);
++}
++
++/*
++ * calculate a % mod, place result in ret
++ * assumes that a is in Montgomery form with the R (Montgomery modulus) being
++ * smallest power of two big enough to fit mod and that's also a power
++ * of the count of number of bits in limb_t (B).
++ * For calculation, we also need n', such that mod * n' == -1 mod B.
++ * anum must be <= 2 * modnum
++ * ret needs to be modnum words long
++ * tmp needs to be mod_montgomery_limb_numb(modnum) limbs long
++ */
++static void mod_montgomery(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
++                          size_t modnum, limb_t ni0, limb_t *tmp)
++{
++    limb_t carry, v;
++    limb_t *res, *rp, *tmp2;
++    ossl_ssize_t i;
++
++    res = tmp;
++    /*
++     * for intermediate result we need an integer twice as long as modulus
++     * but keep the input in the least significant limbs
++     */
++    memset(res, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (modnum * 2));
++    memcpy(&res[modnum * 2 - anum], a, sizeof(limb_t) * anum);
++    rp = &res[modnum];
++    tmp2 = &res[modnum * 2];
++
++    carry = 0;
++
++    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
++    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
++        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
++        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
++        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
++        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
++        rp[-1] = v;
++    }
++
++    /* perform the final reduction by mod... */
++    carry -= sub(ret, rp, mod, modnum);
++
++    /* ...conditionally */
++    cselect(carry, ret, rp, ret, modnum);
++}
++
++/* allocated buffer should be freed afterwards */
++static void BN_to_limb(const BIGNUM *bn, limb_t *buf, size_t limbs)
++{
++    int i;
++    int real_limbs = (BN_num_bytes(bn) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
++    limb_t *ptr = buf + (limbs - real_limbs);
++
++    for (i = 0; i < real_limbs; i++)
++         ptr[i] = bn->d[real_limbs - i - 1];
++}
++
++#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
++static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
++{
++    const union {
++        long one;
++        char little;
++    } is_endian = { 1 };
++
++    if (is_endian.little) {
++        uint64_t big = 0;
++
++        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
++        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
++        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
++        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
++        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
++        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
++        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
++        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
++        return big;
++    } else {
++        return host;
++    }
++}
++
++#else
++/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
++static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
++{
++    const union {
++        long one;
++        char little;
++    } is_endian = { 1 };
++
++    if (is_endian.little) {
++        uint32_t big = 0;
++
++        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
++        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
++        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
++        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
++        return big;
++    } else {
++        return host;
++    }
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * We assume that intermediate, possible_arg2, blinding, and ctx are used
++ * similar to BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() arguments.
++ * to_mod is RSA modulus.
++ * buf and num is the serialization buffer and its length.
++ *
++ * Here we use classic/Montgomery multiplication and modulo. After the calculation finished
++ * we serialize the new structure instead of BIGNUMs taking endianness into account.
++ */
++int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
++                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
++                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
++                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
++                           unsigned char *buf, int num)
++{
++    limb_t *l_im = NULL, *l_mul = NULL, *l_mod = NULL;
++    limb_t *l_ret = NULL, *l_tmp = NULL, l_buf;
++    size_t l_im_count = 0, l_mul_count = 0, l_size = 0, l_mod_count = 0;
++    size_t l_tmp_count = 0;
++    int ret = 0;
++    size_t i;
++    unsigned char *tmp;
++    const BIGNUM *arg1 = intermediate;
++    const BIGNUM *arg2 = (possible_arg2 == NULL) ? blinding->Ai : possible_arg2;
++
++    l_im_count  = (BN_num_bytes(arg1)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
++    l_mul_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg2)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
++    l_mod_count = (BN_num_bytes(to_mod) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
++
++    l_size = l_im_count > l_mul_count ? l_im_count : l_mul_count;
++    l_im  = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++    l_mul = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++    l_mod = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++
++    if ((l_im == NULL) || (l_mul == NULL) || (l_mod == NULL))
++        goto err;
++
++    BN_to_limb(arg1,   l_im,  l_size);
++    BN_to_limb(arg2,   l_mul, l_size);
++    BN_to_limb(to_mod, l_mod, l_mod_count);
++
++    l_ret = OPENSSL_malloc(2 * l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++
++    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
++        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count) ?
++                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count);
++        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++    } else {
++        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count) ?
++                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count);
++        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++    }
++
++    if ((l_ret == NULL) || (l_tmp == NULL))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
++        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
++        mod_montgomery(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count,
++                       blinding->m_ctx->n0[0], l_tmp);
++    } else {
++        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
++        mod(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count, l_tmp);
++    }
++
++    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
++    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
++        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    memset(buf, 0, num);
++    tmp = buf + num - BN_num_bytes(to_mod);
++    for (i = 0; i < l_mod_count; i++) {
++#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
++        l_buf = be64(l_ret[i]);
++#else
++        l_buf = be32(l_ret[i]);
++#endif
++        if (i == 0) {
++            int delta = LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - ((l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE) - num);
++
++            memcpy(tmp, ((char *)&l_buf) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - delta, delta);
++            tmp += delta;
++        } else {
++            memcpy(tmp, &l_buf, LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
++            tmp += LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
++        }
++    }
++    ret = num;
++
++ err:
++    OPENSSL_free(l_im);
++    OPENSSL_free(l_mul);
++    OPENSSL_free(l_mod);
++    OPENSSL_free(l_tmp);
++    OPENSSL_free(l_ret);
++
++    return ret;
++}
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ #
+ # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
+ BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
+ BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
+ BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
++BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
+ BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
+ BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
+ BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         BN_free(d);
+     }
+ 
+-    if (blinding)
+-        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
++    if (blinding) {
++        /*
++         * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
++         * 0-padded BN BE serialization
++         */
++        j = ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(ret, blinding, unblind, rsa->n, ctx,
++                                   buf, num);
++        if (j == 0)
+             goto err;
+-
+-    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
++    } else {
++        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
++        if (j < 0)
++            goto err;
++    }
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
+     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
+index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
++++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
+@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
+ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
++int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
++                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
++                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
++                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
++                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
+index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
+ # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
+ # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
+ # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
++# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
+ 
+ /*
+  * BN reason codes.
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+From bbcf509bd046b34cca19c766bbddc31683d0858b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
+ PEM_read_bio_ex
+
+In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
+allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
+the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
+responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
+free if the caller frees them even on failure.
+
+Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.
+
+Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.
+
+CVE-2022-4450
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
+--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+@@ -957,7 +957,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
+     *data = pem_malloc(len, flags);
+     if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) {
+         pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
++        *header = NULL;
+         pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
++        *data = NULL;
+         goto end;
+     }
+     BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 2bd611267868a008afa576846ba71566bd0d4d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
+
+Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
+ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
+error.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/pemtest.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
+index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
+--- a/test/pemtest.c
++++ b/test/pemtest.c
+@@ -83,9 +83,39 @@ static int test_invalid(void)
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static int test_empty_payload(void)
++{
++    BIO *b;
++    static char *emptypay =
++        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
++        "-\n" /* Base64 EOF character */
++        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
++    char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
++    unsigned char *data = NULL;
++    long len;
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    b = BIO_new_mem_buf(emptypay, strlen(emptypay));
++    if (!TEST_ptr(b))
++        return 0;
++
++    /* Expected to fail because the payload is empty */
++    if (!TEST_false(PEM_read_bio_ex(b, &name, &header, &data, &len, 0)))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++ err:
++    OPENSSL_free(name);
++    OPENSSL_free(header);
++    OPENSSL_free(data);
++    BIO_free(b);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
+     ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
++    ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
+     return 1;
+ }
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+From c3829dd8825c654652201e16f8a0a0c46ee3f344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 16:18:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
+
+If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
+be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
+BIO is eventually freed.
+
+Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
+Buehler.
+
+Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+@@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
+ static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+                             void *parg);
+ 
++/*
++ * On success, the returned BIO owns the input BIO as part of its BIO chain.
++ * On failure, NULL is returned and the input BIO is owned by the caller.
++ *
++ * Unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream()
++ */
+ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+ {
+     NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL;
+     BIO *asn_bio = NULL;
+     const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+     ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
++    BIO *pop_bio = NULL;
+ 
+     if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
+         ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+@@ -69,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+     out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
+     if (out == NULL)
+         goto err;
++    pop_bio = asn_bio;
+ 
+-    BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free);
+-    BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
++    if (BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free) <= 0
++            || BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free) <= 0
++            || BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux) <= 0)
++        goto err;
+ 
+     /*
+-     * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
+-     * needs.
++     * Now let the callback prepend any digest, cipher, etc., that the BIO's
++     * ASN1 structure needs.
+      */
+ 
+     sarg.out = out;
+     sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
+     sarg.boundary = NULL;
+ 
+-    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
++    /*
++     * The asn1_cb(), must not have mutated asn_bio on error, leaving it in the
++     * middle of some partially built, but not returned BIO chain.
++     */
++    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) {
++        /*
++         * ndef_aux is now owned by asn_bio so we must not free it in the err
++         * clean up block
++         */
++        ndef_aux = NULL;
+         goto err;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We must not fail now because the callback has prepended additional
++     * BIOs to the chain
++     */
+ 
+     ndef_aux->val = val;
+     ndef_aux->it = it;
+@@ -91,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+     ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
+     ndef_aux->out = out;
+ 
+-    BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
+-
+     return sarg.ndef_bio;
+ 
+  err:
++    /* BIO_pop() is NULL safe */
++    (void)BIO_pop(pop_bio);
+     BIO_free(asn_bio);
+     OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
+     return NULL;
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From f040f2577891d2bdb7610566c172233844cf673a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
+ handled correctly
+
+Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t  | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 5dc6a3aebe..ec11bfc253 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
+ use POSIX;
+ use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
+ use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file with/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ setup("test_cms");
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
+ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
+     = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
+ 
+-plan tests => 6;
++plan tests => 7;
+ 
+ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+ 
+@@ -584,3 +584,14 @@ sub check_availability {
+ 
+     return "";
+ }
++
++# Check that we get the expected failure return code
++with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 6; } },
++    sub {
++        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-encrypt',
++                    '-in', srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"),
++                    '-stream', '-recip',
++                    srctop_file("test/smime-certs", "badrsa.pem"),
++                   ])),
++            "Check failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled correctly");
++    });
+diff --git a/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f824fc2267
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
++MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIToTV4Z0iuK08vZP20oTh//hC8BDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADAtMSswKQYD
++VfcDEyJTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTE5MTEyMDA2NTQxOFoY
++DzIwNTIwOTI3MDY1NDE4WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5BbGljZSBMb3ZlbGFjZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
++AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALT0iehYOBY+TZp/T5K2KNI05Hwr+E3wP6XTvyi6WWyTgBK9LCOw
++I2juwdRrjFBmXkk7pWpjXwsA3A5GOtz0FpfgyC7OxsVcF7q4WHWZWleYXFKlQHJD73nQwXP968+A
++/3rBX7PhO0DBbZnfitOLPgPEwjTtdg0VQQ6Wz+CRQ/YbHPKaw7aRphZO63dKvIKp4cQVtkWQHi6s
++yTjGsgkLcLNau5LZDQUdsGV+SAo3nBdWCRYV+I65x8Kf4hCxqqmjV3d/2NKRu0BXnDe/N+iDz3X0
++zEoj0fqXgq4SWcC0nsG1lyyXt1TL270I6ATKRGJWiQVCCpDtc0NT6vdJ45bCSxgCAwEAAaOBlzCB
++lDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB4GA1UdEQQXMBWBE2FsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGUwEwYDVR0lBAww
++CgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDwYDVR0PAQH/BAUDAwfAADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUu/bMsi0dBhIcl64papAQ0yBm
++ZnMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUeF8OWnjYa+RUcD2z3ez38fL6wEcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggEBABbW
++eonR6TMTckehDKNOabwaCIcekahAIL6l9tTzUX5ew6ufiAPlC6I/zQlmUaU0iSyFDG1NW14kNbFt
++5CAokyLhMtE4ASHBIHbiOp/ZSbUBTVYJZB61ot7w1/ol5QECSs08b8zrxIncf+t2DHGuVEy/Qq1d
++rBz8d4ay8zpqAE1tUyL5Da6ZiKUfWwZQXSI/JlbjQFzYQqTRDnzHWrg1xPeMTO1P2/cplFaseTiv
++yk4cYwOp/W9UAWymOZXF8WcJYCIUXkdcG/nEZxr057KlScrJmFXOoh7Y+8ON4iWYYcAfiNgpUFo/
++j8BAwrKKaFvdlZS9k1Ypb2+UQY75mKJE9Bg=
++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 2c6c9d439b484e1ba9830d8454a34fa4f80fdfe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:45:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
+ (1.1.1)
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ CHANGES                  | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c  |  2 +-
+ include/openssl/x509v3.h |  2 +-
+ test/v3nametest.c        |  8 ++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
+index 87a5eff47c..e54ddc55c9 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
++++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
+         return -1;
+     switch (a->type) {
+     case GEN_X400:
+-        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
++        result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
+         break;
+ 
+     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
+index 90fa3592ce..e61c0f29d4 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
++++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
+         OTHERNAME *otherName;   /* otherName */
+         ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
+         ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
+-        ASN1_TYPE *x400Address;
++        ASN1_STRING *x400Address;
+         X509_NAME *directoryName;
+         EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
+         ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
+diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
+index d1852190b8..37819da8fd 100644
+--- a/test/v3nametest.c
++++ b/test/v3nametest.c
+@@ -646,6 +646,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
+             0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
+         },
+         15
++    }, {
++        /*
++         * Regression test for CVE-2023-0286.
++         */
++        {
++            0xa3, 0x00
++        },
++        2
+     }
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
+that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
+value even if it is excessively large.
+
+There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
+OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
+perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
+new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
+
+An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
+obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
+Service attack.
+
+The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
+similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
+DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
+
+CVE-2023-3446
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  | 3 ++-
+ include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
+ include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
+ 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+         return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
+      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
+ DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
+ DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
+ DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
++DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
+ DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+ #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
+ # endif
++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
++# endif
+ 
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
+ 
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
+ #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
+ #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
++#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
+ obviously invalid
+
+If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
+is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
+
+We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
+q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
+q value.
+
+Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
+such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
+computations.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-3817
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
+ /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
+ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ {
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     if (t2 == NULL)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    if (dh->q) {
++    if (dh->q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
+
+We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
+DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
+
+This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
+
+It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
+differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
+sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
+DH_check_pub_key().
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
+Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 10 ++++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 ++++--
+ include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
+ 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
++         * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
++         * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
++        ok = 1;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+         goto err;
+     }
++
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+     if (FIPS_mode()
+         && (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
+ # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+ 
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
+ # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
++/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
++# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ 
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD                             202
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-detected-addr-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6 openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6	2021-07-16 15:14:08.491986682 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c	2021-07-16 15:23:21.271329197 +0200
+@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
+     const BIO_ADDRINFO *next;
+     int sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, sock_port;
+     const BIO_ADDR *sock_address;
++    int sock_family_fallback = AF_UNSPEC;
++    const BIO_ADDR *sock_address_fallback = NULL;
+     int sock_options = BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR;
+     int ret = 0;
+ 
+@@ -244,6 +246,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
+             && BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(next) == sock_protocol) {
+         if (sock_family == AF_INET
+                 && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET6) {
++            /* In case AF_INET6 is returned but not supported by the
++             * kernel, retry with the first detected address family */
++            sock_family_fallback = sock_family;
++            sock_address_fallback = sock_address;
+             sock_family = AF_INET6;
+             sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(next);
+         } else if (sock_family == AF_INET6
+@@ -253,6 +259,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
+     }
+ 
+     asock = BIO_socket(sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
++	if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET && sock_family_fallback != AF_UNSPEC) {
++       asock = BIO_socket(sock_family_fallback, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
++       sock_address = sock_address_fallback;
++	}
+     if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET
+         || !BIO_listen(asock, sock_address, sock_options)) {
+         BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ec-curves.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c	2019-05-29 15:36:53.332224470 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
 @@ -490,90 +490,30 @@ static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2];
  #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
  
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
      {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519},
      {"ecdhx448", R_EC_X448}
  };
-@@ -1504,31 +1444,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1502,31 +1442,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
          unsigned int bits;
      } test_curves[] = {
          /* Prime Curves */
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
          /* Other and ECDH only ones */
          {"X25519", NID_X25519, 253},
          {"X448", NID_X448, 448}
-@@ -2028,9 +1947,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -2026,9 +1945,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
  #  endif
  
  #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
          ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
          ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
          if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
-@@ -2042,7 +1961,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -2040,7 +1959,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
              }
          }
      }
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
      ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
      ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
      for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
-@@ -2073,8 +1992,8 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -2071,8 +1990,8 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
      }
  #   endif
  
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
          ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
          if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
              ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
-@@ -2084,7 +2003,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -2082,7 +2001,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
              }
          }
      }
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/apps/speed.c
      ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
      for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
          ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c	2019-05-29 15:30:09.071349520 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
 @@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GRO
          return 0;
      }
@@ -181,9 +181,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves openssl-1.1.1c/crypto/ec/ecp
      if (ctx == NULL) {
          ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
          if (ctx == NULL)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h.curves openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h
---- openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h.curves	2019-05-29 15:30:09.010350595 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves	2020-11-06 13:27:15.627288114 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h	2019-05-29 15:41:24.586444294 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h	2020-11-06 13:27:15.660288441 +0100
 @@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
  } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
  
@@ -208,3 +208,59 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h.curves openssl-1.1.1c/test/ecdsatest.h
      /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
      {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
       "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves	2020-11-06 13:58:36.402895540 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t	2020-11-06 13:59:38.508484498 +0100
+@@ -20,45 +20,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
+     if disabled("ec");
+ 
+ my @prime_curves = qw(
+-    secp112r1
+-    secp112r2
+-    secp128r1
+-    secp128r2
+-    secp160k1
+-    secp160r1
+-    secp160r2
+-    secp192k1
+-    secp224k1
+     secp224r1
+     secp256k1
+     secp384r1
+     secp521r1
+-    prime192v1
+-    prime192v2
+-    prime192v3
+-    prime239v1
+-    prime239v2
+-    prime239v3
+     prime256v1
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+-    brainpoolP160r1
+-    brainpoolP160t1
+-    brainpoolP192r1
+-    brainpoolP192t1
+-    brainpoolP224r1
+-    brainpoolP224t1
+-    brainpoolP256r1
+-    brainpoolP256t1
+-    brainpoolP320r1
+-    brainpoolP320t1
+-    brainpoolP384r1
+-    brainpoolP384t1
+-    brainpoolP512r1
+-    brainpoolP512t1
+ );
+ 
+ my @binary_curves = qw(
+@@ -115,7 +81,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
+     if !disabled("sm2");
+ 
+ my @curve_aliases = qw(
+-    P-192
+     P-224
+     P-256
+     P-384

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-evp-kdf.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt	2020-03-19 16:04:11.299063517 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt	2021-03-03 14:10:13.729466935 +0100
-@@ -747,6 +747,9 @@ EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX:128:EVP_DigestIn
+@@ -748,6 +748,9 @@ EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX:128:EVP_DigestIn
  EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE:219:evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate
  EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX:127:EVP_EncryptFinal_ex
  EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE:167:EVP_EncryptUpdate
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err
  EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX:110:EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
  EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE:162:EVP_MD_size
  EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT:102:EVP_OpenInit
-@@ -809,12 +812,31 @@ EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN:117:PKCS5_PBE_k
+@@ -810,12 +813,31 @@ EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN:117:PKCS5_PBE_k
  EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN:118:PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen
  EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN:164:PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen
  EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN:180:PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err
  KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR:103:pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
  KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE:102:pkey_hkdf_derive
  KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_INIT:108:pkey_hkdf_init
-@@ -826,6 +848,7 @@ KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF:107:pkey_sc
+@@ -827,6 +849,7 @@ KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF:107:pkey_sc
  KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR:100:pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
  KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE:101:pkey_tls1_prf_derive
  KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT:110:pkey_tls1_prf_init
@@ -51,15 +51,15 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err
  KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG:111:tls1_prf_alg
  OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT:105:OBJ_add_object
  OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_SIGID:107:OBJ_add_sigid
-@@ -2277,6 +2300,7 @@ EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED:177:only on
+@@ -2284,6 +2307,7 @@ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_K
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\
  	operation not supported for this keytype
  EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operaton not initialized
+ EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW:184:output would overflow
 +EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE:187:parameter too large
  EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers
  EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR:181:pbkdf2 error
  EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED:179:\
-@@ -2313,6 +2337,7 @@ KDF_R_MISSING_SEED:106:missing seed
+@@ -2320,6 +2344,7 @@ KDF_R_MISSING_SEED:106:missing seed
  KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE:103:unknown parameter type
  KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR:108:value error
  KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING:102:value missing
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err/openssl.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/err
  OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS:102:oid exists
  OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID:101:unknown nid
  OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR:101:certificate verify error
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/build.info
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/build.info
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/build.info.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/build.info.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/build.info	2020-03-19 16:04:11.300063500 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/build.info	2021-03-03 14:08:02.490294839 +0100
 @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
          p_open.c p_seal.c p_sign.c p_verify.c p_lib.c p_enc.c p_dec.c \
          bio_md.c bio_b64.c bio_enc.c evp_err.c e_null.c \
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/
          e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \
          e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \
          e_chacha20_poly1305.c cmeth_lib.c
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:11.300063500 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c	2020-03-19 16:16:46.497967633 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.490294839 +0100
 @@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
  
  # include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/
  
  typedef struct {
      union {
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:11.301063483 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c	2020-03-19 16:14:13.147628683 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
  #include <limits.h>
  #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/en
  
  static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a,
                                      const unsigned char *table);
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:11.218064919 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.469294651 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_err.c	2020-03-19 16:04:11.302063465 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c	2021-03-03 14:12:08.272351600 +0100
 @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_fun
      {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, 0),
       "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
@@ -135,18 +135,18 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e
      {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_UPDATE, 0), "update"},
      {0, NULL}
  };
-@@ -241,6 +246,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_rea
+@@ -243,6 +248,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_rea
-     "operation not supported for this keytype"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED),
      "operaton not initialized"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW),
+     "output would overflow"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE),
 +    "parameter too large"},
      {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING),
      "partially overlapping buffers"},
      {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR), "pbkdf2 error"},
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_local.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:10.657074629 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_local.h.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.362293695 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_local.h	2020-03-19 16:04:20.722900404 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_local.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ struct evp_cipher_ctx_st {
      unsigned char final[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* possible final block */
  } /* EVP_CIPHER_CTX */ ;
@@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp
  int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
                               int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
                               const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md,
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:20.723900386 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c	2020-03-19 16:11:56.425001210 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
@@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/e
  #include "evp_local.h"
  
  /* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:20.723900386 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c	2020-03-19 16:04:20.723900386 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -339,9 +339,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/k
 +    return ctx->kmeth->derive(ctx->impl, key, keylen);
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c	2020-03-19 16:17:48.822886126 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
  /*
 - * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/
  }
  
  int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c	2020-03-19 16:04:20.725900352 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -7,135 +7,12 @@
   * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   */
@@ -763,9 +763,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pbe_scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/ev
  }
 +
  #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:20.726900334 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c	2020-03-19 16:04:20.725900352 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1022,17 +1022,17 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/evp/
 +    pkey_kdf_ctrl_str
 +};
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/build.info
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/build.info
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/build.info.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/build.info.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/build.info	2020-03-19 16:04:32.347699194 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/build.info	2021-03-03 14:08:02.491294847 +0100
 @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
  LIBS=../../libcrypto
  SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
 -        tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c hkdf.c scrypt.c
 +        tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c kdf_util.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c	2020-03-19 16:06:59.757147720 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -8,32 +8,33 @@
   */
  
@@ -1498,9 +1498,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/hkdf
  
   err:
      OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.349699159 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
  /*
   * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
@@ -1556,9 +1556,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/k
      {0, NULL}
  };
  
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.349699159 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.349699159 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1582,9 +1582,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf
 +                int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
 +                int cmd, const char *md_name);
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.350699142 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.350699142 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1659,9 +1659,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/
 +    return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, md);
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.374698727 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.374698727 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1927,9 +1927,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/pb
 +    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
 +    return ret;
 +}
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c	2020-03-19 16:11:06.215872475 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -8,25 +8,35 @@
   */
  
@@ -2517,9 +2517,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/scrypt.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/sc
 +}
  
  #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c	2020-03-19 16:10:32.317460707 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -8,11 +8,15 @@
   */
  
@@ -2802,9 +2802,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/kdf/
              OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
              return 0;
          }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.377698675 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod	2020-03-19 16:04:32.377698675 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod	2021-03-03 14:08:02.492294856 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
 +=pod
 +
@@ -3023,9 +3023,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3/EVP_KDF_CTX.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man3
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.377698675 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod	2020-03-19 16:04:32.377698675 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
 +=pod
 +
@@ -3207,9 +3207,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_HKDF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
 +=pod
 +
@@ -3289,9 +3289,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_PBKDF2.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/m
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
 +=pod
 +
@@ -3442,9 +3442,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_SCRYPT.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/m
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod	2020-03-19 16:04:32.378698658 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
 +=pod
 +
@@ -3588,9 +3588,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/doc/man7/EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF.pod.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/doc
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/evp.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/evp.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/evp.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/evp.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/evp.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/evp.h.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/evp.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.347699194 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/evp.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -112,6 +112,24 @@ extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_m
  extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD poly1305_pkey_meth;
  extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD siphash_pkey_meth;
@@ -3616,10 +3616,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/evp.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/cryp
  struct evp_md_st {
      int type;
      int pkey_type;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:11.250064365 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.477294722 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.379698640 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h	2021-03-03 14:13:37.587003722 +0100
-@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
+@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
  # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE                   219
  # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
  # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          167
@@ -3629,7 +3629,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/
  # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
  # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
  # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102
-@@ -120,11 +123,13 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
+@@ -118,11 +121,13 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
  # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN                      118
  # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN                   164
  # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN                   180
@@ -3643,17 +3643,17 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/evperr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/
  # define EVP_F_UPDATE                                     173
  
  /*
-@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
+@@ -179,6 +184,7 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
  # define EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED                     177
  # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE   150
  # define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED                   151
 +# define EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE                        187
+ # define EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW                      184
  # define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING                      162
  # define EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR                               181
- # define EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED 179
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdferr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdferr.h
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdferr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdferr.h
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdferr.h.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdferr.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdferr.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdferr.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.379698640 +0100
 @@ -23,6 +23,23 @@ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void);
  /*
   * KDF function codes.
@@ -3693,9 +3693,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdferr.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/
 +# define KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE                   112
  
  #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdf.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdf.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdf.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdf.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdf.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdf.h.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdf.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.380698623 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/kdf.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -10,10 +10,50 @@
  #ifndef HEADER_KDF_H
  # define HEADER_KDF_H
@@ -3774,9 +3774,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/kdf.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/ope
  }
  # endif
  #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h	2020-03-19 16:04:32.381698606 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ typedef struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st E
  typedef struct evp_pkey_method_st EVP_PKEY_METHOD;
  typedef struct evp_pkey_ctx_st EVP_PKEY_CTX;
@@ -3786,9 +3786,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/includ
  typedef struct evp_Encode_Ctx_st EVP_ENCODE_CTX;
  
  typedef struct hmac_ctx_st HMAC_CTX;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info	2020-03-19 16:04:32.381698606 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info	2021-03-03 14:08:02.493294865 +0100
 @@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /I
            ssl_test_ctx_test ssl_test x509aux cipherlist_test asynciotest \
            bio_callback_test bio_memleak_test \
@@ -3810,9 +3810,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/build.info
    SOURCE[x509_time_test]=x509_time_test.c
    INCLUDE[x509_time_test]=../include
    DEPEND[x509_time_test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_test.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_kdf_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.382698588 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_test.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.382698588 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_kdf_test.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -4051,9 +4051,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_kdf_
 +#endif
 +    return 1;
 +}
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_test.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.383698571 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/evp_test.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -1705,13 +1705,14 @@ static const EVP_TEST_METHOD encode_test
      encode_test_run,
  };
@@ -4265,9 +4265,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/evp_test.c
      &keypair_test_method,
      &keygen_test_method,
      &mac_test_method,
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c	2020-03-19 16:04:32.386698519 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
  /*
 - * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -4471,9 +4471,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/pk
  }
  #endif
  
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt	2020-03-19 16:04:32.388698484 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
  #
 -# Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -4872,9 +4872,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf.txt.evp-kdf openssl
 +Ctrl.digest = digest:sha512
 +Output = 00ef42cdbfc98d29db20976608e455567fdddf14
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.389698467 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt	2020-03-19 16:04:32.389698467 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
 +#
 +# Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -5181,9 +5181,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_kdf.txt.evp-kdf op
 +Ctrl.p = p:1
 +Result = INTERNAL_ERROR
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:32.390698450 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t	2020-03-19 16:04:32.390698450 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t	2021-03-03 14:08:02.494294874 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env perl
 +# Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -5198,9 +5198,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp_kdf.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/te
 +use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
 +
 +simple_test("test_evp_kdf", "evp_kdf_test");
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
---- openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2020-03-19 16:04:32.390698450 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2021-03-03 14:08:02.495294883 +0100
 @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file/
  setup("test_evp");
  
@@ -5210,10 +5210,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/test/r
      "evpcase.txt", "evpccmcavs.txt" );
  
  plan tests => scalar(@files);
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto.num.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto.num
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num
---- openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto.num.evp-kdf	2020-03-19 16:04:11.263064140 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num.evp-kdf	2021-03-03 14:08:02.481294758 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto.num	2020-03-19 16:04:32.392698415 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num	2021-03-03 14:08:02.495294883 +0100
-@@ -4622,3 +4622,11 @@ FIPS_drbg_get_strength
+@@ -4626,3 +4626,11 @@ FIPS_drbg_get_strength
  FIPS_rand_strength                      6380	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
  FIPS_drbg_get_blocklength               6381	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
  FIPS_drbg_init                          6382	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -5225,9 +5225,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto.num.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/util/libcrypto
 +EVP_KDF_ctrl_str                        6595	1_1_1b	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +EVP_KDF_size                            6596	1_1_1b	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +EVP_KDF_derive                          6597	1_1_1b	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/util/private.num.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1e/util/private.num
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/util/private.num.evp-kdf openssl-1.1.1j/util/private.num
---- openssl-1.1.1e/util/private.num.evp-kdf	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/util/private.num.evp-kdf	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/util/private.num	2020-03-19 16:04:32.393698398 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/util/private.num	2021-03-03 14:08:02.495294883 +0100
 @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ CRYPTO_EX_dup
  CRYPTO_EX_free                          datatype
  CRYPTO_EX_new                           datatype

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-explicit-params.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.304312344 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ struct ec_parameters_st {
-     ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor;
- } /* ECPARAMETERS */ ;
- 
-+typedef enum {
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED = 0,
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT,
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT
-+} ecpk_parameters_type_t;
-+
- struct ecpk_parameters_st {
-     int type;
-     union {
-@@ -535,9 +541,10 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparamet
-             return NULL;
-         }
-     } else {
--        if (ret->type == 0)
-+        if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED)
-             ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve);
--        else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters)
-+        else if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT
-+                 && ret->value.parameters != NULL)
-             ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters);
-     }
- 
-@@ -547,7 +554,7 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparamet
-          */
-         tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
-         if (tmp) {
--            ret->type = 0;
-+            ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED;
-             if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
-                 ok = 0;
-         } else
-@@ -555,7 +562,7 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparamet
-             ok = 0;
-     } else {
-         /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
--        ret->type = 1;
-+        ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT;
-         if ((ret->value.parameters =
-              EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL)
-             ok = 0;
-@@ -894,7 +901,8 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparamete
-         return NULL;
-     }
- 
--    if (params->type == 0) {    /* the curve is given by an OID */
-+    if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED) {
-+        /* the curve is given by an OID */
-         tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
-         if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
-             ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS,
-@@ -902,15 +910,16 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparamete
-             return NULL;
-         }
-         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
--    } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
--                                     * ECPARAMETERS structure */
-+    } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) {
-+        /* the parameters are given by an ECPARAMETERS structure */
-         ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters);
-         if (!ret) {
-             ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-             return NULL;
-         }
-         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
--    } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
-+    } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT) {
-+        /* implicit parameters inherited from CA - unsupported */
-         return NULL;
-     } else {
-         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
-@@ -940,6 +949,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **
-         return NULL;
-     }
- 
-+    if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
-+        group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
-+
-     if (a) {
-         EC_GROUP_free(*a);
-         *a = group;
-@@ -991,6 +1003,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
-     if (priv_key->parameters) {
-         EC_GROUP_free(ret->group);
-         ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters);
-+        if (ret->group != NULL
-+            && priv_key->parameters->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
-+            ret->group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
-     }
- 
-     if (ret->group == NULL) {
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.296312275 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.304312344 +0200
-@@ -566,6 +566,13 @@ void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int
-     key->flags &= ~flags;
- }
- 
-+int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key)
-+{
-+    if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+    return key->group->decoded_from_explicit_params;
-+}
-+
- size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
-                         unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.304312344 +0200
-@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const
- 
-     dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
-     dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;
-+    dest->decoded_from_explicit_params = src->decoded_from_explicit_params;
- 
-     if (src->seed) {
-         OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_local.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.281312147 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_local.h	2020-10-23 15:27:31.304312344 +0200
-@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ struct ec_group_st {
-     BIGNUM *order, *cofactor;
-     int curve_name;             /* optional NID for named curve */
-     int asn1_flag;              /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */
-+    int decoded_from_explicit_params; /* set if decoded from explicit
-+                                       * curve parameters encoding */
-     point_conversion_form_t asn1_form;
-     unsigned char *seed;        /* optional seed for parameters (appears in
-                                  * ASN1) */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_strin
-         return "OCSP verification failed";
-     case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
-         return "OCSP unknown cert";
-+    case X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS:
-+        return "Certificate public key has explicit ECC parameters";
- 
-     default:
-         /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.252311900 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer,
- static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
- static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
- static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
-+static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
- 
- static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-                          unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
-@@ -508,6 +509,14 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_S
-                 ret = 1;
-             break;
-         }
-+        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
-+            /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
-+            ret = check_curve(x);
-+            if (ret < 0)
-+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-+            else if (ret == 0)
-+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
-+        }
-         if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
-             && x->ex_pathlen != -1
-             && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
-@@ -3259,6 +3268,32 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CT
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
-+ * for an elliptic curve.
-+ *
-+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
-+ */
-+static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
-+{
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
-+
-+    /* Unsupported or malformed key */
-+    if (pkey == NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-+        int ret;
-+
-+        ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
-+        return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
-  * level of ``ctx``.  Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
-  * self-signed or otherwise).
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ EC_KEY_get0_engine,
- EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key,
- EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key,
- EC_KEY_get_conv_form,
--EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag, EC_KEY_precompute_mult,
-+EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag,
-+EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params, EC_KEY_precompute_mult,
- EC_KEY_generate_key, EC_KEY_check_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates,
- EC_KEY_oct2key, EC_KEY_key2buf, EC_KEY_oct2priv, EC_KEY_priv2oct,
- EC_KEY_priv2buf - Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating
-@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ EC_KEY objects
-  point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
-  void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
-  void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
-+ int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key);
-  int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx);
-  int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key);
-  int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key);
-@@ -118,6 +120,10 @@ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag() sets the asn1_fla
- (if set). Refer to L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)> for further information on the
- asn1_flag.
- 
-+EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params() returns 1 if the group of the I<key> was
-+decoded from data with explicitly encoded group parameters, -1 if the I<key>
-+is NULL or the group parameters are missing, and 0 otherwise.
-+
- EC_KEY_precompute_mult() stores multiples of the underlying EC_GROUP generator
- for faster point multiplication. See also L<EC_POINT_add(3)>.
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ec.h.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ec.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ec.h.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ec.h	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -829,6 +829,8 @@ void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int f
- 
- void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
- 
-+int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key);
-+
- /** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying
-  *  EC_GROUP object.
-  *  \param  nid  NID of the named curve.
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
- # define         X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED                   73  /* Need OCSP verification */
- # define         X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED                   74  /* Couldn't verify cert through OCSP */
- # define         X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN                    75  /* Certificate wasn't recognized by the OCSP responder */
-+# define         X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS               79
- 
- /* Certificate verify flags */
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.249311874 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t
- static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
-     {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
-     {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
-+    {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
-     {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
-     {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
-     {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.305312352 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIIDGDCCAgCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
-+IENBMCAXDTIwMDkxNTEzMDY0MVoYDzIxMjAwOTE2MTMwNjQxWjANMQswCQYDVQQD
-+DAJDQTCCAUswggEDBgcqhkjOPQIBMIH3AgEBMCwGByqGSM49AQECIQD/////AAAA
-+AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAP///////////////zBbBCD/////AAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-+AP///////////////AQgWsY12Ko6k+ez671VdpiGvGUdBrDMU7D2O848PifSYEsD
-+FQDEnTYIhucEk2pmeOETnSa3gZ9+kARBBGsX0fLhLEJH+Lzm5WOkQPJ3A32BLesz
-+oPShOUXYmMKWT+NC4v4af5uO5+tKfA+eFivOM1drMV7Oy7ZAaDe/UfUCIQD/////
-+AAAAAP//////////vOb6racXnoTzucrC/GMlUQIBAQNCAASlXna3kSD/Yol3RA5I
-+icjIxYb9UJoCTzb/LsxjlOvIS5OqCTzpqP0p3JrnvLPsbzq7Cf/g0bNlxAGs1iVM
-+5NDco1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFk6ucH6gMXeadmuV7a1iWEnU/CIwHwYDVR0jBBgw
-+FoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG
-+9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAdyUgfT0eAsZzoHFXoWN5uqi0MHuhLI37TEzkH5h7iTpDQJTQ
-+F0SjbawfM/nxxUekRW3mjFu3lft+VA7yC0OTNBLffan/vTh+HGOvvYZSMJYgKrMG
-+PRWgDId+n9RTcQCf+91cISvOazHixRiJG7JfRLdNZsAE+miw4HgPLFboTwpxtTDJ
-+zJ4ssBC6P+5IHwBCtNMiilJMMMzuSaZa5iSo6M9AdXWfcQN3uhW1lgQOLOlKLcbo
-+3UhW1GMMhTTeytM5aylbKhRsnL7ozmS44zsKZ25YaQxgjdKitFjVN6j7eyQ7C9J2
-+bLXgl3APweLQbGGs0zv08Ad0SCCKYLHK6mMJqg==
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIICJDCCAQygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
-+IENBMCAXDTIwMDkxNTEzMDY1MFoYDzIxMjAwOTE2MTMwNjUwWjANMQswCQYDVQQD
-+DAJDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABPt+MXCi9+wztEvmdG2EVSk7
-+bAiJMXJXW/u0NbcGCrrbhO1NJSHHV3Lks888sqeSPh/bif/ASJ0HX+VarMUoFIKj
-+UzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRjigU5REz8Lwf1iD6mALVhsHIanjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSO
-+9SWvHptrhD18gJrJU5xNcvejUjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
-+CwUAA4IBAQCQs9wpblefb2C9a7usGL1DJjWJQIFHtUf+6p/KPgEV7LF138ECjL5s
-+0AWRd8Q8SbsBH49j2r3LLLMkvFglyRaN+FF+TCC/UQtclTb4+HgLsUT2xSU8U2cY
-+SOnzNB5AX/qAAsdOGqOjivPtGXcXFexDKPsw3n+3rJgymBP6hbLagb47IabNhot5
-+bMM6S+bmfpMwfsm885zr5vG2Gg9FjjH94Vx4I7eRLkjCS88gkIR1J35ecHFteOdo
-+idOaCHQddYiKukBzgdjtTxSDXKffkaybylrwOZ8VBlQd3zC7s02d+riHCnroLnnE
-+cwYLlJ5z6jN7zoPZ55yX/EmA0RVny2le
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-+MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
-+AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-+///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
-+AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEEaxfR8uEsQkf4vOblY6RA8ncDfYEt6zOg
-+9KE5RdiYwpZP40Li/hp/m47n60p8D54WK84zV2sxXs7LtkBoN79R9QIhAP////8A
-+AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgdEf20fpuqEZU
-+tZ4ORoq4vb5ETV4a6QOl/iGnDQt++/ihRANCAASlXna3kSD/Yol3RA5IicjIxYb9
-+UJoCTzb/LsxjlOvIS5OqCTzpqP0p3JrnvLPsbzq7Cf/g0bNlxAGs1iVM5NDc
-+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
-+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgCTrYrMKcyV49+w4B
-+TWr2WTZsMM4aFpaYulKAuhiuQ7mhRANCAAT7fjFwovfsM7RL5nRthFUpO2wIiTFy
-+V1v7tDW3Bgq624TtTSUhx1dy5LPPPLKnkj4f24n/wEidB1/lWqzFKBSC
-+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIIChzCCAi6gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y
-+MDA5MTUxMzE0MzlaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjEzMTQzOVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy
-+LmV4YW1wbGUwggFLMIIBAwYHKoZIzj0CATCB9wIBATAsBgcqhkjOPQEBAiEA////
-+/wAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD///////////////8wWwQg/////wAAAAEAAAAAAAAA
-+AAAAAAD///////////////wEIFrGNdiqOpPns+u9VXaYhrxlHQawzFOw9jvOPD4n
-+0mBLAxUAxJ02CIbnBJNqZnjhE50mt4GffpAEQQRrF9Hy4SxCR/i85uVjpEDydwN9
-+gS3rM6D0oTlF2JjClk/jQuL+Gn+bjufrSnwPnhYrzjNXazFezsu2QGg3v1H1AiEA
-+/////wAAAAD//////////7zm+q2nF56E87nKwvxjJVECAQEDQgAE+7TDP7C9VqQP
-+TnqoJc/Fvf/N45BX+lBfmfiGBeRKtSsvrERUlymzQ4/nxVtymozAgFxQ0my998HH
-+TSVCj7Sq56N9MHswHQYDVR0OBBYEFKKwEfKYhNv6fbQf0Xd0te7J3GZdMB8GA1Ud
-+IwQYMBaAFGOKBTlETPwvB/WIPqYAtWGwchqeMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww
-+CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwCgYIKoZIzj0E
-+AwIDRwAwRAIgb4UITAOFlATeaayWQX9r5gf61qcnzT7TjXCekf7ww9oCIBDltg/u
-+ZvS9gqviMFuPjTuk/FhsCTAUzTT7WmgcWeH7
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIIBlDCCATqgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y
-+MDA5MTUxMzE0NDVaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjEzMTQ0NVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy
-+LmV4YW1wbGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQv5PnMStW/Wx9lpvjl
-+JTsFIjc2wBv14sNuMh1hfNX8ZJcoCfAAKYu6ujxXt328GWBMaubRbBjOd/eqpEst
-+tYKzo30wezAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUmb/qcE413hkpmtjEMyRZZFcN1TYwHwYDVR0jBBgw
-+FoAUFk6ucH6gMXeadmuV7a1iWEnU/CIwCQYDVR0TBAIwADATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggr
-+BgEFBQcDATAZBgNVHREEEjAQgg5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNI
-+ADBFAiEA9y6J8rdAbO0mDZscIb8rIn6HgxBW4WAqTlFeZeHjjOYCIAmt2ldyObOL
-+tXaiaxYX3WAOR1vmfzsdrkCAOCfAkpbo
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIIBkzCCATqgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y
-+MDA5MTUxNDEwNDhaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjE0MTA0OFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy
-+LmV4YW1wbGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAS0YU57+RFRWxr/frnL
-++vOYkY3h9roKnvxCG07wK5tevEYtSdKz0KsHvDBDatw1r3JNv+m2p54/3AqFPAZ3
-+5b0Po30wezAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUypypuZrUl0BEmbuhfJpo3QFNIvUwHwYDVR0jBBgw
-+FoAUY4oFOURM/C8H9Yg+pgC1YbByGp4wCQYDVR0TBAIwADATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggr
-+BgEFBQcDATAZBgNVHREEEjAQgg5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNH
-+ADBEAiAEkKD7H5uxQ4YbQOiN4evbu5RCV5W7TVE80iBfcY5u4wIgGcwr++lVNX0Q
-+CTT+M3ukDjOA8OEvKUz1TiDuRAQ29qU=
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-+MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
-+AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-+///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
-+AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEEaxfR8uEsQkf4vOblY6RA8ncDfYEt6zOg
-+9KE5RdiYwpZP40Li/hp/m47n60p8D54WK84zV2sxXs7LtkBoN79R9QIhAP////8A
-+AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQg0cmpcTcEYG5G
-+ZaVkGjtsBc3sLZn1EuV9qNK2qx6iNzmhRANCAAT7tMM/sL1WpA9Oeqglz8W9/83j
-+kFf6UF+Z+IYF5Eq1Ky+sRFSXKbNDj+fFW3KajMCAXFDSbL33wcdNJUKPtKrn
-+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
-+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQg2ue+X5ZFJPJPQG2E
-+WQY4ALv2PkPp2Gy6KrMiokgmjkehRANCAAQv5PnMStW/Wx9lpvjlJTsFIjc2wBv1
-+4sNuMh1hfNX8ZJcoCfAAKYu6ujxXt328GWBMaubRbBjOd/eqpEsttYKz
-+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
-+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-+MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgGSoneIKG3//ujXGu
-+/EoJdNhpKZj026EF/YQ5FblUBWahRANCAAS0YU57+RFRWxr/frnL+vOYkY3h9roK
-+nvxCG07wK5tevEYtSdKz0KsHvDBDatw1r3JNv+m2p54/3AqFPAZ35b0P
-+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/setup.sh.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/setup.sh
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/setup.sh.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/certs/setup.sh	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ openssl x509 -in ca-cert-md5.pem -trusto
- # CA has 768-bit key
- OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
- ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 root-key root-cert
-+# EC cert with explicit curve
-+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-ec-explicit ca-cert-ec-explicit root-key root-cert
-+# EC cert with named curve
-+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named root-key root-cert
- 
- # client intermediate ca: cca-cert
- # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth
-@@ -184,6 +188,14 @@ OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
- # 768-bit leaf key
- OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
- ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-768 ee-cert-768 ca-key ca-cert
-+# EC cert with explicit curve signed by named curve ca
-+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-explicit ee-cert-ec-explicit ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named
-+# EC cert with named curve signed by explicit curve ca
-+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-named-explicit \
-+    ee-cert-ec-named-explicit ca-key-ec-explicit ca-cert-ec-explicit
-+# EC cert with named curve signed by named curve ca
-+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-named-named \
-+    ee-cert-ec-named-named ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named
- 
- # Proxy certificates, off of ee-client
- # Start with some good ones
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/ec_internal_test.c.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/ec_internal_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/ec_internal_test.c.explicit-params	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/ec_internal_test.c	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -183,6 +183,106 @@ static int field_tests_default(int n)
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Tests behavior of the decoded_from_explicit_params flag and API
-+ */
-+static int decoded_flag_test(void)
-+{
-+    EC_GROUP *grp;
-+    EC_GROUP *grp_copy = NULL;
-+    ECPARAMETERS *ecparams = NULL;
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS *ecpkparams = NULL;
-+    EC_KEY *key = NULL;
-+    unsigned char *encodedparams = NULL;
-+    const unsigned char *encp;
-+    int encodedlen;
-+    int testresult = 0;
-+
-+    /* Test EC_GROUP_new not setting the flag */
-+    grp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_simple_method());
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(grp)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0))
-+        goto err;
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp);
-+
-+    /* Test EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name not setting the flag */
-+    grp = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(grp)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    /* Test EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters not setting the flag */
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(ecparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(grp, NULL))
-+        || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(ecparams))
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0))
-+        goto err;
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy);
-+    grp_copy = NULL;
-+    ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparams);
-+    ecparams = NULL;
-+
-+    /* Test EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters not setting the flag */
-+    if (!TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp), OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(ecpkparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(grp, NULL))
-+        || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(ecpkparams))
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new())
-+    /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params on key without a group */
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), -1)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_set_group(key, grp_copy), 1)
-+    /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params negative case */
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), 0))
-+        goto err;
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy);
-+    grp_copy = NULL;
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ecpkparams);
-+    ecpkparams = NULL;
-+
-+    /* Test d2i_ECPKParameters with named params not setting the flag */
-+    if (!TEST_int_gt(encodedlen = i2d_ECPKParameters(grp, &encodedparams), 0)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(encp = encodedparams)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &encp, encodedlen))
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0))
-+        goto err;
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy);
-+    grp_copy = NULL;
-+    OPENSSL_free(encodedparams);
-+    encodedparams = NULL;
-+
-+    /* Asn1 flag stays set to explicit with EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters */
-+    EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(grp, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(ecpkparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(grp, NULL))
-+        || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(ecpkparams))
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp_copy), OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0))
-+        goto err;
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy);
-+    grp_copy = NULL;
-+
-+    /* Test d2i_ECPKParameters with explicit params setting the flag */
-+    if (!TEST_int_gt(encodedlen = i2d_ECPKParameters(grp, &encodedparams), 0)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(encp = encodedparams)
-+        || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &encp, encodedlen))
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp_copy), OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 1)
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_set_group(key, grp_copy), 1)
-+    /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params positive case */
-+        || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), 1))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    testresult = 1;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EC_KEY_free(key);
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp);
-+    EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy);
-+    ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparams);
-+    ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ecpkparams);
-+    OPENSSL_free(encodedparams);
-+
-+    return testresult;
-+}
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
-     crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
-@@ -196,6 +296,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
-     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
- #endif
-     ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);
-+    ADD_TEST(decoded_flag_test);
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.253311908 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t	2020-10-23 15:27:31.306312361 +0200
-@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sub verify {
-     run(app([@args]));
- }
- 
--plan tests => 137;
-+plan tests => 142;
- 
- # Canonical success
- ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
-@@ -280,6 +280,27 @@ ok(verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["
- ok(!verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
-    "reject md5 leaf at auth level 1");
- 
-+# Explicit vs named curve tests
-+SKIP: {
-+    skip "EC is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5
-+        if disabled("ec");
-+    ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
-+               ["ca-cert-ec-named"]),
-+        "accept explicit curve leaf with named curve intermediate without strict");
-+    ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-named-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
-+               ["ca-cert-ec-explicit"]),
-+        "accept named curve leaf with explicit curve intermediate without strict");
-+    ok(!verify("ee-cert-ec-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
-+               ["ca-cert-ec-named"], "-x509_strict"),
-+        "reject explicit curve leaf with named curve intermediate with strict");
-+    ok(!verify("ee-cert-ec-named-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
-+               ["ca-cert-ec-explicit"], "-x509_strict"),
-+        "reject named curve leaf with explicit curve intermediate with strict");
-+    ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-named-named", "sslserver", ["root-cert"],
-+              ["ca-cert-ec-named"], "-x509_strict"),
-+        "accept named curve leaf with named curve intermediate with strict");
-+}
-+
- # Depth tests, note the depth limit bounds the number of CA certificates
- # between the trust-anchor and the leaf, so, for example, with a root->ca->leaf
- # chain, depth = 1 is sufficient, but depth == 0 is not.
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/util/libcrypto.num.explicit-params openssl-1.1.1g/util/libcrypto.num
---- openssl-1.1.1g/util/libcrypto.num.explicit-params	2020-10-23 15:27:31.265312011 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/util/libcrypto.num	2020-10-23 15:31:37.424413877 +0200
-@@ -4587,6 +4587,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_meth_set_digestverify
- EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestverify          4541	1_1_1e	EXIST::FUNCTION:
- EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestsign            4542	1_1_1e	EXIST::FUNCTION:
- RSA_get0_pss_params                     4543	1_1_1e	EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
-+EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params     4547	1_1_1h	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
- FIPS_drbg_reseed                        6348	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
- FIPS_selftest_check                     6349	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:
- FIPS_rand_set_method                    6350	1_1_0g	EXIST::FUNCTION:

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-dh.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_const.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_const.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_const.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.245788441 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_const.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.403092418 +0100
 @@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
  /*
 - * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -477,9 +477,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn
 -    return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_8192, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_8192), bn);
 +    return COPY_BN(bn, _bignum_modp_8192_p);
  }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.404092427 +0100
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /*
 - * Copyright 2014-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1956,9 +1956,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/bn/bn_dh
  
 -#endif
 +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.404092427 +0100
 @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
@@ -2043,9 +2043,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh
 +    return dh_check_pub_key_int(dh, q, pub_key, ret);
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.182787923 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.338091859 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.404092427 +0100
 @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, i
                                BN_GENCB *cb)
  {
@@ -2075,10 +2075,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_g
      ctx = BN_CTX_new();
      if (ctx == NULL)
          goto err;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.182787923 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.338091859 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c	2020-07-17 11:00:07.783777846 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c	2021-03-03 14:51:36.235296236 +0100
-@@ -100,10 +100,18 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+@@ -120,10 +120,18 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
      BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
  
  #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
@@ -2101,7 +2101,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_k
      }
  #endif
  
-@@ -139,7 +147,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+@@ -159,7 +167,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
      }
  
      if (generate_new_key) {
@@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_k
              do {
                  if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q))
                      goto err;
-@@ -175,6 +191,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+@@ -195,6 +211,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
          }
          /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */
          BN_clear_free(prk);
@@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_k
      }
  
      dh->pub_key = pub_key;
-@@ -197,6 +222,7 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
+@@ -217,6 +242,7 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
      BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
      BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
      BIGNUM *tmp;
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_k
      int ret = -1;
      int check_result;
  
-@@ -243,6 +269,18 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
+@@ -263,6 +289,18 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
          DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
          goto err;
      }
@@ -2159,11 +2159,11 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_k
 +        goto err;
 +    }
  
-     ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key);
+     ret = BN_bn2binpad(tmp, key, BN_num_bytes(dh->p));
   err:
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.405092436 +0100
 @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
   */
  
@@ -2193,9 +2193,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_l
          dh->length = BN_num_bits(q);
      }
  
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_local.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_local.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_local.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_local.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_local.h.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:28.968786163 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_local.h.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.202090689 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_local.h	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_local.h	2021-03-03 14:23:27.405092436 +0100
 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct dh_st {
      const DH_METHOD *meth;
      ENGINE *engine;
@@ -2215,9 +2215,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_local.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh
 +/* FIPS mode only check which requires nid set and looks up q based on it. */
 +int dh_check_pub_key_full(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret);
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.246788449 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.405092436 +0100
 @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
   * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   */
@@ -2387,10 +2387,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc7919.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/dh/
 +    return dh_match_group(dh, q, NULL) != NID_undef;
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh	2020-07-17 11:00:53.958175227 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.339091868 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2020-07-20 13:24:03.941107320 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.405092436 +0100
-@@ -280,9 +280,18 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *e
+@@ -281,9 +281,18 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *e
      if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
          goto err;
  
@@ -2410,7 +2410,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_k
      ok = 1;
  
   err:
-@@ -296,8 +305,23 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *e
+@@ -297,8 +306,23 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *e
  
  int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
  {
@@ -2435,9 +2435,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_k
  }
  
  int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.247788458 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/p_lib.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.405092436 +0100
 @@ -540,7 +540,8 @@ EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *p
  
  int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
@@ -2448,251 +2448,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/p_l
      int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, type, key);
  
      if (ret)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c.fips-dh	2020-09-17 14:38:55.074927727 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.394092341 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c	2020-10-22 16:06:54.406229842 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
-@@ -59,107 +59,141 @@
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- 
--static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_p[] = {
--    0xAE, 0xEC, 0xEE, 0x22, 0xFA, 0x3A, 0xA5, 0x22, 0xC0, 0xDE, 0x0F, 0x09,
--    0x7E, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x05, 0xF9, 0xF1, 0xE7, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x14, 0x6D, 0x11,
--    0xE7, 0xAE, 0xED, 0x2F, 0x72, 0x59, 0xC5, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0x02, 0xA5,
--    0xF3, 0x69, 0x70, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0x90, 0xF9, 0x19, 0x79, 0xBE, 0x60, 0x8F,
--    0x25, 0x92, 0x30, 0x1C, 0x51, 0x51, 0x38, 0x26, 0x82, 0x25, 0xE6, 0xFC,
--    0xED, 0x65, 0x96, 0x8F, 0x57, 0xE5, 0x53, 0x8B, 0x38, 0x63, 0xC7, 0xCE,
--    0xBC, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x04, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x3C, 0x94, 0x39,
--    0xAE, 0x36, 0xD6, 0x5E, 0x0F, 0xA2, 0xCC, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xC6, 0x1E,
--    0xF6, 0xA0, 0xF5, 0x89, 0x4E, 0xB4, 0x0B, 0xA4, 0xB3, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xE2,
--    0x4E, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x25, 0x99, 0x5F, 0x32, 0x16, 0x33, 0x32, 0x1B, 0x7A,
--    0xA5, 0x5C, 0x6B, 0x34, 0x0D, 0x39, 0x99, 0xDC, 0xF0, 0x76, 0xE5, 0x5A,
--    0xD4, 0x71, 0x00, 0xED, 0x5A, 0x73, 0xFB, 0xC8, 0x01, 0xAD, 0x99, 0xCF,
--    0x99, 0x52, 0x7C, 0x9C, 0x64, 0xC6, 0x76, 0x40, 0x57, 0xAF, 0x59, 0xD7,
--    0x38, 0x0B, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x76, 0xEC, 0xA9, 0xD8, 0x73,
--    0xF8, 0xEF, 0x26, 0x66, 0x06, 0x27, 0xDD, 0x7C, 0xA4, 0x10, 0x9C, 0xA6,
--    0xAA, 0xF9, 0x53, 0x62, 0x73, 0x1D, 0xBA, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x35,
--    0xED, 0x6F, 0x37, 0x92, 0xE8, 0x4F, 0x6C, 0xBA, 0x52, 0x6E, 0xA1, 0xED,
--    0xDA, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x11, 0x82, 0x52, 0x62, 0x08, 0x44, 0xF1, 0x30, 0x03,
--    0xC3, 0x38, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xBD, 0xD4, 0x43, 0x45, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x50, 0xFC,
--    0x29, 0x46, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x54, 0x1A, 0x19, 0x8F, 0x4B, 0x84, 0x08, 0xDE,
--    0x20, 0x62, 0x73, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0x7E, 0xF0, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x58,
--    0x4B, 0xD8, 0x37, 0xEB
-+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_priv_key[] = {
-+    0x0C, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x89, 0xD1, 0xB8, 0x62, 0xCB,
-+    0x3C, 0x43, 0x64, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x91, 0x54, 0x70,
-+    0xC5, 0x27, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xAC, 0xBE, 0xE8, 0x00,
-+    0xEC, 0x55, 0xF6, 0xCC
- };
- 
--static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_g[] = {
--    0x02
-+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_pub_key[] = {
-+    0xE8, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x36, 0x93, 0xB4, 0x94, 0x44,
-+    0xA3, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x5C, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x79, 0x4B,
-+    0x2B, 0xCA, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x16, 0x30, 0x4A, 0xD0,
-+    0xEA, 0x23, 0x04, 0x24, 0x8C, 0x50, 0x82, 0x11,
-+    0x79, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x6F, 0x96, 0xAC, 0xF9, 0x78,
-+    0x38, 0x83, 0x03, 0x0B, 0x77, 0x47, 0xB7, 0x84,
-+    0xB9, 0x6F, 0xE6, 0xB9, 0xCC, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0x94,
-+    0xAE, 0x8A, 0xCA, 0x58, 0x15, 0x7B, 0xA0, 0x73,
-+    0x5D, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0xC6, 0xBA, 0xA6, 0x03, 0x30,
-+    0x6B, 0x52, 0x85, 0x94, 0x57, 0x11, 0xFB, 0xAA,
-+    0x83, 0x71, 0x5E, 0x0E, 0xC4, 0x86, 0x89, 0xF8,
-+    0x38, 0x5A, 0xAE, 0x66, 0xF2, 0xA1, 0x67, 0xE0,
-+    0xF5, 0x7A, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x21, 0x98, 0xF0, 0x33,
-+    0xD6, 0xD7, 0x27, 0x82, 0xED, 0xDE, 0x73, 0x52,
-+    0xD4, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0xA1, 0xA0, 0x5A,
-+    0xCE, 0x05, 0x40, 0xE7, 0xF7, 0x0C, 0xE2, 0x63,
-+    0x21, 0xA0, 0xF3, 0x26, 0x9B, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x33,
-+    0x4D, 0x34, 0x9B, 0x8D, 0x86, 0x10, 0xB8, 0xE8,
-+    0x96, 0x84, 0x66, 0x49, 0x27, 0xED, 0x2B, 0x76,
-+    0x19, 0xF6, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x71, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0x16,
-+    0xB4, 0xD0, 0xC6, 0x49, 0x7A, 0x53, 0xDD, 0x53,
-+    0xA1, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0xB6, 0x33, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xCF,
-+    0x5A, 0x1E, 0x4D, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0x1F, 0x14, 0x9D,
-+    0xF0, 0x14, 0x70, 0x39, 0x50, 0x21, 0x8A, 0xEA,
-+    0x7C, 0x72, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x67, 0x5C, 0x1E, 0x32,
-+    0xA7, 0x5D, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0x03, 0x76,
-+    0x4A, 0xD4, 0x65, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x56, 0x25,
-+    0xE5, 0x78, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0x49, 0x8C, 0x14, 0x2E,
-+    0xF7, 0xFA, 0x70, 0x27, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x66, 0x8F,
-+    0xFA, 0xFC, 0xED, 0x15, 0x98, 0xE8, 0x0D, 0x72,
-+    0x17, 0x02, 0x67, 0x14, 0x55, 0x6C, 0x32, 0x98,
-+    0x59, 0xF3, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x55, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x69
- };
- 
--static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_pub_key[] = {
--    0xA0, 0x39, 0x11, 0x77, 0x9A, 0xC1, 0x30, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xAA,
--    0xA0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x64, 0xAD, 0x1B, 0x70, 0xFA, 0x13, 0x55, 0x63, 0xD2,
--    0x1F, 0x62, 0x32, 0x93, 0x8E, 0xC9, 0x3E, 0x09, 0xA7, 0x64, 0xE4, 0x12,
--    0x6E, 0x1B, 0xF2, 0x92, 0x3B, 0xB9, 0xCB, 0x56, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x88, 0xB5,
--    0xA6, 0xBC, 0x16, 0x1F, 0x27, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x40, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0x2D,
--    0x37, 0x76, 0xA6, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x2C, 0x0E, 0x22, 0x64, 0x9D, 0xCB, 0xD1,
--    0x00, 0xB7, 0x89, 0x14, 0x72, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0x48, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xB2, 0x51,
--    0x11, 0x09, 0x4B, 0x22, 0x01, 0x23, 0x39, 0x96, 0xE0, 0x15, 0xD7, 0x9F,
--    0x60, 0xD1, 0xB7, 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0xDB, 0xE7, 0x03, 0x17, 0x97, 0xA6,
--    0x16, 0x74, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x81, 0x19, 0xC5, 0x47, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0x8D, 0xED,
--    0x45, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x00, 0xA0, 0x0A, 0x68, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x8E, 0x06, 0x46,
--    0x6F, 0xD7, 0xF9, 0xDF, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x77, 0x44, 0x0D, 0x98, 0xE0, 0xCA,
--    0x98, 0x09, 0x52, 0x04, 0x90, 0xEA, 0x6D, 0xF4, 0x30, 0x69, 0x8F, 0xB1,
--    0x9B, 0xC1, 0x43, 0xDB, 0xD5, 0x8D, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB6, 0x0B, 0x05, 0xBE,
--    0x0E, 0xC5, 0x99, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x4E, 0xF3, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x5E, 0x9B, 0x53,
--    0xF7, 0x06, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x6E, 0x30, 0x18, 0xCA, 0x9B, 0xB9,
--    0xBC, 0x5F, 0x17, 0x72, 0x29, 0x5A, 0xE5, 0xD9, 0x96, 0xB7, 0x0B, 0xF3,
--    0x2D, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0xE1, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x74, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0xF0, 0x06, 0xA9,
--    0xB4, 0x95, 0x63, 0x76, 0x46, 0x55, 0x48, 0x82, 0x39, 0x90, 0xEF, 0x56,
--    0x75, 0x34, 0xB8, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x48, 0x7E,
--    0x93, 0x2C, 0x23, 0xE7, 0xF8, 0x90, 0x73, 0xB1, 0x77, 0x80, 0x67, 0xA9,
--    0x36, 0x9E, 0xDA, 0xD2
-+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_peer_key[] = {
-+    0xD3, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x02, 0x38, 0x0A,
-+    0x2E, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x62, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0xF2,
-+    0x54, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x90, 0x33, 0xD8, 0xF7, 0x93,
-+    0xAD, 0x5F, 0xDA, 0xE6, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x29, 0xE1,
-+    0x4B, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x3B, 0x4E, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x43,
-+    0xCD, 0xF7, 0xB9, 0x0F, 0x43, 0x68, 0xED, 0xF7,
-+    0xD1, 0xFD, 0x13, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39,
-+    0xB4, 0x5A, 0x12, 0x96, 0xC6, 0x85, 0xEC, 0x80,
-+    0xC0, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0xC6, 0x59, 0xC0, 0xAD, 0xB6,
-+    0xD8, 0x68, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x21, 0x09,
-+    0xC0, 0xDB, 0xD9, 0xBA, 0x63, 0xC0, 0x11, 0x22,
-+    0xBB, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x35, 0x5C, 0xE0, 0xCE, 0xBE,
-+    0xAB, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x44, 0xCA, 0x05, 0x07, 0xDF,
-+    0xAD, 0x1D, 0xAD, 0x12, 0x15, 0xD3, 0x9C, 0x8C,
-+    0x92, 0xD3, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0x7B, 0x30, 0x97,
-+    0x07, 0xC0, 0x7C, 0x58, 0xF8, 0x98, 0xAE, 0xB9,
-+    0xE8, 0x82, 0x56, 0x0A, 0xEC, 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xEC,
-+    0x85, 0xBA, 0xDF, 0xD7, 0xEA, 0x9D, 0x68, 0xAE,
-+    0x1A, 0x2C, 0xEC, 0x25, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x2B, 0xFE,
-+    0x6D, 0x49, 0xD7, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x5E, 0xC9, 0xA5,
-+    0x2C, 0xF2, 0xB5, 0x8A, 0x14, 0x91, 0x15, 0x6B,
-+    0x71, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x1F, 0xC8, 0x61, 0x46,
-+    0xF2, 0x0D, 0xCC, 0x10, 0xF7, 0x08, 0x9E, 0xBB,
-+    0x66, 0x0D, 0x0D, 0x6D, 0xE7, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x71,
-+    0xA4, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x63, 0xA5, 0xDC, 0xFA, 0xF1,
-+    0x04, 0xD8, 0xCF, 0x16, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0x73, 0xA2,
-+    0x3B, 0xF9, 0x0D, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x9A, 0x3A, 0x2B,
-+    0x0F, 0xB0, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x9D, 0xF1, 0xF0, 0x73,
-+    0x7C, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xEB, 0x34, 0xDD, 0x87,
-+    0xE6, 0x52, 0x79, 0xDD, 0x53, 0x9A, 0xCB, 0x62,
-+    0xE4, 0xF1, 0xB2, 0xCA, 0x6B, 0xD8, 0xC2, 0x69,
-+    0xBD, 0xA9, 0xB8, 0xE8, 0x76, 0x88, 0x91, 0x6D
- };
- 
--static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_priv_key[] = {
--    0x0C, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x89, 0xD1, 0xB8, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x3C, 0x43, 0x64, 0x91,
--    0xF0, 0x91, 0x54, 0x70, 0xC5, 0x27, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xAC, 0xBE, 0xE8, 0x00,
--    0xEC, 0x55, 0xF6, 0xCC
-+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_expected_key[] = {
-+    0xB1, 0x26, 0x63, 0xAD, 0xB9, 0x4D, 0x9A, 0x38,
-+    0x14, 0x25, 0x16, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0x18, 0x36, 0x10,
-+    0xF8, 0xB1, 0x2C, 0x22, 0x4F, 0xD6, 0xA6, 0x2B,
-+    0xEB, 0xDF, 0x39, 0xAA, 0x31, 0x8E, 0x44, 0x40,
-+    0x09, 0xB6, 0x55, 0x7C, 0x95, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x00,
-+    0x5B, 0xF8, 0x94, 0x1E, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x7A, 0x63,
-+    0x38, 0x12, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xDD, 0x58, 0x08, 0x8E,
-+    0x88, 0xF7, 0x82, 0xA5, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x24, 0x10,
-+    0x0E, 0x87, 0x2E, 0x9A, 0x3A, 0xF0, 0xDB, 0xA5,
-+    0x0E, 0x85, 0xAE, 0xFC, 0xD0, 0x35, 0x30, 0x79,
-+    0xFE, 0x84, 0x84, 0xF1, 0x15, 0x14, 0x9C, 0x84,
-+    0x72, 0xA6, 0xB3, 0x7C, 0xB7, 0xEF, 0x38, 0xF5,
-+    0x2C, 0x90, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x41, 0x85, 0x0A, 0xDE,
-+    0x1B, 0xD3, 0x7E, 0x93, 0xCB, 0x59, 0xE8, 0x7C,
-+    0xAB, 0x47, 0x3A, 0x02, 0x22, 0x4F, 0xAC, 0xAD,
-+    0xE9, 0x56, 0x32, 0xEB, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x9B, 0x1F,
-+    0x7C, 0x70, 0x0F, 0x83, 0xEF, 0x4D, 0x88, 0xE8,
-+    0x70, 0x91, 0x34, 0xDD, 0x1C, 0xEF, 0x56, 0x97,
-+    0xA3, 0x6E, 0xF6, 0x88, 0xAC, 0xF3, 0xA2, 0xBE,
-+    0x30, 0xBD, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0xCD, 0x01, 0x46, 0x5E,
-+    0x96, 0xC6, 0x14, 0x44, 0x60, 0xC0, 0x99, 0xFD,
-+    0xF0, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x7D, 0x29, 0xD6, 0x0D, 0xEE,
-+    0x10, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x55, 0x71, 0x29, 0xA7, 0x6A,
-+    0xEB, 0x18, 0x9B, 0x40, 0xF7, 0x37, 0x50, 0x91,
-+    0xBC, 0x16, 0x5D, 0x29, 0x24, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x73,
-+    0x0F, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0x0D, 0x00, 0xD4, 0x5F, 0x61,
-+    0x74, 0x73, 0x99, 0x14, 0x73, 0xC7, 0x35, 0x2A,
-+    0xC0, 0xBA, 0x38, 0x9E, 0x05, 0x09, 0x81, 0xA5,
-+    0xDE, 0x8E, 0xB5, 0xE0, 0x77, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x1A,
-+    0x47, 0xD2, 0x68, 0xD4, 0x3E, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA0,
-+    0x5C, 0xC7, 0xFB, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0x7B, 0xC6, 0x26,
-+    0x35, 0x92, 0x12, 0x88, 0x62, 0x36, 0x98, 0xFE
- };
- 
- int FIPS_selftest_dh()
- {
-     DH *dh = NULL;
-     int ret = 0;
--    void *pub_key_bin = NULL;
-+    unsigned char shared_key[sizeof(dh_test_2048_expected_key)];
-     int len;
--    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *priv_key = NULL, *tmp_pub_key = NULL;
--    const BIGNUM *pub_key;
-+    BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *peer_key = NULL;
- 
--    fips_load_key_component(p, dh_test_2048);
--    fips_load_key_component(g, dh_test_2048);
--    /* note that the private key is much shorter than normally used
--     * but still g ** priv_key > p
--     */
-     fips_load_key_component(priv_key, dh_test_2048);
--    if ((tmp_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
--        goto err;
--
--    dh = DH_new();
-+    fips_load_key_component(pub_key, dh_test_2048);
-+    fips_load_key_component(peer_key, dh_test_2048);
- 
--    if (dh == NULL)
-+    if ((dh = DH_new_by_nid(NID_ffdhe2048)) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
--    DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g);
--    DH_set0_key(dh, tmp_pub_key, priv_key);
-+    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key);
- 
--    if (DH_generate_key(dh) <= 0)
--        goto err;
--
--    DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
--
--    if (pub_key == NULL)
--        goto err;
-+    len = DH_compute_key(shared_key, peer_key, dh);
- 
--    len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
--    if ((pub_key_bin = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
--        goto err;
--    BN_bn2bin(pub_key, pub_key_bin);
--
--    if (len != sizeof(dh_test_2048_pub_key) ||
--        memcmp(pub_key_bin, dh_test_2048_pub_key, len) != 0)
-+    if (len != sizeof(dh_test_2048_expected_key) ||
-+        memcmp(shared_key, dh_test_2048_expected_key, len) != 0)
-         goto err;
- 
-     ret = 1;
-@@ -168,13 +202,10 @@ int FIPS_selftest_dh()
-     if (dh)
-         DH_free(dh);
-     else {
--        BN_free(p);
--        BN_free(g);
-         BN_free(priv_key);
--        BN_free(tmp_pub_key);
-+        BN_free(pub_key);
-     }
--
--    OPENSSL_free(pub_key_bin);
-+    BN_free(peer_key);
-     return ret;
- }
- #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.239788392 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h	2020-07-17 10:36:29.247788458 +0200
 @@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ static const unsigned char so[7762] = {
      0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0D,       /* [ 7753] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 */
  };
@@ -2754,9 +2512,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/o
       481,    /* "nSRecord" */
       173,    /* "name" */
       681,    /* "onBasis" */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/objects.txt.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/objects.txt
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/objects.txt.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/objects.txt
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/objects.txt.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.239788392 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/objects.txt.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.395092350 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/objects.txt	2020-07-17 10:36:29.247788458 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/objects.txt	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
 @@ -1657,6 +1657,13 @@ id-pkinit 5                     : pkInit
                              : ffdhe4096
                              : ffdhe6144
@@ -2771,9 +2529,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/objects.txt.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto
  
  # OIDs for DSTU-4145/DSTU-7564 (http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0423-17)
  
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.239788392 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.395092350 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
 @@ -1196,3 +1196,9 @@ sshkdf		1195
  kbkdf		1196
  krb5kdf		1197
@@ -2784,9 +2542,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/crypto
 +modp_4096		1202
 +modp_6144		1203
 +modp_8192		1204
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
 @@ -8,13 +8,15 @@ DH_new_by_nid, DH_get_nid - get or find
  
   #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -2805,9 +2563,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/DH_new_by_nid.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/doc/ma
  
  DH_get_nid() determines if the parameters contained in B<dh> match
  any named set. It returns the NID corresponding to the matching parameters or
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
 @@ -294,10 +294,11 @@ The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad() macro sets
  If B<pad> is zero (the default) then no padding is performed.
  
@@ -2824,9 +2582,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/do
  The nid parameter and the rfc5114 parameter are mutually exclusive.
  
  The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_rfc5114() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dhx_rfc5114() macros are
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/bn_dh.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/bn_dh.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/bn_dh.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/bn_dh.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/bn_dh.h.fips-dh	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/bn_dh.h.fips-dh	2021-02-16 16:24:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/bn_dh.h	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/crypto/bn_dh.h	2021-03-03 14:23:27.406092444 +0100
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /*
 - * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -2875,9 +2633,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/bn_dh.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/include/cr
 +extern const BIGNUM _bignum_modp_4096_q;
 +extern const BIGNUM _bignum_modp_6144_q;
 +extern const BIGNUM _bignum_modp_8192_q;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.240788400 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.396092358 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h	2021-03-03 14:23:27.407092453 +0100
 @@ -5115,6 +5115,24 @@
  #define SN_ffdhe8192            "ffdhe8192"
  #define NID_ffdhe8192           1130
@@ -2903,10 +2661,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/include
  #define SN_ISO_UA               "ISO-UA"
  #define NID_ISO_UA              1150
  #define OBJ_ISO_UA              OBJ_member_body,804L
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.199788063 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.354091997 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.248788466 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.407092453 +0100
-@@ -4858,13 +4858,51 @@ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey
+@@ -4849,13 +4849,51 @@ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey
  EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh)
  {
      EVP_PKEY *ret;
@@ -2958,91 +2716,15 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/s3_lib.c
      return ret;
  }
  #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-dh openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-dh	2020-07-17 10:36:29.243788425 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-dh	2021-03-03 14:23:27.401092401 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2020-07-17 10:36:29.249788474 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c	2021-03-03 14:23:27.407092453 +0100
-@@ -2511,46 +2511,48 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP
+@@ -2542,7 +2542,7 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+         p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
- DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+     else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
- {
+         p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
-+    DH *dhp = NULL;
+-    else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
-+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
-     int dh_secbits = 80;
--    if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
--        return DH_get_1024_160();
--    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
--        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
--            dh_secbits = 128;
--        else
--            dh_secbits = 80;
--    } else {
--        if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
--            return NULL;
--        dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
-+    if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
-+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
-+            if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
-+                dh_secbits = 128;
-+            else
-+                dh_secbits = 80;
-+        } else {
-+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
-+                return NULL;
-+            dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
-+        }
-     }
- 
--    if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
--        DH *dhp = DH_new();
--        BIGNUM *p, *g;
--        if (dhp == NULL)
--            return NULL;
--        g = BN_new();
--        if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
--            DH_free(dhp);
--            BN_free(g);
--            return NULL;
--        }
--        if (dh_secbits >= 192)
--            p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
--        else
--            p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
--        if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
--            DH_free(dhp);
--            BN_free(p);
--            BN_free(g);
--            return NULL;
--        }
--        return dhp;
-+    dhp = DH_new();
-+    if (dhp == NULL)
-+        return NULL;
-+    g = BN_new();
-+    if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
-+        DH_free(dhp);
-+        BN_free(g);
-+        return NULL;
-+    }
-+    if (dh_secbits >= 192)
-+        p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
-+    else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
-+        p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
-+    else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
-+        p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
 +    else if (dh_secbits >= 112 || FIPS_mode())
-+        p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
+         p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
-+    else
+     else
-+        p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
+         p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
-+    if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
-+        DH_free(dhp);
-+        BN_free(p);
-+        BN_free(g);
-+        return NULL;
-     }
--    if (dh_secbits >= 112)
--        return DH_get_2048_224();
--    return DH_get_1024_160();
-+    return dhp;
- }
- #endif
- 

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-post-rand.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand	2020-03-17 18:06:16.822418854 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-09 10:26:41.634106328 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c	2020-03-17 18:06:16.861418172 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c	2020-12-09 10:26:41.652106475 +0100
 @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  
  # include <openssl/fips.h>
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/
          ret = 1;
          goto end;
      }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c	2020-03-17 18:07:35.305045521 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c	2020-12-09 10:26:41.652106475 +0100
-@@ -1009,6 +1009,20 @@ size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg
+@@ -1005,6 +1005,20 @@ size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg
      return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
  }
  
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cry
  /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
  static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
  {
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
---- openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2020-03-17 18:09:01.503537189 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2020-12-09 10:36:59.531221903 +0100
 @@ -17,10 +17,12 @@
  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  #include "rand_local.h"
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
  # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
  #  include <sys/shm.h>
  #  include <sys/utsname.h>
-@@ -342,7 +344,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
+@@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
   * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
   * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
   */
@@ -100,15 +100,15 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
  {
      /*
       * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
-@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
+@@ -369,6 +371,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
-      * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
+      * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
-      * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
+      * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
       */
 +#  if 0
  #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
      extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
  
-@@ -385,10 +388,10 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
+@@ -394,10 +397,10 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
      if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
          return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
  #  endif
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
  #  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
      return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
  #  else
-@@ -623,6 +626,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
+@@ -633,6 +636,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
      size_t entropy_available;
  
  #   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
      {
          size_t bytes_needed;
          unsigned char *buffer;
-@@ -633,7 +639,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
+@@ -643,7 +649,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
          bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
          while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
              buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
              if (bytes > 0) {
                  rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
                  bytes_needed -= bytes;
-@@ -668,8 +674,10 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
+@@ -678,8 +684,10 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
              int attempts = 3;
              const int fd = get_random_device(i);
  
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
  
              while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
                  buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-@@ -732,7 +740,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
+@@ -742,7 +750,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
              return entropy_available;
      }
  #   endif
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/cr
      return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
  #  endif
  }
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/fips.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand	2020-03-17 18:06:16.831418696 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand	2020-12-09 10:26:41.639106369 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/fips.h	2020-03-17 18:06:16.861418172 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h	2020-12-09 10:26:41.657106516 +0100
 @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int FIPS_selftest_hmac(void);
  int FIPS_selftest_drbg(void);
  int FIPS_selftest_cmac(void);
@@ -176,9 +176,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/incl
  int fips_pkey_signature_test(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
                                   const unsigned char *tbs, int tbslen,
                                   const unsigned char *kat,
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/rand.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h
---- openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand	2020-03-17 15:31:17.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1e/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-03-17 18:07:35.303045555 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-12-09 10:26:41.657106516 +0100
 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
  typedef struct rand_pool_st RAND_POOL;
  

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+From d1d4b56fe0c9a4200276d630f62108e1165e0990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 10:53:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Backport openssl: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread from 3.2
+
+Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
+entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
+have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
+called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
+will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
+should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
+
+We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
+same for the server list while we are about it.
+
+CVE-2024-5535
+
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
+Merged from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717.
+
+Backported-by: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> 
+we did't ported test changes because rely on internal testing framework.
+
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 28 +++++++----
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c                           | 64 +++++++++++++++----------
+ ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c            | 30 +++++++++++-
+ ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c            |  3 +-
+ 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+index e90caec..a3f8dfd 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+                            const unsigned char *server,
+                            unsigned int server_len,
+                            const unsigned char *client,
+-                           unsigned int client_len)
++                           unsigned int client_len);
+  void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                              unsigned *len);
+ 
+@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
+ set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
+ protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
+-B<protos_len>.
++B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
++protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
+ server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
+@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
+ described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
+ matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
+ in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
+-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
+-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
+-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
++B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
++least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
++
++The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
++callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
++item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
++B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
++the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
++must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
++SSL_select_next_proto().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
+ client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
+@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
+ The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
+ server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
+ callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
+-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
+-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
++select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
++fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
++B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
++parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
+ when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
+ =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
+ 
+ No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
+-B<out>, B<outlen>.
++B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
++B<client> is invalid).
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index c71c686..21e6c45 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -2739,38 +2739,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                           unsigned int server_len,
+                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+-    unsigned int i, j;
+-    const unsigned char *result;
+-    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
++    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
++            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
++            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
++        *out = NULL;
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
++     * a match.
++     */
++    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
++    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
+ 
+     /*
+      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+      */
+-    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+-        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+-            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+-                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+-                /* We found a match */
+-                result = &server[i];
+-                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+-                goto found;
++    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
++       while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
++            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
++                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
++            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
++                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
++                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
++                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
++                        /* We found a match */
++                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
++                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
++                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
++                    }
++                }
++                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
++            } else {
++                /* This should never happen */
++                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+             }
+-            j += client[j];
+-            j++;
+         }
+-        i += server[i];
+-        i++;
++        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
+     }
+ 
+-    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+-    result = client;
+-    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+-
+- found:
+-    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+-    *outlen = result[0];
+-    return status;
+-}
++    /*
++     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
++     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
++     */
++    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++ } 
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+index ce8a757..cfde733 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+@@ -1585,8 +1585,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+     if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+                                   PACKET_data(pkt),
+                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+-                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
+-             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
++                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
++           || selected_len == 0) {           
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                         size_t chainidx)
+ {
+     size_t len;
++    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
++    int valid = 0;
+ 
+     /* We must have requested it. */
+     if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
+@@ -1637,6 +1639,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, 
++                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
++        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
++            continue;
++        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
++            /* Valid protocol found */
++            valid = 1;
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (!valid) {
++        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
++                 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+     s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+     if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+index 3c7395c..4e3cbf8 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+@@ -1559,9 +1559,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+         }
+         s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
++        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+     }
+ 
+-    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
++    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ignore-bound.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-Do not return failure when setting version bound on fixed protocol
-version method.
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.ignore-bound openssl-1.1.1-pre8/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.ignore-bound	2018-06-20 16:48:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c	2018-08-13 11:07:52.826304045 +0200
-@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_ver
-          * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
-          * versions.
-          */
--        return 0;
-+        return 1;
- 
-     case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
-         if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-read-buff.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c.read-buff	2021-11-11 15:38:39.678509348 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c	2021-11-11 15:40:59.647922530 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCA
+     }
+     chal = spki->spkac->challenge;
+     if (chal->length)
+-        BIO_printf(out, "  Challenge String: %s\n", chal->data);
++        BIO_printf(out, "  Challenge String: %.*s\n", chal->length, chal->data);
+     i = OBJ_obj2nid(spki->sig_algor.algorithm);
+     BIO_printf(out, "  Signature Algorithm: %s",
+                (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.read-buff	2021-11-11 15:36:43.782339219 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2021-11-11 15:37:43.064937758 +0100
+@@ -761,7 +761,10 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
+         ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
++    if (params->order == NULL
++            || params->base == NULL
++            || params->base->data == NULL
++            || params->base->length == 0) {
+         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+         goto err;
+     }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509/t_x509.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509/t_x509.c.read-buff	2021-11-12 12:54:15.665091764 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509/t_x509.c	2021-11-12 12:56:10.897782587 +0100
+@@ -365,9 +365,9 @@ int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, in
+         BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+     } else
+         BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
+-    alias = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL);
++    alias = X509_alias_get0(x, &i);
+     if (alias)
+-        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %s\n", indent, "", alias);
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", i, alias);
+     keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
+     if (keyid) {
+         BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c.read-buff	2021-11-12 12:40:51.415811428 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c	2021-11-12 12:50:06.062808372 +0100
+@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, S
+         qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i);
+         switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) {
+         case NID_id_qt_cps:
+-            BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "",
++            BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %.*s\n", indent, "",
++                       qualinfo->d.cpsuri->length,
+                        qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data);
+             break;
+ 
+@@ -447,7 +448,8 @@ static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERN
+     if (notice->noticeref) {
+         NOTICEREF *ref;
+         ref = notice->noticeref;
+-        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "",
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %.*s\n", indent, "",
++                   ref->organization->length,
+                    ref->organization->data);
+         BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "",
+                    sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : "");
+@@ -470,7 +472,8 @@ static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERN
+         BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+     }
+     if (notice->exptext)
+-        BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "",
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %.*s\n", indent, "",
++                   notice->exptext->length,
+                    notice->exptext->data);
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c.read-buff	2021-11-11 15:56:12.675140779 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c	2021-11-12 12:38:24.781856836 +0100
+@@ -63,8 +63,30 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+ 
++#define IA5_OFFSET_LEN(ia5base, offset) \
++    ((ia5base)->length - ((unsigned char *)(offset) - (ia5base)->data))
++
++/* Like memchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING. Additionally you can specify the
++ * starting point to search from
++ */
++# define ia5memchr(str, start, c) memchr(start, c, IA5_OFFSET_LEN(str, start))
++
++/* Like memrrchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING */
++static char *ia5memrchr(ASN1_IA5STRING *str, int c)
++{
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = str->length; i > 0 && str->data[i - 1] != c; i--);
++
++    if (i == 0)
++        return NULL;
++
++    return (char *)&str->data[i - 1];
++}
++
+ /*
+- * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules.
++ * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. It
++ * also doesn't work with ASN1_STRINGs that may have embedded NUL characters.
+  * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
+  * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
+  * numeric constants below).
+@@ -89,20 +111,12 @@ static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, c
+ 
+             /* c1 > c2 */
+             return 1;
+-        } else if (*s1 == 0) {
+-            /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */
+-            return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+-{
+-    return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, SIZE_MAX);
+-}
+-
+ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                                   X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+ {
+@@ -337,7 +351,7 @@ static int cn2dnsid(ASN1_STRING *cn, uns
+         --utf8_length;
+ 
+     /* Reject *embedded* NULs */
+-    if ((size_t)utf8_length != strlen((char *)utf8_value)) {
++    if (memchr(utf8_value, 0, utf8_length) != NULL) {
+         OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
+         return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+     }
+@@ -537,7 +551,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, A
+     char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+     char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
+     /* Empty matches everything */
+-    if (!*baseptr)
++    if (base->length == 0)
+         return X509_V_OK;
+     /*
+      * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
+@@ -549,7 +563,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, A
+             return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
++    if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr, base->length))
+         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ 
+     return X509_V_OK;
+@@ -560,16 +574,17 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml,
+ {
+     const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+     const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
++    const char *baseat = ia5memrchr(base, '@');
++    const char *emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@');
++    size_t basehostlen, emlhostlen;
+ 
+-    const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@');
+-    const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
+     if (!emlat)
+         return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+     /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
+-    if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
++    if (!baseat && base->length > 0 && (*baseptr == '.')) {
+         if (eml->length > base->length) {
+             emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
+-            if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0)
++            if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, base->length) == 0)
+                 return X509_V_OK;
+         }
+         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+@@ -589,8 +604,10 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml,
+         baseptr = baseat + 1;
+     }
+     emlptr = emlat + 1;
++    basehostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(base, baseptr);
++    emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr);
+     /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
+-    if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
++    if (basehostlen != emlhostlen || ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlhostlen))
+         return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ 
+     return X509_V_OK;
+@@ -601,10 +618,14 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, A
+ {
+     const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+     const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
+-    const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
++    const char *p = ia5memchr(uri, (char *)uri->data, ':');
+     int hostlen;
++
+     /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
+-    if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/'))
++    if (p == NULL
++            || IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, p) < 3
++            || p[1] != '/'
++            || p[2] != '/')
+         return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+     hostptr = p + 3;
+ 
+@@ -612,13 +633,13 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, A
+ 
+     /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
+ 
+-    p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
++    p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, ':');
+     /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
+-    if (!p)
+-        p = strchr(hostptr, '/');
++    if (p == NULL)
++        p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, '/');
+ 
+-    if (!p)
+-        hostlen = strlen(hostptr);
++    if (p == NULL)
++        hostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, hostptr);
+     else
+         hostlen = p - hostptr;
+ 
+@@ -626,7 +647,7 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, A
+         return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+ 
+     /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
+-    if (*baseptr == '.') {
++    if (base->length > 0 && *baseptr == '.') {
+         if (hostlen > base->length) {
+             p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
+             if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c.read-buff	2021-11-12 12:39:06.649337807 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c	2021-11-12 12:40:07.955201861 +0100
+@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *me
+     i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
+     BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+     if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
+-        BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
++        BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %.*s\n", indent, "",
++                   pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
+                    pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
+     return 1;
+ }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c.read-buff	2021-11-11 15:46:16.797124581 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c	2021-11-11 15:50:36.696748621 +0100
+@@ -502,18 +502,26 @@ static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_S
+     /* First some sanity checks */
+     if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+         return 1;
+-    if (!email->data || !email->length)
++    if (email->data == NULL || email->length == 0)
++        return 1;
++    if (memchr(email->data, 0, email->length) != NULL)
+         return 1;
+     if (*sk == NULL)
+         *sk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp);
+     if (*sk == NULL)
+         return 0;
++
++    emtmp = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)email->data, email->length);
++    if (emtmp == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
+     /* Don't add duplicates */
+-    if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, (char *)email->data) != -1)
++    if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, emtmp) != -1) {
++        OPENSSL_free(emtmp);
+         return 1;
+-    emtmp = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)email->data);
+-    if (emtmp == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) {
+-        OPENSSL_free(emtmp);    /* free on push failure */
++    }
++    if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) {
++        OPENSSL_free(emtmp); /* free on push failure */
+         X509_email_free(*sk);
+         *sk = NULL;
+         return 0;
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/test/x509_time_test.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/test/x509_time_test.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/test/x509_time_test.c.read-buff	2021-11-11 15:53:59.112792286 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/test/x509_time_test.c	2021-11-11 15:55:18.148590259 +0100
+@@ -330,10 +330,12 @@ static int test_x509_time(int idx)
+ 
+     /* if t is not NULL but expected_string is NULL, it is an 'OK' case too */
+     if (t != NULL && x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string) {
+-        if (!TEST_str_eq((const char *)t->data,
+-                    x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string)) {
+-            TEST_info("test_x509_time(%d) failed: expected_string %s, got %s\n",
+-                    idx, x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string, t->data);
++        if (!TEST_mem_eq((const char *)t->data, t->length,
++                    x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string,
++                    strlen(x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string))) {
++            TEST_info("test_x509_time(%d) failed: expected_string %s, got %.*s\n",
++                    idx, x509_format_tests[idx].expected_string, t->length,
++                    t->data);
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c.read-buff openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c.read-buff	2021-11-12 18:19:14.742820536 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c	2021-11-12 18:20:09.663327518 +0100
+@@ -553,6 +553,10 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, A
+     /* Empty matches everything */
+     if (base->length == 0)
+         return X509_V_OK;
++
++    if (dns->length < base->length)
++        return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
++
+     /*
+      * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
+      * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h.reneg-no-extms openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h.reneg-no-extms	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/ssl3.h	2020-06-05 15:20:22.090682776 +0200
-@@ -292,6 +292,9 @@ extern "C" {
- 
- # define TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS                    0x0800
- 
-+/* Set if extended master secret extension required on renegotiation */
-+# define TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS               0x1000
-+
- # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST                   0
- # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO                    1
- # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO                    2
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.reneg-no-extms openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.reneg-no-extms	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2020-06-05 15:22:19.677653437 +0200
-@@ -1168,14 +1168,26 @@ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int
- 
- static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
- {
--    if (!s->server)
-+    if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
-         s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-+        s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS;
-+    }
- 
-     return 1;
- }
- 
- static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
- {
-+    /*
-+     * Check extended master secret extension is not dropped on
-+     * renegotiation.
-+     */
-+    if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
-+        && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS)) {
-+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
-+                 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-     if (!s->server && s->hit) {
-         /*
-          * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-s390x-aes-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/test/evp_extra_test.c.s390x-test-aes openssl-1.1.1k/test/evp_extra_test.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/test/evp_extra_test.c.s390x-test-aes	2021-07-16 17:33:04.663181698 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/test/evp_extra_test.c	2021-07-16 17:49:27.780439742 +0200
+@@ -320,6 +320,97 @@ static const unsigned char pExampleECPar
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
++static const unsigned char kCFBDefaultKey[] = {
++	0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88,
++    0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C
++};
++
++static const unsigned char kGCMDefaultKey[32] = { 0 };
++
++static const unsigned char kGCMResetKey[] = {
++	0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94,
++    0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
++	0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08
++};
++
++static const unsigned char iCFBIV[] = {
++	0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B,
++    0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F
++};
++
++static const unsigned char iGCMDefaultIV[12] = { 0 };
++
++static const unsigned char iGCMResetIV1[] = {
++	0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad
++};
++
++static const unsigned char iGCMResetIV2[] = {
++	0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88
++};
++
++static const unsigned char cfbPlaintext[] = {
++	0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11,
++    0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmDefaultPlaintext[16] = { 0 };
++
++static const unsigned char gcmResetPlaintext[] = {
++	0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5,
++	0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
++	0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95,
++	0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
++    0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39
++};
++
++static const unsigned char cfbCiphertext[] = {
++	0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8,
++    0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmDefaultCiphertext[] = {
++	0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3,
++    0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmResetCiphertext1[] = {
++	0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b,
++    0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa,
++    0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3,
++	0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78,
++	0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmResetCiphertext2[] = {
++	0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3,
++    0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
++	0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48,
++	0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
++	0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmAAD[] = {
++	0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce,
++    0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmDefaultTag[] = {
++	0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5,
++    0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmResetTag1[] = {
++	0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13,
++	0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2
++};
++
++static const unsigned char gcmResetTag2[] = {
++	0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53,
++    0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b
++};
++
++
++
+ typedef struct APK_DATA_st {
+     const unsigned char *kder;
+     size_t size;
+@@ -330,6 +421,385 @@ typedef struct APK_DATA_st {
+     int type; /* 0 for private, 1 for public, 2 for params */
+ } APK_DATA;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++    const char *cipher;
++    const unsigned char *key;
++    const unsigned char *iv;
++    const unsigned char *input;
++    const unsigned char *expected;
++    const unsigned char *tag;
++    size_t ivlen; /* 0 if we do not need to set a specific IV len */
++    size_t inlen;
++    size_t expectedlen;
++    size_t taglen;
++    int keyfirst;
++    int initenc;
++    int finalenc;
++} EVP_INIT_TEST_st;
++
++static const EVP_INIT_TEST_st evp_init_tests[] = {
++    {
++        "aes-128-cfb", kCFBDefaultKey, iCFBIV, cfbPlaintext,
++        cfbCiphertext, NULL, 0, sizeof(cfbPlaintext), sizeof(cfbCiphertext),
++        0, 1, 0, 1
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-256-gcm", kGCMDefaultKey, iGCMDefaultIV, gcmDefaultPlaintext,
++        gcmDefaultCiphertext, gcmDefaultTag, sizeof(iGCMDefaultIV),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultPlaintext), sizeof(gcmDefaultCiphertext),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultTag), 1, 0, 1
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-128-cfb", kCFBDefaultKey, iCFBIV, cfbPlaintext,
++        cfbCiphertext, NULL, 0, sizeof(cfbPlaintext), sizeof(cfbCiphertext),
++        0, 0, 0, 1
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-256-gcm", kGCMDefaultKey, iGCMDefaultIV, gcmDefaultPlaintext,
++        gcmDefaultCiphertext, gcmDefaultTag, sizeof(iGCMDefaultIV),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultPlaintext), sizeof(gcmDefaultCiphertext),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultTag), 0, 0, 1
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-128-cfb", kCFBDefaultKey, iCFBIV, cfbCiphertext,
++        cfbPlaintext, NULL, 0, sizeof(cfbCiphertext), sizeof(cfbPlaintext),
++        0, 1, 1, 0
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-256-gcm", kGCMDefaultKey, iGCMDefaultIV, gcmDefaultCiphertext,
++        gcmDefaultPlaintext, gcmDefaultTag, sizeof(iGCMDefaultIV),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultCiphertext), sizeof(gcmDefaultPlaintext),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultTag), 1, 1, 0
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-128-cfb", kCFBDefaultKey, iCFBIV, cfbCiphertext,
++        cfbPlaintext, NULL, 0, sizeof(cfbCiphertext), sizeof(cfbPlaintext),
++        0, 0, 1, 0
++    },
++    {
++        "aes-256-gcm", kGCMDefaultKey, iGCMDefaultIV, gcmDefaultCiphertext,
++        gcmDefaultPlaintext, gcmDefaultTag, sizeof(iGCMDefaultIV),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultCiphertext), sizeof(gcmDefaultPlaintext),
++        sizeof(gcmDefaultTag), 0, 1, 0
++    }
++};
++
++static int evp_init_seq_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_INIT_TEST_st *t)
++{
++    int res = 0;
++
++    if (t->ivlen != 0) {
++        if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, t->ivlen, NULL)))
++            goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, t->iv, -1)))
++        goto err;
++    res = 1;
++ err:
++    return res;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test step-wise cipher initialization via EVP_CipherInit_ex where the
++ * arguments are given one at a time and a final adjustment to the enc
++ * parameter sets the correct operation.
++ */
++static int test_evp_init_seq(int idx)
++{
++    int outlen1, outlen2;
++    int testresult = 0;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    unsigned char tag[16];
++    const EVP_INIT_TEST_st *t = &evp_init_tests[idx];
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    const EVP_CIPHER *type = NULL;
++    size_t taglen = sizeof(tag);
++    char *errmsg = NULL;
++
++    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++        errmsg = "CTX_ALLOC";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_ptr(type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(t->cipher))) {
++        errmsg = "GET_CIPHERBYNAME";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, t->initenc))) {
++        errmsg = "EMPTY_ENC_INIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0))) {
++        errmsg = "PADDING";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (t->keyfirst && !TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, t->key, NULL, -1))) {
++        errmsg = "KEY_INIT (before iv)";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!evp_init_seq_set_iv(ctx, t)) {
++        errmsg = "IV_INIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (t->keyfirst == 0 &&  !TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, t->key, NULL, -1))) {
++        errmsg = "KEY_INIT (after iv)";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, t->finalenc))) {
++        errmsg = "FINAL_ENC_INIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen1, t->input, t->inlen))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_UPDATE";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (t->finalenc == 0 && t->tag != NULL) {
++        /* Set expected tag */
++        if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
++                                           t->taglen, (void *)t->tag))) {
++            errmsg = "SET_TAG";
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen1, &outlen2))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_FINAL";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->expected, t->expectedlen, outbuf, outlen1 + outlen2)) {
++        errmsg = "WRONG_RESULT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (t->finalenc != 0 && t->tag != NULL) {
++        if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag))) {
++            errmsg = "GET_TAG";
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->tag, t->taglen, tag, taglen)) {
++            errmsg = "TAG_ERROR";
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++    testresult = 1;
++ err:
++    if (errmsg != NULL)
++        TEST_info("evp_init_test %d: %s", idx, errmsg);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++    return testresult;
++}
++
++typedef struct {
++    const unsigned char *input;
++    const unsigned char *expected;
++    size_t inlen;
++    size_t expectedlen;
++    int enc;
++} EVP_RESET_TEST_st;
++
++static const EVP_RESET_TEST_st evp_reset_tests[] = {
++    {
++        cfbPlaintext, cfbCiphertext,
++        sizeof(cfbPlaintext), sizeof(cfbCiphertext), 1
++    },
++    {
++        cfbCiphertext, cfbPlaintext,
++        sizeof(cfbCiphertext), sizeof(cfbPlaintext), 0
++    }
++};
++
++/*
++ * Test a reset of a cipher via EVP_CipherInit_ex after the cipher has already
++ * been used.
++ */
++static int test_evp_reset(int idx)
++{
++    const EVP_RESET_TEST_st *t = &evp_reset_tests[idx];
++    int outlen1, outlen2;
++    int testresult = 0;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    const EVP_CIPHER *type = NULL;
++    char *errmsg = NULL;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())) {
++        errmsg = "CTX_ALLOC";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_ptr(type = EVP_get_cipherbyname("aes-128-cfb"))) {
++        errmsg = "GET_CIPHERBYNAME";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, kCFBDefaultKey, iCFBIV, t->enc))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_INIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0))) {
++        errmsg = "PADDING";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen1, t->input, t->inlen))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_UPDATE";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen1, &outlen2))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_FINAL";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->expected, t->expectedlen, outbuf, outlen1 + outlen2)) {
++        errmsg = "WRONG_RESULT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_REINIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen1, t->input, t->inlen))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_UPDATE (reinit)";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen1, &outlen2))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_FINAL (reinit)";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->expected, t->expectedlen, outbuf, outlen1 + outlen2)) {
++        errmsg = "WRONG_RESULT (reinit)";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    testresult = 1;
++ err:
++    if (errmsg != NULL)
++        TEST_info("test_evp_reset %d: %s", idx, errmsg);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++    return testresult;
++}
++
++typedef struct {
++    const unsigned char *iv1;
++    const unsigned char *iv2;
++    const unsigned char *expected1;
++    const unsigned char *expected2;
++    const unsigned char *tag1;
++    const unsigned char *tag2;
++    size_t ivlen1;
++    size_t ivlen2;
++    size_t expectedlen1;
++    size_t expectedlen2;
++} TEST_GCM_IV_REINIT_st;
++
++static const TEST_GCM_IV_REINIT_st gcm_reinit_tests[] = {
++    {
++        iGCMResetIV1, iGCMResetIV2, gcmResetCiphertext1, gcmResetCiphertext2,
++        gcmResetTag1, gcmResetTag2, sizeof(iGCMResetIV1), sizeof(iGCMResetIV2),
++        sizeof(gcmResetCiphertext1), sizeof(gcmResetCiphertext2)
++    },
++    {
++        iGCMResetIV2, iGCMResetIV1, gcmResetCiphertext2, gcmResetCiphertext1,
++        gcmResetTag2, gcmResetTag1, sizeof(iGCMResetIV2), sizeof(iGCMResetIV1),
++        sizeof(gcmResetCiphertext2), sizeof(gcmResetCiphertext1)
++    }
++};
++
++static int test_gcm_reinit(int idx)
++{
++    int outlen1, outlen2, outlen3;
++    int testresult = 0;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    unsigned char tag[16];
++    const TEST_GCM_IV_REINIT_st *t = &gcm_reinit_tests[idx];
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    const EVP_CIPHER *type = NULL;
++    size_t taglen = sizeof(tag);
++    char *errmsg = NULL;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())) {
++        errmsg = "CTX_ALLOC";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_ptr(type = EVP_get_cipherbyname("aes-256-gcm"))) {
++        errmsg = "GET_CIPHERBYNAME";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
++        errmsg = "ENC_INIT";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, t->ivlen1, NULL))) {
++        errmsg = "SET_IVLEN1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, kGCMResetKey, t->iv1, 1))) {
++        errmsg = "SET_IV1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen3, gcmAAD, sizeof(gcmAAD)))) {
++        errmsg = "AAD1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen1, gcmResetPlaintext,
++                                    sizeof(gcmResetPlaintext)))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_UPDATE1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen1, &outlen2))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_FINAL1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->expected1, t->expectedlen1, outbuf, outlen1 + outlen2)) {
++        errmsg = "WRONG_RESULT1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag))) {
++        errmsg = "GET_TAG1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->tag1, taglen, tag, taglen)) {
++        errmsg = "TAG_ERROR1";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    /* Now reinit */
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, t->ivlen2, NULL))) {
++        errmsg = "SET_IVLEN2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, t->iv2, -1))) {
++        errmsg = "SET_IV2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen3, gcmAAD, sizeof(gcmAAD)))) {
++        errmsg = "AAD2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen1, gcmResetPlaintext,
++                                    sizeof(gcmResetPlaintext)))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_UPDATE2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen1, &outlen2))) {
++        errmsg = "CIPHER_FINAL2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->expected2, t->expectedlen2, outbuf, outlen1 + outlen2)) {
++        errmsg = "WRONG_RESULT2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag))) {
++        errmsg = "GET_TAG2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(t->tag2, taglen, tag, taglen)) {
++        errmsg = "TAG_ERROR2";
++        goto err;
++    }
++    testresult = 1;
++ err:
++    if (errmsg != NULL)
++        TEST_info("evp_init_test %d: %s", idx, errmsg);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++    return testresult;
++}
++
++
++
+ static APK_DATA keydata[] = {
+     {kExampleRSAKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER), EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+     {kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8), EVP_PKEY_RSA},
+@@ -1208,6 +1678,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+     ADD_TEST(test_EVP_PKEY_set1_DH);
+ #endif
+-
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_evp_init_seq, OSSL_NELEM(evp_init_tests));
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_evp_reset, OSSL_NELEM(evp_reset_tests));
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_gcm_reinit, OSSL_NELEM(gcm_reinit_tests));
+     return 1;
+ }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-s390x-aes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.s390x-aes openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.s390x-aes	2021-07-16 11:03:14.362127435 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/evp/e_aes.c	2021-07-16 15:00:42.531477251 +0200
+@@ -1168,9 +1168,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+ 
+-# define S390X_aes_128_cbc_CAPABLE	1	/* checked by callee */
+-# define S390X_aes_192_cbc_CAPABLE	1
+-# define S390X_aes_256_cbc_CAPABLE	1
++# define S390X_aes_128_cbc_CAPABLE	0	/* checked by callee */
++# define S390X_aes_192_cbc_CAPABLE	0
++# define S390X_aes_256_cbc_CAPABLE	0
+ # define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX		EVP_AES_KEY
+ 
+ # define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key
+@@ -1190,11 +1190,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CI
+     S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
+     const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ 
+-    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+-    if (!enc)
+-        cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
++    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen) | (enc ? 0 : S390X_DECRYPT);
+ 
+-    memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen);
++    if (key != NULL)
++        memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1222,14 +1221,17 @@ static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CI
+                                   const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
+-    const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
++    const unsigned char *oiv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+     const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+     const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ 
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen);
+     cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
++
++    if (key != NULL)
++        memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen);
++
+     cctx->res = 0;
++	memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, oiv, ivlen);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1287,18 +1289,18 @@ static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CI
+                                   const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+-    const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
++    const unsigned char *oiv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+     const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+     const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ 
+-    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+-    cctx->fc |= 16 << 24;   /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
+-    if (!enc)
+-        cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
++    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen)| (enc ? 0 : S390X_DECRYPT)
++               | (16 << 24); /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
++
++    if (key != NULL)
++         memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ 
+     cctx->res = 0;
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
++	memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, oiv, ivlen);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1360,17 +1362,18 @@ static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_C
+                                    const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+-    const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
++    const unsigned char *oiv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+     const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+     const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ 
+-    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+-    cctx->fc |= 1 << 24;   /* 1 byte cipher feedback */
+-    if (!enc)
+-        cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
++    cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen) | (enc ? 0 : S390X_DECRYPT)
++		       | (1 << 24); /* 1 byte cipher feedback flag */
++
++    if (key != NULL)
++        memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ 
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+-    memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
++    cctx->res = 0;
++	 memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, oiv, ivlen);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1393,9 +1396,9 @@ static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIP
+ static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                  const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ 
+-# define S390X_aes_128_ctr_CAPABLE	1	/* checked by callee */
+-# define S390X_aes_192_ctr_CAPABLE	1
+-# define S390X_aes_256_ctr_CAPABLE	1
++# define S390X_aes_128_ctr_CAPABLE	0	/* checked by callee */
++# define S390X_aes_192_ctr_CAPABLE	0
++# define S390X_aes_256_ctr_CAPABLE	0
+ # define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX		EVP_AES_KEY
+ 
+ # define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key
+@@ -1563,8 +1566,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_C
+ /*-
+  * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian.
+  */
+-static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx,
+-                                const unsigned char *iv)
++static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+     ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0;
+     ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0;
+@@ -1575,12 +1577,11 @@ static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AE
+     ctx->kreslen = 0;
+ 
+     if (ctx->ivlen == 12) {
+-        memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen);
++        memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen);
+         ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1;
+         ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1;
+     } else {
+         /* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */
+-        memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen);
+         s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL,
+                   ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
+         ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
+@@ -1694,7 +1695,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER
+         if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
+             return 0;
+ 
+-        s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
++        s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx);
+ 
+         if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
+             arg = gctx->ivlen;
+@@ -1714,7 +1715,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER
+             return 0;
+ 
+         memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
+-        s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
++        s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx);
+         gctx->iv_set = 1;
+         return 1;
+ 
+@@ -1770,43 +1771,35 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER
+ }
+ 
+ /*-
+- * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
++ * Set key or iv or enc/dec. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
+  */
+ static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                   const unsigned char *key,
+                                   const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
+-    int keylen;
++    const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ 
+-    if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
+-        return 1;
++	 gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen) | (enc ? 0 : S390X_DECRYPT);
+ 
+     if (key != NULL) {
+-        keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
++		 gctx->fc &= ~S390X_KMA_HS;
+         memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
+-
+-        gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+-        if (!enc)
+-            gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+-
+-        if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+-            iv = gctx->iv;
+-
+-        if (iv != NULL) {
+-            s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
+-            gctx->iv_set = 1;
+-        }
+         gctx->key_set = 1;
+-    } else {
+-        if (gctx->key_set)
+-            s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
+-        else
+-            memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+-
+-        gctx->iv_set = 1;
++    }
++    if (iv != NULL) {
++		memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+         gctx->iv_gen = 0;
++        gctx->iv_set = 1;
+     }
++
++    if (gctx->key_set && gctx->iv_set)
++                 s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx);
++
++    gctx->fc &= ~(S390X_KMA_LPC | S390X_KMA_LAAD);
++    gctx->areslen = 0;
++    gctx->mreslen = 0;
++    gctx->kreslen = 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1895,7 +1888,6 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPH
+         /* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres
+          * and returned it to caller... */
+         OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen);
+-        gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ 
+         enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+         if (enc) {
+@@ -1929,8 +1921,8 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIP
+ }
+ 
+ # define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX		EVP_AES_XTS_CTX
+-# define S390X_aes_128_xts_CAPABLE	1	/* checked by callee */
+-# define S390X_aes_256_xts_CAPABLE	1
++# define S390X_aes_128_xts_CAPABLE	0	/* checked by callee */
++# define S390X_aes_256_xts_CAPABLE	0
+ 
+ # define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key
+ static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+@@ -2134,9 +2126,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_
+                                     const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+-    unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
++    const unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx);
+     unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+     const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
++	 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ 
+     if (out != in
+             || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+@@ -2152,8 +2145,9 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_
+      * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv
+      * (server/client_write_iv) here.
+      */
+-    memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+-    s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
++    memcpy(iv, ivec, sizeof(iv));
++    memcpy(iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
++    s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, iv, len);
+ 
+     /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */
+     s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len);
+@@ -2180,42 +2174,34 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_
+ }
+ 
+ /*-
+- * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is
+- * returned.
++ * Set key or iv or enc/dec. Returns 1 if successful.
++ * Otherwise 0 is returned.
+  */
+ static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+                                   const unsigned char *key,
+                                   const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+ {
+     S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+-    unsigned char *ivec;
+-    int keylen;
++    const int keylen  = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
++    unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ 
+-    if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
+-        return 1;
++    cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ 
+     if (key != NULL) {
+-        keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+         memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
+-
+-        /* Store encoded m and l. */
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7)
+-                                 | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3;
+-        memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0,
+-               sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b));
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0;
+-
+         cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1;
+     }
+-
+     if (iv != NULL) {
+-        ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+         memcpy(ivec, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l);
+-
+         cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1;
+     }
++    /* Store encoded m and l. */
++    cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7)
++			                 | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3;
++    memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0, sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b) - 1);
+ 
++    cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0;
++    cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2230,8 +2216,9 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPH
+ {
+     S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+     const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
++    const unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx);
++    unsigned char *buf;
+     int rv;
+-    unsigned char *buf, *ivec;
+ 
+     if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set)
+         return -1;
+@@ -2253,7 +2240,6 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPH
+     if (out == NULL) {
+         /* Update(): Pass message length. */
+         if (in == NULL) {
+-            ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+             s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+ 
+             cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+@@ -2279,7 +2265,6 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPH
+          * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
+          * Update(), set it now.
+          */
+-        ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+         s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+ 
+         cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+@@ -2304,9 +2289,6 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPH
+         if (rv == -1)
+             OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ 
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+         return rv;
+     }
+ }
+@@ -2414,9 +2396,6 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER
+             return 0;
+ 
+         memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+-        cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+         return 1;
+ 
+     case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+@@ -2453,7 +2432,7 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keyl
+     nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,					\
+     keylen / 8,								\
+     ivlen,								\
+-    flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,					\
++    flags | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,		\
+     s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key,					\
+     s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher,						\
+     NULL,								\
+@@ -2490,7 +2469,7 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keyl
+     blocksize,								\
+     (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8,	\
+     ivlen,								\
+-    flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,					\
++    flags | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE,		\
+     s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key,					\
+     s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher,						\
+     s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup,						\

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-servername-cb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.servername-cb openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c.servername-cb	2021-07-16 16:03:04.200024170 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c	2021-07-16 16:08:04.076630415 +0200
+@@ -1504,8 +1504,8 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s
+ 
+ /*
+  * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
+- * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
+- * a servername callback configured. Otherwise returns 0.
++ * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
++ * returns 0.
+  */
+ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
+ {
+@@ -1515,17 +1515,6 @@ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s
+     EC_KEY *eckey;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
+-        return 0;
+-
+-    /*
+-     * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
+-     * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
+-     */
+-    if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
+-            || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
+-        return 1;
+-
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+     if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
+         return 1;
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/test/sslapitest.c.servername-cb openssl-1.1.1k/test/sslapitest.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/test/sslapitest.c.servername-cb	2021-07-16 16:08:20.094823046 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/test/sslapitest.c	2021-07-16 16:09:25.708612095 +0200
+@@ -6658,62 +6658,6 @@ static int test_ssl_dup(void)
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+-/*
+- * Test that setting an SNI callback works with TLSv1.3. Specifically we check
+- * that it works even without a certificate configured for the original
+- * SSL_CTX
+- */
+-static int test_sni_tls13(void)
+-{
+-    SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL;
+-    SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+-    int testresult = 0;
+-
+-    /* Reset callback counter */
+-    snicb = 0;
+-
+-    /* Create an initial SSL_CTX with no certificate configured */
+-    sctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
+-    if (!TEST_ptr(sctx))
+-        goto end;
+-    /* Require TLSv1.3 as a minimum */
+-    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+-                                       TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, &sctx2, &cctx, cert,
+-                                       privkey)))
+-        goto end;
+-
+-    /* Set up SNI */
+-    if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(sctx, sni_cb))
+-            || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(sctx, sctx2)))
+-        goto end;
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Connection should still succeed because the final SSL_CTX has the right
+-     * certificates configured.
+-     */
+-    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl,
+-                                      &clientssl, NULL, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+-                                                SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+-        goto end;
+-
+-    /* We should have had the SNI callback called exactly once */
+-    if (!TEST_int_eq(snicb, 1))
+-        goto end;
+-
+-    testresult = 1;
+-
+-end:
+-    SSL_free(serverssl);
+-    SSL_free(clientssl);
+-    SSL_CTX_free(sctx2);
+-    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+-    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+-    return testresult;
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     if (!TEST_ptr(certsdir = test_get_argument(0))
+@@ -6837,9 +6781,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+     ADD_TEST(test_ssl_dup);
+ #endif
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+-    ADD_TEST(test_sni_tls13);
+-#endif
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-tls13-curves.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.tls13-curves openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.tls13-curves	2021-04-26 17:11:17.851072025 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h	2021-04-26 17:12:11.551756124 +0200
+@@ -1517,6 +1517,7 @@ typedef struct tls_group_info_st {
+ # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2         0x1
+ # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM        0x2
+ # define TLS_CURVE_FIPS          0x80
++# define TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3        0x100
+ 
+ typedef struct cert_pkey_st CERT_PKEY;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.tls13-curves openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.tls13-curves	2021-04-26 17:11:30.237999157 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2021-04-26 17:13:51.161170191 +0200
+@@ -161,14 +161,14 @@ static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] =
+     {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+     {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+     {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+-    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+-    {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+-    {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
++    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS | TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
++    {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS | TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
++    {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME | TLS_CURVE_FIPS | TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+     {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+     {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+     {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+-    {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
+-    {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
++    {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM | TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3}, /* X25519 (29) */
++    {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM | TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3}, /* X448 (30) */
+ };
+ 
+ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
+@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t c
+ # endif
+     if (FIPS_mode() && !(cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_FIPS))
+         return 0;
++    if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION && !(cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_TLS1_3))
++        return 0;
+     ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
+     ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
+     return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ts-sha256-default.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
-diff --git a/apps/ts.c b/apps/ts.c
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/apps/openssl.cnf.ts-sha256-default openssl-1.1.1h/apps/openssl.cnf
-index 63c5210183..4ef8a72eef 100644
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/apps/openssl.cnf.ts-sha256-default	2020-11-06 11:07:28.850100899 +0100
---- a/apps/ts.c
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/apps/openssl.cnf	2020-11-06 11:11:28.042913791 +0100
-+++ b/apps/ts.c
+@@ -364,5 +348,5 @@ tsa_name		= yes	# Must the TSA name be i
-@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bio, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
+ 				# (optional, default: no)
+ ess_cert_id_chain	= no	# Must the ESS cert id chain be included?
+ 				# (optional, default: no)
+-ess_cert_id_alg		= sha1	# algorithm to compute certificate
++ess_cert_id_alg		= sha256	# algorithm to compute certificate
+ 				# identifier (optional, default: sha1)
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/apps/ts.c.ts-sha256-default openssl-1.1.1h/apps/ts.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/apps/ts.c.ts-sha256-default	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/apps/ts.c	2020-11-06 11:07:28.883101220 +0100
+@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bi
      ASN1_OBJECT *policy_obj = NULL;
      ASN1_INTEGER *nonce_asn1 = NULL;
  
@@ -11,11 +20,22 @@ index 63c5210183..4ef8a72eef 100644
          goto err;
      if ((ts_req = TS_REQ_new()) == NULL)
          goto err;
-diff --git a/doc/man1/ts.pod b/doc/man1/ts.pod
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c.ts-sha256-default openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c
-index 078905a845..83b8fe4350 100644
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c.ts-sha256-default	2020-11-06 12:03:51.226372867 +0100
---- a/doc/man1/ts.pod
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c	2020-11-06 12:04:01.713488990 +0100
-+++ b/doc/man1/ts.pod
+@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ int TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_digest(CONF
-@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ included. Default is no. (Optional)
+     const char *md = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_ESS_CERT_ID_ALG);
+ 
+     if (md == NULL)
+-        md = "sha1";
++        md = "sha256";
+ 
+     cert_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(md);
+     if (cert_md == NULL) {
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/doc/man1/ts.pod.ts-sha256-default openssl-1.1.1h/doc/man1/ts.pod
+--- openssl-1.1.1h/doc/man1/ts.pod.ts-sha256-default	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1h/doc/man1/ts.pod	2020-11-06 11:07:28.883101220 +0100
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ included. Default is no. (Optional)
  =item B<ess_cert_id_alg>
  
  This option specifies the hash function to be used to calculate the TSA's
@@ -24,21 +44,21 @@ index 078905a845..83b8fe4350 100644
  
  =back
  
-@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ openssl/apps/openssl.cnf will do.
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ openssl/apps/openssl.cnf will do.
  
  =head2 Time Stamp Request
  
--To create a time stamp request for design1.txt with SHA-1
+-To create a timestamp request for design1.txt with SHA-1
-+To create a time stamp request for design1.txt with SHA-256
++To create a timestamp request for design1.txt with SHA-256
  without nonce and policy and no certificate is required in the response:
  
    openssl ts -query -data design1.txt -no_nonce \
-@@ -545,12 +545,12 @@ To print the content of the previous request in human readable format:
+@@ -546,12 +546,12 @@ To print the content of the previous req
  
    openssl ts -query -in design1.tsq -text
  
--To create a time stamp request which includes the MD-5 digest
+-To create a timestamp request which includes the MD-5 digest
-+To create a time stamp request which includes the SHA-512 digest
++To create a timestamp request which includes the SHA-512 digest
  of design2.txt, requests the signer certificate and nonce,
  specifies a policy id (assuming the tsa_policy1 name is defined in the
  OID section of the config file):

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-version-override.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/opensslv.h.version-override openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/include/openssl/opensslv.h.version-override openssl-1.1.1i/include/openssl/opensslv.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/opensslv.h.version-override	2020-04-23 13:29:37.802673513 +0200
+--- openssl-1.1.1i/include/openssl/opensslv.h.version-override	2020-12-09 10:25:12.042374409 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/openssl/opensslv.h	2020-04-23 13:30:13.064008458 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/openssl/opensslv.h	2020-12-09 10:26:00.362769170 +0100
 @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ extern "C" {
   *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
   */
- # define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1010107fL
+ # define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x101010bfL
--# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1g  21 Apr 2020"
+-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1k  25 Mar 2021"
-+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1g FIPS  21 Apr 2020"
++# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1k  FIPS 25 Mar 2021"
  
  /*-
   * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)

SPECS/openssl.spec

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.1.1g
+Version: 1.1.1k
-Release: 15%{?dist}
+Release: 14%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@ Patch1: openssl-1.1.1-build.patch
 Patch2: openssl-1.1.1-defaults.patch
 Patch3: openssl-1.1.1-no-html.patch
 Patch4: openssl-1.1.1-man-rename.patch
-# Bug fixes
+
-Patch21: openssl-1.1.0-issuer-hash.patch
 # Functionality changes
 Patch31: openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch
 Patch32: openssl-1.1.1-version-add-engines.patch
@@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ Patch38: openssl-1.1.1-no-weak-verify.patch
 Patch40: openssl-1.1.1-sslv3-keep-abi.patch
 Patch41: openssl-1.1.1-system-cipherlist.patch
 Patch42: openssl-1.1.1-fips.patch
-Patch43: openssl-1.1.1-ignore-bound.patch
 Patch44: openssl-1.1.1-version-override.patch
 Patch45: openssl-1.1.1-weak-ciphers.patch
 Patch46: openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
@@ -69,18 +67,41 @@ Patch62: openssl-1.1.1-fips-curves.patch
 Patch65: openssl-1.1.1-fips-drbg-selftest.patch
 Patch66: openssl-1.1.1-fips-dh.patch
 Patch67: openssl-1.1.1-kdf-selftest.patch
-Patch68: openssl-1.1.1-reneg-no-extms.patch
 Patch69: openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
 Patch70: openssl-1.1.1-rewire-fips-drbg.patch
+Patch76: openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
+Patch77: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-aes.patch
+Patch78: openssl-1.1.1-detected-addr-ipv6.patch
+Patch79: openssl-1.1.1-servername-cb.patch
+Patch80: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-aes-tests.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch52: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-update.patch
 Patch53: openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch
 Patch55: openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
 Patch56: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-ecc.patch
-Patch57: openssl-1.1.1-explicit-params.patch
+Patch74: openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch
-Patch71: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+Patch75: openssl-1.1.1-tls13-curves.patch
-Patch72: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch
+Patch81: openssl-1.1.1-read-buff.patch
-Patch73: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch
+Patch82: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch
+Patch83: openssl-1.1.1-replace-expired-certs.patch
+Patch84: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch
+Patch85: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch
+Patch86: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch
+#OpenSSL 1.1.1t CVEs
+Patch101: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
+Patch102: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
+Patch103: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
+Patch104: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
+# OpenSSL 1.1.1v CVEs
+Patch105: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
+Patch106: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
+Patch107: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
+# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2/RHEL 9
+# Proper fix for CVE-2020-25659
+Patch108: openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
+# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2
+# Fix for CVE-2024-5535
+Patch109: openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -164,8 +185,6 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch3 -p1 -b .no-html  %{?_rawbuild}
 %patch4 -p1 -b .man-rename
 
-%patch21 -p1 -b .issuer-hash
-
 %patch31 -p1 -b .conf-paths
 %patch32 -p1 -b .version-add-engines
 %patch33 -p1 -b .dgst
@@ -175,7 +194,6 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch40 -p1 -b .sslv3-abi
 %patch41 -p1 -b .system-cipherlist
 %patch42 -p1 -b .fips
-%patch43 -p1 -b .ignore-bound
 %patch44 -p1 -b .version-override
 %patch45 -p1 -b .weak-ciphers
 %patch46 -p1 -b .seclevel
@@ -194,14 +212,30 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch65 -p1 -b .drbg-selftest
 %patch66 -p1 -b .fips-dh
 %patch67 -p1 -b .kdf-selftest
-%patch68 -p1 -b .reneg-no-extms
 %patch69 -p1 -b .alpn-cb
 %patch70 -p1 -b .rewire-fips-drbg
-%patch57 -p1 -b .explicit-params
+%patch74 -p1 -b .addrconfig
-%patch71 -p1 -b .null-dereference
+%patch75 -p1 -b .tls13-curves
-%patch72 -p1 -b .sig-alg-null-dereference
+%patch76 -p1 -b .cleanup-reneg
-%patch73 -p1 -b .bypass-strict-flag
+%patch77 -p1 -b .s390x-aes
-
+%patch78 -p1 -b .addr-ipv6
+%patch79 -p1 -b .servername-cb
+%patch80 -p1 -b .s390x-test-aes
+%patch81 -p1 -b .read-buff
+%patch82 -p1 -b .cve-2022-0778
+%patch83 -p1 -b .replace-expired-certs
+%patch84 -p1 -b .cve-2022-1292
+%patch85 -p1 -b .cve-2022-2068
+%patch86 -p1 -b .cve-2022-2097
+%patch101 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4304
+%patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4450
+%patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0215
+%patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0286
+%patch105 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3446
+%patch106 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3817
+%patch107 -p1 -b .cve-2023-5678
+%patch108 -p1 -b .pkcs15imprejection
+%patch109 -p1 -b .cve-2024-5535
 
 %build
 # Figure out which flags we want to use.
@@ -485,20 +519,98 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Mar 25 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-15
+* Tue Sep 17 2024 Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-14
-- version bump
+- Backport fix SSL_select_next proto from OpenSSL 3.2
+  Fix CVE-2024-5535 
+  Resolves: RHEL-45654
 
-* Wed Mar  24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-14
+* Thu Nov 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-12
-- CVE-2021-3450 openssl: CA certificate check
+- Backport implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 to RHEL-8 series
-  bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
+  (a proper fix for CVE-2020-25659)
+  Resolves: RHEL-17694
 
-* Wed Mar  24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-13
+* Wed Nov 15 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-11
+- Fix CVE-2023-5678: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking
+  excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow
+  Resolves: RHEL-16536
+
+* Thu Oct 19 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-10
+- Fix CVE-2023-3446: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters
+  Resolves: RHEL-14243
+- Fix CVE-2023-3817: Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
+  Resolves: RHEL-14237
+
+* Thu May 04 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
+- Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
+  Resolves: CVE-2022-4304
+- Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex
+  Resolves: CVE-2022-4450
+- Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-0215
+
+* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
+- Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-0286
+
+* Tue Jul 05 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-7
+- Fix CVE-2022-2097: AES OCB fails to encrypt some bytes on 32-bit x86
+  Resolves: CVE-2022-2097
+- Update expired certificates used in the testsuite
+  Resolves: rhbz#2100554
+- Fix CVE-2022-1292: openssl: c_rehash script allows command injection
+  Resolves: rhbz#2090371
+- Fix CVE-2022-2068: the c_rehash script allows command injection
+  Resolves: rhbz#2098278
+
+* Wed Mar 23 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-6
+- Fixes CVE-2022-0778 openssl: Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
+- Resolves: rhbz#2067145
+
+* Tue Nov 16 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-5
+- Fixes CVE-2021-3712 openssl: Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings
+- Resolves: rhbz#2005402
+
+* Fri Jul 16 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-4
+- Fixes bugs in s390x AES code.
+- Uses the first detected address family if IPv6 is not available
+- Reverts the changes in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305
+  as it introduces a regression if server has a DSA key pair, the handshake fails
+  when the protocol is not explicitly set to TLS 1.2. However, if the patch is reverted,
+  it has an effect on the "ssl_reject_handshake" feature in nginx. Although, this feature
+  will continue to work, TLS 1.3 protocol becomes unavailable/disabled. This is already
+  known - https://trac.nginx.org/nginx/ticket/2071#comment:1
+  As per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/16075#issuecomment-879939938, nginx
+  could early callback instead of servername callback.
+- Resolves: rhbz#1978214
+- Related: rhbz#1934534
+
+* Thu Jun 24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-3
+- Cleansup the peer point formats on renegotiation
+- Resolves rhbz#1965362
+
+* Wed Jun 23 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-2
+- Fixes FIPS_selftest to work in FIPS mode. Resolves: rhbz#1940085
+- Using safe primes for FIPS DH self-test
+
+* Mon May 24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1k-1
+- Update to version 1.1.1k
+
+* Mon Apr 26 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-16
+- Use AI_ADDRCONFIG only when explicit host name is given
+- Allow only curves defined in RFC 8446 in TLS 1.3
+
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Dmitry Belyavski <dbelyavs@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-15
+- Remove 2-key 3DES test from FIPS_selftest
+
+* Mon Mar 29 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-14
+- Fix CVE-2021-3450 openssl: CA certificate check bypass with
+  X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
 - Fix CVE-2021-3449 NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing
 
-* Fri Dec  4 2020 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-12
+* Fri Dec  4 2020 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-13
 - Fix CVE-2020-1971 ediparty null pointer dereference
 
-* Mon Nov  2 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-11.1
+* Fri Oct 23 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-12
 - Implemented new FIPS requirements in regards to KDF and DH selftests
 - Disallow certificates with explicit EC parameters