SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
  static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  #endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
++#endif
  static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
  static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
@@ -18,10 +20,11 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
          tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
          final_ec_pt_formats
      },
-@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
+@@ -1164,6 +1165,17 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
  }
  #endif
  
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 +{
 +	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
 +
 +	    return 1;
 +}
++#endif
 +
  static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
  {

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
-
-The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
-that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
-value even if it is excessively large.
-
-There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
-OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
-perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
-new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
-
-An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
-obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
-Service attack.
-
-The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
-functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
-similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
-DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
-
-CVE-2023-3446
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
- crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  | 3 ++-
- include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
- include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
-         return 0;
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
-      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
- DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
- DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
- DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
-+DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
-index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
- # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
- #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-+#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
-+# endif
- 
- # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
- # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
- 
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
- #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
- #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
- #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
-+#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
- obviously invalid
-
-If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
-is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
-
-We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
-q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
-q value.
-
-Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
-such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
-computations.
-
-Fixes CVE-2023-3817
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
- /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
- int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
- {
--    int ok = 0, r;
-+    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
-     if (t2 == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
--    if (dh->q) {
-+    if (dh->q != NULL) {
-+        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
-+            q_good = 1;
-+        else
-+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (q_good) {
-         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
-         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
-
-We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
-DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
-
-This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
-
-It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
-differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
-sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
-DH_check_pub_key().
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
-
-(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
-Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
- crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
- crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 10 ++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
- include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 ++++--
- include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 
-     *ret = 0;
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
-+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
-+        /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
-+         * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
-+         * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
-+        ok = 1;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
-         goto err;
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
-     "parameter encoding error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
-     "unable to check generator"},
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
-         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-         goto err;
-     }
-+
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
- #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-     if (FIPS_mode()
-         && (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
- DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
- DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
- DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
-+DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
- DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
- DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
- DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
-index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
-@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
- /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
- # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
- 
--/* DH_check error codes */
-+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
- # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
- # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
- # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
- # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
- # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
--# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
-+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
- # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
-+/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
-+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
- 
- /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
- # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
- #  define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD                             202
- #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
- #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
-+#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
- #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
- #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
- 
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From d1d4b56fe0c9a4200276d630f62108e1165e0990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 10:53:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Backport openssl: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread from 3.2
-
-Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
-entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
-have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
-called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
-will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
-should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
-
-We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
-same for the server list while we are about it.
-
-CVE-2024-5535
-
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
-Merged from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717.
-
-Backported-by: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> 
-we did't ported test changes because rely on internal testing framework.
-
----
- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 28 +++++++----
- ssl/ssl_lib.c                           | 64 +++++++++++++++----------
- ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c            | 30 +++++++++++-
- ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c            |  3 +-
- 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
-index e90caec..a3f8dfd 100644
---- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
-@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
-                            const unsigned char *server,
-                            unsigned int server_len,
-                            const unsigned char *client,
--                           unsigned int client_len)
-+                           unsigned int client_len);
-  void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-                              unsigned *len);
- 
-@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
- SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
- set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
- protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
--B<protos_len>.
-+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
-+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
- 
- SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
- server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
-@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
- described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
- matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
- in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
--B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
--item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
--function can also be used in the NPN callback.
-+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
-+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
-+
-+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
-+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
-+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
-+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
-+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
-+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
-+SSL_select_next_proto().
- 
- SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
- client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
-@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
- The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
- server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
- callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
--select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
--a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
--set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
-+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
-+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
-+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
-+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
- 
- SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
- when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
-@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
- =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
- 
- No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
--B<out>, B<outlen>.
-+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
-+B<client> is invalid).
- 
- =back
- 
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-index c71c686..21e6c45 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-@@ -2739,38 +2739,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-                           unsigned int server_len,
-                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
- {
--    unsigned int i, j;
--    const unsigned char *result;
--    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-+    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
-+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
-+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
-+            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
-+        *out = NULL;
-+        *outlen = 0;
-+        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
-+     * a match.
-+     */
-+    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
-+    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
- 
-     /*
-      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
-      */
--    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
--        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
--            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
--                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
--                /* We found a match */
--                result = &server[i];
--                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
--                goto found;
-+    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
-+       while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
-+            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
-+                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
-+            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
-+                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
-+                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
-+                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
-+                        /* We found a match */
-+                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
-+                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
-+                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-+                    }
-+                }
-+                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
-+            } else {
-+                /* This should never happen */
-+                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-             }
--            j += client[j];
--            j++;
-         }
--        i += server[i];
--        i++;
-+        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
-     }
- 
--    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
--    result = client;
--    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
--
-- found:
--    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
--    *outlen = result[0];
--    return status;
--}
-+    /*
-+     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
-+     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
-+     */
-+    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+ } 
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
-diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
-index ce8a757..cfde733 100644
---- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
-+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
-@@ -1585,8 +1585,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
-     if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
-                                   PACKET_data(pkt),
-                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt),
--                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
--             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-+                                  s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
-+           || selected_len == 0) {           
-         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
-                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
-         return 0;
-@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
-                         size_t chainidx)
- {
-     size_t len;
-+    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
-+    int valid = 0;
- 
-     /* We must have requested it. */
-     if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
-@@ -1637,6 +1639,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
-                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
-         return 0;
-     }
-+
-+    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
-+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
-+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, 
-+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
-+        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
-+            continue;
-+        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
-+            /* Valid protocol found */
-+            valid = 1;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    if (!valid) {
-+        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
-+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
-+                 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-     s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-     if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
-diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
-index 3c7395c..4e3cbf8 100644
---- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
-@@ -1559,9 +1559,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
-             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
-         }
-         s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
-+        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
-     }
- 
--    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
-+    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- }
- #endif
- 
--- 
-2.46.0
-

SPECS/openssl.spec

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.1.1k
-Release: 14%{?dist}
+Release: 9%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -92,16 +92,6 @@ Patch101: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
 Patch102: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
 Patch103: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
 Patch104: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
-# OpenSSL 1.1.1v CVEs
-Patch105: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
-Patch106: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
-Patch107: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
-# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2/RHEL 9
-# Proper fix for CVE-2020-25659
-Patch108: openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
-# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2
-# Fix for CVE-2024-5535
-Patch109: openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -231,11 +221,6 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4450
 %patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0215
 %patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0286
-%patch105 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3446
-%patch106 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3817
-%patch107 -p1 -b .cve-2023-5678
-%patch108 -p1 -b .pkcs15imprejection
-%patch109 -p1 -b .cve-2024-5535
 
 %build
 # Figure out which flags we want to use.
@@ -519,52 +504,33 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
-* Tue Sep 17 2024 Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-14
+* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
-- Backport fix SSL_select_next proto from OpenSSL 3.2
-  Fix CVE-2024-5535 
-  Resolves: RHEL-45654
-
-* Thu Nov 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-12
-- Backport implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 to RHEL-8 series
-  (a proper fix for CVE-2020-25659)
-  Resolves: RHEL-17694
-
-* Wed Nov 15 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-11
-- Fix CVE-2023-5678: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking
-  excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow
-  Resolves: RHEL-16536
-
-* Thu Oct 19 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-10
-- Fix CVE-2023-3446: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters
-  Resolves: RHEL-14243
-- Fix CVE-2023-3817: Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
-  Resolves: RHEL-14237
-
-* Thu May 04 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
 - Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
   Resolves: CVE-2022-4304
 - Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex
   Resolves: CVE-2022-4450
 - Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF
   Resolves: CVE-2023-0215
-
-* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
 - Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
   Resolves: CVE-2023-0286
 
+* Thu Jul 21 2022 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
+- Fix no-ec build
+  Resolves: rhbz#2071020
+
 * Tue Jul 05 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-7
 - Fix CVE-2022-2097: AES OCB fails to encrypt some bytes on 32-bit x86
   Resolves: CVE-2022-2097
 - Update expired certificates used in the testsuite
-  Resolves: rhbz#2100554
+  Resolves: rhbz#2092462
 - Fix CVE-2022-1292: openssl: c_rehash script allows command injection
-  Resolves: rhbz#2090371
+  Resolves: rhbz#2090372
 - Fix CVE-2022-2068: the c_rehash script allows command injection
-  Resolves: rhbz#2098278
+  Resolves: rhbz#2098279
 
 * Wed Mar 23 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-6
 - Fixes CVE-2022-0778 openssl: Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
-- Resolves: rhbz#2067145
+- Resolves: rhbz#2067146
 
 * Tue Nov 16 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-5
 - Fixes CVE-2021-3712 openssl: Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings