128 changed files with 53838 additions and 16423 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/openssl-3.2.2.tar.gz
+SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
--- a/.openssl.metadata
+++ b/.openssl.metadata
@ -1 +1 @@
-b12311372a0277ca0eb218a68a7fd9f5ce66d162 SOURCES/openssl-3.2.2.tar.gz
+6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
--- a/SOURCES/0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 From 603a35802319c0459737e3f067369ceb990fe2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:01:41 +0200
 Subject: Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64
 (Was openssl-1.1.1-build.patch)
 ---
 Configurations/10-main.conf | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/Configurations/10-main.conf b/Configurations/10-main.conf
 index d7580bf3e1..a7dbfd7f40 100644
 --- a/Configurations/10-main.conf
 +++ b/Configurations/10-main.conf
@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ my %targets = (
         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
         asm_arch         => 'ppc64',
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-armv4" => {
@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ my %targets = (
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64" ],
         asm_arch         => 'aarch64',
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 From 3d5755df8d09ca841c0aca2d7344db060f6cc97f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:05:55 +0200
 Subject: Do not install html docs
 (was openssl-1.1.1-no-html.patch)
 ---
 Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 index 342e46d24d..9f369edf0e 100644
 --- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 +++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
 uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev ## Uninstall the software and libraries
 -install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs ## Install manpages and HTML documentation
 +install_docs: install_man_docs ## Install manpages
 uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs ## Uninstall manpages and HTML documentation
 	$(RM) -r "$(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)"
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
 From 6790960076742a9053c624e26fbb87fcd5789e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:17:26 +0200
 Subject: Override default paths for the CA directory tree
 Also add default section to load crypto-policies configuration
 for TLS.
 It needs to be reverted before running tests.
 (was openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch)
 ---
 apps/CA.pl.in    |  2 +-
 apps/openssl.cnf | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/CA.pl.in b/apps/CA.pl.in
 index c0afb96716..d6a5fabd16 100644
 --- a/apps/CA.pl.in
 +++ b/apps/CA.pl.in
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
 my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
 # Default values for various configuration settings.
 -my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
 +my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
 my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
 my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
 my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls	2021-07-06 13:41:39.204978272 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-07-06 13:49:50.362857683 +0200
@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
 [openssl_init]
 providers = provider_sect
 +# Load default TLS policy configuration
 +ssl_conf = ssl_module
 +alg_section = evp_properties
 +
 +[ evp_properties ]
 +#This section is intentionally added empty here
 +#to be tuned on particular systems
 # List of providers to load
 [provider_sect]
@@ -64,6 +66,13 @@ default = default_sect
 [default_sect]
 # activate = 1
 +[ ssl_module ]
 +
 +system_default = crypto_policy
 +
 +[ crypto_policy ]
 +
 +.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
 ####################################################################
 [ ca ]
@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
 ####################################################################
 [ CA_default ]
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
 certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
 crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
 database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
@@ -304,7 +313,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
 [ tsa_config1 ]
 # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
 serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
 crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
 signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
--- a/SOURCES/0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
 From 3d8fa9859501b07e02b76b5577e2915d5851e927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:27:18 +0200
 Subject: apps/ca: fix md option help text
 upstreamable
 (was openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch)
 ---
 apps/ca.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
 index 0f21b4fa1c..3d4b2c1673 100755
 --- a/apps/ca.c
 +++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
     {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"},
     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
 -    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256"},
 +    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256; see openssl help for list"},
     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "The CA private key"},
     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f',
      "Private key file format (ENGINE, other values ignored)"},
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 From 3f9deff30ae6efbfe979043b00cdf649b39793c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:51:34 +0200
 Subject: Disable signature verification with totally unsafe hash algorithms
 (was openssl-1.1.1-no-weak-verify.patch)
 ---
 crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
 index b7eed914b0..af62f0ef08 100644
 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
 +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int ASN1_item_verify_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         if (ret <= 1)
             goto err;
 +    } else if ((mdnid == NID_md5
 +               && ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY") == NULL) ||
 +               mdnid == NID_md4 || mdnid == NID_md2 || mdnid == NID_sha) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 +        goto err;
     } else {
         const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
 From 5b2ec9a54037d7b007324bf53e067e73511cdfe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 14:00:16 +0100
 Subject: Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro
 The macro calls EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled() on the
 default context.
 ---
 include/openssl/crypto.h.in |  1 +
 include/openssl/fips.h      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/property_test.c        | 13 +++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/openssl/fips.h
 diff --git a/include/openssl/fips.h b/include/openssl/fips.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..c64f0f8e8f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/openssl/fips.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_H
 +# define OPENSSL_FIPS_H
 +# pragma once
 +
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 +# include <openssl/macros.h>
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +extern "C" {
 +# endif
 +
 +# define FIPS_mode() EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +}
 +# endif
 +#endif
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro	2021-06-29 12:14:58.851557698 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c	2021-06-29 12:17:14.630143832 +0200
@@ -488,6 +488,19 @@ static int test_property_list_to_string(
     return ret;
 }
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 +static int test_downstream_FIPS_mode(void)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    ret = TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes"))
 +          && TEST_true(FIPS_mode())
 +          && TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=no"))
 +          && TEST_false(FIPS_mode());
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     ADD_TEST(test_property_string);
@@ -500,6 +512,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_property);
     ADD_TEST(test_query_cache_stochastic);
     ADD_TEST(test_fips_mode);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_downstream_FIPS_mode);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_property_list_to_string, OSSL_NELEM(to_string_tests));
     return 1;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
 From aa3aebf132959e7e44876042efaf9ff24ffe0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 09/35] 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
 Patch-name: 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
 Patch-id: 9
 Patch-status: |
    # Add check to see if fips flag is enabled in kernel
 From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
 ---
 crypto/context.c            | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/internal/provider.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
 index e294ea1512..51002ba79a 100644
 --- a/crypto/context.c
 +++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -16,6 +16,41 @@
 #include "crypto/decoder.h"
 #include "crypto/context.h"
 +# include <sys/types.h>
 +# include <sys/stat.h>
 +# include <fcntl.h>
 +# include <unistd.h>
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 +
 +# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
 +
 +static int kernel_fips_flag;
 +
 +static void read_kernel_fips_flag(void)
 +{
 +	char buf[2] = "0";
 +	int fd;
 +
 +	if (secure_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
 +		buf[0] = '1';
 +	} else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
 +		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
 +		close(fd);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (buf[0] == '1') {
 +		kernel_fips_flag = 1;
 +	}
 +
 +		return;
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()
 +{
 +	return kernel_fips_flag;
 +}
 +
 +
 struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock, *rand_crngt_lock;
     OSSL_EX_DATA_GLOBAL global;
@@ -336,6 +371,7 @@ static int default_context_inited = 0;
 DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
 {
 +	 read_kernel_fips_flag();
     if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL))
         goto err;
 diff --git a/include/internal/provider.h b/include/internal/provider.h
 index 18937f84c7..1446bf7afb 100644
 --- a/include/internal/provider.h
 +++ b/include/internal/provider.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
                                 const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
 void ossl_provider_deinit_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
 +/* FIPS flag access */
 +int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag(void);
 +
 # ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 # endif
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
 From 4a275f852b61238161c053774736dc07b3ade200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:46:40 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 11/48] 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
 Patch-name: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
 Patch-id: 11
 Patch-status: |
    # remove unsupported EC curves
 ---
 apps/speed.c                 |  8 +---
 crypto/evp/ec_support.c      | 87 ------------------------------------
 test/acvp_test.inc           |  9 ----
 test/ecdsatest.h             | 17 -------
 test/recipes/15-test_genec.t | 27 -----------
 5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
 index cace25eda1..d527f12f18 100644
 --- a/apps/speed.c
 +++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];  /* 1 op: derivation */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 enum ec_curves_t {
 -    R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
 +    R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
     R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
@@ -395,8 +395,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
 };
 /* list of ecdsa curves */
 static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
 -    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -423,8 +421,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
 };
 /* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
 static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
 -    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -1442,8 +1438,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
      */
     static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
         /* Prime Curves */
 -        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
 -        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
 index 1ec10143d2..82b95294b4 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
 static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
     /* prime field curves */
     /* secg curves */
 -    {"secp112r1", NID_secp112r1 },
 -    {"secp112r2", NID_secp112r2 },
 -    {"secp128r1", NID_secp128r1 },
 -    {"secp128r2", NID_secp128r2 },
 -    {"secp160k1", NID_secp160k1 },
 -    {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1 },
 -    {"secp160r2", NID_secp160r2 },
 -    {"secp192k1", NID_secp192k1 },
 -    {"secp224k1", NID_secp224k1 },
     {"secp224r1", NID_secp224r1 },
     {"secp256k1", NID_secp256k1 },
     {"secp384r1", NID_secp384r1 },
     {"secp521r1", NID_secp521r1 },
     /* X9.62 curves */
 -    {"prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1 },
 -    {"prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2 },
 -    {"prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3 },
 -    {"prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1 },
 -    {"prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2 },
 -    {"prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3 },
     {"prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1 },
     /* characteristic two field curves */
     /* NIST/SECG curves */
 -    {"sect113r1", NID_sect113r1 },
 -    {"sect113r2", NID_sect113r2 },
 -    {"sect131r1", NID_sect131r1 },
 -    {"sect131r2", NID_sect131r2 },
 -    {"sect163k1", NID_sect163k1 },
 -    {"sect163r1", NID_sect163r1 },
 -    {"sect163r2", NID_sect163r2 },
 -    {"sect193r1", NID_sect193r1 },
 -    {"sect193r2", NID_sect193r2 },
 -    {"sect233k1", NID_sect233k1 },
 -    {"sect233r1", NID_sect233r1 },
 -    {"sect239k1", NID_sect239k1 },
 -    {"sect283k1", NID_sect283k1 },
 -    {"sect283r1", NID_sect283r1 },
 -    {"sect409k1", NID_sect409k1 },
 -    {"sect409r1", NID_sect409r1 },
 -    {"sect571k1", NID_sect571k1 },
 -    {"sect571r1", NID_sect571r1 },
 -    /* X9.62 curves */
 -    {"c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 },
 -    {"c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 },
 -    {"c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 },
 -    {"c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 },
 -    {"c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 },
 -    /*
 -     * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
 -     * from X9.62]
 -     */
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 },
 -    /* IPSec curves */
 -    {"Oakley-EC2N-3", NID_ipsec3 },
 -    {"Oakley-EC2N-4", NID_ipsec4 },
     /* brainpool curves */
 -    {"brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1 },
     {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
     {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
     {"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
     {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1 },
     {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1 },
     {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1 },
 -    /* SM2 curve */
 -    {"SM2", NID_sm2 },
 };
 const char *OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(int nid)
@@ -150,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *name)
 /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
 static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
 -    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
 -    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
 -    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
 -    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
 -    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
 -    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
 -    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
 -    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
 -    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
 -    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
 -    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
     {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
     {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
     {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
 index ad11d3ae1e..894a0bff9d 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.inc
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -211,15 +211,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_s1[] = {
     0xB1, 0xAC,
 };
 static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
 -    {
 -        "SHA-1",
 -        "P-192",
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_pub0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_r0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
 -        PASS,
 -    },
     {
         "SHA2-512",
         "P-521",
 diff --git a/test/ecdsatest.h b/test/ecdsatest.h
 index 63fe319025..06b5c0aac5 100644
 --- a/test/ecdsatest.h
 +++ b/test/ecdsatest.h
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
 } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
 static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
 -    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
 -     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
 -     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
 -     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
 -     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
 -     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
 -     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
 -     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
 -     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
 -     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
 -     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
 diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
 index 2dfed387ca..c733b68f83 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-ec build"
     if disabled("ec");
 my @prime_curves = qw(
 -    secp112r1
 -    secp112r2
 -    secp128r1
 -    secp128r2
 -    secp160k1
 -    secp160r1
 -    secp160r2
 -    secp192k1
 -    secp224k1
     secp224r1
     secp256k1
     secp384r1
     secp521r1
 -    prime192v1
 -    prime192v2
 -    prime192v3
 -    prime239v1
 -    prime239v2
 -    prime239v3
     prime256v1
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
 -    brainpoolP160r1
 -    brainpoolP160t1
 -    brainpoolP192r1
 -    brainpoolP192t1
 -    brainpoolP224r1
 -    brainpoolP224t1
     brainpoolP256r1
     brainpoolP256t1
     brainpoolP320r1
@@ -136,7 +110,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
     if !disabled("sm2");
 my @curve_aliases = qw(
 -    P-192
     P-224
     P-256
     P-384
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-22 13:10:45.718077845 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2022-03-22 13:12:46.626599016 +0100
@@ -895,6 +895,12 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **
     if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
         group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
 +    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +        EC_GROUP_free(group);
 +        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
     if (a) {
         EC_GROUP_free(*a);
         *a = group;
@@ -954,6 +959,11 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
         goto err;
     }
 +    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(ret->group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     ret->version = priv_key->version;
     if (priv_key->privateKey) {
 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 index a84e088c19..6c37bf78ae 100644
 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -1724,6 +1724,11 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
         goto err;
     }
     if (named_group == group) {
 +        if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
 +            goto err;
 +        }
 +#if 0
         /*
          * If we did not find a named group then the encoding should be explicit
          * if it was specified
@@ -1739,6 +1744,7 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
             goto err;
         }
         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
 +#endif
     } else {
         EC_GROUP_free(group);
         group = named_group;
 diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
 index 4890b0555e..e11aec5b3b 100644
 --- a/test/ectest.c
 +++ b/test/ectest.c
@@ -2301,10 +2301,11 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
     if (!TEST_ptr(params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld))
         || !TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL))
         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx), 0)
 -        || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
 +        || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
                                           EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params), 0))
         goto err;
 -
 +/* As creating the key should fail, the rest of the test is pointless */
 +# if 0
     /*- Check that all the set values are retrievable -*/
     /* There should be no match to a group name since the generator changed */
@@ -2433,6 +2434,7 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
 #endif
         )
         goto err;
 +#endif
     ret = 1;
 err:
     BN_free(order_out);
@@ -2714,21 +2716,21 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
     /* Compute keyexchange in both directions */
     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx1 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey1, NULL))
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 1)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
 +            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 0)
 +/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, NULL, &sslen), 1)
             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, sslen)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1))
 +            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1)*/)
         goto err;
     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx2 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey2, NULL))
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
 +            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
 +/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, NULL, &t), 1)
             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, t)
             || !TEST_int_le(sslen, t)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1))
 +            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1) */)
         goto err;
 -
 +#if 0
     /* Both sides should expect the same shared secret */
     if (!TEST_mem_eq(buf1, sslen, buf2, t))
         goto err;
@@ -2780,7 +2782,7 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
             /* compare with previous result */
             || !TEST_mem_eq(buf1, t, buf2, sslen))
         goto err;
 -
 +#endif
     ret = 1;
  err:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-21 16:55:46.005558779 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-03-21 16:56:12.636792762 +0100
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime_nc = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = NULL;
 -static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;
 +/*static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_tri_nc = NULL;
@@ -990,9 +990,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC, "EC")
 DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC")
 -DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 -IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)
 -IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")
 +/*DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 +/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)*/
 +/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params_namedcurve(bld_prime_nc)
         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params(bld_prime)
         || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime_nc))
 -        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))
 +/*        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     TEST_info("Generating EC keys...");
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC, "EC", EC_params);
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
 -    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
 +/*    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_nc);
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_explicit);
@@ -1389,8 +1389,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 -        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 -        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 +/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 +/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
 -    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
 +/*    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime_nc);
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC);
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 -    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 +/*    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-25 11:20:50.920949208 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt	2022-03-25 11:21:13.177147598 +0100
@@ -121,18 +121,6 @@ AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEB
 3ev1gTwRBduzqqlwd54AUSgI+pjttW8zrWNitO8H1sf59MPWOESKxNtZ1+Nl
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 -PrivateKey = EC_EXPLICIT
 ------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
 -MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
 -AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
 -///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
 -AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEE5JcIvn36opqjEm/k59Al40rBAxWM2TPG
 -l0L13Je51zHpfXQ9Z2o7IQicMXP4wSfJ0qCgg2bgydqoxlYrlLGuVQIhAP////8A
 -AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgec92jwduadCk
 -OjoNRI+YT5Be5TkzZXzYCyTLkMOikDmhRANCAATtECEhQbLEaiUj/Wu0qjcr81lL
 -46dx5zYgArz/iaSNJ3W80oO+F7v04jlQ7wxQzg96R0bwKiMeq5CcW9ZFt6xg
 ------END PRIVATE KEY-----
 -
 PrivateKey = B-163
 -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
 MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUDnQW0mLiHVha/jqFznX/K
--- a/SOURCES/0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
 --- ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 13:42:38.865508269 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t	2023-03-14 13:43:36.237021635 +0100
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- public key
 subtest 'Check loading of fips and non-fips keys' => sub {
     plan skip_all => "FIPS is disabled"
 -        if $no_fips;
 +        if 1; #Red Hat specific, original value is $no_fips;
     plan tests => 2;
 diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
 --- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 10:13:11.342056559 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t	2023-03-14 10:14:42.643873496 +0100
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
 plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a shared library build on Windows"
     if $^O eq 'MSWin32' && !disabled("shared");
 -plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 +plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_protect_test",
                  data_file("prot_RSA.pem"),
 diff --git a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
 index f722800e27..26a01786bb 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-cmp build"
 plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-ec build"
     if disabled("ec");
 -plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 +plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_vfy_test",
                  data_file("server.crt"),     data_file("client.crt"),
--- a/SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
 -# For FIPS
 -# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
 -# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
 -# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g. [fips_sect] which is
 -# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
 -# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
 -# .include fipsmodule.cnf
 -
 [openssl_init]
 providers = provider_sect
 # Load default TLS policy configuration
@@ -42,23 +42,27 @@ [ evp_properties ]
 #This section is intentionally added empty here
 #to be tuned on particular systems
 -# List of providers to load
 -[provider_sect]
 -default = default_sect
 -# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
 -# included fipsmodule.cnf.
 -# fips = fips_sect
 +# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
 +# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
 +# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160
 +# Symmetric Ciphers: Blowfish, CAST, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4,RC5, SEED
 +# Key Derivation Function (KDF): PBKDF1
 +# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
 +# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
 +# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 -# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
 -# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
 -#
 -# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
 -# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
 -# becomes unavailable in openssl.  As a consequence applications depending on
 -# OpenSSL may not work correctly which could lead to significant system
 -# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
 -[default_sect]
 -# activate = 1
 +[provider_sect]
 +default = default_sect
 +##legacy = legacy_sect
 +##
 +[default_sect]
 +activate = 1
 +
 +##[legacy_sect]
 +##activate = 1
 +
 +#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
 +.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
 [ ssl_module ]
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:09:38.079040853 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-09-09 12:11:56.646224876 +0200
@@ -273,6 +273,14 @@ significant.
 All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made
 available to the provider.
 +=head3 Loading the legacy provider
 +
 +Uncomment the sections that start with ## in openssl.cnf
 +to enable the legacy provider.
 +Note: In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
 +security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
 +to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 +
 =head3 Default provider and its activation
 If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
--- a/SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx	2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
 # to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 [provider_sect]
 -default = default_sect
 +##default = default_sect
 ##legacy = legacy_sect
 ##
 -[default_sect]
 -activate = 1
 +##[default_sect]
 +##activate = 1
 ##[legacy_sect]
 ##activate = 1
--- a/SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
 From 2c110cf5551a3869514e697d8dc06682b62ca57d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:59:02 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 16/48] 0032-Force-fips.patch
 Patch-name: 0032-Force-fips.patch
 Patch-id: 32
 Patch-status: |
    # We load FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly
 ---
 crypto/provider_conf.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/provider_conf.c b/crypto/provider_conf.c
 index 058fb58837..5274265a70 100644
 --- a/crypto/provider_conf.c
 +++ b/crypto/provider_conf.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/trace.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/safestack.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
         if (path != NULL)
             ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
 -        ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
 +        ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
         if (ok == 1) {
             if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_L
         if (ok <= 0)
             ossl_provider_free(prov);
 +    } else {
 +        ok = 1;
     }
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
@@ -309,6 +311,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
             return 0;
     }
 +    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag() != 0) { /* XXX from provider_conf_load */
 +        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf);
 +#  define FIPS_LOCAL_CONF           OPENSSLDIR "/fips_local.cnf"
 +
 +        if (access(FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, R_OK) == 0) {
 +            CONF *fips_conf = NCONF_new_ex(libctx, NCONF_default());
 +            if (NCONF_load(fips_conf, FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, NULL) <= 0)
 +                return 0;
 +
 +            if (provider_conf_load(libctx, "fips", "fips_sect", fips_conf) != 1) {
 +                NCONF_free(fips_conf);
 +                return 0;
 +            }
 +            NCONF_free(fips_conf);
 +        } else {
 +            if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
 +        /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even when the test is failed so check explicitly */
 +        if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +        if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +        if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
     return 1;
 }
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
@ -1,396 +0,0 @@
 From 831d0025257fd3746ab3fe30c05dbbfc0043f78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 16/49] 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
 Patch-name: 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
 Patch-id: 33
 Patch-status: |
    # # Embed HMAC into the fips.so
    # Modify fips self test as per
    # https://github.com/simo5/openssl/commit/9b95ef8bd2f5ac862e5eee74c724b535f1a8578a
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test.c            | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 test/fipsmodule.cnf                   |   2 +
 test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t |   2 +-
 test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t |   2 +-
 test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t    |   2 +-
 test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t      |   2 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t        |   2 +-
 test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t         |   2 +-
 8 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/fipsmodule.cnf
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
 index b8dc9817b2..28f536d13c 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -230,11 +230,133 @@ err:
     return ok;
 }
 +#define HMAC_LEN 32
 +/*
 + * The __attribute__ ensures we've created the .rodata1 section
 + * static ensures it's zero filled
 +*/
 +static const unsigned char __attribute__ ((section (".rodata1"))) fips_hmac_container[HMAC_LEN] = {0};
 +
 /*
  * Calculate the HMAC SHA256 of data read using a BIO and read_cb, and verify
  * the result matches the expected value.
  * Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
  */
 +
 +#ifndef __USE_GNU
 +#define __USE_GNU
 +#include <dlfcn.h>
 +#undef __USE_GNU
 +#else
 +#include <dlfcn.h>
 +#endif
 +#include <link.h>
 +
 +static int verify_integrity_rodata(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio,
 +                                   OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
 +                                   unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
 +                                   OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
 +                                   const char *event_type)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0, status;
 +    unsigned char out[MAX_MD_SIZE];
 +    unsigned char buf[INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE];
 +    size_t bytes_read = 0, out_len = 0;
 +    EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
 +    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
 +    Dl_info info;
 +    void *extra_info = NULL;
 +    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
 +    unsigned long paddr;
 +    unsigned long off = 0;
 +
 +    if (expected_len != HMAC_LEN)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
 +
 +    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
 +                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
 +        goto err;
 +    lm = extra_info;
 +    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
 +
 +    mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
 +    if (mac == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +    ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
 +    if (ctx == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", DIGEST_NAME, 0);
 +    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 +
 +    if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            break;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (off < paddr) {
 +        int delta = paddr - off;
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            goto err;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* read away the buffer */
 +    status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
 +    if (status != 1)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    /* check that it is the expect bytes, no point in continuing otherwise */
 +   if (memcmp(expected, buf, HMAC_LEN) != 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    /* replace in-file HMAC buffer with the original zeros */
 +    memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
 +    if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, HMAC_LEN))
 +        goto err;
 +    off += HMAC_LEN;
 +
 +    while (bytes_read > 0) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            break;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(ev, out);
 +    if (expected_len != out_len
 +            || memcmp(expected, out, out_len) != 0)
 +        goto err;
 +    ret = 1;
 +err:
 +    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, MAX_MD_SIZE);
 +    OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
 +    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    EVP_MAC_free(mac);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
                             unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
@@ -247,12 +369,23 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
 +    Dl_info info;
 +    void *extra_info = NULL;
 +    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
 +    unsigned long paddr;
 +    unsigned long off = 0;
     if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
         goto err;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
 +    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
 +                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
 +        goto err;
 +    lm = extra_info;
 +    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
 +
     mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
     if (mac == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -266,13 +399,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
     if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
         goto err;
 -    while (1) {
 -        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read);
 +    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
         if (status != 1)
             break;
         if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
             goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
     }
 +
 +    if (off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE > paddr) {
 +        int delta = paddr - off;
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            goto err;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
 +        memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            goto err;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
 +    while (bytes_read > 0) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            break;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
     if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
         goto err;
@@ -282,6 +444,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
         goto err;
     ret = 1;
 err:
 +    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
     EVP_MAC_free(mac);
@@ -335,8 +498,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
         return 0;
     }
 -    if (st == NULL
 -            || st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
 +    if (st == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
         goto end;
     }
@@ -345,8 +507,14 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
     if (ev == NULL)
         goto end;
 -    module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
 -                                         &checksum_len);
 +   if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
 +        module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
 +        checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
 +    } else {
 +        module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
 +                                             &checksum_len);
 +    }
 +
     if (module_checksum == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
         goto end;
@@ -354,14 +522,27 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
     bio_module = (*st->bio_new_file_cb)(st->module_filename, "rb");
     /* Always check the integrity of the fips module */
 -    if (bio_module == NULL
 -            || !verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
 -                                 module_checksum, checksum_len, st->libctx,
 -                                 ev, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
 +    if (bio_module == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
         goto end;
     }
 -
 +    if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
 +        if (!verify_integrity_rodata(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
 +                                     module_checksum, checksum_len,
 +                                     st->libctx, ev,
 +                                     OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    } else {
 +        if (!verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
 +                              module_checksum, checksum_len,
 +                              st->libctx, ev,
 +                              OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
     /* This will be NULL during installation - so the self test KATS will run */
     if (st->indicator_data != NULL) {
         /*
@@ -420,7 +601,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
 end:
     EVP_RAND_free(testrand);
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
 -    OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
     OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
     if (st != NULL) {
 diff --git a/test/fipsmodule.cnf b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..f05d0dedbe
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
 +[fips_sect]
 +activate = 1
 diff --git a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 index 4e3a6d85e8..e8255ba974 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -my $no_check = disabled("fips");
 +my $no_check = 1;
 plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
     if $no_check;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 index ce594817d5..00cebacff8 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -my $no_check = disabled("fips");
 +my $no_check = 1;
 plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
     if $no_check;
 plan tests => 1;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
 index b8b136d110..8242f4ebc3 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
 +plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
 # Compatible options for pedantic FIPS compliance
 my @pedantic_okay =
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
 index c8f145405b..56a2ec5dc4 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 plan skip_all => "Configuration loading is turned off"
     if disabled("autoload-config");
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 plan tests =>
     ($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
 index 195b85ea8c..92d48dbf7d 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ setup("test_ssl_new");
 use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 $ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
 diff --git a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
 index 18d9f3d204..71780d8caa 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ setup("test_sslapi");
 setup("test_sslapi");
 }
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 my $fipsmodcfg_filename = "fipsmodule.cnf";
 my $fipsmodcfg = bldtop_file("test", $fipsmodcfg_filename);
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
@ -1,473 +0,0 @@
 From a9825123e7ab3474d2794a5706d9bed047959c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 18/35] 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
 Patch-name: 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
 Patch-id: 34
 Patch-status: |
    # Comment out fipsinstall command-line utility
 From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
 ---
 apps/fipsinstall.c                  |   3 +
 doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in | 272 +---------------------------
 doc/man1/openssl.pod                |   4 -
 doc/man5/config.pod                 |   1 -
 doc/man5/fips_config.pod            | 104 +----------
 doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod     |   1 -
 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/fipsinstall.c b/apps/fipsinstall.c
 index e1ef645b60..db92cb5fb2 100644
 --- a/apps/fipsinstall.c
 +++ b/apps/fipsinstall.c
@@ -375,6 +375,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **argv)
     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
     CONF *conf = NULL;
 +    BIO_printf(bio_err, "This command is not enabled in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL build, please consult Red Hat documentation to learn how to enable FIPS mode\n");
 +    return 1;
 +
     if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
         goto end;
 diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
 index b1768b7f91..b6b00e27d8 100644
 --- a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
 +++ b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
@@ -8,275 +8,9 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS configuration installation
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 B<openssl fipsinstall>
 -[B<-help>]
 -[B<-in> I<configfilename>]
 -[B<-out> I<configfilename>]
 -[B<-module> I<modulefilename>]
 -[B<-provider_name> I<providername>]
 -[B<-section_name> I<sectionname>]
 -[B<-verify>]
 -[B<-mac_name> I<macname>]
 -[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
 -[B<-noout>]
 -[B<-quiet>]
 -[B<-pedantic>]
 -[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
 -[B<-no_security_checks>]
 -[B<-ems_check>]
 -[B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>]
 -[B<-self_test_onload>]
 -[B<-self_test_oninstall>]
 -[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
 -[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
 -[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
 -
 -=head1 DESCRIPTION
 -
 -This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
 -This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
 -in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always
 -verifies its MAC, but optionally only needs to run the KAT's once,
 -at installation.
 -
 -The generated configuration file consists of:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item - A MAC of the FIPS module file.
 -
 -=item - A test status indicator.
 -
 -This indicates if the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run.
 -
 -=item - A MAC of the status indicator.
 -
 -=item - A control for conditional self tests errors.
 -
 -By default if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails then the FIPS module
 -will enter an error state, and no services or cryptographic algorithms will be
 -able to be accessed after this point.
 -The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered.
 -If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered.
 -Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation
 -(e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying
 -the operation if the module error state is not entered.
 -
 -=item - A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done.
 -
 -This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
 -such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
 -The default value of '1' will perform the checks.
 -If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must
 -be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -This file is described in L<fips_config(5)>.
 -
 -=head1 OPTIONS
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<-help>
 -
 -Print a usage message.
 -
 -=item B<-module> I<filename>
 -
 -Filename of the FIPS module to perform an integrity check on.
 -The path provided in the filename is used to load the module when it is
 -activated, and this overrides the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MODULES>.
 -
 -=item B<-out> I<configfilename>
 -
 -Filename to output the configuration data to; the default is standard output.
 -
 -=item B<-in> I<configfilename>
 -
 -Input filename to load configuration data from.
 -Must be used if the B<-verify> option is specified.
 -
 -=item B<-verify>
 -
 -Verify that the input configuration file contains the correct information.
 -
 -=item B<-provider_name> I<providername>
 -
 -Name of the provider inside the configuration file.
 -The default value is C<fips>.
 -
 -=item B<-section_name> I<sectionname>
 -
 -Name of the section inside the configuration file.
 -The default value is C<fips_sect>.
 -
 -=item B<-mac_name> I<name>
 -
 -Specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm which will be used.
 -The MAC mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
 -used when building OpenSSL.
 -To see the list of supported MAC's use the command
 -C<openssl list -mac-algorithms>.  The default is B<HMAC>.
 -
 -=item B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>
 -
 -Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
 -A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
 -documentation.
 -Common control strings used for this command are:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<key>:I<string>
 -
 -Specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains
 -printable characters only).
 -The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
 -If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
 -configured is used.
 -
 -=item B<hexkey>:I<string>
 -
 -Specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
 -The key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
 -If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
 -configured is used.
 -
 -=item B<digest>:I<string>
 -
 -Used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains printable
 -characters only).
 -The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -To see the list of supported digests, use the command
 -C<openssl list -digest-commands>.
 -The default digest is SHA-256.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -=item B<-noout>
 -
 -Disable logging of the self tests.
 -
 -=item B<-pedantic>
 -
 -Configure the module so that it is strictly FIPS compliant rather
 -than being backwards compatible.  This enables conditional errors,
 -security checks etc.  Note that any previous configuration options will
 -be overwritten and any subsequent configuration options that violate
 -FIPS compliance will result in an error.
 -
 -=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
 -
 -Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
 -fails as described above.
 -
 -=item B<-no_security_checks>
 -
 -Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
 -
 -Enabling the configuration option "no-fips-securitychecks" provides another way to
 -turn off the check at compile time.
 -
 -=item B<-ems_check>
 -
 -Configure the module to enable a run-time Extended Master Secret (EMS) check
 -when using the TLS1_PRF KDF algorithm. This check is disabled by default.
 -See RFC 7627 for information related to EMS.
 -
 -=item B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>
 -
 -Configure the module to not allow truncated digests to be used with Hash and
 -HMAC DRBGs.  See FIPS 140-3 IG D.R for details.
 -
 -=item B<-self_test_onload>
 -
 -Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
 -"MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. Without these fields
 -the self tests KATS will run each time the module is loaded. This option could be
 -used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each
 -target machine. Once the self tests have run on the target machine the user
 -could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
 -mechanism.
 -
 -This is the default.
 -
 -=item B<-self_test_oninstall>
 -
 -The converse of B<-self_test_oninstall>.  The two fields related to the
 -"test status indicator" and "MAC status indicator" are written to the
 -output configuration file.
 -
 -=item B<-quiet>
 -
 -Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
 -
 -=item B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>,
 -B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>
 -
 -The corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by
 -name.
 -Either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt.
 -Refer to the entries for B<st-desc> and B<st-type> in L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)> for
 -values that can be used.
 -
 -=item B<-config> I<parent_config>
 -
 -Test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file.
 -A previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration
 -data that is included by the base C<parent_config> configuration file.
 -See L<config(5)> for further information on how to set up a provider section.
 -All other options are ignored if '-config' is used.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -=head1 NOTES
 -
 -Self tests results are logged by default if the options B<-quiet> and B<-noout>
 -are not specified, or if either of the options B<-corrupt_desc> or
 -B<-corrupt_type> are used.
 -If the base configuration file is set up to autoload the fips module, then the
 -fips module will be loaded and self tested BEFORE the fipsinstall application
 -has a chance to set up its own self test callback. As a result of this the self
 -test output and the options B<-corrupt_desc> and B<-corrupt_type> will be ignored.
 -For normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider
 -when generating the fips configuration file.
 -
 -The B<-self_test_oninstall> option was added and the
 -B<-self_test_onload> option was made the default in OpenSSL 3.1.
 -
 -The command and all remaining options were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
 -
 -=head1 EXAMPLES
 -
 -Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
 -for the module, and save the F<fips.cnf> configuration file:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips
 -
 -Verify that the configuration file F<fips.cnf> contains the correct info:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf  -provider_name fips -verify
 -
 -Corrupt any self tests which have the description C<SHA1>:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
 -         -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'
 -
 -Validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file:
 -
 - export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
 - export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
 - openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf'
 -
 -
 -=head1 SEE ALSO
 -
 -L<config(5)>,
 -L<fips_config(5)>,
 -L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)>,
 -L<EVP_MAC(3)>
 +This command is disabled.
 +Please consult Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation to learn how to correctly
 +enable FIPS mode on Red Hat Enterprise
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl.pod b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
 index d9c22a580f..d5ec3b9a6a 100644
 --- a/doc/man1/openssl.pod
 +++ b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
@@ -135,10 +135,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and manipulation.
 Error Number to Error String Conversion.
 -=item B<fipsinstall>
 -
 -FIPS configuration installation.
 -
 =item B<gendsa>
 Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
 diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
 index 714a10437b..bd05736220 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax will have to be modified.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
 L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
 L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
 L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
 diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 index 2255464304..1c15e32a5c 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 -A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
 -is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
 -of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
 -This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
 -purposes:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
 -
 -This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
 -run each time the module is used.
 -
 -=item - Verify the module's checksum.
 -
 -This is done each time the module is used.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
 -used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
 -
 -The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
 -whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
 -section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<activate>
 -
 -If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
 -significant.
 -
 -=item B<install-version>
 -
 -A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
 -
 -=item B<conditional-errors>
 -
 -The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
 -Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
 -accessible from this point on.
 -Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
 -generation, or the CRNG output test).
 -Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
 -continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
 -Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
 -continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
 -operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
 -
 -=item B<security-checks>
 -
 -This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
 -such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
 -A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
 -are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
 -the relevant Security Policy.
 -
 -=item B<module-mac>
 -
 -The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
 -
 -=item B<install-status>
 -
 -An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
 -This should only be written after the module has
 -successfully passed its self tests during installation.
 -If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
 -loads.
 -
 -=item B<install-mac>
 -
 -A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
 -changes to that value.
 -It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -For example:
 -
 - [fips_sect]
 - activate = 1
 - install-version = 1
 - conditional-errors = 1
 - security-checks = 1
 - module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
 - install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
 - install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
 -
 -=head1 NOTES
 -
 -When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
 -B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
 -non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
 -See L<config(5)>.
 -
 -=head1 SEE ALSO
 -
 -L<config(5)>
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
 +This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
 +automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
 +environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
 +for more information.
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff --git a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
 index 4f908888ba..ef00247770 100644
 --- a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
 +++ b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ want to operate in a FIPS approved manner.  The algorithms are:
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
 L<fips_config(5)>,
 L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
 L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit	2021-12-21 15:14:04.210431584 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c	2021-12-21 15:46:05.554085125 +0100
@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ static int EVP_MAC_loop(int algindex, vo
     for (count = 0; COND(c[algindex][testnum]); count++) {
         size_t outl;
 +        if (mctx == NULL)
 +            return -1;
 +
         if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, NULL, 0, NULL)
             || !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, buf, lengths[testnum])
             || !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac, &outl, sizeof(mac)))
--- a/SOURCES/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
 From b300beb172d5813b01b93bfd62fe191f8187fe1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 12:05:23 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 20/48] 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
 Patch-name: 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
 Patch-id: 44
 Patch-status: |
    # Extra public/private key checks required by FIPS-140-3
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_key.c                            | 26 ++++++++++
 .../implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c      | 19 ++++++++
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c  | 24 +++++++++-
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c | 18 +++++++
 .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     | 37 +++++++++++++--
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 index 4e9705beef..83773cceea 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
     BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
     int ret = -1;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int validate = 0;
 +#endif
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -262,6 +272,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 #endif
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int validate = 0;
 +#endif
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -354,8 +367,21 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
     if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, priv_key, pub_key))
         goto err;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     dh->pub_key = pub_key;
     dh->priv_key = priv_key;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) <= 0) {
 +        abort();
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     dh->dirty_cnt++;
     ok = 1;
  err:
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
 index 43caedb6df..73873f9758 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
@@ -489,6 +489,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
     }
     ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    {
 +        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(privk));
 +        int check = 0;
 +
 +        if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +
 +        check = ossl_ec_key_public_check(pecdhctx->peerk, bn_ctx);
 +        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 +
 +        if (check <= 0) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +#endif
     retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
 index a37cbbdba8..bca3f3c674 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
@@ -989,8 +989,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
     EC_GROUP *gen_group;
     unsigned char *dhkem_ikm;
     size_t dhkem_ikmlen;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    void *ecdsa_sig_ctx;
 +#endif
 };
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
 +void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx);
 +int do_ec_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
 +#endif
 +
 static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
                          const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -1009,6 +1018,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
             gctx = NULL;
         }
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (gctx != NULL)
 +        gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = ecdsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
 +#endif
     return gctx;
 }
@@ -1279,6 +1292,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* Pairwise consistency test */
 +    if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0
 +        && do_ec_pct(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx, "sha256", ec) != 1)
 +        abort();
 +#endif
     if (gctx->group_check != NULL)
         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec,
@@ -1348,7 +1367,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
     if (gctx == NULL)
         return;
 -
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    ecdsa_freectx(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx);
 +    gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = NULL;
 +#endif
     OPENSSL_clear_free(gctx->dhkem_ikm, gctx->dhkem_ikmlen);
     EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
     BN_free(gctx->p);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
 index 3ba12c4889..ff49f8fcd8 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
     /* ACVP test parameters */
     OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
 +    void *prov_rsa_ctx;
 #endif
 };
@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
     return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
 +void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
 +int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
 +#endif
 +
 static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
                       const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
     if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
         goto err;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (gctx != NULL)
 +        gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
 +#endif
     return gctx;
 err:
@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     rsa = rsa_tmp;
     rsa_tmp = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* Pairwise consistency test */
 +    if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
 +        abort();
 +#endif
  err:
     BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
     RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
@@ -645,6 +661,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
     ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
     gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
 +    rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
 +    gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
 #endif
     BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
     OPENSSL_free(gctx);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 index 865d49d100..ebeb30e002 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #include "crypto/ec.h"
 #include "prov/der_ec.h"
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ typedef struct {
     unsigned int nonce_type;
 } PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
 -static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 +void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 {
     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx;
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
 }
 -static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
 +void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
 {
     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx)
     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +int do_ec_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec)
 +{
 +    static const unsigned char data[32];
 +    unsigned char sigbuf[256];
 +    size_t siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, sizeof(sigbuf)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init },
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index cd5de6bd51..d4261e8f7d 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen)
     return 1;
 }
 -static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 +void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
     char *propq_copy = NULL;
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
     return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
 }
 -static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
 +void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@@ -1455,6 +1455,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +int do_rsa_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *rsa)
 +{
 +    static const unsigned char data[32];
 +    unsigned char *sigbuf = NULL;
 +    size_t siglen = 0;
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, NULL, &siglen, 0) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if ((sigbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, siglen) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +    ret = 1;
 +
 + err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(sigbuf);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
 index e0d139d..35f23b2 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
             rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
             rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
             rsa->iqmp = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +            abort();
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         }
     }
     return ok;
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
@ -1,779 +0,0 @@
 From e25b25227043a2b2cf156527c31d7686a4265bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 20/49] 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
 Patch-name: 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
 Patch-id: 45
 Patch-status: |
    # # Minimize fips services
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 apps/ecparam.c                                |  7 +++
 apps/req.c                                    |  2 +-
 providers/common/capabilities.c               |  2 +-
 providers/fips/fipsprov.c                     | 44 +++++++++++--------
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             |  9 +++-
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 26 +++++++++++
 ssl/ssl_ciph.c                                |  3 ++
 test/acvp_test.c                              |  2 +
 test/endecode_test.c                          |  4 ++
 test/evp_libctx_test.c                        |  9 +++-
 test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t                 |  2 +-
 test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t               |  3 +-
 test/recipes/30-test_evp.t                    | 20 ++++-----
 .../30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt        | 22 ++++++++++
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    | 22 +++++-----
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  2 +-
 16 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
 index 71f93c4ca5..347bf62d5c 100644
 --- a/apps/ecparam.c
 +++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
 +        if (((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512t1)) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
 +            continue;
 +
         if (comment == NULL)
             comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
         if (sname == NULL)
 diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
 index 8995453dca..cb38e6aa64 100644
 --- a/apps/req.c
 +++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, reqflag = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 +    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_256_cbc();
 #endif
     opt_set_unknown_name("digest");
 diff --git a/providers/common/capabilities.c b/providers/common/capabilities.c
 index f7234615e4..0d4c0e3388 100644
 --- a/providers/common/capabilities.c
 +++ b/providers/common/capabilities.c
@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM param_group_list[][10] = {
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 25),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 26),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "EC", 27),
 -#  endif
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x25519", "X25519", "X25519", 28),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x448", "X448", "X448", 29),
 +#  endif
 #  ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1tls13", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 30),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1tls13", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 31),
 diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 index 7ec409710b..ec5bdd5a69 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -199,13 +199,13 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
                                               OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX);
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))
@@ -298,10 +298,11 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests[] = {
      * KECCAK-KMAC-128 and KECCAK-KMAC-256 as hashes are mostly useful for
      * KMAC128 and KMAC256.
      */
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +    /* We don't certify KECCAK in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
       ossl_keccak_kmac_128_functions },
     { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 -      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions },
 +      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions }, */
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
@@ -360,8 +361,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips_ciphers[] = {
     ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
          ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
 -    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions),
 +    /* We don't certify 3DES in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
 +    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions), */
 #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
     { { NULL, NULL, NULL }, NULL }
 };
@@ -373,8 +375,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[] = {
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_GMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_gmac_functions },
     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_hmac_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify KMAC in our FIPS provider */
 +    /*{ PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions }, */
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
@@ -410,8 +413,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     { PROV_NAMES_ECDH, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdh_keyexch_functions },
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /*{ PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },*/
 # endif
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
@@ -422,14 +426,16 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch[] = {
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 -    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },*/
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_signature_functions },
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
 -    { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
       ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },*/
 # endif
     { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions },
 #endif
@@ -460,8 +466,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt[] = {
       PROV_DESCS_DHX },
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 -    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
 -      PROV_DESCS_DSA },
 +    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
 +      PROV_DESCS_DSA }, */
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_RSA },
@@ -471,14 +478,15 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt[] = {
     { PROV_NAMES_EC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ec_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_EC },
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_X25519 },
     { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_X448 },
     { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_ED25519 },
     { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_keymgmt_functions,
 -      PROV_DESCS_ED448 },
 +      PROV_DESCS_ED448 }, */
 # endif
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions,
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index 2057378d3d..4b80bb70b9 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_DIGEST st_kat_digest_tests[] =
 /*- CIPHER TEST DATA */
 /* DES3 test data */
 +#if 0
 static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_pt[] = {
     0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
     0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_ct[] = {
     0x51, 0x65, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1F, 0x25, 0xB5, 0x0F,
     0x73, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0x0D, 0xA7
 };
 -
 +#endif
 /* AES-256 GCM test data */
 static const unsigned char aes_256_gcm_key[] = {
     0x92, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x6f, 0x5c,
@@ -1454,8 +1455,9 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_bin_key[] = {
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 /* dsa 2048 */
 +#if 0
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 static const unsigned char dsa_p[] = {
     0xa2, 0x9b, 0x88, 0x72, 0xce, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x23,
     0xb7, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x7e,
@@ -1590,6 +1592,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dsa_key[] = {
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 +#endif
 /* Hash DRBG inputs for signature KATs */
 static const unsigned char sig_kat_entropyin[] = {
@@ -1642,6 +1645,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
     },
 # endif
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 +#if 0
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
     {
         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_DSA,
@@ -1654,6 +1658,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
         ITM(dsa_expected_sig)
     },
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 +#endif
 };
 static const ST_KAT_ASYM_CIPHER st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[] = {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 22d93ead53..c1405f47ea 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -686,6 +686,19 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
     int ret;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
 +
 +    if (rsabits < 2048) {
 +        if (rsabits != 1024
 +            && rsabits != 1280
 +            && rsabits != 1536
 +            && rsabits != 1792) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +# endif
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
@@ -774,6 +787,19 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
     size_t rslen;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
 +
 +    if (rsabits < 2048) {
 +        if (rsabits != 1024
 +            && rsabits != 1280
 +            && rsabits != 1536
 +            && rsabits != 1792) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +# endif
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
 index 33c23efb0d..113c204716 100644
 --- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
 +++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
     ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
 +    if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(ctx->libctx))
 +        ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
 +
     /*
      * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
      * if these algorithms are not available.
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.c b/test/acvp_test.c
 index 45509095af..4a67519bb4 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.c
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.c
@@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
                   OSSL_NELEM(dh_safe_prime_keyver_data));
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 +#if 0 /* Red Hat FIPS provider doesn't have fips=yes property on DSA */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_keygen_data));
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_paramgen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_paramgen_data));
@@ -1485,6 +1486,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_siggen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_siggen_data));
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_sigver_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_sigver_data));
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 +#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(ecdsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_keygen_data));
 diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
 index b53b7b715b..885e49a47c 100644
 --- a/test/endecode_test.c
 +++ b/test/endecode_test.c
@@ -1419,6 +1419,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
          * so no legacy tests.
          */
 #endif
 +    if (is_fips == 0) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(DSA);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(DSA);
@@ -1429,6 +1430,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PROTECTED_PVK(DSA);
 # endif
 #endif
 +    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(EC);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(EC);
@@ -1443,10 +1445,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTri2G);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTri2G);
 # endif
 +    if (is_fips == 0) {
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED25519);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED448);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X25519);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X448);
 +    }
         /*
          * ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448 have no support for
          * PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(), so no legacy tests.
 diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 index 2448c35a14..a7913cda4c 100644
 --- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 +++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
 #include <assert.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
@@ -726,7 +727,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         return 0;
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
 -    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
 +    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
 +        ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
 +    }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dh_safeprime_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
@@ -746,7 +749,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(kem_invalid_keytype);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
 +    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
 +        ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
 +    }
 #endif
     return 1;
 }
 diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t b/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
 index 4bc460784b..93052eb3e7 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-dsa build"
     if disabled("dsa");
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1;
 plan tests =>
     ($no_fips ? 0 : 2)          # FIPS related tests
 diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t b/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
 index d4b4d4ca51..031814e8ff 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
@@ -278,8 +278,7 @@ SKIP: {
 }
 SKIP : {
 -    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1
 -        if disabled("dsa");
 +    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1;
     subtest DSA => sub {
         my $testtext_prefix = 'DSA';
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t b/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
 index eddca5c58e..36a192d041 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
@@ -46,10 +46,8 @@ my @files = qw(
                 evpciph_aes_cts.txt
                 evpciph_aes_wrap.txt
                 evpciph_aes_stitched.txt
 -                evpciph_des3_common.txt
                 evpkdf_hkdf.txt
                 evpkdf_kbkdf_counter.txt
 -                evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
                 evpkdf_pbkdf1.txt
                 evpkdf_pbkdf2.txt
                 evpkdf_ss.txt
@@ -69,15 +67,6 @@ push @files, qw(
                 evppkey_ffdhe.txt
                 evppkey_dh.txt
                ) unless $no_dh;
 -push @files, qw(
 -                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
 -                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
 -               ) unless $no_des;
 -push @files, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
 -push @files, qw(
 -                evppkey_ecx.txt
 -                evppkey_mismatch_ecx.txt
 -               ) unless $no_ecx;
 push @files, qw(
                 evppkey_ecc.txt
                 evppkey_ecdh.txt
@@ -97,6 +86,7 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
                      evpciph_cast5.txt
                      evpciph_chacha.txt
                      evpciph_des.txt
 +                     evpciph_des3_common.txt
                      evpciph_idea.txt
                      evpciph_rc2.txt
                      evpciph_rc4.txt
@@ -121,13 +111,19 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
                      evpmd_whirlpool.txt
                      evppbe_scrypt.txt
                      evppbe_pkcs12.txt
 +                     evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
                      evppkey_kdf_scrypt.txt
                      evppkey_kdf_tls1_prf.txt
                      evppkey_rsa.txt
                     );
 +push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
 +push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
 +push @defltfiles, qw(
 +                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
 +                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
 +               ) unless $no_des;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecdsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_ec;
 -push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_dsa;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_sm2.txt) unless $no_sm2;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_gcm_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
 index e47023aae6..96a8febeef 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ IV = 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C
 Input = 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E541002E58495C08000F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D0007
 Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 Title = KMAC Tests (From NIST)
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
@@ -373,12 +374,14 @@ Ctrl = xof:0
 OutputSize = 32
 BlockSize = 168
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 3B1FBA963CD8B0B59E8C1A6D71888B7143651AF8BA0A7070C0979E2811324AA5
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1F5B4E6CCA02209E0DCB5CA635B89A15E271ECC760071DFD805FAA38F9729230
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -394,12 +398,14 @@ Output = 20C570C31346F703C9AC36C61C03CB64C3970D0CFC787E9B79599D273A68D2F7F69D4CC
 OutputSize = 64
 BlockSize = 136
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
 Custom = ""
 Output = 75358CF39E41494E949707927CEE0AF20A3FF553904C86B08F21CC414BCFD691589D27CF5E15369CBBFF8B9A4C2EB17800855D0235FF635DA82533EC6B759B69
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -409,12 +415,14 @@ Ctrl = size:64
 Title = KMAC XOF Tests (From NIST)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -422,6 +430,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -430,6 +439,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF658490C0DB61438B8326FE9BDDF281B83AE0F
 XOF = 1
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -437,6 +447,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -444,6 +455,7 @@ Custom = ""
 Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -454,6 +466,7 @@ XOF = 1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string (from NIST ACVP)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
 Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -464,12 +477,14 @@ XOF = 1
 Title = KMAC XOF Tests via ctrl (From NIST)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -477,6 +492,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -485,6 +501,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF658490C0DB61438B8326FE9BDDF281B83AE0F
 Ctrl = xof:1
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -492,6 +509,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -499,6 +517,7 @@ Custom = ""
 Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -509,6 +528,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string via ctrl (from NIST ACVP)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
 Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -519,6 +539,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string negative test
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -527,6 +548,7 @@ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
 Title = KMAC output is too large
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index 6a9792128b..4e368c730b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
 +    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing), no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-resign", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-outform", "DER",
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-noattr", "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&zero_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
 my @smime_cms_tests = (
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-keyid",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
 +    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
         "-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index 50b74a1e29..e2dcb68fb5 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ sub testssl {
         my @exkeys = ();
         my $ciphers = '-PSK:-SRP:@SECLEVEL=0';
 -        if (!$no_dsa) {
 +        if (!$no_dsa && $provider ne "fips") {
             push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", $Dkey;
         }
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 From ba6e65e2f7e7fe8d9cd62e1e7e345bc41dda424f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 13:12:40 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 21/46] 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
 Patch-name: 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
 Patch-id: 47
 Patch-status: |
    # # Execute KATS before HMAC verification
 From-dist-git-commit: 5c67b5adc311af297f425c09e3e1ac7ca8483911
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
 index e3a629018a..3c09bd8638 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -401,6 +401,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
     if (ev == NULL)
         goto end;
 +    /*
 +     * Run the KAT's before HMAC verification according to FIPS-140-3 requirements
 +     */
 +    if (kats_already_passed == 0) {
 +        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
    if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
         module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
         checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
@@ -451,18 +461,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
         }
     }
 -    /*
 -     * Only runs the KAT's during installation OR on_demand().
 -     * NOTE: If the installation option 'self_test_onload' is chosen then this
 -     * path will always be run, since kats_already_passed will always be 0.
 -     */
 -    if (on_demand_test || kats_already_passed == 0) {
 -        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
 -            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
 -            goto end;
 -        }
 -    }
 -
     /* Verify that the RNG has been restored properly */
     rng = ossl_rand_get0_private_noncreating(st->libctx);
     if (rng != NULL)
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
 From 4f9167db05cade673f98f1a00efd57136e97b460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 22/49] 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
 Patch-name: 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
 Patch-id: 49
 Patch-status: |
    # # Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures rhbz#2070977
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 crypto/context.c                              | 14 ++++
 crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c                          | 13 +++
 crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                         | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                        | 15 ++++
 doc/man5/config.pod                           | 13 +++
 include/crypto/context.h                      |  3 +
 include/internal/cryptlib.h                   |  3 +-
 include/internal/sslconf.h                    |  4 +
 providers/common/securitycheck.c              | 20 +++++
 providers/common/securitycheck_default.c      |  9 ++-
 providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 11 ++-
 .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 +
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 20 ++++-
 ssl/t1_lib.c                                  |  8 ++
 util/libcrypto.num                            |  2 +
 15 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
 index fb4816d89b..c04920fe14 100644
 --- a/crypto/context.c
 +++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
     void *fips_prov;
 #endif
 +    void *legacy_digest_signatures;
 +
     unsigned int ischild:1;
 };
@@ -223,6 +225,10 @@ static int context_init(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
         goto err;
 #endif
 +    ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(ctx);
 +    if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
     /* Low priority. */
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     ctx->child_provider = ossl_child_prov_ctx_new(ctx);
@@ -366,6 +372,11 @@ static void context_deinit_objs(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
     }
 #endif
 +    if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures != NULL) {
 +        ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(ctx->legacy_digest_signatures);
 +        ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = NULL;
 +    }
 +
     /* Low priority. */
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (ctx->child_provider != NULL) {
@@ -663,6 +674,9 @@ void *ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int index)
         return ctx->fips_prov;
 #endif
 +    case OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX:
 +        return ctx->legacy_digest_signatures;
 +
     default:
         return NULL;
     }
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
 index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -57,6 +58,18 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
                 return 0;
             }
 +        } else if (strcmp(oval->name, "rh-allow-sha1-signatures") == 0) {
 +            int m;
 +
 +            /* Detailed error already reported. */
 +            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
 +                return 0;
 +
 +            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(
 +                    NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf), m > 0, 0)) {
 +                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
 +                return 0;
 +            }
         } else {
             ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
                            "name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 index 3a979f4bd4..fd3a4b79df 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -15,6 +15,73 @@
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */
 #include "evp_local.h"
 +#include "crypto/context.h"
 +
 +typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
 +    int allowed;
 +} OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
 +
 +void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs = vldsigs;
 +
 +    if (ldsigs != NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(ldsigs);
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES* ldsigs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
 +    /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
 +     * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
 +     * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
 +    ldsigs->allowed = 0;
 +    return ldsigs;
 +}
 +
 +static OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(
 +        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
 +{
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (loadconfig && !OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
 +        return NULL;
 +#endif
 +
 +    return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX);
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
 +        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
 +
 + #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +     if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_SHA1_SIGNATURES") != NULL)
 +        /* used in tests */
 +         return 1;
 + #endif
 +
 +    /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
 +     * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
 +     * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
 +    return ldsigs != NULL ? ldsigs->allowed : 0;
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
 +                                                  int loadconfig)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
 +        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
 +
 +    if (ldsigs == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    ldsigs->allowed = allow;
 +    return 1;
 +}
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -253,6 +320,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         }
     }
 +    if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
 +        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);
 +        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)
 +                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
 +            goto err;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (ver) {
         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 index 268b1617e3..248f655d0f 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "internal/ffc.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "evp_local.h"
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -951,6 +952,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
         return -2;
     }
 +    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
 +            && md != NULL
 +            && ctx->pkey != NULL
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
 +        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
 +        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
 +                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
 +            return -1;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (fallback)
         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, 0, (void *)(md));
 diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
 index bd05736220..ed34ff4b9c 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -304,6 +304,17 @@ Within the algorithm properties section, the following names have meaning:
 The value may be anything that is acceptable as a property query
 string for EVP_set_default_properties().
 +=item B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures>
 +
 +The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is not set,
 +it behaves as if it was set to B<no>.
 +
 +When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
 +digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
 +option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
 +that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
 +B<no>.
 +
 =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
 The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is
 diff --git a/include/crypto/context.h b/include/crypto/context.h
 index 7369a730fb..55b74238c8 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/context.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/context.h
@@ -46,3 +46,6 @@ void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void);
 #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
 void ossl_threads_ctx_free(void *);
 #endif
 +
 +void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *);
 +void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *);
 diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 index 64851fd8ed..8e01a77ddc 100644
 --- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 +++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_CHILD_PROVIDER_INDEX          18
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_THREAD_INDEX                  19
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_DECODER_CACHE_INDEX           20
 -# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   20
 +# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX 21
 +# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   21
 OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
 int ossl_lib_ctx_is_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
 diff --git a/include/internal/sslconf.h b/include/internal/sslconf.h
 index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
 --- a/include/internal/sslconf.h
 +++ b/include/internal/sslconf.h
@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ int conf_ssl_name_find(const char *name, size_t *idx);
 void conf_ssl_get_cmd(const SSL_CONF_CMD *cmd, size_t idx, char **cmdstr,
                       char **arg);
 +/* Methods to support disabling all signatures with legacy digests */
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig);
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
 +                                                  int loadconfig);
 #endif
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 index 0d3acdbe56..fe694c4e96 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 /*
  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
@@ -243,6 +244,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
             mdnid = -1; /* disallowed by security checks */
     }
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
 +
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
 +        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
 +         * it. */
 +        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)
 +            mdnid = -1;
 +#endif
 +
     return mdnid;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 index 246323493e..2ca7a59f39 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
 int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -29,9 +30,10 @@ int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 }
 int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
 -                                    ossl_unused int sha1_allowed)
 +                                    int sha1_allowed)
 {
     int mdnid;
 +    int ldsigs_allowed;
     static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
         { NID_md5,       OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5       },
@@ -42,8 +44,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
         { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
     };
 -    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, 1);
 +    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);
 +    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);
     if (mdnid == NID_undef)
         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
 +    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)
 +        mdnid = -1;
     return mdnid;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 index b89a0f6836..e0c26a13e4 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
         mdprops = ctx->propq;
     if (mdname != NULL) {
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
         WPACKET pkt;
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
 -        int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
 -                                                            sha1_allowed);
 +        int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 +#else
 +        int sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
 +        md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
 +                                                            sha1_allowed);
         if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
             if (md == NULL)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 index f158105e71..62355b89fe 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -247,7 +247,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 +#else
 +    sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                     sha1_allowed);
     if (md_nid < 0) {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index c1405f47ea..aeda1a7758 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
 +#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256
 OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
@@ -301,10 +303,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
     if (mdname != NULL) {
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
 +        int md_nid;
 +        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -        int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
 +#else
 +        int sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
 +        md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                      sha1_allowed);
 -        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
         if (md == NULL
             || md_nid <= 0
@@ -1392,8 +1399,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
 -        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
 +        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
 +            pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
 +        }
 +#endif
 +    }
 +
     if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
         && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index 631e1fdef9..05dd7c5595 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
@@ -1506,6 +1507,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
     EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
     int ret = 0;
 +    int ldsigs_allowed;
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -1521,6 +1523,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
         goto err;
     ERR_set_mark();
 +    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0);
     /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
     for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
          i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
@@ -1542,6 +1545,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
             cache[i].enabled = 0;
             continue;
         }
 +        if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
 +                && !ldsigs_allowed) {
 +            cache[i].enabled = 0;
 +            continue;
 +        }
         if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
             cache[i].enabled = 0;
 diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
 index ef97803327..8046454025 100644
 --- a/util/libcrypto.num
 +++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5536,3 +5536,5 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_set_get_crl              5663	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons      5664	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_STORE_delete                       5665	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BIO_ADDR_copy                           5666	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
 +ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch
@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips	2022-02-21 12:35:24.829893907 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c	2022-02-21 13:01:22.711622967 +0100
@@ -85,17 +85,41 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
     EVP_KDF *kdf;
     EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx;
     OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
 +    char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
     if (n <= 0)
         return 0;
 -    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
 -    if (kdf == NULL)
 +    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()) {
 +        const char *nofips = "-fips";
 +        size_t len = propq ? strlen(propq) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
 +                                                 strlen(nofips) + 1;
 +        char *ptr = NULL;
 +
 +        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
 +        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
 +            ptr = adjusted_propq;
 +            if (propq) {
 +                memcpy(ptr, propq, strlen(propq));
 +                ptr += strlen(propq);
 +                *ptr = ',';
 +                ptr++;
 +            }
 +            memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    kdf = adjusted_propq ? EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", adjusted_propq) : EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
 +    if (kdf == NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         return 0;
 +    }
     ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
     EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
 -    if (ctx == NULL)
 +    if (ctx == NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         return 0;
 +    }
     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
                                             (char *)EVP_MD_get0_name(md_type),
@@ -127,6 +149,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
         } OSSL_TRACE_END(PKCS12_KEYGEN);
     }
     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
     return res;
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps	2022-02-21 16:37:07.908923682 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c	2022-02-21 17:38:44.555345633 +0100
@@ -765,15 +765,34 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
     if (macver) {
         EVP_KDF *pkcs12kdf;
 +        char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
 +        const char *nofips = "-fips";
 +        size_t len = app_get0_propq() ? strlen(app_get0_propq()) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
 +                                                            strlen(nofips) + 1;
 +        char *ptr = NULL;
 +
 +        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
 +        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
 +                ptr = adjusted_propq;
 +                if (app_get0_propq()) {
 +                    memcpy(ptr, app_get0_propq(), strlen(app_get0_propq()));
 +                    ptr += strlen(app_get0_propq());
 +                    *ptr = ',';
 +                    ptr++;
 +                }
 +                memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
 +        }
         pkcs12kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(app_get0_libctx(), "PKCS12KDF",
 -                                  app_get0_propq());
 +                                  adjusted_propq ? adjusted_propq : app_get0_propq());
         if (pkcs12kdf == NULL) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying PKCS12 MAC; no PKCS12KDF support.\n");
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Use -nomacver if MAC verification is not required.\n");
 +            OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
             goto end;
         }
         EVP_KDF_free(pkcs12kdf);
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
         if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
             /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */
--- a/SOURCES/0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
 From c63599ee9708d543205a9173207ee7167315c624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 15:44:18 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Allow SHA1 in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes
 References: rhbz#2055796
 ---
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c        | 19 ++++++++++-
 doc/man5/config.pod           |  7 +++-
 ssl/t1_lib.c                  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |  7 ++--
 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 index ff3ca83de6..a549c1c111 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/dane.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "crypto/x509.h"
 #include "x509_local.h"
@@ -3440,14 +3441,30 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
 {
     int secbits = -1;
     int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
 +    int nid;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
     if (level <= 0)
         return 1;
     if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
         level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
 -    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
 +    if (ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = ctx->libctx;
 +    else if (cert->libctx)
 +        libctx = cert->libctx;
 +    else
 +        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
 +
 +    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
         return 0;
 +    if (nid == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
 +            && ctx->param->auth_level < 3)
 +        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
 +        return 1;
 +
     return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
 }
 diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
 index aa1be5ca7f..aa69e2b844 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
 digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
 option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
 that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
 -B<no>.
 +B<no>.  Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature
 +algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 2, despite the definition of
 +security level 2 of 112 bits of security, which SHA1 does not meet.  Because
 +TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key
 +material, disabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or
 +newer.
 =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include "crypto/x509.h"
 #include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
@@ -1561,19 +1562,27 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
         return 0;
     }
 -    /*
 -     * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
 -     * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
 -     */
 -    sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
 -    sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
 -    secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
 -    if (secbits == 0 ||
 -        !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
 -                      md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
 -                      (void *)sigalgstr)) {
 -        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 -        return 0;
 +
 +    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->session_ctx->libctx, 0)
 +            && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3) {
 +        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
 +    } else {
 +        /*
 +         * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
 +         * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
 +         */
 +        sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
 +        sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
 +        secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->session_ctx, lu);
 +        if (secbits == 0 ||
 +            !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
 +                          md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
 +                          (void *)sigalgstr)) {
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
     }
     /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
     s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
@@ -2106,6 +2115,14 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
         }
     }
 +    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->session_ctx->libctx, 0)
 +            && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3) {
 +        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
 +        return 1;
 +    }
 +
     /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
     secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
     sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
@@ -2977,6 +2994,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
 {
     /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
     int secbits, nid, pknid;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
 +
     /* Don't check signature if self signed */
     if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
@@ -2985,6 +3004,25 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
     /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
     if (nid == NID_undef)
         nid = pknid;
 +
 +    if (x && x->libctx)
 +        libctx = x->libctx;
 +    else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = ctx->libctx;
 +    else if (s && s->session_ctx && s->session_ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = s->session_ctx->libctx;
 +    else
 +        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
 +
 +    if (nid == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
 +            && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3)
 +                || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 3)
 +            ))
 +        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
 +        return 1;
 +
     if (s != NULL)
         return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
     else
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
     run(app([@args]));
 }
 -plan tests => 193;
 +plan tests => 192;
 # Canonical success
 ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -387,8 +387,9 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"
 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
     "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
 -ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
 -    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
 +## rh-allow-sha1-signatures=yes allows this to pass despite -auth_level 1
 +#ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
 +#    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
     "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
 -- 
 2.35.1
--- a/SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num
 --- openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale	2022-06-01 12:35:52.667498724 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num	2022-06-01 12:36:08.112633093 +0200
@@ -5425,5 +5425,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons      5664	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_STORE_delete                       5665	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BIO_ADDR_copy                           5666	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
 +OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     ? 	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp	2022-11-25 12:50:22.449760653 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c	2022-11-25 12:51:19.416350584 +0100
@@ -342,7 +342,12 @@ int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char
 #endif
 }
 -int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
 +int
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif
 +OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
 {
     int t;
@@ -352,7 +354,12 @@ int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, c
     return t;
 }
 -int OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
 +int
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif
 +OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
 {
     int t;
     size_t i;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
 --- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp	2022-11-25 18:19:05.669769076 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t	2022-11-25 18:31:20.993392678 +0100
@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ foreach my $libname (@libnames) {
                   s| .*||;
                   # Drop OpenSSL dynamic version information if there is any
                   s|\@\@.+$||;
 +                  s|\@.+$||;
                   # Return the result
                   $_
               }
--- a/SOURCES/0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
@ -1,949 +0,0 @@
 From 012e319b3d5b936a9208b1c75c13d9c4a2d0cc04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 24/49] 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
 Patch-name: 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
 Patch-id: 58
 Patch-status: |
    # # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2053289
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 providers/common/securitycheck.c              |   1 +
 .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     |  35 +++++
 .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 140 +++++++++++++-----
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |   5 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  27 +++-
 5 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 index fe694c4e96..f635b5aec8 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  * Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
  * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
  */
 +/* Red Hat build implements some extra limitations in providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c */
 int ossl_rsa_check_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa, int operation)
 {
     int protect = 0;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 index 71bfa344d4..d548560f1f 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -135,6 +135,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
     return rsa_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT);
 }
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +static int fips_padding_allowed(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
 +{
 +    if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING
 +        || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +# endif
 +
 static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
                        size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 {
@@ -144,6 +155,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +# endif
 +
     if (out == NULL) {
         size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
@@ -206,6 +229,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +# endif
 +
     if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) {
         if (out == NULL) {
             *outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 index 76ddc1ec60..62d55308b0 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
@@ -248,13 +248,13 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974002aa6e6160b481447c6819947c2d3b537a6e377
 Output = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
 # RSA decrypt
 -
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
 Input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
 Output = "Hello World"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C70
 Output = "Hello World"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # Corrupted ciphertext
 # Note: output is generated synthethically by the Bleichenbacher workaround
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C70
 Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # Corrupted ciphertext
 # Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
@@ -345,82 +345,90 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
 # RSA decrypt
 # a random positive test case
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test case decrypting to empty
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 20aaa8adbbc593a924ba1c5c7990b5c2242ae4b99d0fe636a19a4cf754edbcee774e472fe028160ed42634f8864900cb514006da642cae6ae8c7d087caebcfa6dad1551301e130344989a1d462d4164505f6393933450c67bc6d39d8f5160907cabc251b737925a1cf21e5c6aa5781b7769f6a2a583d97cce008c0f8b6add5f0b2bd80bee60237aa39bb20719fe75749f4bc4e42466ef5a861ae3a92395c7d858d430bfe38040f445ea93fa2958b503539800ffa5ce5f8cf51fa8171a91f36cb4f4575e8de6b4d3f096ee140b938fd2f50ee13f0d050222e2a72b0a3069ff3a6738e82c87090caa5aed4fcbe882c49646aa250b98f12f83c8d528113614a29e7
 Output =
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # invalid decrypting to max length message
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = 0f9b
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 1690ebcceece2ce024f382e467cf8510e74514120937978576caf684d4a02ad569e8d76cbe365a060e00779de2f0865ccf0d923de3b4783a4e2c74f422e2f326086c390b658ba47f31ab013aa80f468c71256e5fa5679b24e83cd82c3d1e05e398208155de2212993cd2b8bab6987cf4cc1293f19909219439d74127545e9ed8a706961b8ee2119f6bfacafbef91b75a789ba65b8b833bc6149cf49b5c4d2c6359f62808659ba6541e1cd24bf7f7410486b5103f6c0ea29334ea6f4975b17387474fe920710ea61568d7b7c0a7916acf21665ad5a31c4eabcde44f8fb6120d8457afa1f3c85d517cda364af620113ae5a3c52a048821731922737307f77a1081
 Output = 4f02
 # positive test with 11 byte long value
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = a2e8f114ea8d05d12dc843e3cc3b2edc8229ff2a028bda29ba9d55e3cd02911902fef1f42a075bf05e8016e8567213d6f260fa49e360779dd81aeea3e04c2cb567e0d72b98bf754014561b7511e083d20e0bfb9cd23f8a0d3c88900c49d2fcd5843ff0765607b2026f28202a87aa94678aed22a0c20724541394cd8f44e373eba1d2bae98f516c1e2ba3d86852d064f856b1daf24795e767a2b90396e50743e3150664afab131fe40ea405dcf572dd1079af1d3f0392ccadcca0a12740dbb213b925ca2a06b1bc1383e83a658c82ba2e7427342379084d5f66b544579f07664cb26edd4f10fd913fdbc0de05ef887d4d1ec1ac95652397ea7fd4e4759fda8b
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive that generates a 0 byte long synthetic message internally
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = b5e49308f6e9590014ffaffc5b8560755739dd501f1d4e9227a7d291408cf4b753f292322ff8bead613bf2caa181b221bc38caf6392deafb28eb21ad60930841ed02fd6225cc9c463409adbe7d8f32440212fbe3881c51375bb09565efb22e62b071472fb38676e5b4e23a0617db5d14d93519ac0007a30a9c822eb31c38b57fcb1be29608fcf1ca2abdcaf5d5752bbc2b5ac7dba5afcff4a5641da360dd01f7112539b1ed46cdb550a3b1006559b9fe1891030ec80f0727c42401ddd6cbb5e3c80f312df6ec89394c5a7118f573105e7ab00fe57833c126141b50a935224842addfb479f75160659ba28877b512bb9a93084ad8bec540f92640f63a11a010e0
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive that generates a 245 byte long synthetic message internally
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 1ea0b50ca65203d0a09280d39704b24fe6e47800189db5033f202761a78bafb270c5e25abd1f7ecc6e7abc4f26d1b0cd9b8c648d529416ee64ccbdd7aa72a771d0353262b543f0e436076f40a1095f5c7dfd10dcf0059ccb30e92dfa5e0156618215f1c3ff3aa997a9d999e506924f5289e3ac72e5e2086cc7b499d71583ed561028671155db4005bee01800a7cdbdae781dd32199b8914b5d4011dd6ff11cd26d46aad54934d293b0bc403dd211bf13b5a5c6836a5e769930f437ffd8634fb7371776f4bc88fa6c271d8aa6013df89ae6470154497c4ac861be2a1c65ebffec139bf7aaba3a81c7c5cdd84da9af5d3edfb957848074686b5837ecbcb6a41c50
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
 Input = 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
 Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
 # (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -428,7 +436,7 @@ Input = 9b2ec9c0c917c98f1ad3d0119aec6be51ae3106e9af1914d48600ab6a2c0c0c8ae02a2dc
 Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
 # (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -436,7 +444,7 @@ Input = 782c2b59a21a511243820acedd567c136f6d3090c115232a82a5efb0b178285f55b5ec2d
 Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
 # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
 # plaintext
@@ -445,7 +453,7 @@ Input = 0096136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27f895d1faa51c800dafce73d001d60796cd4e2a
 Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
 # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
 # plaintext
@@ -454,7 +462,7 @@ Input = 96136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27f895d1faa51c800dafce73d001d60796cd4e2ac3
 Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
 # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
 # plaintext
@@ -463,7 +471,7 @@ Input = 0000587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f
 Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
 # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
 # plaintext
@@ -472,7 +480,7 @@ Input = 587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f136c
 Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
 # to random 11 byte long synthetic plaintext
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -480,7 +488,7 @@ Input = 1786550ce8d8433052e01ecba8b76d3019f1355b212ac9d0f5191b023325a7e7714b7802
 Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
 # of padding
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -488,7 +496,7 @@ Input = 179598823812d2c58a7eb50521150a48bcca8b4eb53414018b6bca19f4801456c5e36a94
 Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eighth
 # byte of padding
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -496,7 +504,7 @@ Input = a7a340675a82c30e22219a55bc07cdf36d47d01834c1834f917f18b517419ce9de2a9646
 Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
 # byte
 Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -551,53 +559,58 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
 # RSA decrypt
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = 42
 # simple positive test case
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test case with null padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 0002aadf846a329fadc6760980303dbd87bfadfa78c2015ce4d6c5782fd9d3f1078bd3c0a2c5bfbdd1c024552e5054d98b5bcdc94e476dd280e64d650089326542ce7c61d4f1ab40004c2e6a88a883613568556a10f3f9edeab67ae8dddc1e6b0831c2793d2715de943f7ce34c5c05d1b09f14431fde566d17e76c9feee90d86a2c158616ec81dda0c642f58c0ba8fa4495843124a7235d46fb4069715a51bf710fd024259131ba94da73597ace494856c94e7a3ec261545793b0990279b15fa91c7fd13dbfb1df2f221dab9fa9f7c1d21e48aa49f6aaecbabf5ee76dc6c2af2317ffb4e303115386a97f8729afc3d0c89419669235f1a3a69570e0836c79fc162
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 02aadf846a329fadc6760980303dbd87bfadfa78c2015ce4d6c5782fd9d3f1078bd3c0a2c5bfbdd1c024552e5054d98b5bcdc94e476dd280e64d650089326542ce7c61d4f1ab40004c2e6a88a883613568556a10f3f9edeab67ae8dddc1e6b0831c2793d2715de943f7ce34c5c05d1b09f14431fde566d17e76c9feee90d86a2c158616ec81dda0c642f58c0ba8fa4495843124a7235d46fb4069715a51bf710fd024259131ba94da73597ace494856c94e7a3ec261545793b0990279b15fa91c7fd13dbfb1df2f221dab9fa9f7c1d21e48aa49f6aaecbabf5ee76dc6c2af2317ffb4e303115386a97f8729afc3d0c89419669235f1a3a69570e0836c79fc162
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = "lorem ipsum"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
 Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
 Decrypt = RSA-2049
 Input = 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
@@ -661,14 +674,14 @@ ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAE=
 PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthetic one
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output =
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
 # in the last value
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -676,46 +689,51 @@ Input = 7db0390d75fcf9d4c59cf27b264190d856da9abd11e92334d0e5f71005cfed865a711dfa
 Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random invalid that generates a synthetic of maximum size
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = 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
 # a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 6c60845a854b4571f678941ae35a2ac03f67c21e21146f9db1f2306be9f136453b86ad55647d4f7b5c9e62197aaff0c0e40a3b54c4cde14e774b1c5959b6c2a2302896ffae1f73b00b862a20ff4304fe06cea7ff30ecb3773ca9af27a0b54547350d7c07dfb0a39629c7e71e83fc5af9b2adbaf898e037f1de696a3f328cf45af7ec9aff7173854087fb8fbf34be981efbd8493f9438d1b2ba2a86af082662aa46ae9adfbec51e5f3d9550a4dd1dcb7c8969c9587a6edc82a8cabbc785c40d9fbd12064559fb769450ac3e47e87bc046148130d7eaa843e4b3ccef3675d0630500803cb7ffee3882378c1a404e850c3e20707bb745e42b13c18786c4976076ed9fa8fd0ff15e571bef02cbbe2f90c908ac3734a433b73e778d4d17fcc28f49185ebc6e8536a06d293202d94496453bfdf1c2c7833a3f99fa38ca8a81f42eaa529d603b890308a319c0ab63a35ff8ebac965f6278f5a7e5d622be5d5fe55f0ca3ec993d55430d2bf59c5d3e860e90c16d91a04596f6fdf60d89ed95d88c036dde
 Output = "forty two"
 # a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = "forty two"
 # a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = "forty two"
 # a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = "forty two"
 # a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = "forty two"
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = 257906ca6de8307728
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
 # second to last value from PRF
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -723,7 +741,7 @@ Input = 758c215aa6acd61248062b88284bf43c13cb3b3d02410be4238607442f1c0216706e21a0
 Output = 043383c929060374ed
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
 # PRF
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -731,35 +749,35 @@ Input = 7b22d5e62d287968c6622171a1f75db4b0fd15cdf3134a1895d235d56f8d8fe619f2bf48
 Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 6db80adb5ff0a768caf1378ecc382a694e7d1bde2eff4ba12c48aaf794ded7a994a5b2b57acec20dbec4ae385c9dd531945c0f197a5496908725fc99d88601a17d3bb0b2d38d2c1c3100f39955a4cb3dbed5a38bf900f23d91e173640e4ec655c84fdfe71fcdb12a386108fcf718c9b7af37d39703e882436224c877a2235e8344fba6c951eb7e2a4d1d1de81fb463ac1b880f6cc0e59ade05c8ce35179ecd09546731fc07b141d3d6b342a97ae747e61a9130f72d37ac5a2c30215b6cbd66c7db893810df58b4c457b4b54f34428247d584e0fa71062446210db08254fb9ead1ba1a393c724bd291f0cf1a7143f32df849051dc896d7d176fef3b57ab6dffd626d0c3044e9edb2e3d012ace202d2581df01bec7e9aa0727a6650dd373d374f0bc0f4a611f8139dfe97d63e70c6188f4df5b672e47c51d8aa567097293fbff127c75ec690b43407578b73c85451710a0cece58fd497d7f7bd36a8a92783ef7dc6265dff52aac8b70340b996508d39217f2783ce6fc91a1cc94bb2ac487b84f62
 Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
 Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
 # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
 -FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
 +Availablein = default
 # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
 Decrypt = RSA-3072
 Input = 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
@@ -1106,36 +1124,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mNXb79cyY+NygUJ0OBgWbtfdY2
 h90qjKHS9PvY4Q==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a
 Output=6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=640db1acc58e0568fe5407e5f9b701dff8c3c91e716c536fc7fcec6cb5b71c1165988d4a279e1577d730fc7a29932e3f00c81515236d8d8e31017a7a09df4352d904cdeb79aa583adcc31ea698a4c05283daba9089be5491f67c1a4ee48dc74bbbe6643aef846679b4cb395a352d5ed115912df696ffe0702932946d71492b44
 Output=750c4047f547e8e41411856523298ac9bae245efaf1397fbe56f9dd5
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=423736ed035f6026af276c35c0b3741b365e5f76ca091b4e8c29e2f0befee603595aa8322d602d2e625e95eb81b2f1c9724e822eca76db8618cf09c5343503a4360835b5903bc637e3879fb05e0ef32685d5aec5067cd7cc96fe4b2670b6eac3066b1fcf5686b68589aafb7d629b02d8f8625ca3833624d4800fb081b1cf94eb
 Output=d94ae0832e6445ce42331cb06d531a82b1db4baad30f746dc916df24d4e3c2451fff59a6423eb0e1d02d4fe646cf699dfd818c6e97b051
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755
 Output=52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=36f6e34d94a8d34daacba33a2139d00ad85a9345a86051e73071620056b920e219005855a213a0f23897cdcd731b45257c777fe908202befdd0b58386b1244ea0cf539a05d5d10329da44e13030fd760dcd644cfef2094d1910d3f433e1c7c6dd18bc1f2df7f643d662fb9dd37ead9059190f4fa66ca39e869c4eb449cbdc439
 Output=8da89fd9e5f974a29feffb462b49180f6cf9e802
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1160,36 +1184,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64e2EbcTLLfqc1bCMVHB53UVB8
 eG2e4XlBcKjI6A==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0181af8922b9fcb4d79d92ebe19815992fc0c1439d8bcd491398a0f4ad3a329a5bd9385560db532683c8b7da04e4b12aed6aacdf471c34c9cda891addcc2df3456653aa6382e9ae59b54455257eb099d562bbe10453f2b6d13c59c02e10f1f8abb5da0d0570932dacf2d0901db729d0fefcc054e70968ea540c81b04bcaefe720e
 Output=8ff00caa605c702830634d9a6c3d42c652b58cf1d92fec570beee7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=018759ff1df63b2792410562314416a8aeaf2ac634b46f940ab82d64dbf165eee33011da749d4bab6e2fcd18129c9e49277d8453112b429a222a8471b070993998e758861c4d3f6d749d91c4290d332c7a4ab3f7ea35ff3a07d497c955ff0ffc95006b62c6d296810d9bfab024196c7934012c2df978ef299aba239940cba10245
 Output=2d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=018802bab04c60325e81c4962311f2be7c2adce93041a00719c88f957575f2c79f1b7bc8ced115c706b311c08a2d986ca3b6a9336b147c29c6f229409ddec651bd1fdd5a0b7f610c9937fdb4a3a762364b8b3206b4ea485fd098d08f63d4aa8bb2697d027b750c32d7f74eaf5180d2e9b66b17cb2fa55523bc280da10d14be2053
 Output=74fc88c51bc90f77af9d5e9a4a70133d4b4e0b34da3c37c7ef8e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641
 Output=a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec
 Output=2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1214,36 +1244,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+WJ9N6z/c8J3nmNLsmARwsj38z
 Ya4qnqZe1onjY5o=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80
 Output=087820b569e8fa8d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5
 Output=4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a
 Output=d94cd0e08fa404ed89
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0
 Output=6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60
 Output=df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1268,36 +1304,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/kSbj6XloJ5qGWywrQmUkz8Uq
 aD0x7TDrmEvkEro=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8
 Output=4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e
 Output=b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065
 Output=bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4
 Output=fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2
 Output=28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1322,36 +1364,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/GOeBWKNKXF1fhgoPbAQHGn0B
 MSwGUGLx60i3nRyDyw==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5
 Output=af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad
 Output=a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967
 Output=308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf
 Output=15c5b9ee1185
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723
 Output=21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1376,36 +1424,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hqziQG4iyeBY3bSuVAYnri/bCC
 Yejn5Ly8mU2q+jBcRQ==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3
 Output=4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f
 Output=5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65
 Output=b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8
 Output=684e3038c5c041f7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab
 Output=32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1430,36 +1484,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4ohPIOWIGzfukQi8Y1vYdvLXS
 FMlxv0gq65dqc3DC
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1
 Output=47aae909
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6
 Output=1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b
 Output=d976fc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac
 Output=d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478
 Output=bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1484,36 +1544,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15EtXgyL2QF1iEdoZUZZmqof9xM
 2MiPa249Z+lh3Luj0A==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61
 Output=050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d
 Output=4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f
 Output=8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0
 Output=fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2
 Output=4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1544,36 +1610,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSckFlJCf6zfby2VL63Jo7IAeWo
 tKo5Eb69iFQvBb4=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72
 Output=f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8
 Output=81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3
 Output=fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858
 Output=f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e
 Output=53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index 4e368c730b..879d5d76eb 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
 +    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
         "-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
         $smrsa1,
@@ -1118,6 +1118,9 @@ sub check_availability {
     return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
         if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
 +    return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
 +        if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
 +
     return "";
 }
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index e2dcb68fb5..0775112b40 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -493,6 +493,18 @@ sub testssl {
             # the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
             my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
             my $ciphersuites = "";
 +            my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
 +AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
 +	    );
             foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
                 if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
                     note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
@@ -504,11 +516,16 @@ sub testssl {
                     } else {
                         $cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
                     }
 -                    ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
 -                                 $cipher,
 -                                 "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
 -                                 $flag || ()])),
 -                       "Testing $cipher");
 +                    if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
 +                        note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
 +                        ok(1);
 +                    } else {
 +                        ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
 +                                     $cipher,
 +                                     "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
 +                                     $flag || ()])),
 +                           "Testing $cipher");
 +                    }
                 }
             }
             next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch
@ -1,570 +0,0 @@
 From 5f4f350ce797a7cd2fdca84c474ee196da9d6fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 17:25:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider
 For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default
 provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more
 lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think
 continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the
 published chosen-prefix collision attacks.
 As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS
 provider.
 This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail:
 - 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1.
 - 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and
  evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default",
  which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled.
 - 80-test_cms: Re-create all certificates in test/smime-certificates
  with SHA256 signatures while keeping the same private keys. These
  certificates were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the
  FIPS provider.
  Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default
  provider, where SHA-1 is available.
 - 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with
  the FIPS provider.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c |  4 --
 .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 --
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |  8 +--
 test/acvp_test.inc                            | 20 -------
 .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt        |  7 +++
 .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 51 +++++++++++++++-
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |  4 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  4 ++
 test/smime-certs/smdh.pem                     | 18 +++---
 test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smec1.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smec2.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smec3.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smroot.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 19 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 index fa3822f39f..c365d7b13a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -128,11 +128,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
         int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
         int sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
         md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                             sha1_allowed);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 index 99b228e82c..44a22832ec 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
         return 0;
     }
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -    sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
     sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                     sha1_allowed);
     if (md_nid < 0) {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index f66d7705c3..34f45175e8 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -292,11 +292,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
         int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
         int sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
         md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                      sha1_allowed);
@@ -1355,8 +1351,10 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
         && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
 +#else
         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
 -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
         if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
             pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
         }
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
 index ad11d3ae1e..73b24bdb0c 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.inc
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -1841,17 +1841,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
         FAIL
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        3072,
 -        "SHA1",
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_msg),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_n),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_e),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_sig),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -        PASS
 -    },
     {
         "x931",
         3072,
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 index f36982845d..51e507a61c 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
 Title = ECDSA tests
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
 # Digest too long
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Digest too short
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Digest invalid
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Invalid signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -79,12 +84,14 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # BER signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 index b8d8bb2993..8dd566067b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ NDL6WCBbets=
 Title = RSA tests
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -112,24 +113,28 @@ Ctrl = digest:SHA512-224
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123456789ABC"
 Output = 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
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = 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
 Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 # Leading zero in the signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 00c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2eaee6cd60089a52482d4809a238149520df3bdde4cb9e23d9307b05c0a6f327052325a29adf2cc95b66523be7024e2a585c3d4db15dfbe146efe0ecdc0402e33fe5d40324ee96c5c3edd374a15cdc0f5d84aa243c0f07e188c6518fbfceae158a9943be398e31097da81b62074f626eff738be6160741d5a26957a482b3251fd85d8df78b98148459de10aa93305dbb4a5230aa1da291a9b0e481918f99b7638d72bb687f97661d304ae145d64a474437a4ef39d7b8059332ddeb07e92bf6e0e3acaf8afedc93795e4511737ec1e7aab6d5bc9466afc950c1c17b48ad
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # Mismatched digest
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Corrupted signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -144,6 +150,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # parameter is not NULLt
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -151,42 +158,49 @@ Output = 3ec3fc29eb6e122bd7aa361cd09fe1bcbe85311096a7b9e4799cedfb2351ce0ab7fe4e7
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # embedded digest too long
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # embedded digest too short
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # Garbage after DigestInfo
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # invalid tag for parameter
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Verify using public key
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -370,6 +385,8 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
 Output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
 # Verify using salt length auto detect
 +# In the FIPS provider on RHEL-9, the default digest for PSS signatures is SHA-256
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:auto
@@ -404,6 +421,10 @@ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DD
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Verify using default parameters, explicitly setting parameters
 +# NOTE: RSA-PSS-DEFAULT contains a restriction to use SHA1 as digest, which
 +# RHEL-9 does not support in FIPS mode; all these tests are thus marked
 +# Availablein = default.
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:20
@@ -412,6 +433,7 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Verify explicitly setting parameters "digest" salt length
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
@@ -420,18 +442,21 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Verify using salt length larger than minimum
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:30
 Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output = 6BF7EDC63A0BA184EEEC7F3020FEC8F5EBF38C2B76481881F48BCCE5796E7AB294548BA9AE810457C7723CABD1BDE94CF59CF7C0FC7461B22760C8ED703DD98E97BFDD61FA8D1181C411F6DEE5FF159F4850746D78EDEE385A363DC28E2CB373D5CAD7953F3BD5E639BE345732C03A1BDEA268814DA036EB1891C82D4012F3B903D86636055F87B96FC98806AD1B217685A4D754046A5DE0B0D7870664BE07902153EC85BA457BE7D7F89D7FE0F626D02A9CBBB2BB479DDA1A5CAE75247FB7BF6BFB15C1D3FD9E6B1573CCDBC72011C3B97716058BB11C7EA2E4E56ADAFE1F5DE6A7FD405AC5890100F9C3408EFFB5C73BF73F48177FF743B4B819D0699D507B
 # Verify using maximum salt length
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:max
 Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Attempt to change salt length below minimum
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
@@ -439,21 +464,25 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Attempt to change padding mode
 # Note this used to return PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
 # but it is limited because setparams only returns 0 or 1.
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Attempt to change digest
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = digest:sha256
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD
 Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
 Reason = invalid salt length
 # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD2
 Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
 Reason = invalid salt length
@@ -472,36 +501,42 @@ CAltWyuLbfXWce9jd8CSHLI8Jwpw4lmOb/idGfEFrMLT8Ms18pKA4Thrb2TE7yLh
 4fINDOjP+yJJvZohNwIDAQAB
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=cd8b6538cb8e8de566b68bd067569dbf1ee2718e
 Output=9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=e35befc17a1d160b9ce35fbd8eb16e7ee491d3fd
 Output=3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0652ec67bcee30f9d2699122b91c19abdba89f91
 Output=666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=39c21c4cceda9c1adf839c744e1212a6437575ec
 Output=4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=36dae913b77bd17cae6e7b09453d24544cebb33c
 Output=1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -517,36 +552,42 @@ swU7R97S7NSkyu/WFIM9yLtiLzF+0Ha4BX/o3j+ESArV6D5KYZBKTySPs5cCc1fh
 0w5GMTmBXG/U/VrFuBcqRSMOy2MYoE8UVdhOWosCAwEAAQ==
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2715a49b8b0012cd7aee84c116446e6dfe3faec0
 Output=586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2dac956d53964748ac364d06595827c6b4f143cd
 Output=80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=28d98c46cccafbd3bc04e72f967a54bd3ea12298
 Output=484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0866d2ff5a79f25ef668cd6f31b42dee421e4c0e
 Output=84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=6a5b4be4cd36cc97dfde9995efbf8f097a4a991a
 Output=82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -564,36 +605,42 @@ F7jfF3jbOB3OCctK0FilEQAac4GY7ifPVaE7dUU5kGWC7IsXS9WNXR89dnxhNyGu
 BQIDAQAB
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=9596bb630cf6a8d4ea4600422b9eba8b13675dd4
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=b503319399277fd6c1c8f1033cbf04199ea21716
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=50aaede8536b2c307208b275a67ae2df196c7628
 Output=6e3e4d7b6b15d2fb46013b8900aa5bbb3939cf2c095717987042026ee62c74c54cffd5d7d57efbbf950a0f5c574fa09d3fc1c9f513b05b4ff50dd8df7edfa20102854c35e592180119a70ce5b085182aa02d9ea2aa90d1df03f2daae885ba2f5d05afdac97476f06b93b5bc94a1a80aa9116c4d615f333b098892b25fface266f5db5a5a3bcc10a824ed55aad35b727834fb8c07da28fcf416a5d9b2224f1f8b442b36f91e456fdea2d7cfe3367268de0307a4c74e924159ed33393d5e0655531c77327b89821bdedf880161c78cd4196b5419f7acc3f13e5ebf161b6e7c6724716ca33b85c2e25640192ac2859651d50bde7eb976e51cec828b98b6563b86bb
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=aa0b72b8b371ddd10c8ae474425ccccf8842a294
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=fad3902c9750622a2bc672622c48270cc57d3ea8
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1329,11 +1376,13 @@ Title = RSA FIPS tests
 # FIPS tests
 -# Verifying with SHA1 is permitted in fips mode for older applications
 +# Verifying with SHA1 is not permitted on RHEL-9 in FIPS mode
 +Availablein = fips
 DigestVerify = SHA1
 Key = RSA-2048
 Input = "Hello "
 Output = 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
 +Result = DIGESTVERIFYINIT_ERROR
 # Verifying with a 1024 bit key is permitted in fips mode for older applications
 DigestVerify = SHA256
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index 48a92f735d..34afe91b88 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
         "-certfile", $smroot,
         "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&final_compare
     ],
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
     [ "signed zero-length content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont_zero, "-md", "sha1",
         "-certfile", $smroot, "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&zero_compare
     ],
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index 8c52b637fc..ff75c5b6ec 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ sub testssl {
                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
           }
 +        SKIP: {
 +          skip "SSLv3 is not supported by the FIPS provider", 4
 +              if $provider eq "fips";
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
@@ -402,6 +405,7 @@ sub testssl {
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
 +         }
         SKIP: {
             skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 4
--- a/SOURCES/0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
 From e3d6fca1af033d00c47bcd8f9ba28fcf1aa476aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:02:49 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] fips: Expose a FIPS indicator
 FIPS 140-3 requires us to indicate whether an operation was using
 approved services or not. The FIPS 140-3 implementation guidelines
 provide two basic approaches to doing this: implicit indicators, and
 explicit indicators.
 Implicit indicators are basically the concept of "if the operation
 passes, it was approved". We were originally aiming for implicit
 indicators in our copy of OpenSSL. However, this proved to be a problem,
 because we wanted to certify a signature service, and FIPS 140-3
 requires that a signature service computes the digest to be signed
 within the boundaries of the FIPS module. Since we were planning to
 certify fips.so only, this means that EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify
 would have to be blocked. Unfortunately, EVP_SignFinal uses
 EVP_PKEY_sign internally, but outside of fips.so and thus outside of the
 FIPS module boundary. This means that using implicit indicators in
 combination with certifying only fips.so would require us to block both
 EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal, which are the two APIs currently used
 by most users of OpenSSL for signatures.
 EVP_DigestSign would be acceptable, but has only been added in 3.0 and
 is thus not yet widely used.
 As a consequence, we've decided to introduce explicit indicators so that
 EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal can continue to work for now, but
 FIPS-aware applications can query the explicit indicator to check
 whether the operation was approved.
 To avoid affecting the ABI and public API too much, this is implemented
 as an exported symbol in fips.so and a private header, so applications
 that wish to use this will have to dlopen(3) fips.so, locate the
 function using dlsym(3), and then call it. These applications will have
 to build against the private header in order to use the returned
 pointer.
 Modify util/mkdef.pl to support exposing a symbol only for a specific
 provider identified by its name and path.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 doc/build.info                      |   6 ++
 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 providers/fips/fipsprov.c           |  71 +++++++++++++
 providers/fips/indicator.h          |  66 ++++++++++++
 util/mkdef.pl                       |  25 ++++-
 util/providers.num                  |   1 +
 6 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 create mode 100644 providers/fips/indicator.h
 diff --git a/doc/build.info b/doc/build.info
 index b0aa4297a4..af235113bb 100644
 --- a/doc/build.info
 +++ b/doc/build.info
@@ -4389,6 +4389,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
 GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
 DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
 GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
 +DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 DEPEND[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
 GENERATE[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
 DEPEND[man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
@@ -4631,6 +4635,7 @@ html/man7/ct.html \
 html/man7/des_modes.html \
 html/man7/evp.html \
 html/man7/fips_module.html \
 +html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-digest.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-kdf.html \
@@ -4754,6 +4759,7 @@ man/man7/ct.7 \
 man/man7/des_modes.7 \
 man/man7/evp.7 \
 man/man7/fips_module.7 \
 +man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-digest.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-kdf.7 \
 diff --git a/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..23db2b395c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
 +=pod
 +
 +=head1 NAME
 +
 +fips_module_indicators - Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS module indicators guide
 +
 +=head1 DESCRIPTION
 +
 +This guide documents how the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS provider
 +implements Approved Security Service Indicators according to the FIPS 140-3
 +Implementation Guidelines, section 2.4.C. See
 +L<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf>
 +for the FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidelines.
 +
 +For all approved services except signatures, the Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider
 +uses the return code as the indicator as understood by FIPS 140-3. That means
 +that every operation that succeeds denotes use of an approved security service.
 +Operations that do not succeed may not have been approved security services, or
 +may have been used incorrectly.
 +
 +For signatures, an explicit indicator API is available to determine whether
 +a selected operation is an approved security service, in combination with the
 +return code of the operation. For a signature operation to be approved, the
 +explicit indicator must claim it as approved, and it must succeed.
 +
 +=head2 Querying the explicit indicator
 +
 +The Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider exports a symbol named
 +I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> that provides information on which signature
 +operations are approved security functions. To use this function, either link
 +against I<fips.so> directly, or load it at runtime using dlopen(3) and
 +dlsym(3).
 +
 +    #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
 +    #include "providers/fips/indicator.h"
 +
 +    void *provider = dlopen("/usr/lib64/ossl-modules/fips.so", RTLD_LAZY);
 +    if (provider == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALORITHM *(*redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator)(int) \
 +        = dlsym(provider, "redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator");
 +    if (redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
 +        fprintf(stderr, "Does your copy of fips.so have the required Red Hat"
 +                        " patches?\n");
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +Note that this uses the I<providers/fips/indicator.h> header, which is not
 +public. Install the I<openssl-debugsource> package from the I<BaseOS-debuginfo>
 +repository using I<dnf debuginfo-install openssl> and include
 +I</usr/src/debug/openssl-3.*/> in the compiler's include path.
 +
 +I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> expects an operation ID as its only
 +argument. Currently, the only supported operation ID is I<OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE> to
 +obtain the indicators for signature operations. On success, the return value is
 +a pointer to an array of I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_STRUCT>s. On failure, NULL is
 +returned. The last entry in the array is indicated by I<algorithm_names> being
 +NULL.
 +
 +    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
 +        const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
 +        const char *property_definition; /* key */
 +        const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
 +    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
 +
 +    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
 +        int function_id;
 +        int approved;
 +    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
 +
 +The I<algorithm_names> field is a colon-separated list of algorithm names from
 +one of the I<PROV_NAMES_...> constants, e.g., I<PROV_NAMES_RSA>. strtok(3) can
 +be used to locate the appropriate entry. See the example below, where
 +I<algorithm> contains the algorithm name to search for:
 +
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicator_dispatch = NULL;
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *indicator =
 +        redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(operation_id);
 +    if (indicator == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for operation, probably using implicit"
 +                        " indicators.\n");
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +    for (; indicator->algorithm_names != NULL; ++indicator) {
 +        char *algorithm_names = strdup(indicator->algorithm_names);
 +        if (algorithm_names == NULL) {
 +            perror("strdup(3)");
 +            // handle error
 +        }
 +
 +        const char *algorithm_name = strtok(algorithm_names, ":");
 +        for (; algorithm_name != NULL; algorithm_name = strtok(NULL, ":")) {
 +            if (strcasecmp(algorithm_name, algorithm) == 0) {
 +                indicator_dispatch = indicator->indicators;
 +                free(algorithm_names);
 +                algorithm_names = NULL;
 +                break;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        free(algorithm_names);
 +    }
 +    if (indicator_dispatch == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for algorithm %s.\n", algorithm);
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +If an appropriate I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH> array is available for the
 +given algorithm name, it maps function IDs to their approval status. The last
 +entry is indicated by a zero I<function_id>. I<approved> is
 +I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED> if the operation is an approved security
 +service, or part of an approved security service, or
 +I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED> otherwise. Any other value is invalid.
 +Function IDs are I<OSSL_FUNC_*> constants from I<openssl/core_dispatch.h>,
 +e.g., I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE> or I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN>.
 +
 +Assuming I<function_id> is the function in question, the following code can be
 +used to query the approval status:
 +
 +    for (; indicator_dispatch->function_id != 0; ++indicator_dispatch) {
 +        if (indicator_dispatch->function_id == function_id) {
 +            switch (indicator_dispatch->approved) {
 +                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED:
 +                    // approved security service
 +                    break;
 +                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED:
 +                    // unapproved security service
 +                    break;
 +                default:
 +                    // invalid result
 +                    break;
 +            }
 +            break;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +=head1 SEE ALSO
 +
 +L<fips_module(7)>, L<provider(7)>
 +
 +=head1 COPYRIGHT
 +
 +Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 +
 +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
 diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 index de391ce067..1cfd71c5cf 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include "self_test.h"
 #include "crypto/context.h"
 #include "internal/core.h"
 +#include "indicator.h"
 static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
 static const char FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=no";
@@ -425,6 +426,68 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_rsa_signature_indicators[] = {
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
 +};
 +
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators[] = {
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
 +};
 +
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM redhat_indicator_fips_signature[] = {
 +    { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +        redhat_rsa_signature_indicators },
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +    { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +        redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators },
 +#endif
 +    { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 +};
 +
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_asym_cipher[] = {
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_asym_cipher_functions },
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
@@ -527,6 +590,14 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void) {
     return NULL;
 }
 +const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id) {
 +    switch (operation_id) {
 +    case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
 +        return redhat_indicator_fips_signature;
 +    }
 +    return NULL;
 +}
 +
 static void fips_teardown(void *provctx)
 {
     OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx));
 diff --git a/providers/fips/indicator.h b/providers/fips/indicator.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..b323efe44c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/providers/fips/indicator.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
 +# define OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
 +# pragma once
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +extern "C" {
 +# endif
 +
 +# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED (0)
 +# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED (1)
 +
 +/*
 + * FIPS indicator dispatch table element.  function_id numbers and the
 + * functions are defined in core_dispatch.h, see macros with
 + * 'OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC' in their names.
 + *
 + * An array of these is always terminated by function_id == 0
 + */
 +typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
 +    int function_id;
 +    int approved;
 +} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
 +
 +/*
 + * Type to tie together algorithm names, property definition string and the
 + * algorithm implementation's FIPS indicator status in the form of a FIPS
 + * indicator dispatch table.
 + *
 + * An array of these is always terminated by algorithm_names == NULL
 + */
 +typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
 +    const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
 +    const char *property_definition; /* key */
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
 +} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
 +
 +/**
 + * Query FIPS indicator status for the given operation.  Possible values for
 + * 'operation_id' are currently only OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE, as all other algorithms
 + * use implicit indicators.  The return value is an array of
 + * OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHMs, terminated by an entry with
 + * algorithm_names == NULL.  'algorithm_names' is a colon-separated list of
 + * algorithm names, 'property_definition' a comma-separated list of properties,
 + * and 'indicators' is a list of OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH structs.  This
 + * list is terminated by function_id == 0.  'function_id' is one of the
 + * OSSL_FUNC_* constants, e.g., OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL.
 + *
 + * If there is no entry in the returned struct for the given operation_id,
 + * algorithm name, or function_id, the algorithm is unapproved.
 + */
 +const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id);
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +}
 +# endif
 +
 +#endif
 diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl
 index a1c76f7c97..eda39b71ee 100755
 --- a/util/mkdef.pl
 +++ b/util/mkdef.pl
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $ordinal_opts{filter} =
         return
             $item->exists()
             && platform_filter($item)
 -            && feature_filter($item);
 +            && feature_filter($item)
 +            && fips_filter($item, $name);
     };
 my $ordinals = OpenSSL::Ordinals->new(from => $ordinals_file);
@@ -205,6 +206,28 @@ sub feature_filter {
     return $verdict;
 }
 +sub fips_filter {
 +    my $item = shift;
 +    my $name = uc(shift);
 +    my @features = ( $item->features() );
 +
 +    # True if no features are defined
 +    return 1 if scalar @features == 0;
 +
 +    my @matches = grep(/^ONLY_.*$/, @features);
 +    if (@matches) {
 +        # There is at least one only_* flag on this symbol, check if any of
 +        # them match the name
 +        for (@matches) {
 +            if ($_ eq "ONLY_${name}") {
 +                return 1;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 sub sorter_unix {
     my $by_name = OpenSSL::Ordinals::by_name();
     my %weight = (
 diff --git a/util/providers.num b/util/providers.num
 index 4e2fa81b98..77879d0e5f 100644
 --- a/util/providers.num
 +++ b/util/providers.num
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 OSSL_provider_init                     1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator        1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:ONLY_PROVIDERS/FIPS
 -- 
 2.35.3
--- a/SOURCES/0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
 From 4a2239bd7d444c30c55b20ea8b4aeadafdfe1afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 13:59:37 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use OAEP in KATs, support fixed OAEP seed
 Review by our lab for FIPS 140-3 certification expects the RSA
 encryption and decryption tests to use a supported padding mode, not raw
 RSA signatures. Switch to RSA-OAEP for the self tests to fulfill that.
 The FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance specifies in section 10.3.A
 "Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test Requirements" that a self-test may be
 a known-answer test, a comparison test, or a fault-detection test.
 Comparison tests are not an option, because they would require
 a separate implementation of RSA-OAEP, which we do not have. Fault
 detection tests require implementing fault detection mechanisms into the
 cryptographic algorithm implementation, we we also do not have.
 As a consequence, a known-answer test must be used to test RSA
 encryption and decryption, but RSA encryption with OAEP padding is not
 deterministic, and thus encryption will always yield different results
 that could not be compared to known answers. For this reason, this
 change explicitly sets the seed in OAEP (see RFC 8017 section 7.1.1),
 which is the source of randomness for RSA-OAEP, to a fixed value. This
 setting is only available during self-test execution, and the parameter
 set using EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() will be ignored otherwise.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h                        |  8 ++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c                         | 34 ++++++--
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             | 83 +++++++++++--------
 providers/fips/self_test_kats.c               |  7 ++
 .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 41 +++++++++-
 util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm               |  1 +
 6 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
 index ea70da05ad..dde57a1a0e 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
@@ -193,4 +193,12 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to
                                          int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
                                          int flen);
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *param,
 +                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
 +                                             const char *redhat_st_seed);
 +
 #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_RSA_LOCAL_H */
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 index d9be1a4f98..b2f7f7dc4b 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                                    param, plen, NULL, NULL);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
 /*
  * Perform the padding as per NIST 800-56B 7.2.2.3
  *      from (K) is the key material.
@@ -51,12 +55,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
  * Step numbers are included here but not in the constant time inverse below
  * to avoid complicating an already difficult enough function.
  */
 -int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 -                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 -                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 -                                            const unsigned char *param,
 -                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 -                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *param,
 +                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
 +                                             const char *redhat_st_seed)
 {
     int rv = 0;
     int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
@@ -107,6 +112,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
     memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
     /* step 3d: generate random byte string */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (redhat_st_seed != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
 +        memcpy(seed, redhat_st_seed, mdlen);
 +    } else
 +#endif
     if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, mdlen, 0) <= 0)
         goto err;
@@ -138,6 +148,18 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     return rv;
 }
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                            const unsigned char *param,
 +                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 +{
 +    return ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(libctx, to, tlen, from,
 +                                                    flen, param, plen, md,
 +                                                    mgf1md, NULL);
 +}
 +
 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                     const unsigned char *from, int flen,
                                     const unsigned char *param, int plen,
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index 4e30ec56dd..0103c87528 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -1294,15 +1294,22 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_priv_key[] = {
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
 -/*-
 - * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE directly in the expansion of the
 - * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
 - * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
 - */
 -static const char pad_mode_none[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE;
 -
 +/*-
 + * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP directly in the expansion of the
 + * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
 + * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
 + */
 +static const char pad_mode_oaep[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP;
 +static const char oaep_fixed_seed[] = {
 +    0xf6, 0x10, 0xef, 0x0a, 0x97, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x25,
 +    0x97, 0xcf, 0x8e, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x51, 0x2f, 0xab,
 +    0x2e, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0xe6
 +};
 +
 static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_enc_params[] = {
 -    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_none),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_oaep),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED,
 +                       oaep_fixed_seed),
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
@@ -1335,43 +1348,43 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_expected_sig[256] = {
     0x2c, 0x68, 0xf0, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xd2, 0x56, 0xd6
 };
 -static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[256] = {
 +static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[208] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
 };
 static const unsigned char rsa_asym_expected_encrypt[256] = {
 -    0x54, 0xac, 0x23, 0x96, 0x1d, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x8b,
 -    0x8f, 0x36, 0x33, 0xd0, 0xf4, 0x02, 0xa2, 0x61,
 -    0xb1, 0x13, 0xd4, 0x4a, 0x46, 0x06, 0x37, 0x3c,
 -    0xbf, 0x40, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x64, 0xdc,
 -    0x22, 0x22, 0xaf, 0x36, 0x79, 0x62, 0x45, 0xf0,
 -    0x97, 0x82, 0x22, 0x44, 0x86, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0xfa,
 -    0xac, 0x03, 0x21, 0x84, 0x3f, 0x31, 0xad, 0x2a,
 -    0xa4, 0x6e, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xfc,
 -    0xf1, 0x62, 0xce, 0x82, 0x12, 0x45, 0xc9, 0x35,
 -    0xb0, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0x99, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b, 0x5a,
 -    0xd3, 0x46, 0xdb, 0xf9, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x49, 0xbd,
 -    0x1e, 0xe8, 0xda, 0xac, 0x61, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xda,
 -    0xfc, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x74, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x18,
 -    0x86, 0x3e, 0x20, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0xe1, 0x04, 0xb7,
 -    0x38, 0x43, 0xb1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0xc1, 0x39,
 -    0x4d, 0xe1, 0xd3, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x87,
 -    0x1f, 0x74, 0xb5, 0x69, 0xfd, 0x33, 0xd6, 0x21,
 -    0x7c, 0x61, 0x60, 0x28, 0xca, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xa0,
 -    0xbb, 0xc8, 0x73, 0xa9, 0x82, 0xf8, 0x6b, 0xd8,
 -    0xf0, 0xc9, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0x8c,
 -    0xd4, 0xa2, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0x04, 0xad, 0xaa,
 -    0x11, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0xce, 0x83, 0x29, 0x56, 0x69,
 -    0xbb, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xef, 0xca, 0x2d, 0xcd, 0x52,
 -    0xc8, 0xf1, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x6d, 0x9c,
 -    0x3d, 0x69, 0xcc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xe6,
 -    0xbb, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xdc, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0x24, 0x93,
 -    0x03, 0x46, 0xa2, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x5d,
 -    0x68, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0x30, 0xdb, 0xf5,
 -    0x4f, 0x0f, 0xad, 0xc7, 0xd0, 0xaa, 0x47, 0xd9,
 -    0x9f, 0x85, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0x6c, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x04,
 -    0x29, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0x66, 0x7d, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xaa,
 -    0x05, 0x52, 0x55, 0xc1, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x90, 0xab,
 +    0x6c, 0x21, 0xc1, 0x9e, 0x94, 0xee, 0xdf, 0x74,
 +    0x3a, 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x04, 0x1a, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x7c,
 +    0x42, 0xac, 0x7e, 0x28, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xe2, 0x4e,
 +    0x87, 0xd4, 0x00, 0x69, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x0b,
 +    0xc1, 0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0x21, 0x39, 0x4f, 0x25,
 +    0x22, 0x1f, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x62, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x89,
 +    0xdb, 0x38, 0x32, 0x88, 0x21, 0x1d, 0x89, 0xf1,
 +    0xe0, 0x14, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x50,
 +    0xb0, 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x2f, 0x49, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x17,
 +    0x9e, 0x60, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0x77, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa2,
 +    0xcf, 0x16, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x4a, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xcb,
 +    0x1e, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x27, 0x06, 0x9d,
 +    0xf4, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x7e,
 +    0xfd, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x82, 0x62, 0x0f,
 +    0x29, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0xd3,
 +    0x51, 0x92, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x39, 0x9d, 0xdd, 0x06,
 +    0xff, 0xb1, 0xb0, 0xd5, 0x61, 0x03, 0x8f, 0x25,
 +    0x5c, 0x49, 0x12, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x67, 0x61, 0x78,
 +    0xb3, 0xe3, 0xc4, 0xf6, 0x36, 0x16, 0xa9, 0x04,
 +    0x91, 0x0a, 0x4b, 0x27, 0x28, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7c,
 +    0x65, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x71, 0x84, 0xe7, 0x47,
 +    0x79, 0x83, 0x91, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x79, 0xce,
 +    0x49, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x34, 0xac, 0x61, 0xe0,
 +    0xe6, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x10, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x9a, 0xd6,
 +    0xed, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x99,
 +    0xde, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x11, 0x16, 0xa2, 0x18, 0x30,
 +    0x30, 0xdc, 0x95, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20,
 +    0xc4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x1e, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xbb,
 +    0x29, 0x94, 0x27, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0xab, 0xb4, 0x27,
 +    0x8b, 0x4d, 0xe1, 0xcb, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x66,
 +    0x41, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xeb, 0x61, 0x4c, 0x77, 0x5a,
 +    0xee, 0xb0, 0xca, 0x99, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xbe, 0x06
 };
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 index 064794d9bf..b6d5e8e134 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -647,14 +647,21 @@ static int self_test_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return ret;
 }
 +int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
 +
 static int self_test_asym_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
     int i, ret = 1;
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 1;
 +
     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_asym_cipher_tests); ++i) {
         if (!self_test_asym_cipher(&st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[i], st, libctx))
             ret = 0;
     }
 +
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
 +
     return ret;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +# include "crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h"
 +#endif
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ typedef struct {
     /* TLS padding */
     unsigned int client_version;
     unsigned int alt_version;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
     unsigned int implicit_rejection;
 } PROV_RSA_CTX;
@@ -190,12 +196,21 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
             }
         }
         ret =
 -            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(
 +#else
 +            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(
 +#endif
 +                                                    prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
                                                     rsasize, in, inlen,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_label,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_labellen,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_md,
 -                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md);
 +                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +                                                    , prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed
 +#endif
 +                                                    );
         if (!ret) {
             OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
@@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->oaep_md);
     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
     OPENSSL_free(prsactx->oaep_label);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
 }
@@ -445,6 +463,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
                     NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
@@ -454,6 +475,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx,
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@@ -563,6 +588,18 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         prsactx->oaep_labellen = tmp_labellen;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED);
 +    if (p != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
 +        void *tmp_oaep_seed = NULL;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &tmp_oaep_seed, 0, NULL))
 +            return 0;
 +        OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
 +        prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed = (char *)tmp_oaep_seed;
 +    }
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION);
     if (p != NULL) {
         unsigned int client_version;
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index c37ed7815f..70f7c50fe4 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ my %params = (
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION' =>       "tls-client-version",
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' =>   "tls-negotiated-version",
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' =>       "implicit-rejection",
 +    'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' =>     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
 # Encoder / decoder parameters
 -- 
 2.37.1
--- a/SOURCES/0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
@ -1,317 +0,0 @@
 From dc41625dc4a793f0e21188165711181ca085339b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:16 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 28/49] 
 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
 Patch-name: 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
 Patch-id: 74
 Patch-status: |
    # [PATCH 29/46]
    # 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 crypto/evp/m_sigver.c           | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 43 +++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 index fd3a4b79df..3e9f33c26c 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
     return 0;
 }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 /*
  * If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
@@ -125,8 +126,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         reinit = 0;
         if (e == NULL)
             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
         else
             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     }
     if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -136,8 +139,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     locpctx = ctx->pctx;
     ERR_set_mark();
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(locpctx))
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     /* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
     if (reinit
@@ -222,8 +227,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             signature =
                 evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
                                               supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             if (signature == NULL)
                 goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
             break;
         }
         if (signature == NULL)
@@ -307,6 +314,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
             if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
                 ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             } else {
                 /* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
                 ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
@@ -315,11 +323,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
                     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
                     goto err;
                 }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
             }
             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
         }
     }
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
@@ -331,6 +341,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             goto err;
         }
     }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     if (ver) {
         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
@@ -363,6 +374,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
     return 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     /*
      * If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
@@ -434,6 +446,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
     ret = 1;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
  end:
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -476,7 +489,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
                           NULL);
 }
 -#endif /* FIPS_MDOE */
 int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
 {
@@ -548,24 +560,31 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
     return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
 }
 -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
                         size_t *siglen)
 {
 -    int sctx = 0, r = 0;
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +    int r = 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int sctx = 0;
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 + 
     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (pctx == NULL
             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX
             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (sigret != NULL && (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
         /* try dup */
         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
@@ -580,7 +599,14 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
     else
         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
     return r;
 +#else
 +    r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
 +                                                  sigret, siglen,
 +                                                  sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
 +    return r;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -653,6 +679,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
         }
     }
     return 1;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 }
 int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
@@ -691,23 +718,30 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
 int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
                           size_t siglen)
 {
 -    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     int r = 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     unsigned int mdlen = 0;
     int vctx = 0;
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 + 
     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (pctx == NULL
             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX
             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
         /* try dup */
         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
@@ -721,7 +755,13 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     else
         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
     return r;
 +#else
 +    r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
 +                                                    sig, siglen);
 +    return r;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -762,6 +802,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     if (vctx || !r)
         return r;
     return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 }
 int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -794,4 +835,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
         return -1;
     return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
 }
 -#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 index 4ea10670c0..5eb27c8ed2 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -450,10 +450,13 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
     int ret = 0;
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
 +    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 +    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *sctx = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 -    unsigned char sig[256];
     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
 +    const char *msg = "Hello World!";
 +    unsigned char sig[256];
     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -487,23 +490,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
         || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
         goto err;
 -    /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to use for the signing operation */
 -    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, NULL);
 -    if (sctx == NULL
 -        || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(sctx) <= 0)
 -        goto err;
 -
 -    /* set signature parameters */
 -    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST,
 -                                         t->mdalgorithm,
 -                                         strlen(t->mdalgorithm) + 1))
 -        goto err;
 +    /* Create a EVP_MD_CTX to use for the signature operation, assign signature
 +     * parameters and sign */
     params_sig = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
 +    md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
 +    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 +    if (md == NULL || ctx == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
 +    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
 +        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0
 +        || EVP_DigestSign(ctx, sig, &siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0
 +        || EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx) <= 0)
         goto err;
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_sign(sctx, sig, &siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0
 -        || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(sctx) <= 0
 +    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    sctx = NULL;
 +
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
 +    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
         || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
         goto err;
@@ -513,14 +519,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
         goto err;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(sctx, sig, siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0)
 +    if (EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sig, siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0)
         goto err;
     ret = 1;
 err:
     BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
 +    EVP_MD_free(md);
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
     OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
     OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch
@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
 From e385647549c467fe263b68b72dd21bdfb875ee88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:51:16 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIPS: Use FFDHE2048 in self test
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 342 +++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index a29cc650b5..1b5623833f 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -821,188 +821,190 @@ static const ST_KAT_DRBG st_kat_drbg_tests[] =
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 /* DH KAT */
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 p */
 static const unsigned char dh_p[] = {
 -    0xdc, 0xca, 0x15, 0x11, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25,
 -    0xf5, 0x21, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x54, 0x27, 0x89, 0xe0,
 -    0x01, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x66,
 -    0xf7, 0x40, 0x64, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x8b,
 -    0xe6, 0x10, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x8b, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xbe,
 -    0x39, 0xdb, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x85, 0xbf, 0x24, 0xce,
 -    0x68, 0x80, 0xad, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x7c, 0x6d,
 -    0x01, 0x5e, 0x61, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x4d,
 -    0xe1, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0x41, 0xff, 0xde,
 -    0x9d, 0x41, 0x84, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x38, 0xbb,
 -    0x02, 0x1d, 0xae, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x2d, 0x17,
 -    0x82, 0xac, 0xc6, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xb0,
 -    0x23, 0x2c, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x97,
 -    0xb3, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0xac, 0xaf, 0xb9,
 -    0x8f, 0x06, 0x66, 0x08, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x4e, 0xc7,
 -    0xdd, 0xb6, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x99, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0xc1,
 -    0xb5, 0x98, 0x25, 0xda, 0x84, 0x32, 0x07, 0x7d,
 -    0xef, 0x69, 0x56, 0x46, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x20, 0x82,
 -    0x3c, 0x95, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x76, 0xd4,
 -    0x73, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x36, 0x1c,
 -    0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0x2f, 0x32, 0x9b,
 -    0x82, 0x09, 0x9b, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x50,
 -    0xf4, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x62, 0xa3, 0x31,
 -    0x88, 0xb0, 0x27, 0x98, 0xba, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x44,
 -    0xb9, 0x46, 0xfe, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xc5,
 -    0xa1, 0x23, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x97, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x80,
 -    0xda, 0x8c, 0xac, 0x88, 0xe0, 0x92, 0xb1, 0x12,
 -    0x70, 0x60, 0xff, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x57, 0x99, 0x94,
 -    0x01, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xc7,
 -    0x62, 0x45, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x22, 0x31, 0xc1,
 -    0x7d, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xef, 0x0d,
 -    0xb9, 0x9f, 0x9c, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x69
 -};
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +    0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a,
 +    0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
 +    0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95,
 +    0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb,
 +    0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
 +    0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8,
 +    0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a,
 +    0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
 +    0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0,
 +    0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3,
 +    0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
 +    0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77,
 +    0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72,
 +    0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
 +    0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a,
 +    0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61,
 +    0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
 +    0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68,
 +    0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4,
 +    0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
 +    0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70,
 +    0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec,
 +    0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
 +    0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff,
 +    0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32, 0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83,
 +    0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
 +    0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05,
 +    0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2,
 +    0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
 +    0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97,
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +};
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 q */
 static const unsigned char dh_q[] = {
 -    0x89, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x67, 0x17, 0xef, 0x03, 0x9e,
 -    0x60, 0x3e, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0xe4, 0x83,
 -    0x74, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x5c, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xea,
 -    0x11, 0xac, 0xb5, 0x7d
 -};
 +    0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +    0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d,
 +    0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
 +    0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a,
 +    0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd,
 +    0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
 +    0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec,
 +    0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01, 0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd,
 +    0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
 +    0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68,
 +    0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79,
 +    0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
 +    0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb,
 +    0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39,
 +    0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
 +    0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd,
 +    0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0,
 +    0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
 +    0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34,
 +    0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51, 0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa,
 +    0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
 +    0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8,
 +    0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76,
 +    0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
 +    0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff,
 +    0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1,
 +    0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
 +    0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02,
 +    0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9,
 +    0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
 +    0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b,
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +};
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 g */
 static const unsigned char dh_g[] = {
 -    0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb8, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0xf6, 0x01, 0x39,
 -    0x35, 0x1d, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x12, 0x66, 0x80, 0x5f,
 -    0xdf, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xd1, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xa0,
 -    0x05, 0x0c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x24, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9f,
 -    0x6a, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x8f,
 -    0xfe, 0x88, 0xd6, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x89, 0x4a,
 -    0x3d, 0x53, 0x5f, 0xc8, 0x21, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xd4,
 -    0x24, 0x87, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x8c,
 -    0x51, 0xe9, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x9c, 0x7c, 0x20,
 -    0x3e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x31, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0x25,
 -    0x63, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x53,
 -    0xd3, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xef, 0xd9,
 -    0x67, 0x7c, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x77, 0xd6, 0xdc,
 -    0xe2, 0xa1, 0x96, 0x37, 0x95, 0xca, 0x64, 0xb9,
 -    0x2d, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xac, 0x6d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x43,
 -    0x1d, 0xe5, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x60, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x86,
 -    0x89, 0xc9, 0xec, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x24, 0x8c, 0x16,
 -    0xed, 0x09, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x40,
 -    0x6d, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x23,
 -    0x7b, 0x97, 0x34, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xfa,
 -    0xe0, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xed, 0x30, 0xd6,
 -    0x91, 0x87, 0xda, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0xe2,
 -    0xaa, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x61,
 -    0x66, 0x55, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x1c, 0x6b, 0x4a,
 -    0x37, 0x97, 0x63, 0xb0, 0xa9, 0x16, 0x58, 0xef,
 -    0xc8, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x4f,
 -    0x21, 0x37, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x10, 0x17, 0x2c, 0xf3,
 -    0x9b, 0x83, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x8a,
 -    0xb8, 0x25, 0x16, 0xec, 0xab, 0x99, 0x5f, 0xa4,
 -    0x21, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0x80, 0x74,
 -    0xc3, 0x9d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x1e, 0xe4,
 -    0xe9, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x20, 0xea, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x32
 +    0x02
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
 -    0x14, 0x33, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x0a,
 -    0x30, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x70,
 -    0xd2, 0x96, 0x8a, 0xba, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc8, 0x15,
 -    0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
 +    0x01, 0xdc, 0x2a, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x71, 0x57, 0x0f,
 +    0xcd, 0x93, 0x65, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x56, 0x6d,
 +    0xc5, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xad, 0x8d,
 +    0x6c, 0xdc, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x94
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
 -    0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
 -    0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
 -    0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
 -    0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
 -    0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
 -    0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
 -    0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
 -    0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
 -    0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
 -    0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
 -    0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
 -    0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
 -    0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
 -    0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
 -    0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
 -    0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
 -    0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
 -    0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
 -    0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
 -    0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
 -    0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
 -    0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
 -    0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
 -    0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
 -    0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
 -    0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
 -    0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
 -    0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
 -    0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
 -    0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
 -    0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
 -    0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
 +    0x00, 0xc4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x69, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x05,
 +    0x55, 0x2a, 0x7e, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x02, 0xbb, 0x7f,
 +    0xcc, 0x63, 0x74, 0xee, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x98, 0x43,
 +    0x0e, 0x29, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x44, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x23,
 +    0x81, 0xca, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x01, 0x4a,
 +    0x1a, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x0b,
 +    0xb9, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x14, 0x01, 0x62, 0x3c,
 +    0x8a, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xbb, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x63,
 +    0xb7, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x0b, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x38,
 +    0x10, 0x0f, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x24, 0xf6,
 +    0xe3, 0x70, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x7a,
 +    0x87, 0x49, 0x64, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x75, 0x3b, 0x94,
 +    0xc8, 0x09, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x92,
 +    0xb9, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x47, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x44,
 +    0x3b, 0xe3, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x53,
 +    0xd8, 0xfb, 0x06, 0x44, 0xdb, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0x13,
 +    0x2b, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x30,
 +    0xd6, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x59, 0xba, 0x1b,
 +    0xbf, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
 +    0x0b, 0x54, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x3d,
 +    0xe8, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x52, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x18,
 +    0x6f, 0xa3, 0x27, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xc3, 0x81,
 +    0xcb, 0xae, 0x23, 0x11, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x6f,
 +    0x23, 0x17, 0x40, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0xb7,
 +    0x34, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0x98, 0x39,
 +    0xbf, 0x2e, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xad, 0xed,
 +    0x1b, 0x5e, 0x47, 0x90, 0x49, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x71,
 +    0x5f, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x35, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xce,
 +    0x58, 0x60, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0x70, 0x04,
 +    0x2a, 0x6a, 0x98, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xae, 0x69,
 +    0x95, 0xf9, 0x99, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0xed,
 +    0x61, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x05, 0xe9, 0xf2,
 +    0x32
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
 -    0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,
 -    0x96, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x24, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x87, 0x7d,
 -    0xd0, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x56, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x58,
 -    0xaa, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x32,
 -    0x23, 0x51, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0xb5, 0xdb,
 -    0xfa, 0x97, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x30, 0xf0,
 -    0x2d, 0x31, 0x14, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xb1, 0xc0,
 -    0xe0, 0x24, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x98, 0xbc,
 -    0xa9, 0xe6, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x80, 0x86, 0x22, 0xf1,
 -    0x81, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6e,
 -    0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x67, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x97,
 -    0x70, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x05,
 -    0xfb, 0x77, 0xf5, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xd3,
 -    0x3c, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0x0f,
 -    0xec, 0xb6, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x11, 0xe7,
 -    0x7a, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xb1,
 -    0x50, 0xf2, 0x16, 0x87, 0x35, 0x78, 0xfb, 0x96,
 -    0x46, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3d, 0xe8, 0xef, 0xbf,
 -    0xce, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x22,
 -    0xa3, 0x4f, 0x14, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x98,
 -    0x4c, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0x42,
 -    0xe5, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x8c,
 -    0xa1, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x75, 0x98, 0x0d, 0xde,
 -    0x7f, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x36, 0x52, 0x38, 0x20,
 -    0xd4, 0x31, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x22,
 -    0x89, 0x78, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x72, 0xf3,
 -    0x39, 0xca, 0xeb, 0x99, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0xe3,
 -    0x01, 0x26, 0x8b, 0xc9, 0x97, 0x89, 0xc9, 0xb2,
 -    0x55, 0x71, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x3f, 0x00,
 -    0x7f, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x1c, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x51,
 -    0x9c, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x02, 0xab, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x0f,
 -    0x34, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x8b
 +    0x00, 0xef, 0x15, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x56, 0xa3, 0x79,
 +    0x40, 0x58, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x56, 0xad, 0xcb, 0xda,
 +    0x8c, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x25, 0x29,
 +    0x9e, 0x43, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x84,
 +    0xbc, 0x85, 0xd0, 0x94, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x27, 0x57,
 +    0xe4, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x08, 0xf5,
 +    0x74, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x56, 0xd2, 0x09, 0xc8, 0x68,
 +    0xef, 0xed, 0x18, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x2e, 0x95, 0x6c,
 +    0xba, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x1b, 0xf6,
 +    0x15, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x20,
 +    0x76, 0x43, 0x51, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d,
 +    0xd6, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0x18, 0x33, 0xd1, 0xa3,
 +    0x3b, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x13, 0x7a,
 +    0x53, 0xde, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x77,
 +    0x6b, 0xf8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x70, 0x8c, 0xba, 0x73,
 +    0x80, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0xda, 0x53,
 +    0x4d, 0x3c, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x37, 0xce, 0xb1,
 +    0xde, 0x45, 0x97, 0x58, 0x65, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0x05,
 +    0xbb, 0xc3, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x59, 0x7a,
 +    0x99, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x61, 0xe5,
 +    0x1a, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xee, 0xe9,
 +    0xa9, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x91,
 +    0x0d, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x7e, 0x1d, 0x31,
 +    0x79, 0xf1, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0xb2, 0x4f,
 +    0x22, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x72, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xe4,
 +    0x1c, 0x35, 0x96, 0x61, 0x98, 0x39, 0xfb, 0x7e,
 +    0x6d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x69, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x59,
 +    0xbb, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x36, 0x84,
 +    0x5e, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x8a,
 +    0xba, 0x59, 0x88, 0x47, 0xc4, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xbd,
 +    0x78, 0x76, 0x24, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x56, 0x44, 0xc2,
 +    0x4a, 0xc2, 0xd5, 0x3a, 0x59, 0x40, 0xab, 0x87,
 +    0x64
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_secret_expected[] = {
 -    0x08, 0xff, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x9a,
 -    0x7d, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x12, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x6a,
 -    0xb5, 0x11, 0x64, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0x76, 0x77, 0x0c,
 -    0x8c, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xc2, 0x33, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xfe,
 -    0x70, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x81, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x9e, 0xd2,
 -    0x3b, 0x21, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xe8, 0x78, 0x69, 0x21,
 -    0xed, 0xca, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x68, 0xb1, 0x61, 0x53,
 -    0xfa, 0x01, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x2c, 0x90, 0xdd,
 -    0xab, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x81, 0x67, 0x70, 0xa9, 0x87,
 -    0x10, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xab, 0x83, 0xb6, 0xe4,
 -    0x6e, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x43, 0x0d,
 -    0x61, 0x87, 0xda, 0xa3, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xcd,
 -    0x73, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x33,
 -    0x64, 0xf5, 0x04, 0x20, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x4b, 0xfe,
 -    0xaf, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x43, 0x85, 0x05, 0xa5, 0x9a,
 -    0x4a, 0x40, 0xda, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x73,
 -    0xdb, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x74, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x23, 0xad,
 -    0x88, 0x32, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x58, 0x2d, 0x38, 0xf0,
 -    0xa6, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0xb8, 0x79,
 -    0x9e, 0x42, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x32, 0xe9,
 -    0x81, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x42, 0x97, 0x57, 0xb2,
 -    0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xaa, 0x1f, 0xf6,
 -    0xed, 0x93, 0xd7, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xae,
 -    0xd9, 0x0c, 0xaf, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x2b, 0xc6, 0x57,
 -    0x0f, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x1a,
 -    0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x63,
 -    0xf9, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x56, 0xf9,
 -    0x58, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x47, 0x94, 0x86,
 -    0xbe, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xd5,
 -    0xcb, 0x4f, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0x00,
 -    0xfb, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x82, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x82, 0x52,
 -    0x6a, 0x97, 0xd1, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xea, 0xf6
 +    0x56, 0x13, 0xe3, 0x12, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xe5,
 +    0x08, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x90, 0x9d, 0xf5,
 +    0x1a, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x50, 0x93,
 +    0x5b, 0xf4, 0x11, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xa5,
 +    0x80, 0xae, 0x01, 0x3d, 0x66, 0x92, 0xc0, 0x3e,
 +    0x5f, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x82, 0x39,
 +    0x72, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x94, 0xe5, 0x04,
 +    0x7c, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc4, 0x9d,
 +    0xc1, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xec, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xa3, 0x7c,
 +    0x07, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x1d, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x47,
 +    0x4b, 0x94, 0x05, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0xae,
 +    0x7b, 0x21, 0x86, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x62, 0x38, 0x08,
 +    0xea, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x7c, 0xef, 0x19,
 +    0xf8, 0x29, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xde, 0xe8,
 +    0xb8, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xa1, 0x16, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x8f,
 +    0x48, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x1e,
 +    0x2a, 0x66, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x18, 0xe9, 0xd2,
 +    0xfd, 0xa2, 0x4e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x2e, 0x88, 0x3d,
 +    0x7d, 0xac, 0x15, 0x18, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xba, 0xd4,
 +    0x0e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x4a, 0xb4,
 +    0x49, 0x8f, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x62, 0x8c, 0xc6, 0x66,
 +    0x20, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0xed, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x88, 0x46,
 +    0xa7, 0x67, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc5, 0x22, 0x95, 0xa0,
 +    0x23, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xa7, 0x70,
 +    0x1c, 0xac, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x50, 0x3c,
 +    0xe4, 0x23, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xda, 0x2f,
 +    0xf4, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xe4, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x25,
 +    0x86, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x46, 0x16, 0xbc,
 +    0x41, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x19, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x02,
 +    0x87, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x04,
 +    0x82, 0xd2, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0xb1,
 +    0x41, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x0c, 0x89
 };
 static const ST_KAT_PARAM dh_group[] = {
 -- 
 2.35.3
--- a/SOURCES/0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c	2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
     size_t entropy_available;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 -    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
 +    /*
 +     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
 +     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
 +     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
 +     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
 +     * amount of entropy.
 +     */
 +    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c	2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
      * to the nearest byte.  If the entropy is of less than full quality,
      * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
      */
 -    bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
 +    /*
 +     * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
 +     * + 128 bits during initial seeding
 +     */
 +    bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
     if (bytes_needed < min_len)
         bytes_needed = min_len;
     if (bytes_needed > max_len)
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c	2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
 #endif
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    prediction_resistance = 1;
 +#endif
     /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
     if (drbg->parent != NULL
 -            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
 +            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
 +        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
 +#else
         reseed_required = 1;
 +#endif
 +        }
     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
         if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg	2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h	2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * The value is in bytes.
  */
 -#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
 +#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ   32
 /*
  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c	2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
 # include <fcntl.h>
 # include <unistd.h>
 # include <sys/time.h>
 +# include <sys/random.h>
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
@@ -339,70 +341,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
      */
 -
 -    /*
 -     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
 -     *
 -     * Known OSs that should support this:
 -     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
 -     * - Solaris since 11.3
 -     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
 -     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
 -     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
 -     *
 -     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
 -     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
 -     */
 -#  if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
 -#    if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
 -    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
 -
 -    if (getentropy != NULL) {
 -        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
 -            return (ssize_t)buflen;
 -        if (errno != ENOSYS)
 -            return -1;
 -    }
 -#    elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
 -
 -    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
 -	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
 -
 -    return -1;
 -#    else
 -    union {
 -        void *p;
 -        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
 -    } p_getentropy;
 -
 -    /*
 -     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
 -     * call this function often.
 -     */
 -    ERR_set_mark();
 -    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
 -    ERR_pop_to_mark();
 -    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
 -        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
 -#    endif
 -#  endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
 -
 -    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
 -#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
 -    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
 -#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
 -    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
 -#  elif (defined(__DragonFly__)  && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
 -     || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
 -    return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
 -#  elif defined(__wasi__)
 -    if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
 -      return (ssize_t)buflen;
 -    return -1;
 -#  else
 -    errno = ENOSYS;
 -    return -1;
 -#  endif
 +    int realbuflen = buflen > 32 ? 32 : buflen; /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
 +    return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, realbuflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
 }
 #  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
 diff -up openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
 --- openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx	2024-04-10 13:14:38.984033920 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c	2024-04-10 13:15:20.565045748 +0200
@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
         return 0;
     }
 -    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
 +    /*
 +     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
 +     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
 +     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
 +     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
 +     * amount of entropy.
 +     */
 +    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
     size_t i;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 -    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
 +    /*
 +     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
 +     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
 +     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
 +     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
 +     * amount of entropy.
 +     */
 +    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
         return 0;
 diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
 index 14999540ab..b05b84717b 100644
 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
         return ret;
     }
 -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 -    if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
 -        ERR_set_mark();
 -        dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
 -        ERR_pop_to_mark();
 -    }
 -#endif
 -
 -    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
 +    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
     /*
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_public(OSSL_LIB_
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
 -        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
 +        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public, rand);
     }
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_private(OSSL_LIB
         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public) == NULL
                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
             return NULL;
 -        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
 +        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private, rand);
     }
 diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c
 --- openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx	2024-05-02 15:37:23.550979597 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c	2024-05-02 15:45:37.189979881 +0200
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
         reseed_when = time(NULL);
     /* Generate random output from the public and private DRBG */
 -    before_reseed = expect_primary_reseed == 1 ? reseed_when : 0;
 +    before_reseed = 0;
     if (!TEST_int_eq(rand_bytes((unsigned char*)public_random,
                                 RANDOM_SIZE), expect_success)
         || !TEST_int_eq(rand_priv_bytes((unsigned char*) private_random,
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
      */
     /* Test whether reseeding succeeded as expected */
 -    if (!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
 -        || !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
 +    if (/*!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
 +        ||*/ !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
         || !TEST_int_eq(state(private), expected_state))
         return 0;
@@ -246,16 +246,16 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
     if (expect_public_reseed >= 0) {
         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(public), public_reseed)
 -                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
 -                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
 +                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
 +                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
             return 0;
     }
     if (expect_private_reseed >= 0) {
         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(private), private_reseed)
 -                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
 -                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
 +                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
 +                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
             return 0;
     }
@@ -577,8 +577,8 @@ static int test_rand_reseed(void)
     if (!TEST_ptr_ne(public, private)
         || !TEST_ptr_ne(public, primary)
         || !TEST_ptr_ne(private, primary)
 -        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
 -        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary)))
 +        /*|| !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
 +        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary))*/)
         return 0;
     /* Disable CRNG testing for the primary DRBG */
--- a/SOURCES/0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:11:27.211413931 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c	2022-08-05 13:11:34.151475891 +0200
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ void ossl_ffc_params_init(FFC_PARAMS *pa
 void ossl_ffc_params_cleanup(FFC_PARAMS *params)
 {
 -    BN_free(params->p);
 -    BN_free(params->q);
 -    BN_free(params->g);
 -    BN_free(params->j);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->p);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->q);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->g);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->j);
     OPENSSL_free(params->seed);
     ossl_ffc_params_init(params);
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:08:31.875848536 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:09:35.438416025 +0200
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
     CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
 -    BN_free(r->n);
 -    BN_free(r->e);
 +    BN_clear_free(r->n);
 +    BN_clear_free(r->e);
     BN_clear_free(r->d);
     BN_clear_free(r->p);
     BN_clear_free(r->q);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:14:58.827303241 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c	2022-08-05 13:16:24.530068399 +0200
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
 -    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
 +    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:12:40.552068717 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c	2022-08-05 13:13:34.324548799 +0200
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provct
 static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
 {
     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
 -    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
 +    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:48:32.221345774 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:49:16.138741452 +0200
@@ -744,12 +744,16 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *g
 void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
 {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
 +#else
     if (point == NULL)
         return;
     if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
         point->meth->point_finish(point);
     OPENSSL_free(point);
 +#endif
 }
 void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
--- a/SOURCES/0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch
@ -1,911 +0,0 @@
 From 2290280617183863eb15425b8925765966723725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 09:27:12 +0200
 Subject: KDF: Add FIPS indicators
 FIPS requires a number of restrictions on the parameters of the various
 key derivation functions implemented in OpenSSL. The KDFs that use
 digest algorithms usually should not allow SHAKE (due to FIPS 140-3 IG
 C.C). Additionally, some application-specific KDFs have further
 restrictions defined in SP 800-135r1.
 Generally, all KDFs shall use a key-derivation key length of at least
 112 bits due to SP 800-131Ar2 section 8. Additionally any use of a KDF
 to generate and output length of less than 112 bits will also set the
 indicator to unapproved.
 Add explicit indicators to all KDFs usable in FIPS mode except for
 PBKDF2 (which has its specific FIPS limits already implemented). The
 indicator can be queried using EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params() after setting
 the required parameters and keys for the KDF.
 Our FIPS provider implements SHA1, SHA2 (both -256 and -512, and the
 truncated variants -224 and -384) and SHA3 (-256 and -512, and the
 truncated versions -224 and -384), as well as SHAKE-128 and -256.
 The SHAKE functions are generally not allowed in KDFs. For the rest, the
 support matrix is:
 KDF         | SHA-1 | SHA-2 | SHA-2 truncated  | SHA-3 | SHA-3 truncated
 ==========================================================================
 KBKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 HKDF         |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 TLS1PRF      |       | SHA-{256,384,512} only   |       |
 SSHKDF       |   x   |   x   |         x        |       |
 SSKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 X9.63KDF     |       |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 X9.42-ASN1   |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 TLS1.3PRF    |       | SHA-{256,384} only       |       |
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
 Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
 ---
 include/crypto/evp.h                      |   7 ++
 include/openssl/kdf.h                     |   4 +
 providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c     | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c    |  82 ++++++++++++++++--
 providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c   |  75 +++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c    | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c |  74 +++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c  |  66 +++++++++++++-
 util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm           |   1 +
 9 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
 index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/evp.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ struct evp_mac_st {
     OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
 };
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +/* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8: Deriving
 + * Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of the
 + * key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112 bits". */
 +# define EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
 +#endif
 +
 struct evp_kdf_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
 diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
 index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/kdf.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int EVP_KDF_names_do_all(const EVP_KDF *kdf,
 # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY        1
 # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY         2
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV     65
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI     66
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 67
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_3_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
     size_t data_len;
     unsigned char *info;
     size_t info_len;
 +    int is_tls13;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_HKDF;
 static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     switch (ctx->mode) {
     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
     default:
@@ -318,22 +318,85 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void
 {
     KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
         size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
 +        any_valid = 1;
         if (sz == 0)
             return 0;
         return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
     }
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
         if (ctx->info == NULL || ctx->info_len == 0) {
             p->return_size = 0;
             return 1;
         }
         return OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
     }
 -    return -2;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
 +            != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (ctx->is_tls13) {
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")
 +                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
 +                /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic
 +                 * Module Validation Program, Section 2.4.B, (5): "The TLS 1.3
 +                 * key derivation function documented in Section 7.1 of RFC
 +                 * 8446. This is considered an approved CVL because the
 +                 * underlying functions performed within the TLS 1.3 KDF map to
 +                 * NIST approved standards, namely: SP 800-133rev2 (Section 6.3
 +                 * Option #3), SP 800-56Crev2, and SP 800-108."
 +                 *
 +                 * RFC 8446 appendix B.4 only lists SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        } else {
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                        EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                /* HKDF is a SP 800-56Cr2 TwoStep KDF, for which all SHA-1,
 +                 * SHA-2 and SHA-3 are approved. SHAKE is not approved, because
 +                 * of FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +                 * extendable-output functions may only be used as the
 +                 * standalone algorithms." */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -348,6 +421,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
         OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -677,6 +753,17 @@ static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     return ret;
 }
 +static void *kdf_tls1_3_new(void *provctx)
 +{
 +    KDF_HKDF *hkdf = kdf_hkdf_new(provctx);
 +
 +    if (hkdf != NULL)
 +        hkdf->is_tls13 = 1;
 +
 +    return hkdf;
 +}
 +
 +
 static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
                              const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -692,6 +779,11 @@ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     switch (ctx->mode) {
     default:
         return 0;
@@ -769,7 +861,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 }
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
 -    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
 index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ typedef struct {
     kbkdf_mode mode;
     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
 +    /* HMAC digest algorithm, if any; used to compute FIPS indicator */
 +    PROV_DIGEST digest;
 +
     /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
     int r;
     unsigned char *ki;
@@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ typedef struct {
     int use_l;
     int is_kmac;
     int use_separator;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KBKDF;
 /* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
@@ -138,6 +144,7 @@ static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
 +    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         goto done;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init);
     if (h == 0)
         goto done;
@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         }
     }
 +    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
 +        return 0;
 +
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
     if (p != NULL
         && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
@@ -363,20 +378,77 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
 -    if (p == NULL)
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->ki_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." Note that the digest is only used when the MAC
 +         * algorithm is HMAC. */
 +        if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
 +                && EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
 +            const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
         return -2;
 -    /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
 -    return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
                                                    ossl_unused void *provctx)
 {
 -    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
 -        { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
 +    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
 index c592ba72f1..4a52b38266 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ typedef struct {
     char type; /* X */
     unsigned char *session_id;
     size_t session_id_len;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_SSHKDF;
 static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -126,6 +129,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
         return 0;
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
                   ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
                   ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
@@ -194,10 +203,67 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms."
 +         *
 +         * Additionally, SP 800-135r1 section 5.2 specifies that the hash
 +         * function used in SSHKDF "is one of the hash functions specified in
 +         * FIPS 180-3.", which rules out SHA-3 and truncated variants of SHA-2.
 +         * */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-224")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -205,6 +271,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
 index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ typedef struct {
     size_t salt_len;
     size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
     int is_kmac;
 +    int is_x963kdf;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_SSKDF;
 #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct {
 static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn sskdf_dup;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
     return ctx;
 }
 +static void *x963kdf_new(void *provctx)
 +{
 +    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = sskdf_new(provctx);
 +
 +    if (ctx)
 +        ctx->is_x963kdf = 1;
 +
 +    return ctx;
 +}
 +
 static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
@@ -361,6 +376,11 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
     }
     md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
         /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
         int ret;
@@ -442,6 +462,11 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
                           ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
 }
@@ -514,10 +539,74 @@ static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx)))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
 -    return -2;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." */
 +        if (ctx->macctx == NULL
 +                || (ctx->macctx != NULL &&
 +                    EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC))) {
 +            if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +
 +            /* Table H-3 in ANS X9.63-2001 says that 160-bit hash functions
 +             * should only be used for 80-bit key agreement, but FIPS 140-3
 +             * requires a security strength of 112 bits, so SHA-1 cannot be
 +             * used with X9.63. See the discussion in
 +             * https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1403#issuecomment-1435300395.
 +             */
 +            if (ctx->is_x963kdf
 +                    && ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                    && EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -525,6 +614,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -545,7 +637,7 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
 };
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
 -    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_dup },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ typedef struct {
     /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
     unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
     size_t seedlen;
 +
 +    /* MAC digest algorithm; used to compute FIPS indicator */
 +    PROV_DIGEST digest;
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } TLS1_PRF;
 static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -129,6 +136,7 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
 +    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
     ctx->provctx = provctx;
 }
@@ -157,6 +165,10 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     /*
      * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         }
     }
 +    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
 +        return 0;
 +
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
         OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
         ctx->sec = NULL;
@@ -232,10 +247,60 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
 static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->seclen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* SP 800-135r1 section 4.2.2 says TLS 1.2 KDF is approved when "(3)
 +         * P_HASH uses either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512." */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
@@ -243,6 +308,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
 index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
 #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/params.h>
 #include <openssl/proverr.h>
 #include "internal/packet.h"
 #include "internal/der.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include "crypto/evp.h"
 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ typedef struct {
     const unsigned char *cek_oid;
     size_t cek_oid_len;
     int use_keybits;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_X942;
 /*
@@ -460,6 +466,10 @@ static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
                            der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
     OPENSSL_free(der);
@@ -563,10 +573,58 @@ static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
 -    return -2;
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx)))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -574,6 +632,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index 70f7c50fe4..6618122417 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ my %params = (
     'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO' =>    "supp-pubinfo",
     'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO' =>   "supp-privinfo",
     'KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS' =>     "use-keybits",
 +    'KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' =>     "redhat-fips-indicator",
     'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_ENTROPY' =>     "entropy",
     'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_NONCE' =>       "nonce",
     'KDF_PARAM_THREADS' =>        "threads",                # uint32_t
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0080-rand-Forbid-truncated-hashes-SHA-3-in-FIPS-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0080-rand-Forbid-truncated-hashes-SHA-3-in-FIPS-prov.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
 From 4de5fa26873297f5c2eeed53e5c988437f837f55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 13:53:31 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] signature: Remove X9.31 padding from FIPS prov
 The current draft of FIPS 186-5 [1] no longer contains specifications
 for X9.31 signature padding. Instead, it contains the following
 information in Appendix E:
 > ANSI X9.31 was withdrawn, so X9.31 RSA signatures were removed from
 > this standard.
 Since this situation is unlikely to change in future revisions of the
 draft, and future FIPS 140-3 validations of the provider will require
 X9.31 to be disabled or marked as not approved with an explicit
 indicator, disallow this padding mode now.
 Remove the X9.31 tests from the acvp test, since they will always fail
 now.
 [1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5-draft.pdf
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |   6 +
 test/acvp_test.inc                            | 214 ------------------
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 34f45175e8..49e7f9158a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -1233,7 +1233,13 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
             err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
             goto cont;
         case RSA_X931_PADDING:
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
 +#else /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +            err_extra_text = "X.931 padding no longer allowed in FIPS mode,"
 +                             " since it was removed from FIPS 186-5";
 +            goto bad_pad;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         cont:
             if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
                                RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
 index 73b24bdb0c..96a72073f9 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.inc
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -1204,13 +1204,6 @@ static const struct rsa_siggen_st rsa_siggen_data[] = {
         ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        2048,
 -        "SHA384",
 -        ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -    },
     {
         "pss",
         2048,
@@ -1622,202 +1615,6 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_sigverpss_1_sig[] = {
     0x5c, 0xea, 0x8a, 0x92, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x11, 0x4b,
 };
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_n[] = {
 -    0xa0, 0x16, 0x14, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xad,
 -    0xd7, 0x07, 0x31, 0x6d, 0xfc, 0xba, 0x25, 0x83,
 -    0x09, 0xa0, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x22, 0x87,
 -    0xd6, 0xbd, 0x13, 0xd9, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0xf7, 0xe6,
 -    0x48, 0xdb, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x8c,
 -    0xea, 0xbe, 0xe0, 0x04, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x3b, 0x73,
 -    0xdc, 0xc5, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xef, 0xea, 0x10,
 -    0x46, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xb9, 0x93, 0xbc, 0xa0, 0xb6,
 -    0x06, 0x02, 0x82, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x54, 0xec, 0x79,
 -    0x50, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xd7,
 -    0x26, 0xcd, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0x0f, 0x26, 0x5b,
 -    0x1f, 0x21, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x3f, 0x02,
 -    0x8c, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0x70, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0x41,
 -    0xfd, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x12, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x6e, 0x0f,
 -    0x19, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0x31, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x0e, 0xdf,
 -    0x08, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x4b, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x8d, 0x7d,
 -    0x6e, 0xea, 0xc7, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x84, 0x54,
 -    0x7f, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x29, 0x96, 0x39, 0x4c, 0x3e,
 -    0x85, 0xec, 0x22, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x04,
 -    0x2f, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xae, 0x47, 0x79,
 -    0x59, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x17, 0xae, 0x16,
 -    0x38, 0x66, 0x4e, 0xff, 0x45, 0x7f, 0xac, 0x5e,
 -    0x75, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x8b,
 -    0x3d, 0x08, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x11, 0xba, 0xa8,
 -    0xc3, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x89,
 -    0x27, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x7b,
 -    0x39, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x3d, 0x62,
 -    0xb6, 0xd4, 0x43, 0xd0, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0xc1, 0x73,
 -    0x3d, 0x99, 0x37, 0xbe, 0x62, 0x13, 0x6a, 0x8b,
 -    0xeb, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x2a, 0x8b, 0x4f, 0x7f,
 -    0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x3e, 0x08, 0x1b, 0xb5, 0x77,
 -    0xd3, 0xdc, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x59, 0xf6, 0x33,
 -    0x47, 0xa0, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x66,
 -    0x24, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xc1, 0xd4,
 -    0x11, 0x6c, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0xd7, 0x8a, 0x53, 0x5c,
 -    0xb2, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x14, 0x29, 0x0f, 0xcf, 0x28,
 -    0x32, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0x17, 0xf6, 0xbc, 0x0e, 0xb8,
 -    0x99, 0x7c, 0x14, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0xe4,
 -    0x31, 0xbe, 0x54, 0x64, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x1d, 0xb0,
 -    0x37, 0xcc, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x07,
 -    0x37, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x65, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xfe, 0x60,
 -    0x6a, 0x64, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x5b, 0x9a,
 -    0x28, 0x61, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xd7, 0x0d, 0x56, 0x1e,
 -    0x4d, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x4e,
 -    0xaa, 0x37, 0x23, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0x69, 0x66, 0x81,
 -    0xc8, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0f, 0x28, 0x31, 0x9a,
 -    0x2d, 0xe5, 0x79, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0xca, 0x60, 0x45,
 -    0xf7, 0x83, 0x73, 0x5a, 0x01, 0x29, 0xda, 0xf7,
 -
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_e[] = {
 -    0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_msg[] = {
 -    0x82, 0x2e, 0x41, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0x47,
 -    0xec, 0xf1, 0x79, 0xcc, 0x05, 0xef, 0xdb, 0xcd,
 -    0xca, 0x8b, 0x8e, 0x61, 0x45, 0xad, 0xa6, 0xd9,
 -    0xd7, 0x4b, 0x15, 0xf4, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x2a, 0x52,
 -    0xe3, 0x44, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x41,
 -    0x50, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x13, 0x49, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x54,
 -    0x97, 0xfd, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0x5c,
 -    0xc1, 0x37, 0x58, 0x17, 0x63, 0x19, 0x9c, 0xcf,
 -    0xee, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x06, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x47,
 -    0xd1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x59, 0x97, 0x02, 0x01,
 -    0x31, 0x45, 0x8c, 0xe1, 0x5c, 0xac, 0xe7, 0x5f,
 -    0x6a, 0x23, 0xda, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0x25, 0xc6, 0x67,
 -    0xea, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x0f, 0x41,
 -    0xb5, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x7e, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0xaa, 0xbd,
 -    0xe2, 0x8d, 0xad, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x29, 0x70, 0xca,
 -    0x1b, 0x38, 0x21, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0xaf, 0x00,
 -
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_sig[] = {
 -    0x29, 0xa9, 0x3a, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x1b, 0xdb,
 -    0xaf, 0x0b, 0x47, 0x5b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x8c, 0xc3,
 -    0x70, 0xbe, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x65, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1e,
 -    0x95, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x76, 0x79, 0xf1, 0x00,
 -    0x71, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x7b, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0x18,
 -    0xc4, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x31, 0x04, 0x3f, 0xfc,
 -    0x36, 0x06, 0x20, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x62, 0xf2, 0xb5,
 -    0x79, 0x0a, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0x4f,
 -    0x9a, 0x17, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x64, 0x48, 0x09, 0x75,
 -    0xff, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x36, 0xca, 0xca, 0x1d, 0x74,
 -    0x99, 0xbe, 0x5c, 0x94, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xf4,
 -    0x59, 0x7e, 0x17, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0xb1,
 -    0xda, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x34, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x19,
 -    0x0a, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0xef, 0x82,
 -    0xd4, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xbe, 0x15, 0x73, 0xac, 0xef,
 -    0x05, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0x8a, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0x8e, 0xa5,
 -    0xee, 0xfb, 0x28, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xa4, 0x2b, 0xd2,
 -    0x85, 0x2b, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x04,
 -    0xa0, 0x49, 0x24, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xcf,
 -    0x73, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0x70, 0xda, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x5a,
 -    0x28, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xbd, 0x2a, 0x7c,
 -    0x8e, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x8d,
 -    0x76, 0xea, 0x70, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x63, 0x74,
 -    0xbc, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x1b, 0x75,
 -    0x82, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x55, 0xd4, 0xbd,
 -    0x14, 0xde, 0x58, 0x56, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x4e, 0x57,
 -    0x0d, 0x54, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x86, 0x8c, 0xcb, 0x07,
 -    0x9f, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xc2, 0x08, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x05,
 -    0x3b, 0xc8, 0xd2, 0x15, 0x68, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0x3c,
 -    0x4e, 0x85, 0xa9, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xca,
 -    0xca, 0xa8, 0x27, 0x89, 0x61, 0x4e, 0x1f, 0x57,
 -    0x2d, 0x99, 0x10, 0x3f, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x96, 0x5e,
 -    0x2f, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xea, 0x65, 0x2a,
 -    0x22, 0x35, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0x13, 0x89, 0x05, 0x2e,
 -    0x19, 0x73, 0x1d, 0x70, 0x74, 0x98, 0x15, 0x4b,
 -    0xab, 0x56, 0x52, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x42, 0x95, 0x6a,
 -    0x46, 0x2c, 0x78, 0xff, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x48, 0x10,
 -    0x38, 0x25, 0xab, 0x32, 0x7c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x5d,
 -    0x6f, 0x45, 0x54, 0x74, 0x2d, 0x93, 0x56, 0x52,
 -    0x11, 0x34, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x4f,
 -    0x37, 0x14, 0x75, 0xac, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xda,
 -    0x38, 0x06, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x59,
 -    0x1b, 0x5d, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x39, 0x37,
 -    0x44, 0x85, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x06, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x15,
 -    0x35, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x27, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xec,
 -    0x30, 0x37, 0x20, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x11, 0x61, 0xc0,
 -    0xdb, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x26, 0x78, 0x27, 0xb9, 0x13,
 -    0xc9, 0x1a, 0xa7, 0x67, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0xcb,
 -};
 -
 -#define rsa_sigverx931_1_n rsa_sigverx931_0_n
 -#define rsa_sigverx931_1_e rsa_sigverx931_0_e
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_msg[] = {
 -    0x79, 0x02, 0xb9, 0xd2, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x02, 0xc8,
 -    0x2a, 0x94, 0x92, 0x14, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x8d,
 -    0xb2, 0xf6, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0xf9,
 -    0xa8, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xac, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0x34, 0xf3,
 -    0xda, 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x70, 0x92, 0xfb, 0x40, 0x26,
 -    0xc7, 0x9b, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0x10, 0x11, 0xcf, 0x7f,
 -    0x23, 0xd0, 0xed, 0x55, 0x52, 0x6d, 0xd3, 0xb2,
 -    0x56, 0x53, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xb5,
 -    0xfd, 0xd0, 0x45, 0x4f, 0x62, 0x40, 0x54, 0x42,
 -    0x68, 0xd5, 0xe5, 0xdd, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x94, 0x59,
 -    0x1a, 0x57, 0x13, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xcc, 0xbd,
 -    0x4c, 0x2e, 0xc8, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x68, 0xd0, 0x72,
 -    0x6a, 0x94, 0xd2, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x86, 0x45,
 -    0x95, 0xaa, 0x50, 0xda, 0x35, 0xeb, 0x69, 0x44,
 -    0x1f, 0xf3, 0x3a, 0x51, 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x08, 0x42,
 -    0x12, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0x21, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x87, 0x55,
 -};
 -
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_sig[] = {
 -    0x3b, 0xba, 0xb3, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0x29, 0xb5,
 -    0xf9, 0x94, 0xf1, 0x00, 0x5c, 0x16, 0x67, 0x67,
 -    0x73, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x7e, 0x07, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0x95,
 -    0xeb, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0xa9, 0x70, 0x5a,
 -    0xee, 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x69, 0x85, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xe3,
 -    0xdc, 0xe2, 0x73, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x69,
 -    0x08, 0x03, 0x17, 0xd6, 0x50, 0x21, 0x14, 0x23,
 -    0x8c, 0xe6, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x14,
 -    0x81, 0xb1, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0xd2, 0xbe, 0x58, 0x75,
 -    0x94, 0x74, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0xf6, 0x1f,
 -    0x73, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x5f, 0xbd, 0xbf, 0x59, 0x37,
 -    0x5b, 0x98, 0x54, 0xad, 0x3a, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xef,
 -    0xcb, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x84, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0x60,
 -    0xb8, 0xc3, 0x8d, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xa0, 0x91, 0x94,
 -    0xb7, 0xd7, 0xb1, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xee, 0x81, 0x93,
 -    0xfc, 0x41, 0xf0, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x52, 0xde,
 -    0x80, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x68, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0x50, 0x1b,
 -    0x08, 0x3f, 0x40, 0xde, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x81, 0x99,
 -    0x7f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x27, 0xd4, 0xfb,
 -    0xcd, 0xc5, 0x7a, 0xea, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x66, 0xef,
 -    0x55, 0x3f, 0x85, 0xea, 0x84, 0xc5, 0x0a, 0xf6,
 -    0x3c, 0x40, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xbe,
 -    0x61, 0x41, 0xd3, 0xb1, 0x08, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0xf9,
 -    0x6e, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63,
 -    0x3e, 0x41, 0x33, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x27, 0xa4, 0xd9,
 -    0x3a, 0x20, 0x2b, 0x39, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x82, 0x48,
 -    0xd6, 0x5b, 0x58, 0x85, 0x44, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0xfd,
 -    0xfb, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xac, 0xbc, 0xba, 0x16,
 -    0x92, 0x0e, 0x20, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8,
 -    0x00, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x41, 0x46, 0x38, 0xb6, 0x54,
 -    0x70, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x62, 0x97, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x66,
 -    0x5a, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x27, 0x56,
 -    0x60, 0x5b, 0x0c, 0x52, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x99,
 -    0x55, 0x11, 0x62, 0x52, 0x09, 0x48, 0x53, 0x90,
 -    0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe3, 0x4c, 0xe3,
 -    0xa8, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x5c, 0x59, 0x25,
 -    0x99, 0x30, 0xde, 0x57, 0x6a, 0x84, 0x25, 0x34,
 -    0x3e, 0x64, 0x11, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x70,
 -    0xd2, 0x5c, 0x0e, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x24, 0x53, 0x75,
 -    0x98, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x01, 0x6a, 0x14, 0xed, 0xc3,
 -    0x6f, 0xc4, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x59, 0x53,
 -    0x81, 0x3a, 0x86, 0x31, 0xfc, 0x9e, 0xbf, 0x6c,
 -    0x52, 0x93, 0x86, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x07,
 -    0x8a, 0x40, 0x33, 0x64, 0xb2, 0x70, 0x48, 0x85,
 -    0x05, 0x59, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x6b, 0x9a, 0xad, 0xab,
 -    0x20, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x6d, 0xde, 0xcf, 0x22, 0x0b,
 -    0xea, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0x1c, 0x39, 0x3a, 0xfd, 0xa4,
 -    0xde, 0x54, 0xae, 0xde, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb0, 0x6d,
 -};
 -
 static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
     {
         "pkcs1", /* pkcs1v1.5 */
@@ -1841,17 +1638,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
         FAIL
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        3072,
 -        "SHA256",
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_msg),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_n),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_e),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_sig),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -        FAIL
 -    },
     {
         "pss",
         4096,
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
 From e1eba21921ceeffa45ffd2115868c14e4c7fb8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:08:24 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] hmac: Add explicit FIPS indicator for key length
 NIST SP 800-131Ar2, table 9 "Approval Status of MAC Algorithms"
 specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and
 are legacy use for HMAC verification.
 Add an explicit indicator that will mark shorter key lengths as
 unsupported. The indicator can be queries from the EVP_MAC_CTX object
 using EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() with the
  OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
 parameter.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/crypto/evp.h                       |  7 +++++++
 include/openssl/evp.h                      |  3 +++
 providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
 index 76fb990de4..1e2240516e 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/evp.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -196,6 +196,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_ed448_pkey_method(void);
 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void);
 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +/* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms specifies key
 + * lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and legacy use for
 + * HMAC verification. */
 +# define EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
 +#endif
 +
 struct evp_mac_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index 49e8e1df78..a5e78efd6e 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1192,6 +1192,9 @@ void EVP_MD_do_all_provided(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
                             void *arg);
 /* MAC stuff */
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
                        const char *properties);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
 index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 +#include "crypto/evp.h"
 +
 #include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -244,6 +246,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -265,6 +270,18 @@ static int hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
             && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, hmac_block_size(macctx)))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR)) != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        /* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms
 +         * specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation
 +         * and legacy use for HMAC verification. */
 +        if (macctx->keylen < EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return 1;
 }
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index 6618122417..8b2d430f17 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -137,12 +137,13 @@ my %params = (
 # If "engine",or "properties",are specified, they should always be paired
 # with "cipher",or "digest".
 -    'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' =>           '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER',        # utf8 string
 -    'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' =>           '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST',        # utf8 string
 -    'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>       '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES',    # utf8 string
 -    'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' =>             "size",                     # size_t
 -    'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' =>       "block-size",               # size_t
 -    'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' =>    "tls-data-size",            # size_t
 +    'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' =>                '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER',        # utf8 string
 +    'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST',        # utf8 string
 +    'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>            '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES',    # utf8 string
 +    'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' =>                  "size",                     # size_t
 +    'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' =>            "block-size",               # size_t
 +    'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' =>         "tls-data-size",            # size_t
 +    'MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",    # size_t
 # KDF / PRF parameters
     'KDF_PARAM_SECRET' =>       "secret",                   # octet string
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
 From 754862899058cfb5f2341c81f9e04dd2f7b37056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:37:17 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] pbkdf2: Set minimum password length of 8 bytes
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
 "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the
 vendor shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
 a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper
 bound for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random.
 This probability shall take into account not only the length of the
 password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The
 decision on the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is
 the vendor’s, but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the
 decision."
 We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's
 ACVP testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer
 passwords combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error)
 would cause the module to fail ACVP testing.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 index 2a0ae63acc..aa0adce5e6 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN   (128 / 8)
 +/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
 + * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
 + * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
 + * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
 + * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
 + * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
 + * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
 + * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
 + * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
 + *
 + * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
 + * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
 + * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
 + * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
 +#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
@@ -186,9 +201,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
     }
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
 +        if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
 +            && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
         if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
             return 0;
 +    }
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
         if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
@@ -297,6 +318,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
     }
     if (lower_bound_checks) {
 +        if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
             return 0;
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
 From 52b347703ba2b98a0efee86c1a483c2f0f9f73d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 12:52:59 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Disallow SHAKE in OAEP and PSS in FIPS prov
 According to FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C, the SHAKE digest algorithms
 must not be used in higher-level algorithms (such as RSA-OAEP and
 RSASSA-PSS):
 "To be used in an approved mode of operation, the SHA-3 hash functions
 may be implemented either as part of an approved higher-level algorithm,
 for example, a digital signature algorithm, or as the standalone
 functions. The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 extendable-output functions may
 only be used as the standalone algorithms."
 Add a check to prevent their use as message digest in PSS signatures and
 as MGF1 hash function in both OAEP and PSS.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 index d9be1a4f98..dfe9c9f0e8 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -73,9 +73,23 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         return 0;
 #endif
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
     if (mgf1md == NULL)
         mgf1md = md;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
     if (mdlen <= 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
@@ -181,9 +195,23 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 #endif
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     if (mgf1md == NULL)
         mgf1md = md;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
     if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 index 33874bfef8..e8681b0351 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
         mgf1Hash = Hash;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +#endif
 +
     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
@@ -164,6 +172,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
         mgf1Hash = Hash;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +#endif
 +
     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
 -- 
 2.39.0
--- a/SOURCES/0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
 From a325a23bc83f4efd60130001c417ca5b96bdbff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:33:02 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] signature: Add indicator for PSS salt length
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
 salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 ≤ sLen ≤ hLen, where hLen is the length of
 the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 It is not exactly clear from this text whether hLen refers to the
 message digest or the hash function used for the mask generation
 function MGF1. PKCS#1 v2.1 suggests it is the former:
 | Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of
 | the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of
 | RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1.
 | Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of
 | the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former
 | case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain
 | Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13]
 | Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
 | from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts
 | the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the
 | original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.
 Since OpenSSL defaults to creating signatures with the maximum salt
 length, blocking the use of longer salts would probably lead to
 significant problems in practice. Instead, introduce an explicit
 indicator that can be obtained from the EVP_PKEY_CTX object using
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() with the
  OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
 parameter.
 We also add indicator for RSA_NO_PADDING here to avoid patch-over-patch.
 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 ++++
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++
 util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm               | 23 ++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index a5e78efd6e..f239200465 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -797,6 +797,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
 __owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
                               int *outl);
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 __owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
                          EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 __owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 49e7f9158a..0c45008a00 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -1127,6 +1127,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
         }
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
 +            if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
 +            } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
 +            if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     return 1;
 }
@@ -1136,6 +1151,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index 8b2d430f17..a109e44521 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -377,17 +377,18 @@ my %params = (
     'EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM' =>               "kdf-ukm",
 # Signature parameters
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' =>       "algorithm-id",
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' =>             '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>         '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' =>        "saltlen",
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' =>        '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' =>    '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' =>        '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' =>         "nonce-type",
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' =>           "instance",
 -    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' =>     "context-string",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' =>          "algorithm-id",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' =>              '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>            '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' =>           "saltlen",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' =>       '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' =>            "nonce-type",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' =>              "instance",
 +    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' =>        "context-string",
 # Asym cipher parameters
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                   '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap	2022-11-22 12:27:30.994530801 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c	2022-11-22 12:32:15.916875495 +0100
@@ -264,6 +264,14 @@ static int rsasve_generate(PROV_RSA_CTX
             *secretlen = nlen;
         return 1;
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     /*
      * Step (2): Generate a random byte string z of nlen bytes where
      *            1 < z < n - 1
@@ -307,6 +315,13 @@ static int rsasve_recover(PROV_RSA_CTX *
         return 1;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     /* Step (2): check the input ciphertext 'inlen' matches the nlen */
     if (inlen != nlen) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
--- a/SOURCES/0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
@ -1,344 +0,0 @@
 From 8a2d1b22ede5eeca4d104bb027b84f3ecfc69549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 12:51:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] DH: Disable FIPS 186-4 type parameters in FIPS mode
 For DH parameter and key pair generation/verification, the DSA
 procedures specified in FIPS 186-4 are used. With the release of FIPS
 186-5 and the removal of DSA, the approved status of these groups is in
 peril. Once the transition for DSA ends (this transition will be 1 year
 long and start once CMVP has published the guidance), no more
 submissions claiming DSA will be allowed. Hence, FIPS 186-type
 parameters will also be automatically non-approved.
 In the FIPS provider, disable validation of any DH parameters that are
 not well-known groups, and remove DH parameter generation completely.
 Adjust tests to use well-known groups or larger DH groups where this
 change would now cause failures, and skip tests that are expected to
 fail due to this change.
 Related: rhbz#2169757, rhbz#2169757
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_backend.c                       | 10 ++++
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c                         | 12 ++--
 crypto/dh/dh_gen.c                           | 12 +++-
 crypto/dh/dh_key.c                           | 13 ++--
 crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c                         | 10 +++-
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c |  5 ++
 test/endecode_test.c                         |  4 +-
 test/evp_libctx_test.c                       |  2 +-
 test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c           | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
 test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h           |  1 +
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                   |  4 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t               |  3 +
 12 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
 index 726843fd30..24c65ca84f 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ int ossl_dh_params_fromdata(DH *dh, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if (!dh_ffc_params_fromdata(dh, params))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (!ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) {
 +        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                       "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                       " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines"
 +                       " were removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     param_priv_len =
         OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN);
     if (param_priv_len != NULL
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 0b391910d6..75581ca347 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -57,13 +57,15 @@ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
     if (nid != NID_undef)
         return 1;
 +
     /*
 -     * OR
 -     * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
 -     * validity tests.
 +     * FIPS 186-4 explicit domain parameters are no longer supported in FIPS mode.
      */
 -    return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
 -                                              FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +    return 0;
 }
 #else
 int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
 index aec6b85316..9c55121067 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
@@ -38,18 +38,26 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
 int ossl_dh_generate_ffc_parameters(DH *dh, int type, int pbits, int qbits,
                                     BN_GENCB *cb)
 {
 -    int ret, res;
 +    int ret = 0;
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int res;
 +
     if (type == DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_2_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
     else
 -#endif
         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
 +#else
 +    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +#endif
     if (ret > 0)
         dh->dirty_cnt++;
     return ret;
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 index 4e9705beef..14c0b0b6b3 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -308,8 +308,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                 goto err;
         } else {
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -            if (dh->params.q == NULL)
 -                goto err;
 +            ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                           "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer"
 +                           " allowed in FIPS mode, since the required"
 +                           " generation routines were removed from FIPS"
 +                           " 186-5");
 +            goto err;
 #else
             if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
                 /* secret exponent length, must satisfy 2^(l-1) <= p */
@@ -330,9 +334,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                     if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
                         goto err;
                 }
 -            } else
 -#endif
 -            {
 +            } else {
                 /* Do a partial check for invalid p, q, g */
                 if (!ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                      FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL))
@@ -348,6 +350,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                                                    priv_key))
                     goto err;
             }
 +#endif
         }
     }
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
 index f201eede0d..30f90d15be 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static DH *ffc_params_generate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx,
                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
                                                 pcb);
     else
 -# endif
 -    /* For FIPS we always use the DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_4 generator */
 -    if (dctx->paramgen_type >= DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
         rv = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(libctx, &ret->params,
                                                 FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
                                                 pcb);
 +# else
 +    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +# endif
     if (rv <= 0) {
         DH_free(ret);
         return NULL;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 index 9a7dde7c66..b3e7bca5ac 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -414,6 +414,11 @@ static int dh_validate(const void *keydata, int selection, int checktype)
     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
         return 1; /* nothing to validate */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* In FIPS provider, always check the domain parameters to disallow
 +     * operations on keys with FIPS 186-4 params. */
 +    selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
 +#endif
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0) {
         /*
          * Both of these functions check parameters. DH_check_params_ex()
 diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
 index e3f7b81f69..1b63daaed5 100644
 --- a/test/endecode_test.c
 +++ b/test/endecode_test.c
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *make_template(const char *type, OSSL_PARAM *genparams)
      * for testing only. Use a minimum key size of 2048 for security purposes.
      */
     if (strcmp(type, "DH") == 0)
 -        return get_dh512(keyctx);
 +        return get_dh2048(keyctx);
     if (strcmp(type, "X9.42 DH") == 0)
 -        return get_dhx512(keyctx);
 +        return get_dhx_ffdhe2048(keyctx);
 # endif
     /*
 diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 index 2448c35a14..92d484fb12 100644
 --- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 +++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int do_dh_param_keygen(int tstid, const BIGNUM **bn)
     if (!TEST_ptr(gen_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey_parm, NULL))
         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gen_ctx), 0)
 -        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey), expected))
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey) == 1, expected))
         goto err;
     if (expected) {
 diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
 index 4bdadc4143..e5186e4b4a 100644
 --- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
 +++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
@@ -116,6 +116,68 @@ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
                           dhx512_q, sizeof(dhx512_q));
 }
 +EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 +{
 +    /* This is RFC 7919 ffdhe2048, since Red Hat removes support for
 +     * non-well-known groups in FIPS mode. */
 +    static unsigned char dhx_p[] = {
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58,
 +        0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
 +        0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41,
 +        0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb, 0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
 +        0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8, 0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02,
 +        0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
 +        0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0, 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55,
 +        0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
 +        0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77, 0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda,
 +        0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
 +        0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82,
 +        0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
 +        0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3,
 +        0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
 +        0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1,
 +        0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
 +        0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff, 0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32,
 +        0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83, 0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
 +        0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83,
 +        0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2, 0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
 +        0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +    };
 +    static unsigned char dhx_g[] = {
 +        0x02
 +    };
 +    static unsigned char dhx_q[] = {
 +        0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c,
 +        0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d, 0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
 +        0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20,
 +        0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
 +        0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01,
 +        0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd, 0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
 +        0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68, 0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa,
 +        0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
 +        0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed,
 +        0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
 +        0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1,
 +        0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
 +        0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51,
 +        0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
 +        0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70,
 +        0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76, 0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
 +        0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19,
 +        0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
 +        0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02, 0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1,
 +        0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
 +        0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +    };
 +
 +    return get_dh_from_pg(libctx, "X9.42 DH",
 +                          dhx_p, sizeof(dhx_p),
 +                          dhx_g, sizeof(dhx_g),
 +                          dhx_q, sizeof(dhx_q));
 +}
 +
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
     static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
 diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
 index f0e8709062..2ff6d6e721 100644
 --- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
 +++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libct);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh4096(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index cabbe3ecdf..efe56c5665 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -627,10 +627,10 @@ my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
     ],
     [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH",
 -      [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
 +      [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
         "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
         "-in", "{output}.cms", "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&final_compare
     ]
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index 8c52b637fc..31ed54621b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ sub testssl {
             skip "skipping dhe1024dsa test", 1
                 if ($no_dh);
 +            skip "FIPS 186-4 type DH groups are no longer supported by the FIPS provider", 1
 +                if $provider eq "fips";
 +
             ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])),
                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
           }
 -- 
 2.40.1
--- a/SOURCES/0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
 From 589eb3898896c1ac916bc20069ecd5adb8534850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:31:08 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] GCM: Implement explicit FIPS indicator for IV gen
 Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
 uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
 this. Provide an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be generated
 internally at its entirety randomly."
 Resolves: rhbz#2168289
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
 .../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c    |  4 +++
 .../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c                | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
 util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm               |  5 ++--
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index 49e8e1df78..ec2ba46fbd 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -746,6 +746,10 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 __owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
                            const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
 __owur int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
 index fa383165d8..716add7339 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_aead_known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN, NULL, 0),
 +    /* normally we would hide this under an #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but that does
 +     * not work in ciphercommon.c because it is compiled only once into
 +     * libcommon.a */
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_cipher_aead_gettable_ctx_params(
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
 index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
@@ -238,6 +238,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
             break;
         }
     }
 +
 +    /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
 +     * ciphercommon_gcm.c is only compiled once into libcommon.a, so ifdefs do
 +     * not work here. */
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
 +         * uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
 +         * this. This provides an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be
 +         * generated internally at its entirety randomly." Note that one of the
 +         * conditions of this option is that "The IV length shall be at least
 +         * 96 bits (per SP 800-38D)." We do not specically check for this
 +         * condition here, because gcm_iv_generate will fail in this case. */
 +        if (ctx->enc && !ctx->iv_gen_rand)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     return 1;
 }
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index a109e44521..64e9809387 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -101,8 +101,9 @@ my %params = (
     'CIPHER_PARAM_SPEED' =>                "speed",       # uint
     'CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE' =>             "cts_mode",    # utf8_string
 # For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form
 -    'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' =>  "alg_id_param",# octet_string
 -    'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' =>         "xts_standard",# utf8_string
 +    'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' =>   "alg_id_param",# octet_string
 +    'CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator", # int
 +    'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' =>          "xts_standard",# utf8_string
     'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT' =>  "tls1multi_maxsndfrag",# uint
     'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE' =>        "tls1multi_maxbufsz",  # size_t
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
 From fa96a2f493276e7a57512e8c3d535052586f1525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:32:04 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] pbdkf2: Set indicator if pkcs5 param disabled checks
 The pbkdf2 implementation in the FIPS provider supports the checks
 required by NIST, but allows disabling these checks by setting the
 OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5 parameter to 1. The implementation must indicate
 that the use of this configuration is not approved in FIPS mode. Add an
 explicit indicator to provide this indication.
 Resolves: rhbz#2175145
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 index aa0adce5e6..6df8c6d321 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -251,11 +251,42 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
 +            != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* The lower_bound_checks parameter enables checks required by FIPS. If
 +         * those checks are disabled, the PBKDF2 implementation will also
 +         * support non-approved parameters (e.g., salt lengths < 16 bytes, see
 +         * NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1). */
 +        if (!ctx->lower_bound_checks)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -263,6 +294,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
 From ee6e381e4140efd5365ddf27a12055859103cf59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:39:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] asymciphers, kem: Add explicit FIPS indicator
 NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and key
 agreement schemes, but explicit key confirmation is not implemented and
 cannot be implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider
 does not implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on
 its callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST did clarify
 that OpenSSL can claim KTS-OAEP and RSASVE as approved, but we did add
 an indicator to mark them as unapproved previously and should thus keep
 the indicator available.
 This does not affect RSA-OAEP decryption, because it is approved as
 a component according to the FIPS 140-3 IG, section 2.4.G.
 Resolves: rhbz#2179331
 Resolves: RHEL-14083
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
 .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 22 ++++++++++++++
 providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c       | 30 ++++++++++++++++++-
 util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm               |  6 ++--
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index ec2ba46fbd..3803b03422 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1764,6 +1764,10 @@ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 size_t EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(void);
 OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(size_t idx);
 # endif
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 EVP_KEYMGMT *EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
                                const char *properties);
 int EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -462,6 +462,27 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 +         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 +         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
 +         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
 +         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
 +         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
 +         * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP as unapproved until
 +         * we have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such
 +         * as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
 +        fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return 1;
 }
@@ -465,6 +483,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
@@ -151,11 +151,39 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
 static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (ctx == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 +         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 +         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for key agreement or key transport, but
 +         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
 +         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
 +         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
 +         * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSASVE unapproved until we
 +         * have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such as
 +         * OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 -    return ctx != NULL;
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_rsakem_ctx_params[] = {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 index 64e9809387..45ab0c8dc4 100644
 --- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ my %params = (
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' =>   "tls-negotiated-version",
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' =>       "implicit-rejection",
     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' =>     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
 +    'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' =>    "redhat-fips-indicator",
 # Encoder / decoder parameters
@@ -438,8 +439,9 @@ my %params = (
     'SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT' =>     "kat",
 # KEM parameters
 -    'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' =>            "operation",
 -    'KEM_PARAM_IKME' =>                 "ikme",
 +    'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' =>             "operation",
 +    'KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
 +    'KEM_PARAM_IKME' =>                  "ikme",
 # Capabilities
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
@ -1,251 +0,0 @@
 From 9b02ad7225b74a5b9088b361caead0a41e570e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:40:56 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 48/48] 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
 Patch-name: 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
 Patch-id: 114
 Patch-status: |
    # We believe that some changes present in CentOS are not necessary
    # because ustream has a check for FIPS version
 ---
 doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod                     |  3 +++
 doc/man5/fips_config.pod                      | 13 +++++++++++
 include/openssl/fips_names.h                  |  8 +++++++
 include/openssl/ssl.h.in                      |  1 +
 providers/fips/fipsprov.c                     |  2 +-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c     | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
 ssl/ssl_conf.c                                |  1 +
 ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c                  |  8 ++++++-
 ssl/t1_enc.c                                  | 11 ++++++++--
 .../30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt     | 10 +++++++++
 test/sslapitest.c                             |  2 +-
 11 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
 index ae6ca43282..b83c04a308 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended master secret extension, enabled by
 default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
 B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
 +B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
 +This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
 +
 B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
 default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
 B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
 diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 index 1c15e32a5c..f2cedaf88d 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ for more information.
 This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
 +Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
 +OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
 +should have format
 +
 + [fips_sect]
 + tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
 + activate = 1
 +
 +The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
 +presence of extended master secret or not.
 +
 +The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
 +
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
 index 5c77f6d691..8cdd5a6bf7 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern "C" {
  */
 # define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_DRBG_TRUNC_DIGEST  "drbg-no-trunc-md"
 +/*
 + * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
 + * This is disabled by default.
 + *
 + * Type: OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
 + */
 +# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"
 +
 # ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 # endif
 diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
 index 0b6de603e2..26a69ca282 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
 +++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL *s, void *arg);
      * interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
      */
 # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG                     SSL_OP_BIT(31)
 +# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS                     SSL_OP_BIT(48)
 /*
  * Disable RFC8879 certificate compression
  * SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION: don't send compressed certificates,
 diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 index 5ff9872bd8..eb9653a9df 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     if (fgbl == NULL)
         return NULL;
     init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_security_checks, 1);
 -    init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 0); /* Disabled by default */
 +    init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 1); /* Enabled by default */
     init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 0);
     return fgbl;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 index 25a6c79a2e..79bc7a9719 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
 static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
 {
     TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
     if (ctx != NULL) {
         kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
@@ -222,6 +223,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         }
     }
 +    /*
 +     * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
 +     * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
 +     * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
 +     * as "extended master secret".
 +     */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +            && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
 +                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
 +    ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
 +        if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +                && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
 +                          TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
                         ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
 index 5146cedb96..086db98c33 100644
 --- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
 +++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
                      SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
 +        SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 index 00b1ee531e..22cdabb308 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "../ssl_local.h"
 #include "statem_local.h"
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION     1
@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                                   unsigned int context,
                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
 {
 -    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
 +    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
 +        if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
 +            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
 +        }
         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 +    }
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
             || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
 index 91238e6457..e8ad8ecd9e 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/trace.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
 static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
     }
  err:
 -    if (fatal)
 -        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +    if (fatal) {
 +        /* The calls to this function are local so it's safe to implement the check */
 +        if (FIPS_mode() && seed1_len >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +            && memcmp(seed1, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
 +	else
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +    }
     else
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
 index 44040ff66b..deb6bf3fcb 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587c
 Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
 Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
 +Availablein = fips
 +KDF = TLS1-PRF
 +Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
 +Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
 +Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
 +Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
 +Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
 +Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
 +Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
 +
 FIPSversion = <=3.1.0
 KDF = TLS1-PRF
 Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index 169e3c7466..e67b5bb44c 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int test_client_cert_verify_cb(void)
     STACK_OF(X509) *server_chain;
     SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
     SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
 -    int testresult = 0;
 +    int testresult = 0, status;
     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
                                        TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION, 0,
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
 From ec8e4e25cc5e5c67313c5fd6af94fa248685c3d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 17:37:09 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 45/49] 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
 Patch-name: 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
 Patch-id: 115
 Patch-status: |
    # skip quic and pairwise tests temporarily
 ---
 test/quicapitest.c                     |  4 +++-
 test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t |  1 +
 test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t   | 10 ++++++++--
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/test/quicapitest.c b/test/quicapitest.c
 index 41cf0fc7a8..0fb7492700 100644
 --- a/test/quicapitest.c
 +++ b/test/quicapitest.c
@@ -2139,7 +2139,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_cipher_find);
     ADD_TEST(test_version);
 #if defined(DO_SSL_TRACE_TEST)
 -    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
 +    if (is_fips == 0) {
 +        ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
 +    }
 #endif
     ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis_ctx);
     ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
 index c837d48fb4..6291c08c49 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 use strict;
 use warnings;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file);
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file with);
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 BEGIN {
@@ -31,28 +31,37 @@ run(test(["fips_version_test", "-config"
 SKIP: {
     skip "Skip RSA test because of no rsa in this build", 1
         if disabled("rsa");
 +    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
 +    sub {
     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
                  "-pairwise", "rsa"])),
        "fips provider rsa keygen pairwise failure test");
 +    });
 }
 SKIP: {
     skip "Skip EC test because of no ec in this build", 2
         if disabled("ec");
 +    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
 +    sub {
     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
                  "-pairwise", "ec"])),
        "fips provider ec keygen pairwise failure test");
 +    });
     skip "FIPS provider version is too old", 1
         if !$fips_exit;
 +    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
 +    sub {
     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
                  "-pairwise", "eckat"])),
        "fips provider ec keygen kat failure test");
 +    });
 }
 SKIP: {
     skip "Skip DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 2
 -        if disabled("dsa");
 +        if 1; #if disabled("dsa");
     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
                  "-pairwise", "dsa", "-dsaparam", data_file("dsaparam.pem")])),
        "fips provider dsa keygen pairwise failure test");
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0116-version-aliasing.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0116-version-aliasing.patch
@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
 From a2673b5e2e95bcf54a1746bfd409cca688275e75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:17 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 46/49] 0116-version-aliasing.patch
 Patch-name: 0116-version-aliasing.patch
 Patch-id: 116
 Patch-status: |
    # Add version aliasing due to
    # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23534
 From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
 ---
 crypto/evp/digest.c                    | 7 ++++++-
 crypto/evp/evp_enc.c                   | 7 ++++++-
 test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t | 1 +
 util/libcrypto.num                     | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
 index 42331703da..3a280acc0e 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -553,7 +553,12 @@ legacy:
     return ret;
 }
 -EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
 +EVP_MD_CTX
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
 +                    symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
 +#endif
 +*EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
 {
     EVP_MD_CTX *out = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
 index e9faf31057..5a29b8dbb7 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -1444,7 +1444,12 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key)
 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 }
 -EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
 +EVP_CIPHER_CTX
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
 +                    symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
 +#endif
 +*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
 {
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
 index 222b1886ae..7e2f65cccb 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ foreach (sort keys %stlibname) {
     }
 }
 my @duplicates = sort grep { $symbols{$_} > 1 } keys %symbols;
 +@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") && ($_ ne "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup") && ($_ ne "EVP_MD_CTX_dup") } @duplicates;
 +@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_strcasecmp") && ($_ ne "OPENSSL_strncasecmp") } @duplicates;
 if (@duplicates) {
     note "Duplicates:";
     note join('\n', @duplicates);
 diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
 index 8046454025..068e9904e2 100644
 --- a/util/libcrypto.num
 +++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5435,7 +5435,9 @@ X509_PUBKEY_set0_public_key             5562	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free                 5563	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_trace_string                       5564	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_MD_CTX_dup                          5565	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +EVP_MD_CTX_dup                          ?	    3_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup                      5566	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup                      ?    	3_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BN_signed_bin2bn                        5567	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BN_signed_bn2bin                        5568	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BN_signed_lebin2bn                      5569	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
 From 242c746690dd1d0e500fa554c60536877d77776d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 17:08:56 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 47/49] 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
 Patch-name: 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
 Patch-id: 117
 Patch-status: |
    # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23050
 ---
 CHANGES.md                        | 13 +++++++
 doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod  |  6 ++-
 doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod | 11 +++++-
 ssl/t1_lib.c                      | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
 test/sslapitest.c                 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
 index ca29762ac2..4e21d0ddf9 100644
 --- a/CHANGES.md
 +++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ OpenSSL 3.2
 ### Changes between 3.2.0 and 3.2.1 [30 Jan 2024]
 + * Unknown entries in TLS SignatureAlgorithms, ClientSignatureAlgorithms
 +   config options and the respective calls to SSL[_CTX]_set1_sigalgs() and
 +   SSL[_CTX]_set1_client_sigalgs() that start with `?` character are
 +   ignored and the configuration will still be used.
 +
 +   Similarly unknown entries that start with `?` character in a TLS
 +   Groups config option or set with SSL[_CTX]_set1_groups_list() are ignored
 +   and the configuration will still be used.
 +
 +   In both cases if the resulting list is empty, an error is returned.
 +
 +   *Tomáš Mráz*
 +
  * A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from
    an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be
    NULL, but OpenSSL did not correctly check for this case. A fix has been
 diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
 index c26ef00306..f0566e148e 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ string B<list>. The string is a colon separated list of group names, for example
 are B<P-256>, B<P-384>, B<P-521>, B<X25519>, B<X448>, B<brainpoolP256r1tls13>,
 B<brainpoolP384r1tls13>, B<brainpoolP512r1tls13>, B<ffdhe2048>, B<ffdhe3072>,
 B<ffdhe4096>, B<ffdhe6144> and B<ffdhe8192>. Support for other groups may be
 -added by external providers.
 +added by external providers. If a group name is preceded with the C<?>
 +character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
 SSL_set1_groups() and SSL_set1_groups_list() are similar except they set
 supported groups for the SSL structure B<ssl>.
@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ The curve functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group
 functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. The SSL_get_negotiated_group() function
 was added in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
 +Support for ignoring unknown groups in SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() and
 +SSL_set1_groups_list() was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
 +
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 Copyright 2013-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
 index eb31006346..5b7de7d956 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ signature algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The B<str> parameter
 must be a null terminated string consisting of a colon separated list of
 elements, where each element is either a combination of a public key
 algorithm and a digest separated by B<+>, or a TLS 1.3-style named
 -SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256.
 +SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256. If a list entry is preceded
 +with the C<?> character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
 +
 SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(),
 SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set
@@ -106,6 +108,13 @@ using a string:
 L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)>,
 L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>
 +=head1 HISTORY
 +
 +Support for ignoring unknown signature algorithms in
 +SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(), SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(),
 +SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list()
 +was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
 +
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index 056aae3863..fe680449c5 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1052,9 +1052,15 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     size_t i;
     uint16_t gid = 0;
     char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
 +    int ignore_unknown = 0;
     if (elem == NULL)
         return 0;
 +    if (elem[0] == '?') {
 +        ignore_unknown = 1;
 +        ++elem;
 +        --len;
 +    }
     if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
         uint16_t *tmp =
             OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
@@ -1070,13 +1076,14 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
     if (gid == 0) {
 -        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
 -                       "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
 -        return 0;
 +        /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
 +        return ignore_unknown;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
 -        if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
 -            return 0;
 +        if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
 +            /* Duplicate group - ignore */
 +            return 1;
 +        }
     garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -1097,6 +1104,11 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
     gcb.ctx = ctx;
     if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
         goto end;
 +    if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
 +                       "No valid groups in '%s'", str);
 +        goto end;
 +    }
     if (pext == NULL) {
         ret = 1;
         goto end;
@@ -2905,8 +2917,15 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
     char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
     int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
 +    int ignore_unknown = 0;
 +
     if (elem == NULL)
         return 0;
 +    if (elem[0] == '?') {
 +        ignore_unknown = 1;
 +        ++elem;
 +        --len;
 +    }
     if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
         return 0;
     if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
@@ -2931,8 +2950,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
                     break;
                 }
             }
 -            if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
 -                return 0;
 +            if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
 +                /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
 +                return ignore_unknown;
 +            }
         }
     } else {
         *p = 0;
@@ -2940,8 +2961,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
             return 0;
         get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
         get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
 -        if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
 -            return 0;
 +        if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
 +            /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
 +            return ignore_unknown;
 +        }
         for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
              i++, s++) {
             if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
@@ -2949,15 +2972,17 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
                 break;
             }
         }
 -        if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
 -            return 0;
 +        if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
 +            /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
 +            return ignore_unknown;
 +        }
     }
 -    /* Reject duplicates */
 +    /* Ignore duplicates */
     for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
         if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
             sarg->sigalgcnt--;
 -            return 0;
 +            return 1;
         }
     }
     return 1;
@@ -2973,6 +2998,11 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
     }
     if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
         return 0;
 +    if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
 +                       "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
     if (c == NULL)
         return 1;
     return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index 1c14f93ed1..184a0f1055 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "testutil.h"
 #include "testutil/output.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
 #include "internal/ktls.h"
 #include "../ssl/ssl_local.h"
 #include "../ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h"
@@ -3147,6 +3148,7 @@ static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = {
     {validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0},
 # endif
     {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1},
 +    {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:?Invalid", 1, 1},
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1},
     {NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0},
@@ -9276,6 +9278,64 @@ static int test_servername(int tst)
     return testresult;
 }
 +static int test_unknown_sigalgs_groups(void)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = SSL_CTX_new_ex(libctx, NULL, TLS_server_method())))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx,
 +                                               "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
 +                                               0))
 +        goto end;
 +    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgslen, 2)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx,
 +                                                      "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
 +                                                      0))
 +        goto end;
 +    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgslen, 2)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
 +                                              "nonexistent"),
 +                                              0))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
 +                                              "?nonexistent1:?nonexistent2:?nonexistent3"),
 +                                              0))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
 +                                              "P-256:nonexistent"),
 +                                              0))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
 +                                              "P-384:?nonexistent:?P-521"),
 +                                              0))
 +        goto end;
 +    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, 2)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[0], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[1], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1))
 +        goto end;
 +#endif
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 + end:
 +    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
     && (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
 /*
@@ -11519,6 +11579,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multiblock_write, OSSL_NELEM(multiblock_cipherlist_data));
 #endif
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_servername, 10);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_unknown_sigalgs_groups);
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
     && (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_sigalgs_available, 6);
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms	2023-05-18 14:03:56.360555106 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c	2023-05-18 14:13:33.765183185 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
 static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -810,12 +811,16 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
     if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
         if (!cipher) {
 +            if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_128_cbc();
 +            } else {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -            cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 +                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 -            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 -            goto end;
 +                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 +                goto end;
 #endif
 +           }
         }
         if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) {
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms	2023-05-22 10:06:50.276528155 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c	2023-05-22 10:08:58.406073945 +0200
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
@@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(C
             return 0;
         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
             return 0;
 +        if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
     } else if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -484,6 +489,11 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encryp
         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
             goto err;
 +
 +        if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
 +                goto err;
 +        }
     }
     if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)
--- a/SOURCES/0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c
 --- openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx	2024-04-15 10:14:47.292448045 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c	2024-04-15 10:15:23.428396994 +0200
@@ -1020,9 +1020,10 @@ static int execute_test_large_message(co
 /* sock must be connected */
 static int ktls_chk_platform(int sock)
 {
 -    if (!ktls_enable(sock))
 +/*    if (!ktls_enable(sock))
         return 0;
 -    return 1;
 +    return 1; */
 +    return 0;
 }
 static int ping_pong_query(SSL *clientssl, SSL *serverssl)
--- a/SOURCES/0123-kdf-Preserve-backward-compatibility-with-older-provi.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0123-kdf-Preserve-backward-compatibility-with-older-provi.patch
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
 From a4daab0c29bce044d385bdeada177a88c32cba4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 16:48:26 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix regression of EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() with older
 providers
 If there is no get_ctx_params() implemented in the key exchange
 provider implementation the fallback will not work. Instead
 check the gettable_ctx_params() to see if the fallback should be
 performed.
 Fixes #24611
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24661)
 (cherry picked from commit 663dbc9c9c897392a9f9d18aa9a8400ca024dc5d)
 ---
 crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 index 2caff2cd6d..d15e43be05 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
                                           int datalen)
 {
     OSSL_PARAM os_params[2];
 +    const OSSL_PARAM *gettables;
     unsigned char *info = NULL;
     size_t info_len = 0;
     size_t info_alloc = 0;
@@ -1049,6 +1050,12 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
         return 1;
     }
 +    /* Check for older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
 +    gettables = EVP_PKEY_CTX_gettable_params(ctx);
 +    if (gettables == NULL || OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(gettables, param) == NULL)
 +        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl,
 +                                              data, datalen);
 +
     /* Get the original value length */
     os_params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(param, NULL, 0);
     os_params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
@@ -1056,9 +1063,9 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
     if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, os_params))
         return 0;
 -    /* Older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
 +    /* This should not happen but check to be sure. */
     if (os_params[0].return_size == OSSL_PARAM_UNMODIFIED)
 -        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl, data, datalen);
 +        return 0;
     info_alloc = os_params[0].return_size + datalen;
     if (info_alloc == 0)
 -- 
 2.45.1
--- a/SOURCES/0124-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0124-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
 From 99fb785a5f85315b95288921a321a935ea29a51e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
 Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
 entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
 have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
 called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
 will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
 should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
 We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
 same for the server list while we are about it.
 CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 index 016135fe18..cf52b317cf 100644
 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3518,37 +3518,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
                           unsigned int server_len,
                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
 {
 -    unsigned int i, j;
 -    const unsigned char *result;
 -    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
 +    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
 +
 +    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
 +            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
 +            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
 +        *out = NULL;
 +        *outlen = 0;
 +        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 +    }
 +
 +    /*
 +     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
 +     * a match.
 +     */
 +    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
 +    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
     /*
      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
      */
 -    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
 -        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
 -            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
 -                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
 -                /* We found a match */
 -                result = &server[i];
 -                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
 -                goto found;
 +    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
 +        while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
 +            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
 +                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
 +            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
 +                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
 +                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
 +                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
 +                        /* We found a match */
 +                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
 +                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
 +                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
 +                    }
 +                }
 +                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
 +            } else {
 +                /* This should never happen */
 +                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
             }
 -            j += client[j];
 -            j++;
         }
 -        i += server[i];
 -        i++;
 +        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
     }
 -    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
 -    result = client;
 -    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 -
 - found:
 -    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
 -    *outlen = result[0];
 -    return status;
 +    /*
 +     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
 +     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
 +     */
 +    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0125-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0125-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 From 015255851371757d54c2560643eb3b3a88123cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:18:27 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 02/10] More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when
 processing NPN
 In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
 the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
 internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
 return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
 explicit and return a handshake failure alert.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 index 381a6c9d7b..1ab3c13d57 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1560,8 +1560,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
                                 &selected, &selected_len,
                                 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
 -                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
 -             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
 +                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
 +            || selected_len == 0) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
         return 0;
     }
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0126-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0126-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 From 6cc511826f09e513b4ec066d9b95acaf4f86d991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:22:13 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Use correctly formatted ALPN data in tserver
 The QUIC test server was using incorrectly formatted ALPN data. With the
 previous implementation of SSL_select_next_proto this went unnoticed. With
 the new stricter implemenation it was failing.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
 index 86187d06ff..15694e723f 100644
 --- a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
 +++ b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
     if (srv->args.alpn == NULL) {
         alpn = alpndeflt;
 -        alpnlen = sizeof(alpn);
 +        alpnlen = sizeof(alpndeflt);
     } else {
         alpn = srv->args.alpn;
         alpnlen = srv->args.alpnlen;
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0127-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0127-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch
@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
 From 8e81c57adbbf703dfb63955f65599765fdacc741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:46:38 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Clarify the SSL_select_next_proto() documentation
 We clarify the input preconditions and the expected behaviour in the event
 of no overlap.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
 index 05fee2fbec..79e1a252f6 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
 SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
 set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
 protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
 -B<protos_len>.
 +B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
 +protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
 SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
 server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
 described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
 matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
 in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
 -B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
 -item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
 -function can also be used in the NPN callback.
 +B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
 +least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
 +
 +The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
 +callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
 +item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
 +B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
 +the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
 +must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
 +SSL_select_next_proto().
 SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
 client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
 The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
 server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
 callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
 -select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
 -a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
 -set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
 +select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
 +fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
 +B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
 +parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
 SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
 when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -154,7 +163,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
 =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
 No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
 -B<out>, B<outlen>.
 +B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
 +B<client> is invalid).
 =back
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0128-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0128-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
 From add5c52a25c549cec4a730cdf96e2252f0a1862d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 16:35:16 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 05/10] Add a test for SSL_select_next_proto
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 test/sslapitest.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index ce163322cd..15cb9060cb 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11741,6 +11741,142 @@ static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
     return testresult;
 }
 +static struct next_proto_st {
 +    int serverlen;
 +    unsigned char server[40];
 +    int clientlen;
 +    unsigned char client[40];
 +    int expected_ret;
 +    size_t selectedlen;
 +    unsigned char selected[40];
 +} next_proto_tests[] = {
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b', },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        7, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        10, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
 +        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'b', 'c', 'd' },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        0, { 0 },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        -1, { 0 },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        0, { 0 },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        0, { 0 }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        -1, { 0 },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        0, { 0 }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
 +    },
 +    {
 +        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
 +        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
 +        0, { 0 }
 +    }
 +};
 +
 +static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
 +{
 +    struct next_proto_st *np = &next_proto_tests[idx];
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    unsigned char *out, *client, *server;
 +    unsigned char outlen;
 +    unsigned int clientlen, serverlen;
 +
 +    if (np->clientlen == -1) {
 +        client = NULL;
 +        clientlen = 0;
 +    } else {
 +        client = np->client;
 +        clientlen = (unsigned int)np->clientlen;
 +    }
 +    if (np->serverlen == -1) {
 +        server = NULL;
 +        serverlen = 0;
 +    } else {
 +        server = np->server;
 +        serverlen = (unsigned int)np->serverlen;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_select_next_proto(&out, &outlen, server, serverlen,
 +                                           client, clientlen),
 +                     np->expected_ret))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (np->selectedlen == 0) {
 +        if (!TEST_ptr_null(out) || !TEST_uchar_eq(outlen, 0))
 +            goto err;
 +    } else {
 +        if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, outlen, np->selected, np->selectedlen))
 +            goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 + err:
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
 int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12053,6 +12189,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake_retry, 16);
     ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
 +    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
     return 1;
  err:
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0129-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0129-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0130-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0130-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 From 53f5677f358c4a4f69830d944ea40e71950673b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:41:55 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 07/10] Correct return values for
 tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg
 Return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT in the event that we don't send the extension,
 rather than EXT_RETURN_SENT. This actually makes no difference at all to
 the current control flow since this return value is ignored in this case
 anyway. But lets make it correct anyway.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 index 800654450e..66ed7dacf2 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1501,9 +1501,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
         }
         s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
 +        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
     }
 -    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
 +    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 }
 #endif
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0131-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0131-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
 From 195e15421df113d7283aab2ccff8b8fb06df5465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 11:51:54 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Add ALPN validation in the client
 The ALPN protocol selected by the server must be one that we originally
 advertised. We should verify that it is.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 index 1ab3c13d57..ff9c009ee5 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1590,6 +1590,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                         X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
 {
     size_t len;
 +    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
 +    int valid = 0;
     /* We must have requested it. */
     if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
@@ -1608,6 +1610,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
         return 0;
     }
 +
 +    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
 +    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
 +        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
 +        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
 +            continue;
 +        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
 +            /* Valid protocol found */
 +            valid = 1;
 +            break;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!valid) {
 +        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
 +        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
     s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
     if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0132-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0132-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch
@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
 From 7c95191434415d1c9b7fe9b130df13cce630b6b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:09:41 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add explicit testing of ALN and NPN in sslapitest
 We already had some tests elsewhere - but this extends that testing with
 additional tests.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 test/sslapitest.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 229 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index 15cb9060cb..7a55a2b721 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11877,6 +11877,231 @@ static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
     return ret;
 }
 +static const unsigned char fooprot[] = {3, 'f', 'o', 'o' };
 +static const unsigned char barprot[] = {3, 'b', 'a', 'r' };
 +
 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 +static int npn_advert_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
 +                         unsigned int *outlen, void *arg)
 +{
 +    int *idx = (int *)arg;
 +
 +    switch (*idx) {
 +    default:
 +    case 0:
 +        *out = fooprot;
 +        *outlen = sizeof(fooprot);
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 1:
 +        *outlen = 0;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 2:
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +static int npn_select_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
 +                         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
 +{
 +    int *idx = (int *)arg;
 +
 +    switch (*idx) {
 +    case 0:
 +    case 1:
 +        *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
 +        *outlen = *fooprot;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 3:
 +        *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
 +        *outlen = *barprot;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 4:
 +        *outlen = 0;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    default:
 +    case 2:
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Test the NPN callbacks
 + * Test 0: advert = foo, select = foo
 + * Test 1: advert = <empty>, select = foo
 + * Test 2: no advert
 + * Test 3: advert = foo, select = bar
 + * Test 4: advert = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
 + */
 +static int test_npn(int idx)
 +{
 +    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
 +    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
 +    int testresult = 0;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
 +                                       TLS_client_method(), 0, TLS1_2_VERSION,
 +                                       &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(sctx, npn_advert_cb, &idx);
 +    SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(cctx, npn_select_cb, &idx);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
 +                                      NULL)))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (idx == 4) {
 +        /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
 +        if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
 +                                              SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
 +            goto end;
 +    } else {
 +        const unsigned char *prot;
 +        unsigned int protlen;
 +
 +        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
 +                                             SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
 +            goto end;
 +
 +        SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(serverssl, &prot, &protlen);
 +        switch (idx) {
 +        case 0:
 +        case 1:
 +            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
 +                goto end;
 +            break;
 +        case 2:
 +            if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
 +                goto end;
 +            break;
 +        case 3:
 +            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, barprot + 1, *barprot))
 +                goto end;
 +            break;
 +        default:
 +            TEST_error("Should not get here");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    testresult = 1;
 + end:
 +    SSL_free(serverssl);
 +    SSL_free(clientssl);
 +    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
 +
 +    return testresult;
 +}
 +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) */
 +
 +static int alpn_select_cb2(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
 +                           unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
 +                           unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
 +{
 +    int *idx = (int *)arg;
 +
 +    switch (*idx) {
 +    case 0:
 +        *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
 +        *outlen = *fooprot;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 2:
 +        *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
 +        *outlen = *barprot;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    case 3:
 +        *outlen = 0;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +
 +    default:
 +    case 1:
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 +    }
 +    return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Test the ALPN callbacks
 + * Test 0: client = foo, select = foo
 + * Test 1: client = <empty>, select = none
 + * Test 2: client = foo, select = bar (should fail)
 + * Test 3: client = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
 + */
 +static int test_alpn(int idx)
 +{
 +    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
 +    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
 +    int testresult = 0;
 +    const unsigned char *prots = fooprot;
 +    unsigned int protslen = sizeof(fooprot);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
 +                                       TLS_client_method(), 0, 0,
 +                                       &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb2, &idx);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
 +                                      NULL)))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (idx == 1) {
 +        prots = NULL;
 +        protslen = 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success! */
 +    if (!TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, prots, protslen)))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    if (idx == 2 || idx == 3) {
 +        /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
 +        if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
 +                                              SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
 +            goto end;
 +    } else {
 +        const unsigned char *prot;
 +        unsigned int protlen;
 +
 +        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
 +                                             SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
 +            goto end;
 +
 +        SSL_get0_alpn_selected(clientssl, &prot, &protlen);
 +        switch (idx) {
 +        case 0:
 +            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
 +                goto end;
 +            break;
 +        case 1:
 +            if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
 +                goto end;
 +            break;
 +        default:
 +            TEST_error("Should not get here");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    testresult = 1;
 + end:
 +    SSL_free(serverssl);
 +    SSL_free(clientssl);
 +    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
 +
 +    return testresult;
 +}
 +
 OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
 int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12190,6 +12415,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 +    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_npn, 5);
 +#endif
 +    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_alpn, 4);
     return 1;
  err:
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0133-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0133-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch
@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
 From 301b870546d1c7b2d8f0d66e04a2596142f0399f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 14:29:26 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Add a test for an empty NextProto message
 It is valid according to the spec for a NextProto message to have no
 protocols listed in it. The OpenSSL implementation however does not allow
 us to create such a message. In order to check that we work as expected
 when communicating with a client that does generate such messages we have
 to use a TLSProxy test.
 Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
 ---
 test/recipes/70-test_npn.t      | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm   |  9 ++++
 util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm     |  1 +
 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
 create mode 100644 util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
 diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..f82e71af6a
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env perl
 +# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +#
 +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 +
 +use strict;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 +
 +use TLSProxy::Proxy;
 +
 +my $test_name = "test_npn";
 +setup($test_name);
 +
 +plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
 +    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
 +
 +plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
 +    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
 +
 +plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
 +    if disabled("sock");
 +
 +plan skip_all => "$test_name needs NPN enabled"
 +    if disabled("nextprotoneg");
 +
 +plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
 +    if disabled("tls1_2");
 +
 +my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
 +    undef,
 +    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
 +    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
 +    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
 +);
 +
 +$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
 +plan tests => 1;
 +
 +my $npnseen = 0;
 +
 +# Test 1: Check sending an empty NextProto message from the client works. This is
 +#         valid as per the spec, but OpenSSL does not allow you to send it.
 +#         Therefore we must be prepared to receive such a message but we cannot
 +#         generate it except via TLSProxy
 +$proxy->clear();
 +$proxy->filter(\&npn_filter);
 +$proxy->clientflags("-nextprotoneg foo -no_tls1_3");
 +$proxy->serverflags("-nextprotoneg foo");
 +$proxy->start();
 +ok($npnseen && TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Empty NPN message");
 +
 +sub npn_filter
 +{
 +    my $proxy = shift;
 +    my $message;
 +
 +    # The NextProto message always appears in flight 2
 +    return if $proxy->flight != 2;
 +
 +    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
 +        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
 +            # Our TLSproxy NextProto message support doesn't support parsing of
 +            # the message. If we repack it just creates an empty NextProto
 +            # message - which is exactly the scenario we want to test here.
 +            $message->repack();
 +            $npnseen = 1;
 +        }
 +    }
 +}
 diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
 index ce22187569..fb41b2ffc8 100644
 --- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
@@ -384,6 +384,15 @@ sub create_message
             [@message_frag_lens]
         );
         $message->parse();
 +    }  elsif ($mt == MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
 +        $message = TLSProxy::NextProto->new(
 +            $server,
 +            $data,
 +            [@message_rec_list],
 +            $startoffset,
 +            [@message_frag_lens]
 +        );
 +        $message->parse();
     } else {
         #Unknown message type
         $message = TLSProxy::Message->new(
 diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..0e18347546
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 +# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +#
 +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 +
 +use strict;
 +
 +package TLSProxy::NextProto;
 +
 +use vars '@ISA';
 +push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
 +
 +sub new
 +{
 +    my $class = shift;
 +    my ($server,
 +        $data,
 +        $records,
 +        $startoffset,
 +        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
 +
 +    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
 +        $server,
 +        TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO,
 +        $data,
 +        $records,
 +        $startoffset,
 +        $message_frag_lens);
 +
 +    return $self;
 +}
 +
 +sub parse
 +{
 +    # We don't support parsing at the moment
 +}
 +
 +# This is supposed to reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes.
 +# For now though since we don't support parsing we just create an empty NextProto
 +# message - this capability is used in test_npn
 +sub set_message_contents
 +{
 +    my $self = shift;
 +    my $data;
 +
 +    $data = pack("C32", 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
 +                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
 +                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
 +                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
 +    $self->data($data);
 +}
 +1;
 diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
 index 3de10eccb9..b707722b6b 100644
 --- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
 +++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use TLSProxy::CertificateRequest;
 use TLSProxy::CertificateVerify;
 use TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
 use TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
 +use TLSProxy::NextProto;
 my $have_IPv6;
 my $IP_factory;
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/SOURCES/0136-CVE-2024-6119.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0136-CVE-2024-6119.patch
@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
 index 1a18174995..a09414c972 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
@@ -916,36 +916,64 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
             ASN1_STRING *cstr;
             gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
 -            if ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)) {
 -                if (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
 -                    NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox) {
 -                    san_present = 1;
 -
 -                    /*
 -                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected and we
 -                     * treat it as no match
 -                     */
 -                    if (gen->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
 -                        cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
 -
 -                        /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
 -                        if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, 0, equal, flags,
 -                                                chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
 -                            break;
 -                    }
 -                } else
 +            switch (gen->type) {
 +            default:
 +                continue;
 +            case GEN_OTHERNAME:
 +		switch (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id)) {
 +                default:
                     continue;
 -            } else {
 -                if ((gen->type != check_type) && (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME))
 +                case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox:
 +                    /*-
 +                     * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8398#section-3
 +                     *
 +                     *   Due to name constraint compatibility reasons described
 +                     *   in Section 6, SmtpUTF8Mailbox subjectAltName MUST NOT
 +                     *   be used unless the local-part of the email address
 +                     *   contains non-ASCII characters. When the local-part is
 +                     *   ASCII, rfc822Name subjectAltName MUST be used instead
 +                     *   of SmtpUTF8Mailbox. This is compatible with legacy
 +                     *   software that supports only rfc822Name (and not
 +                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox). [...]
 +                     *
 +                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox is encoded as UTF8String.
 +                     *
 +                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected, and
 +                     * we ignore the invalid SAN (neither set san_present nor
 +                     * consider it a candidate for equality).  This does mean
 +                     * that the subject CN may be considered, as would be the
 +                     * case when the malformed SmtpUtf8Mailbox SAN is instead
 +                     * simply absent.
 +                     *
 +                     * When CN-ID matching is not desirable, applications can
 +                     * choose to turn it off, doing so is at this time a best
 +                     * practice.
 +                     */
 +                    if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL
 +                        || gen->d.otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
 +                        continue;
 +                    alt_type = 0;
 +                    cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
 +                    break;
 +                }
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_EMAIL:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL)
                     continue;
 -            }
 -            san_present = 1;
 -            if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
                 cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
 -            else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_DNS:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_DNS)
 +                    continue;
                 cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
 -            else
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_IPADD:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_IPADD)
 +                    continue;
                 cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
 +                break;
 +            }
 +            san_present = 1;
             /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
             if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
                                       chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
 index 522982ddfb..e18735d89a 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ setup("test_eai_data");
 #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_leaf.pem
 #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_leaf.pem
 -plan tests => 12;
 +plan tests => 16;
 require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
 my $folder = "test/recipes/25-test_eai_data";
 my $ascii_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_leaf.pem");
 my $utf8_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_leaf.pem");
 +my $kdc_pem   = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-cert.pem");
 my $ascii_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_chain.pem");
 my $utf8_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_chain.pem");
 +my $kdc_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-root-cert.pem");
 my $out;
 my $outcnt = 0;
@@ -56,10 +58,18 @@ SKIP: {
 ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
 ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
 ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
 ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem,  $ascii_pem])));
 +# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an DNS name, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_hostname", 'mx1.example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an email address, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'joe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +# We expect SmtpUTF8Mailbox to be a UTF8 String, not an IA5String.
 +ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'moe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +
 #Check that we get the expected failure return code
 with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
      sub {
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..e8a2c6f55d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARSb290
 +MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxU
 +RVNULkVYQU1QTEUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC6wfP+
 +6go79dkpo/dGLMlPZ7Gw/Q6gUYrCWZWUEgEeRVHCrqOlgUEyA+PcWas/XDPUxXry
 +BQlJHLvlqamAQn8gs4QPBARFYWKNiTVGyaRkgNA1N5gqyZdrP9UE+ZJmdqxRAAe8
 +vvpGZWSgevPhLUiSCFYDiD0Rtji2Hm3rGUrReQFBQDEw2pNGwz9zIaxUs08kQZcx
 +Yzyiplz5Oau+R/6sAgUwDlrD9xOlUxx/tA/MSDIfkK8qioU11uUZtO5VjkNQy/bT
 +7zQMmXxWgm2MIgOs1u4YN7YGOtgqHE9v9iPHHfgrkbQDtVDGQsa8AQEhkUDSCtW9
 +3VFAKx6dGNXYzFwfAgMBAAGjgcgwgcUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFR5tZycW19DmtbL4Zqj
 +te1c2vZLMAkGA1UdIwQCMAAwCQYDVR0TBAIwADCBjQYDVR0RBIGFMIGCoD8GBisG
 +AQUCAqA1MDOgDhsMVEVTVC5FWEFNUExFoSEwH6ADAgEBoRgwFhsGa3JidGd0GwxU
 +RVNULkVYQU1QTEWgHQYIKwYBBQUHCAmgERYPbW9lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tgQ9qb2VA
 +ZXhhbXBsZS5jb22CD214MS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA
 +T0xzVtVpRtaOzIhgzw7XQUdzWD5UEGSJJ1cBCOmKUWwDLTAouCYLFB4TbEE7MMUb
 +iuMy60bjmVtvfJIXorGUgSadRe5RWJ5DamJWvPA0Q9x7blnEcXqEF+9Td+ypevgU
 +UYHFmg83OYwxOsFXZ5cRuXMk3WCsDHQIBi6D1L6oDDZ2pfArs5mqm3thQKVlqyl1
 +El3XRYEdqAz/5eCOFNfwxF0ALxjxVr/Z50StUZU8I7Zfev6+kHhyrR7dqzYJImv9
 +0fTCOBEMjIETDsrA70OxAMu4V16nrWZdJdvzblS2qrt97Omkj+2kiPAJFB76RpwI
 +oDQ9fKfUOAmUFth2/R/eGA==
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..a74c96bf31
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIICnDCCAYQCCQCBswYcrlZSHjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARS
 +b290MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQD
 +DARSb290MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqRj8S4kBbIUj
 +61kZfi6nE35Q38U140+qt4uAiwAhKumfVHlBM0zQ98WFt5zMHIBQwIb3yjc2zj+0
 +qzUnQfwm1r/RfcMmBPEti9Ge+aEMSsds2gMXziOFM8wd2aAFPy7UVE0XpEWofsRK
 +MGi61MKVdPSbGIxBwY9VW38/7D/wf1HtJe7y0xpuecR7GB2XAs+qST59NjuF+7wS
 +dLM8Hb3TATgeYbXXWsRJgwz+SPzExg5WmLnU+7y4brZ32dHtdSmkRVSgSlaIf7Xj
 +3Tc6Zi7I+W/JYk7hy1zUexVdWCak4PHcoWrXe0gNNN/t8VfLfMExt5z/HIylXnU7
 +pGUyqZlTGQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAHpLF1UCRy7b6Hk0rLokxI
 +lgwiH9BU9mktigAGASvkbllpt+YbUbWnuYAvpHBGiP1qZtfX2r96UrSJaGO9BEzT
 +Gp9ThnSjoj4Srul0+s/NArU22irFLmDzbalgevAmm9gMGkdqkiIm/mXbwrPj0ncl
 +KGicevXryVpvaP62eZ8cc3C4p97frMmXxRX8sTdQpD/gRI7prdEILRSKveqT+AEW
 +7rFGM5AOevb4U8ddop8A3D/kX0wcCAIBF6jCNk3uEJ57jVcagL04kPnVfdRiedTS
 +vfq1DRNcD29d1H/9u0fHdSn1/+8Ep3X+afQ3C6//5NvOEaXcIGO4QSwkprQydfv8
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
 new file mode 100755
 index 0000000000..7a8dbc719f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env bash
 +
 +# Create a root CA, signing a leaf cert with a KDC principal otherName SAN, and
 +# also a non-UTF8 smtpUtf8Mailbox SAN followed by an rfc822Name SAN and a DNS
 +# name SAN.  In the vulnerable EAI code, the KDC principal `otherName` should
 +# trigger ASAN errors in DNS name checks, while the non-UTF8 `smtpUtf8Mailbox`
 +# should likewise lead to ASAN issues with email name checks.
 +
 +rm -f root-key.pem root-cert.pem
 +openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-root-key.pem \
 +        -x509 -subj /CN=Root -days 36524 -out kdc-root-cert.pem
 +
 +exts=$(
 +    printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s = " \
 +        "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
 +        "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
 +        "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
 +        "subjectAltName"
 +    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name"
 +    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9;IA5:moe@example.com"
 +    printf "%s, " "email:joe@example.com"
 +    printf "%s\n" "DNS:mx1.example.com"
 +    printf "[kdc_princ_name]\n"
 +    printf "realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
 +    printf "principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq\n"
 +    printf "[kdc_principal_seq]\n"
 +    printf "name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1\n"
 +    printf "name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_components\n"
 +    printf "[kdc_principal_components]\n"
 +    printf "princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt\n"
 +    printf "princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
 +    )
 +
 +printf "%s\n" "$exts"
 +
 +openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-key.pem \
 +    -subj "/CN=TEST.EXAMPLE" |
 +    openssl x509 -req -out kdc-cert.pem \
 +        -CA "kdc-root-cert.pem" -CAkey "kdc-root-key.pem" \
 +        -set_serial 2 -days 36524 \
 +        -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts")
--- a/SOURCES/README.FIPS
+++ b/SOURCES/README.FIPS
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
 User guide for the FIPS Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OpenSSL Module
 =================================================================
 This package contains libraries which comprise the FIPS 140-2
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OPENSSL Module.
 The module files
 ================
 /usr/lib[64]/libcrypto.so.1.1.0
 /usr/lib[64]/libssl.so.1.1.0
 /usr/lib[64]/.libcrypto.so.1.1.0.hmac
 /usr/lib[64]/.libssl.so.1.1.0.hmac
 Dependencies
 ============
 The approved mode of operation requires kernel with /dev/urandom RNG running
 with properties as defined in the security policy of the module. This is
 provided by kernel packages with validated Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel
 Crytographic Module.
 Installation
 ============
 The RPM package of the module can be installed by standard tools recommended
 for installation of RPM packages on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (yum,
 rpm, RHN remote management tool).
 The RPM package dracut-fips must be installed for the approved mode of
 operation.
 Usage and API
 =============
 The module respects kernel command line FIPS setting. If the kernel command
 line contains option fips=1 the module will initialize in the FIPS approved
 mode of operation automatically. To allow for the automatic initialization the
 application using the module has to call one of the following API calls:
 - void OPENSSL_init_library(void) - this will do only a basic initialization
 of the library and does initialization of the FIPS approved mode without setting
 up EVP API with supported algorithms.
 - void OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) - this API function calls
 OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also adds all approved algorithms to the EVP API
 in the approved mode 
 - void SSL_library_init(void) - it calls OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also
 adds algorithms which are necessary for TLS protocol support and initializes
 the SSL library.
 To explicitely put the library to the approved mode the application can call
 the following function:
 - int FIPS_mode_set(int on) - if called with 1 as a parameter it will switch
 the library from the non-approved to the approved mode. If any of the selftests
 and integrity verification tests fail, the library is put into the error state
 and 0 is returned. If they succeed the return value is 1.
 To query the module whether it is in the approved mode or not:
 - int FIPS_mode(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the approved mode,
 0 otherwise.
 To query whether the module is in the error state:
 - int FIPS_selftest_failed(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the error
 state, 0 otherwise.
 To zeroize the FIPS RNG key and internal state the application calls:
 - void RAND_cleanup(void)
--- a/SOURCES/configuration-switch.h
+++ b/SOURCES/configuration-switch.h
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
 /* This file is here to prevent a file conflict on multiarch systems.  A
 * conflict will frequently occur because arch-specific build-time
 * configuration options are stored (and used, so they can't just be stripped
 * out) in configuration.h.  The original configuration.h has been renamed.
 * DO NOT INCLUDE THE NEW FILE DIRECTLY -- ALWAYS INCLUDE THIS ONE INSTEAD. */
 #ifdef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
 #error "Do not define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h!"
 #endif
 #define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
 #if defined(__i386__)
 #include "configuration-i386.h"
 #elif defined(__ia64__)
 #include "configuration-ia64.h"
 #elif defined(__mips64) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
 #include "configuration-mips64el.h"
 #elif defined(__mips64)
 #include "configuration-mips64.h"
 #elif defined(__mips) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
 #include "configuration-mipsel.h"
 #elif defined(__mips)
 #include "configuration-mips.h"
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
 #include <endian.h>
 #if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
 #include "configuration-ppc64.h"
 #else
 #include "configuration-ppc64le.h"
 #endif
 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
 #include "configuration-ppc.h"
 #elif defined(__s390x__)
 #include "configuration-s390x.h"
 #elif defined(__s390__)
 #include "configuration-s390.h"
 #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)
 #include "configuration-sparc64.h"
 #elif defined(__sparc__)
 #include "configuration-sparc.h"
 #elif defined(__x86_64__)
 #include "configuration-x86_64.h"
 #else
 #error "The openssl-devel package does not work your architecture?"
 #endif
 #undef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
--- a/SOURCES/ec_curve.c
+++ b/SOURCES/ec_curve.c
@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
 /*
 * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
 *
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */
 #include <string.h>
 #include "ec_local.h"
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 typedef struct {
    int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
     seed_len, param_len;
    unsigned int cofactor;      /* promoted to BN_ULONG */
 } EC_CURVE_DATA;
 /* the nist prime curves */
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F,
        0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
        /* b */
        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
        /* x */
        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
        /* y */
        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A,
        0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
        0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
        0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
        0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
        /* x */
        0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
        0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
        0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
        0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
        /* y */
        0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
        0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
        0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
        0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
        0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17,
        0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA,
        /* p */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
        0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
        0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
        0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
        0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
        0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
        /* x */
        0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
        0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
        0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
        0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
        0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
        0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
        /* y */
        0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
        0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
        0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
        0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
        0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
        0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
        /* order */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
        0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
        0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
        0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
 } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1,
        0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
        0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
        0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
        /* x */
        0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
        0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
        0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
        /* y */
        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
        0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
        0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
        0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
 } _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
    },
    {
        /* no seed */
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F,
        /* a */
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        /* b */
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
        /* x */
        0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95,
        0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9,
        0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98,
        /* y */
        0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc,
        0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19,
        0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B,
        0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
    }
 };
 typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
    int nid;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
    const char *comment;
 } ec_list_element;
 static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
    /* prime field curves */
    /* secg curves */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #else
    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #endif
    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
     "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
    /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
 #else
    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
 #endif
    /* X9.62 curves */
    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
 #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
     EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
 #else
     0,
 #endif
     "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
 };
 #define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
 static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
 {
    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
    EC_POINT *P = NULL;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order =
        NULL;
    int ok = 0;
    int seed_len, param_len;
    const EC_METHOD *meth;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const unsigned char *params;
    /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */
    if (curve.data == NULL)
        return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL);
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
    data = curve.data;
    seed_len = data->seed_len;
    param_len = data->param_len;
    params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
    params += seed_len;         /* skip seed */
    if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (curve.meth != 0) {
        meth = curve.meth();
        if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
            (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
    else {                      /* field_type ==
                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
 #endif
    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
    if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, P, x, y, ctx)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (seed_len) {
        if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
    ok = 1;
 err:
    if (!ok) {
        EC_GROUP_free(group);
        group = NULL;
    }
    EC_POINT_free(P);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    BN_free(p);
    BN_free(a);
    BN_free(b);
    BN_free(order);
    BN_free(x);
    BN_free(y);
    return group;
 }
 EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
 {
    size_t i;
    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
    if (nid <= 0)
        return NULL;
    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
        if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
            ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
            break;
        }
    if (ret == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
        return NULL;
    }
    return ret;
 }
 size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
 {
    size_t i, min;
    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
        return curve_list_length;
    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
    }
    return curve_list_length;
 }
 /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
 typedef struct {
    const char *name;           /* NIST Name of curve */
    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
 } EC_NIST_NAME;
 static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = {
    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
    {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
    {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
    {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
    {"P-521", NID_secp521r1}
 };
 const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid)
 {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
        if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid)
            return nist_curves[i].name;
    }
    return NULL;
 }
 int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
 {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
        if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0)
            return nist_curves[i].nid;
    }
    return NID_undef;
 }
 #define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
 /*
 * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
 * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
 * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
 *
 * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
 *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
 */
 int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
    size_t i, seed_len;
    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
    const EC_METHOD *meth;
    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
    if (meth == NULL)
        return -1;
    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
    cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    /*
     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
     */
    param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order);
    len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
    if (len > param_len)
        param_len = len;
    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
    if (param_bytes == NULL)
        goto end;
    /* Create the bignums */
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
            goto end;
    }
    /*
     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
     */
    /* Get p, a & b */
    if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
        /* Get x & y */
        && EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
        /* Get order */
        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
        goto end;
   /*
     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
        if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
            goto end;
    }
    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
        data = curve.data;
        /* Get the raw order byte data */
        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
        if (data->field_type == field_type
            && param_len == data->param_len
            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
                             == 0) {
            ret = curve.nid;
            goto end;
        }
    }
    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
    ret = NID_undef;
 end:
    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    return ret;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/ectest.c
+++ b/SOURCES/ectest.c
--- a/SOURCES/genpatches
+++ b/SOURCES/genpatches
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 if [ $# -ne 2 ] ; then
    echo "Usage:"
    echo "   $0 <git-dir> <base-tag>"
    exit 1
 fi
 git_dir="$1"
 base_tag="$2"
 target_dir="$(pwd)"
 pushd "$git_dir" >/dev/null
 git format-patch -k -o "$target_dir" "$base_tag" >/dev/null
 popd >/dev/null
 echo "# Patches exported from source git"
 i=1
 for p in *.patch ; do
    printf "# "
    sed '/^Subject:/{s/^Subject: //;p};d' "$p"
    printf "Patch%s: %s\n" $i "$p"
    i=$(($i + 1))
 done
--- a/SOURCES/hobble-openssl
+++ b/SOURCES/hobble-openssl
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # Quit out if anything fails.
 set -e
 # Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
 # MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007 - expired, we do not remove it but do not enable it anyway
 # IDEA:  5,214,703 07/01/2012 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # RC5:   5,724,428 01/11/2015 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # EC:    ????????? ??/??/2020
 # SRP:   ????????? ??/??/2017 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # Remove assembler portions of IDEA, MDC2, and RC5.
 # (find crypto/rc5/asm -type f | xargs -r rm -fv)
 for c in `find crypto/bn -name "*gf2m.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for c in `find crypto/ec -name "ec2*.c" -o -name "ec_curve.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for c in `find test -name "ectest.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for h in `find crypto ssl apps test -name "*.h"` ; do
 	echo Removing EC2M references from $h
 	cat $h | \
 	awk    'BEGIN {ech=1;} \
 		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC2M/ {ech--; next;} \
                /^#[ \t]*if/ {if(ech < 1) ech--;} \
 		{if(ech>0) {;print $0};} \
 		/^#[ \t]*endif/ {if(ech < 1) ech++;}' > $h.hobbled && \
 	mv $h.hobbled $h
 done
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
 From a3f4cd5019b60649f6eb216ebe99caa43cd96f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:40:17 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] BIO_lookup_ex: use AI_ADDRCONFIG only if explicit host name
 is given
 The flag only affects which record types are queried (A or AAAA, or
 both), and when node is NULL, it prevents getaddrinfo returning the
 right address associated with the loopback interface.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/bio/b_addr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
 index b023bbda40..ea15601f3d 100644
 --- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
 +++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
         hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
 # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
 #  ifdef AF_UNSPEC
 -        if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
 +        if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC)
 #  endif
             hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
 # endif
 -- 
 2.30.2
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
 commit 9e885a707d604e9528b5491b78fb9c00f41193fc
 Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date:   Thu Mar 26 15:59:00 2020 +0100
    s_server: Properly indicate ALPN protocol mismatch
    Return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from alpn_select_cb so that
    an alert is sent to the client on ALPN protocol mismatch.
    Fixes: #2708
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11415)
 diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
 index bcc83e562c..591c6c19c5 100644
 --- a/apps/s_server.c
 +++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
     if (SSL_select_next_proto
         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
          inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
 -        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
     }
     if (!s_quiet) {
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst	2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c	2019-03-15 15:53:46.622267688 +0100
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
     {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's',
      "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"},
     {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"},
 -    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"},
 +    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; see openssl help for list"},
     {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"},
     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"},
     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf
 --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build	2020-03-31 14:17:45.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ my %targets = (
         cxxflags         => add("-m64"),
         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-armv4" => {
@@ -718,6 +719,7 @@ my %targets = (
     "linux-aarch64" => {
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2020-04-07 16:44:23.539142108 +0200
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ uninstall_runtime_libs:
 install_man_docs:
 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing manpages"
 -	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 +	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)" --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX)
 uninstall_man_docs:
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ uninstall_man_docs:
 install_html_docs:
 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing HTML manpages"
 -	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 +	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR)" --type=html
 uninstall_html_docs:
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 #endif
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_de
         TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
         | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
 -        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
 +        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
         tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
         final_ec_pt_formats
     },
@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
 }
 #endif
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 +{
 +	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
 +	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
 +	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
 +
 +	    return 1;
 +}
 +
 static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 {
     s->ext.use_etm = 0;
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in
 --- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths	2018-06-20 16:48:09.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in	2018-07-25 17:26:58.388624296 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
 my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
 # default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following
 -my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
 +my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
 my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
 my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
 my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths	2018-07-25 17:26:58.378624057 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf	2018-07-27 13:20:08.198513471 +0200
@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ oid_section		= new_oids
 # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
 # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
 +# Load default TLS policy configuration
 +
 +openssl_conf = default_modules
 +
 +[ default_modules ]
 +
 +ssl_conf = ssl_module
 +
 +[ ssl_module ]
 +
 +system_default = crypto_policy
 +
 +[ crypto_policy ]
 +
 +.include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
 +
 [ new_oids ]
 # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'.
@@ -43,7 +59,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
 ####################################################################
 [ CA_default ]
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
 certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
 crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
 database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
@@ -329,7 +345,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
 [ tsa_config1 ]
 # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
 serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
 crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
 signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch
@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
 From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
 The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
 This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
 Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 From b5fcb7e133725b8b2eb66f63f5142710ed63a6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:30 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation of BN_mod_sqrt()
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 doc/man3/BN_add.pod | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 From 3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:35 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Add a negative testcase for BN_mod_sqrt
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/bntest.c                          | 11 ++++++++++-
 test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
 index 1723d5ded5a8..53b0f559855c 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 /*
  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
 - * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
 + * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
 + * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
  */
 {
     BIGNUM *ret = in;
@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
             goto vrfy;
         }
 -        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
 -        i = 1;
 -        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
 -            goto end;
 -        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
 -            i++;
 -            if (i == e) {
 -                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
 -                goto end;
 +        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
 +        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
 +            if (i == 1) {
 +                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
 +                    goto end;
 +
 +            } else {
 +                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
 +                    goto end;
             }
 -            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
 -                goto end;
 +            if (BN_is_one(t))
 +                break;
 +        }
 +        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
 +        if (i >= e) {
 +            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
 +            goto end;
         }
         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
 diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
 index dccd4790ede7..1f5e37a4d183 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 =head1 NAME
 BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
 -BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
 +BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
 arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
  int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
 + BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
 +
  int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
  int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -87,6 +89,12 @@ L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>.
 BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
 result in I<r>.
 +BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I<a> such that
 +C<in^2 = a (mod p)>. The modulus I<p> must be a
 +prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned.
 +The result is stored into I<in> which can be NULL. The result will be
 +newly allocated in that case.
 +
 BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
 (C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
 BN_mul().
@@ -108,7 +116,10 @@ the arguments.
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 -For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
 +The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I<p> is
 +not a prime), or NULL.
 +
 +For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
 value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
 The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
 diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
 index 390dd800733e..1cab660bcafb 100644
 --- a/test/bntest.c
 +++ b/test/bntest.c
@@ -1729,8 +1729,17 @@ static int file_modsqrt(STANZA *s)
             || !TEST_ptr(ret2 = BN_new()))
         goto err;
 +    if (BN_is_negative(mod_sqrt)) {
 +        /* A negative testcase */
 +        if (!TEST_ptr_null(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx)))
 +            goto err;
 +
 +        st = 1;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     /* There are two possible answers. */
 -    if (!TEST_true(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
             || !TEST_true(BN_sub(ret2, p, ret)))
         goto err;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
 index 5ea4d031f271..e28cc6bfb02e 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
@@ -2799,3 +2799,15 @@ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
 ModSqrt = a1d52989f12f204d3d2167d9b1e6c8a6174c0c786a979a5952383b7b8bd186
 A = 2eee37cf06228a387788188e650bc6d8a2ff402931443f69156a29155eca07dcb45f3aac238d92943c0c25c896098716baa433f25bd696a142f5a69d5d937e81
 P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
 +
 +# Negative testcases for BN_mod_sqrt()
 +
 +# This one triggers an infinite loop with unfixed implementation
 +# It should just fail.
 +ModSqrt = -1
 +A = 20a7ee
 +P = 460201
 +
 +ModSqrt = -1
 +A = 65bebdb00a96fc814ec44b81f98b59fba3c30203928fa5214c51e0a97091645280c947b005847f239758482b9bfc45b066fde340d1fe32fc9c1bf02e1b2d0ed
 +P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
 From e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:40:24 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] c_rehash: Do not use shell to invoke openssl
 Except on VMS where it is safe.
 This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23]
 ---
 tools/c_rehash.in | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
 index fa7c6c9fef91..83c1cc80e08a 100644
 --- a/tools/c_rehash.in
 +++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ sub check_file {
 	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 }
 +sub compute_hash {
 +    my $fh;
 +    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {
 +        # VMS uses the open through shell
 +        # The file names are safe there and list form is unsupported
 +        if (!open($fh, "-|", join(' ', @_))) {
 +            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +    } else {
 +        if (!open($fh, "-|", @_)) {
 +            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +    }
 +    return (<$fh>, <$fh>);
 +}
 # Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
 # the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
@@ -161,10 +178,12 @@ sub check_file {
 sub link_hash_cert {
 		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		$fname =~ s/\"/\\\"/g;
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
 +		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
 +						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +						   "-in", $fname);
 		chomp $hash;
 		chomp $fprint;
 +		return if !$hash;
 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 		my $suffix = 0;
@@ -202,10 +221,12 @@ sub link_hash_cert {
 sub link_hash_crl {
 		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
 +		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
 +						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +						   "-in", $fname);
 		chomp $hash;
 		chomp $fprint;
 +		return if !$hash;
 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 		my $suffix = 0;
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
 From 9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daniel Fiala <daniel@openssl.org>
 Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:11:24 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix file operations in c_rehash.
 CVE-2022-2068
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7]
 ---
 tools/c_rehash.in | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
 index cfd18f5da110..9d2a6f6db73b 100644
 --- a/tools/c_rehash.in
 +++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -104,52 +104,78 @@ foreach (@dirlist) {
 }
 exit($errorcount);
 +sub copy_file {
 +    my ($src_fname, $dst_fname) = @_;
 +
 +    if (open(my $in, "<", $src_fname)) {
 +        if (open(my $out, ">", $dst_fname)) {
 +            print $out $_ while (<$in>);
 +            close $out;
 +        } else {
 +            warn "Cannot open $dst_fname for write, $!";
 +        }
 +        close $in;
 +    } else {
 +        warn "Cannot open $src_fname for read, $!";
 +    }
 +}
 +
 sub hash_dir {
 -	my %hashlist;
 -	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
 -	chdir $_[0];
 -	opendir(DIR, ".");
 -	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
 -	closedir DIR;
 -	if ( $removelinks ) {
 -		# Delete any existing symbolic links
 -		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
 -			if (-l $_) {
 -				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
 -				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
 -		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
 -		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
 -		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
 -			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
 -			next;
 -		}
 -		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
 -		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
 -	}
 +    my $dir = shift;
 +    my %hashlist;
 +
 +    print "Doing $dir\n";
 +
 +    if (!chdir $dir) {
 +        print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot chdir to '$dir', $!\n";
 +        return;
 +    }
 +
 +    opendir(DIR, ".") || print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot opendir '.', $!\n";
 +    my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
 +    closedir DIR;
 +    if ( $removelinks ) {
 +        # Delete any existing symbolic links
 +        foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
 +            if (-l $_) {
 +                print "unlink $_\n" if $verbose;
 +                unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +    FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
 +        # Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
 +        my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
 +        if (!$cert && !$crl) {
 +            print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
 +            next;
 +        }
 +        link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
 +        link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
 +    }
 +
 +    chdir $pwd;
 }
 sub check_file {
 -	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
 -	my $fname = $_[0];
 -	open IN, $fname;
 -	while(<IN>) {
 -		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
 -			my $hdr = $1;
 -			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
 -				$is_cert = 1;
 -				last if ($is_crl);
 -			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
 -				$is_crl = 1;
 -				last if ($is_cert);
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -	close IN;
 -	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 +    my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
 +    my $fname = $_[0];
 +
 +    open(my $in, "<", $fname);
 +    while(<$in>) {
 +        if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
 +            my $hdr = $1;
 +            if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
 +                $is_cert = 1;
 +                last if ($is_crl);
 +            } elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
 +                $is_crl = 1;
 +                last if ($is_cert);
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +    close $in;
 +    return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 }
 sub compute_hash {
@@ -177,76 +203,48 @@ sub compute_hash {
 # certificate fingerprints
 sub link_hash_cert {
 -		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
 -						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 -						   "-in", $fname);
 -		chomp $hash;
 -		chomp $fprint;
 -		return if !$hash;
 -		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 -		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 -		my $suffix = 0;
 -		# Search for an unused hash filename
 -		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
 -			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 -			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 -				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
 -				return;
 -			}
 -			$suffix++;
 -		}
 -		$hash .= ".$suffix";
 -		if ($symlink_exists) {
 -			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 -		} else {
 -			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
 -                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
 -                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
 -                                close $out;
 -                            } else {
 -                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
 -                            }
 -                            close $in;
 -                        } else {
 -                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
 -                        }
 -		}
 -		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 +    link_hash($_[0], 'cert');
 }
 # Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
 sub link_hash_crl {
 -		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
 -						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 -						   "-in", $fname);
 -		chomp $hash;
 -		chomp $fprint;
 -		return if !$hash;
 -		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 -		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 -		my $suffix = 0;
 -		# Search for an unused hash filename
 -		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
 -			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 -			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 -				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
 -				return;
 -			}
 -			$suffix++;
 -		}
 -		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
 -		if ($symlink_exists) {
 -			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 -		} else {
 -			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
 -                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
 -		}
 -		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 +    link_hash($_[0], 'crl');
 +}
 +
 +sub link_hash {
 +    my ($fname, $type) = @_;
 +    my $is_cert = $type eq 'cert';
 +
 +    my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl,
 +                                       $is_cert ? "x509" : "crl",
 +                                       $is_cert ? $x509hash : $crlhash,
 +                                       "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +                                       "-in", $fname);
 +    chomp $hash;
 +    chomp $fprint;
 +    return if !$hash;
 +    $fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 +    $fprint =~ tr/://d;
 +    my $suffix = 0;
 +    # Search for an unused hash filename
 +    my $crlmark = $is_cert ? "" : "r";
 +    while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"}) {
 +        # Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 +        if ($hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 +            my $what = $is_cert ? 'certificate' : 'CRL';
 +            print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate $what $fname\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +        $suffix++;
 +    }
 +    $hash .= ".$crlmark$suffix";
 +    if ($symlink_exists) {
 +        print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 +        symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 +    } else {
 +        print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 +        copy_file($fname, $hash);
 +    }
 +    $hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 From 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
 Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:00:22 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
 that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
 "grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
 be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
 As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
 length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
 can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
 there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
 this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
 the remaining zero to five blocks.
 Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
 error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
 equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
 chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
 there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
 then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
 fall-through is intended.
 The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
 of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
 `out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
 those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
 also incorrect.
 The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
 aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
 This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
 Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
 Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431]
 ---
 crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
 index fe2b26542ab6..812758e02e04 100644
 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
 +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
 -	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
 +	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
 &set_label("short");
 	&add		($len,16*6);
@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
 -	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
 +	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
 &set_label("short");
 	&add		($len,16*6);
 From 9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
 Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:02:37 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH] AES OCB test vectors
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Add test vectors for AES OCB for x86 AES-NI multiple of 96 byte issue.
 Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
 Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06]
 ---
 test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
 index 1c02ea1e9c2d..e12670d9a4b4 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
@@ -1188,6 +1188,56 @@ Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B21
 Operation = DECRYPT
 Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
 +#Test vectors generated to validate aesni_ocb_encrypt on x86
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = C14DFF7D62A13C4A3422456207453190
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B819333
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = D47D84F6FF912C79B6A4223AB9BE2DB8
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC204
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 41970D13737B7BD1B5FBF49ED4412CA5
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = BE0228651ED4E48A11BDED68D953F3A0
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 17BC6E10B16E5FDC52836E7D589518C7
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = E84AAC18666116990A3A37B3A5FC55BD
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 3E5EA7EE064FE83B313E28D411E91EAD
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED48D9E09F452F8E6FBEB76A3DED47611C
 +
 Title = AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007
 # Using the same key twice for encryption is always banned.
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
 From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
 A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
 implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
 a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
 decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
 of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
 padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
 Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
 CVE-2022-4304
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
 crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
 crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
 crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
 crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
 include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
 include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
 index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
 #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER     32
 -struct bn_blinding_st {
 -    BIGNUM *A;
 -    BIGNUM *Ai;
 -    BIGNUM *e;
 -    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
 -    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
 -    int counter;
 -    unsigned long flags;
 -    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 -    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 -                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
 -    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
 -};
 -
 BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
 {
     BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
 index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
 +    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
 index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
     } cb;
 };
 +struct bn_blinding_st {
 +    BIGNUM *A;
 +    BIGNUM *Ai;
 +    BIGNUM *e;
 +    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
 +    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
 +    int counter;
 +    unsigned long flags;
 +    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 +    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 +                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
 +    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
 +};
 +
 /*-
  * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
  *
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
 index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/build.info
 +++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
         bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
 -        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
 +        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
 +        rsa_sup_mul.c
 INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
 +#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
 +#include <stddef.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <openssl/bn.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
 +#include "internal/numbers.h"
 +#include "internal/constant_time.h"
 +#include "bn_local.h"
 +
 +# if BN_BYTES == 8
 +typedef uint64_t limb_t;
 +#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
 +/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
 +typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
 +#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
 +#  endif
 +#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
 +#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
 +# elif BN_BYTES == 4
 +typedef uint32_t limb_t;
 +typedef uint64_t limb2_t;
 +#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
 +#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
 +#  define HAVE_LIMB2_T
 +# else
 +#  error "Not supported"
 +# endif
 +
 +/*
 + * For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
 + * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
 + * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
 + *                        A B C D E F
 + *                     x  I J K L M N
 + *                     --------------
 + *                                N*F
 + *                              N*E
 + *                            N*D
 + *                          N*C
 + *                        N*B
 + *                      N*A
 + *                              M*F
 + *                            M*E
 + *                          M*D
 + *                        M*C
 + *                      M*B
 + *                    M*A
 + *                            L*F
 + *                          L*E
 + *                        L*D
 + *                      L*C
 + *                    L*B
 + *                  L*A
 + *                          K*F
 + *                        K*E
 + *                      K*D
 + *                    K*C
 + *                  K*B
 + *                K*A
 + *                        J*F
 + *                      J*E
 + *                    J*D
 + *                  J*C
 + *                J*B
 + *              J*A
 + *                      I*F
 + *                    I*E
 + *                  I*D
 + *                I*C
 + *              I*B
 + *         +  I*A
 + *         ==========================
 + *                        N*B N*D N*F
 + *                    + N*A N*C N*E
 + *                    + M*B M*D M*F
 + *                  + M*A M*C M*E
 + *                  + L*B L*D L*F
 + *                + L*A L*C L*E
 + *                + K*B K*D K*F
 + *              + K*A K*C K*E
 + *              + J*B J*D J*F
 + *            + J*A J*C J*E
 + *            + I*B I*D I*F
 + *          + I*A I*C I*E
 + *
 + *                1+1 1+3 1+5
 + *              1+0 1+2 1+4
 + *              0+1 0+3 0+5
 + *            0+0 0+2 0+4
 + *
 + *            0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 + * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
 + * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
 + * limbs
 + */
 +
 +#if defined HAVE_LIMB2_T
 +static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
 +{
 +    limb2_t t;
 +    /*
 +     * this is idiomatic code to tell compiler to use the native mul
 +     * those three lines will actually compile to single instruction
 +     */
 +
 +    t = (limb2_t)a * b;
 +    *hi = t >> LIMB_BIT_SIZE;
 +    *lo = (limb_t)t;
 +}
 +#elif (BN_BYTES == 8) && (defined _MSC_VER)
 +/* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/intrinsics/umul128?view=msvc-170 */
 +#pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
 +static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
 +{
 +    *lo = _umul128(a, b, hi);
 +}
 +#else
 +/*
 + * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
 + * high 64 bits of multiplication"
 + */
 +static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
 +{
 +    limb_t a_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)a;
 +    limb_t a_hi = a >> 32;
 +    limb_t b_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)b;
 +    limb_t b_hi = b >> 32;
 +
 +    limb_t p0 = a_low * b_low;
 +    limb_t p1 = a_low * b_hi;
 +    limb_t p2 = a_hi * b_low;
 +    limb_t p3 = a_hi * b_hi;
 +
 +    uint32_t cy = (uint32_t)(((p0 >> 32) + (uint32_t)p1 + (uint32_t)p2) >> 32);
 +
 +    *lo = p0 + (p1 << 32) + (p2 << 32);
 +    *hi = p3 + (p1 >> 32) + (p2 >> 32) + cy;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
 +static ossl_inline limb_t _add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
 +{
 +    limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
 +    /*
 +     * `c = a + b; if (c < a)` is idiomatic code that makes compilers
 +     * use add with carry on assembly level
 +     */
 +
 +    *ret = a + carry;
 +    if (*ret < a)
 +        carry1 = 1;
 +    else
 +        carry1 = 0;
 +
 +    t = *ret;
 +    *ret = t + b;
 +    if (*ret < t)
 +        carry2 = 1;
 +    else
 +        carry2 = 0;
 +
 +    return carry1 + carry2;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
 + *
 + * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
 + * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
 + */
 +static ossl_inline limb_t add(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
 +{
 +    limb_t c = 0;
 +    ossl_ssize_t i;
 +
 +    for(i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
 +        c = _add_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
 +
 +    return c;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * return number of limbs necessary for temporary values
 + * when multiplying numbers n limbs large
 + */
 +static ossl_inline size_t mul_limb_numb(size_t n)
 +{
 +    return  2 * n * 2;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * multiply two numbers of the same size
 + *
 + * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
 + * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be mul_limb_numb(n) limbs
 + * long
 + */
 +static void limb_mul(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
 +{
 +    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
 +    size_t i, j, k;
 +
 +    r_odd = tmp;
 +    r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
 +
 +    memset(ret, 0, 2 * n * sizeof(limb_t));
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 +        for (k = 0; k < i + n + 1; k++) {
 +            r_even[k] = 0;
 +            r_odd[k] = 0;
 +        }
 +        for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
 +            /*
 +             * place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
 +             * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
 +             * limb multiplication result
 +             */
 +            if (j % 2 == 0)
 +                _mul_limb(&r_even[i + j], &r_even[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
 +            else
 +                _mul_limb(&r_odd[i + j], &r_odd[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
 +        }
 +        /*
 +         * skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
 +         * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway)
 +         */
 +        add(ret, ret, r_even, n + i + 1);
 +        add(ret, ret, r_odd, n + i + 1);
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
 +static ossl_inline void rshift1(limb_t *val, size_t n)
 +{
 +    limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
 +    size_t i;
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 +        shift_out = val[i] & 1;
 +        val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE - 1) | (val[i] >> 1);
 +        shift_in = shift_out;
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +/* extend the LSB of flag to all bits of limb */
 +static ossl_inline limb_t mk_mask(limb_t flag)
 +{
 +    flag |= flag << 1;
 +    flag |= flag << 2;
 +    flag |= flag << 4;
 +    flag |= flag << 8;
 +    flag |= flag << 16;
 +#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
 +    flag |= flag << 32;
 +#endif
 +    return flag;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
 + * when flag == 0, then copies from b
 + * when flag == 1, then copies from a
 + */
 +static ossl_inline void cselect(limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
 +{
 +    /*
 +     * would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
 +     * generates code with jumps
 +     */
 +    volatile limb_t mask;
 +    size_t i;
 +
 +    mask = mk_mask(flag);
 +    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 +#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
 +        ret[i] = constant_time_select_64(mask, a[i], b[i]);
 +#else
 +        ret[i] = constant_time_select_32(mask, a[i], b[i]);
 +#endif
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +static limb_t _sub_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
 +{
 +    limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
 +    /*
 +     * while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
 +     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction
 +     */
 +
 +    *ret = a - borrow;
 +    if (*ret > a)
 +        borrow1 = 1;
 +    else
 +        borrow1 = 0;
 +
 +    t = *ret;
 +    *ret = t - b;
 +    if (*ret > t)
 +        borrow2 = 1;
 +    else
 +        borrow2 = 0;
 +
 +    return borrow1 + borrow2;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
 + * All arrays need to be n limbs long
 + */
 +static limb_t sub(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
 +{
 +    limb_t borrow = 0;
 +    ossl_ssize_t i;
 +
 +    for (i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
 +        borrow = _sub_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
 +
 +    return borrow;
 +}
 +
 +/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
 +static ossl_inline size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum)
 +{
 +    return (anum + modnum) * 3;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
 + * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
 + * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
 + */
 +static void mod(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
 +               size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
 +{
 +    limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
 +    limb_t res;
 +    size_t i;
 +
 +    memset(tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +
 +    atmp = tmp;
 +    modtmp = &tmp[anum + modnum];
 +    rettmp = &tmp[(anum + modnum) * 2];
 +
 +    for (i = modnum; i <modnum + anum; i++)
 +        atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < modnum; i++)
 +        modtmp[i] = mod[i];
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < anum * LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++) {
 +        rshift1(modtmp, anum + modnum);
 +        res = sub(rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
 +        cselect(res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
 +    }
 +
 +    memcpy(ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t) * modnum);
 +}
 +
 +/* necessary size of tmp for a _mul_add_limb() call with provided anum */
 +static ossl_inline size_t _mul_add_limb_numb(size_t anum)
 +{
 +    return 2 * (anum + 1);
 +}
 +
 +/* multiply a by m, add to ret, return carry */
 +static limb_t _mul_add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum,
 +                           limb_t m, limb_t *tmp)
 +{
 +    limb_t carry = 0;
 +    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
 +    size_t i;
 +
 +    memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (anum + 1) * 2);
 +
 +    r_odd = tmp;
 +    r_even = &tmp[anum + 1];
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < anum; i++) {
 +        /*
 +         * place the results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays
 +         * so that we have to worry about carry just once
 +         */
 +        if (i % 2 == 0)
 +            _mul_limb(&r_even[i], &r_even[i + 1], a[i], m);
 +        else
 +            _mul_limb(&r_odd[i], &r_odd[i + 1], a[i], m);
 +    }
 +    /* assert: add() carry here will be equal zero */
 +    add(r_even, r_even, r_odd, anum + 1);
 +    /*
 +     * while here it will not overflow as the max value from multiplication
 +     * is -2 while max overflow from addition is 1, so the max value of
 +     * carry is -1 (i.e. max int)
 +     */
 +    carry = add(ret, ret, &r_even[1], anum) + r_even[0];
 +
 +    return carry;
 +}
 +
 +static ossl_inline size_t mod_montgomery_limb_numb(size_t modnum)
 +{
 +    return modnum * 2 + _mul_add_limb_numb(modnum);
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * calculate a % mod, place result in ret
 + * assumes that a is in Montgomery form with the R (Montgomery modulus) being
 + * smallest power of two big enough to fit mod and that's also a power
 + * of the count of number of bits in limb_t (B).
 + * For calculation, we also need n', such that mod * n' == -1 mod B.
 + * anum must be <= 2 * modnum
 + * ret needs to be modnum words long
 + * tmp needs to be mod_montgomery_limb_numb(modnum) limbs long
 + */
 +static void mod_montgomery(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
 +                          size_t modnum, limb_t ni0, limb_t *tmp)
 +{
 +    limb_t carry, v;
 +    limb_t *res, *rp, *tmp2;
 +    ossl_ssize_t i;
 +
 +    res = tmp;
 +    /*
 +     * for intermediate result we need an integer twice as long as modulus
 +     * but keep the input in the least significant limbs
 +     */
 +    memset(res, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (modnum * 2));
 +    memcpy(&res[modnum * 2 - anum], a, sizeof(limb_t) * anum);
 +    rp = &res[modnum];
 +    tmp2 = &res[modnum * 2];
 +
 +    carry = 0;
 +
 +    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
 +    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
 +        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
 +        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
 +        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
 +        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
 +        rp[-1] = v;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* perform the final reduction by mod... */
 +    carry -= sub(ret, rp, mod, modnum);
 +
 +    /* ...conditionally */
 +    cselect(carry, ret, rp, ret, modnum);
 +}
 +
 +/* allocated buffer should be freed afterwards */
 +static void BN_to_limb(const BIGNUM *bn, limb_t *buf, size_t limbs)
 +{
 +    int i;
 +    int real_limbs = (BN_num_bytes(bn) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
 +    limb_t *ptr = buf + (limbs - real_limbs);
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < real_limbs; i++)
 +         ptr[i] = bn->d[real_limbs - i - 1];
 +}
 +
 +#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
 +static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
 +{
 +    const union {
 +        long one;
 +        char little;
 +    } is_endian = { 1 };
 +
 +    if (is_endian.little) {
 +        uint64_t big = 0;
 +
 +        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
 +        return big;
 +    } else {
 +        return host;
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +#else
 +/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
 +static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
 +{
 +    const union {
 +        long one;
 +        char little;
 +    } is_endian = { 1 };
 +
 +    if (is_endian.little) {
 +        uint32_t big = 0;
 +
 +        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
 +        return big;
 +    } else {
 +        return host;
 +    }
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +/*
 + * We assume that intermediate, possible_arg2, blinding, and ctx are used
 + * similar to BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() arguments.
 + * to_mod is RSA modulus.
 + * buf and num is the serialization buffer and its length.
 + *
 + * Here we use classic/Montgomery multiplication and modulo. After the calculation finished
 + * we serialize the new structure instead of BIGNUMs taking endianness into account.
 + */
 +int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
 +                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
 +                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
 +                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
 +                           unsigned char *buf, int num)
 +{
 +    limb_t *l_im = NULL, *l_mul = NULL, *l_mod = NULL;
 +    limb_t *l_ret = NULL, *l_tmp = NULL, l_buf;
 +    size_t l_im_count = 0, l_mul_count = 0, l_size = 0, l_mod_count = 0;
 +    size_t l_tmp_count = 0;
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    size_t i;
 +    unsigned char *tmp;
 +    const BIGNUM *arg1 = intermediate;
 +    const BIGNUM *arg2 = (possible_arg2 == NULL) ? blinding->Ai : possible_arg2;
 +
 +    l_im_count  = (BN_num_bytes(arg1)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
 +    l_mul_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg2)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
 +    l_mod_count = (BN_num_bytes(to_mod) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
 +
 +    l_size = l_im_count > l_mul_count ? l_im_count : l_mul_count;
 +    l_im  = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +    l_mul = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +    l_mod = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +
 +    if ((l_im == NULL) || (l_mul == NULL) || (l_mod == NULL))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    BN_to_limb(arg1,   l_im,  l_size);
 +    BN_to_limb(arg2,   l_mul, l_size);
 +    BN_to_limb(to_mod, l_mod, l_mod_count);
 +
 +    l_ret = OPENSSL_malloc(2 * l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +
 +    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
 +        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count) ?
 +                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count);
 +        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +    } else {
 +        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count) ?
 +                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count);
 +        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +    }
 +
 +    if ((l_ret == NULL) || (l_tmp == NULL))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
 +        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
 +        mod_montgomery(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count,
 +                       blinding->m_ctx->n0[0], l_tmp);
 +    } else {
 +        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
 +        mod(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count, l_tmp);
 +    }
 +
 +    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
 +    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
 +        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    memset(buf, 0, num);
 +    tmp = buf + num - BN_num_bytes(to_mod);
 +    for (i = 0; i < l_mod_count; i++) {
 +#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
 +        l_buf = be64(l_ret[i]);
 +#else
 +        l_buf = be32(l_ret[i]);
 +#endif
 +        if (i == 0) {
 +            int delta = LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - ((l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE) - num);
 +
 +            memcpy(tmp, ((char *)&l_buf) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - delta, delta);
 +            tmp += delta;
 +        } else {
 +            memcpy(tmp, &l_buf, LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
 +            tmp += LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
 +        }
 +    }
 +    ret = num;
 +
 + err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(l_im);
 +    OPENSSL_free(l_mul);
 +    OPENSSL_free(l_mod);
 +    OPENSSL_free(l_tmp);
 +    OPENSSL_free(l_ret);
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 #
 # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
 BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
 BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
 BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
 +BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
 index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         BN_free(d);
     }
 -    if (blinding)
 -        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 +    if (blinding) {
 +        /*
 +         * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
 +         * 0-padded BN BE serialization
 +         */
 +        j = ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(ret, blinding, unblind, rsa->n, ctx,
 +                                   buf, num);
 +        if (j == 0)
             goto err;
 -
 -    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 +    } else {
 +        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 +        if (j < 0)
 +            goto err;
 +    }
     switch (padding) {
     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
 index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/bn.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
 int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
 int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
 +int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
 +                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
 +                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
 +                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
 +                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
 #endif
 diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
 index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
 # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
 # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
 +# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
 /*
  * BN reason codes.
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
 From bbcf509bd046b34cca19c766bbddc31683d0858b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
 PEM_read_bio_ex
 In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
 allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
 the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
 responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
 free if the caller frees them even on failure.
 Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.
 Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.
 CVE-2022-4450
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
 index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -957,7 +957,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
     *data = pem_malloc(len, flags);
     if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) {
         pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
 +        *header = NULL;
         pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
 +        *data = NULL;
         goto end;
     }
     BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From 2bd611267868a008afa576846ba71566bd0d4d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
 Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
 ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
 error.
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/pemtest.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
 index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
 --- a/test/pemtest.c
 +++ b/test/pemtest.c
@@ -83,9 +83,39 @@ static int test_invalid(void)
     return 1;
 }
 +static int test_empty_payload(void)
 +{
 +    BIO *b;
 +    static char *emptypay =
 +        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
 +        "-\n" /* Base64 EOF character */
 +        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
 +    char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
 +    unsigned char *data = NULL;
 +    long len;
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    b = BIO_new_mem_buf(emptypay, strlen(emptypay));
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(b))
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    /* Expected to fail because the payload is empty */
 +    if (!TEST_false(PEM_read_bio_ex(b, &name, &header, &data, &len, 0)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 + err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(name);
 +    OPENSSL_free(header);
 +    OPENSSL_free(data);
 +    BIO_free(b);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
     ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
     return 1;
 }
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
 From c3829dd8825c654652201e16f8a0a0c46ee3f344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 16:18:14 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
 If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
 be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
 BIO is eventually freed.
 Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
 Buehler.
 Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
 index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
 --- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
 +++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
 static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
                             void *parg);
 +/*
 + * On success, the returned BIO owns the input BIO as part of its BIO chain.
 + * On failure, NULL is returned and the input BIO is owned by the caller.
 + *
 + * Unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream()
 + */
 BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
     NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL;
     BIO *asn_bio = NULL;
     const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
     ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
 +    BIO *pop_bio = NULL;
     if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
         ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
@@ -69,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
     out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
     if (out == NULL)
         goto err;
 +    pop_bio = asn_bio;
 -    BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free);
 -    BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
 +    if (BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free) <= 0
 +            || BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free) <= 0
 +            || BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
     /*
 -     * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
 -     * needs.
 +     * Now let the callback prepend any digest, cipher, etc., that the BIO's
 +     * ASN1 structure needs.
      */
     sarg.out = out;
     sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
     sarg.boundary = NULL;
 -    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
 +    /*
 +     * The asn1_cb(), must not have mutated asn_bio on error, leaving it in the
 +     * middle of some partially built, but not returned BIO chain.
 +     */
 +    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) {
 +        /*
 +         * ndef_aux is now owned by asn_bio so we must not free it in the err
 +         * clean up block
 +         */
 +        ndef_aux = NULL;
         goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    /*
 +     * We must not fail now because the callback has prepended additional
 +     * BIOs to the chain
 +     */
     ndef_aux->val = val;
     ndef_aux->it = it;
@@ -91,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
     ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
     ndef_aux->out = out;
 -    BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
 -
     return sarg.ndef_bio;
  err:
 +    /* BIO_pop() is NULL safe */
 +    (void)BIO_pop(pop_bio);
     BIO_free(asn_bio);
     OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
     return NULL;
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From f040f2577891d2bdb7610566c172233844cf673a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
 handled correctly
 Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t  | 15 +++++++++++++--
 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index 5dc6a3aebe..ec11bfc253 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
 use POSIX;
 use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
 use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file with/;
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 setup("test_cms");
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
 my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
     = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
 -plan tests => 6;
 +plan tests => 7;
 my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
@@ -584,3 +584,14 @@ sub check_availability {
     return "";
 }
 +
 +# Check that we get the expected failure return code
 +with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 6; } },
 +    sub {
 +        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-encrypt',
 +                    '-in', srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"),
 +                    '-stream', '-recip',
 +                    srctop_file("test/smime-certs", "badrsa.pem"),
 +                   ])),
 +            "Check failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled correctly");
 +    });
 diff --git a/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..f824fc2267
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIToTV4Z0iuK08vZP20oTh//hC8BDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADAtMSswKQYD
 +VfcDEyJTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTE5MTEyMDA2NTQxOFoY
 +DzIwNTIwOTI3MDY1NDE4WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5BbGljZSBMb3ZlbGFjZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
 +AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALT0iehYOBY+TZp/T5K2KNI05Hwr+E3wP6XTvyi6WWyTgBK9LCOw
 +I2juwdRrjFBmXkk7pWpjXwsA3A5GOtz0FpfgyC7OxsVcF7q4WHWZWleYXFKlQHJD73nQwXP968+A
 +/3rBX7PhO0DBbZnfitOLPgPEwjTtdg0VQQ6Wz+CRQ/YbHPKaw7aRphZO63dKvIKp4cQVtkWQHi6s
 +yTjGsgkLcLNau5LZDQUdsGV+SAo3nBdWCRYV+I65x8Kf4hCxqqmjV3d/2NKRu0BXnDe/N+iDz3X0
 +zEoj0fqXgq4SWcC0nsG1lyyXt1TL270I6ATKRGJWiQVCCpDtc0NT6vdJ45bCSxgCAwEAAaOBlzCB
 +lDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB4GA1UdEQQXMBWBE2FsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGUwEwYDVR0lBAww
 +CgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDwYDVR0PAQH/BAUDAwfAADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUu/bMsi0dBhIcl64papAQ0yBm
 +ZnMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUeF8OWnjYa+RUcD2z3ez38fL6wEcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggEBABbW
 +eonR6TMTckehDKNOabwaCIcekahAIL6l9tTzUX5ew6ufiAPlC6I/zQlmUaU0iSyFDG1NW14kNbFt
 +5CAokyLhMtE4ASHBIHbiOp/ZSbUBTVYJZB61ot7w1/ol5QECSs08b8zrxIncf+t2DHGuVEy/Qq1d
 +rBz8d4ay8zpqAE1tUyL5Da6ZiKUfWwZQXSI/JlbjQFzYQqTRDnzHWrg1xPeMTO1P2/cplFaseTiv
 +yk4cYwOp/W9UAWymOZXF8WcJYCIUXkdcG/nEZxr057KlScrJmFXOoh7Y+8ON4iWYYcAfiNgpUFo/
 +j8BAwrKKaFvdlZS9k1Ypb2+UQY75mKJE9Bg=
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
 From 2c6c9d439b484e1ba9830d8454a34fa4f80fdfe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:45:42 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
 (1.1.1)
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 CHANGES                  | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c  |  2 +-
 include/openssl/x509v3.h |  2 +-
 test/v3nametest.c        |  8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
 index 87a5eff47c..e54ddc55c9 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
         return -1;
     switch (a->type) {
     case GEN_X400:
 -        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
 +        result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
         break;
     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
 diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
 index 90fa3592ce..e61c0f29d4 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
         OTHERNAME *otherName;   /* otherName */
         ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
         ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
 -        ASN1_TYPE *x400Address;
 +        ASN1_STRING *x400Address;
         X509_NAME *directoryName;
         EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
         ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
 diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
 index d1852190b8..37819da8fd 100644
 --- a/test/v3nametest.c
 +++ b/test/v3nametest.c
@@ -646,6 +646,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
             0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
         },
         15
 +    }, {
 +        /*
 +         * Regression test for CVE-2023-0286.
 +         */
 +        {
 +            0xa3, 0x00
 +        },
 +        2
     }
 };
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
 From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
 The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
 that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
 value even if it is excessively large.
 There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
 OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
 perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
 new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
 An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
 obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
 Service attack.
 The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
 functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
 similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
 DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
 CVE-2023-3446
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
 Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
 Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
 crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
 crypto/err/openssl.txt  | 3 ++-
 include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
 include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
 +    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
 +    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
         return 0;
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
 - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
 DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
 DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
 DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
 +DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
 DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
 DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
 DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
 index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dh.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
 #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
 # endif
 +# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
 +#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
 +# endif
 # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
 # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
 index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
 - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
 #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
 #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
 #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
 +#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
 #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
 #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
 #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
 From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
 obviously invalid
 If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
 is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
 We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
 q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
 q value.
 Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
 such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
 computations.
 Fixes CVE-2023-3817
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
 Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
 /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
 int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
 {
 -    int ok = 0, r;
 +    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     if (t2 == NULL)
         goto err;
 -    if (dh->q) {
 +    if (dh->q != NULL) {
 +        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
 +            q_good = 1;
 +        else
 +            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (q_good) {
         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
 From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
 We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
 DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
 This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
 It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
 differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
 sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
 DH_check_pub_key().
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
 (cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
 Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
 crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 10 ++++++++++
 crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
 include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 ++++--
 include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     *ret = 0;
 +
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 +
 +    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
 +    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
 +        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
 +        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
 +        /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
 +         * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
 +         * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
 +        ok = 1;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
         goto err;
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
     "parameter encoding error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
     "unable to check generator"},
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
         return 0;
     }
 +    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
         goto err;
     }
 +
 +    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode()
         && (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
 DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
 DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
 DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
 +DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
 DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
 DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
 DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
 index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dh.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
 /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
 # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
 -/* DH_check error codes */
 +/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
 # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
 # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
 # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
 # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
 # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
 -# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
 +# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
 # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
 +/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
 +# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
 /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
 # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
 index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
 #  define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD                             202
 #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
 #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
 +#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
 #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
 #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0002-Use-more-general-default-values-in-openssl.cnf.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0002-Use-more-general-default-values-in-openssl.cnf.patch
@ -1,21 +1,7 @@
-From 41df9ae215cee9574e17e6f887c96a7c97d588f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf
-From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+--- openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults	2018-11-20 14:35:37.000000000 +0100
-Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:03:40 +0200
+++ openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf	2019-01-15 13:56:50.841719776 +0100
-Subject: Use more general default values in openssl.cnf
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate fi
 Also set sha256 as default hash, although that should not be
 necessary anymore.
 (was openssl-1.1.1-defaults.patch)
 ---
 apps/openssl.cnf | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/openssl.cnf b/apps/openssl.cnf
 index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
 --- a/apps/openssl.cnf
 +++ b/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
 default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
 default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
@ -24,7 +10,7 @@ index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
 preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
 # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
+@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
 ####################################################################
 [ req ]
 default_bits		= 2048
@ -32,7 +18,7 @@ index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
 default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
 distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
 attributes		= req_attributes
-@@ -158,17 +159,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
+@@ -128,17 +129,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
 [ req_distinguished_name ]
 countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
@ -54,7 +40,7 @@ index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
 # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-)
 #1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (eg, company)
-@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
+@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=
@ -63,6 +49,3 @@ index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
 commonName_max			= 64
 emailAddress			= Email Address
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-detected-addr-ipv6.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-detected-addr-ipv6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6 openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6	2021-07-16 15:14:08.491986682 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c	2021-07-16 15:23:21.271329197 +0200
@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
     const BIO_ADDRINFO *next;
     int sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, sock_port;
     const BIO_ADDR *sock_address;
 +    int sock_family_fallback = AF_UNSPEC;
 +    const BIO_ADDR *sock_address_fallback = NULL;
     int sock_options = BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR;
     int ret = 0;
@@ -244,6 +246,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
             && BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(next) == sock_protocol) {
         if (sock_family == AF_INET
                 && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET6) {
 +            /* In case AF_INET6 is returned but not supported by the
 +             * kernel, retry with the first detected address family */
 +            sock_family_fallback = sock_family;
 +            sock_address_fallback = sock_address;
             sock_family = AF_INET6;
             sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(next);
         } else if (sock_family == AF_INET6
@@ -253,6 +259,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
     }
     asock = BIO_socket(sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
 +	if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET && sock_family_fallback != AF_UNSPEC) {
 +       asock = BIO_socket(sock_family_fallback, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
 +       sock_address = sock_address_fallback;
 +	}
     if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET
         || !BIO_listen(asock, sock_address, sock_options)) {
         BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ec-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ec-curves.patch
@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
@@ -490,90 +490,30 @@ static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2];
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
 enum {
 -    R_EC_P160,
 -    R_EC_P192,
     R_EC_P224,
     R_EC_P256,
     R_EC_P384,
     R_EC_P521,
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 -    R_EC_K163,
 -    R_EC_K233,
 -    R_EC_K283,
 -    R_EC_K409,
 -    R_EC_K571,
 -    R_EC_B163,
 -    R_EC_B233,
 -    R_EC_B283,
 -    R_EC_B409,
 -    R_EC_B571,
 -#endif
 -    R_EC_BRP256R1,
 -    R_EC_BRP256T1,
 -    R_EC_BRP384R1,
 -    R_EC_BRP384T1,
 -    R_EC_BRP512R1,
 -    R_EC_BRP512T1,
     R_EC_X25519,
     R_EC_X448
 };
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 static OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[] = {
 -    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
     {"ecdsap521", R_EC_P521},
 -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 -    {"ecdsak163", R_EC_K163},
 -    {"ecdsak233", R_EC_K233},
 -    {"ecdsak283", R_EC_K283},
 -    {"ecdsak409", R_EC_K409},
 -    {"ecdsak571", R_EC_K571},
 -    {"ecdsab163", R_EC_B163},
 -    {"ecdsab233", R_EC_B233},
 -    {"ecdsab283", R_EC_B283},
 -    {"ecdsab409", R_EC_B409},
 -    {"ecdsab571", R_EC_B571},
 -# endif
 -    {"ecdsabrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1},
 -    {"ecdsabrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1},
 -    {"ecdsabrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1},
 -    {"ecdsabrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1},
 -    {"ecdsabrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1},
 -    {"ecdsabrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1}
 };
 # define ECDSA_NUM       OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_choices)
 static double ecdsa_results[ECDSA_NUM][2];    /* 2 ops: sign then verify */
 static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[] = {
 -    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
     {"ecdhp521", R_EC_P521},
 -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 -    {"ecdhk163", R_EC_K163},
 -    {"ecdhk233", R_EC_K233},
 -    {"ecdhk283", R_EC_K283},
 -    {"ecdhk409", R_EC_K409},
 -    {"ecdhk571", R_EC_K571},
 -    {"ecdhb163", R_EC_B163},
 -    {"ecdhb233", R_EC_B233},
 -    {"ecdhb283", R_EC_B283},
 -    {"ecdhb409", R_EC_B409},
 -    {"ecdhb571", R_EC_B571},
 -# endif
 -    {"ecdhbrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1},
 -    {"ecdhbrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1},
 -    {"ecdhbrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1},
 -    {"ecdhbrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1},
 -    {"ecdhbrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1},
 -    {"ecdhbrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1},
     {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519},
     {"ecdhx448", R_EC_X448}
 };
@@ -1502,31 +1442,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
         unsigned int bits;
     } test_curves[] = {
         /* Prime Curves */
 -        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
 -        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
         {"nistp521", NID_secp521r1, 521},
 -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 -        /* Binary Curves */
 -        {"nistk163", NID_sect163k1, 163},
 -        {"nistk233", NID_sect233k1, 233},
 -        {"nistk283", NID_sect283k1, 283},
 -        {"nistk409", NID_sect409k1, 409},
 -        {"nistk571", NID_sect571k1, 571},
 -        {"nistb163", NID_sect163r2, 163},
 -        {"nistb233", NID_sect233r1, 233},
 -        {"nistb283", NID_sect283r1, 283},
 -        {"nistb409", NID_sect409r1, 409},
 -        {"nistb571", NID_sect571r1, 571},
 -# endif
 -        {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 256},
 -        {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 256},
 -        {"brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 384},
 -        {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 384},
 -        {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 512},
 -        {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 512},
         /* Other and ECDH only ones */
         {"X25519", NID_X25519, 253},
         {"X448", NID_X448, 448}
@@ -2026,9 +1945,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
 #  endif
 #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
 -    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
 -    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
 +    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P224][0] = count / 1000;
 +    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P224][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
 +    for (i = R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
         ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
         ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
         if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
@@ -2040,7 +1959,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
             }
         }
     }
 -#   ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 +#   if 0
     ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
     ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
     for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
@@ -2071,8 +1990,8 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
 #   endif
 -    ecdh_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
 -    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
 +    ecdh_c[R_EC_P224][0] = count / 1000;
 +    for (i = R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
         ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
         if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
             ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
@@ -2082,7 +2001,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
             }
         }
     }
 -#   ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 +#   if 0
     ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
     for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
         ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GRO
         return 0;
     }
 +    if (BN_num_bits(p) < 224) {
 +        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     if (ctx == NULL) {
         ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
         if (ctx == NULL)
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves	2020-11-06 13:27:15.627288114 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h	2020-11-06 13:27:15.660288441 +0100
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
 } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
 static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
 -    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
 -     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
 -     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
 -     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
 -     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
 -     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
 -     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
 -     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
 -     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
 -     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
 -     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
 --- openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves	2020-11-06 13:58:36.402895540 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t	2020-11-06 13:59:38.508484498 +0100
@@ -20,45 +20,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
     if disabled("ec");
 my @prime_curves = qw(
 -    secp112r1
 -    secp112r2
 -    secp128r1
 -    secp128r2
 -    secp160k1
 -    secp160r1
 -    secp160r2
 -    secp192k1
 -    secp224k1
     secp224r1
     secp256k1
     secp384r1
     secp521r1
 -    prime192v1
 -    prime192v2
 -    prime192v3
 -    prime239v1
 -    prime239v2
 -    prime239v3
     prime256v1
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
 -    brainpoolP160r1
 -    brainpoolP160t1
 -    brainpoolP192r1
 -    brainpoolP192t1
 -    brainpoolP224r1
 -    brainpoolP224t1
 -    brainpoolP256r1
 -    brainpoolP256t1
 -    brainpoolP320r1
 -    brainpoolP320t1
 -    brainpoolP384r1
 -    brainpoolP384t1
 -    brainpoolP512r1
 -    brainpoolP512t1
 );
 my @binary_curves = qw(
@@ -115,7 +81,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
     if !disabled("sm2");
 my @curve_aliases = qw(
 -    P-192
     P-224
     P-256
     P-384
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-edk2-build.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-edk2-build.patch
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.299548432 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
 +#include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
 static int pkey_kdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c	2020-05-18 12:57:18.648288904 +0200
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
 #include "kdf_local.h"
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:56:05.646655554 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2020-05-18 12:58:51.088090896 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include "crypto/fips.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "internal/dso.h"
 -#ifdef __linux
 +#if defined(__linux) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 # include <sys/syscall.h>
 # include <sys/random.h>
 # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.296548406 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
 -# error FIPS is disabled.
 -#endif
 -
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff);
@@ -97,4 +93,8 @@ void fips_set_selftest_fail(void);
 void FIPS_get_timevec(unsigned char *buf, unsigned long *pctr);
 +#else
 +
 +# define fips_in_post() 0
 +
 #endif
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-evp-kdf.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-evp-kdf.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch
@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.863389837 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info	2020-04-23 13:31:55.847069892 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
 -        randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
 +        randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \
         rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
 INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.818390686 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
 /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
 -static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
 +static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
 static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
@@ -201,8 +201,13 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secu
     drbg->parent = parent;
     if (parent == NULL) {
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +        drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
 +        drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
 +#else
         drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
         drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
 +#endif
 #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
         drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
         drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +/*
 + * Implementation of the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
 + */
 +
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include "crypto/rand.h"
 +#include "internal/thread_once.h"
 +#include "rand_local.h"
 +
 +static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
 +static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 +
 +int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
 +    = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
 +
 +int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
 +                              unsigned int *md_size)
 +{
 +    int r;
 +    size_t n;
 +    unsigned char *p;
 +
 +    n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool);
 +    if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
 +        p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
 +        r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
 +        if (r != 0)
 +            memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
 +        rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
 +        return r;
 +    }
 +    return 0;
 +}
 +
 +void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
 +{
 +    rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
 +    crngt_pool = NULL;
 +}
 +
 +int rand_crngt_init(void)
 +{
 +    unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
 +
 +    if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 1, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +    if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) {
 +        OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
 +        return 1;
 +    }
 +    rand_crngt_cleanup();
 +    return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init)
 +{
 +    return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)
 +        && rand_crngt_init()
 +        && OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup);
 +}
 +
 +int rand_crngt_single_init(void)
 +{
 +    return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init);
 +}
 +
 +size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 +                              unsigned char **pout,
 +                              int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
 +                              int prediction_resistance)
 +{
 +    unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 +    unsigned int sz;
 +    RAND_POOL *pool;
 +    size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
 +    int attempts = 3;
 +
 +    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init))
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
 +        s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
 +        if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz)
 +            || memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
 +            || !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
 +            goto err;
 +        memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz);
 +        t += s;
 +        attempts++;
 +    }
 +    r = t;
 +    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
 +err:
 +    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
 +    rand_pool_free(pool);
 +    return r;
 +}
 +
 +void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 +                                unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 +{
 +    OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
 +}
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.470397250 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,15 @@
 # define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL             (60*60)   /* 1 hour */
 # define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL              (7*60)    /* 7 minutes */
 -
 +/*
 + * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
 + * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.  The size is somewhat
 + * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
 + * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
 + *
 + * The value is in bytes.
 + */
 +#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
 /*
  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
@@ -44,6 +52,8 @@
  */
 # define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH                         INT32_MAX
 +/* The default nonce */
 +# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING                "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"
 /*
  * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
@@ -296,4 +306,22 @@ int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *
 /* initializes the AES-CTR DRBG implementation */
 int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
 +/*
 + * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
 + * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
 + */
 +int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
 +                              unsigned int *md_size);
 +extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
 +                                unsigned int *md_size);
 +int rand_crngt_init(void);
 +void rand_crngt_cleanup(void);
 +
 +/*
 + * Expose the run once initialisation function for the unit tests because.
 + * they need to restart from scratch to validate the first block is skipped
 + * properly.
 + */
 +int rand_crngt_single_init(void);
 +
 #endif
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.824390573 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAN
 void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
 +/* CRNG test entropy filter callbacks. */
 +size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 +                              unsigned char **pout,
 +                              int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
 +                              int prediction_resistance);
 +void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 +                                unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
 +
 /*
  * RAND_POOL functions
  */
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.865389800 +0200
@@ -150,6 +150,31 @@ static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     return t->noncelen;
 }
 + /*
 + * Disable CRNG testing if it is enabled.
 + * If the DRBG is ready or in an error state, this means an instantiate cycle
 + * for which the default personalisation string is used.
 + */
 +static int disable_crngt(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 +{
 +    static const char pers[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
 +    const int instantiate = drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
 +
 +    if (drbg->get_entropy != rand_crngt_get_entropy)
 +        return 1;
 +
 +     if ((instantiate && !RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg))
 +        || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_drbg_get_entropy,
 +                                              &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
 +                                              &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
 +                                              &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce))
 +        || (instantiate
 +            && !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, (const unsigned char *)pers,
 +                                      sizeof(pers) - 1)))
 +        return 0;
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 {
     int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
@@ -175,7 +200,8 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA
     if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
         return 0;
     if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
 -                                           kat_nonce, NULL))) {
 +                                           kat_nonce, NULL))
 +        || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) {
         failures++;
         goto err;
     }
@@ -293,7 +319,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DAT
     unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
     int ret = 0;
 -    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
 +	|| !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg)))
         goto err;
     /*
@@ -740,6 +767,10 @@ static int test_rand_drbg_reseed(void)
         || !TEST_ptr_eq(private->parent, master))
         return 0;
 +    /* Disable CRNG testing for the master DRBG */
 +    if (!TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
 +        return 0;
 +
     /* uninstantiate the three global DRBGs */
     RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private);
     RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public);
@@ -964,7 +995,8 @@ static int test_rand_seed(void)
     size_t rand_buflen;
     size_t required_seed_buflen = 0;
 -    if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()))
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
 +        || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
         return 0;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
@@ -1013,6 +1045,95 @@ static int test_rand_add(void)
     return 1;
 }
 +/*
 + * A list of the FIPS DRGB types.
 + */
 +static const struct s_drgb_types {
 +    int nid;
 +    int flags;
 +} drgb_types[] = {
 +    { NID_aes_128_ctr,  0                   },
 +    { NID_aes_192_ctr,  0                   },
 +    { NID_aes_256_ctr,  0                   },
 +};
 +
 +/* Six cases for each covers seed sizes up to 32 bytes */
 +static const size_t crngt_num_cases = 6;
 +
 +static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx;
 +
 +static int crngt_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
 +                            unsigned int *md_size)
 +{
 +    size_t i, z;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_int_lt(crngt_idx, crngt_num_cases))
 +        return 0;
 +    /* Generate a block of unique data unless this is the duplication point */
 +    z = crngt_idx++;
 +    if (z > 0 && crngt_case == z)
 +        z--;
 +    for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++)
 +        buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z);
 +    return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
 +}
 +
 +static int test_crngt(int n)
 +{
 +    const struct s_drgb_types *dt = drgb_types + n / crngt_num_cases;
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
 +    unsigned char buff[100];
 +    size_t ent;
 +    int res = 0;
 +    int expect;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_single_init()))
 +        return 0;
 +    rand_crngt_cleanup();
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
 +        return 0;
 +    ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ;
 +    crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases;
 +    crngt_idx = 0;
 +    crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb;
 +    if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_init()))
 +        goto err;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy,
 +                                           &rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy,
 +                                           &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
 +                                           &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce)))
 +        goto err;
 +#endif
 +    expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > ent;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), expect))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!expect)
 +        goto fin;
 +    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > 2 * ent;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0), expect))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!expect)
 +        goto fin;
 +    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +fin:
 +    res = 1;
 +err:
 +    if (!res)
 +        TEST_note("DRBG %zd case %zd block %zd", n / crngt_num_cases,
 +                  crngt_case, crngt_idx);
 +    uninstantiate(drbg);
 +    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
 +    crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
 +    return res;
 +}
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
@@ -1025,5 +1146,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
 #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
     ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread);
 #endif
 +    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_crngt, crngt_num_cases * OSSL_NELEM(drgb_types));
     return 1;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-curves.patch
@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.fips-curves openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.fips-curves	2020-05-18 12:59:54.839643980 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c	2020-05-18 12:59:54.852644093 +0200
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 typedef struct {
@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ static const struct {
 typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
     int nid;
 +    int fips_allowed;
     const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
     const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
     const char *comment;
@@ -246,23 +248,23 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
     /* prime field curves */
     /* secg curves */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
 -    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
 +    {NID_secp224r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
      "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #else
 -    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
 +    {NID_secp224r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
      "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #endif
 -    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
 +    {NID_secp256k1, 0, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
      "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
     /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
 -    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h,
 +    {NID_secp384r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h,
 # if defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
      EC_GFp_s390x_nistp384_method,
 # else
      0,
 # endif
      "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
 -    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h,
 +    {NID_secp521r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h,
 # if defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
      EC_GFp_s390x_nistp521_method,
 # elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
 # endif
      "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
     /* X9.62 curves */
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
 +    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
 #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
      EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
 # elif defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
@@ -404,6 +406,10 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int
     for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
         if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
 +            if (!curve_list[i].fips_allowed && FIPS_mode()) {
 +                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME);
 +                return NULL;
 +            }
             ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
             break;
         }
@@ -418,19 +424,31 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int
 size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
 {
 -    size_t i, min;
 +    size_t i, j, num;
 +    int fips_mode = FIPS_mode();
 -    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
 -        return curve_list_length;
 +    num = curve_list_length;
 +    if (fips_mode)
 +        for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
 +            if (!curve_list[i].fips_allowed)
 +                --num;
 +        }
 -    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
 +    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0) {
 +        return num;
 +    }
 -    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
 -        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
 -        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
 +    for (i = 0, j = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
 +        if (j >= nitems)
 +            break;
 +        if (!fips_mode || curve_list[i].fips_allowed) {
 +            r[j].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
 +            r[j].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
 +            ++j;
 +        }
     }
 -    return curve_list_length;
 +    return num;
 }
 /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-curves openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-curves	2020-05-18 12:59:54.797643616 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2020-05-18 13:03:54.748725463 +0200
@@ -678,6 +678,36 @@ static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] =
 #endif
 };
 +static const uint16_t tls12_fips_sigalgs[] = {
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
 +#endif
 +
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
 +
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
 +#endif
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
 +    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
 +#endif
 +};
 +
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
     TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
@@ -894,6 +924,8 @@ static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_leg
     }
     if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
         return NULL;
 +    if (FIPS_mode()) /* We do not allow legacy SHA1 signatures in FIPS mode */
 +        return NULL;
     if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
         const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
@@ -954,6 +986,9 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int se
     } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
         *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
         return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
 +    } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +        *psigs = tls12_fips_sigalgs;
 +        return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_fips_sigalgs);
     } else {
         *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
         return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
@@ -973,6 +1008,9 @@ int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s,
     if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
         sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
         siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
 +    } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +        sigs = tls12_fips_sigalgs;
 +        siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_fips_sigalgs);
     } else {
         sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
         siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
@@ -1617,6 +1655,8 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SS
     if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
             || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
             || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
 +        if (FIPS_mode())
 +            return 0;
         /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
         if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
             return 0;
@@ -2842,6 +2882,13 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatale
                 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
                 size_t sent_sigslen;
 +                if (fatalerrs && FIPS_mode()) {
 +                    /* There are no suitable legacy algorithms in FIPS mode */
 +                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
 +                             SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
 +                             SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
 +                    return 0;
 +                }
                 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
                     if (!fatalerrs)
                         return 1;
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-dh.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-dh.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-drbg-selftest.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-drbg-selftest.patch
@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_post.c.drbg-selftest openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_post.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_post.c.drbg-selftest	2020-04-23 13:33:12.500624151 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/fips/fips_post.c	2020-04-23 13:33:12.618621925 +0200
@@ -67,12 +67,18 @@
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
 # include "crypto/fips.h"
 +# include "crypto/rand.h"
 # include "fips_locl.h"
 /* Run all selftests */
 int FIPS_selftest(void)
 {
     int rv = 1;
 +    if (!rand_drbg_selftest()) {
 +        FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_SELFTEST, FIPS_R_TEST_FAILURE);
 +        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", "rand_drbg_selftest");
 +        rv = 0;
 +    }
     if (!FIPS_selftest_drbg())
         rv = 0;
     if (!FIPS_selftest_sha1())
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.drbg-selftest openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.drbg-selftest	2020-04-23 13:33:12.619621907 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info	2020-04-23 13:34:10.857523497 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
         randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \
 -        rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
 +        rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_selftest.c
 INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_selftest.c.drbg-selftest openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_selftest.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_selftest.c.drbg-selftest	2020-04-23 13:33:12.619621907 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_selftest.c	2020-04-23 13:33:12.619621907 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <stddef.h>
 +#include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
 +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 +#include "internal/thread_once.h"
 +#include "crypto/rand.h"
 +
 +typedef struct test_ctx_st {
 +    const unsigned char *entropy;
 +    size_t entropylen;
 +    int entropycnt;
 +    const unsigned char *nonce;
 +    size_t noncelen;
 +    int noncecnt;
 +} TEST_CTX;
 +
 +static int app_data_index = -1;
 +static CRYPTO_ONCE get_index_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(drbg_app_data_index_init)
 +{
 +    app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 +enum drbg_kat_type {
 +    NO_RESEED,
 +    PR_FALSE,
 +    PR_TRUE
 +};
 +
 +enum drbg_df {
 +    USE_DF,
 +    NO_DF,
 +    NA
 +};
 +
 +struct drbg_kat_no_reseed {
 +    size_t count;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyin;
 +    const unsigned char *nonce;
 +    const unsigned char *persstr;
 +    const unsigned char *addin1;
 +    const unsigned char *addin2;
 +    const unsigned char *retbytes;
 +};
 +
 +struct drbg_kat_pr_false {
 +    size_t count;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyin;
 +    const unsigned char *nonce;
 +    const unsigned char *persstr;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyinreseed;
 +    const unsigned char *addinreseed;
 +    const unsigned char *addin1;
 +    const unsigned char *addin2;
 +    const unsigned char *retbytes;
 +};
 +
 +struct drbg_kat_pr_true {
 +    size_t count;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyin;
 +    const unsigned char *nonce;
 +    const unsigned char *persstr;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyinpr1;
 +    const unsigned char *addin1;
 +    const unsigned char *entropyinpr2;
 +    const unsigned char *addin2;
 +    const unsigned char *retbytes;
 +};
 +
 +struct drbg_kat {
 +    enum drbg_kat_type type;
 +    enum drbg_df df;
 +    int nid;
 +
 +    size_t entropyinlen;
 +    size_t noncelen;
 +    size_t persstrlen;
 +    size_t addinlen;
 +    size_t retbyteslen;
 +
 +    const void *t;
 +};
 +
 +/*
 + * Excerpt from test/drbg_cavs_data.c
 + * DRBG test vectors from:
 + * https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/
 + */
 +
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_entropyin[] = {
 +    0x7c, 0x5d, 0x90, 0x70, 0x3b, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x0f, 0x23, 0x73, 0x24, 0x9c,
 +    0xa7, 0x15, 0x41, 0x71, 0x7a, 0x31, 0xea, 0x32, 0xfc, 0x28, 0x0d, 0xd7,
 +    0x5b, 0x09, 0x01, 0x98, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xa5, 0x53, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x32, 0x97,
 +    0xec, 0xbe, 0x86, 0xfd, 0x1c, 0x1c, 0x71, 0x4c, 0x52, 0x29, 0x9e, 0x52,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_nonce[] = {0};
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_persstr[] = {
 +    0xdc, 0x07, 0x2f, 0x68, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x03, 0x23, 0x42, 0xb0, 0xf5, 0xa2,
 +    0xd9, 0xad, 0xa1, 0xd0, 0xad, 0xa2, 0x14, 0xb4, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x39,
 +    0xdd, 0xc2, 0xac, 0xfb, 0x98, 0xdf, 0x7f, 0xce, 0x4c, 0x75, 0x56, 0x45,
 +    0xcd, 0x86, 0x93, 0x74, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0x85, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xc3,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_addin0[] = {
 +    0x52, 0x25, 0xc4, 0x2f, 0x03, 0xce, 0x29, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0x4e,
 +    0xad, 0x8d, 0x6f, 0x17, 0x82, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0xfd, 0xfd, 0x9b, 0x94, 0x9a,
 +    0x1d, 0xac, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xe3, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x5a,
 +    0x68, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x74, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xc6, 0x27, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x6c,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_addin1[] = {
 +    0xdc, 0x91, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0xb9, 0x94, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x06, 0xc4, 0x70, 0x19,
 +    0x33, 0x25, 0x7c, 0x96, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x62, 0xb0, 0x50, 0xe6, 0xc0, 0x3a,
 +    0x56, 0x8f, 0xc5, 0x50, 0x48, 0xc6, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xe5, 0x70, 0x16, 0x2e,
 +    0xae, 0xf2, 0x99, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x18, 0x16, 0xcd, 0xe0, 0x24, 0xe4,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1308_retbits[] = {
 +    0xde, 0xf8, 0x91, 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xe1, 0xa9, 0x97, 0xd8, 0x61, 0x84, 0xe2,
 +    0xdb, 0x83, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x45, 0xcd, 0xc8, 0x66, 0x93, 0x28, 0xc8, 0x92,
 +    0xbc, 0x25, 0xae, 0xe8, 0xb0, 0xed, 0xed, 0x16, 0x3d, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0x0f,
 +    0xb3, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0xac, 0x3c, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x7d, 0x63,
 +    0x3e, 0xde, 0x59, 0x37, 0x0e, 0x40, 0x12, 0x2b, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x96, 0x53,
 +    0x26, 0x32, 0xd0, 0xb8,
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat_no_reseed kat1308_t = {
 +    2, kat1308_entropyin, kat1308_nonce, kat1308_persstr,
 +    kat1308_addin0, kat1308_addin1, kat1308_retbits
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat kat1308 = {
 +    NO_RESEED, NO_DF, NID_aes_256_ctr, 48, 0, 48, 48, 64, &kat1308_t
 +};
 +
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_entropyin[] = {
 +    0xc9, 0x96, 0x3a, 0x15, 0x51, 0x76, 0x4f, 0xe0, 0x45, 0x82, 0x8a, 0x64,
 +    0x87, 0xbe, 0xaa, 0xc0,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_nonce[] = {
 +    0x08, 0xcd, 0x69, 0x39, 0xf8, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x85,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_persstr[] = {0};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_entropyinreseed[] = {
 +    0x16, 0xcc, 0x35, 0x15, 0xb1, 0x17, 0xf5, 0x33, 0x80, 0x9a, 0x80, 0xc5,
 +    0x1f, 0x4b, 0x7b, 0x51,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_addinreseed[] = {
 +    0xf5, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x1c, 0x00, 0x7b, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x12,
 +    0x61, 0x9f, 0x26, 0x5f,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_addin0[] = {
 +    0xe2, 0x67, 0x06, 0x62, 0x09, 0xa7, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0x84, 0x8c, 0x20, 0xf6,
 +    0x10, 0x5a, 0x73, 0x9c,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_addin1[] = {
 +    0x26, 0xfa, 0x50, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x65, 0xed, 0xbc, 0x6d, 0xda, 0x18,
 +    0x47, 0x99, 0x1f, 0xeb,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat1465_retbits[] = {
 +    0xf9, 0x47, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x58, 0xa8, 0x66, 0x8a, 0xf5, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0x6d,
 +    0x4e, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x65, 0xbf, 0x51, 0x22, 0xbf, 0xe8, 0x8d, 0x6c, 0xeb,
 +    0xf9, 0x68, 0x7f, 0xed, 0x3b, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x28, 0x47, 0x56, 0x52,
 +    0xda, 0x50, 0xf0, 0x90, 0x73, 0x95, 0x06, 0x58, 0xaf, 0x08, 0x98, 0x6e,
 +    0x24, 0x18, 0xfd, 0x2f, 0x48, 0x72, 0x57, 0xd6, 0x59, 0xab, 0xe9, 0x41,
 +    0x58, 0xdb, 0x27, 0xba,
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat_pr_false kat1465_t = {
 +    9, kat1465_entropyin, kat1465_nonce, kat1465_persstr,
 +    kat1465_entropyinreseed, kat1465_addinreseed, kat1465_addin0,
 +    kat1465_addin1, kat1465_retbits
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat kat1465 = {
 +    PR_FALSE, USE_DF, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 8, 0, 16, 64, &kat1465_t
 +};
 +
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_entropyin[] = {
 +    0xd7, 0x08, 0x42, 0x82, 0xc2, 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x01, 0xb4, 0x36, 0xb3,
 +    0x7f, 0xbd, 0xd3, 0xdd, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0x31, 0x4f, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x10, 0xf4,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_nonce[] = {
 +    0x7b, 0x9e, 0xcd, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x46, 0xa0, 0x08, 0x32, 0xff, 0x2e, 0xc3,
 +    0x50, 0x86, 0xca, 0xca,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_persstr[] = {0};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_entropyinpr1[] = {
 +    0x68, 0xd0, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x22, 0x19, 0xe6, 0xb6, 0x46, 0x6a, 0xda,
 +    0x8e, 0x67, 0xea, 0x63, 0x3f, 0xaf, 0x2f, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0x5e, 0x48, 0x15,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_addinpr1[] = {
 +    0x70, 0x0f, 0x54, 0xf4, 0x53, 0xde, 0xca, 0x61, 0x5c, 0x49, 0x51, 0xd1,
 +    0x41, 0xc4, 0xf1, 0x2f, 0x65, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0x9b, 0x14, 0xba, 0x90,
 +    0x05, 0x33, 0x7e, 0x64, 0xb7, 0x2b, 0xaf, 0x99,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_entropyinpr2[] = {
 +    0xeb, 0x77, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x2d, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x66, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0xf7,
 +    0x6c, 0xb2, 0x74, 0x36, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x78, 0x04, 0xd8, 0xd7, 0xd2, 0x34,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_addinpr2[] = {
 +    0x05, 0xcd, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x5a, 0x5d, 0xfb, 0x98, 0xc1, 0xf1, 0x00, 0x0c,
 +    0xed, 0xe6, 0x2a, 0xba, 0xf0, 0x89, 0x1f, 0x5a, 0x4f, 0xd7, 0x48, 0xb3,
 +    0x24, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0x3d, 0x60, 0x59, 0x5d, 0xb6,
 +};
 +static const unsigned char kat3146_retbits[] = {
 +    0x29, 0x94, 0xa4, 0xa8, 0x17, 0x3e, 0x62, 0x2f, 0x94, 0xdd, 0x40, 0x1f,
 +    0xe3, 0x7e, 0x77, 0xd4, 0x38, 0xbc, 0x0e, 0x49, 0x46, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x28,
 +    0x91, 0xc6, 0x9c, 0xc4, 0xa6, 0xa1, 0xf8, 0x9a, 0x64, 0x5e, 0x99, 0x76,
 +    0xd0, 0x2d, 0xee, 0xde, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x93, 0x29, 0x4b, 0x12, 0xcf, 0x87,
 +    0x03, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x74, 0x41, 0xdb, 0x3a, 0x49, 0x9f, 0x92, 0xd0, 0x45,
 +    0xd4, 0x30, 0x73, 0xbb,
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat_pr_true kat3146_t = {
 +    10, kat3146_entropyin, kat3146_nonce, kat3146_persstr,
 +    kat3146_entropyinpr1, kat3146_addinpr1, kat3146_entropyinpr2,
 +    kat3146_addinpr2, kat3146_retbits
 +};
 +static const struct drbg_kat kat3146 = {
 +    PR_TRUE, USE_DF, NID_aes_192_ctr, 24, 16, 0, 32, 64, &kat3146_t
 +};
 +
 +static const struct drbg_kat *drbg_test[] = { &kat1308, &kat1465, &kat3146 };
 +
 +static const size_t drbg_test_nelem = OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test);
 +
 +static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
 +                          int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
 +                          int prediction_resistance)
 +{
 +    TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
 +
 +    t->entropycnt++;
 +    *pout = (unsigned char *)t->entropy;
 +    return t->entropylen;
 +}
 +
 +static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
 +                        int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 +{
 +    TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
 +
 +    t->noncecnt++;
 +    *pout = (unsigned char *)t->nonce;
 +    return t->noncelen;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Do a single NO_RESEED KAT:
 + *
 + * Instantiate
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=false)
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=false)
 + * Uninstantiate
 + *
 + * Return 0 on failure.
 + */
 +static int single_kat_no_reseed(const struct drbg_kat *td)
 +{
 +    struct drbg_kat_no_reseed *data = (struct drbg_kat_no_reseed *)td->t;
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
 +    unsigned char *buff = NULL;
 +    unsigned int flags = 0;
 +    int failures = 0;
 +    TEST_CTX t;
 +
 +    if (td->df != USE_DF)
 +        flags |= RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
 +
 +    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
 +                                 kat_nonce, NULL)) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyin;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +    t.nonce = data->nonce;
 +    t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
 +    RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
 +
 +    buff = OPENSSL_malloc(td->retbyteslen);
 +    if (buff == NULL) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, data->persstr, td->persstrlen)
 +        || !RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 0,
 +                               data->addin1, td->addinlen)
 +        || !RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 0,
 +                               data->addin2, td->addinlen)
 +        || memcmp(data->retbytes, buff,
 +                  td->retbyteslen) != 0)
 +        failures++;
 +
 +err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(buff);
 +    RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
 +    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
 +    return failures == 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * Do a single PR_FALSE KAT:
 + *
 + * Instantiate
 + * Reseed
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=false)
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=false)
 + * Uninstantiate
 + *
 + * Return 0 on failure.
 + */
 +static int single_kat_pr_false(const struct drbg_kat *td)
 +{
 +    struct drbg_kat_pr_false *data = (struct drbg_kat_pr_false *)td->t;
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
 +    unsigned char *buff = NULL;
 +    unsigned int flags = 0;
 +    int failures = 0;
 +    TEST_CTX t;
 +
 +    if (td->df != USE_DF)
 +        flags |= RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
 +
 +    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
 +                                 kat_nonce, NULL)) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyin;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +    t.nonce = data->nonce;
 +    t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
 +    RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
 +
 +    buff = OPENSSL_malloc(td->retbyteslen);
 +    if (buff == NULL) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, data->persstr, td->persstrlen))
 +        failures++;
 +
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyinreseed;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, data->addinreseed, td->addinlen, 0)
 +        || !RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 0,
 +                               data->addin1, td->addinlen)
 +        || !RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 0,
 +                               data->addin2, td->addinlen)
 +        || memcmp(data->retbytes, buff,
 +                  td->retbyteslen) != 0)
 +        failures++;
 +
 +err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(buff);
 +    RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
 +    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
 +    return failures == 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * Do a single PR_TRUE KAT:
 + *
 + * Instantiate
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=true)
 + * Generate Random Bits (pr=true)
 + * Uninstantiate
 + *
 + * Return 0 on failure.
 + */
 +static int single_kat_pr_true(const struct drbg_kat *td)
 +{
 +    struct drbg_kat_pr_true *data = (struct drbg_kat_pr_true *)td->t;
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
 +    unsigned char *buff = NULL;
 +    unsigned int flags = 0;
 +    int failures = 0;
 +    TEST_CTX t;
 +
 +    if (td->df != USE_DF)
 +        flags |= RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
 +
 +    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
 +                                 kat_nonce, NULL)) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
 +    t.nonce = data->nonce;
 +    t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyin;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +    RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
 +
 +    buff = OPENSSL_malloc(td->retbyteslen);
 +    if (buff == NULL) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, data->persstr, td->persstrlen))
 +        failures++;
 +
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyinpr1;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 1,
 +                            data->addin1, td->addinlen))
 +        failures++;
 +
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyinpr2;
 +    t.entropylen = td->entropyinlen;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->retbyteslen, 1,
 +                            data->addin2, td->addinlen)
 +        || memcmp(data->retbytes, buff,
 +                  td->retbyteslen) != 0)
 +        failures++;
 +
 +err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(buff);
 +    RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
 +    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
 +    return failures == 0;
 +}
 +
 +static int test_kats(int i)
 +{
 +    const struct drbg_kat *td = drbg_test[i];
 +    int rv = 0;
 +
 +    switch (td->type) {
 +    case NO_RESEED:
 +        if (!single_kat_no_reseed(td))
 +            goto err;
 +        break;
 +    case PR_FALSE:
 +        if (!single_kat_pr_false(td))
 +            goto err;
 +        break;
 +    case PR_TRUE:
 +        if (!single_kat_pr_true(td))
 +            goto err;
 +        break;
 +    default:	/* cant happen */
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    rv = 1;
 +err:
 +    return rv;
 +}
 +
 +/*-
 + * Do one expected-error test:
 + *
 + * Instantiate with no entropy supplied
 + *
 + * Return 0 on failure.
 + */
 +static int test_drbg_sanity(const struct drbg_kat *td)
 +{
 +    struct drbg_kat_pr_false *data = (struct drbg_kat_pr_false *)td->t;
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
 +    unsigned int flags = 0;
 +    int failures = 0;
 +    TEST_CTX t;
 +
 +    if (td->df != USE_DF)
 +        flags |= RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
 +
 +    if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
 +                                 kat_nonce, NULL)) {
 +        failures++;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +    memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
 +    t.entropy = data->entropyin;
 +    t.entropylen = 0;     /* No entropy */
 +    t.nonce = data->nonce;
 +    t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
 +    RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
 +
 +    ERR_set_mark();
 +    /* This must fail. */
 +    if (RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, data->persstr, td->persstrlen))
 +        failures++;
 +    RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
 +    ERR_pop_to_mark();
 +
 +err:
 +    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
 +    return failures == 0;
 +}
 +
 +
 +int rand_drbg_selftest(void)
 +{
 +    int i;
 +
 +    if (!RUN_ONCE(&get_index_once, drbg_app_data_index_init))
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    for (i = 0; i < drbg_test_nelem; i++) {
 +        if (test_kats(i) <= 0)
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (test_drbg_sanity(&kat1465) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.drbg-selftest openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.drbg-selftest	2020-04-23 13:33:12.587622510 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-04-23 13:33:12.619621907 +0200
@@ -140,4 +140,9 @@ void rand_pool_cleanup(void);
  */
 void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep);
 +/*
 + * Perform the DRBG KAT selftests
 + */
 +int rand_drbg_selftest(void);
 +
 #endif
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-post-rand.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-post-rand.patch
@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-09 10:26:41.634106328 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c	2020-12-09 10:26:41.652106475 +0100
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
 # include "internal/thread_once.h"
 +# include "crypto/rand.h"
 # ifndef PATH_MAX
 #  define PATH_MAX 1024
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
 static int fips_selftest_fail = 0;
 static int fips_mode = 0;
 static int fips_started = 0;
 +static int fips_post = 0;
 static int fips_is_owning_thread(void);
 static int fips_set_owning_thread(void);
@@ -158,6 +160,11 @@ void fips_set_selftest_fail(void)
     fips_selftest_fail = 1;
 }
 +int fips_in_post(void)
 +{
 +    return fips_post;
 +}
 +
 /* we implement what libfipscheck does ourselves */
 static int
@@ -445,6 +452,8 @@ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff)
         }
 # endif
 +        fips_post = 1;
 +
         if (!FIPS_selftest()) {
             fips_selftest_fail = 1;
             ret = 0;
@@ -459,7 +468,12 @@ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff)
             goto end;
         }
 +        fips_post = 0;
 +
         fips_set_mode(onoff);
 +        /* force RNG reseed with entropy from getrandom() on next call */
 +        rand_force_reseed();
 +
         ret = 1;
         goto end;
     }
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c	2020-12-09 10:26:41.652106475 +0100
@@ -1005,6 +1005,20 @@ size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg
     return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
 }
 +void rand_force_reseed(void)
 +{
 +    RAND_DRBG *drbg;
 +
 +    drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
 +    drbg->fork_id = 0;
 +
 +    drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
 +    drbg->fork_id = 0;
 +
 +    drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
 +    drbg->fork_id = 0;
 +}
 +
 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
 static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
 {
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2020-12-09 10:36:59.531221903 +0100
@@ -17,10 +17,12 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "rand_local.h"
 #include "crypto/rand.h"
 +#include "crypto/fips.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "internal/dso.h"
 #ifdef __linux
 # include <sys/syscall.h>
 +# include <sys/random.h>
 # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
 #  include <sys/shm.h>
 #  include <sys/utsname.h>
@@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
  * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
  * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
  */
 -static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
 +static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen, int nonblock)
 {
     /*
      * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
@@ -369,6 +371,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
      * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
      * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
      */
 +#  if 0
 #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
     extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
@@ -394,10 +397,10 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
     if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
         return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
 #  endif
 -
 +#  endif
     /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
 -#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
 -    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
 +#  if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
 +    return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, nonblock?GRND_NONBLOCK:0);
 #  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
     return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
 #  else
@@ -633,6 +636,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
     size_t entropy_available;
 #   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
 +    int in_post;
 +
 +    for (in_post = fips_in_post(); in_post >= 0; --in_post) {
     {
         size_t bytes_needed;
         unsigned char *buffer;
@@ -643,7 +649,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
         bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
         while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
             buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
 -            bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
 +            bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed, in_post);
             if (bytes > 0) {
                 rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
                 bytes_needed -= bytes;
@@ -678,8 +684,10 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
             int attempts = 3;
             const int fd = get_random_device(i);
 -            if (fd == -1)
 +            if (fd == -1) {
 +                OPENSSL_showfatal("Random device %s cannot be opened.\n", random_device_paths[i]);
                 continue;
 +            }
             while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
                 buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
@@ -742,7 +750,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
             return entropy_available;
     }
 #   endif
 -
 +#   ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
 +    }
 +#   endif
     return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
 #  endif
 }
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h.fips-post-rand	2020-12-09 10:26:41.639106369 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips.h	2020-12-09 10:26:41.657106516 +0100
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int FIPS_selftest_hmac(void);
 int FIPS_selftest_drbg(void);
 int FIPS_selftest_cmac(void);
 +int fips_in_post(void);
 +
 int fips_pkey_signature_test(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
                                  const unsigned char *tbs, int tbslen,
                                  const unsigned char *kat,
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h
 --- openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h.fips-post-rand	2020-12-08 14:20:59.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-12-09 10:26:41.657106516 +0100
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 typedef struct rand_pool_st RAND_POOL;
 void rand_cleanup_int(void);
 +void rand_force_reseed(void);
 void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void);
 void drbg_delete_thread_state(void);
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
 From d1d4b56fe0c9a4200276d630f62108e1165e0990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 10:53:53 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Backport openssl: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread from 3.2
 Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
 entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
 have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
 called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
 will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
 should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
 We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
 same for the server list while we are about it.
 CVE-2024-5535
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
 Merged from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717.
 Backported-by: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> 
 we did't ported test changes because rely on internal testing framework.
 ---
 doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 28 +++++++----
 ssl/ssl_lib.c                           | 64 +++++++++++++++----------
 ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c            | 30 +++++++++++-
 ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c            |  3 +-
 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
 index e90caec..a3f8dfd 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
                            const unsigned char *server,
                            unsigned int server_len,
                            const unsigned char *client,
 -                           unsigned int client_len)
 +                           unsigned int client_len);
  void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
                              unsigned *len);
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
 SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
 set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
 protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
 -B<protos_len>.
 +B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
 +protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
 SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
 server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
 described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
 matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
 in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
 -B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
 -item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
 -function can also be used in the NPN callback.
 +B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
 +least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
 +
 +The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
 +callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
 +item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
 +B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
 +the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
 +must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
 +SSL_select_next_proto().
 SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
 client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
 The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
 server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
 callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
 -select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
 -a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
 -set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
 +select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
 +fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
 +B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
 +parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
 SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
 when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
 =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
 No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
 -B<out>, B<outlen>.
 +B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
 +B<client> is invalid).
 =back
 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 index c71c686..21e6c45 100644
 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2739,38 +2739,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
                           unsigned int server_len,
                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
 {
 -    unsigned int i, j;
 -    const unsigned char *result;
 -    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
 +    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
 +    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
 +            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
 +            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
 +        *out = NULL;
 +        *outlen = 0;
 +        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 +    }
 +
 +    /*
 +     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
 +     * a match.
 +     */
 +    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
 +    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
     /*
      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
      */
 -    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
 -        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
 -            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
 -                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
 -                /* We found a match */
 -                result = &server[i];
 -                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
 -                goto found;
 +    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
 +       while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
 +            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
 +                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
 +            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
 +                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
 +                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
 +                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
 +                        /* We found a match */
 +                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
 +                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
 +                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
 +                    }
 +                }
 +                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
 +            } else {
 +                /* This should never happen */
 +                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
             }
 -            j += client[j];
 -            j++;
         }
 -        i += server[i];
 -        i++;
 +        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
     }
 -    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
 -    result = client;
 -    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 -
 - found:
 -    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
 -    *outlen = result[0];
 -    return status;
 -}
 +    /*
 +     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
 +     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
 +     */
 +    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 + } 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /*
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 index ce8a757..cfde733 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1585,8 +1585,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
     if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
                                   PACKET_data(pkt),
                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt),
 -                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
 -             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
 +                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
 +           || selected_len == 0) {           
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
         return 0;
@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
                         size_t chainidx)
 {
     size_t len;
 +    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
 +    int valid = 0;
     /* We must have requested it. */
     if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
@@ -1637,6 +1639,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
         return 0;
     }
 +
 +    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
 +    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
 +        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, 
 +                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
 +        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
 +            continue;
 +        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
 +            /* Valid protocol found */
 +            valid = 1;
 +            break;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!valid) {
 +        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
 +        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
 +                 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
     s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
     if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 index 3c7395c..4e3cbf8 100644
 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1559,9 +1559,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
         }
         s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
 +        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
     }
 -    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
 +    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 }
 #endif
 -- 
 2.46.0
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`SOURCES/openssl-3.2.2.tar.gz`	`SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz`
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`b12311372a0277ca0eb218a68a7fd9f5ce66d162 SOURCES/openssl-3.2.2.tar.gz`	`6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz`