.fmf/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,64 @@
-SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
+.build*.log
+clog
+*.src.rpm
+openssl-1.0.0a-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0b-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0c-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0d-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0e-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0f-usa.tar.bz2
+/openssl-1.0.0g-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1-beta2-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1-beta3-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1a-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1b-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1c-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1e-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1g-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1h-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1i-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1j-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2a-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2c-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2d-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2e-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2f-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2g-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2h-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2i-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.0.2j-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0b-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0c-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0d-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0e-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0f-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0g-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.0h-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1-pre8-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1-pre9-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1a-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1b-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1c-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1d-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1e-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1f-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1g-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1h-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1i-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1j-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-3.0.0-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-3.0.2-hobbled.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.0.3-hobbled.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.0.5-hobbled.tar.xz
+/openssl-3.0.7-hobbled.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.0.8-hobbled.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.0.8.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.1.4.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.2.1.tar.gz
+/openssl-3.2.2.tar.gz

.openssl.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz

0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 603a35802319c0459737e3f067369ceb990fe2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:01:41 +0200
+Subject: Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64
+
+(Was openssl-1.1.1-build.patch)
+---
+ Configurations/10-main.conf | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/10-main.conf b/Configurations/10-main.conf
+index d7580bf3e1..a7dbfd7f40 100644
+--- a/Configurations/10-main.conf
++++ b/Configurations/10-main.conf
+@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ my %targets = (
+         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
+         asm_arch         => 'ppc64',
+         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
++        multilib         => "64",
+     },
+ 
+     "linux-armv4" => {
+@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ my %targets = (
+         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64" ],
+         asm_arch         => 'aarch64',
+         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
++        multilib         => "64",
+     },
+     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
+         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

0002-Use-more-general-default-values-in-openssl.cnf.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf
---- openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults	2018-11-20 14:35:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf	2019-01-15 13:56:50.841719776 +0100
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate fi
+From 41df9ae215cee9574e17e6f887c96a7c97d588f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:03:40 +0200
+Subject: Use more general default values in openssl.cnf
+
+Also set sha256 as default hash, although that should not be
+necessary anymore.
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-defaults.patch)
+---
+ apps/openssl.cnf | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/openssl.cnf b/apps/openssl.cnf
+index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
+--- a/apps/openssl.cnf
++++ b/apps/openssl.cnf
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
  
  default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
  default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
@@ -10,7 +24,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
  
  # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
  ####################################################################
  [ req ]
  default_bits		= 2048
@@ -18,7 +32,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
-@@ -128,17 +129,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
+@@ -158,17 +159,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
  
  [ req_distinguished_name ]
  countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
@@ -40,7 +54,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  
  # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-)
  #1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (eg, company)
-@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city
+@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
  organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
  #organizationalUnitName_default	=
  
@@ -49,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  commonName_max			= 64
  
  emailAddress			= Email Address
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From a3e7963320ba44e96a60b389fccb8e1cccc30674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 13:12:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/46] 0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
+Patch-id: 3
+Patch-status: |
+    # # Do not install html docs
+From-dist-git-commit: 5c67b5adc311af297f425c09e3e1ac7ca8483911
+---
+ Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+index a48fae5fb8..56b42926e7 100644
+--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
++++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
+ 
+ uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev ## Uninstall the software and libraries
+ 
+-install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs ## Install manpages and HTML documentation
++install_docs: install_man_docs ## Install manpages
+ 
+ uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs ## Uninstall manpages and HTML documentation
+ 	$(RM) -r "$(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)"
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 7a65ee33793fa8a28c0dfc94e6872ce92f408b15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/35] 
+ 0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
+Patch-id: 4
+Patch-status: |
+    # Override default paths for the CA directory tree
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ apps/CA.pl.in    |  2 +-
+ apps/openssl.cnf | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/CA.pl.in b/apps/CA.pl.in
+index c0afb96716..d6a5fabd16 100644
+--- a/apps/CA.pl.in
++++ b/apps/CA.pl.in
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
+ my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
+ 
+ # Default values for various configuration settings.
+-my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
++my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
+ my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
+ my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
+ my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls	2021-07-06 13:41:39.204978272 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-07-06 13:49:50.362857683 +0200
+@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+ 
+ [openssl_init]
+ providers = provider_sect
++# Load default TLS policy configuration
++ssl_conf = ssl_module
++alg_section = evp_properties
++
++[ evp_properties ]
++#This section is intentionally added empty here
++#to be tuned on particular systems
+ 
+ # List of providers to load
+ [provider_sect]
+@@ -64,6 +66,13 @@ default = default_sect
+ [default_sect]
+ # activate = 1
+ 
++[ ssl_module ]
++
++system_default = crypto_policy
++
++[ crypto_policy ]
++
++.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
+ 
+ ####################################################################
+ [ ca ]
+@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
+ ####################################################################
+ [ CA_default ]
+ 
+-dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
++dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
+ certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+ crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+ database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+@@ -304,7 +313,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
+ [ tsa_config1 ]
+ 
+ # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+-dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
++dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
+ serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+ crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
+ signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate

0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 3d8fa9859501b07e02b76b5577e2915d5851e927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:27:18 +0200
+Subject: apps/ca: fix md option help text
+
+upstreamable
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch)
+---
+ apps/ca.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
+index 0f21b4fa1c..3d4b2c1673 100755
+--- a/apps/ca.c
++++ b/apps/ca.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
+     {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"},
+ 
+     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
+-    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256"},
++    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256; see openssl help for list"},
+     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "The CA private key"},
+     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f',
+      "Private key file format (ENGINE, other values ignored)"},
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 3f9deff30ae6efbfe979043b00cdf649b39793c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:51:34 +0200
+Subject: Disable signature verification with totally unsafe hash algorithms
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-no-weak-verify.patch)
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+index b7eed914b0..af62f0ef08 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int ASN1_item_verify_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+         if (ret <= 1)
+             goto err;
++    } else if ((mdnid == NID_md5
++               && ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY") == NULL) ||
++               mdnid == NID_md4 || mdnid == NID_md2 || mdnid == NID_sha) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
++        goto err;
+     } else {
+         const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
+ 
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,29 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
---- openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist	2019-05-29 15:42:27.951329271 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2019-05-29 15:42:27.974328867 +0200
-@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
+From 8be4ef77c64fcada41041c00e02c34b07658ba66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/49] 
+ 0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
+Patch-id: 7
+Patch-status: |
+    # # Add support for PROFILE=SYSTEM system default cipherlist
+From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
+---
+ Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl |  5 ++
+ Configure                         | 11 +++-
+ doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in   |  9 ++++
+ include/openssl/ssl.h.in          |  5 ++
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c                    | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c                     |  4 +-
+ test/cipherlist_test.c            |  2 +
+ 7 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+index 5d61ce9550..e9fba957f1 100644
+--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
++++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+@@ -324,6 +324,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
  DOCDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/doc/$(BASENAME)
  HTMLDIR=$(DOCDIR)/html
  
@@ -12,7 +34,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist open
  # MANSUFFIX is for the benefit of anyone who may want to have a suffix
  # appended after the manpage file section number.  "ssl" is popular,
  # resulting in files such as config.5ssl rather than config.5.
-@@ -203,6 +207,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
+@@ -347,6 +351,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
  CXX={- $config{CXX} ? "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)$config{CXX}" : '' -}
  CPPFLAGS={- our $cppflags1 = join(" ",
                                    (map { "-D".$_} @{$config{CPPDEFINES}}),
@@ -20,29 +42,31 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist open
                                    (map { "-I".$_} @{$config{CPPINCLUDES}}),
                                    @{$config{CPPFLAGS}}) -}
  CFLAGS={- join(' ', @{$config{CFLAGS}}) -}
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configure.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/Configure
---- openssl-1.1.1c/Configure.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/Configure	2019-05-29 15:45:10.465469533 +0200
-@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use OpenSSL::Glob;
+diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
+index cca1ac8d16..2ae1cd0bc2 100755
+--- a/Configure
++++ b/Configure
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use OpenSSL::config;
  my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
  $SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
  
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<feature> ...] [enable-<feature> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]thread-pool] [[no-]default-thread-pool] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<feature> ...] [enable-<feature> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]thread-pool] [[no-]default-thread-pool] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
  
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher>
+ my $banner = <<"EOF";
+ 
+@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ EOF
+ #               given with --prefix.
  #               This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
  #               (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
- #
++#
 +# --system-ciphers-file  A file to read cipher string from when the PROFILE=SYSTEM
 +#		cipher is specified (default).
 +#
- # --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components.
+ # --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner
  #
- # --api         One of 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or 1.1.0.  Do not compile support for
-@@ -295,6 +298,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
+ # -w            Don't wait after showing a Configure warning
+@@ -394,6 +398,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
  $config{openssldir}="";
  $config{processor}="";
  $config{libdir}="";
@@ -50,30 +74,22 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configure.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/Configure
  my $auto_threads=1;    # enable threads automatically? true by default
  my $default_ranlib;
  
-@@ -824,6 +828,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
-                             push @seed_sources, $x;
-                             }
+@@ -1047,6 +1052,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
+                         die "FIPS key too long (64 bytes max)\n"
+                            if length $1 > 64;
                          }
 +		elsif (/^--system-ciphers-file=(.*)$/)
 +			{
 +			$config{system_ciphers_file}=$1;
 +			}
-                 elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/)
+                 elsif (/^--banner=(.*)$/)
                          {
-                         $user{CROSS_COMPILE}=$1;
-@@ -1016,6 +1024,8 @@ if ($target eq "HASH") {
-     exit 0;
- }
- 
-+chop $config{system_ciphers_file} if $config{system_ciphers_file} =~ /\/$/;
-+
- print "Configuring OpenSSL version $config{version} ($config{version_num}) ";
- print "for $target\n";
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod	2019-05-29 15:42:27.975328849 +0200
-@@ -182,6 +182,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher s
+                         $banner = $1 . "\n";
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
+index d4df30686f..cec4835268 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
+@@ -190,6 +190,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher suites are sensibly ordered by default.
  
  The cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently B<eNULL>.
  
@@ -89,34 +105,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/do
  =item B<HIGH>
  
  "High" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h
---- openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h	2019-05-29 15:42:27.975328849 +0200
-@@ -186,6 +186,11 @@ extern "C" {
+diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+index 9f91039f8a..fc34d4ca61 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
++++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ extern "C" {
   * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not
   * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.)
   */
 +# ifdef SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE
 +#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "PROFILE=SYSTEM"
 +# else
-+#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST
++#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST OSSL_default_cipher_list()
 +# endif
  
  /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
  # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN       1
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.976328831 +0200
-@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
-  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
-  */
- 
-+/* for secure_getenv */
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <openssl/objects.h>
-@@ -1399,6 +1401,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const c
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+index 8360991ce4..33c23efb0d 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+@@ -1455,6 +1455,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
      return ret;
  }
  
@@ -167,13 +176,13 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
 +}
 +#endif
 +
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites,
                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
-@@ -1412,15 +1461,25 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
-     const char *rule_p;
+@@ -1469,15 +1516,25 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
      const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+     const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = ctx->method;
 +#ifdef SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE
 +    char *new_rules = NULL;
 +
@@ -191,23 +200,23 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
 -        return NULL;
 +        goto err;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ 
      if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
 -        return NULL;
 +        goto err;
- #endif
  
      /*
-@@ -1443,7 +1502,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+      * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+@@ -1499,7 +1556,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+     if (num_of_ciphers > 0) {
          co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers);
-     if (co_list == NULL) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+         if (co_list == NULL)
 -            return NULL;          /* Failure */
 +            goto err;
      }
  
      ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
-@@ -1509,8 +1568,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1565,8 +1622,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
       * in force within each class
       */
      if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
@@ -217,18 +226,17 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      }
  
      /*
-@@ -1555,9 +1613,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1611,8 +1667,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
      ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max);
      if (ca_list == NULL) {
 -        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 -        return NULL;          /* Failure */
 +        goto err;
      }
      ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
                                 disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
-@@ -1583,8 +1640,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1637,8 +1693,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      OPENSSL_free(ca_list);      /* Not needed anymore */
  
      if (!ok) {                  /* Rule processing failure */
@@ -238,7 +246,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      }
  
      /*
-@@ -1592,14 +1648,18 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1646,10 +1701,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
       * if we cannot get one.
       */
      if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
@@ -253,13 +261,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
 +
      /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */
      for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) {
-         if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack,
-                                 sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i))) {
-+            OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
-             return NULL;
-         }
-@@ -1631,6 +1691,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+         const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i);
+@@ -1701,6 +1759,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      *cipher_list = cipherstack;
  
      return cipherstack;
@@ -274,31 +277,33 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
  }
  
  char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-29 15:42:27.970328937 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.977328814 +0200
-@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index cf59d2dfa5..1329841aaf 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
                                  ctx->tls13_ciphersuites,
                                  &(ctx->cipher_list),
                                  &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
--                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+-                                OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ctx->cert);
 +                                SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
      if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
          return 0;
-@@ -2954,7 +2954,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
-     if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+@@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
+     if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret,
                                  ret->tls13_ciphersuites,
                                  &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
--                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
+-                                OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ret->cert)
 +                                SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
          || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
-         goto err2;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.977328814 +0200
-@@ -251,7 +251,9 @@ end:
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/test/cipherlist_test.c b/test/cipherlist_test.c
+index c46e431b00..19d05e860b 100644
+--- a/test/cipherlist_test.c
++++ b/test/cipherlist_test.c
+@@ -261,7 +261,9 @@ end:
  
  int setup_tests(void)
  {
@@ -307,4 +312,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/
 +#endif
      ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_explicit);
      ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_clear);
-     return 1;
+     ADD_TEST(test_stdname_cipherlist);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 8e29a10b39a649d751870eb1fd1b8c388e66acc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/35] 0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
+Patch-id: 8
+Patch-status: |
+    # Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ include/openssl/fips.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/property_test.c   | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 include/openssl/fips.h
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/fips.h b/include/openssl/fips.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..4162cbf88e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/openssl/fips.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_H
++# define OPENSSL_FIPS_H
++# pragma once
++
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/macros.h>
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++# endif
++
++# define FIPS_mode() EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++# endif
++#endif
+diff --git a/test/property_test.c b/test/property_test.c
+index 45b1db3e85..8894c1c1cb 100644
+--- a/test/property_test.c
++++ b/test/property_test.c
+@@ -677,6 +677,19 @@ static int test_property_list_to_string(int i)
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++static int test_downstream_FIPS_mode(void)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    ret = TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes"))
++          && TEST_true(FIPS_mode())
++          && TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=no"))
++          && TEST_false(FIPS_mode());
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     ADD_TEST(test_property_string);
+@@ -690,6 +703,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(test_property);
+     ADD_TEST(test_query_cache_stochastic);
+     ADD_TEST(test_fips_mode);
++    ADD_TEST(test_downstream_FIPS_mode);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_property_list_to_string, OSSL_NELEM(to_string_tests));
+     return 1;
+ }
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From aa3aebf132959e7e44876042efaf9ff24ffe0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/35] 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
+Patch-id: 9
+Patch-status: |
+    # Add check to see if fips flag is enabled in kernel
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ crypto/context.c            | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/internal/provider.h |  3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
+index e294ea1512..51002ba79a 100644
+--- a/crypto/context.c
++++ b/crypto/context.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,41 @@
+ #include "crypto/decoder.h"
+ #include "crypto/context.h"
+ 
++# include <sys/types.h>
++# include <sys/stat.h>
++# include <fcntl.h>
++# include <unistd.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++
++# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
++
++static int kernel_fips_flag;
++
++static void read_kernel_fips_flag(void)
++{
++	char buf[2] = "0";
++	int fd;
++
++	if (secure_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
++		buf[0] = '1';
++	} else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
++		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
++		close(fd);
++	}
++
++	if (buf[0] == '1') {
++		kernel_fips_flag = 1;
++	}
++
++		return;
++}
++
++int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()
++{
++	return kernel_fips_flag;
++}
++
++
+ struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
+     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock, *rand_crngt_lock;
+     OSSL_EX_DATA_GLOBAL global;
+@@ -336,6 +371,7 @@ static int default_context_inited = 0;
+ 
+ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
+ {
++	 read_kernel_fips_flag();
+     if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL))
+         goto err;
+ 
+diff --git a/include/internal/provider.h b/include/internal/provider.h
+index 18937f84c7..1446bf7afb 100644
+--- a/include/internal/provider.h
++++ b/include/internal/provider.h
+@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
+                                 const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
+ void ossl_provider_deinit_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
+ 
++/* FIPS flag access */
++int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag(void);
++
+ # ifdef __cplusplus
+ }
+ # endif
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+From 4a275f852b61238161c053774736dc07b3ade200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:46:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/48] 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
+Patch-id: 11
+Patch-status: |
+    # remove unsupported EC curves
+---
+ apps/speed.c                 |  8 +---
+ crypto/evp/ec_support.c      | 87 ------------------------------------
+ test/acvp_test.inc           |  9 ----
+ test/ecdsatest.h             | 17 -------
+ test/recipes/15-test_genec.t | 27 -----------
+ 5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
+index cace25eda1..d527f12f18 100644
+--- a/apps/speed.c
++++ b/apps/speed.c
+@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];  /* 1 op: derivation */
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ 
+ enum ec_curves_t {
+-    R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
++    R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
+     R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
+@@ -395,8 +395,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
+ };
+ /* list of ecdsa curves */
+ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
+-    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
+-    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
+     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
+     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
+     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
+@@ -423,8 +421,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
+ };
+ /* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
+ static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
+-    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
+-    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
+     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
+     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
+     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
+@@ -1442,8 +1438,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+      */
+     static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
+         /* Prime Curves */
+-        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
+-        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
+         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
+         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
+         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+index 1ec10143d2..82b95294b4 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
+ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
+     /* prime field curves */
+     /* secg curves */
+-    {"secp112r1", NID_secp112r1 },
+-    {"secp112r2", NID_secp112r2 },
+-    {"secp128r1", NID_secp128r1 },
+-    {"secp128r2", NID_secp128r2 },
+-    {"secp160k1", NID_secp160k1 },
+-    {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1 },
+-    {"secp160r2", NID_secp160r2 },
+-    {"secp192k1", NID_secp192k1 },
+-    {"secp224k1", NID_secp224k1 },
+     {"secp224r1", NID_secp224r1 },
+     {"secp256k1", NID_secp256k1 },
+     {"secp384r1", NID_secp384r1 },
+     {"secp521r1", NID_secp521r1 },
+     /* X9.62 curves */
+-    {"prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1 },
+-    {"prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2 },
+-    {"prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3 },
+-    {"prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1 },
+-    {"prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2 },
+-    {"prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3 },
+     {"prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1 },
+     /* characteristic two field curves */
+     /* NIST/SECG curves */
+-    {"sect113r1", NID_sect113r1 },
+-    {"sect113r2", NID_sect113r2 },
+-    {"sect131r1", NID_sect131r1 },
+-    {"sect131r2", NID_sect131r2 },
+-    {"sect163k1", NID_sect163k1 },
+-    {"sect163r1", NID_sect163r1 },
+-    {"sect163r2", NID_sect163r2 },
+-    {"sect193r1", NID_sect193r1 },
+-    {"sect193r2", NID_sect193r2 },
+-    {"sect233k1", NID_sect233k1 },
+-    {"sect233r1", NID_sect233r1 },
+-    {"sect239k1", NID_sect239k1 },
+-    {"sect283k1", NID_sect283k1 },
+-    {"sect283r1", NID_sect283r1 },
+-    {"sect409k1", NID_sect409k1 },
+-    {"sect409r1", NID_sect409r1 },
+-    {"sect571k1", NID_sect571k1 },
+-    {"sect571r1", NID_sect571r1 },
+-    /* X9.62 curves */
+-    {"c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 },
+-    {"c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 },
+-    {"c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 },
+-    {"c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 },
+-    {"c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 },
+-    /*
+-     * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
+-     * from X9.62]
+-     */
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 },
+-    /* IPSec curves */
+-    {"Oakley-EC2N-3", NID_ipsec3 },
+-    {"Oakley-EC2N-4", NID_ipsec4 },
+     /* brainpool curves */
+-    {"brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
+     {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
+@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
+     {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1 },
+     {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1 },
+-    /* SM2 curve */
+-    {"SM2", NID_sm2 },
+ };
+ 
+ const char *OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(int nid)
+@@ -150,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *name)
+ /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
+ 
+ static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
+-    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
+-    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
+-    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
+-    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
+-    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
+-    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
+-    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
+-    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
+-    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
+-    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
+-    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
+     {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
+     {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+     {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
+index ad11d3ae1e..894a0bff9d 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
++++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
+@@ -211,15 +211,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_s1[] = {
+     0xB1, 0xAC,
+ };
+ static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
+-    {
+-        "SHA-1",
+-        "P-192",
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_pub0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_r0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
+-        PASS,
+-    },
+     {
+         "SHA2-512",
+         "P-521",
+diff --git a/test/ecdsatest.h b/test/ecdsatest.h
+index 63fe319025..06b5c0aac5 100644
+--- a/test/ecdsatest.h
++++ b/test/ecdsatest.h
+@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
+ } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
+ 
+ static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
+-    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
+-    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
+-     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
+-     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
+-     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
+-     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
+-     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
+-     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
+-     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
+-    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
+-     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
+-     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
+-     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
+-     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
+-     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
+-     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
+-     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
+     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
+     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
+      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
+index 2dfed387ca..c733b68f83 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
++++ b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
+@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-ec build"
+     if disabled("ec");
+ 
+ my @prime_curves = qw(
+-    secp112r1
+-    secp112r2
+-    secp128r1
+-    secp128r2
+-    secp160k1
+-    secp160r1
+-    secp160r2
+-    secp192k1
+-    secp224k1
+     secp224r1
+     secp256k1
+     secp384r1
+     secp521r1
+-    prime192v1
+-    prime192v2
+-    prime192v3
+-    prime239v1
+-    prime239v2
+-    prime239v3
+     prime256v1
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+-    brainpoolP160r1
+-    brainpoolP160t1
+-    brainpoolP192r1
+-    brainpoolP192t1
+-    brainpoolP224r1
+-    brainpoolP224t1
+     brainpoolP256r1
+     brainpoolP256t1
+     brainpoolP320r1
+@@ -136,7 +110,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
+     if !disabled("sm2");
+ 
+ my @curve_aliases = qw(
+-    P-192
+     P-224
+     P-256
+     P-384
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+From 91bdd9b816b22bc1464ec323f3272b866b24114d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/35] 0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
+Patch-id: 12
+Patch-status: |
+    # Disable explicit EC curves
+    # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2066412
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c                           | 11 ++++++++++
+ crypto/ec/ec_lib.c                            |  6 +++++
+ test/ectest.c                                 | 22 ++++++++++---------
+ test/endecode_test.c                          | 20 ++++++++---------
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt        | 12 ----------
+ 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+index 7a0b35a594..d19d57344e 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+@@ -905,6 +905,12 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+     if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
+         group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
+ 
++    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++        EC_GROUP_free(group);
++        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     if (a) {
+         EC_GROUP_free(*a);
+         *a = group;
+@@ -964,6 +970,11 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(ret->group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     ret->version = priv_key->version;
+ 
+     if (priv_key->privateKey) {
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+index a84e088c19..6c37bf78ae 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+@@ -1724,6 +1724,11 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+         goto err;
+     }
+     if (named_group == group) {
++        if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
++            goto err;
++        }
++#if 0
+         /*
+          * If we did not find a named group then the encoding should be explicit
+          * if it was specified
+@@ -1739,6 +1744,7 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+             goto err;
+         }
+         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
++#endif
+     } else {
+         EC_GROUP_free(group);
+         group = named_group;
+diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
+index 4890b0555e..e11aec5b3b 100644
+--- a/test/ectest.c
++++ b/test/ectest.c
+@@ -2301,10 +2301,11 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+     if (!TEST_ptr(params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld))
+         || !TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL))
+         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx), 0)
+-        || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
++        || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params), 0))
+         goto err;
+-
++/* As creating the key should fail, the rest of the test is pointless */
++# if 0
+     /*- Check that all the set values are retrievable -*/
+ 
+     /* There should be no match to a group name since the generator changed */
+@@ -2433,6 +2434,7 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ #endif
+         )
+         goto err;
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     BN_free(order_out);
+@@ -2714,21 +2716,21 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+ 
+     /* Compute keyexchange in both directions */
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx1 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey1, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 0)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, NULL, &sslen), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, sslen)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1)*/)
+         goto err;
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx2 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey2, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, NULL, &t), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, t)
+             || !TEST_int_le(sslen, t)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1) */)
+         goto err;
+-
++#if 0
+     /* Both sides should expect the same shared secret */
+     if (!TEST_mem_eq(buf1, sslen, buf2, t))
+         goto err;
+@@ -2780,7 +2782,7 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+             /* compare with previous result */
+             || !TEST_mem_eq(buf1, t, buf2, sslen))
+         goto err;
+-
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ 
+  err:
+diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
+index 14648287eb..9a437d8c64 100644
+--- a/test/endecode_test.c
++++ b/test/endecode_test.c
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime_nc = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = NULL;
+-static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;
++/*static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;*/
+ 
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_tri_nc = NULL;
+@@ -1009,9 +1009,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC, "EC")
+ DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC")
+-DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
+-IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)
+-IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")
++/*DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
++/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)*/
++/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
+@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params_namedcurve(bld_prime_nc)
+         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params(bld_prime)
+         || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime_nc))
+-        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))
++/*        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     TEST_info("Generating EC keys...");
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC, "EC", EC_params);
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
+-    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
++/*    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_nc);
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_explicit);
+@@ -1423,8 +1423,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+-        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);
+-        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);
++/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
++/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
+ {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
+-    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
++/*    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime_nc);
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime);
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC);
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+-    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
++/*    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+index ec3c032aba..584ecee0eb 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+@@ -133,18 +133,6 @@ AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgiUTxtr5vLVjj
+ 3ev1gTwRBduzqqlwd54AUSgI+pjttW8zrWNitO8H1sf59MPWOESKxNtZ1+Nl
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
+-PrivateKey = EC_EXPLICIT
+------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+-MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
+-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
+-///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
+-AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEE5JcIvn36opqjEm/k59Al40rBAxWM2TPG
+-l0L13Je51zHpfXQ9Z2o7IQicMXP4wSfJ0qCgg2bgydqoxlYrlLGuVQIhAP////8A
+-AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgec92jwduadCk
+-OjoNRI+YT5Be5TkzZXzYCyTLkMOikDmhRANCAATtECEhQbLEaiUj/Wu0qjcr81lL
+-46dx5zYgArz/iaSNJ3W80oO+F7v04jlQ7wxQzg96R0bwKiMeq5CcW9ZFt6xg
+------END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-
+ PrivateKey = B-163
+ -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUDnQW0mLiHVha/jqFznX/K
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 9ede2b1e13f72db37718853faff74b4429084d59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/35] 0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
+Patch-id: 13
+Patch-status: |
+    # Skipped tests from former 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ test/recipes/15-test_ec.t          | 2 +-
+ test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t | 2 +-
+ test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t     | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t b/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
+index 0638d626e7..c0efd77649 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
++++ b/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- public key' => sub {
+ 
+ subtest 'Check loading of fips and non-fips keys' => sub {
+     plan skip_all => "FIPS is disabled"
+-        if $no_fips;
++        if 1; #Red Hat specific, original value is $no_fips;
+ 
+     plan tests => 2;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
+index 631603df7c..4cb2ffebbc 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
++++ b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-cmp build"
+ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a shared library build on Windows"
+     if $^O eq 'MSWin32' && !disabled("shared");
+ 
+-plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
++plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
+ 
+ my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_protect_test",
+                  data_file("prot_RSA.pem"),
+diff --git a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
+index f722800e27..26a01786bb 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
++++ b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-cmp build"
+ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-ec build"
+     if disabled("ec");
+ 
+-plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
++plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
+ 
+ my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_vfy_test",
+                  data_file("server.crt"),     data_file("client.crt"),
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0024-load-legacy-prov.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 69636828729ecc287863366dcdd6548dee78c7a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/35] 0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
+Patch-id: 24
+Patch-status: |
+    # Instructions to load legacy provider in openssl.cnf
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ apps/openssl.cnf    | 37 +++++++++++++++----------------------
+ doc/man5/config.pod |  8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
+@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+ tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+ 
+-# For FIPS
+-# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
+-# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
+-# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g. [fips_sect] which is
+-# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
+-# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
+-# .include fipsmodule.cnf
+-
+ [openssl_init]
+ providers = provider_sect
+ # Load default TLS policy configuration
+@@ -42,23 +42,27 @@ [ evp_properties ]
+ #This section is intentionally added empty here
+ #to be tuned on particular systems
+ 
+-# List of providers to load
+-[provider_sect]
+-default = default_sect
+-# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
+-# included fipsmodule.cnf.
+-# fips = fips_sect
++# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
++# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
++# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160
++# Symmetric Ciphers: Blowfish, CAST, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4,RC5, SEED
++# Key Derivation Function (KDF): PBKDF1
++# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
++# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
++# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+ 
+-# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
+-# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
+-#
+-# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
+-# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
+-# becomes unavailable in openssl.  As a consequence applications depending on
+-# OpenSSL may not work correctly which could lead to significant system
+-# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
+-[default_sect]
+-# activate = 1
++[provider_sect]
++default = default_sect
++##legacy = legacy_sect
++##
++[default_sect]
++activate = 1
++
++##[legacy_sect]
++##activate = 1
++
++#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
++.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
+ 
+ [ ssl_module ]
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:09:38.079040853 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-09-09 12:11:56.646224876 +0200
+@@ -273,6 +273,14 @@ significant.
+ All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made
+ available to the provider.
+ 
++=head3 Loading the legacy provider
++
++Uncomment the sections that start with ## in openssl.cnf
++to enable the legacy provider.
++Note: In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
++security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
++to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
++
+ =head3 Default provider and its activation
+ 
+ If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.

0025-for-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx	2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
+@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
+ # to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+ 
+ [provider_sect]
+-default = default_sect
++##default = default_sect
+ ##legacy = legacy_sect
+ ##
+-[default_sect]
+-activate = 1
++##[default_sect]
++##activate = 1
+ 
+ ##[legacy_sect]
+ ##activate = 1

0032-Force-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 2c110cf5551a3869514e697d8dc06682b62ca57d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:59:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/48] 0032-Force-fips.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0032-Force-fips.patch
+Patch-id: 32
+Patch-status: |
+    # We load FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly
+---
+ crypto/provider_conf.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/provider_conf.c b/crypto/provider_conf.c
+index 058fb58837..5274265a70 100644
+--- a/crypto/provider_conf.c
++++ b/crypto/provider_conf.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/trace.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+ #include <openssl/safestack.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
+         if (path != NULL)
+             ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
+ 
+-        ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
++        ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
+ 
+         if (ok == 1) {
+             if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
+@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_L
+ 
+         if (ok <= 0)
+             ossl_provider_free(prov);
++    } else {
++        ok = 1;
+     }
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ 
+@@ -309,6 +311,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+             return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag() != 0) { /* XXX from provider_conf_load */
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf);
++#  define FIPS_LOCAL_CONF           OPENSSLDIR "/fips_local.cnf"
++
++        if (access(FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, R_OK) == 0) {
++            CONF *fips_conf = NCONF_new_ex(libctx, NCONF_default());
++            if (NCONF_load(fips_conf, FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, NULL) <= 0)
++                return 0;
++
++            if (provider_conf_load(libctx, "fips", "fips_sect", fips_conf) != 1) {
++                NCONF_free(fips_conf);
++                return 0;
++            }
++            NCONF_free(fips_conf);
++        } else {
++            if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
++                return 0;
++        }
++        /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even when the test is failed so check explicitly */
++        if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
++            return 0;
++        if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
++            return 0;
++        if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)
++            return 0;
++    }
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+From 831d0025257fd3746ab3fe30c05dbbfc0043f78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 16/49] 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
+Patch-id: 33
+Patch-status: |
+    # # Embed HMAC into the fips.so
+    # Modify fips self test as per
+    # https://github.com/simo5/openssl/commit/9b95ef8bd2f5ac862e5eee74c724b535f1a8578a
+From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test.c            | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ test/fipsmodule.cnf                   |   2 +
+ test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t |   2 +-
+ test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t |   2 +-
+ test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t    |   2 +-
+ test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t      |   2 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t        |   2 +-
+ test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t         |   2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/fipsmodule.cnf
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+index b8dc9817b2..28f536d13c 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+@@ -230,11 +230,133 @@ err:
+     return ok;
+ }
+ 
++#define HMAC_LEN 32
++/*
++ * The __attribute__ ensures we've created the .rodata1 section
++ * static ensures it's zero filled
++*/
++static const unsigned char __attribute__ ((section (".rodata1"))) fips_hmac_container[HMAC_LEN] = {0};
++
+ /*
+  * Calculate the HMAC SHA256 of data read using a BIO and read_cb, and verify
+  * the result matches the expected value.
+  * Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
+  */
++
++#ifndef __USE_GNU
++#define __USE_GNU
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#undef __USE_GNU
++#else
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#endif
++#include <link.h>
++
++static int verify_integrity_rodata(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio,
++                                   OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
++                                   unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
++                                   OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
++                                   const char *event_type)
++{
++    int ret = 0, status;
++    unsigned char out[MAX_MD_SIZE];
++    unsigned char buf[INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE];
++    size_t bytes_read = 0, out_len = 0;
++    EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
++    EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
++    Dl_info info;
++    void *extra_info = NULL;
++    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
++    unsigned long paddr;
++    unsigned long off = 0;
++
++    if (expected_len != HMAC_LEN)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
++        goto err;
++
++    OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
++
++    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
++                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
++        goto err;
++    lm = extra_info;
++    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
++
++    mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
++    if (mac == NULL)
++        goto err;
++    ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
++    if (ctx == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", DIGEST_NAME, 0);
++    *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++    if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
++        goto err;
++
++    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            break;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
++    if (off < paddr) {
++        int delta = paddr - off;
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            goto err;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
++    /* read away the buffer */
++    status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
++    if (status != 1)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* check that it is the expect bytes, no point in continuing otherwise */
++   if (memcmp(expected, buf, HMAC_LEN) != 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* replace in-file HMAC buffer with the original zeros */
++    memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
++    if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, HMAC_LEN))
++        goto err;
++    off += HMAC_LEN;
++
++    while (bytes_read > 0) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            break;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
++    if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
++        goto err;
++
++    OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(ev, out);
++    if (expected_len != out_len
++            || memcmp(expected, out, out_len) != 0)
++        goto err;
++    ret = 1;
++err:
++    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, MAX_MD_SIZE);
++    OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
++    EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
++    EVP_MAC_free(mac);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
+                             unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
+                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
+@@ -247,12 +369,23 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
+     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
++    Dl_info info;
++    void *extra_info = NULL;
++    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
++    unsigned long paddr;
++    unsigned long off = 0;
+ 
+     if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+ 
++    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
++                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
++        goto err;
++    lm = extra_info;
++    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
++
+     mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
+     if (mac == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -266,13 +399,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
+     if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (1) {
+-        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read);
++    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
+         if (status != 1)
+             break;
+         if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+             goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
+     }
++
++    if (off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE > paddr) {
++        int delta = paddr - off;
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            goto err;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
++        memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
++        if (status != 1)
++            goto err;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
++    while (bytes_read > 0) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            break;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
+     if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -282,6 +444,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
+         goto err;
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
++    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+     EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+@@ -335,8 +498,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (st == NULL
+-            || st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
++    if (st == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
+         goto end;
+     }
+@@ -345,8 +507,14 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+     if (ev == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
+-    module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
+-                                         &checksum_len);
++   if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
++        module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
++        checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
++    } else {
++        module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
++                                             &checksum_len);
++    }
++
+     if (module_checksum == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
+         goto end;
+@@ -354,14 +522,27 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+     bio_module = (*st->bio_new_file_cb)(st->module_filename, "rb");
+ 
+     /* Always check the integrity of the fips module */
+-    if (bio_module == NULL
+-            || !verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
+-                                 module_checksum, checksum_len, st->libctx,
+-                                 ev, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
++    if (bio_module == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
+         goto end;
+     }
+-
++    if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
++        if (!verify_integrity_rodata(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
++                                     module_checksum, checksum_len,
++                                     st->libctx, ev,
++                                     OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (!verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
++                              module_checksum, checksum_len,
++                              st->libctx, ev,
++                              OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
+     /* This will be NULL during installation - so the self test KATS will run */
+     if (st->indicator_data != NULL) {
+         /*
+@@ -420,7 +601,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+ end:
+     EVP_RAND_free(testrand);
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
+-    OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
+     OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
+ 
+     if (st != NULL) {
+diff --git a/test/fipsmodule.cnf b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f05d0dedbe
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++[fips_sect]
++activate = 1
+diff --git a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+index 4e3a6d85e8..e8255ba974 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
++++ b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
++my $no_check = 1;
+ plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
+     if $no_check;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+index ce594817d5..00cebacff8 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
++++ b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
++my $no_check = 1;
+ plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
+     if $no_check;
+ plan tests => 1;
+diff --git a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
+index b8b136d110..8242f4ebc3 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
++++ b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
++plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
+ 
+ # Compatible options for pedantic FIPS compliance
+ my @pedantic_okay =
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
+index c8f145405b..56a2ec5dc4 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ plan skip_all => "Configuration loading is turned off"
+     if disabled("autoload-config");
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ 
+ plan tests =>
+     ($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
+index 195b85ea8c..92d48dbf7d 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ setup("test_ssl_new");
+ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ 
+ $ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
+index 18d9f3d204..71780d8caa 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
++++ b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
+@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ setup("test_sslapi");
+ setup("test_sslapi");
+ }
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ my $fipsmodcfg_filename = "fipsmodule.cnf";
+ my $fipsmodcfg = bldtop_file("test", $fipsmodcfg_filename);
+ 
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+From a9825123e7ab3474d2794a5706d9bed047959c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/35] 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
+Patch-id: 34
+Patch-status: |
+    # Comment out fipsinstall command-line utility
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ apps/fipsinstall.c                  |   3 +
+ doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in | 272 +---------------------------
+ doc/man1/openssl.pod                |   4 -
+ doc/man5/config.pod                 |   1 -
+ doc/man5/fips_config.pod            | 104 +----------
+ doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod     |   1 -
+ 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/fipsinstall.c b/apps/fipsinstall.c
+index e1ef645b60..db92cb5fb2 100644
+--- a/apps/fipsinstall.c
++++ b/apps/fipsinstall.c
+@@ -375,6 +375,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+     CONF *conf = NULL;
+ 
++    BIO_printf(bio_err, "This command is not enabled in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL build, please consult Red Hat documentation to learn how to enable FIPS mode\n");
++    return 1;
++
+     if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
+index b1768b7f91..b6b00e27d8 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
+@@ -8,275 +8,9 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS configuration installation
+ =head1 SYNOPSIS
+ 
+ B<openssl fipsinstall>
+-[B<-help>]
+-[B<-in> I<configfilename>]
+-[B<-out> I<configfilename>]
+-[B<-module> I<modulefilename>]
+-[B<-provider_name> I<providername>]
+-[B<-section_name> I<sectionname>]
+-[B<-verify>]
+-[B<-mac_name> I<macname>]
+-[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
+-[B<-noout>]
+-[B<-quiet>]
+-[B<-pedantic>]
+-[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
+-[B<-no_security_checks>]
+-[B<-ems_check>]
+-[B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>]
+-[B<-self_test_onload>]
+-[B<-self_test_oninstall>]
+-[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
+-[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
+-[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
+-
+-=head1 DESCRIPTION
+-
+-This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
+-This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
+-in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always
+-verifies its MAC, but optionally only needs to run the KAT's once,
+-at installation.
+-
+-The generated configuration file consists of:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item - A MAC of the FIPS module file.
+-
+-=item - A test status indicator.
+-
+-This indicates if the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run.
+-
+-=item - A MAC of the status indicator.
+-
+-=item - A control for conditional self tests errors.
+-
+-By default if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails then the FIPS module
+-will enter an error state, and no services or cryptographic algorithms will be
+-able to be accessed after this point.
+-The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered.
+-If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered.
+-Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation
+-(e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying
+-the operation if the module error state is not entered.
+-
+-=item - A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done.
+-
+-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
+-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
+-The default value of '1' will perform the checks.
+-If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must
+-be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-This file is described in L<fips_config(5)>.
+-
+-=head1 OPTIONS
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<-help>
+-
+-Print a usage message.
+-
+-=item B<-module> I<filename>
+-
+-Filename of the FIPS module to perform an integrity check on.
+-The path provided in the filename is used to load the module when it is
+-activated, and this overrides the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MODULES>.
+-
+-=item B<-out> I<configfilename>
+-
+-Filename to output the configuration data to; the default is standard output.
+-
+-=item B<-in> I<configfilename>
+-
+-Input filename to load configuration data from.
+-Must be used if the B<-verify> option is specified.
+-
+-=item B<-verify>
+-
+-Verify that the input configuration file contains the correct information.
+-
+-=item B<-provider_name> I<providername>
+-
+-Name of the provider inside the configuration file.
+-The default value is C<fips>.
+-
+-=item B<-section_name> I<sectionname>
+-
+-Name of the section inside the configuration file.
+-The default value is C<fips_sect>.
+-
+-=item B<-mac_name> I<name>
+-
+-Specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm which will be used.
+-The MAC mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
+-used when building OpenSSL.
+-To see the list of supported MAC's use the command
+-C<openssl list -mac-algorithms>.  The default is B<HMAC>.
+-
+-=item B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>
+-
+-Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
+-A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
+-documentation.
+-Common control strings used for this command are:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<key>:I<string>
+-
+-Specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains
+-printable characters only).
+-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
+-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
+-configured is used.
+-
+-=item B<hexkey>:I<string>
+-
+-Specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
+-The key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
+-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
+-configured is used.
+-
+-=item B<digest>:I<string>
+-
+-Used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains printable
+-characters only).
+-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-To see the list of supported digests, use the command
+-C<openssl list -digest-commands>.
+-The default digest is SHA-256.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-=item B<-noout>
+-
+-Disable logging of the self tests.
+-
+-=item B<-pedantic>
+-
+-Configure the module so that it is strictly FIPS compliant rather
+-than being backwards compatible.  This enables conditional errors,
+-security checks etc.  Note that any previous configuration options will
+-be overwritten and any subsequent configuration options that violate
+-FIPS compliance will result in an error.
+-
+-=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
+-
+-Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
+-fails as described above.
+-
+-=item B<-no_security_checks>
+-
+-Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
+-
+-Enabling the configuration option "no-fips-securitychecks" provides another way to
+-turn off the check at compile time.
+-
+-=item B<-ems_check>
+-
+-Configure the module to enable a run-time Extended Master Secret (EMS) check
+-when using the TLS1_PRF KDF algorithm. This check is disabled by default.
+-See RFC 7627 for information related to EMS.
+-
+-=item B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>
+-
+-Configure the module to not allow truncated digests to be used with Hash and
+-HMAC DRBGs.  See FIPS 140-3 IG D.R for details.
+-
+-=item B<-self_test_onload>
+-
+-Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
+-"MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. Without these fields
+-the self tests KATS will run each time the module is loaded. This option could be
+-used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each
+-target machine. Once the self tests have run on the target machine the user
+-could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
+-mechanism.
+-
+-This is the default.
+-
+-=item B<-self_test_oninstall>
+-
+-The converse of B<-self_test_oninstall>.  The two fields related to the
+-"test status indicator" and "MAC status indicator" are written to the
+-output configuration file.
+-
+-=item B<-quiet>
+-
+-Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
+-
+-=item B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>,
+-B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>
+-
+-The corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by
+-name.
+-Either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt.
+-Refer to the entries for B<st-desc> and B<st-type> in L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)> for
+-values that can be used.
+-
+-=item B<-config> I<parent_config>
+-
+-Test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file.
+-A previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration
+-data that is included by the base C<parent_config> configuration file.
+-See L<config(5)> for further information on how to set up a provider section.
+-All other options are ignored if '-config' is used.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-=head1 NOTES
+-
+-Self tests results are logged by default if the options B<-quiet> and B<-noout>
+-are not specified, or if either of the options B<-corrupt_desc> or
+-B<-corrupt_type> are used.
+-If the base configuration file is set up to autoload the fips module, then the
+-fips module will be loaded and self tested BEFORE the fipsinstall application
+-has a chance to set up its own self test callback. As a result of this the self
+-test output and the options B<-corrupt_desc> and B<-corrupt_type> will be ignored.
+-For normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider
+-when generating the fips configuration file.
+-
+-The B<-self_test_oninstall> option was added and the
+-B<-self_test_onload> option was made the default in OpenSSL 3.1.
+-
+-The command and all remaining options were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+-
+-=head1 EXAMPLES
+-
+-Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
+-for the module, and save the F<fips.cnf> configuration file:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips
+-
+-Verify that the configuration file F<fips.cnf> contains the correct info:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf  -provider_name fips -verify
+-
+-Corrupt any self tests which have the description C<SHA1>:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
+-         -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'
+-
+-Validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file:
+-
+- export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
+- export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
+- openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf'
+-
+-
+-=head1 SEE ALSO
+-
+-L<config(5)>,
+-L<fips_config(5)>,
+-L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)>,
+-L<EVP_MAC(3)>
++This command is disabled.
++Please consult Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation to learn how to correctly
++enable FIPS mode on Red Hat Enterprise
+ 
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl.pod b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
+index d9c22a580f..d5ec3b9a6a 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl.pod
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
+@@ -135,10 +135,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and manipulation.
+ 
+ Error Number to Error String Conversion.
+ 
+-=item B<fipsinstall>
+-
+-FIPS configuration installation.
+-
+ =item B<gendsa>
+ 
+ Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
+diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
+index 714a10437b..bd05736220 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
+@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax will have to be modified.
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
+ L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
+ L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
+ L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
+diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+index 2255464304..1c15e32a5c 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+-A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
+-is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
+-of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
+-This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
+-purposes:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
+-
+-This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
+-run each time the module is used.
+-
+-=item - Verify the module's checksum.
+-
+-This is done each time the module is used.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
+-used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
+-
+-The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
+-whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
+-section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<activate>
+-
+-If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
+-significant.
+-
+-=item B<install-version>
+-
+-A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
+-
+-=item B<conditional-errors>
+-
+-The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
+-Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
+-accessible from this point on.
+-Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
+-generation, or the CRNG output test).
+-Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
+-continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
+-Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
+-continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
+-operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
+-
+-=item B<security-checks>
+-
+-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
+-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
+-A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
+-are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
+-the relevant Security Policy.
+-
+-=item B<module-mac>
+-
+-The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
+-
+-=item B<install-status>
+-
+-An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
+-This should only be written after the module has
+-successfully passed its self tests during installation.
+-If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
+-loads.
+-
+-=item B<install-mac>
+-
+-A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
+-changes to that value.
+-It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-For example:
+-
+- [fips_sect]
+- activate = 1
+- install-version = 1
+- conditional-errors = 1
+- security-checks = 1
+- module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
+- install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
+- install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
+-
+-=head1 NOTES
+-
+-When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
+-B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
+-non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
+-See L<config(5)>.
+-
+-=head1 SEE ALSO
+-
+-L<config(5)>
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
++This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
++automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
++environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
++for more information.
+ 
+ =head1 HISTORY
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
+index 4f908888ba..ef00247770 100644
+--- a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
++++ b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
+@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ want to operate in a FIPS approved manner.  The algorithms are:
+ 
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
+ L<fips_config(5)>,
+ L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
+ L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 213f38dc580d39f2cb46592b5e6db585fc6a650f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/35] 0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
+Patch-id: 35
+Patch-status: |
+    # Skip unavailable algorithms running `openssl speed`
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ apps/speed.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
+index d527f12f18..2ff3eb53bd 100644
+--- a/apps/speed.c
++++ b/apps/speed.c
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ static int EVP_MAC_loop(int algindex, void *args)
+     for (count = 0; COND(c[algindex][testnum]); count++) {
+         size_t outl;
+ 
++        if (mctx == NULL)
++            return -1;
++
+         if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, NULL, 0, NULL)
+             || !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, buf, lengths[testnum])
+             || !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac, &outl, sizeof(mac)))
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+From b300beb172d5813b01b93bfd62fe191f8187fe1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 12:05:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/48] 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
+Patch-id: 44
+Patch-status: |
+    # Extra public/private key checks required by FIPS-140-3
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c                            | 26 ++++++++++
+ .../implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c      | 19 ++++++++
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c  | 24 +++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c | 18 +++++++
+ .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     | 37 +++++++++++++--
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 4e9705beef..83773cceea 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
+     int ret = -1;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int validate = 0;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -262,6 +272,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+ #endif
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int validate = 0;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+@@ -354,8 +367,21 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+     if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, priv_key, pub_key))
+         goto err;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
++        goto err;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+     dh->priv_key = priv_key;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) <= 0) {
++        abort();
++    }
++#endif
++
+     dh->dirty_cnt++;
+     ok = 1;
+  err:
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+index 43caedb6df..73873f9758 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+@@ -489,6 +489,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
+     }
+ 
+     ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    {
++        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(privk));
++        int check = 0;
++
++        if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++
++        check = ossl_ec_key_public_check(pecdhctx->peerk, bn_ctx);
++        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++
++        if (check <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++#endif
+ 
+     retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+index a37cbbdba8..bca3f3c674 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+@@ -989,8 +989,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
+     EC_GROUP *gen_group;
+     unsigned char *dhkem_ikm;
+     size_t dhkem_ikmlen;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    void *ecdsa_sig_ctx;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
++void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx);
++int do_ec_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
++#endif
++
+ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
+                          const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -1009,6 +1018,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
+             gctx = NULL;
+         }
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (gctx != NULL)
++        gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = ecdsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
++#endif
+     return gctx;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1279,6 +1292,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
+ 
+     if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
+         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* Pairwise consistency test */
++    if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0
++        && do_ec_pct(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx, "sha256", ec) != 1)
++        abort();
++#endif
+ 
+     if (gctx->group_check != NULL)
+         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec,
+@@ -1348,7 +1367,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
+ 
+     if (gctx == NULL)
+         return;
+-
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    ecdsa_freectx(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx);
++    gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = NULL;
++#endif
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(gctx->dhkem_ikm, gctx->dhkem_ikmlen);
+     EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
+     BN_free(gctx->p);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
+index 3ba12c4889..ff49f8fcd8 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
+@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
+ #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+     /* ACVP test parameters */
+     OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
++    void *prov_rsa_ctx;
+ #endif
+ };
+ 
+@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
+     return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
++void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
++int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
++#endif
++
+ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
+                       const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
+ 
+     if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
+         goto err;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (gctx != NULL)
++        gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
++#endif
+     return gctx;
+ 
+ err:
+@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
+ 
+     rsa = rsa_tmp;
+     rsa_tmp = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* Pairwise consistency test */
++    if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
++        abort();
++#endif
+  err:
+     BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
+     RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+@@ -645,6 +661,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
+ #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+     ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
+     gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
++    rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
++    gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
+ #endif
+     BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
+     OPENSSL_free(gctx);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+index 865d49d100..ebeb30e002 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #include "crypto/ec.h"
+ #include "prov/der_ec.h"
+ 
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ typedef struct {
+     unsigned int nonce_type;
+ } PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
+ 
+-static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
++void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+ {
+     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx;
+ 
+@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+     return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+ }
+ 
+-static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
++void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
+ {
+     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ 
+@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx)
+     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++int do_ec_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec)
++{
++    static const unsigned char data[32];
++    unsigned char sigbuf[256];
++    size_t siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, sizeof(sigbuf)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    return 1;
++}
++#endif
++
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init },
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index cd5de6bd51..d4261e8f7d 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
+ 
+ #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
+ 
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen)
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
++void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
+     char *propq_copy = NULL;
+@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
+     return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+ }
+ 
+-static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
++void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ 
+@@ -1455,6 +1455,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
+     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++int do_rsa_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *rsa)
++{
++    static const unsigned char data[32];
++    unsigned char *sigbuf = NULL;
++    size_t siglen = 0;
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, NULL, &siglen, 0) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if ((sigbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen)) == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, siglen) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++    ret = 1;
++
++ err:
++    OPENSSL_free(sigbuf);
++    return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
+-- 
+2.41.0
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+index e0d139d..35f23b2 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+@@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+             rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
+             rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
+             rsa->iqmp = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++            abort();
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         }
+     }
+     return ok;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
+From a9dc983f82cabe29d6b48f3af3e30e26074ce5cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 12:55:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/48] 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
+Patch-id: 45
+Patch-status: |
+    # Minimize fips services
+---
+ apps/ecparam.c                                |  7 +++
+ apps/req.c                                    |  2 +-
+ providers/common/capabilities.c               |  2 +-
+ providers/fips/fipsprov.c                     | 44 +++++++++++--------
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             |  9 +++-
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 26 +++++++++++
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c                                |  3 ++
+ test/acvp_test.c                              |  2 +
+ test/endecode_test.c                          |  4 ++
+ test/evp_libctx_test.c                        |  9 +++-
+ test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t                 |  2 +-
+ test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t               |  3 +-
+ test/recipes/30-test_evp.t                    | 16 +++----
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt        | 22 ++++++++++
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    | 22 +++++-----
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  2 +-
+ 16 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
+index 9e9ad13683..9c66cf2434 100644
+--- a/apps/ecparam.c
++++ b/apps/ecparam.c
+@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
+         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
+         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+ 
++        if (((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512t1)) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
++            continue;
++
+         if (comment == NULL)
+             comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
+         if (sname == NULL)
+diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
+index 23757044ab..5916914978 100644
+--- a/apps/req.c
++++ b/apps/req.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, reqflag = 0;
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
++    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ #endif
+ 
+     opt_set_unknown_name("digest");
+diff --git a/providers/common/capabilities.c b/providers/common/capabilities.c
+index ed37e76969..eb836dfa6a 100644
+--- a/providers/common/capabilities.c
++++ b/providers/common/capabilities.c
+@@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM param_group_list[][10] = {
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 25),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 26),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "EC", 27),
+-#  endif
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x25519", "X25519", "X25519", 28),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x448", "X448", "X448", 29),
++#  endif
+ #  ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1tls13", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 30),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1tls13", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 31),
+diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+index 518226dfc6..29438faea8 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
++++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+@@ -199,13 +199,13 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+                                               OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX);
+ 
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))
+@@ -298,10 +298,11 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests[] = {
+      * KECCAK-KMAC-128 and KECCAK-KMAC-256 as hashes are mostly useful for
+      * KMAC128 and KMAC256.
+      */
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++    /* We don't certify KECCAK in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+       ossl_keccak_kmac_128_functions },
+     { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+-      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions },
++      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions }, */
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -360,8 +361,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips_ciphers[] = {
+     ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
+          ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
+-    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions),
++    /* We don't certify 3DES in our FIPS provider */
++    /* UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
++    UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions), */
+ #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
+     { { NULL, NULL, NULL }, NULL }
+ };
+@@ -373,8 +375,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[] = {
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_GMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_gmac_functions },
+     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_hmac_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions },
++    /* We don't certify KMAC in our FIPS provider */
++    /*{ PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions }, */
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -409,8 +412,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch[] = {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     { PROV_NAMES_ECDH, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdh_keyexch_functions },
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /*{ PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },*/
+ # endif
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+@@ -456,8 +462,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt[] = {
+       PROV_DESCS_DHX },
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
+-      PROV_DESCS_DSA },
++    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
++      PROV_DESCS_DSA }, */
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_RSA },
+@@ -466,14 +473,15 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt[] = {
+     { PROV_NAMES_EC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ec_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_EC },
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_X25519 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_X448 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_ED25519 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_keymgmt_functions,
+-      PROV_DESCS_ED448 },
++      PROV_DESCS_ED448 }, */
+ # endif
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions,
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index 2057378d3d..4b80bb70b9 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_DIGEST st_kat_digest_tests[] =
+ /*- CIPHER TEST DATA */
+ 
+ /* DES3 test data */
++#if 0
+ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_pt[] = {
+     0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
+     0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
+@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_ct[] = {
+     0x51, 0x65, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1F, 0x25, 0xB5, 0x0F,
+     0x73, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0x0D, 0xA7
+ };
+-
++#endif
+ /* AES-256 GCM test data */
+ static const unsigned char aes_256_gcm_key[] = {
+     0x92, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x6f, 0x5c,
+@@ -1454,8 +1455,9 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_bin_key[] = {
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ 
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ /* dsa 2048 */
++#if 0
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ static const unsigned char dsa_p[] = {
+     0xa2, 0x9b, 0x88, 0x72, 0xce, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x23,
+     0xb7, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x7e,
+@@ -1590,6 +1592,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dsa_key[] = {
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Hash DRBG inputs for signature KATs */
+ static const unsigned char sig_kat_entropyin[] = {
+@@ -1642,6 +1645,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
+     },
+ # endif
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
++#if 0
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+     {
+         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_DSA,
+@@ -1654,6 +1658,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
+         ITM(dsa_expected_sig)
+     },
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_ASYM_CIPHER st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[] = {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index d4261e8f7d..2a5504d104 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -689,6 +689,19 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     int ret;
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
++
++    if (rsabits < 2048) {
++        if (rsabits != 1024
++            && rsabits != 1280
++            && rsabits != 1536
++            && rsabits != 1792) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++# endif
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+@@ -777,6 +790,19 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     size_t rslen;
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
++
++    if (rsabits < 2048) {
++        if (rsabits != 1024
++            && rsabits != 1280
++            && rsabits != 1536
++            && rsabits != 1792) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++# endif
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+index a5e60e8839..f9af07d12b 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+     ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
+     ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
+ 
++    if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(ctx->libctx))
++        ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
++
+     /*
+      * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
+      * if these algorithms are not available.
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.c b/test/acvp_test.c
+index fee880d441..13d7a0ea8b 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.c
++++ b/test/acvp_test.c
+@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+                   OSSL_NELEM(dh_safe_prime_keyver_data));
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ 
++#if 0 /* Red Hat FIPS provider doesn't have fips=yes property on DSA */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_keygen_data));
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_paramgen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_paramgen_data));
+@@ -1483,6 +1484,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_siggen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_siggen_data));
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_sigver_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_sigver_data));
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(ecdsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_keygen_data));
+diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
+index 9a437d8c64..53385028fc 100644
+--- a/test/endecode_test.c
++++ b/test/endecode_test.c
+@@ -1407,6 +1407,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+          * so no legacy tests.
+          */
+ #endif
++    if (is_fips == 0) {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(DSA);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(DSA);
+@@ -1417,6 +1418,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PROTECTED_PVK(DSA);
+ # endif
+ #endif
++    }
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(EC);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(EC);
+@@ -1431,10 +1433,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTri2G);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTri2G);
+ # endif
++    if (is_fips == 0) {
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED25519);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED448);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X25519);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X448);
++    }
+         /*
+          * ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448 have no support for
+          * PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(), so no legacy tests.
+diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+index 2448c35a14..a7913cda4c 100644
+--- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
++++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+  */
+ #include "internal/deprecated.h"
+ #include <assert.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+@@ -726,7 +727,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         return 0;
+ 
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+-    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
++    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
++        ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
++    }
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dh_safeprime_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
+@@ -746,7 +749,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(kem_invalid_keytype);
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
++    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
++        ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
++    }
+ #endif
+     return 1;
+ }
+diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t b/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
+index b495b08bda..69bd299521 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
++++ b/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-dsa build"
+     if disabled("dsa");
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1;
+ 
+ plan tests =>
+     ($no_fips ? 0 : 2)          # FIPS related tests
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t b/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
+index 6d3c5ba1bb..2ba47b5fca 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
+@@ -273,8 +273,7 @@ SKIP: {
+ }
+ 
+ SKIP : {
+-    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1
+-        if disabled("dsa");
++    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1;
+ 
+     subtest DSA => sub {
+         my $testtext_prefix = 'DSA';
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t b/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+index 9d7040ced2..f8beb538d4 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+@@ -42,10 +42,8 @@ my @files = qw(
+                 evpciph_aes_cts.txt
+                 evpciph_aes_wrap.txt
+                 evpciph_aes_stitched.txt
+-                evpciph_des3_common.txt
+                 evpkdf_hkdf.txt
+                 evpkdf_kbkdf_counter.txt
+-                evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
+                 evpkdf_pbkdf1.txt
+                 evpkdf_pbkdf2.txt
+                 evpkdf_ss.txt
+@@ -91,6 +83,7 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
+                      evpciph_cast5.txt
+                      evpciph_chacha.txt
+                      evpciph_des.txt
++                     evpciph_des3_common.txt
+                      evpciph_idea.txt
+                      evpciph_rc2.txt
+                      evpciph_rc4.txt
+@@ -114,10 +107,17 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
+                      evpmd_whirlpool.txt
+                      evppbe_scrypt.txt
+                      evppbe_pkcs12.txt
++                     evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
+                      evppkey_kdf_scrypt.txt
+                      evppkey_kdf_tls1_prf.txt
+                      evppkey_rsa.txt
+                     );
++push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
++push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
++push @defltfiles, qw(
++                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
++                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
++               ) unless $no_des;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecdsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_ec;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_dsa;
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
+index 93195df97c..315413cd9b 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
+@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ IV = 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C
+ Input = 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E541002E58495C08000F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D0007
+ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Title = KMAC Tests (From NIST)
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+@@ -350,12 +351,14 @@ Ctrl = xof:0
+ OutputSize = 32
+ BlockSize = 168
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 3B1FBA963CD8B0B59E8C1A6D71888B7143651AF8BA0A7070C0979E2811324AA5
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -363,6 +366,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1F5B4E6CCA02209E0DCB5CA635B89A15E271ECC760071DFD805FAA38F9729230
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -371,12 +375,14 @@ Output = 20C570C31346F703C9AC36C61C03CB64C3970D0CFC787E9B79599D273A68D2F7F69D4CC
+ OutputSize = 64
+ BlockSize = 136
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+ Custom = ""
+ Output = 75358CF39E41494E949707927CEE0AF20A3FF553904C86B08F21CC414BCFD691589D27CF5E15369CBBFF8B9A4C2EB17800855D0235FF635DA82533EC6B759B69
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -386,12 +392,14 @@ Ctrl = size:64
+ 
+ Title = KMAC XOF Tests (From NIST)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -399,6 +407,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -407,6 +416,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF658490C0DB61438B8326FE9BDDF281B83AE0F
+ XOF = 1
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -414,6 +424,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -421,6 +432,7 @@ Custom = ""
+ Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -431,6 +443,7 @@ XOF = 1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string (from NIST ACVP)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
+ Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
+@@ -441,12 +454,14 @@ XOF = 1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC XOF Tests via ctrl (From NIST)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -454,6 +469,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -462,6 +478,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF658490C0DB61438B8326FE9BDDF281B83AE0F
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -469,6 +486,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -476,6 +494,7 @@ Custom = ""
+ Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -486,6 +505,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string via ctrl (from NIST ACVP)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
+ Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
+@@ -496,6 +516,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string negative test
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -504,6 +525,7 @@ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
+ 
+ Title = KMAC output is too large
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 40dd585c18..cbec426137 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
++    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing), no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-resign", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-outform", "DER",
+@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-noattr", "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&zero_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+ 
+ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-keyid",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
++    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+         "-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
+         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index 50b74a1e29..e2dcb68fb5 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ sub testssl {
+         my @exkeys = ();
+         my $ciphers = '-PSK:-SRP:@SECLEVEL=0';
+ 
+-        if (!$no_dsa) {
++        if (!$no_dsa && $provider ne "fips") {
+             push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", $Dkey;
+         }
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.patch openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+--- openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.patch	2023-12-06 15:33:27.843751147 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2023-12-06 15:34:27.585351920 +0100
+@@ -70,15 +70,6 @@ push @files, qw(
+                 evppkey_dh.txt
+                ) unless $no_dh;
+ push @files, qw(
+-                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
+-                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
+-               ) unless $no_des;
+-push @files, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
+-push @files, qw(
+-                evppkey_ecx.txt
+-                evppkey_mismatch_ecx.txt
+-               ) unless $no_ecx;
+-push @files, qw(
+                 evppkey_ecc.txt
+                 evppkey_ecdh.txt
+                 evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.patch-fips openssl-3.2.0/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.patch-fips	2023-12-06 15:49:08.711198219 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/providers/fips/fipsprov.c	2023-12-06 15:55:42.362078721 +0100
+@@ -426,14 +426,16 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
+ 
+ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },
++    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },*/
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_signature_functions },
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
+-    { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
+       ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },*/
+ # endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions },
+ #endif
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fips-min openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+--- openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fips-min	2024-02-01 11:00:56.823687618 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2024-02-01 11:01:20.131934678 +0100
+@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ push @defltfiles, qw(
+                ) unless $no_des;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecdsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_ec;
+-push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_dsa;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_sm2.txt) unless $no_sm2;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_gcm_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;

0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From ba6e65e2f7e7fe8d9cd62e1e7e345bc41dda424f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 13:12:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/46] 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
+Patch-id: 47
+Patch-status: |
+    # # Execute KATS before HMAC verification
+From-dist-git-commit: 5c67b5adc311af297f425c09e3e1ac7ca8483911
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+index e3a629018a..3c09bd8638 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+@@ -401,6 +401,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+     if (ev == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
++    /*
++     * Run the KAT's before HMAC verification according to FIPS-140-3 requirements
++     */
++    if (kats_already_passed == 0) {
++        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
+    if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
+         module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
+         checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
+@@ -451,18 +461,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * Only runs the KAT's during installation OR on_demand().
+-     * NOTE: If the installation option 'self_test_onload' is chosen then this
+-     * path will always be run, since kats_already_passed will always be 0.
+-     */
+-    if (on_demand_test || kats_already_passed == 0) {
+-        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
+-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
+-            goto end;
+-        }
+-    }
+-
+     /* Verify that the RNG has been restored properly */
+     rng = ossl_rand_get0_private_noncreating(st->libctx);
+     if (rng != NULL)
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+From 2e8388e06eafb703aeb315498915bf079561bdb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 13:07:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/48] 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
+Patch-id: 49
+Patch-status: |
+    # Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures rhbz#2070977
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ crypto/context.c                              | 14 ++++
+ crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c                          | 13 +++
+ crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                         | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                        | 15 ++++
+ doc/man5/config.pod                           | 13 +++
+ include/crypto/context.h                      |  3 +
+ include/internal/cryptlib.h                   |  3 +-
+ include/internal/sslconf.h                    |  4 +
+ providers/common/securitycheck.c              | 20 +++++
+ providers/common/securitycheck_default.c      |  9 ++-
+ providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 11 ++-
+ .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 +
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 20 ++++-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c                                  |  8 ++
+ util/libcrypto.num                            |  2 +
+ 15 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
+index 51002ba79a..e697974c9d 100644
+--- a/crypto/context.c
++++ b/crypto/context.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
+     void *fips_prov;
+ #endif
+ 
++    void *legacy_digest_signatures;
++
+     unsigned int ischild:1;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -206,6 +208,10 @@ static int context_init(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+         goto err;
+ #endif
+ 
++    ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(ctx);
++    if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
+     /* Low priority. */
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     ctx->child_provider = ossl_child_prov_ctx_new(ctx);
+@@ -334,6 +340,11 @@ static void context_deinit_objs(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures != NULL) {
++        ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(ctx->legacy_digest_signatures);
++        ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = NULL;
++    }
++
+     /* Low priority. */
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (ctx->child_provider != NULL) {
+@@ -625,6 +636,9 @@ void *ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int index)
+         return ctx->fips_prov;
+ #endif
+ 
++    case OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX:
++        return ctx->legacy_digest_signatures;
++
+     default:
+         return NULL;
+     }
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+@@ -57,6 +58,18 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
+                 return 0;
+             }
++        } else if (strcmp(oval->name, "rh-allow-sha1-signatures") == 0) {
++            int m;
++
++            /* Detailed error already reported. */
++            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
++                return 0;
++
++            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(
++                    NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf), m > 0, 0)) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
++                return 0;
++            }
+         } else {
+             ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
+                            "name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+index 630d339c35..6e4e9f5ae7 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,73 @@
+ #include "internal/provider.h"
+ #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */
+ #include "evp_local.h"
++#include "crypto/context.h"
++
++typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
++    int allowed;
++} OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
++
++void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs = vldsigs;
++
++    if (ldsigs != NULL) {
++        OPENSSL_free(ldsigs);
++    }
++}
++
++void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES* ldsigs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
++    /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
++     * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
++     * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
++    ldsigs->allowed = 0;
++    return ldsigs;
++}
++
++static OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
++{
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (loadconfig && !OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
++        return NULL;
++#endif
++
++    return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX);
++}
++
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
++        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
++
++ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++     if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_SHA1_SIGNATURES") != NULL)
++        /* used in tests */
++         return 1;
++ #endif
++
++    /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
++     * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
++     * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
++    return ldsigs != NULL ? ldsigs->allowed : 0;
++}
++
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
++                                                  int loadconfig)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
++        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
++
++    if (ldsigs == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    ldsigs->allowed = allow;
++    return 1;
++}
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ 
+@@ -251,6 +318,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
++        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);
++        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)
++                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (ver) {
+         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+index ce6e1a1ccb..003926247b 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include "internal/ffc.h"
+ #include "internal/numbers.h"
+ #include "internal/provider.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "evp_local.h"
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+@@ -958,6 +959,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+         return -2;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
++            && md != NULL
++            && ctx->pkey != NULL
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
++        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
++        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
++                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++            return -1;
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (fallback)
+         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, 0, (void *)(md));
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
+index bd05736220..ed34ff4b9c 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
+@@ -304,6 +304,19 @@ Within the algorithm properties section, the following names have meaning:
+ The value may be anything that is acceptable as a property query
+ string for EVP_set_default_properties().
+ 
++=item B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures>
++
++The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is not set,
++it behaves as if it was set to B<yes>.
++
++When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
++digest will fail.  To test whether your software will work with future versions
++of OpenSSL, set this option to B<no>.  This setting also affects TLS, where
++signature algorithms that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if
++this option is set to B<no>.  Because TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as
++pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key material, disabling
++B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or newer.
++
+ =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
+ 
+ The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is
+diff --git a/include/crypto/context.h b/include/crypto/context.h
+index cc06c71be8..e9f74a414d 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/context.h
++++ b/include/crypto/context.h
+@@ -39,3 +39,6 @@ void ossl_rand_crng_ctx_free(void *);
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+ void ossl_threads_ctx_free(void *);
+ #endif
++
++void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *);
++void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *);
+diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+index ac50eb3bbd..3b115cc7df 100644
+--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
++++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_CHILD_PROVIDER_INDEX          18
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_THREAD_INDEX                  19
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_DECODER_CACHE_INDEX           20
+-# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   20
++# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX 21
++# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   21
+ 
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
+ int ossl_lib_ctx_is_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
+diff --git a/include/internal/sslconf.h b/include/internal/sslconf.h
+index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
+--- a/include/internal/sslconf.h
++++ b/include/internal/sslconf.h
+@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ int conf_ssl_name_find(const char *name, size_t *idx);
+ void conf_ssl_get_cmd(const SSL_CONF_CMD *cmd, size_t idx, char **cmdstr,
+                       char **arg);
+ 
++/* Methods to support disabling all signatures with legacy digests */
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig);
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
++                                                  int loadconfig);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
+@@ -235,6 +236,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+             mdnid = -1; /* disallowed by security checks */
+     }
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
++
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
++        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
++         * it. */
++        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)
++            mdnid = -1;
++#endif
++
+     return mdnid;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+index 246323493e..2ca7a59f39 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ 
+ /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
+ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+@@ -29,9 +30,10 @@ int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ }
+ 
+ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+-                                    ossl_unused int sha1_allowed)
++                                    int sha1_allowed)
+ {
+     int mdnid;
++    int ldsigs_allowed;
+ 
+     static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
+         { NID_md5,       OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5       },
+@@ -42,8 +44,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+         { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
+     };
+ 
+-    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, 1);
++    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);
++    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);
+     if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
++    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)
++        mdnid = -1;
+     return mdnid;
+ }
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+index 70d0ea5d24..3c482e0181 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+@@ -123,12 +123,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
+         mdprops = ctx->propq;
+ 
+     if (mdname != NULL) {
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+         WPACKET pkt;
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+-        int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+-                                                            sha1_allowed);
++        int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
++#else
++        int sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
++        md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
++                                                            sha1_allowed);
+ 
+         if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
+             if (md == NULL)
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+index ebeb30e002..c874f87bd5 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+@@ -237,7 +237,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
++#else
++    sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
+     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                     sha1_allowed);
+     if (md_nid < 0) {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 2a5504d104..5f3a029566 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "crypto/rsa.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ 
+ #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
++#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256
+ 
+ OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+@@ -302,10 +304,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ 
+     if (mdname != NULL) {
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
++        int md_nid;
++        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-        int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
++#else
++        int sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
++        md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                      sha1_allowed);
+-        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+ 
+         if (md == NULL
+             || md_nid <= 0
+@@ -1396,8 +1403,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+ 
+     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+-        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
++        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
++            pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
++        }
++#endif
++    }
++
+ 
+     if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
+         && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 9cb8a4dda2..feb660d030 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -5436,3 +5436,5 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup                      5563	3_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons      5664	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OSSL_STORE_delete                       5665	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ BIO_ADDR_copy                           5666	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
++ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/ssl/t1_lib.c.patch-sha1 openssl-3.2.0/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/ssl/t1_lib.c.patch-sha1	2023-12-08 13:01:44.752501257 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/ssl/t1_lib.c	2023-12-08 13:04:18.969899853 +0100
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
+ #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
+@@ -1506,6 +1507,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+     uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+     int ret = 0;
++    int ldsigs_allowed;
+ 
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -1521,6 +1523,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     ERR_set_mark();
++    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0);
+     /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
+     for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+          i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
+@@ -1542,6 +1545,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+             cache[i].enabled = 0;
+             continue;
+         }
++        if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
++                && !ldsigs_allowed) {
++            cache[i].enabled = 0;
++            continue;
++        }
+ 
+         if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
+             cache[i].enabled = 0;

0056-strcasecmp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num
+--- openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale	2022-06-01 12:35:52.667498724 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num	2022-06-01 12:36:08.112633093 +0200
+@@ -5425,5 +5425,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons      5664	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OSSL_STORE_delete                       5665	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ BIO_ADDR_copy                           5666	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
++OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     ? 	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp	2022-11-25 12:50:22.449760653 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c	2022-11-25 12:51:19.416350584 +0100
+@@ -342,7 +342,12 @@ int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
++int
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
++                    symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
++#endif
++OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+ {
+     int t;
+ 
+@@ -352,7 +354,12 @@ int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, c
+     return t;
+ }
+ 
+-int OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
++int
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
++                    symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
++#endif
++OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+ {
+     int t;
+     size_t i;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
+--- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp	2022-11-25 18:19:05.669769076 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t	2022-11-25 18:31:20.993392678 +0100
+@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ foreach my $libname (@libnames) {
+                   s| .*||;
+                   # Drop OpenSSL dynamic version information if there is any
+                   s|\@\@.+$||;
++                  s|\@.+$||;
+                   # Return the result
+                   $_
+               }

0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,965 @@
+From 56511d480823bedafce604374fa3b15d3b3ffd6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 26/48] 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
+Patch-id: 58
+Patch-status: |
+    # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2053289
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ providers/common/securitycheck.c              |  1 +
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 35 +++++++++++
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 58 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |  5 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                | 27 +++++++--
+ 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+index e534ad0a5f..c017c658e5 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
+  * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
+  */
++/* Red Hat build implements some extra limitations in providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c */
+ int ossl_rsa_check_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa, int operation)
+ {
+     int protect = 0;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index d865968058..872967bcb3 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
+     return rsa_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT);
+ }
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++static int fips_padding_allowed(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
++{
++    if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING
++        || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING)
++        return 0;
++
++    return 1;
++}
++# endif
++
+ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                        size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+@@ -141,6 +152,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++        return 0;
++    }
++# endif
++
+     if (out == NULL) {
+         size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ 
+@@ -204,6 +227,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++        return 0;
++    }
++# endif
++
+     if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) {
+         if (out == NULL) {
+             *outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index 8680797b90..95d5d51102 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -619,36 +619,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mNXb79cyY+NygUJ0OBgWbtfdY2
+ h90qjKHS9PvY4Q==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a
+ Output=6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=640db1acc58e0568fe5407e5f9b701dff8c3c91e716c536fc7fcec6cb5b71c1165988d4a279e1577d730fc7a29932e3f00c81515236d8d8e31017a7a09df4352d904cdeb79aa583adcc31ea698a4c05283daba9089be5491f67c1a4ee48dc74bbbe6643aef846679b4cb395a352d5ed115912df696ffe0702932946d71492b44
+ Output=750c4047f547e8e41411856523298ac9bae245efaf1397fbe56f9dd5
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=423736ed035f6026af276c35c0b3741b365e5f76ca091b4e8c29e2f0befee603595aa8322d602d2e625e95eb81b2f1c9724e822eca76db8618cf09c5343503a4360835b5903bc637e3879fb05e0ef32685d5aec5067cd7cc96fe4b2670b6eac3066b1fcf5686b68589aafb7d629b02d8f8625ca3833624d4800fb081b1cf94eb
+ Output=d94ae0832e6445ce42331cb06d531a82b1db4baad30f746dc916df24d4e3c2451fff59a6423eb0e1d02d4fe646cf699dfd818c6e97b051
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755
+ Output=52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=36f6e34d94a8d34daacba33a2139d00ad85a9345a86051e73071620056b920e219005855a213a0f23897cdcd731b45257c777fe908202befdd0b58386b1244ea0cf539a05d5d10329da44e13030fd760dcd644cfef2094d1910d3f433e1c7c6dd18bc1f2df7f643d662fb9dd37ead9059190f4fa66ca39e869c4eb449cbdc439
+ Output=8da89fd9e5f974a29feffb462b49180f6cf9e802
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -673,36 +679,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64e2EbcTLLfqc1bCMVHB53UVB8
+ eG2e4XlBcKjI6A==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0181af8922b9fcb4d79d92ebe19815992fc0c1439d8bcd491398a0f4ad3a329a5bd9385560db532683c8b7da04e4b12aed6aacdf471c34c9cda891addcc2df3456653aa6382e9ae59b54455257eb099d562bbe10453f2b6d13c59c02e10f1f8abb5da0d0570932dacf2d0901db729d0fefcc054e70968ea540c81b04bcaefe720e
+ Output=8ff00caa605c702830634d9a6c3d42c652b58cf1d92fec570beee7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=018759ff1df63b2792410562314416a8aeaf2ac634b46f940ab82d64dbf165eee33011da749d4bab6e2fcd18129c9e49277d8453112b429a222a8471b070993998e758861c4d3f6d749d91c4290d332c7a4ab3f7ea35ff3a07d497c955ff0ffc95006b62c6d296810d9bfab024196c7934012c2df978ef299aba239940cba10245
+ Output=2d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=018802bab04c60325e81c4962311f2be7c2adce93041a00719c88f957575f2c79f1b7bc8ced115c706b311c08a2d986ca3b6a9336b147c29c6f229409ddec651bd1fdd5a0b7f610c9937fdb4a3a762364b8b3206b4ea485fd098d08f63d4aa8bb2697d027b750c32d7f74eaf5180d2e9b66b17cb2fa55523bc280da10d14be2053
+ Output=74fc88c51bc90f77af9d5e9a4a70133d4b4e0b34da3c37c7ef8e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641
+ Output=a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec
+ Output=2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -727,36 +739,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+WJ9N6z/c8J3nmNLsmARwsj38z
+ Ya4qnqZe1onjY5o=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80
+ Output=087820b569e8fa8d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5
+ Output=4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a
+ Output=d94cd0e08fa404ed89
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0
+ Output=6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60
+ Output=df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -781,36 +799,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/kSbj6XloJ5qGWywrQmUkz8Uq
+ aD0x7TDrmEvkEro=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8
+ Output=4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e
+ Output=b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065
+ Output=bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4
+ Output=fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2
+ Output=28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -835,36 +859,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/GOeBWKNKXF1fhgoPbAQHGn0B
+ MSwGUGLx60i3nRyDyw==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5
+ Output=af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad
+ Output=a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967
+ Output=308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf
+ Output=15c5b9ee1185
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723
+ Output=21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -889,36 +919,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hqziQG4iyeBY3bSuVAYnri/bCC
+ Yejn5Ly8mU2q+jBcRQ==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3
+ Output=4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f
+ Output=5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65
+ Output=b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8
+ Output=684e3038c5c041f7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab
+ Output=32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -943,36 +979,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4ohPIOWIGzfukQi8Y1vYdvLXS
+ FMlxv0gq65dqc3DC
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1
+ Output=47aae909
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6
+ Output=1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b
+ Output=d976fc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac
+ Output=d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478
+ Output=bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -997,36 +1039,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15EtXgyL2QF1iEdoZUZZmqof9xM
+ 2MiPa249Z+lh3Luj0A==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61
+ Output=050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d
+ Output=4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f
+ Output=8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0
+ Output=fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2
+ Output=4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -1057,36 +1105,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSckFlJCf6zfby2VL63Jo7IAeWo
+ tKo5Eb69iFQvBb4=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72
+ Output=f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8
+ Output=81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3
+ Output=fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858
+ Output=f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e
+ Output=53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index cbec426137..9ba7fbeed2 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
++    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
+         $smrsa1,
+@@ -1022,6 +1022,9 @@ sub check_availability {
+     return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
+         if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
+ 
++    return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
++        if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
++
+     return "";
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index e2dcb68fb5..0775112b40 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -493,6 +493,18 @@ sub testssl {
+             # the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
+             my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
+             my $ciphersuites = "";
++            my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
++AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
++	    );
+             foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
+                 if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
+                     note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
+@@ -504,11 +516,16 @@ sub testssl {
+                     } else {
+                         $cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
+                     }
+-                    ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
+-                                 $cipher,
+-                                 "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
+-                                 $flag || ()])),
+-                       "Testing $cipher");
++                    if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
++                        note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
++                        ok(1);
++                    } else {
++                        ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
++                                     $cipher,
++                                     "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
++                                     $flag || ()])),
++                           "Testing $cipher");
++                    }
+                 }
+             }
+             next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.patch-58 openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+--- openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.patch-58	2023-12-11 19:15:32.167790754 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt	2023-12-11 21:16:08.390089120 +0100
+@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974
+ Output = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
+ 
+ # RSA decrypt
+-
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235
+ Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+ # Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.only-default openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+--- openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.only-default	2024-02-01 15:09:31.498568631 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt	2024-02-01 15:14:45.858384004 +0100
+@@ -365,28 +365,28 @@ Input = 8bfe264e85d3bdeaa6b8851b8e3b956e
+ Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test case decrypting to empty
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # invalid decrypting to max length message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 1439e08c3f84c1a7fec74ce07614b20e01f6fa4e8c2a6cffdc3520d8889e5d9a950c6425798f85d4be38d300ea5695f13ecd4cb389d1ff5b82484b494d6280ab7fa78e645933981cb934cce8bfcd114cc0e6811eefa47aae20af638a1cd163d2d3366186d0a07df0c81f6c9f3171cf3561472e98a6006bf75ddb457bed036dcce199369de7d94ef2c68e8467ee0604eea2b3009479162a7891ba5c40cab17f49e1c438cb6eaea4f76ce23cce0e483ff0e96fa790ea15be67671814342d0a23f4a20262b6182e72f3a67cd289711503c85516a9ed225422f98b116f1ab080a80abd6f0216df88d8cfd67c139243be8dd78502a7aaf6bc99d7da71bcdf627e7354
+ Output = 0f9b
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+@@ -428,14 +428,14 @@ Input = 1ea0b50ca65203d0a09280d39704b24f
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ Input = 9b2ec9c0c917c98f1ad3d0119aec6be5
+ Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ Input = 782c2b59a21a511243820acedd567c13
+ Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ Input = 0096136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ Input = 96136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ Input = 0000587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a9880
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ Input = 587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
+ # to random 11 byte long synthetic plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ Input = 1786550ce8d8433052e01ecba8b76d30
+ Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
+ # of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ Input = 179598823812d2c58a7eb50521150a48
+ Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eighth
+ # byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ Input = a7a340675a82c30e22219a55bc07cdf3
+ Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
+ # byte
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -566,53 +566,58 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLI
+ # RSA decrypt
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 42
+ 
+ # simple positive test case
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.only-default openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+--- openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.only-default	2024-02-01 15:22:09.981463726 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt	2024-02-01 15:28:41.789966051 +0100
+@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
+@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+ # Note: output is generated synthethically by the Bleichenbacher workaround
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-P
+ # RSA decrypt
+ 
+ # a random positive test case
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
+@@ -393,36 +394,43 @@ Input = 1690ebcceece2ce024f382e467cf8510
+ Output = 4f02
+ 
+ # positive test with 11 byte long value
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive that generates a 0 byte long synthetic message internally
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
+ # positive that generates a 245 byte long synthetic message internally
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+@@ -681,14 +690,14 @@ ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKu
+ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthetic one
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
+ # in the last value
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+@@ -696,46 +705,51 @@ Input = 7db0390d75fcf9d4c59cf27b264190d8
+ Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random invalid that generates a synthetic of maximum size
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 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
+ 
+ # a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
+ # a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
+ # a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
+ # a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
+ # a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 257906ca6de8307728
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
+ # second to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+@@ -743,7 +757,7 @@ Input = 758c215aa6acd61248062b88284bf43c
+ Output = 043383c929060374ed
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
+ # PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+@@ -751,35 +765,35 @@ Input = 7b22d5e62d287968c6622171a1f75db4
+ Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
+ 
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
++Availablein = default
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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

0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+From 5f4f350ce797a7cd2fdca84c474ee196da9d6fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 17:25:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider
+
+For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default
+provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more
+lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think
+continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the
+published chosen-prefix collision attacks.
+
+As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS
+provider.
+
+This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail:
+- 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1.
+- 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and
+  evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default",
+  which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled.
+- 80-test_cms: Re-create all certificates in test/smime-certificates
+  with SHA256 signatures while keeping the same private keys. These
+  certificates were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the
+  FIPS provider.
+  Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default
+  provider, where SHA-1 is available.
+- 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with
+  the FIPS provider.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c |  4 --
+ .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 --
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |  8 +--
+ test/acvp_test.inc                            | 20 -------
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt        |  7 +++
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 51 +++++++++++++++-
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |  4 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  4 ++
+ test/smime-certs/smdh.pem                     | 18 +++---
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smec1.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smec2.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smec3.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smroot.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ 19 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+index fa3822f39f..c365d7b13a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+@@ -128,11 +128,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+         int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+         int sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+         md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                             sha1_allowed);
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+index 99b228e82c..44a22832ec 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+         return 0;
+     }
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-    sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+     sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                     sha1_allowed);
+     if (md_nid < 0) {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index f66d7705c3..34f45175e8 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -292,11 +292,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+         int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+         int sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+         md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                      sha1_allowed);
+ 
+@@ -1355,8 +1351,10 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ 
+     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+         && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
++#else
+         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
+             pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
+         }
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
+index ad11d3ae1e..73b24bdb0c 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
++++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
+@@ -1841,17 +1841,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+         FAIL
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        3072,
+-        "SHA1",
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_msg),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_n),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_e),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_sig),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-        PASS
+-    },
+     {
+         "x931",
+         3072,
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+index f36982845d..51e507a61c 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
+ 
+ Title = ECDSA tests
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+ 
+ # Digest too long
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Digest too short
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
+@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Digest invalid
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
+@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Invalid signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -79,12 +84,14 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # BER signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index b8d8bb2993..8dd566067b 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ NDL6WCBbets=
+ 
+ Title = RSA tests
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -112,24 +113,28 @@ Ctrl = digest:SHA512-224
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123456789ABC"
+ Output = 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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ 
+ # Leading zero in the signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # Mismatched digest
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Corrupted signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+@@ -144,6 +150,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # parameter is not NULLt
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -151,42 +158,49 @@ Output = 3ec3fc29eb6e122bd7aa361cd09fe1bcbe85311096a7b9e4799cedfb2351ce0ab7fe4e7
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # embedded digest too long
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # embedded digest too short
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # Garbage after DigestInfo
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # invalid tag for parameter
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verify using public key
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -370,6 +385,8 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Verify using salt length auto detect
++# In the FIPS provider on RHEL-9, the default digest for PSS signatures is SHA-256
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:auto
+@@ -404,6 +421,10 @@ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DD
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verify using default parameters, explicitly setting parameters
++# NOTE: RSA-PSS-DEFAULT contains a restriction to use SHA1 as digest, which
++# RHEL-9 does not support in FIPS mode; all these tests are thus marked
++# Availablein = default.
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:20
+@@ -412,6 +433,7 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Verify explicitly setting parameters "digest" salt length
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
+@@ -420,18 +442,21 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output = 3EFE09D88509027D837BFA5F8471CF7B69E6DF395DD999BB9CA42021F15722D9AC76670507C6BCFB73F64FB2211B611B8F140E76EBDB064BD762FDBA89D019E304A0D6B274E1C2FE1DF50005598A0306AF805416094E2A5BA60BC72BDE38CE061E853ED40F14967A8B9CA4DC739B462F89558F12FDF2D8D19FBEF16AD66FE2DDDA8BEE983ECBD873064244849D8D94B5B33F45E076871A47ED653E73257A2BE2DB3C0878094B0D2B6B682C8007DFD989425FB39A1FEEC9EED5876414601A49176EC344F5E3EDEE81CA2DDD29B7364F4638112CB3A547E2BC170E28CB66BDABE863754BE8AD5BA230567B575266F4B6B4CF81F28310ABF05351CC9E2DB85D00BF
+ 
+ # Verify using salt length larger than minimum
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:30
+ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output = 6BF7EDC63A0BA184EEEC7F3020FEC8F5EBF38C2B76481881F48BCCE5796E7AB294548BA9AE810457C7723CABD1BDE94CF59CF7C0FC7461B22760C8ED703DD98E97BFDD61FA8D1181C411F6DEE5FF159F4850746D78EDEE385A363DC28E2CB373D5CAD7953F3BD5E639BE345732C03A1BDEA268814DA036EB1891C82D4012F3B903D86636055F87B96FC98806AD1B217685A4D754046A5DE0B0D7870664BE07902153EC85BA457BE7D7F89D7FE0F626D02A9CBBB2BB479DDA1A5CAE75247FB7BF6BFB15C1D3FD9E6B1573CCDBC72011C3B97716058BB11C7EA2E4E56ADAFE1F5DE6A7FD405AC5890100F9C3408EFFB5C73BF73F48177FF743B4B819D0699D507B
+ 
+ # Verify using maximum salt length
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:max
+ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output = 4470DCFE812DEE2E58E4301D4ED274AB348FE040B724B2CD1D8CD0914BFF375F0B86FCB32BFA8AEA9BD22BD7C4F1ADD4F3D215A5CFCC99055BAFECFC23800E9BECE19A08C66BEBC5802122D13A732E5958FC228DCC0B49B5B4B1154F032D8FA2F3564AA949C1310CC9266B0C47F86D449AC9D2E7678347E7266E2D7C888CCE1ADF44A109A293F8516AE2BD94CE220F26E137DB8E7A66BB9FCE052CDC1D0BE24D8CEBB20D10125F26B069F117044B9E1D16FDDAABCA5340AE1702F37D0E1C08A2E93801C0A41035C6C73DA02A0E32227EAFB0B85E79107B59650D0EE7DC32A6772CCCE90F06369B2880FE87ED76997BA61F5EA818091EE88F8B0D6F24D02A3FC6
+ 
+ # Attempt to change salt length below minimum
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+@@ -439,21 +464,25 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ # Attempt to change padding mode
+ # Note this used to return PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
+ # but it is limited because setparams only returns 0 or 1.
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ 
+ # Attempt to change digest
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = digest:sha256
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ 
+ # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = invalid salt length
+ 
+ # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD2
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = invalid salt length
+@@ -472,36 +501,42 @@ CAltWyuLbfXWce9jd8CSHLI8Jwpw4lmOb/idGfEFrMLT8Ms18pKA4Thrb2TE7yLh
+ 4fINDOjP+yJJvZohNwIDAQAB
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=cd8b6538cb8e8de566b68bd067569dbf1ee2718e
+ Output=9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=e35befc17a1d160b9ce35fbd8eb16e7ee491d3fd
+ Output=3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0652ec67bcee30f9d2699122b91c19abdba89f91
+ Output=666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=39c21c4cceda9c1adf839c744e1212a6437575ec
+ Output=4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=36dae913b77bd17cae6e7b09453d24544cebb33c
+ Output=1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -517,36 +552,42 @@ swU7R97S7NSkyu/WFIM9yLtiLzF+0Ha4BX/o3j+ESArV6D5KYZBKTySPs5cCc1fh
+ 0w5GMTmBXG/U/VrFuBcqRSMOy2MYoE8UVdhOWosCAwEAAQ==
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2715a49b8b0012cd7aee84c116446e6dfe3faec0
+ Output=586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2dac956d53964748ac364d06595827c6b4f143cd
+ Output=80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=28d98c46cccafbd3bc04e72f967a54bd3ea12298
+ Output=484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0866d2ff5a79f25ef668cd6f31b42dee421e4c0e
+ Output=84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=6a5b4be4cd36cc97dfde9995efbf8f097a4a991a
+ Output=82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -564,36 +605,42 @@ F7jfF3jbOB3OCctK0FilEQAac4GY7ifPVaE7dUU5kGWC7IsXS9WNXR89dnxhNyGu
+ BQIDAQAB
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=9596bb630cf6a8d4ea4600422b9eba8b13675dd4
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=b503319399277fd6c1c8f1033cbf04199ea21716
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=50aaede8536b2c307208b275a67ae2df196c7628
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=aa0b72b8b371ddd10c8ae474425ccccf8842a294
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=fad3902c9750622a2bc672622c48270cc57d3ea8
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -1329,11 +1376,13 @@ Title = RSA FIPS tests
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ 
+-# Verifying with SHA1 is permitted in fips mode for older applications
++# Verifying with SHA1 is not permitted on RHEL-9 in FIPS mode
++Availablein = fips
+ DigestVerify = SHA1
+ Key = RSA-2048
+ Input = "Hello "
+ Output = 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
++Result = DIGESTVERIFYINIT_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verifying with a 1024 bit key is permitted in fips mode for older applications
+ DigestVerify = SHA256
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 48a92f735d..34afe91b88 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
+         "-certfile", $smroot,
+         "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+     [ "signed zero-length content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont_zero, "-md", "sha1",
+         "-certfile", $smroot, "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&zero_compare
+     ],
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index 8c52b637fc..ff75c5b6ec 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ sub testssl {
+                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
+           }
+ 
++        SKIP: {
++          skip "SSLv3 is not supported by the FIPS provider", 4
++              if $provider eq "fips";
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+@@ -402,6 +405,7 @@ sub testssl {
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
++         }
+ 
+         SKIP: {
+             skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 4

0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+From e3d6fca1af033d00c47bcd8f9ba28fcf1aa476aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:02:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fips: Expose a FIPS indicator
+
+FIPS 140-3 requires us to indicate whether an operation was using
+approved services or not. The FIPS 140-3 implementation guidelines
+provide two basic approaches to doing this: implicit indicators, and
+explicit indicators.
+
+Implicit indicators are basically the concept of "if the operation
+passes, it was approved". We were originally aiming for implicit
+indicators in our copy of OpenSSL. However, this proved to be a problem,
+because we wanted to certify a signature service, and FIPS 140-3
+requires that a signature service computes the digest to be signed
+within the boundaries of the FIPS module. Since we were planning to
+certify fips.so only, this means that EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify
+would have to be blocked. Unfortunately, EVP_SignFinal uses
+EVP_PKEY_sign internally, but outside of fips.so and thus outside of the
+FIPS module boundary. This means that using implicit indicators in
+combination with certifying only fips.so would require us to block both
+EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal, which are the two APIs currently used
+by most users of OpenSSL for signatures.
+
+EVP_DigestSign would be acceptable, but has only been added in 3.0 and
+is thus not yet widely used.
+
+As a consequence, we've decided to introduce explicit indicators so that
+EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal can continue to work for now, but
+FIPS-aware applications can query the explicit indicator to check
+whether the operation was approved.
+
+To avoid affecting the ABI and public API too much, this is implemented
+as an exported symbol in fips.so and a private header, so applications
+that wish to use this will have to dlopen(3) fips.so, locate the
+function using dlsym(3), and then call it. These applications will have
+to build against the private header in order to use the returned
+pointer.
+
+Modify util/mkdef.pl to support exposing a symbol only for a specific
+provider identified by its name and path.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ doc/build.info                      |   6 ++
+ doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ providers/fips/fipsprov.c           |  71 +++++++++++++
+ providers/fips/indicator.h          |  66 ++++++++++++
+ util/mkdef.pl                       |  25 ++++-
+ util/providers.num                  |   1 +
+ 6 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+ create mode 100644 providers/fips/indicator.h
+
+diff --git a/doc/build.info b/doc/build.info
+index b0aa4297a4..af235113bb 100644
+--- a/doc/build.info
++++ b/doc/build.info
+@@ -4389,6 +4389,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
++DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+ DEPEND[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+ GENERATE[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+ DEPEND[man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+@@ -4631,6 +4635,7 @@ html/man7/ct.html \
+ html/man7/des_modes.html \
+ html/man7/evp.html \
+ html/man7/fips_module.html \
++html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-digest.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-kdf.html \
+@@ -4754,6 +4759,7 @@ man/man7/ct.7 \
+ man/man7/des_modes.7 \
+ man/man7/evp.7 \
+ man/man7/fips_module.7 \
++man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-digest.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-kdf.7 \
+diff --git a/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..23db2b395c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++=pod
++
++=head1 NAME
++
++fips_module_indicators - Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS module indicators guide
++
++=head1 DESCRIPTION
++
++This guide documents how the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS provider
++implements Approved Security Service Indicators according to the FIPS 140-3
++Implementation Guidelines, section 2.4.C. See
++L<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf>
++for the FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidelines.
++
++For all approved services except signatures, the Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider
++uses the return code as the indicator as understood by FIPS 140-3. That means
++that every operation that succeeds denotes use of an approved security service.
++Operations that do not succeed may not have been approved security services, or
++may have been used incorrectly.
++
++For signatures, an explicit indicator API is available to determine whether
++a selected operation is an approved security service, in combination with the
++return code of the operation. For a signature operation to be approved, the
++explicit indicator must claim it as approved, and it must succeed.
++
++=head2 Querying the explicit indicator
++
++The Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider exports a symbol named
++I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> that provides information on which signature
++operations are approved security functions. To use this function, either link
++against I<fips.so> directly, or load it at runtime using dlopen(3) and
++dlsym(3).
++
++    #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
++    #include "providers/fips/indicator.h"
++
++    void *provider = dlopen("/usr/lib64/ossl-modules/fips.so", RTLD_LAZY);
++    if (provider == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALORITHM *(*redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator)(int) \
++        = dlsym(provider, "redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator");
++    if (redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
++        fprintf(stderr, "Does your copy of fips.so have the required Red Hat"
++                        " patches?\n");
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++Note that this uses the I<providers/fips/indicator.h> header, which is not
++public. Install the I<openssl-debugsource> package from the I<BaseOS-debuginfo>
++repository using I<dnf debuginfo-install openssl> and include
++I</usr/src/debug/openssl-3.*/> in the compiler's include path.
++
++I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> expects an operation ID as its only
++argument. Currently, the only supported operation ID is I<OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE> to
++obtain the indicators for signature operations. On success, the return value is
++a pointer to an array of I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_STRUCT>s. On failure, NULL is
++returned. The last entry in the array is indicated by I<algorithm_names> being
++NULL.
++
++    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
++        const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
++        const char *property_definition; /* key */
++        const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
++    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
++
++    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
++        int function_id;
++        int approved;
++    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
++
++The I<algorithm_names> field is a colon-separated list of algorithm names from
++one of the I<PROV_NAMES_...> constants, e.g., I<PROV_NAMES_RSA>. strtok(3) can
++be used to locate the appropriate entry. See the example below, where
++I<algorithm> contains the algorithm name to search for:
++
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicator_dispatch = NULL;
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *indicator =
++        redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(operation_id);
++    if (indicator == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for operation, probably using implicit"
++                        " indicators.\n");
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++    for (; indicator->algorithm_names != NULL; ++indicator) {
++        char *algorithm_names = strdup(indicator->algorithm_names);
++        if (algorithm_names == NULL) {
++            perror("strdup(3)");
++            // handle error
++        }
++
++        const char *algorithm_name = strtok(algorithm_names, ":");
++        for (; algorithm_name != NULL; algorithm_name = strtok(NULL, ":")) {
++            if (strcasecmp(algorithm_name, algorithm) == 0) {
++                indicator_dispatch = indicator->indicators;
++                free(algorithm_names);
++                algorithm_names = NULL;
++                break;
++            }
++        }
++        free(algorithm_names);
++    }
++    if (indicator_dispatch == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for algorithm %s.\n", algorithm);
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++If an appropriate I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH> array is available for the
++given algorithm name, it maps function IDs to their approval status. The last
++entry is indicated by a zero I<function_id>. I<approved> is
++I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED> if the operation is an approved security
++service, or part of an approved security service, or
++I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED> otherwise. Any other value is invalid.
++Function IDs are I<OSSL_FUNC_*> constants from I<openssl/core_dispatch.h>,
++e.g., I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE> or I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN>.
++
++Assuming I<function_id> is the function in question, the following code can be
++used to query the approval status:
++
++    for (; indicator_dispatch->function_id != 0; ++indicator_dispatch) {
++        if (indicator_dispatch->function_id == function_id) {
++            switch (indicator_dispatch->approved) {
++                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED:
++                    // approved security service
++                    break;
++                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED:
++                    // unapproved security service
++                    break;
++                default:
++                    // invalid result
++                    break;
++            }
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++=head1 SEE ALSO
++
++L<fips_module(7)>, L<provider(7)>
++
++=head1 COPYRIGHT
++
++Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++
++Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
++
++=cut
+diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+index de391ce067..1cfd71c5cf 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
++++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "self_test.h"
+ #include "crypto/context.h"
+ #include "internal/core.h"
++#include "indicator.h"
+ 
+ static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
+ static const char FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=no";
+@@ -425,6 +426,68 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_rsa_signature_indicators[] = {
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
++};
++
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators[] = {
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
++};
++
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM redhat_indicator_fips_signature[] = {
++    { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++        redhat_rsa_signature_indicators },
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++    { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++        redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators },
++#endif
++    { NULL, NULL, NULL }
++};
++
+ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_asym_cipher[] = {
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_asym_cipher_functions },
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+@@ -527,6 +590,14 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void) {
+     return NULL;
+ }
+ 
++const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id) {
++    switch (operation_id) {
++    case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
++        return redhat_indicator_fips_signature;
++    }
++    return NULL;
++}
++
+ static void fips_teardown(void *provctx)
+ {
+     OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx));
+diff --git a/providers/fips/indicator.h b/providers/fips/indicator.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..b323efe44c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/providers/fips/indicator.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
++# define OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
++# pragma once
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++# endif
++
++# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED (0)
++# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED (1)
++
++/*
++ * FIPS indicator dispatch table element.  function_id numbers and the
++ * functions are defined in core_dispatch.h, see macros with
++ * 'OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC' in their names.
++ *
++ * An array of these is always terminated by function_id == 0
++ */
++typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
++    int function_id;
++    int approved;
++} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
++
++/*
++ * Type to tie together algorithm names, property definition string and the
++ * algorithm implementation's FIPS indicator status in the form of a FIPS
++ * indicator dispatch table.
++ *
++ * An array of these is always terminated by algorithm_names == NULL
++ */
++typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
++    const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
++    const char *property_definition; /* key */
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
++} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
++
++/**
++ * Query FIPS indicator status for the given operation.  Possible values for
++ * 'operation_id' are currently only OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE, as all other algorithms
++ * use implicit indicators.  The return value is an array of
++ * OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHMs, terminated by an entry with
++ * algorithm_names == NULL.  'algorithm_names' is a colon-separated list of
++ * algorithm names, 'property_definition' a comma-separated list of properties,
++ * and 'indicators' is a list of OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH structs.  This
++ * list is terminated by function_id == 0.  'function_id' is one of the
++ * OSSL_FUNC_* constants, e.g., OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL.
++ *
++ * If there is no entry in the returned struct for the given operation_id,
++ * algorithm name, or function_id, the algorithm is unapproved.
++ */
++const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id);
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++# endif
++
++#endif
+diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl
+index a1c76f7c97..eda39b71ee 100755
+--- a/util/mkdef.pl
++++ b/util/mkdef.pl
+@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $ordinal_opts{filter} =
+         return
+             $item->exists()
+             && platform_filter($item)
+-            && feature_filter($item);
++            && feature_filter($item)
++            && fips_filter($item, $name);
+     };
+ my $ordinals = OpenSSL::Ordinals->new(from => $ordinals_file);
+ 
+@@ -205,6 +206,28 @@ sub feature_filter {
+     return $verdict;
+ }
+ 
++sub fips_filter {
++    my $item = shift;
++    my $name = uc(shift);
++    my @features = ( $item->features() );
++
++    # True if no features are defined
++    return 1 if scalar @features == 0;
++
++    my @matches = grep(/^ONLY_.*$/, @features);
++    if (@matches) {
++        # There is at least one only_* flag on this symbol, check if any of
++        # them match the name
++        for (@matches) {
++            if ($_ eq "ONLY_${name}") {
++                return 1;
++            }
++        }
++        return 0;
++    }
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ sub sorter_unix {
+     my $by_name = OpenSSL::Ordinals::by_name();
+     my %weight = (
+diff --git a/util/providers.num b/util/providers.num
+index 4e2fa81b98..77879d0e5f 100644
+--- a/util/providers.num
++++ b/util/providers.num
+@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+ OSSL_provider_init                     1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator        1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:ONLY_PROVIDERS/FIPS
+-- 
+2.35.3
+

0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+From abeda0b0475adb0d4f89b0c97cfc349779915bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/35] 
+ 0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
+Patch-id: 73
+Patch-status: |
+    # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2102535
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h                        |  8 ++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c                         | 34 ++++++--
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  3 +
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             | 79 ++++++++++---------
+ providers/fips/self_test_kats.c               |  7 ++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 41 +++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+index ea70da05ad..dde57a1a0e 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+@@ -193,4 +193,12 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to
+                                          int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                          int flen);
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                             const unsigned char *param,
++                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
++                                             const char *redhat_st_seed);
++
+ #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_RSA_LOCAL_H */
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+index d9be1a4f98..b2f7f7dc4b 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                                    param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+ /*
+  * Perform the padding as per NIST 800-56B 7.2.2.3
+  *      from (K) is the key material.
+@@ -51,12 +55,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+  * Step numbers are included here but not in the constant time inverse below
+  * to avoid complicating an already difficult enough function.
+  */
+-int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+-                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+-                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+-                                            const unsigned char *param,
+-                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+-                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                             const unsigned char *param,
++                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
++                                             const char *redhat_st_seed)
+ {
+     int rv = 0;
+     int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+@@ -107,6 +112,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+     memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+     /* step 3d: generate random byte string */
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (redhat_st_seed != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
++        memcpy(seed, redhat_st_seed, mdlen);
++    } else
++#endif
+     if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, mdlen, 0) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -138,6 +148,18 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                            const unsigned char *param,
++                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
++{
++    return ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(libctx, to, tlen, from,
++                                                    flen, param, plen, md,
++                                                    mgf1md, NULL);
++}
++
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                     const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                     const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index e0fdc0daa4..aa2012c04a 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -1296,14 +1296,21 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_priv_key[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ /*-
+- * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE directly in the expansion of the
++ * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP directly in the expansion of the
+  * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
+  * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
+  */
+-static const char pad_mode_none[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE;
++static const char pad_mode_oaep[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP;
++static const char oaep_fixed_seed[] = {
++    0xf6, 0x10, 0xef, 0x0a, 0x97, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x25,
++    0x97, 0xcf, 0x8e, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x51, 0x2f, 0xab,
++    0x2e, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0xe6
++};
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_enc_params[] = {
+-    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_none),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_oaep),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED,
++                       oaep_fixed_seed),
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1342,43 +1349,43 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_expected_sig[256] = {
+     0x2c, 0x68, 0xf0, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xd2, 0x56, 0xd6
+ };
+ 
+-static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[256] = {
++static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[208] = {
+    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char rsa_asym_expected_encrypt[256] = {
+-    0x54, 0xac, 0x23, 0x96, 0x1d, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x8b,
+-    0x8f, 0x36, 0x33, 0xd0, 0xf4, 0x02, 0xa2, 0x61,
+-    0xb1, 0x13, 0xd4, 0x4a, 0x46, 0x06, 0x37, 0x3c,
+-    0xbf, 0x40, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x64, 0xdc,
+-    0x22, 0x22, 0xaf, 0x36, 0x79, 0x62, 0x45, 0xf0,
+-    0x97, 0x82, 0x22, 0x44, 0x86, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0xfa,
+-    0xac, 0x03, 0x21, 0x84, 0x3f, 0x31, 0xad, 0x2a,
+-    0xa4, 0x6e, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xfc,
+-    0xf1, 0x62, 0xce, 0x82, 0x12, 0x45, 0xc9, 0x35,
+-    0xb0, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0x99, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b, 0x5a,
+-    0xd3, 0x46, 0xdb, 0xf9, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x49, 0xbd,
+-    0x1e, 0xe8, 0xda, 0xac, 0x61, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xda,
+-    0xfc, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x74, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x18,
+-    0x86, 0x3e, 0x20, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0xe1, 0x04, 0xb7,
+-    0x38, 0x43, 0xb1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0xc1, 0x39,
+-    0x4d, 0xe1, 0xd3, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x87,
+-    0x1f, 0x74, 0xb5, 0x69, 0xfd, 0x33, 0xd6, 0x21,
+-    0x7c, 0x61, 0x60, 0x28, 0xca, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xa0,
+-    0xbb, 0xc8, 0x73, 0xa9, 0x82, 0xf8, 0x6b, 0xd8,
+-    0xf0, 0xc9, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0x8c,
+-    0xd4, 0xa2, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0x04, 0xad, 0xaa,
+-    0x11, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0xce, 0x83, 0x29, 0x56, 0x69,
+-    0xbb, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xef, 0xca, 0x2d, 0xcd, 0x52,
+-    0xc8, 0xf1, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x6d, 0x9c,
+-    0x3d, 0x69, 0xcc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xe6,
+-    0xbb, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xdc, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0x24, 0x93,
+-    0x03, 0x46, 0xa2, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x5d,
+-    0x68, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0x30, 0xdb, 0xf5,
+-    0x4f, 0x0f, 0xad, 0xc7, 0xd0, 0xaa, 0x47, 0xd9,
+-    0x9f, 0x85, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0x6c, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x04,
+-    0x29, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0x66, 0x7d, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xaa,
+-    0x05, 0x52, 0x55, 0xc1, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x90, 0xab,
++    0x6c, 0x21, 0xc1, 0x9e, 0x94, 0xee, 0xdf, 0x74,
++    0x3a, 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x04, 0x1a, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x7c,
++    0x42, 0xac, 0x7e, 0x28, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xe2, 0x4e,
++    0x87, 0xd4, 0x00, 0x69, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x0b,
++    0xc1, 0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0x21, 0x39, 0x4f, 0x25,
++    0x22, 0x1f, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x62, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x89,
++    0xdb, 0x38, 0x32, 0x88, 0x21, 0x1d, 0x89, 0xf1,
++    0xe0, 0x14, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x50,
++    0xb0, 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x2f, 0x49, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x17,
++    0x9e, 0x60, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0x77, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa2,
++    0xcf, 0x16, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x4a, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xcb,
++    0x1e, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x27, 0x06, 0x9d,
++    0xf4, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x7e,
++    0xfd, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x82, 0x62, 0x0f,
++    0x29, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0xd3,
++    0x51, 0x92, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x39, 0x9d, 0xdd, 0x06,
++    0xff, 0xb1, 0xb0, 0xd5, 0x61, 0x03, 0x8f, 0x25,
++    0x5c, 0x49, 0x12, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x67, 0x61, 0x78,
++    0xb3, 0xe3, 0xc4, 0xf6, 0x36, 0x16, 0xa9, 0x04,
++    0x91, 0x0a, 0x4b, 0x27, 0x28, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7c,
++    0x65, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x71, 0x84, 0xe7, 0x47,
++    0x79, 0x83, 0x91, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x79, 0xce,
++    0x49, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x34, 0xac, 0x61, 0xe0,
++    0xe6, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x10, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x9a, 0xd6,
++    0xed, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x99,
++    0xde, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x11, 0x16, 0xa2, 0x18, 0x30,
++    0x30, 0xdc, 0x95, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20,
++    0xc4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x1e, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xbb,
++    0x29, 0x94, 0x27, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0xab, 0xb4, 0x27,
++    0x8b, 0x4d, 0xe1, 0xcb, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x66,
++    0x41, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xeb, 0x61, 0x4c, 0x77, 0x5a,
++    0xee, 0xb0, 0xca, 0x99, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xbe, 0x06
+ };
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+index 74ee25dcb6..a9bc8be7fa 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+@@ -641,14 +641,21 @@ static int self_test_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
++
+ static int self_test_asym_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+     int i, ret = 1;
+ 
++    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 1;
++
+     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_asym_cipher_tests); ++i) {
+         if (!self_test_asym_cipher(&st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[i], st, libctx))
+             ret = 0;
+     }
++
++    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
++
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index 9cd8904131..40de5ce8fa 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++# include "crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h"
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* TLS padding */
+     unsigned int client_version;
+     unsigned int alt_version;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+     /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
+     unsigned int implicit_rejection;
+ } PROV_RSA_CTX;
+@@ -192,12 +198,21 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+             }
+         }
+         ret =
+-            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(
++#else
++            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(
++#endif
++                                                    prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
+                                                     rsasize, in, inlen,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_label,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_md,
+-                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md);
++                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++                                                    , prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed
++#endif
++                                                    );
+ 
+         if (!ret) {
+             OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
+@@ -328,6 +343,9 @@ static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->oaep_md);
+     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+     OPENSSL_free(prsactx->oaep_label);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ 
+     OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
+ }
+@@ -447,6 +465,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+                     NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+@@ -456,6 +477,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx,
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+@@ -567,6 +592,18 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         prsactx->oaep_labellen = tmp_labellen;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED);
++    if (p != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
++        void *tmp_oaep_seed = NULL;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &tmp_oaep_seed, 0, NULL))
++            return 0;
++        OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
++        prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed = (char *)tmp_oaep_seed;
++    }
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION);
+     if (p != NULL) {
+         unsigned int client_version;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.patch-config openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+--- openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.patch-config	2023-12-14 13:48:23.398025507 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm	2023-12-14 14:24:49.519488385 +0100
+@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ my %params = (
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION' =>       "tls-client-version",
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' =>   "tls-negotiated-version",
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' =>       "implicit-rejection",
++    'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' =>     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
+ 
+ # Encoder / decoder parameters
+ 

0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+From 97ac06e5a8e3a8699279c06eeb64c8e958bad7bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 17:45:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use digest_sign & digest_verify in self test
+
+In review for FIPS 140-3, the lack of a self-test for the digest_sign
+and digest_verify provider functions was highlighted as a problem. NIST
+no longer provides ACVP tests for the RSA SigVer primitive (see
+https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1347). Because FIPS 140-3
+recommends the use of functions that compute the digest and signature
+within the module, we have been advised in our module review that the
+self tests should also use the combined digest and signature APIs, i.e.
+the digest_sign and digest_verify provider functions.
+
+Modify the signature self-test to use these instead by switching to
+EVP_DigestSign and EVP_DigestVerify. This requires adding more ifdefs to
+crypto/evp/m_sigver.c to make these functions usable in the FIPS module.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/evp/m_sigver.c           | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 37 +++++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
+     return 0;
+ }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+ /*
+  * If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
+@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         reinit = 0;
+         if (e == NULL)
+             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         else
+             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     }
+     if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
+         return 0;
+@@ -139,8 +142,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     locpctx = ctx->pctx;
+     ERR_set_mark();
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(locpctx))
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     /* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
+     if (reinit
+@@ -225,8 +230,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             signature =
+                 evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
+                                               supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             if (signature == NULL)
+                 goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+             break;
+         }
+         if (signature == NULL)
+@@ -310,6 +317,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
+             if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
+                 ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             } else {
+                 /* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
+                 ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
+@@ -318,11 +326,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                     goto err;
+                 }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+             }
+             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+         }
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
+@@ -334,6 +344,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             goto err;
+         }
+     }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if (ver) {
+         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
+@@ -366,6 +377,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
+     return 0;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     /*
+      * If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
+@@ -437,6 +449,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
+ 
+     ret = 1;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+  end:
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+@@ -479,7 +492,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
+                           NULL);
+ }
+-#endif /* FIPS_MDOE */
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
+ {
+@@ -639,6 +659,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+         }
+     }
+     return 1;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ }
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
+@@ -732,6 +761,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+     if (vctx || !r)
+         return r;
+     return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ }
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
+@@ -757,4 +787,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
+         return -1;
+     return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
+ }
+-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+@@ -444,10 +444,13 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+     int ret = 0;
+     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *sctx = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+-    unsigned char sig[256];
+     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
++    const char *msg = "Hello World!";
++    unsigned char sig[256];
+     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
+     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
+         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
+@@ -488,23 +491,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+         || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to use for the signing operation */
+-    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, NULL);
+-    if (sctx == NULL
+-        || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(sctx) <= 0)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    /* set signature parameters */
+-    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST,
+-                                         t->mdalgorithm,
+-                                         strlen(t->mdalgorithm) + 1))
+-        goto err;
++    /* Create a EVP_MD_CTX to use for the signature operation, assign signature
++     * parameters and sign */
+     params_sig = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
++    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++    if (md == NULL || ctx == NULL)
++        goto err;
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
++    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0
++        || EVP_DigestSign(ctx, sig, &siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0
++        || EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_sign(sctx, sig, &siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0
+-        || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(sctx) <= 0
++    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
++    sctx = NULL;
++
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
++    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+         || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -509,14 +510,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+         goto err;
+ 
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(sctx, sig, siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0)
++    if (EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sig, siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
++    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
+-- 
+2.37.1
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch	2024-01-04 11:44:18.761559765 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c	2024-01-04 11:51:18.297195401 +0100
+@@ -560,26 +560,33 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *c
+     return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                         size_t *siglen)
+ {
+-    int sctx = 0, r = 0;
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++    int r = 0;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    int sctx = 0;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++ 
+ 
+     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (pctx == NULL
+             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX
+             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
+             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if (sigret != NULL && (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
+         /* try dup */
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+         if (dctx != NULL)
+             pctx = dctx;
+@@ -591,8 +598,10 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     return r;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+@@ -704,25 +713,32 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsi
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                           size_t siglen)
+ {
+-    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     int r = 0;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     unsigned int mdlen = 0;
+     int vctx = 0;
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++ 
+ 
+     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (pctx == NULL
+             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX
+             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
+             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
+         /* try dup */
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+         if (dctx != NULL)
+             pctx = dctx;
+@@ -733,8 +749,10 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
+         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     return r;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch	2024-01-04 12:39:26.858137284 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c	2024-01-04 12:40:28.201680446 +0100
+@@ -736,9 +736,9 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
+         goto legacy;
+ #endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
+         /* try dup */
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+         if (dctx != NULL)
+             pctx = dctx;
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.digest-sign-patch	2024-01-04 12:55:41.172653897 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c	2024-01-04 12:56:23.562017396 +0100
+@@ -584,9 +584,9 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+         goto legacy;
+ #endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (sigret != NULL && (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
+         /* try dup */
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+         if (dctx != NULL)
+             pctx = dctx;
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.fips-new openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.fips-new	2024-01-30 23:50:10.115710238 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c	2024-01-31 00:04:31.448164500 +0100
+@@ -598,7 +598,11 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++    return r;
+ #endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
++                                                  sigret, siglen,
++                                                  sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
+     return r;
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+@@ -749,7 +753,10 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
+         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++    return r;
+ #endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
++                                                    sig, siglen);
+     return r;
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.fix-ifdef openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+--- openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c.fix-ifdef	2024-02-01 09:23:07.877696442 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c	2024-02-01 09:25:30.857169997 +0100
+@@ -599,11 +599,12 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
+     return r;
+-#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++#else
+     r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+                                                   sigret, siglen,
+                                                   sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
+     return r;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+@@ -754,10 +755,11 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
+     else
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
+     return r;
+-#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++#else
+     r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+                                                     sig, siglen);
+     return r;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:

0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+From e385647549c467fe263b68b72dd21bdfb875ee88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:51:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIPS: Use FFDHE2048 in self test
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 342 +++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index a29cc650b5..1b5623833f 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -821,188 +821,190 @@ static const ST_KAT_DRBG st_kat_drbg_tests[] =
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /* DH KAT */
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 p */
+ static const unsigned char dh_p[] = {
+-    0xdc, 0xca, 0x15, 0x11, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25,
+-    0xf5, 0x21, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x54, 0x27, 0x89, 0xe0,
+-    0x01, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x66,
+-    0xf7, 0x40, 0x64, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x8b,
+-    0xe6, 0x10, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x8b, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xbe,
+-    0x39, 0xdb, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x85, 0xbf, 0x24, 0xce,
+-    0x68, 0x80, 0xad, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x7c, 0x6d,
+-    0x01, 0x5e, 0x61, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x4d,
+-    0xe1, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0x41, 0xff, 0xde,
+-    0x9d, 0x41, 0x84, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x38, 0xbb,
+-    0x02, 0x1d, 0xae, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x2d, 0x17,
+-    0x82, 0xac, 0xc6, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xb0,
+-    0x23, 0x2c, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x97,
+-    0xb3, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0xac, 0xaf, 0xb9,
+-    0x8f, 0x06, 0x66, 0x08, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x4e, 0xc7,
+-    0xdd, 0xb6, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x99, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0xc1,
+-    0xb5, 0x98, 0x25, 0xda, 0x84, 0x32, 0x07, 0x7d,
+-    0xef, 0x69, 0x56, 0x46, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x20, 0x82,
+-    0x3c, 0x95, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x76, 0xd4,
+-    0x73, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x36, 0x1c,
+-    0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0x2f, 0x32, 0x9b,
+-    0x82, 0x09, 0x9b, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x50,
+-    0xf4, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x62, 0xa3, 0x31,
+-    0x88, 0xb0, 0x27, 0x98, 0xba, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x44,
+-    0xb9, 0x46, 0xfe, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xc5,
+-    0xa1, 0x23, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x97, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x80,
+-    0xda, 0x8c, 0xac, 0x88, 0xe0, 0x92, 0xb1, 0x12,
+-    0x70, 0x60, 0xff, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x57, 0x99, 0x94,
+-    0x01, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xc7,
+-    0x62, 0x45, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x22, 0x31, 0xc1,
+-    0x7d, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xef, 0x0d,
+-    0xb9, 0x9f, 0x9c, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x69
+-};
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++    0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a,
++    0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
++    0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95,
++    0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb,
++    0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
++    0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8,
++    0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a,
++    0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
++    0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0,
++    0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3,
++    0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
++    0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77,
++    0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72,
++    0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
++    0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a,
++    0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61,
++    0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
++    0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68,
++    0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4,
++    0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
++    0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70,
++    0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec,
++    0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
++    0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff,
++    0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32, 0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83,
++    0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
++    0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05,
++    0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2,
++    0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
++    0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97,
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++};
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 q */
+ static const unsigned char dh_q[] = {
+-    0x89, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x67, 0x17, 0xef, 0x03, 0x9e,
+-    0x60, 0x3e, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0xe4, 0x83,
+-    0x74, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x5c, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xea,
+-    0x11, 0xac, 0xb5, 0x7d
+-};
++    0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++    0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d,
++    0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
++    0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a,
++    0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd,
++    0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
++    0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec,
++    0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01, 0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd,
++    0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
++    0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68,
++    0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79,
++    0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
++    0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb,
++    0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39,
++    0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
++    0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd,
++    0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0,
++    0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
++    0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34,
++    0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51, 0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa,
++    0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
++    0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8,
++    0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76,
++    0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
++    0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff,
++    0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1,
++    0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
++    0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02,
++    0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9,
++    0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
++    0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b,
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++};
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 g */
+ static const unsigned char dh_g[] = {
+-    0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb8, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0xf6, 0x01, 0x39,
+-    0x35, 0x1d, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x12, 0x66, 0x80, 0x5f,
+-    0xdf, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xd1, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xa0,
+-    0x05, 0x0c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x24, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9f,
+-    0x6a, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x8f,
+-    0xfe, 0x88, 0xd6, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x89, 0x4a,
+-    0x3d, 0x53, 0x5f, 0xc8, 0x21, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xd4,
+-    0x24, 0x87, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x8c,
+-    0x51, 0xe9, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x9c, 0x7c, 0x20,
+-    0x3e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x31, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0x25,
+-    0x63, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x53,
+-    0xd3, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xef, 0xd9,
+-    0x67, 0x7c, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x77, 0xd6, 0xdc,
+-    0xe2, 0xa1, 0x96, 0x37, 0x95, 0xca, 0x64, 0xb9,
+-    0x2d, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xac, 0x6d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x43,
+-    0x1d, 0xe5, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x60, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x86,
+-    0x89, 0xc9, 0xec, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x24, 0x8c, 0x16,
+-    0xed, 0x09, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x40,
+-    0x6d, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x23,
+-    0x7b, 0x97, 0x34, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xfa,
+-    0xe0, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xed, 0x30, 0xd6,
+-    0x91, 0x87, 0xda, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0xe2,
+-    0xaa, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x61,
+-    0x66, 0x55, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x1c, 0x6b, 0x4a,
+-    0x37, 0x97, 0x63, 0xb0, 0xa9, 0x16, 0x58, 0xef,
+-    0xc8, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x4f,
+-    0x21, 0x37, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x10, 0x17, 0x2c, 0xf3,
+-    0x9b, 0x83, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x8a,
+-    0xb8, 0x25, 0x16, 0xec, 0xab, 0x99, 0x5f, 0xa4,
+-    0x21, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0x80, 0x74,
+-    0xc3, 0x9d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x1e, 0xe4,
+-    0xe9, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x20, 0xea, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x32
++    0x02
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
+-    0x14, 0x33, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x0a,
+-    0x30, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x70,
+-    0xd2, 0x96, 0x8a, 0xba, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc8, 0x15,
+-    0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
++    0x01, 0xdc, 0x2a, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x71, 0x57, 0x0f,
++    0xcd, 0x93, 0x65, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x56, 0x6d,
++    0xc5, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xad, 0x8d,
++    0x6c, 0xdc, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x94
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
+-    0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
+-    0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
+-    0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
+-    0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
+-    0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
+-    0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
+-    0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
+-    0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
+-    0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
+-    0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
+-    0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
+-    0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
+-    0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
+-    0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
+-    0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
+-    0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
+-    0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
+-    0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
+-    0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
+-    0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
+-    0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
+-    0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
+-    0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
+-    0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
+-    0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
+-    0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
+-    0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
+-    0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
+-    0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
+-    0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
+-    0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
+-    0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
++    0x00, 0xc4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x69, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x05,
++    0x55, 0x2a, 0x7e, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x02, 0xbb, 0x7f,
++    0xcc, 0x63, 0x74, 0xee, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x98, 0x43,
++    0x0e, 0x29, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x44, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x23,
++    0x81, 0xca, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x01, 0x4a,
++    0x1a, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x0b,
++    0xb9, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x14, 0x01, 0x62, 0x3c,
++    0x8a, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xbb, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x63,
++    0xb7, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x0b, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x38,
++    0x10, 0x0f, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x24, 0xf6,
++    0xe3, 0x70, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x7a,
++    0x87, 0x49, 0x64, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x75, 0x3b, 0x94,
++    0xc8, 0x09, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x92,
++    0xb9, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x47, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x44,
++    0x3b, 0xe3, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x53,
++    0xd8, 0xfb, 0x06, 0x44, 0xdb, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0x13,
++    0x2b, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x30,
++    0xd6, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x59, 0xba, 0x1b,
++    0xbf, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
++    0x0b, 0x54, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x3d,
++    0xe8, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x52, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x18,
++    0x6f, 0xa3, 0x27, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xc3, 0x81,
++    0xcb, 0xae, 0x23, 0x11, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x6f,
++    0x23, 0x17, 0x40, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0xb7,
++    0x34, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0x98, 0x39,
++    0xbf, 0x2e, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xad, 0xed,
++    0x1b, 0x5e, 0x47, 0x90, 0x49, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x71,
++    0x5f, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x35, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xce,
++    0x58, 0x60, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0x70, 0x04,
++    0x2a, 0x6a, 0x98, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xae, 0x69,
++    0x95, 0xf9, 0x99, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0xed,
++    0x61, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x05, 0xe9, 0xf2,
++    0x32
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
+-    0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,
+-    0x96, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x24, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x87, 0x7d,
+-    0xd0, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x56, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x58,
+-    0xaa, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x32,
+-    0x23, 0x51, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0xb5, 0xdb,
+-    0xfa, 0x97, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x30, 0xf0,
+-    0x2d, 0x31, 0x14, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xb1, 0xc0,
+-    0xe0, 0x24, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x98, 0xbc,
+-    0xa9, 0xe6, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x80, 0x86, 0x22, 0xf1,
+-    0x81, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6e,
+-    0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x67, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x97,
+-    0x70, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x05,
+-    0xfb, 0x77, 0xf5, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xd3,
+-    0x3c, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0x0f,
+-    0xec, 0xb6, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x11, 0xe7,
+-    0x7a, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xb1,
+-    0x50, 0xf2, 0x16, 0x87, 0x35, 0x78, 0xfb, 0x96,
+-    0x46, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3d, 0xe8, 0xef, 0xbf,
+-    0xce, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x22,
+-    0xa3, 0x4f, 0x14, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x98,
+-    0x4c, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0x42,
+-    0xe5, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x8c,
+-    0xa1, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x75, 0x98, 0x0d, 0xde,
+-    0x7f, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x36, 0x52, 0x38, 0x20,
+-    0xd4, 0x31, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x22,
+-    0x89, 0x78, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x72, 0xf3,
+-    0x39, 0xca, 0xeb, 0x99, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0xe3,
+-    0x01, 0x26, 0x8b, 0xc9, 0x97, 0x89, 0xc9, 0xb2,
+-    0x55, 0x71, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x3f, 0x00,
+-    0x7f, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x1c, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x51,
+-    0x9c, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x02, 0xab, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x0f,
+-    0x34, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x8b
++    0x00, 0xef, 0x15, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x56, 0xa3, 0x79,
++    0x40, 0x58, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x56, 0xad, 0xcb, 0xda,
++    0x8c, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x25, 0x29,
++    0x9e, 0x43, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x84,
++    0xbc, 0x85, 0xd0, 0x94, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x27, 0x57,
++    0xe4, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x08, 0xf5,
++    0x74, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x56, 0xd2, 0x09, 0xc8, 0x68,
++    0xef, 0xed, 0x18, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x2e, 0x95, 0x6c,
++    0xba, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x1b, 0xf6,
++    0x15, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x20,
++    0x76, 0x43, 0x51, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d,
++    0xd6, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0x18, 0x33, 0xd1, 0xa3,
++    0x3b, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x13, 0x7a,
++    0x53, 0xde, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x77,
++    0x6b, 0xf8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x70, 0x8c, 0xba, 0x73,
++    0x80, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0xda, 0x53,
++    0x4d, 0x3c, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x37, 0xce, 0xb1,
++    0xde, 0x45, 0x97, 0x58, 0x65, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0x05,
++    0xbb, 0xc3, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x59, 0x7a,
++    0x99, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x61, 0xe5,
++    0x1a, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xee, 0xe9,
++    0xa9, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x91,
++    0x0d, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x7e, 0x1d, 0x31,
++    0x79, 0xf1, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0xb2, 0x4f,
++    0x22, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x72, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xe4,
++    0x1c, 0x35, 0x96, 0x61, 0x98, 0x39, 0xfb, 0x7e,
++    0x6d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x69, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x59,
++    0xbb, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x36, 0x84,
++    0x5e, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x8a,
++    0xba, 0x59, 0x88, 0x47, 0xc4, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xbd,
++    0x78, 0x76, 0x24, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x56, 0x44, 0xc2,
++    0x4a, 0xc2, 0xd5, 0x3a, 0x59, 0x40, 0xab, 0x87,
++    0x64
+ };
+ 
+ static const unsigned char dh_secret_expected[] = {
+-    0x08, 0xff, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x9a,
+-    0x7d, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x12, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x6a,
+-    0xb5, 0x11, 0x64, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0x76, 0x77, 0x0c,
+-    0x8c, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xc2, 0x33, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xfe,
+-    0x70, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x81, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x9e, 0xd2,
+-    0x3b, 0x21, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xe8, 0x78, 0x69, 0x21,
+-    0xed, 0xca, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x68, 0xb1, 0x61, 0x53,
+-    0xfa, 0x01, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x2c, 0x90, 0xdd,
+-    0xab, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x81, 0x67, 0x70, 0xa9, 0x87,
+-    0x10, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xab, 0x83, 0xb6, 0xe4,
+-    0x6e, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x43, 0x0d,
+-    0x61, 0x87, 0xda, 0xa3, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xcd,
+-    0x73, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x33,
+-    0x64, 0xf5, 0x04, 0x20, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x4b, 0xfe,
+-    0xaf, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x43, 0x85, 0x05, 0xa5, 0x9a,
+-    0x4a, 0x40, 0xda, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x73,
+-    0xdb, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x74, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x23, 0xad,
+-    0x88, 0x32, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x58, 0x2d, 0x38, 0xf0,
+-    0xa6, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0xb8, 0x79,
+-    0x9e, 0x42, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x32, 0xe9,
+-    0x81, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x42, 0x97, 0x57, 0xb2,
+-    0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xaa, 0x1f, 0xf6,
+-    0xed, 0x93, 0xd7, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xae,
+-    0xd9, 0x0c, 0xaf, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x2b, 0xc6, 0x57,
+-    0x0f, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x1a,
+-    0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x63,
+-    0xf9, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x56, 0xf9,
+-    0x58, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x47, 0x94, 0x86,
+-    0xbe, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xd5,
+-    0xcb, 0x4f, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0x00,
+-    0xfb, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x82, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x82, 0x52,
+-    0x6a, 0x97, 0xd1, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xea, 0xf6
++    0x56, 0x13, 0xe3, 0x12, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xe5,
++    0x08, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x90, 0x9d, 0xf5,
++    0x1a, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x50, 0x93,
++    0x5b, 0xf4, 0x11, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xa5,
++    0x80, 0xae, 0x01, 0x3d, 0x66, 0x92, 0xc0, 0x3e,
++    0x5f, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x82, 0x39,
++    0x72, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x94, 0xe5, 0x04,
++    0x7c, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc4, 0x9d,
++    0xc1, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xec, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xa3, 0x7c,
++    0x07, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x1d, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x47,
++    0x4b, 0x94, 0x05, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0xae,
++    0x7b, 0x21, 0x86, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x62, 0x38, 0x08,
++    0xea, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x7c, 0xef, 0x19,
++    0xf8, 0x29, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xde, 0xe8,
++    0xb8, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xa1, 0x16, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x8f,
++    0x48, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x1e,
++    0x2a, 0x66, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x18, 0xe9, 0xd2,
++    0xfd, 0xa2, 0x4e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x2e, 0x88, 0x3d,
++    0x7d, 0xac, 0x15, 0x18, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xba, 0xd4,
++    0x0e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x4a, 0xb4,
++    0x49, 0x8f, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x62, 0x8c, 0xc6, 0x66,
++    0x20, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0xed, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x88, 0x46,
++    0xa7, 0x67, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc5, 0x22, 0x95, 0xa0,
++    0x23, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xa7, 0x70,
++    0x1c, 0xac, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x50, 0x3c,
++    0xe4, 0x23, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xda, 0x2f,
++    0xf4, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xe4, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x25,
++    0x86, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x46, 0x16, 0xbc,
++    0x41, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x19, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x02,
++    0x87, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x04,
++    0x82, 0xd2, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0xb1,
++    0x41, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x0c, 0x89
+ };
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dh_group[] = {
+-- 
+2.35.3
+

0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+From 0329eb6523363705946887d4f145dd77c741ae4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 30/49] 0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
+Patch-id: 76
+Patch-status: |
+    # # Downstream only. Reseed DRBG using getrandom(GRND_RANDOM)
+    # # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2102541
+From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
+---
+ crypto/rand/prov_seed.c                       |  9 ++-
+ providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c       |  6 +-
+ providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c        | 11 ++-
+ providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h  |  2 +-
+ .../implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c | 68 ++-----------------
+ 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
+
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c	2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
+@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
+     size_t entropy_available;
+     RAND_POOL *pool;
+ 
+-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
++     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
++     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
++     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
++     * amount of entropy.
++     */
++    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
+     if (pool == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
+         return 0;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c	2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
+@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
+      * to the nearest byte.  If the entropy is of less than full quality,
+      * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
+      */
+-    bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
++    /*
++     * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
++     * + 128 bits during initial seeding
++     */
++    bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
+     if (bytes_needed < min_len)
+         bytes_needed = min_len;
+     if (bytes_needed > max_len)
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c	2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
+@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    prediction_resistance = 1;
++#endif
+     /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
+     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
+                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
+@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
+             reseed_required = 1;
+     }
+     if (drbg->parent != NULL
+-            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
++            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
++        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
++#else
+         reseed_required = 1;
++#endif
++        }
+ 
+     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
+         if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg	2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h	2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
+  *
+  * The value is in bytes.
+  */
+-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
++#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ   32
+ 
+ /*
+  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c	2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
+ # include <fcntl.h>
+ # include <unistd.h>
+ # include <sys/time.h>
++# include <sys/random.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
+ 
+@@ -339,70 +341,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
+      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
+      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
+      */
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
+-     *
+-     * Known OSs that should support this:
+-     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
+-     * - Solaris since 11.3
+-     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
+-     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
+-     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
+-     *
+-     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
+-     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
+-     */
+-#  if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
+-#    if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
+-    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
+-
+-    if (getentropy != NULL) {
+-        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
+-            return (ssize_t)buflen;
+-        if (errno != ENOSYS)
+-            return -1;
+-    }
+-#    elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
+-
+-    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
+-	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
+-
+-    return -1;
+-#    else
+-    union {
+-        void *p;
+-        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
+-    } p_getentropy;
+-
+-    /*
+-     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
+-     * call this function often.
+-     */
+-    ERR_set_mark();
+-    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
+-    ERR_pop_to_mark();
+-    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
+-        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
+-#    endif
+-#  endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
+-
+-    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
+-#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+-    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
+-#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
+-    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
+-#  elif (defined(__DragonFly__)  && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
+-     || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
+-    return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
+-#  elif defined(__wasi__)
+-    if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
+-      return (ssize_t)buflen;
+-    return -1;
+-#  else
+-    errno = ENOSYS;
+-    return -1;
+-#  endif
++    int realbuflen = buflen > 32 ? 32 : buflen; /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
++    return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, realbuflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
+ }
+ #  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
+--- openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx	2024-04-10 13:14:38.984033920 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c	2024-04-10 13:15:20.565045748 +0200
+@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
++     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
++     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
++     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
++     * amount of entropy.
++     */
++    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
+     if (pool == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
+         return 0;
+@@ -189,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
+     size_t i;
+     RAND_POOL *pool;
+ 
+-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
++     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
++     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
++     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
++     * amount of entropy.
++     */
++    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
+     if (pool == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
+         return 0;
+diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+index 14999540ab..b05b84717b 100644
+--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+ 
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+         return ret;
+     }
+ 
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+-    if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
+-        ERR_set_mark();
+-        dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
+-        ERR_pop_to_mark();
+-    }
+-#endif
+-
+-    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
++    ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
+                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+                                         PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
+     /*
+@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_public(OSSL_LIB_
+         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private) == NULL
+                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
+             return NULL;
+-        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
++        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
+         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public, rand);
+     }
+@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_private(OSSL_LIB
+         if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public) == NULL
+                 && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
+             return NULL;
+-        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
++        rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+                              SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 0);
+         CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private, rand);
+     }
+diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c
+--- openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c.xxx	2024-05-02 15:37:23.550979597 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.1/test/drbgtest.c	2024-05-02 15:45:37.189979881 +0200
+@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
+         reseed_when = time(NULL);
+ 
+     /* Generate random output from the public and private DRBG */
+-    before_reseed = expect_primary_reseed == 1 ? reseed_when : 0;
++    before_reseed = 0;
+     if (!TEST_int_eq(rand_bytes((unsigned char*)public_random,
+                                 RANDOM_SIZE), expect_success)
+         || !TEST_int_eq(rand_priv_bytes((unsigned char*) private_random,
+@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
+      */
+ 
+     /* Test whether reseeding succeeded as expected */
+-    if (!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
+-        || !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
++    if (/*!TEST_int_eq(state(primary), expected_state)
++        ||*/ !TEST_int_eq(state(public), expected_state)
+         || !TEST_int_eq(state(private), expected_state))
+         return 0;
+ 
+@@ -246,16 +246,16 @@ static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_s
+     if (expect_public_reseed >= 0) {
+         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
+         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(public), public_reseed)
+-                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
+-                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
++                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(public),
++                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
+             return 0;
+     }
+ 
+     if (expect_private_reseed >= 0) {
+         /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
+         if (!TEST_int_ge(reseed_counter(private), private_reseed)
+-                || !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
+-                                 reseed_counter(primary)))
++                /*|| !TEST_uint_ge(reseed_counter(private),
++                                 reseed_counter(primary))*/)
+             return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -577,8 +577,8 @@ static int test_rand_reseed(void)
+     if (!TEST_ptr_ne(public, private)
+         || !TEST_ptr_ne(public, primary)
+         || !TEST_ptr_ne(private, primary)
+-        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
+-        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary)))
++        /*|| !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(public)->parent, prov_rand(primary))
++        || !TEST_ptr_eq(prov_rand(private)->parent, prov_rand(primary))*/)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     /* Disable CRNG testing for the primary DRBG */

0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 9c667a7ba589329f3a777b012bf69a0db7f7eda9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/35] 0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
+Patch-id: 77
+Patch-status: |
+    # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2102542
+From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
+---
+ crypto/ec/ec_lib.c                      | 4 ++++
+ crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c                 | 8 ++++----
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c                    | 4 ++--
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c   | 2 +-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+index 6c37bf78ae..cfbc3c3c1d 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+@@ -744,12 +744,16 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
+ 
+ void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
+ {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
++#else
+     if (point == NULL)
+         return;
+ 
+     if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
+         point->meth->point_finish(point);
+     OPENSSL_free(point);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
+diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
+index 3536efd1ad..f3c164b8fc 100644
+--- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
++++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
+@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ void ossl_ffc_params_init(FFC_PARAMS *params)
+ 
+ void ossl_ffc_params_cleanup(FFC_PARAMS *params)
+ {
+-    BN_free(params->p);
+-    BN_free(params->q);
+-    BN_free(params->g);
+-    BN_free(params->j);
++    BN_clear_free(params->p);
++    BN_clear_free(params->q);
++    BN_clear_free(params->g);
++    BN_clear_free(params->j);
+     OPENSSL_free(params->seed);
+     ossl_ffc_params_init(params);
+ }
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+index 9588a75964..76b4aac6fc 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+     CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
+ 
+-    BN_free(r->n);
+-    BN_free(r->e);
++    BN_clear_free(r->n);
++    BN_clear_free(r->e);
+     BN_clear_free(r->d);
+     BN_clear_free(r->p);
+     BN_clear_free(r->q);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+index daa619b8af..5304baa6c9 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
+ 
+     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+-    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
++    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+     OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
+     OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+index 5c3e7b95ce..349c3dd657 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provctx)
+ static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
+ {
+     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+-    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
++    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ }
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,911 @@
+From 2290280617183863eb15425b8925765966723725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 09:27:12 +0200
+Subject: KDF: Add FIPS indicators
+
+FIPS requires a number of restrictions on the parameters of the various
+key derivation functions implemented in OpenSSL. The KDFs that use
+digest algorithms usually should not allow SHAKE (due to FIPS 140-3 IG
+C.C). Additionally, some application-specific KDFs have further
+restrictions defined in SP 800-135r1.
+
+Generally, all KDFs shall use a key-derivation key length of at least
+112 bits due to SP 800-131Ar2 section 8. Additionally any use of a KDF
+to generate and output length of less than 112 bits will also set the
+indicator to unapproved.
+
+Add explicit indicators to all KDFs usable in FIPS mode except for
+PBKDF2 (which has its specific FIPS limits already implemented). The
+indicator can be queried using EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params() after setting
+the required parameters and keys for the KDF.
+
+Our FIPS provider implements SHA1, SHA2 (both -256 and -512, and the
+truncated variants -224 and -384) and SHA3 (-256 and -512, and the
+truncated versions -224 and -384), as well as SHAKE-128 and -256.
+
+The SHAKE functions are generally not allowed in KDFs. For the rest, the
+support matrix is:
+
+ KDF         | SHA-1 | SHA-2 | SHA-2 truncated  | SHA-3 | SHA-3 truncated
+==========================================================================
+KBKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+HKDF         |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+TLS1PRF      |       | SHA-{256,384,512} only   |       |
+SSHKDF       |   x   |   x   |         x        |       |
+SSKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+X9.63KDF     |       |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+X9.42-ASN1   |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+TLS1.3PRF    |       | SHA-{256,384} only       |       |
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
+Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
+---
+ include/crypto/evp.h                      |   7 ++
+ include/openssl/kdf.h                     |   4 +
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c     | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c    |  82 ++++++++++++++++--
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c   |  75 +++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c    | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c |  74 +++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c  |  66 +++++++++++++-
+ util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm           |   1 +
+ 9 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
+index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
++++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
+@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ struct evp_mac_st {
+     OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++/* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8: Deriving
++ * Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of the
++ * key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112 bits". */
++# define EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
++#endif
++
+ struct evp_kdf_st {
+     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
+     int name_id;
+diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
+index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
++++ b/include/openssl/kdf.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int EVP_KDF_names_do_all(const EVP_KDF *kdf,
+ # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY        1
+ # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY         2
+ 
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV     65
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI     66
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 67
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_3_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
+@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
+     size_t data_len;
+     unsigned char *info;
+     size_t info_len;
++    int is_tls13;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_HKDF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     switch (ctx->mode) {
+     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
+     default:
+@@ -318,22 +318,85 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void
+ {
+     KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+         size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
+ 
++        any_valid = 1;
+         if (sz == 0)
+             return 0;
+         return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
+     }
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
+         if (ctx->info == NULL || ctx->info_len == 0) {
+             p->return_size = 0;
+             return 1;
+         }
+         return OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+     }
+-    return -2;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
++            != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (ctx->is_tls13) {
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")
++                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
++                /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic
++                 * Module Validation Program, Section 2.4.B, (5): "The TLS 1.3
++                 * key derivation function documented in Section 7.1 of RFC
++                 * 8446. This is considered an approved CVL because the
++                 * underlying functions performed within the TLS 1.3 KDF map to
++                 * NIST approved standards, namely: SP 800-133rev2 (Section 6.3
++                 * Option #3), SP 800-56Crev2, and SP 800-108."
++                 *
++                 * RFC 8446 appendix B.4 only lists SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        } else {
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                        EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                /* HKDF is a SP 800-56Cr2 TwoStep KDF, for which all SHA-1,
++                 * SHA-2 and SHA-3 are approved. SHAKE is not approved, because
++                 * of FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++                 * extendable-output functions may only be used as the
++                 * standalone algorithms." */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -348,6 +421,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+         OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -677,6 +753,17 @@ static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static void *kdf_tls1_3_new(void *provctx)
++{
++    KDF_HKDF *hkdf = kdf_hkdf_new(provctx);
++
++    if (hkdf != NULL)
++        hkdf->is_tls13 = 1;
++
++    return hkdf;
++}
++
++
+ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                              const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -692,6 +779,11 @@ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     switch (ctx->mode) {
+     default:
+         return 0;
+@@ -769,7 +861,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ }
+ 
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
+-    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
+index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     kbkdf_mode mode;
+     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
+ 
++    /* HMAC digest algorithm, if any; used to compute FIPS indicator */
++    PROV_DIGEST digest;
++
+     /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
+     int r;
+     unsigned char *ki;
+@@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     int use_l;
+     int is_kmac;
+     int use_separator;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KBKDF;
+ 
+ /* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
+@@ -138,6 +144,7 @@ static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
+ 
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
++    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
+@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         goto done;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init);
+     if (h == 0)
+         goto done;
+@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
++        return 0;
++
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
+     if (p != NULL
+         && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
+@@ -363,20 +378,77 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
+-    if (p == NULL)
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->ki_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." Note that the digest is only used when the MAC
++         * algorithm is HMAC. */
++        if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
++                && EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
++            const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
+         return -2;
+ 
+-    /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
+-    return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+                                                    ossl_unused void *provctx)
+ {
+-    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
+-        { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
++    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++        OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
+index c592ba72f1..4a52b38266 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     char type; /* X */
+     unsigned char *session_id;
+     size_t session_id_len;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_SSHKDF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -126,6 +129,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
+                   ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
+                   ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+@@ -194,10 +203,67 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms."
++         *
++         * Additionally, SP 800-135r1 section 5.2 specifies that the hash
++         * function used in SSHKDF "is one of the hash functions specified in
++         * FIPS 180-3.", which rules out SHA-3 and truncated variants of SHA-2.
++         * */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-224")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -205,6 +271,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ typedef struct {
+     size_t salt_len;
+     size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
+     int is_kmac;
++    int is_x963kdf;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_SSKDF;
+ 
+ #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
+@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
+ 
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
++static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn sskdf_dup;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
+@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
+     return ctx;
+ }
+ 
++static void *x963kdf_new(void *provctx)
++{
++    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = sskdf_new(provctx);
++
++    if (ctx)
++        ctx->is_x963kdf = 1;
++
++    return ctx;
++}
++
+ static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
+ {
+     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+@@ -361,6 +376,11 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+     }
+     md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
+         /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
+         int ret;
+@@ -442,6 +462,11 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                           ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+ }
+@@ -514,10 +539,74 @@ static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx)))
++            return 0;
++    }
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
+-    return -2;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." */
++        if (ctx->macctx == NULL
++                || (ctx->macctx != NULL &&
++                    EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC))) {
++            if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++
++            /* Table H-3 in ANS X9.63-2001 says that 160-bit hash functions
++             * should only be used for 80-bit key agreement, but FIPS 140-3
++             * requires a security strength of 112 bits, so SHA-1 cannot be
++             * used with X9.63. See the discussion in
++             * https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1403#issuecomment-1435300395.
++             */
++            if (ctx->is_x963kdf
++                    && ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                    && EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -525,6 +614,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -545,7 +637,7 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
+-    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_dup },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
+     unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
+     size_t seedlen;
++
++    /* MAC digest algorithm; used to compute FIPS indicator */
++    PROV_DIGEST digest;
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } TLS1_PRF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -129,6 +136,7 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+     OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
++    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+     ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ }
+@@ -157,6 +165,10 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     /*
+      * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
+@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
++        return 0;
++
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
+         OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+         ctx->sec = NULL;
+@@ -232,10 +247,60 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
+ static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->seclen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* SP 800-135r1 section 4.2.2 says TLS 1.2 KDF is approved when "(3)
++         * P_HASH uses either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512." */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
+@@ -243,6 +308,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
+ #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ #include <openssl/params.h>
+ #include <openssl/proverr.h>
+ #include "internal/packet.h"
+ #include "internal/der.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
++#include "crypto/evp.h"
+ #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     const unsigned char *cek_oid;
+     size_t cek_oid_len;
+     int use_keybits;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_X942;
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -460,6 +466,10 @@ static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                            der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+     OPENSSL_free(der);
+@@ -563,10 +573,58 @@ static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
+-    return -2;
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx)))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -574,6 +632,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+index 70f7c50fe4..6618122417 100644
+--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
++++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ my %params = (
+     'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO' =>    "supp-pubinfo",
+     'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO' =>   "supp-privinfo",
+     'KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS' =>     "use-keybits",
++    'KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' =>     "redhat-fips-indicator",
+     'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_ENTROPY' =>     "entropy",
+     'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_NONCE' =>       "nonce",
+     'KDF_PARAM_THREADS' =>        "threads",                # uint32_t
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+From 930e7acf7dd225102b6e88d23f5e2a3f4acea9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:43:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/48] 
+ 0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
+Patch-id: 81
+---
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |   6 +
+ test/acvp_test.inc                            | 214 ------------------
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 63ee11e566..cfaa4841cb 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -1279,7 +1279,13 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
+             goto cont;
+         case RSA_X931_PADDING:
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
++#else /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++            err_extra_text = "X.931 padding no longer allowed in FIPS mode,"
++                             " since it was removed from FIPS 186-5";
++            goto bad_pad;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         cont:
+             if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
+                                RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
+index 73b24bdb0c..96a72073f9 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
++++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
+@@ -1204,13 +1204,6 @@ static const struct rsa_siggen_st rsa_siggen_data[] = {
+         ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        2048,
+-        "SHA384",
+-        ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-    },
+     {
+         "pss",
+         2048,
+@@ -1622,202 +1615,6 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_sigverpss_1_sig[] = {
+     0x5c, 0xea, 0x8a, 0x92, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x11, 0x4b,
+ };
+ 
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_n[] = {
+-    0xa0, 0x16, 0x14, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xad,
+-    0xd7, 0x07, 0x31, 0x6d, 0xfc, 0xba, 0x25, 0x83,
+-    0x09, 0xa0, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x22, 0x87,
+-    0xd6, 0xbd, 0x13, 0xd9, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0xf7, 0xe6,
+-    0x48, 0xdb, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x8c,
+-    0xea, 0xbe, 0xe0, 0x04, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x3b, 0x73,
+-    0xdc, 0xc5, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xef, 0xea, 0x10,
+-    0x46, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xb9, 0x93, 0xbc, 0xa0, 0xb6,
+-    0x06, 0x02, 0x82, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x54, 0xec, 0x79,
+-    0x50, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xd7,
+-    0x26, 0xcd, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0x0f, 0x26, 0x5b,
+-    0x1f, 0x21, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x3f, 0x02,
+-    0x8c, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0x70, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0x41,
+-    0xfd, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x12, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x6e, 0x0f,
+-    0x19, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0x31, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x0e, 0xdf,
+-    0x08, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x4b, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x8d, 0x7d,
+-    0x6e, 0xea, 0xc7, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x84, 0x54,
+-    0x7f, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x29, 0x96, 0x39, 0x4c, 0x3e,
+-    0x85, 0xec, 0x22, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x04,
+-    0x2f, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xae, 0x47, 0x79,
+-    0x59, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x17, 0xae, 0x16,
+-    0x38, 0x66, 0x4e, 0xff, 0x45, 0x7f, 0xac, 0x5e,
+-    0x75, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x8b,
+-    0x3d, 0x08, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x11, 0xba, 0xa8,
+-    0xc3, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x89,
+-    0x27, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x7b,
+-    0x39, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x3d, 0x62,
+-    0xb6, 0xd4, 0x43, 0xd0, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0xc1, 0x73,
+-    0x3d, 0x99, 0x37, 0xbe, 0x62, 0x13, 0x6a, 0x8b,
+-    0xeb, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x2a, 0x8b, 0x4f, 0x7f,
+-    0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x3e, 0x08, 0x1b, 0xb5, 0x77,
+-    0xd3, 0xdc, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x59, 0xf6, 0x33,
+-    0x47, 0xa0, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x66,
+-    0x24, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xc1, 0xd4,
+-    0x11, 0x6c, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0xd7, 0x8a, 0x53, 0x5c,
+-    0xb2, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x14, 0x29, 0x0f, 0xcf, 0x28,
+-    0x32, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0x17, 0xf6, 0xbc, 0x0e, 0xb8,
+-    0x99, 0x7c, 0x14, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0xe4,
+-    0x31, 0xbe, 0x54, 0x64, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x1d, 0xb0,
+-    0x37, 0xcc, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x07,
+-    0x37, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x65, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xfe, 0x60,
+-    0x6a, 0x64, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x5b, 0x9a,
+-    0x28, 0x61, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xd7, 0x0d, 0x56, 0x1e,
+-    0x4d, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x4e,
+-    0xaa, 0x37, 0x23, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0x69, 0x66, 0x81,
+-    0xc8, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0f, 0x28, 0x31, 0x9a,
+-    0x2d, 0xe5, 0x79, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0xca, 0x60, 0x45,
+-    0xf7, 0x83, 0x73, 0x5a, 0x01, 0x29, 0xda, 0xf7,
+-
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_e[] = {
+-    0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_msg[] = {
+-    0x82, 0x2e, 0x41, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0x47,
+-    0xec, 0xf1, 0x79, 0xcc, 0x05, 0xef, 0xdb, 0xcd,
+-    0xca, 0x8b, 0x8e, 0x61, 0x45, 0xad, 0xa6, 0xd9,
+-    0xd7, 0x4b, 0x15, 0xf4, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x2a, 0x52,
+-    0xe3, 0x44, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x41,
+-    0x50, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x13, 0x49, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x54,
+-    0x97, 0xfd, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0x5c,
+-    0xc1, 0x37, 0x58, 0x17, 0x63, 0x19, 0x9c, 0xcf,
+-    0xee, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x06, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x47,
+-    0xd1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x59, 0x97, 0x02, 0x01,
+-    0x31, 0x45, 0x8c, 0xe1, 0x5c, 0xac, 0xe7, 0x5f,
+-    0x6a, 0x23, 0xda, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0x25, 0xc6, 0x67,
+-    0xea, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x0f, 0x41,
+-    0xb5, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x7e, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0xaa, 0xbd,
+-    0xe2, 0x8d, 0xad, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x29, 0x70, 0xca,
+-    0x1b, 0x38, 0x21, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0xaf, 0x00,
+-
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_sig[] = {
+-    0x29, 0xa9, 0x3a, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x1b, 0xdb,
+-    0xaf, 0x0b, 0x47, 0x5b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x8c, 0xc3,
+-    0x70, 0xbe, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x65, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1e,
+-    0x95, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x76, 0x79, 0xf1, 0x00,
+-    0x71, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x7b, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0x18,
+-    0xc4, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x31, 0x04, 0x3f, 0xfc,
+-    0x36, 0x06, 0x20, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x62, 0xf2, 0xb5,
+-    0x79, 0x0a, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0x4f,
+-    0x9a, 0x17, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x64, 0x48, 0x09, 0x75,
+-    0xff, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x36, 0xca, 0xca, 0x1d, 0x74,
+-    0x99, 0xbe, 0x5c, 0x94, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xf4,
+-    0x59, 0x7e, 0x17, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0xb1,
+-    0xda, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x34, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x19,
+-    0x0a, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0xef, 0x82,
+-    0xd4, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xbe, 0x15, 0x73, 0xac, 0xef,
+-    0x05, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0x8a, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0x8e, 0xa5,
+-    0xee, 0xfb, 0x28, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xa4, 0x2b, 0xd2,
+-    0x85, 0x2b, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x04,
+-    0xa0, 0x49, 0x24, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xcf,
+-    0x73, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0x70, 0xda, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x5a,
+-    0x28, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xbd, 0x2a, 0x7c,
+-    0x8e, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x8d,
+-    0x76, 0xea, 0x70, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x63, 0x74,
+-    0xbc, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x1b, 0x75,
+-    0x82, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x55, 0xd4, 0xbd,
+-    0x14, 0xde, 0x58, 0x56, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x4e, 0x57,
+-    0x0d, 0x54, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x86, 0x8c, 0xcb, 0x07,
+-    0x9f, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xc2, 0x08, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x05,
+-    0x3b, 0xc8, 0xd2, 0x15, 0x68, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0x3c,
+-    0x4e, 0x85, 0xa9, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xca,
+-    0xca, 0xa8, 0x27, 0x89, 0x61, 0x4e, 0x1f, 0x57,
+-    0x2d, 0x99, 0x10, 0x3f, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x96, 0x5e,
+-    0x2f, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xea, 0x65, 0x2a,
+-    0x22, 0x35, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0x13, 0x89, 0x05, 0x2e,
+-    0x19, 0x73, 0x1d, 0x70, 0x74, 0x98, 0x15, 0x4b,
+-    0xab, 0x56, 0x52, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x42, 0x95, 0x6a,
+-    0x46, 0x2c, 0x78, 0xff, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x48, 0x10,
+-    0x38, 0x25, 0xab, 0x32, 0x7c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x5d,
+-    0x6f, 0x45, 0x54, 0x74, 0x2d, 0x93, 0x56, 0x52,
+-    0x11, 0x34, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x4f,
+-    0x37, 0x14, 0x75, 0xac, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xda,
+-    0x38, 0x06, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x59,
+-    0x1b, 0x5d, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x39, 0x37,
+-    0x44, 0x85, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x06, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x15,
+-    0x35, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x27, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xec,
+-    0x30, 0x37, 0x20, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x11, 0x61, 0xc0,
+-    0xdb, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x26, 0x78, 0x27, 0xb9, 0x13,
+-    0xc9, 0x1a, 0xa7, 0x67, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0xcb,
+-};
+-
+-#define rsa_sigverx931_1_n rsa_sigverx931_0_n
+-#define rsa_sigverx931_1_e rsa_sigverx931_0_e
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_msg[] = {
+-    0x79, 0x02, 0xb9, 0xd2, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x02, 0xc8,
+-    0x2a, 0x94, 0x92, 0x14, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x8d,
+-    0xb2, 0xf6, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0xf9,
+-    0xa8, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xac, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0x34, 0xf3,
+-    0xda, 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x70, 0x92, 0xfb, 0x40, 0x26,
+-    0xc7, 0x9b, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0x10, 0x11, 0xcf, 0x7f,
+-    0x23, 0xd0, 0xed, 0x55, 0x52, 0x6d, 0xd3, 0xb2,
+-    0x56, 0x53, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xb5,
+-    0xfd, 0xd0, 0x45, 0x4f, 0x62, 0x40, 0x54, 0x42,
+-    0x68, 0xd5, 0xe5, 0xdd, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x94, 0x59,
+-    0x1a, 0x57, 0x13, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xcc, 0xbd,
+-    0x4c, 0x2e, 0xc8, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x68, 0xd0, 0x72,
+-    0x6a, 0x94, 0xd2, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x86, 0x45,
+-    0x95, 0xaa, 0x50, 0xda, 0x35, 0xeb, 0x69, 0x44,
+-    0x1f, 0xf3, 0x3a, 0x51, 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x08, 0x42,
+-    0x12, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0x21, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x87, 0x55,
+-};
+-
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_sig[] = {
+-    0x3b, 0xba, 0xb3, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0x29, 0xb5,
+-    0xf9, 0x94, 0xf1, 0x00, 0x5c, 0x16, 0x67, 0x67,
+-    0x73, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x7e, 0x07, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0x95,
+-    0xeb, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0xa9, 0x70, 0x5a,
+-    0xee, 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x69, 0x85, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xe3,
+-    0xdc, 0xe2, 0x73, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x69,
+-    0x08, 0x03, 0x17, 0xd6, 0x50, 0x21, 0x14, 0x23,
+-    0x8c, 0xe6, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x14,
+-    0x81, 0xb1, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0xd2, 0xbe, 0x58, 0x75,
+-    0x94, 0x74, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0xf6, 0x1f,
+-    0x73, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x5f, 0xbd, 0xbf, 0x59, 0x37,
+-    0x5b, 0x98, 0x54, 0xad, 0x3a, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xef,
+-    0xcb, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x84, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0x60,
+-    0xb8, 0xc3, 0x8d, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xa0, 0x91, 0x94,
+-    0xb7, 0xd7, 0xb1, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xee, 0x81, 0x93,
+-    0xfc, 0x41, 0xf0, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x52, 0xde,
+-    0x80, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x68, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0x50, 0x1b,
+-    0x08, 0x3f, 0x40, 0xde, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x81, 0x99,
+-    0x7f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x27, 0xd4, 0xfb,
+-    0xcd, 0xc5, 0x7a, 0xea, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x66, 0xef,
+-    0x55, 0x3f, 0x85, 0xea, 0x84, 0xc5, 0x0a, 0xf6,
+-    0x3c, 0x40, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xbe,
+-    0x61, 0x41, 0xd3, 0xb1, 0x08, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0xf9,
+-    0x6e, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63,
+-    0x3e, 0x41, 0x33, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x27, 0xa4, 0xd9,
+-    0x3a, 0x20, 0x2b, 0x39, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x82, 0x48,
+-    0xd6, 0x5b, 0x58, 0x85, 0x44, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0xfd,
+-    0xfb, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xac, 0xbc, 0xba, 0x16,
+-    0x92, 0x0e, 0x20, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8,
+-    0x00, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x41, 0x46, 0x38, 0xb6, 0x54,
+-    0x70, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x62, 0x97, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x66,
+-    0x5a, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x27, 0x56,
+-    0x60, 0x5b, 0x0c, 0x52, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x99,
+-    0x55, 0x11, 0x62, 0x52, 0x09, 0x48, 0x53, 0x90,
+-    0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe3, 0x4c, 0xe3,
+-    0xa8, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x5c, 0x59, 0x25,
+-    0x99, 0x30, 0xde, 0x57, 0x6a, 0x84, 0x25, 0x34,
+-    0x3e, 0x64, 0x11, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x70,
+-    0xd2, 0x5c, 0x0e, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x24, 0x53, 0x75,
+-    0x98, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x01, 0x6a, 0x14, 0xed, 0xc3,
+-    0x6f, 0xc4, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x59, 0x53,
+-    0x81, 0x3a, 0x86, 0x31, 0xfc, 0x9e, 0xbf, 0x6c,
+-    0x52, 0x93, 0x86, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x07,
+-    0x8a, 0x40, 0x33, 0x64, 0xb2, 0x70, 0x48, 0x85,
+-    0x05, 0x59, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x6b, 0x9a, 0xad, 0xab,
+-    0x20, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x6d, 0xde, 0xcf, 0x22, 0x0b,
+-    0xea, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0x1c, 0x39, 0x3a, 0xfd, 0xa4,
+-    0xde, 0x54, 0xae, 0xde, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb0, 0x6d,
+-};
+-
+ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+     {
+         "pkcs1", /* pkcs1v1.5 */
+@@ -1841,17 +1638,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+         FAIL
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        3072,
+-        "SHA256",
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_msg),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_n),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_e),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_sig),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-        FAIL
+-    },
+     {
+         "pss",
+         4096,
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 8e388e194e665286a8996d7d5926bab5c1a6b4f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:46:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/48] 
+ 0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
+Patch-id: 83
+---
+ include/crypto/evp.h                       |  7 +++++++
+ include/openssl/evp.h                      |  3 +++
+ providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
+index aa07153441..a13127bd59 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
++++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
+@@ -196,6 +196,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_ed448_pkey_method(void);
+ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void);
+ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void);
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++/* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms specifies key
++ * lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and legacy use for
++ * HMAC verification. */
++# define EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
++#endif
++
+ struct evp_mac_st {
+     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
+     int name_id;
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index 86f4e22c70..615857caf5 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -1194,6 +1194,9 @@ void EVP_MD_do_all_provided(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+                             void *arg);
+ 
+ /* MAC stuff */
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
+ 
+ EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
+                        const char *properties);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
++#include "crypto/evp.h"
++
+ #include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
+
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+@@ -244,6 +246,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -265,6 +270,18 @@ static int hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, hmac_block_size(macctx)))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR)) != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        /* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms
++         * specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation
++         * and legacy use for HMAC verification. */
++        if (macctx->keylen < EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.hmac-patch openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+--- openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.hmac-patch	2024-01-02 12:18:16.909596613 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm	2024-01-02 12:20:18.465886160 +0100
+@@ -137,12 +137,13 @@ my %params = (
+ # If "engine",or "properties",are specified, they should always be paired
+ # with "cipher",or "digest".
+ 
+-    'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' =>           '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER',        # utf8 string
+-    'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' =>           '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST',        # utf8 string
+-    'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>       '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES',    # utf8 string
+-    'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' =>             "size",                     # size_t
+-    'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' =>       "block-size",               # size_t
+-    'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' =>    "tls-data-size",            # size_t
++    'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' =>                '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER',        # utf8 string
++    'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST',        # utf8 string
++    'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>            '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES',    # utf8 string
++    'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' =>                  "size",                     # size_t
++    'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' =>            "block-size",               # size_t
++    'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' =>         "tls-data-size",            # size_t
++    'MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",    # size_t
+ 
+ # KDF / PRF parameters
+     'KDF_PARAM_SECRET' =>       "secret",                   # octet string

0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 915990e450e769e370fcacbfd8ed58ab6afaf2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:47:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 39/48] 
+ 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
+Patch-id: 84
+---
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+index 349c3dd657..11820d1e69 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN   (128 / 8)
++/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
++ * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
++ * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
++ * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
++ * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
++ * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
++ * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
++ * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
++ * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
++ *
++ * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
++ * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
++ * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
++ * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
++#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
+ 
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
+@@ -219,9 +234,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
++        if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
++            && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
+         if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+             return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+         if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
+@@ -331,6 +352,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+     }
+ 
+     if (lower_bound_checks) {
++        if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
+         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+             return 0;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From 2306fde5556cbcb875d095c09fed01a0f16fe7ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:51:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 40/48] 0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
+Patch-id: 85
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+index b2f7f7dc4b..af2b0b026c 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+@@ -78,9 +78,23 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+         return 0;
+ #endif
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
+     if (mgf1md == NULL)
+         mgf1md = md;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+     if (mdlen <= 0) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+@@ -203,9 +217,23 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return -1;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     if (mgf1md == NULL)
+         mgf1md = md;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return -1;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ 
+     if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+index bb46ec64c7..c0fdf232da 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+         mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++#endif
++
+     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
+     if (hLen < 0)
+         goto err;
+@@ -168,6 +176,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+         mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++#endif
++
+     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
+     if (hLen < 0)
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 98ee6faef3da1439c04f11cd2796132d27d1e607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:58:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 41/48] 0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
+Patch-id: 88
+---
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 ++++
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index 615857caf5..05f2d0f75a 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -799,6 +799,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                               int *outl);
+ 
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ __owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
+                          EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ __owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index cfaa4841cb..851671cfb1 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -1173,6 +1173,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+         }
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
++            if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
++            } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
++            if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
++    }
++#endif
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1182,6 +1200,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.salt-patch openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+--- openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.salt-patch	2024-01-02 12:23:57.106998142 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm	2024-01-02 12:26:29.687472015 +0100
+@@ -377,17 +377,18 @@ my %params = (
+     'EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM' =>               "kdf-ukm",
+ 
+ # Signature parameters
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' =>       "algorithm-id",
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' =>             '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>         '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' =>        "saltlen",
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' =>        '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' =>    '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' =>        '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' =>         "nonce-type",
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' =>           "instance",
+-    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' =>     "context-string",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' =>          "algorithm-id",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' =>              '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' =>            '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' =>           "saltlen",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' =>       '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' =>           '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' =>            "nonce-type",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' =>              "instance",
++    'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' =>        "context-string",
+ 
+ # Asym cipher parameters
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST' =>                   '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',

0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From afab56d09edb525dd794fcb2ae2295ab7f39400a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:01:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 42/48] 0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
+Patch-id: 91
+---
+ providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+index 365ae3d7d6..8a6f585d0b 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+@@ -265,6 +265,14 @@ static int rsasve_generate(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx,
+             *secretlen = nlen;
+         return 1;
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     /*
+      * Step (2): Generate a random byte string z of nlen bytes where
+      *            1 < z < n - 1
+@@ -308,6 +316,13 @@ static int rsasve_recover(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx,
+         return 1;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     /* Step (2): check the input ciphertext 'inlen' matches the nlen */
+     if (inlen != nlen) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+From 590babb35e3aa399c889282747965e301333a656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:07:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 43/48] 
+ 0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
+Patch-id: 93
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_backend.c                       | 10 ++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c                         | 12 ++--
+ crypto/dh/dh_gen.c                           | 12 +++-
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c                           | 13 ++--
+ crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c                         | 10 +++-
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c |  5 ++
+ test/endecode_test.c                         |  4 +-
+ test/evp_libctx_test.c                       |  2 +-
+ test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c           | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h           |  1 +
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                   |  4 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t               |  3 +
+ 12 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
+index 726843fd30..24c65ca84f 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ int ossl_dh_params_fromdata(DH *dh, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     if (!dh_ffc_params_fromdata(dh, params))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (!ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) {
++        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                       "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                       " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines"
++                       " were removed from FIPS 186-5");
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     param_priv_len =
+         OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN);
+     if (param_priv_len != NULL
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 0b391910d6..75581ca347 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -57,13 +57,15 @@ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+     if (nid != NID_undef)
+         return 1;
++
+     /*
+-     * OR
+-     * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
+-     * validity tests.
++     * FIPS 186-4 explicit domain parameters are no longer supported in FIPS mode.
+      */
+-    return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+-                                              FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++    return 0;
+ }
+ #else
+ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
+index 204662a81c..9961f21920 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
+@@ -39,18 +39,26 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
+ int ossl_dh_generate_ffc_parameters(DH *dh, int type, int pbits, int qbits,
+                                     BN_GENCB *cb)
+ {
+-    int ret, res;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    int res;
++
+     if (type == DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
+         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_2_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
+     else
+-#endif
+         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
++#else
++    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++#endif
+     if (ret > 0)
+         dh->dirty_cnt++;
+     return ret;
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 83773cceea..7e988368d3 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -321,8 +321,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-            if (dh->params.q == NULL)
+-                goto err;
++            ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                           "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer"
++                           " allowed in FIPS mode, since the required"
++                           " generation routines were removed from FIPS"
++                           " 186-5");
++            goto err;
+ #else
+             if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
+                 /* secret exponent length, must satisfy 2^(l-1) <= p */
+@@ -343,9 +347,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                     if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
+                         goto err;
+                 }
+-            } else
+-#endif
+-            {
++            } else {
+                 /* Do a partial check for invalid p, q, g */
+                 if (!ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                      FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL))
+@@ -361,6 +363,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                                                    priv_key))
+                     goto err;
+             }
++#endif
+         }
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+index f201eede0d..30f90d15be 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static DH *ffc_params_generate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx,
+                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
+                                                 pcb);
+     else
+-# endif
+-    /* For FIPS we always use the DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_4 generator */
+-    if (dctx->paramgen_type >= DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
+         rv = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(libctx, &ret->params,
+                                                 FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
+                                                 pcb);
++# else
++    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++# endif
+     if (rv <= 0) {
+         DH_free(ret);
+         return NULL;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+index 9a7dde7c66..b3e7bca5ac 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+@@ -414,6 +414,11 @@ static int dh_validate(const void *keydata, int selection, int checktype)
+     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
+         return 1; /* nothing to validate */
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* In FIPS provider, always check the domain parameters to disallow
++     * operations on keys with FIPS 186-4 params. */
++    selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
++#endif
+     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0) {
+         /*
+          * Both of these functions check parameters. DH_check_params_ex()
+diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
+index 53385028fc..169f3ccd73 100644
+--- a/test/endecode_test.c
++++ b/test/endecode_test.c
+@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *make_template(const char *type, OSSL_PARAM *genparams)
+      * for testing only. Use a minimum key size of 2048 for security purposes.
+      */
+     if (strcmp(type, "DH") == 0)
+-        return get_dh512(keyctx);
++        return get_dh2048(keyctx);
+ 
+     if (strcmp(type, "X9.42 DH") == 0)
+-        return get_dhx512(keyctx);
++        return get_dhx_ffdhe2048(keyctx);
+ # endif
+ 
+     /*
+diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+index a7913cda4c..96a35ac1cc 100644
+--- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
++++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static int do_dh_param_keygen(int tstid, const BIGNUM **bn)
+ 
+     if (!TEST_ptr(gen_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey_parm, NULL))
+         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gen_ctx), 0)
+-        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey), expected))
++        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey) == 1, expected))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (expected) {
+diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
+index 4bdadc4143..e5186e4b4a 100644
+--- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
++++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,68 @@ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+                           dhx512_q, sizeof(dhx512_q));
+ }
+ 
++EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
++{
++    /* This is RFC 7919 ffdhe2048, since Red Hat removes support for
++     * non-well-known groups in FIPS mode. */
++    static unsigned char dhx_p[] = {
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58,
++        0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
++        0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41,
++        0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb, 0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
++        0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8, 0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02,
++        0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
++        0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0, 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55,
++        0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
++        0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77, 0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda,
++        0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
++        0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82,
++        0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
++        0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3,
++        0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
++        0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1,
++        0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
++        0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff, 0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32,
++        0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83, 0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
++        0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83,
++        0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2, 0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
++        0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++    };
++    static unsigned char dhx_g[] = {
++        0x02
++    };
++    static unsigned char dhx_q[] = {
++        0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c,
++        0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d, 0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
++        0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20,
++        0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
++        0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01,
++        0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd, 0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
++        0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68, 0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa,
++        0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
++        0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed,
++        0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
++        0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1,
++        0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
++        0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51,
++        0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
++        0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70,
++        0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76, 0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
++        0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19,
++        0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
++        0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02, 0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1,
++        0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
++        0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++    };
++
++    return get_dh_from_pg(libctx, "X9.42 DH",
++                          dhx_p, sizeof(dhx_p),
++                          dhx_g, sizeof(dhx_g),
++                          dhx_q, sizeof(dhx_q));
++}
++
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+     static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
+index f0e8709062..2ff6d6e721 100644
+--- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
++++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
++EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libct);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh4096(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 2a459856f0..afac836fa3 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -627,10 +627,10 @@ my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
+     ],
+ 
+     [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH",
+-      [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
++      [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
+         "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
+         "-in", "{output}.cms", "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&final_compare
+     ]
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index 527abcea6e..e1d38b1e62 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ sub testssl {
+             skip "skipping dhe1024dsa test", 1
+                 if ($no_dh);
+ 
++            skip "FIPS 186-4 type DH groups are no longer supported by the FIPS provider", 1
++                if $provider eq "fips";
++
+             ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])),
+                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
+           }
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 5db03a4d024f1e396ff54d38ac70d9890b034074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:10:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/48] 
+ 0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
+Patch-id: 110
+---
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
+ .../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c    |  4 +++
+ .../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c                | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index 05f2d0f75a..f1a33ff6f2 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -748,6 +748,10 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ 
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ __owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                            const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ __owur int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
+index fa383165d8..716add7339 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_aead_known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN, NULL, 0),
++    /* normally we would hide this under an #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but that does
++     * not work in ciphercommon.c because it is compiled only once into
++     * libcommon.a */
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_cipher_aead_gettable_ctx_params(
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+@@ -224,6 +224,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             break;
+         }
+     }
++
++    /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
++     * ciphercommon_gcm.c is only compiled once into libcommon.a, so ifdefs do
++     * not work here. */
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
++         * uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
++         * this. This provides an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be
++         * generated internally at its entirety randomly." Note that one of the
++         * conditions of this option is that "The IV length shall be at least
++         * 96 bits (per SP 800-38D)." We do not specically check for this
++         * condition here, because gcm_iv_generate will fail in this case. */
++        if (ctx->enc && !ctx->iv_gen_rand)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.ivgen-patch openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+--- openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.ivgen-patch	2024-01-02 12:29:45.119433637 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm	2024-01-02 12:33:09.146723045 +0100
+@@ -101,8 +101,9 @@ my %params = (
+     'CIPHER_PARAM_SPEED' =>                "speed",       # uint
+     'CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE' =>             "cts_mode",    # utf8_string
+ # For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form
+-    'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' =>  "alg_id_param",# octet_string
+-    'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' =>         "xts_standard",# utf8_string
++    'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' =>   "alg_id_param",# octet_string
++    'CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator", # int
++    'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' =>          "xts_standard",# utf8_string
+ 
+     'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT' =>  "tls1multi_maxsndfrag",# uint
+     'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE' =>        "tls1multi_maxbufsz",  # size_t

0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 48c763ed9cc889806bc01222382ce6f918a408a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:12:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 46/48] 
+ 0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
+Patch-id: 112
+---
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+index 11820d1e69..bae2238ab5 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+@@ -284,11 +284,42 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ 
+ static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
++            != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        /* The lower_bound_checks parameter enables checks required by FIPS. If
++         * those checks are disabled, the PBKDF2 implementation will also
++         * support non-approved parameters (e.g., salt lengths < 16 bytes, see
++         * NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1). */
++        if (!ctx->lower_bound_checks)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -296,6 +327,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+From 136988155862ce2b45683ef8045e7a8cdd11e215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:13:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 47/48] 0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
+Patch-id: 113
+---
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  2 ++
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 22 ++++++++++++++
+ providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c       | 30 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index f1a33ff6f2..dadbf46a5a 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -1767,6 +1767,10 @@ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 size_t EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(void);
+ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(size_t idx);
+ # endif
+ 
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
+                                const char *properties);
+ int EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index d169bfd396..bd4dcb4e27 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -466,6 +466,27 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
++         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
++         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
++         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
++         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
++         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
++         * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP as unapproved until
++         * we have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such
++         * as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
++        fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -480,6 +501,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+ #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+index 8a6f585d0b..f4b7415074 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+@@ -152,11 +152,39 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
+ static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM *p;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (ctx == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
++         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
++         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for key agreement or key transport, but
++         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
++         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
++         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
++         * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSASVE unapproved until we
++         * have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such as
++         * OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+-    return ctx != NULL;
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_rsakem_ctx_params[] = {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+diff -up openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.kem-patch openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+--- openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm.kem-patch	2024-01-02 12:49:04.598756268 +0100
++++ openssl-3.2.0/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm	2024-01-02 12:53:16.466464414 +0100
+@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ my %params = (
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' =>   "tls-negotiated-version",
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' =>       "implicit-rejection",
+     'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' =>     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
++    'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' =>    "redhat-fips-indicator",
+ 
+ # Encoder / decoder parameters
+ 
+@@ -438,8 +439,9 @@ my %params = (
+     'SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT' =>     "kat",
+ 
+ # KEM parameters
+-    'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' =>            "operation",
+-    'KEM_PARAM_IKME' =>                 "ikme",
++    'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' =>             "operation",
++    'KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
++    'KEM_PARAM_IKME' =>                  "ikme",
+ 
+ # Capabilities
+ 

0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+From 9b02ad7225b74a5b9088b361caead0a41e570e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:40:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 48/48] 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
+Patch-id: 114
+Patch-status: |
+    # We believe that some changes present in CentOS are not necessary
+    # because ustream has a check for FIPS version
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod                     |  3 +++
+ doc/man5/fips_config.pod                      | 13 +++++++++++
+ include/openssl/fips_names.h                  |  8 +++++++
+ include/openssl/ssl.h.in                      |  1 +
+ providers/fips/fipsprov.c                     |  2 +-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c     | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
+ ssl/ssl_conf.c                                |  1 +
+ ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c                  |  8 ++++++-
+ ssl/t1_enc.c                                  | 11 ++++++++--
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt     | 10 +++++++++
+ test/sslapitest.c                             |  2 +-
+ 11 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+index ae6ca43282..b83c04a308 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended master secret extension, enabled by
+ default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
+ B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
+ 
++B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
++This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
++
+ B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
+ default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
+ B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
+diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+index 1c15e32a5c..f2cedaf88d 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ for more information.
+ 
+ This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+ 
++Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
++OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
++should have format
++
++ [fips_sect]
++ tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
++ activate = 1
++
++The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
++presence of extended master secret or not.
++
++The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+index 5c77f6d691..8cdd5a6bf7 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern "C" {
+  */
+ # define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_DRBG_TRUNC_DIGEST  "drbg-no-trunc-md"
+ 
++/*
++ * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
++ * This is disabled by default.
++ *
++ * Type: OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
++ */
++# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"
++
+ # ifdef __cplusplus
+ }
+ # endif
+diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+index 0b6de603e2..26a69ca282 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
++++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL *s, void *arg);
+      * interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
+      */
+ # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG                     SSL_OP_BIT(31)
++# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS                     SSL_OP_BIT(48)
+ /*
+  * Disable RFC8879 certificate compression
+  * SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION: don't send compressed certificates,
+diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+index 5ff9872bd8..eb9653a9df 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
++++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     if (fgbl == NULL)
+         return NULL;
+     init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_security_checks, 1);
+-    init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 0); /* Disabled by default */
++    init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 1); /* Enabled by default */
+     init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 0);
+     return fgbl;
+ }
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+index 25a6c79a2e..79bc7a9719 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
+ static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
+ {
+     TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ 
+     if (ctx != NULL) {
+         kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
+@@ -222,6 +223,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    /*
++     * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
++     * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
++     * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
++     * as "extended master secret".
++     */
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++            && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
++                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
++    ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
++        if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++                && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
++                          TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++
+     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
+                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
+                         ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+index 5146cedb96..086db98c33 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
+                      SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
++        SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+index 00b1ee531e..22cdabb308 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include "../ssl_local.h"
+ #include "statem_local.h"
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION     1
+ 
+@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                                   unsigned int context,
+                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+ {
+-    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
++    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
++        if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
++            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
++        }
+         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
++    }
+ 
+     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+             || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 91238e6457..e8ad8ecd9e 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/trace.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+ static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+     }
+ 
+  err:
+-    if (fatal)
+-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    if (fatal) {
++        /* The calls to this function are local so it's safe to implement the check */
++        if (FIPS_mode() && seed1_len >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++            && memcmp(seed1, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
++	else
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    }
+     else
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
+index 44040ff66b..deb6bf3fcb 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
+@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587c
+ Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+ Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+ 
++Availablein = fips
++KDF = TLS1-PRF
++Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
++Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
++Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
++Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
++Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
++Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
++Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
++
+ FIPSversion = <=3.1.0
+ KDF = TLS1-PRF
+ Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 169e3c7466..e67b5bb44c 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int test_client_cert_verify_cb(void)
+     STACK_OF(X509) *server_chain;
+     SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+     SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+-    int testresult = 0;
++    int testresult = 0, status;
+ 
+     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+                                        TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION, 0,
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 42ed594a3a905830374fb65cced431748f8c639c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2024 11:50:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/50] 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
+Patch-id: 115
+Patch-status: |
+    # Amend tests according to Fedora/RHEL code
+---
+ test/quicapitest.c                     |  4 +++-
+ test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t |  1 +
+ test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t   | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/quicapitest.c b/test/quicapitest.c
+index 41cf0fc7a8..0fb7492700 100644
+--- a/test/quicapitest.c
++++ b/test/quicapitest.c
+@@ -2139,7 +2139,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(test_cipher_find);
+     ADD_TEST(test_version);
+ #if defined(DO_SSL_TRACE_TEST)
+-    ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
++    if (is_fips == 0) {
++        ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
++    }
+ #endif
+     ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis_ctx);
+     ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
+index c837d48fb4..f06ef04b1a 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file);
++use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file with);
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ BEGIN {
+@@ -31,28 +31,37 @@ run(test(["fips_version_test", "-config", $provconf, ">=3.1.0"]),
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skip RSA test because of no rsa in this build", 1
+         if disabled("rsa");
++    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
++    sub {
+     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
+                  "-pairwise", "rsa"])),
+        "fips provider rsa keygen pairwise failure test");
++    });
+ }
+ 
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skip EC test because of no ec in this build", 2
+         if disabled("ec");
++    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
++    sub {
+     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
+                  "-pairwise", "ec"])),
+        "fips provider ec keygen pairwise failure test");
++    });
+ 
+     skip "FIPS provider version is too old", 1
+         if !$fips_exit;
++    with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
++    sub {
+     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
+                  "-pairwise", "eckat"])),
+        "fips provider ec keygen kat failure test");
++    });
+ }
+ 
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Skip DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 2
+-        if disabled("dsa");
++        if 1; #if disabled("dsa");
+     ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
+                  "-pairwise", "dsa", "-dsaparam", data_file("dsaparam.pem")])),
+        "fips provider dsa keygen pairwise failure test");
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

0116-version-aliasing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From a2673b5e2e95bcf54a1746bfd409cca688275e75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 46/49] 0116-version-aliasing.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0116-version-aliasing.patch
+Patch-id: 116
+Patch-status: |
+    # Add version aliasing due to
+    # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23534
+From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
+---
+ crypto/evp/digest.c                    | 7 ++++++-
+ crypto/evp/evp_enc.c                   | 7 ++++++-
+ test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t | 1 +
+ util/libcrypto.num                     | 2 ++
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+index 42331703da..3a280acc0e 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+@@ -553,7 +553,12 @@ legacy:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
++EVP_MD_CTX
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
++                    symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
++#endif
++*EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
+ {
+     EVP_MD_CTX *out = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+index e9faf31057..5a29b8dbb7 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+@@ -1444,7 +1444,12 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key)
+ #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ }
+ 
+-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
++EVP_CIPHER_CTX
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
++                    symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
++#endif
++*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
+ {
+     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
+index 222b1886ae..7e2f65cccb 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
++++ b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
+@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ foreach (sort keys %stlibname) {
+     }
+ }
+ my @duplicates = sort grep { $symbols{$_} > 1 } keys %symbols;
++@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") && ($_ ne "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup") && ($_ ne "EVP_MD_CTX_dup") } @duplicates;
++@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_strcasecmp") && ($_ ne "OPENSSL_strncasecmp") } @duplicates;
+ if (@duplicates) {
+     note "Duplicates:";
+     note join('\n', @duplicates);
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 8046454025..068e9904e2 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -5435,7 +5435,9 @@ X509_PUBKEY_set0_public_key             5562	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free                 5563	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OSSL_trace_string                       5564	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_dup                          5565	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++EVP_MD_CTX_dup                          ?	    3_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup                      5566	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup                      ?    	3_1_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ BN_signed_bin2bn                        5567	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ BN_signed_bn2bin                        5568	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ BN_signed_lebin2bn                      5569	3_2_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+From 242c746690dd1d0e500fa554c60536877d77776d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 17:08:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 47/49] 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
+
+Patch-name: 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
+Patch-id: 117
+Patch-status: |
+    # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23050
+---
+ CHANGES.md                        | 13 +++++++
+ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod  |  6 ++-
+ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod | 11 +++++-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c                      | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ test/sslapitest.c                 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
+index ca29762ac2..4e21d0ddf9 100644
+--- a/CHANGES.md
++++ b/CHANGES.md
+@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ OpenSSL 3.2
+ 
+ ### Changes between 3.2.0 and 3.2.1 [30 Jan 2024]
+ 
++ * Unknown entries in TLS SignatureAlgorithms, ClientSignatureAlgorithms
++   config options and the respective calls to SSL[_CTX]_set1_sigalgs() and
++   SSL[_CTX]_set1_client_sigalgs() that start with `?` character are
++   ignored and the configuration will still be used.
++
++   Similarly unknown entries that start with `?` character in a TLS
++   Groups config option or set with SSL[_CTX]_set1_groups_list() are ignored
++   and the configuration will still be used.
++
++   In both cases if the resulting list is empty, an error is returned.
++
++   *Tomáš Mráz*
++
+  * A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from
+    an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be
+    NULL, but OpenSSL did not correctly check for this case. A fix has been
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
+index c26ef00306..f0566e148e 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
+@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ string B<list>. The string is a colon separated list of group names, for example
+ are B<P-256>, B<P-384>, B<P-521>, B<X25519>, B<X448>, B<brainpoolP256r1tls13>,
+ B<brainpoolP384r1tls13>, B<brainpoolP512r1tls13>, B<ffdhe2048>, B<ffdhe3072>,
+ B<ffdhe4096>, B<ffdhe6144> and B<ffdhe8192>. Support for other groups may be
+-added by external providers.
++added by external providers. If a group name is preceded with the C<?>
++character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
+ 
+ SSL_set1_groups() and SSL_set1_groups_list() are similar except they set
+ supported groups for the SSL structure B<ssl>.
+@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ The curve functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group
+ functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. The SSL_get_negotiated_group() function
+ was added in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
+ 
++Support for ignoring unknown groups in SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() and
++SSL_set1_groups_list() was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2013-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
+index eb31006346..5b7de7d956 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
+@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ signature algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The B<str> parameter
+ must be a null terminated string consisting of a colon separated list of
+ elements, where each element is either a combination of a public key
+ algorithm and a digest separated by B<+>, or a TLS 1.3-style named
+-SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256.
++SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256. If a list entry is preceded
++with the C<?> character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
++
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(),
+ SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set
+@@ -106,6 +108,13 @@ using a string:
+ L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)>,
+ L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>
+ 
++=head1 HISTORY
++
++Support for ignoring unknown signature algorithms in
++SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(), SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(),
++SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list()
++was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 056aae3863..fe680449c5 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1052,9 +1052,15 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+     size_t i;
+     uint16_t gid = 0;
+     char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
++    int ignore_unknown = 0;
+ 
+     if (elem == NULL)
+         return 0;
++    if (elem[0] == '?') {
++        ignore_unknown = 1;
++        ++elem;
++        --len;
++    }
+     if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
+         uint16_t *tmp =
+             OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
+@@ -1070,13 +1076,14 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+ 
+     gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
+     if (gid == 0) {
+-        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+-                       "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
+-        return 0;
++        /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
++        return ignore_unknown;
+     }
+     for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
+-        if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
+-            return 0;
++        if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
++            /* Duplicate group - ignore */
++            return 1;
++        }
+     garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -1097,6 +1104,11 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+     gcb.ctx = ctx;
+     if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
+         goto end;
++    if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
++        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
++                       "No valid groups in '%s'", str);
++        goto end;
++    }
+     if (pext == NULL) {
+         ret = 1;
+         goto end;
+@@ -2905,8 +2917,15 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+     const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+     char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
+     int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
++    int ignore_unknown = 0;
++
+     if (elem == NULL)
+         return 0;
++    if (elem[0] == '?') {
++        ignore_unknown = 1;
++        ++elem;
++        --len;
++    }
+     if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
+         return 0;
+     if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+@@ -2931,8 +2950,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+                     break;
+                 }
+             }
+-            if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
+-                return 0;
++            if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
++                /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
++                return ignore_unknown;
++            }
+         }
+     } else {
+         *p = 0;
+@@ -2940,8 +2961,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+             return 0;
+         get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
+         get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
+-        if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
+-            return 0;
++        if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
++            /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
++            return ignore_unknown;
++        }
+         for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+              i++, s++) {
+             if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
+@@ -2949,15 +2972,17 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+                 break;
+             }
+         }
+-        if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
+-            return 0;
++        if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
++            /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
++            return ignore_unknown;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+-    /* Reject duplicates */
++    /* Ignore duplicates */
+     for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
+         if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
+             sarg->sigalgcnt--;
+-            return 0;
++            return 1;
+         }
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -2973,6 +2998,11 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+     }
+     if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+         return 0;
++    if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
++        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
++                       "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
++        return 0;
++    }
+     if (c == NULL)
+         return 1;
+     return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 1c14f93ed1..184a0f1055 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "testutil.h"
+ #include "testutil/output.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
++#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
+ #include "internal/ktls.h"
+ #include "../ssl/ssl_local.h"
+ #include "../ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h"
+@@ -3147,6 +3148,7 @@ static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = {
+     {validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0},
+ # endif
+     {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1},
++    {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:?Invalid", 1, 1},
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1},
+     {NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0},
+@@ -9276,6 +9278,64 @@ static int test_servername(int tst)
+     return testresult;
+ }
+ 
++static int test_unknown_sigalgs_groups(void)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = SSL_CTX_new_ex(libctx, NULL, TLS_server_method())))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx,
++                                               "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
++                                               0))
++        goto end;
++    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgslen, 2)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx,
++                                                      "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
++                                                      0))
++        goto end;
++    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgslen, 2)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
++                                              "nonexistent"),
++                                              0))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
++                                              "?nonexistent1:?nonexistent2:?nonexistent3"),
++                                              0))
++        goto end;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++    if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
++                                              "P-256:nonexistent"),
++                                              0))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
++                                              "P-384:?nonexistent:?P-521"),
++                                              0))
++        goto end;
++    if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, 2)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[0], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
++        || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[1], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1))
++        goto end;
++#endif
++
++    ret = 1;
++ end:
++    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
+     && (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
+ /*
+@@ -11519,6 +11579,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multiblock_write, OSSL_NELEM(multiblock_cipherlist_data));
+ #endif
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_servername, 10);
++    ADD_TEST(test_unknown_sigalgs_groups);
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
+     && (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_sigalgs_available, 6);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms	2023-05-18 14:03:56.360555106 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c	2023-05-18 14:13:33.765183185 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
+ static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+@@ -810,12 +811,16 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+     if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+         if (!cipher) {
++            if (FIPS_mode()) {
++                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_128_cbc();
++            } else {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-            cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
++                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ #else
+-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
+-            goto end;
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
++                goto end;
+ #endif
++           }
+         }
+ 
+         if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) {
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms	2023-05-22 10:06:50.276528155 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c	2023-05-22 10:08:58.406073945 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
+ #include "crypto/asn1.h"
+ #include "crypto/evp.h"
+@@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(C
+             return 0;
+         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
+             return 0;
++        if (FIPS_mode()) {
++            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
++                return 0;
++        }
+     } else if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+@@ -484,6 +489,11 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encryp
+ 
+         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+             goto err;
++
++        if (FIPS_mode()) {
++            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
++                goto err;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)

0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c
+--- openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx	2024-04-15 10:14:47.292448045 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c	2024-04-15 10:15:23.428396994 +0200
+@@ -1020,9 +1020,10 @@ static int execute_test_large_message(co
+ /* sock must be connected */
+ static int ktls_chk_platform(int sock)
+ {
+-    if (!ktls_enable(sock))
++/*    if (!ktls_enable(sock))
+         return 0;
+-    return 1;
++    return 1; */
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int ping_pong_query(SSL *clientssl, SSL *serverssl)

0123-kdf-Preserve-backward-compatibility-with-older-provi.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From a4daab0c29bce044d385bdeada177a88c32cba4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 16:48:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix regression of EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() with older
+ providers
+
+If there is no get_ctx_params() implemented in the key exchange
+provider implementation the fallback will not work. Instead
+check the gettable_ctx_params() to see if the fallback should be
+performed.
+
+Fixes #24611
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24661)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 663dbc9c9c897392a9f9d18aa9a8400ca024dc5d)
+---
+ crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+index 2caff2cd6d..d15e43be05 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
+                                           int datalen)
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM os_params[2];
++    const OSSL_PARAM *gettables;
+     unsigned char *info = NULL;
+     size_t info_len = 0;
+     size_t info_alloc = 0;
+@@ -1049,6 +1050,12 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
+         return 1;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Check for older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
++    gettables = EVP_PKEY_CTX_gettable_params(ctx);
++    if (gettables == NULL || OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(gettables, param) == NULL)
++        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl,
++                                              data, datalen);
++
+     /* Get the original value length */
+     os_params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(param, NULL, 0);
+     os_params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+@@ -1056,9 +1063,9 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
+     if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, os_params))
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    /* Older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
++    /* This should not happen but check to be sure. */
+     if (os_params[0].return_size == OSSL_PARAM_UNMODIFIED)
+-        return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl, data, datalen);
++        return 0;
+ 
+     info_alloc = os_params[0].return_size + datalen;
+     if (info_alloc == 0)
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0125-PBMAC1-PKCS12-FIPS-default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.2.2/apps/pkcs12.c.xxx openssl-3.2.2/apps/pkcs12.c
+--- openssl-3.2.2/apps/pkcs12.c.xxx	2024-08-14 11:24:41.164589397 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.2/apps/pkcs12.c	2024-08-14 11:28:21.071004221 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+@@ -708,6 +709,9 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         }
+ 
+         if (maciter != -1) {
++            if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
++                pbmac1_pbkdf2 = 1;
++
+             if (pbmac1_pbkdf2 == 1) {
+                 if (!PKCS12_set_pbmac1_pbkdf2(p12, mpass, -1, NULL,
+                                               macsaltlen, maciter,

0126-pkeyutl-encap.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+From 77a0eabe15b9c8c0fb5fde27f6ce1c593c278e20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 17:17:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Support of en/decapsulation in the pkeyutl command
+
+---
+ apps/pkeyutl.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+index b5390c64c2a81..a14ad88217823 100644
+--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
++++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                               const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+                               char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+                               const int impl, int rawin, EVP_PKEY **ppkey,
+-                              EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, const char *digestname,
++                              EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, const char *digestname, const char *kemop,
+                               OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
+ 
+ static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+ 
+ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
+-                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
++                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
++                    unsigned char *secret, size_t *psecretlen);
+ 
+ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx,
+                         EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in,
+@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
+     OPT_DERIVE, OPT_SIGFILE, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PEERKEY, OPT_PASSIN,
+     OPT_PEERFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_PKEYOPT_PASSIN, OPT_KDF,
+     OPT_KDFLEN, OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_PROV_ENUM,
++    OPT_DECAP, OPT_ENCAP, OPT_SECOUT, OPT_KEMOP,
+     OPT_CONFIG,
+     OPT_RAWIN, OPT_DIGEST
+ } OPTION_CHOICE;
+@@ -64,6 +66,8 @@ const OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+     {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt input data with public key"},
+     {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt input data with private key"},
+     {"derive", OPT_DERIVE, '-', "Derive shared secret"},
++    {"decap", OPT_DECAP, '-', "Decapsulate shared secret"},
++    {"encap", OPT_ENCAP, '-', "Encapsulate shared secret"},
+     OPT_CONFIG_OPTION,
+ 
+     OPT_SECTION("Input"),
+@@ -81,12 +85,13 @@ const OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+ 
+     OPT_SECTION("Output"),
+     {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"},
++    {"secret", OPT_SECOUT, '>', "File to store secret on encapsulation"},
+     {"asn1parse", OPT_ASN1PARSE, '-', "asn1parse the output data"},
+     {"hexdump", OPT_HEXDUMP, '-', "Hex dump output"},
+     {"verifyrecover", OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, '-',
+      "Verify with public key, recover original data"},
+ 
+-    OPT_SECTION("Signing/Derivation"),
++    OPT_SECTION("Signing/Derivation/Encapsulation"),
+     {"digest", OPT_DIGEST, 's',
+      "Specify the digest algorithm when signing the raw input data"},
+     {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Public key options as opt:value"},
+@@ -94,6 +99,7 @@ const OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+      "Public key option that is read as a passphrase argument opt:passphrase"},
+     {"kdf", OPT_KDF, 's', "Use KDF algorithm"},
+     {"kdflen", OPT_KDFLEN, 'p', "KDF algorithm output length"},
++    {"kemop", OPT_KEMOP, 's', "KEM operation specific to the key algorithm"},
+ 
+     OPT_R_OPTIONS,
+     OPT_PROV_OPTIONS,
+@@ -103,23 +109,23 @@ const OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = {
+ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+     CONF *conf = NULL;
+-    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
++    BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *secout = NULL;
+     ENGINE *e = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+-    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *sigfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
++    char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *secoutfile = NULL, *sigfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
+     char hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, rev = 0, *prog;
+-    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
++    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL, *secret = NULL;
+     OPTION_CHOICE o;
+     int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1;
+     int keyform = FORMAT_UNDEF, peerform = FORMAT_UNDEF;
+     int keysize = -1, pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY;
+     int engine_impl = 0;
+     int ret = 1, rv = -1;
+-    size_t buf_outlen;
++    size_t buf_outlen = 0, secretlen = 0;
+     const char *inkey = NULL;
+     const char *peerkey = NULL;
+-    const char *kdfalg = NULL, *digestname = NULL;
++    const char *kdfalg = NULL, *digestname = NULL, *kemop = NULL;
+     int kdflen = 0;
+     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL;
+     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts_passin = NULL;
+@@ -147,6 +153,9 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         case OPT_OUT:
+             outfile = opt_arg();
+             break;
++        case OPT_SECOUT:
++            secoutfile = opt_arg();
++            break;
+         case OPT_SIGFILE:
+             sigfile = opt_arg();
+             break;
+@@ -216,6 +225,15 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         case OPT_DERIVE:
+             pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+             break;
++        case OPT_DECAP:
++            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE;
++            break;
++        case OPT_ENCAP:
++            pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE;
++            break;
++        case OPT_KEMOP:
++            kemop = opt_arg();
++            break;
+         case OPT_KDF:
+             pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+             key_type = KEY_NONE;
+@@ -303,7 +321,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     }
+     ctx = init_ctx(kdfalg, &keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type,
+                    passinarg, pkey_op, e, engine_impl, rawin, &pkey,
+-                   mctx, digestname, libctx, app_get0_propq());
++                   mctx, digestname, kemop, libctx, app_get0_propq());
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+         BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error initializing context\n", prog);
+         goto end;
+@@ -387,7 +405,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+         goto end;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) {
++    if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE) {
+         in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY);
+         if (infile != NULL) {
+             struct stat st;
+@@ -402,6 +420,16 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     if (out == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
++    if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE) {
++        if (secoutfile == NULL) {
++            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Encapsulation requires '-secret' argument\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
++        secout = bio_open_default(secoutfile, 'w', FORMAT_BINARY);
++        if (secout == NULL)
++            goto end;
++    }
++
+     if (sigfile != NULL) {
+         BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb");
+ 
+@@ -473,13 +501,15 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+             rv = 1;
+         } else {
+             rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+-                          buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++                          buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen, NULL, (size_t *)&secretlen);
+         }
+         if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
+             buf_out = app_malloc(buf_outlen, "buffer output");
++            if (secretlen > 0)
++                secret = app_malloc(secretlen, "secret output");
+             rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op,
+                           buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
+-                          buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
++                          buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen, secret, (size_t *)&secretlen);
+         }
+     }
+     if (rv <= 0) {
+@@ -500,6 +530,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     } else {
+         BIO_write(out, buf_out, buf_outlen);
+     }
++    if (secretlen > 0)
++        BIO_write(secout, secret, secretlen);
+ 
+  end:
+     if (ret != 0)
+@@ -510,9 +542,11 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     release_engine(e);
+     BIO_free(in);
+     BIO_free_all(out);
++    BIO_free_all(secout);
+     OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
+     OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
+     OPENSSL_free(sig);
++    OPENSSL_free(secret);
+     sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts);
+     sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts_passin);
+     NCONF_free(conf);
+@@ -524,7 +558,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+                               char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+                               const int engine_impl, int rawin,
+                               EVP_PKEY **ppkey, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, const char *digestname,
+-                              OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
++                              const char *kemop, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+@@ -642,6 +676,18 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize,
+         case EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE:
+             rv = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx);
+             break;
++
++        case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE:
++            rv = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL);
++            if (rv > 0 && kemop != NULL)
++                rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(ctx, kemop);
++            break;
++
++        case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE:
++            rv = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL);
++            if (rv > 0 && kemop != NULL)
++                rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(ctx, kemop);
++            break;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -679,7 +725,8 @@ static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file,
+ 
+ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+                     unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
+-                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
++                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
++                    unsigned char *secret, size_t *pseclen)
+ {
+     int rv = 0;
+     switch (pkey_op) {
+@@ -703,6 +750,14 @@ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
+         rv = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, out, poutlen);
+         break;
+ 
++    case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE:
++        rv = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, poutlen, secret, pseclen);
++        break;
++
++    case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE:
++        rv = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen);
++        break;
++
+     }
+     return rv;
+ }
+
+From 1598da873df55887c2d878549f74b7aaed6d5fde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 17:50:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Encap/decap in pkeyutl - documentation
+
+---
+ doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+index 50c2030aa353c..9de50dd6cee8f 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
+ [B<-rawin>]
+ [B<-digest> I<algorithm>]
+ [B<-out> I<file>]
++[B<-secret> I<file>]
+ [B<-sigfile> I<file>]
+ [B<-inkey> I<filename>|I<uri>]
+ [B<-keyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>|B<ENGINE>]
+@@ -28,8 +29,11 @@ B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
+ [B<-encrypt>]
+ [B<-decrypt>]
+ [B<-derive>]
++[B<-encap>]
++[B<-decap>]
+ [B<-kdf> I<algorithm>]
+ [B<-kdflen> I<length>]
++[B<-kemop> I<operation>]
+ [B<-pkeyopt> I<opt>:I<value>]
+ [B<-pkeyopt_passin> I<opt>[:I<passarg>]]
+ [B<-hexdump>]
+@@ -79,6 +83,10 @@ then the B<-rawin> option must be also specified.
+ Specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+ default.
+ 
++=item B<-secret> I<filename>
++
++Specifies the output filename to write the secret to on I<-encap>.
++
+ =item B<-sigfile> I<file>
+ 
+ Signature file, required for B<-verify> operations only
+@@ -147,6 +155,31 @@ Decrypt the input data using a private key.
+ 
+ Derive a shared secret using the peer key.
+ 
++=item B<-encap>
++
++Encapsulate a generated secret using a private key.
++The encapsulated result (binary data) is written to standard output by default,
++or else to the file specified with I<-out>.
++The I<-secret> option must also be provided to specify the output file for the
++secret value generated in the encapsulation process.
++
++=item B<-decap>
++
++Decapsulate the secret using a private key.
++The result (binary data) is written to standard output by default, or else to
++the file specified with I<-out>.
++
++=item B<-kemop> I<operation>
++
++This option is used for I<-encap>/I<-decap> commands and specifies the KEM
++operation specific for the key algorithm when there is no default KEM
++operation.
++If the algorithm has the default KEM operation, this option can be omitted.
++
++See L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op(3)> and algorithm-specific KEM documentation e.g.
++L<EVP_KEM-RSA(7)>, L<EVP_KEM-EC(7)>, L<EVP_KEM-X25519(7)>, and
++L<EVP_KEM-X448(7)>.
++
+ =item B<-kdf> I<algorithm>
+ 
+ Use key derivation function I<algorithm>.  The supported algorithms are
+
+From 1fe7d5b3d96e2ce1e822a4e6e042959af55b0145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 13:45:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Encap/decap in pkeyutl - tests
+
+---
+ test/decap_out.bin             |  3 +++
+ test/encap_out.bin             |  4 ++++
+ test/encap_secret.bin          |  3 +++
+ test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/decap_out.bin
+ create mode 100644 test/encap_out.bin
+ create mode 100644 test/encap_secret.bin
+
+diff --git a/test/decap_out.bin b/test/decap_out.bin
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..b94441ed1c002
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/decap_out.bin
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++6žW«¡ŠòÌn‘©ú;’ù<1B>¡ÃÄmç Ä¥ÉB[HãÕË#äÓ‡(™‡hŽ]:\³PŸ›xñe¡ƒŽbòé)G¿fõÈ"¨ýË­fË	ÊýJÝ)ïþÜ<02>ì{ªHm‚\Pú<C383>+¸PÞ¸%èÄ/jÏ™%ç؆È<_æ~–
++K—JEhßù‡©lEa¼:¢(Ÿå/\Ñ®Íb<C38D>€Ã®©Ê×È-g,AYœ‹4<E280B9>
++l<>ÚtÚN­)~\<5C>HU4
yáŸ	}qJŸ€”t#<0C>¦}.™üTÅý”?ÚØÏŠÐÿcD=üLõ¨nmv<6D>{—éÅ¿Ô‹È£®
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/encap_out.bin b/test/encap_out.bin
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..024fc40550f15
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/encap_out.bin
+@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
++¼:÷Ùy‚Ä<E2809A>‰5°ã ÿÙ[Û2ê<¾ê?«î±qÕª1·µŒ¸ºæÝ>YÎM寬3PÝ
++ìÛO’2rÈÙŠíùAd"Gç„m‡2mÏÄ7x•Ñhú7-ÿ@:?NµÇrSê‹œKÁ¡žè`«t¥ÉŸªÓxié头'	Mhøñ‘˜3r<><1F>ÞÚƒ–Sd¦ðO±£ãHT„F§þ
++®‹kZ'xšFÛKùx”q"ÐÒúl@04E‰†ÌûŽ;c¾iA}U÷ÆŒP6ýk0–‰ó%DôòLÄ.U– aO¨(L<>Iý®QÇç¢ÏA
++Œ[´uÔžØ4s$¨†Ò%tÕB
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/encap_secret.bin b/test/encap_secret.bin
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..b94441ed1c002
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/encap_secret.bin
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++6žW«¡ŠòÌn‘©ú;’ù<1B>¡ÃÄmç Ä¥ÉB[HãÕË#äÓ‡(™‡hŽ]:\³PŸ›xñe¡ƒŽbòé)G¿fõÈ"¨ýË­fË	ÊýJÝ)ïþÜ<02>ì{ªHm‚\Pú<C383>+¸PÞ¸%èÄ/jÏ™%ç؆È<_æ~–
++K—JEhßù‡©lEa¼:¢(Ÿå/\Ñ®Íb<C38D>€Ã®©Ê×È-g,AYœ‹4<E280B9>
++l<>ÚtÚN­)~\<5C>HU4
yáŸ	}qJŸ€”t#<0C>¦}.™üTÅý”?ÚØÏŠÐÿcD=üLõ¨nmv<6D>{—éÅ¿Ô‹È£®
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+index 76e4f0a869459..e9472a21352e2 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_pkeyutl.t
+@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ use File::Spec;
+ use File::Basename;
+ use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file ok_nofips/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+-use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
++use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
+ 
+ setup("test_pkeyutl");
+ 
+-plan tests => 14;
++plan tests => 19;
+ 
+ # For the tests below we use the cert itself as the TBS file
+ 
+@@ -200,3 +200,33 @@ SKIP: {
+                     "-rawin");
+     };
+ }
++
++#Encap/decap tests
++# openssl pkeyutl -encap -pubin -inkey rsa_pub.pem -secret secret.bin -out encap_out.bin
++# openssl pkeyutl -decap -inkey rsa_priv.pem -in encap_out.bin -out decap_out.bin
++# decap_out is equal to secret
++SKIP: {
++    skip "RSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 3
++        if disabled("rsa");
++
++    # Self-compat
++    ok(run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-encap', '-pubin', '-kemop', 'RSASVE',
++                  '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa2048pub.pem'),
++                  '-out', 'encap_out.bin', '-secret', 'secret.bin']))),
++                  "RSA pubkey encapsulation");
++    ok(run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-decap', '-kemop', 'RSASVE',
++                  '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa2048.pem'),
++                  '-in', 'encap_out.bin', '-out', 'decap_out.bin']))),
++                  "RSA pubkey decapsulation");
++    is(compare("secret.bin", "decap_out.bin"), 0, "Secret is correctly decapsulated");
++
++    # Pregenerated
++    ok(run(app(([ 'openssl', 'pkeyutl', '-decap', '-kemop', 'RSASVE',
++                  '-inkey', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa2048.pem'),
++                  '-in', srctop_file('test', 'encap_out.bin'), '-out', 'decap_out_etl.bin']))),
++                  "RSA pubkey decapsulation - pregenerated");
++
++    is(compare(srctop_file('test', 'encap_secret.bin'), "decap_out_etl.bin"), 0,
++               "Secret is correctly decapsulated - pregenerated");
++}
++

0127-speedup-SSL_add_cert_subjects_to_stack.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+From e2e469593a15681983d16e36d856bf8fb7de8589 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 12:45:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Speed up SSL_add_{file,dir}_cert_subjects_to_stack
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The X509_NAME comparison function converts its arguments to DER using
+i2d_X509_NAME before comparing the results using memcmp(). For every
+invocation of the comparison function (of which there are many when
+loading many certificates), it allocates two buffers of the appropriate
+size for the DER encoding.
+
+Switching to static buffers (possibly of X509_NAME_MAX size as defined
+in crypto/x509/x_name.c) would not work with multithreaded use, e.g.,
+when two threads sort two separate STACK_OF(X509_NAME)s at the same
+time. A suitable re-usable buffer could have been added to the
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) if sk_X509_NAME_compfunc did have a void* argument,
+or a pointer to the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) – but it does not.
+
+Instead, copy the solution chosen in SSL_load_client_CA_file() by
+filling an LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) with all existing names in the stack and
+using that to deduplicate, rather than relying on sk_X509_NAME_find(),
+which ends up being very slow.
+
+Adjust SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() to keep a local
+LHASH_OF(X509_NAME)s over the complete directory it is processing.
+
+In a small benchmark that calls SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack()
+twice, once on a directory with one entry, and once with a directory
+with 1000 certificates, and repeats this in a loop 10 times, this change
+yields a speed-up of 5.32:
+
+| Benchmark 1: ./bench 10 dir-1 dir-1000
+|   Time (mean ± σ):      6.685 s ±  0.017 s    [User: 6.402 s, System: 0.231 s]
+|   Range (min … max):    6.658 s …  6.711 s    10 runs
+|
+| Benchmark 2: LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. ./bench 10 dir-1 dir-1000
+|   Time (mean ± σ):      1.256 s ±  0.013 s    [User: 1.034 s, System: 0.212 s]
+|   Range (min … max):    1.244 s …  1.286 s    10 runs
+|
+| Summary
+|   LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. ./bench 10 dir-1 dir-1000 ran
+|    5.32 ± 0.06 times faster than ./bench 10 dir-1 dir-1000
+
+In the worst case scenario where many entries are added to a stack that
+is then repeatedly used to add more certificates, and with a larger test
+size, the speedup is still very significant. With 15000 certificates,
+a single pass to load them, followed by attempting to load a subset of
+1000 of these 15000 certificates, followed by a single certificate, the
+new approach is ~85 times faster:
+
+| Benchmark 1: ./bench 1 dir-15000 dir-1000 dir-1
+|   Time (mean ± σ):     176.295 s ±  4.147 s    [User: 174.593 s, System: 0.448 s]
+|   Range (min … max):   173.774 s … 185.594 s    10 runs
+|
+| Benchmark 2: LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. ./bench 1 dir-15000 dir-1000 dir-1
+|   Time (mean ± σ):      2.087 s ±  0.034 s    [User: 1.679 s, System: 0.393 s]
+|   Range (min … max):    2.057 s …  2.167 s    10 runs
+|
+| Summary
+|   LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. ./bench 1 dir-15000 dir-1000 dir-1 ran
+|    84.48 ± 2.42 times faster than ./bench 1 dir-15000 dir-1000 dir-1
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ ssl/ssl_cert.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+index 0ff407bf55edc..5e5ffe39d0655 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+@@ -813,16 +813,14 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+     return SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(file, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+-                                        const char *file)
++static int add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
++                                           const char *file,
++                                           LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash)
+ {
+     BIO *in;
+     X509 *x = NULL;
+     X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+     int ret = 1;
+-    int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+-
+-    oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
+ 
+     in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ 
+@@ -842,12 +840,15 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+         xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+         if (xn == NULL)
+             goto err;
+-        if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
++        if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+             /* Duplicate. */
+             X509_NAME_free(xn);
+         } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+             X509_NAME_free(xn);
+             goto err;
++        } else {
++            /* Successful insert, add to hash table */
++            lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -859,7 +860,42 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+  done:
+     BIO_free(in);
+     X509_free(x);
+-    (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
++                                        const char *file)
++{
++    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
++    int ret = 1;
++    int idx = 0;
++    int num = 0;
++    LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
++
++    if (name_hash == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Pre-populate the lhash with the existing entries of the stack, since
++     * using the LHASH_OF is much faster for duplicate checking. That's because
++     * xname_cmp converts the X509_NAMEs to DER involving a memory allocation
++     * for every single invocation of the comparison function.
++     */
++    num = sk_X509_NAME_num(stack);
++    for (idx = 0; idx < num; idx++) {
++        xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(stack, idx);
++        lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
++    }
++
++    ret = add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, file, name_hash);
++    goto done;
++
++ err:
++    ret = 0;
++ done:
++    lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -869,8 +905,27 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+     OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+     const char *filename;
+     int ret = 0;
++    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
++    int idx = 0;
++    int num = 0;
++    LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
++
++    if (name_hash == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
++        goto err;
++    }
+ 
+-    /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
++    /*
++     * Pre-populate the lhash with the existing entries of the stack, since
++     * using the LHASH_OF is much faster for duplicate checking. That's because
++     * xname_cmp converts the X509_NAMEs to DER involving a memory allocation
++     * for every single invocation of the comparison function.
++     */
++    num = sk_X509_NAME_num(stack);
++    for (idx = 0; idx < num; idx++) {
++        xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(stack, idx);
++        lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
++    }
+ 
+     while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+         char buf[1024];
+@@ -899,7 +954,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ #endif
+         if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+             goto err;
+-        if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
++        if (!add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf, name_hash))
+             goto err;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -915,6 +970,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+  err:
+     if (d)
+         OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
++    lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+ 
+     return ret;
+ }

0128-SAST-findings.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.2.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c.xxx openssl-3.2.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+--- openssl-3.2.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c.xxx	2024-08-14 14:22:48.733407808 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c	2024-08-14 14:23:32.994483135 +0200
+@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(un
+ 
+     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ 
+-    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
++    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0 || mdlen <= 0)
+         return -1;
+     /*
+      * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
+diff -up openssl-3.2.2/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c.xxx openssl-3.2.2/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+--- openssl-3.2.2/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c.xxx	2024-08-14 14:14:13.144850097 +0200
++++ openssl-3.2.2/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c	2024-08-14 14:14:53.213826481 +0200
+@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ 
+     *ptree = NULL;
+ 
++    if (n < 0)
++        return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+     /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+     if (n == 0)
+         return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;

0129-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 99fb785a5f85315b95288921a321a935ea29a51e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
+
+Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
+entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
+have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
+called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
+will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
+should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
+
+We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
+same for the server list while we are about it.
+
+CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index 016135fe18..cf52b317cf 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -3518,37 +3518,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                           unsigned int server_len,
+                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+-    unsigned int i, j;
+-    const unsigned char *result;
+-    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
++    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
++
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
++            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
++            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
++        *out = NULL;
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
++     * a match.
++     */
++    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
++    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
+ 
+     /*
+      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+      */
+-    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+-        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+-            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+-                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+-                /* We found a match */
+-                result = &server[i];
+-                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+-                goto found;
++    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
++        while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
++            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
++                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
++            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
++                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
++                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
++                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
++                        /* We found a match */
++                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
++                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
++                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
++                    }
++                }
++                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
++            } else {
++                /* This should never happen */
++                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+             }
+-            j += client[j];
+-            j++;
+         }
+-        i += server[i];
+-        i++;
++        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
+     }
+ 
+-    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+-    result = client;
+-    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+-
+- found:
+-    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+-    *outlen = result[0];
+-    return status;
++    /*
++     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
++     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
++     */
++    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0130-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 015255851371757d54c2560643eb3b3a88123cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:18:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 02/10] More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when
+ processing NPN
+
+In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
+the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
+internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
+return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
+explicit and return a handshake failure alert.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+index 381a6c9d7b..1ab3c13d57 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+@@ -1560,8 +1560,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+     if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+                                 &selected, &selected_len,
+                                 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+-                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
+-             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
++                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
++            || selected_len == 0) {
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+     }
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0131-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 6cc511826f09e513b4ec066d9b95acaf4f86d991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:22:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Use correctly formatted ALPN data in tserver
+
+The QUIC test server was using incorrectly formatted ALPN data. With the
+previous implementation of SSL_select_next_proto this went unnoticed. With
+the new stricter implemenation it was failing.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
+index 86187d06ff..15694e723f 100644
+--- a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
++++ b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ 
+     if (srv->args.alpn == NULL) {
+         alpn = alpndeflt;
+-        alpnlen = sizeof(alpn);
++        alpnlen = sizeof(alpndeflt);
+     } else {
+         alpn = srv->args.alpn;
+         alpnlen = srv->args.alpnlen;
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0132-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 8e81c57adbbf703dfb63955f65599765fdacc741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:46:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Clarify the SSL_select_next_proto() documentation
+
+We clarify the input preconditions and the expected behaviour in the event
+of no overlap.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+index 05fee2fbec..79e1a252f6 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
+ set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
+ protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
+-B<protos_len>.
++B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
++protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
+ server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
+@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
+ described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
+ matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
+ in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
+-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
+-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
+-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
++B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
++least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
++
++The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
++callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
++item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
++B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
++the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
++must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
++SSL_select_next_proto().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
+ client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
+@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
+ The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
+ server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
+ callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
+-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
+-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
++select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
++fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
++B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
++parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
+ when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+@@ -154,7 +163,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
+ =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
+ 
+ No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
+-B<out>, B<outlen>.
++B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
++B<client> is invalid).
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0133-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From add5c52a25c549cec4a730cdf96e2252f0a1862d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 16:35:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/10] Add a test for SSL_select_next_proto
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ test/sslapitest.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index ce163322cd..15cb9060cb 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -11741,6 +11741,142 @@ static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
+     return testresult;
+ }
+ 
++static struct next_proto_st {
++    int serverlen;
++    unsigned char server[40];
++    int clientlen;
++    unsigned char client[40];
++    int expected_ret;
++    size_t selectedlen;
++    unsigned char selected[40];
++} next_proto_tests[] = {
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b', },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        7, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        10, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
++        7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'b', 'c', 'd' },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        0, { 0 },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        -1, { 0 },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        0, { 0 },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        0, { 0 }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        -1, { 0 },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        0, { 0 }
++    },
++    {
++        3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
++    },
++    {
++        4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
++        OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
++        0, { 0 }
++    }
++};
++
++static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
++{
++    struct next_proto_st *np = &next_proto_tests[idx];
++    int ret = 0;
++    unsigned char *out, *client, *server;
++    unsigned char outlen;
++    unsigned int clientlen, serverlen;
++
++    if (np->clientlen == -1) {
++        client = NULL;
++        clientlen = 0;
++    } else {
++        client = np->client;
++        clientlen = (unsigned int)np->clientlen;
++    }
++    if (np->serverlen == -1) {
++        server = NULL;
++        serverlen = 0;
++    } else {
++        server = np->server;
++        serverlen = (unsigned int)np->serverlen;
++    }
++
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_select_next_proto(&out, &outlen, server, serverlen,
++                                           client, clientlen),
++                     np->expected_ret))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (np->selectedlen == 0) {
++        if (!TEST_ptr_null(out) || !TEST_uchar_eq(outlen, 0))
++            goto err;
++    } else {
++        if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, outlen, np->selected, np->selectedlen))
++            goto err;
++    }
++
++    ret = 1;
++ err:
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
+ 
+ int setup_tests(void)
+@@ -12053,6 +12189,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake_retry, 16);
+     ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
+     return 1;
+ 
+  err:
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0135-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 53f5677f358c4a4f69830d944ea40e71950673b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:41:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/10] Correct return values for
+ tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg
+
+Return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT in the event that we don't send the extension,
+rather than EXT_RETURN_SENT. This actually makes no difference at all to
+the current control flow since this return value is ignored in this case
+anyway. But lets make it correct anyway.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+index 800654450e..66ed7dacf2 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+@@ -1501,9 +1501,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+         }
+         s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
++        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+     }
+ 
+-    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
++    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0136-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 195e15421df113d7283aab2ccff8b8fb06df5465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 11:51:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Add ALPN validation in the client
+
+The ALPN protocol selected by the server must be one that we originally
+advertised. We should verify that it is.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+index 1ab3c13d57..ff9c009ee5 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+@@ -1590,6 +1590,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                         X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+ {
+     size_t len;
++    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
++    int valid = 0;
+ 
+     /* We must have requested it. */
+     if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
+@@ -1608,6 +1610,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
++        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
++            continue;
++        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
++            /* Valid protocol found */
++            valid = 1;
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (!valid) {
++        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+     s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+     if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0137-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+From 7c95191434415d1c9b7fe9b130df13cce630b6b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:09:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add explicit testing of ALN and NPN in sslapitest
+
+We already had some tests elsewhere - but this extends that testing with
+additional tests.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ test/sslapitest.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 229 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 15cb9060cb..7a55a2b721 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -11877,6 +11877,231 @@ static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static const unsigned char fooprot[] = {3, 'f', 'o', 'o' };
++static const unsigned char barprot[] = {3, 'b', 'a', 'r' };
++
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
++static int npn_advert_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
++                         unsigned int *outlen, void *arg)
++{
++    int *idx = (int *)arg;
++
++    switch (*idx) {
++    default:
++    case 0:
++        *out = fooprot;
++        *outlen = sizeof(fooprot);
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 1:
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 2:
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
++    }
++}
++
++static int npn_select_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
++                         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
++{
++    int *idx = (int *)arg;
++
++    switch (*idx) {
++    case 0:
++    case 1:
++        *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
++        *outlen = *fooprot;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 3:
++        *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
++        *outlen = *barprot;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 4:
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    default:
++    case 2:
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
++    }
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test the NPN callbacks
++ * Test 0: advert = foo, select = foo
++ * Test 1: advert = <empty>, select = foo
++ * Test 2: no advert
++ * Test 3: advert = foo, select = bar
++ * Test 4: advert = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
++ */
++static int test_npn(int idx)
++{
++    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
++    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
++    int testresult = 0;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
++                                       TLS_client_method(), 0, TLS1_2_VERSION,
++                                       &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
++        goto end;
++
++    SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(sctx, npn_advert_cb, &idx);
++    SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(cctx, npn_select_cb, &idx);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
++                                      NULL)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (idx == 4) {
++        /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
++        if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
++                                              SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++            goto end;
++    } else {
++        const unsigned char *prot;
++        unsigned int protlen;
++
++        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
++                                             SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++            goto end;
++
++        SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(serverssl, &prot, &protlen);
++        switch (idx) {
++        case 0:
++        case 1:
++            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
++                goto end;
++            break;
++        case 2:
++            if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
++                goto end;
++            break;
++        case 3:
++            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, barprot + 1, *barprot))
++                goto end;
++            break;
++        default:
++            TEST_error("Should not get here");
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
++    testresult = 1;
++ end:
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
++    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
++
++    return testresult;
++}
++#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) */
++
++static int alpn_select_cb2(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
++                           unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
++                           unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
++{
++    int *idx = (int *)arg;
++
++    switch (*idx) {
++    case 0:
++        *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
++        *outlen = *fooprot;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 2:
++        *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
++        *outlen = *barprot;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    case 3:
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
++
++    default:
++    case 1:
++        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
++    }
++    return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test the ALPN callbacks
++ * Test 0: client = foo, select = foo
++ * Test 1: client = <empty>, select = none
++ * Test 2: client = foo, select = bar (should fail)
++ * Test 3: client = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
++ */
++static int test_alpn(int idx)
++{
++    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
++    SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
++    int testresult = 0;
++    const unsigned char *prots = fooprot;
++    unsigned int protslen = sizeof(fooprot);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
++                                       TLS_client_method(), 0, 0,
++                                       &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
++        goto end;
++
++    SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb2, &idx);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
++                                      NULL)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (idx == 1) {
++        prots = NULL;
++        protslen = 0;
++    }
++
++    /* SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success! */
++    if (!TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, prots, protslen)))
++        goto end;
++
++    if (idx == 2 || idx == 3) {
++        /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
++        if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
++                                              SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++            goto end;
++    } else {
++        const unsigned char *prot;
++        unsigned int protlen;
++
++        if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
++                                             SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
++            goto end;
++
++        SSL_get0_alpn_selected(clientssl, &prot, &protlen);
++        switch (idx) {
++        case 0:
++            if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
++                goto end;
++            break;
++        case 1:
++            if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
++                goto end;
++            break;
++        default:
++            TEST_error("Should not get here");
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
++    testresult = 1;
++ end:
++    SSL_free(serverssl);
++    SSL_free(clientssl);
++    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
++    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
++
++    return testresult;
++}
++
+ OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
+ 
+ int setup_tests(void)
+@@ -12190,6 +12415,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_npn, 5);
++#endif
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_alpn, 4);
+     return 1;
+ 
+  err:
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0138-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+From 301b870546d1c7b2d8f0d66e04a2596142f0399f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 14:29:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Add a test for an empty NextProto message
+
+It is valid according to the spec for a NextProto message to have no
+protocols listed in it. The OpenSSL implementation however does not allow
+us to create such a message. In order to check that we work as expected
+when communicating with a client that does generate such messages we have
+to use a TLSProxy test.
+
+Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
+---
+ test/recipes/70-test_npn.t      | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm   |  9 ++++
+ util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm     |  1 +
+ 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
+ create mode 100644 util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f82e71af6a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
+@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env perl
++# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++
++use strict;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
++
++use TLSProxy::Proxy;
++
++my $test_name = "test_npn";
++setup($test_name);
++
++plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
++    if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
++
++plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
++    if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
++
++plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
++    if disabled("sock");
++
++plan skip_all => "$test_name needs NPN enabled"
++    if disabled("nextprotoneg");
++
++plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
++    if disabled("tls1_2");
++
++my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
++    undef,
++    cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
++    srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
++    (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
++);
++
++$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
++plan tests => 1;
++
++my $npnseen = 0;
++
++# Test 1: Check sending an empty NextProto message from the client works. This is
++#         valid as per the spec, but OpenSSL does not allow you to send it.
++#         Therefore we must be prepared to receive such a message but we cannot
++#         generate it except via TLSProxy
++$proxy->clear();
++$proxy->filter(\&npn_filter);
++$proxy->clientflags("-nextprotoneg foo -no_tls1_3");
++$proxy->serverflags("-nextprotoneg foo");
++$proxy->start();
++ok($npnseen && TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Empty NPN message");
++
++sub npn_filter
++{
++    my $proxy = shift;
++    my $message;
++
++    # The NextProto message always appears in flight 2
++    return if $proxy->flight != 2;
++
++    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
++        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
++            # Our TLSproxy NextProto message support doesn't support parsing of
++            # the message. If we repack it just creates an empty NextProto
++            # message - which is exactly the scenario we want to test here.
++            $message->repack();
++            $npnseen = 1;
++        }
++    }
++}
+diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+index ce22187569..fb41b2ffc8 100644
+--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
++++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+@@ -384,6 +384,15 @@ sub create_message
+             [@message_frag_lens]
+         );
+         $message->parse();
++    }  elsif ($mt == MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
++        $message = TLSProxy::NextProto->new(
++            $server,
++            $data,
++            [@message_rec_list],
++            $startoffset,
++            [@message_frag_lens]
++        );
++        $message->parse();
+     } else {
+         #Unknown message type
+         $message = TLSProxy::Message->new(
+diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..0e18347546
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++
++use strict;
++
++package TLSProxy::NextProto;
++
++use vars '@ISA';
++push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
++
++sub new
++{
++    my $class = shift;
++    my ($server,
++        $data,
++        $records,
++        $startoffset,
++        $message_frag_lens) = @_;
++
++    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
++        $server,
++        TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO,
++        $data,
++        $records,
++        $startoffset,
++        $message_frag_lens);
++
++    return $self;
++}
++
++sub parse
++{
++    # We don't support parsing at the moment
++}
++
++# This is supposed to reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes.
++# For now though since we don't support parsing we just create an empty NextProto
++# message - this capability is used in test_npn
++sub set_message_contents
++{
++    my $self = shift;
++    my $data;
++
++    $data = pack("C32", 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++                 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
++    $self->data($data);
++}
++1;
+diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
+index 3de10eccb9..b707722b6b 100644
+--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
++++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use TLSProxy::CertificateRequest;
+ use TLSProxy::CertificateVerify;
+ use TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
+ use TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
++use TLSProxy::NextProto;
+ 
+ my $have_IPv6;
+ my $IP_factory;
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0139-CVE-2024-6119.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
+index 1a18174995..a09414c972 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
+@@ -916,36 +916,64 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+             ASN1_STRING *cstr;
+ 
+             gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+-            if ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)) {
+-                if (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
+-                    NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox) {
+-                    san_present = 1;
+-
+-                    /*
+-                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected and we
+-                     * treat it as no match
+-                     */
+-                    if (gen->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+-                        cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
+-
+-                        /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
+-                        if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, 0, equal, flags,
+-                                                chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
+-                            break;
+-                    }
+-                } else
++            switch (gen->type) {
++            default:
++                continue;
++            case GEN_OTHERNAME:
++		switch (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id)) {
++                default:
+                     continue;
+-            } else {
+-                if ((gen->type != check_type) && (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME))
++                case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox:
++                    /*-
++                     * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8398#section-3
++                     *
++                     *   Due to name constraint compatibility reasons described
++                     *   in Section 6, SmtpUTF8Mailbox subjectAltName MUST NOT
++                     *   be used unless the local-part of the email address
++                     *   contains non-ASCII characters. When the local-part is
++                     *   ASCII, rfc822Name subjectAltName MUST be used instead
++                     *   of SmtpUTF8Mailbox. This is compatible with legacy
++                     *   software that supports only rfc822Name (and not
++                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox). [...]
++                     *
++                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox is encoded as UTF8String.
++                     *
++                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected, and
++                     * we ignore the invalid SAN (neither set san_present nor
++                     * consider it a candidate for equality).  This does mean
++                     * that the subject CN may be considered, as would be the
++                     * case when the malformed SmtpUtf8Mailbox SAN is instead
++                     * simply absent.
++                     *
++                     * When CN-ID matching is not desirable, applications can
++                     * choose to turn it off, doing so is at this time a best
++                     * practice.
++                     */
++                    if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL
++                        || gen->d.otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
++                        continue;
++                    alt_type = 0;
++                    cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
++                    break;
++                }
++                break;
++            case GEN_EMAIL:
++                if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL)
+                     continue;
+-            }
+-            san_present = 1;
+-            if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
+                 cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
+-            else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
++                break;
++            case GEN_DNS:
++                if (check_type != GEN_DNS)
++                    continue;
+                 cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
+-            else
++                break;
++            case GEN_IPADD:
++                if (check_type != GEN_IPADD)
++                    continue;
+                 cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
++                break;
++            }
++            san_present = 1;
+             /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
+             if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
+                                       chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
+index 522982ddfb..e18735d89a 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
+@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ setup("test_eai_data");
+ #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_leaf.pem
+ #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_leaf.pem
+ 
+-plan tests => 12;
++plan tests => 16;
+ 
+ require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+ my $folder = "test/recipes/25-test_eai_data";
+ 
+ my $ascii_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_leaf.pem");
+ my $utf8_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_leaf.pem");
++my $kdc_pem   = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-cert.pem");
+ 
+ my $ascii_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_chain.pem");
+ my $utf8_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_chain.pem");
++my $kdc_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-root-cert.pem");
+ 
+ my $out;
+ my $outcnt = 0;
+@@ -56,10 +58,18 @@ SKIP: {
+ 
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
++ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+ 
+ ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
+ ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem,  $ascii_pem])));
+ 
++# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an DNS name, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
++ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_hostname", 'mx1.example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
++# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an email address, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
++ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'joe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
++# We expect SmtpUTF8Mailbox to be a UTF8 String, not an IA5String.
++ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'moe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
++
+ #Check that we get the expected failure return code
+ with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
+      sub {
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..e8a2c6f55d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..a74c96bf31
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000000..7a8dbc719f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env bash
++
++# Create a root CA, signing a leaf cert with a KDC principal otherName SAN, and
++# also a non-UTF8 smtpUtf8Mailbox SAN followed by an rfc822Name SAN and a DNS
++# name SAN.  In the vulnerable EAI code, the KDC principal `otherName` should
++# trigger ASAN errors in DNS name checks, while the non-UTF8 `smtpUtf8Mailbox`
++# should likewise lead to ASAN issues with email name checks.
++
++rm -f root-key.pem root-cert.pem
++openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-root-key.pem \
++        -x509 -subj /CN=Root -days 36524 -out kdc-root-cert.pem
++
++exts=$(
++    printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s = " \
++        "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
++        "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
++        "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
++        "subjectAltName"
++    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name"
++    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9;IA5:moe@example.com"
++    printf "%s, " "email:joe@example.com"
++    printf "%s\n" "DNS:mx1.example.com"
++    printf "[kdc_princ_name]\n"
++    printf "realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
++    printf "principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq\n"
++    printf "[kdc_principal_seq]\n"
++    printf "name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1\n"
++    printf "name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_components\n"
++    printf "[kdc_principal_components]\n"
++    printf "princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt\n"
++    printf "princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
++    )
++
++printf "%s\n" "$exts"
++
++openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-key.pem \
++    -subj "/CN=TEST.EXAMPLE" |
++    openssl x509 -req -out kdc-cert.pem \
++        -CA "kdc-root-cert.pem" -CAkey "kdc-root-key.pem" \
++        -set_serial 2 -days 36524 \
++        -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts")

SOURCES/ec_curve.c

@@ -1,582 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "ec_local.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "internal/nelem.h"
-
-typedef struct {
-    int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
-                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-     seed_len, param_len;
-    unsigned int cofactor;      /* promoted to BN_ULONG */
-} EC_CURVE_DATA;
-
-/* the nist prime curves */
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F,
-        0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
-        /* b */
-        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
-        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
-        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
-        /* x */
-        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
-        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
-        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
-        /* y */
-        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
-        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
-        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
-        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A,
-        0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
-        0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
-        0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
-        0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
-        /* x */
-        0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
-        0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
-        0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
-        0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
-        /* y */
-        0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
-        0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
-        0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
-        0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
-        0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17,
-        0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA,
-        /* p */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
-        0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
-        0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
-        0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
-        0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
-        0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
-        /* x */
-        0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
-        0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
-        0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
-        0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
-        0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
-        0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
-        /* y */
-        0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
-        0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
-        0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
-        0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
-        0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
-        0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
-        /* order */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
-        0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
-        0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
-        0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
-} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1,
-        0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
-        0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
-        0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
-        /* x */
-        0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
-        0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
-        0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
-        /* y */
-        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
-        0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
-        0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
-        0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
-} _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* no seed */
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F,
-        /* a */
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        /* b */
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
-        /* x */
-        0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95,
-        0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9,
-        0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98,
-        /* y */
-        0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc,
-        0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19,
-        0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B,
-        0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
-    }
-};
-
-typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
-    int nid;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
-    const char *comment;
-} ec_list_element;
-
-static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
-    /* prime field curves */
-    /* secg curves */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
-#else
-    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
-#endif
-    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
-     "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
-    /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
-    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
-#else
-    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
-#endif
-    /* X9.62 curves */
-    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
-#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
-     EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
-#else
-     0,
-#endif
-     "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
-};
-
-#define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
-
-static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
-{
-    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
-    EC_POINT *P = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order =
-        NULL;
-    int ok = 0;
-    int seed_len, param_len;
-    const EC_METHOD *meth;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const unsigned char *params;
-
-    /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */
-    if (curve.data == NULL)
-        return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL);
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    data = curve.data;
-    seed_len = data->seed_len;
-    param_len = data->param_len;
-    params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
-    params += seed_len;         /* skip seed */
-
-    if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (curve.meth != 0) {
-        meth = curve.meth();
-        if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
-            (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
-        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-    else {                      /* field_type ==
-                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-
-        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-#endif
-
-    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
-
-    if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, P, x, y, ctx)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (seed_len) {
-        if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-    ok = 1;
- err:
-    if (!ok) {
-        EC_GROUP_free(group);
-        group = NULL;
-    }
-    EC_POINT_free(P);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    BN_free(p);
-    BN_free(a);
-    BN_free(b);
-    BN_free(order);
-    BN_free(x);
-    BN_free(y);
-    return group;
-}
-
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
-
-    if (nid <= 0)
-        return NULL;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
-        if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
-            ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
-            break;
-        }
-
-    if (ret == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
-{
-    size_t i, min;
-
-    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
-        return curve_list_length;
-
-    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
-        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
-        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
-    }
-
-    return curve_list_length;
-}
-
-/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
-
-typedef struct {
-    const char *name;           /* NIST Name of curve */
-    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
-} EC_NIST_NAME;
-
-static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = {
-    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
-    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
-    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
-    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
-    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
-    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
-    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
-    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
-    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
-    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
-    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
-    {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
-    {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
-    {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
-    {"P-521", NID_secp521r1}
-};
-
-const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
-        if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid)
-            return nist_curves[i].name;
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
-        if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0)
-            return nist_curves[i].nid;
-    }
-    return NID_undef;
-}
-
-#define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
-/*
- * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
- * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
- * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
- *
- * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
- *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
- */
-int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
-    size_t i, seed_len;
-    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
-    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
-    const EC_METHOD *meth;
-    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
-    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
-    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
-    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
-    if (meth == NULL)
-        return -1;
-    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
-    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
-    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
-    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
-    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
-    cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
-
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-    /*
-     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
-     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
-     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
-     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
-     */
-    param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order);
-    len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
-    if (len > param_len)
-        param_len = len;
-
-    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
-    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
-    if (param_bytes == NULL)
-        goto end;
-
-    /* Create the bignums */
-    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
-        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-            goto end;
-    }
-    /*
-     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
-     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
-     */
-    /* Get p, a & b */
-    if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
-        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
-        /* Get x & y */
-        && EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
-        /* Get order */
-        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
-        goto end;
-
-   /*
-     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
-     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
-     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
-        if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
-        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
-
-        data = curve.data;
-        /* Get the raw order byte data */
-        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
-        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
-
-        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
-        if (data->field_type == field_type
-            && param_len == data->param_len
-            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
-            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
-            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
-                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
-            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
-            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
-                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
-                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
-            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
-            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
-                             == 0) {
-            ret = curve.nid;
-            goto end;
-        }
-    }
-    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
-    ret = NID_undef;
-end:
-    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    return ret;
-}

SOURCES/hobble-openssl

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-# Quit out if anything fails.
-set -e
-
-# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
-# MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007 - expired, we do not remove it but do not enable it anyway
-# IDEA:  5,214,703 07/01/2012 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-# RC5:   5,724,428 01/11/2015 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-# EC:    ????????? ??/??/2020
-# SRP:   ????????? ??/??/2017 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-
-# Remove assembler portions of IDEA, MDC2, and RC5.
-# (find crypto/rc5/asm -type f | xargs -r rm -fv)
-
-for c in `find crypto/bn -name "*gf2m.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for c in `find crypto/ec -name "ec2*.c" -o -name "ec_curve.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for c in `find test -name "ectest.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for h in `find crypto ssl apps test -name "*.h"` ; do
-	echo Removing EC2M references from $h
-	cat $h | \
-	awk    'BEGIN {ech=1;} \
-		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC2M/ {ech--; next;} \
-                /^#[ \t]*if/ {if(ech < 1) ech--;} \
-		{if(ech>0) {;print $0};} \
-		/^#[ \t]*endif/ {if(ech < 1) ech++;}' > $h.hobbled && \
-	mv $h.hobbled $h
-done

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From a3f4cd5019b60649f6eb216ebe99caa43cd96f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:40:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] BIO_lookup_ex: use AI_ADDRCONFIG only if explicit host name
- is given
-
-The flag only affects which record types are queried (A or AAAA, or
-both), and when node is NULL, it prevents getaddrinfo returning the
-right address associated with the loopback interface.
-
-Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/bio/b_addr.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-index b023bbda40..ea15601f3d 100644
---- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-+++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
-         hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
- # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
- #  ifdef AF_UNSPEC
--        if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
-+        if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC)
- #  endif
-             hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
- # endif
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-commit 9e885a707d604e9528b5491b78fb9c00f41193fc
-Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
-Date:   Thu Mar 26 15:59:00 2020 +0100
-
-    s_server: Properly indicate ALPN protocol mismatch
-    
-    Return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from alpn_select_cb so that
-    an alert is sent to the client on ALPN protocol mismatch.
-    
-    Fixes: #2708
-    
-    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11415)
-
-diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
-index bcc83e562c..591c6c19c5 100644
---- a/apps/s_server.c
-+++ b/apps/s_server.c
-@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-     if (SSL_select_next_proto
-         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
-          inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
--        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-     }
- 
-     if (!s_quiet) {

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c
---- openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst	2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c	2019-03-15 15:53:46.622267688 +0100
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
-     {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's',
-      "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"},
-     {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"},
--    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"},
-+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; see openssl help for list"},
-     {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"},
-     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"},
-     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf
---- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build	2020-03-31 14:17:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
-@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ my %targets = (
-         cxxflags         => add("-m64"),
-         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
-         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
-+        multilib         => "64",
-     },
- 
-     "linux-armv4" => {
-@@ -718,6 +719,7 @@ my %targets = (
-     "linux-aarch64" => {
-         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
-         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
-+        multilib         => "64",
-     },
-     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
-         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
---- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2020-04-07 16:44:23.539142108 +0200
-@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ uninstall_runtime_libs:
- install_man_docs:
- 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
- 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing manpages"
--	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
-+	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
- 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)" --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX)
- 
- uninstall_man_docs:
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ uninstall_man_docs:
- install_html_docs:
- 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
- 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing HTML manpages"
--	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
-+	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
- 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR)" --type=html
- 
- uninstall_html_docs:

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
---- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- #endif
-+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
-@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_de
-         TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
-         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
-         | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
--        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
-+        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
-         tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
-         final_ec_pt_formats
-     },
-@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
- }
- #endif
- 
-+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
-+{
-+	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
-+	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
-+	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
-+
-+	    return 1;
-+}
-+
- static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
- {
-     s->ext.use_etm = 0;

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in
---- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths	2018-06-20 16:48:09.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in	2018-07-25 17:26:58.388624296 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
- my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
- 
- # default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following
--my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
-+my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
- my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
- my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
- my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf
---- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths	2018-07-25 17:26:58.378624057 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf	2018-07-27 13:20:08.198513471 +0200
-@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ oid_section		= new_oids
- # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
- # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
- 
-+# Load default TLS policy configuration
-+
-+openssl_conf = default_modules
-+
-+[ default_modules ]
-+
-+ssl_conf = ssl_module
-+
-+[ ssl_module ]
-+
-+system_default = crypto_policy
-+
-+[ crypto_policy ]
-+
-+.include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
-+
- [ new_oids ]
- 
- # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'.
-@@ -43,7 +59,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
- ####################################################################
- [ CA_default ]
- 
--dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
-+dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
- certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
- crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
- database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
-@@ -329,7 +345,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
- [ tsa_config1 ]
- 
- # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
--dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
-+dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
- serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
- crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
- signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
-
-The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
-
-This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
-
-Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-From b5fcb7e133725b8b2eb66f63f5142710ed63a6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:30 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation of BN_mod_sqrt()
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- doc/man3/BN_add.pod | 15 +++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-From 3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add a negative testcase for BN_mod_sqrt
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- test/bntest.c                          | 11 ++++++++++-
- test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-index 1723d5ded5a8..53b0f559855c 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
- /*
-  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
-  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
-- * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
-+ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
-+ * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
-  */
- {
-     BIGNUM *ret = in;
-@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-             goto vrfy;
-         }
- 
--        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
--        i = 1;
--        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
--            goto end;
--        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
--            i++;
--            if (i == e) {
--                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
--                goto end;
-+        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
-+        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
-+            if (i == 1) {
-+                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
-+                    goto end;
-+
-+            } else {
-+                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
-+                    goto end;
-             }
--            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
--                goto end;
-+            if (BN_is_one(t))
-+                break;
-+        }
-+        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
-+        if (i >= e) {
-+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
-+            goto end;
-         }
- 
-         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
-diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
-index dccd4790ede7..1f5e37a4d183 100644
---- a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
- =head1 NAME
- 
- BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
--BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
-+BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
- arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
- 
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
-@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
- 
-  int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
- 
-+ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
-+
-  int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
- 
-  int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-@@ -87,6 +89,12 @@ L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>.
- BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
- result in I<r>.
- 
-+BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I<a> such that
-+C<in^2 = a (mod p)>. The modulus I<p> must be a
-+prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned.
-+The result is stored into I<in> which can be NULL. The result will be
-+newly allocated in that case.
-+
- BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
- (C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
- BN_mul().
-@@ -108,7 +116,10 @@ the arguments.
- 
- =head1 RETURN VALUES
- 
--For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
-+The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I<p> is
-+not a prime), or NULL.
-+
-+For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
- value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
- The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
- 
-diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
-index 390dd800733e..1cab660bcafb 100644
---- a/test/bntest.c
-+++ b/test/bntest.c
-@@ -1729,8 +1729,17 @@ static int file_modsqrt(STANZA *s)
-             || !TEST_ptr(ret2 = BN_new()))
-         goto err;
- 
-+    if (BN_is_negative(mod_sqrt)) {
-+        /* A negative testcase */
-+        if (!TEST_ptr_null(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx)))
-+            goto err;
-+
-+        st = 1;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     /* There are two possible answers. */
--    if (!TEST_true(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
-             || !TEST_true(BN_sub(ret2, p, ret)))
-         goto err;
- 
-diff --git a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
-index 5ea4d031f271..e28cc6bfb02e 100644
---- a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
-+++ b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
-@@ -2799,3 +2799,15 @@ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
- ModSqrt = a1d52989f12f204d3d2167d9b1e6c8a6174c0c786a979a5952383b7b8bd186
- A = 2eee37cf06228a387788188e650bc6d8a2ff402931443f69156a29155eca07dcb45f3aac238d92943c0c25c896098716baa433f25bd696a142f5a69d5d937e81
- P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
-+
-+# Negative testcases for BN_mod_sqrt()
-+
-+# This one triggers an infinite loop with unfixed implementation
-+# It should just fail.
-+ModSqrt = -1
-+A = 20a7ee
-+P = 460201
-+
-+ModSqrt = -1
-+A = 65bebdb00a96fc814ec44b81f98b59fba3c30203928fa5214c51e0a97091645280c947b005847f239758482b9bfc45b066fde340d1fe32fc9c1bf02e1b2d0ed
-+P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:40:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] c_rehash: Do not use shell to invoke openssl
-
-Except on VMS where it is safe.
-
-This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
-
-Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23]
----
- tools/c_rehash.in | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
-index fa7c6c9fef91..83c1cc80e08a 100644
---- a/tools/c_rehash.in
-+++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
-@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ sub check_file {
- 	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
- }
- 
-+sub compute_hash {
-+    my $fh;
-+    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {
-+        # VMS uses the open through shell
-+        # The file names are safe there and list form is unsupported
-+        if (!open($fh, "-|", join(' ', @_))) {
-+            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
-+            return;
-+        }
-+    } else {
-+        if (!open($fh, "-|", @_)) {
-+            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
-+            return;
-+        }
-+    }
-+    return (<$fh>, <$fh>);
-+}
- 
- # Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
- # the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
-@@ -161,10 +178,12 @@ sub check_file {
- 
- sub link_hash_cert {
- 		my $fname = $_[0];
--		$fname =~ s/\"/\\\"/g;
--		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
-+		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
-+						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
-+						   "-in", $fname);
- 		chomp $hash;
- 		chomp $fprint;
-+		return if !$hash;
- 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
- 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
- 		my $suffix = 0;
-@@ -202,10 +221,12 @@ sub link_hash_cert {
- 
- sub link_hash_crl {
- 		my $fname = $_[0];
--		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
--		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
-+		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
-+						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
-+						   "-in", $fname);
- 		chomp $hash;
- 		chomp $fprint;
-+		return if !$hash;
- 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
- 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
- 		my $suffix = 0;

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From 9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Fiala <daniel@openssl.org>
-Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:11:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix file operations in c_rehash.
-
-CVE-2022-2068
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7]
----
- tools/c_rehash.in | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
-index cfd18f5da110..9d2a6f6db73b 100644
---- a/tools/c_rehash.in
-+++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
-@@ -104,52 +104,78 @@ foreach (@dirlist) {
- }
- exit($errorcount);
- 
-+sub copy_file {
-+    my ($src_fname, $dst_fname) = @_;
-+
-+    if (open(my $in, "<", $src_fname)) {
-+        if (open(my $out, ">", $dst_fname)) {
-+            print $out $_ while (<$in>);
-+            close $out;
-+        } else {
-+            warn "Cannot open $dst_fname for write, $!";
-+        }
-+        close $in;
-+    } else {
-+        warn "Cannot open $src_fname for read, $!";
-+    }
-+}
-+
- sub hash_dir {
--	my %hashlist;
--	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
--	chdir $_[0];
--	opendir(DIR, ".");
--	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
--	closedir DIR;
--	if ( $removelinks ) {
--		# Delete any existing symbolic links
--		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
--			if (-l $_) {
--				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
--				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
--			}
--		}
--	}
--	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
--		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
--		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
--		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
--			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
--			next;
--		}
--		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
--		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
--	}
-+    my $dir = shift;
-+    my %hashlist;
-+
-+    print "Doing $dir\n";
-+
-+    if (!chdir $dir) {
-+        print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot chdir to '$dir', $!\n";
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    opendir(DIR, ".") || print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot opendir '.', $!\n";
-+    my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
-+    closedir DIR;
-+    if ( $removelinks ) {
-+        # Delete any existing symbolic links
-+        foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
-+            if (-l $_) {
-+                print "unlink $_\n" if $verbose;
-+                unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+    FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
-+        # Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
-+        my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
-+        if (!$cert && !$crl) {
-+            print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
-+            next;
-+        }
-+        link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
-+        link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
-+    }
-+
-+    chdir $pwd;
- }
- 
- sub check_file {
--	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
--	my $fname = $_[0];
--	open IN, $fname;
--	while(<IN>) {
--		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
--			my $hdr = $1;
--			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
--				$is_cert = 1;
--				last if ($is_crl);
--			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
--				$is_crl = 1;
--				last if ($is_cert);
--			}
--		}
--	}
--	close IN;
--	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
-+    my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
-+    my $fname = $_[0];
-+
-+    open(my $in, "<", $fname);
-+    while(<$in>) {
-+        if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
-+            my $hdr = $1;
-+            if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
-+                $is_cert = 1;
-+                last if ($is_crl);
-+            } elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
-+                $is_crl = 1;
-+                last if ($is_cert);
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+    close $in;
-+    return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
- }
- 
- sub compute_hash {
-@@ -177,76 +203,48 @@ sub compute_hash {
- # certificate fingerprints
- 
- sub link_hash_cert {
--		my $fname = $_[0];
--		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
--						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
--						   "-in", $fname);
--		chomp $hash;
--		chomp $fprint;
--		return if !$hash;
--		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
--		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
--		my $suffix = 0;
--		# Search for an unused hash filename
--		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
--			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
--			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
--				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
--				return;
--			}
--			$suffix++;
--		}
--		$hash .= ".$suffix";
--		if ($symlink_exists) {
--			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
--			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
--		} else {
--			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
--                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
--                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
--                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
--                                close $out;
--                            } else {
--                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
--                            }
--                            close $in;
--                        } else {
--                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
--                        }
--		}
--		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
-+    link_hash($_[0], 'cert');
- }
- 
- # Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
- 
- sub link_hash_crl {
--		my $fname = $_[0];
--		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
--						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
--						   "-in", $fname);
--		chomp $hash;
--		chomp $fprint;
--		return if !$hash;
--		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
--		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
--		my $suffix = 0;
--		# Search for an unused hash filename
--		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
--			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
--			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
--				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
--				return;
--			}
--			$suffix++;
--		}
--		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
--		if ($symlink_exists) {
--			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
--			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
--		} else {
--			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
--			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
--                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
--		}
--		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
-+    link_hash($_[0], 'crl');
-+}
-+
-+sub link_hash {
-+    my ($fname, $type) = @_;
-+    my $is_cert = $type eq 'cert';
-+
-+    my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl,
-+                                       $is_cert ? "x509" : "crl",
-+                                       $is_cert ? $x509hash : $crlhash,
-+                                       "-fingerprint", "-noout",
-+                                       "-in", $fname);
-+    chomp $hash;
-+    chomp $fprint;
-+    return if !$hash;
-+    $fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
-+    $fprint =~ tr/://d;
-+    my $suffix = 0;
-+    # Search for an unused hash filename
-+    my $crlmark = $is_cert ? "" : "r";
-+    while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"}) {
-+        # Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
-+        if ($hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
-+            my $what = $is_cert ? 'certificate' : 'CRL';
-+            print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate $what $fname\n";
-+            return;
-+        }
-+        $suffix++;
-+    }
-+    $hash .= ".$crlmark$suffix";
-+    if ($symlink_exists) {
-+        print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-+        symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
-+    } else {
-+        print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
-+        copy_file($fname, $hash);
-+    }
-+    $hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
- }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
-Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:00:22 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
-that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
-"grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
-be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
-
-As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
-length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
-can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
-there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
-this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
-the remaining zero to five blocks.
-
-Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
-error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
-equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
-chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
-there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
-then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
-fall-through is intended.
-
-The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
-of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
-`out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
-those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
-also incorrect.
-
-The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
-aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
-
-This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
-
-Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
-Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431]
----
- crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-index fe2b26542ab6..812758e02e04 100644
---- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
-@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
- 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
--	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
-+	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
- 
- &set_label("short");
- 	&add		($len,16*6);
-@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
- 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
- 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
- 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
--	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
-+	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
- 
- &set_label("short");
- 	&add		($len,16*6);
-From 9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
-Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:02:37 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] AES OCB test vectors
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Add test vectors for AES OCB for x86 AES-NI multiple of 96 byte issue.
-
-Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
-Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06]
----
- test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
-index 1c02ea1e9c2d..e12670d9a4b4 100644
---- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
-+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
-@@ -1188,6 +1188,56 @@ Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B21
- Operation = DECRYPT
- Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
- 
-+#Test vectors generated to validate aesni_ocb_encrypt on x86
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = C14DFF7D62A13C4A3422456207453190
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B819333
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = D47D84F6FF912C79B6A4223AB9BE2DB8
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC204
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = 41970D13737B7BD1B5FBF49ED4412CA5
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = BE0228651ED4E48A11BDED68D953F3A0
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = 17BC6E10B16E5FDC52836E7D589518C7
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = E84AAC18666116990A3A37B3A5FC55BD
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED
-+
-+Cipher = aes-128-ocb
-+Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
-+IV = 000000000001020304050607
-+Tag = 3E5EA7EE064FE83B313E28D411E91EAD
-+Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D
-+Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED48D9E09F452F8E6FBEB76A3DED47611C
-+
- Title = AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007
- 
- # Using the same key twice for encryption is always banned.

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch

@@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
-From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
-
-A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
-implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
-a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
-decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
-of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
-padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
-
-Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
-
-CVE-2022-4304
-
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
- crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
- crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
- crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
- crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
- include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
- include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
- 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
- 
- #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER     32
- 
--struct bn_blinding_st {
--    BIGNUM *A;
--    BIGNUM *Ai;
--    BIGNUM *e;
--    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
--    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
--    int counter;
--    unsigned long flags;
--    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
--    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
--                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
--    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
--};
--
- BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
- {
-     BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
-+    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
-     {0, NULL}
- };
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
-     } cb;
- };
- 
-+struct bn_blinding_st {
-+    BIGNUM *A;
-+    BIGNUM *Ai;
-+    BIGNUM *e;
-+    BIGNUM *mod;                /* just a reference */
-+    CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-+    int counter;
-+    unsigned long flags;
-+    BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
-+    int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-+                       const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-+    CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-+};
-+
- /*-
-  * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
-  *
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
-index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/build.info
-+++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
-@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
-         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
-         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
-         bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
--        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
-+        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
-+        rsa_sup_mul.c
- 
- INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <stddef.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
-+#include "internal/numbers.h"
-+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
-+#include "bn_local.h"
-+
-+# if BN_BYTES == 8
-+typedef uint64_t limb_t;
-+#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
-+/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
-+typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
-+#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+#  endif
-+#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
-+#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
-+# elif BN_BYTES == 4
-+typedef uint32_t limb_t;
-+typedef uint64_t limb2_t;
-+#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
-+#  define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
-+#  define HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+# else
-+#  error "Not supported"
-+# endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
-+ * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
-+ * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
-+ *                        A B C D E F
-+ *                     x  I J K L M N
-+ *                     --------------
-+ *                                N*F
-+ *                              N*E
-+ *                            N*D
-+ *                          N*C
-+ *                        N*B
-+ *                      N*A
-+ *                              M*F
-+ *                            M*E
-+ *                          M*D
-+ *                        M*C
-+ *                      M*B
-+ *                    M*A
-+ *                            L*F
-+ *                          L*E
-+ *                        L*D
-+ *                      L*C
-+ *                    L*B
-+ *                  L*A
-+ *                          K*F
-+ *                        K*E
-+ *                      K*D
-+ *                    K*C
-+ *                  K*B
-+ *                K*A
-+ *                        J*F
-+ *                      J*E
-+ *                    J*D
-+ *                  J*C
-+ *                J*B
-+ *              J*A
-+ *                      I*F
-+ *                    I*E
-+ *                  I*D
-+ *                I*C
-+ *              I*B
-+ *         +  I*A
-+ *         ==========================
-+ *                        N*B N*D N*F
-+ *                    + N*A N*C N*E
-+ *                    + M*B M*D M*F
-+ *                  + M*A M*C M*E
-+ *                  + L*B L*D L*F
-+ *                + L*A L*C L*E
-+ *                + K*B K*D K*F
-+ *              + K*A K*C K*E
-+ *              + J*B J*D J*F
-+ *            + J*A J*C J*E
-+ *            + I*B I*D I*F
-+ *          + I*A I*C I*E
-+ *
-+ *                1+1 1+3 1+5
-+ *              1+0 1+2 1+4
-+ *              0+1 0+3 0+5
-+ *            0+0 0+2 0+4
-+ *
-+ *            0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-+ * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
-+ * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
-+ * limbs
-+ */
-+
-+#if defined HAVE_LIMB2_T
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    limb2_t t;
-+    /*
-+     * this is idiomatic code to tell compiler to use the native mul
-+     * those three lines will actually compile to single instruction
-+     */
-+
-+    t = (limb2_t)a * b;
-+    *hi = t >> LIMB_BIT_SIZE;
-+    *lo = (limb_t)t;
-+}
-+#elif (BN_BYTES == 8) && (defined _MSC_VER)
-+/* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/intrinsics/umul128?view=msvc-170 */
-+#pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    *lo = _umul128(a, b, hi);
-+}
-+#else
-+/*
-+ * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
-+ * high 64 bits of multiplication"
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
-+{
-+    limb_t a_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)a;
-+    limb_t a_hi = a >> 32;
-+    limb_t b_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)b;
-+    limb_t b_hi = b >> 32;
-+
-+    limb_t p0 = a_low * b_low;
-+    limb_t p1 = a_low * b_hi;
-+    limb_t p2 = a_hi * b_low;
-+    limb_t p3 = a_hi * b_hi;
-+
-+    uint32_t cy = (uint32_t)(((p0 >> 32) + (uint32_t)p1 + (uint32_t)p2) >> 32);
-+
-+    *lo = p0 + (p1 << 32) + (p2 << 32);
-+    *hi = p3 + (p1 >> 32) + (p2 >> 32) + cy;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t _add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
-+    /*
-+     * `c = a + b; if (c < a)` is idiomatic code that makes compilers
-+     * use add with carry on assembly level
-+     */
-+
-+    *ret = a + carry;
-+    if (*ret < a)
-+        carry1 = 1;
-+    else
-+        carry1 = 0;
-+
-+    t = *ret;
-+    *ret = t + b;
-+    if (*ret < t)
-+        carry2 = 1;
-+    else
-+        carry2 = 0;
-+
-+    return carry1 + carry2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
-+ *
-+ * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
-+ * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t add(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t c = 0;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    for(i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
-+        c = _add_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
-+
-+    return c;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * return number of limbs necessary for temporary values
-+ * when multiplying numbers n limbs large
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline size_t mul_limb_numb(size_t n)
-+{
-+    return  2 * n * 2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * multiply two numbers of the same size
-+ *
-+ * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
-+ * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be mul_limb_numb(n) limbs
-+ * long
-+ */
-+static void limb_mul(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
-+    size_t i, j, k;
-+
-+    r_odd = tmp;
-+    r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
-+
-+    memset(ret, 0, 2 * n * sizeof(limb_t));
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+        for (k = 0; k < i + n + 1; k++) {
-+            r_even[k] = 0;
-+            r_odd[k] = 0;
-+        }
-+        for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
-+            /*
-+             * place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
-+             * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
-+             * limb multiplication result
-+             */
-+            if (j % 2 == 0)
-+                _mul_limb(&r_even[i + j], &r_even[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
-+            else
-+                _mul_limb(&r_odd[i + j], &r_odd[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
-+        }
-+        /*
-+         * skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
-+         * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway)
-+         */
-+        add(ret, ret, r_even, n + i + 1);
-+        add(ret, ret, r_odd, n + i + 1);
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
-+static ossl_inline void rshift1(limb_t *val, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+        shift_out = val[i] & 1;
-+        val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE - 1) | (val[i] >> 1);
-+        shift_in = shift_out;
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+/* extend the LSB of flag to all bits of limb */
-+static ossl_inline limb_t mk_mask(limb_t flag)
-+{
-+    flag |= flag << 1;
-+    flag |= flag << 2;
-+    flag |= flag << 4;
-+    flag |= flag << 8;
-+    flag |= flag << 16;
-+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
-+    flag |= flag << 32;
-+#endif
-+    return flag;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
-+ * when flag == 0, then copies from b
-+ * when flag == 1, then copies from a
-+ */
-+static ossl_inline void cselect(limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
-+     * generates code with jumps
-+     */
-+    volatile limb_t mask;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    mask = mk_mask(flag);
-+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
-+        ret[i] = constant_time_select_64(mask, a[i], b[i]);
-+#else
-+        ret[i] = constant_time_select_32(mask, a[i], b[i]);
-+#endif
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+static limb_t _sub_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
-+{
-+    limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
-+    /*
-+     * while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
-+     * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction
-+     */
-+
-+    *ret = a - borrow;
-+    if (*ret > a)
-+        borrow1 = 1;
-+    else
-+        borrow1 = 0;
-+
-+    t = *ret;
-+    *ret = t - b;
-+    if (*ret > t)
-+        borrow2 = 1;
-+    else
-+        borrow2 = 0;
-+
-+    return borrow1 + borrow2;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
-+ * All arrays need to be n limbs long
-+ */
-+static limb_t sub(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
-+{
-+    limb_t borrow = 0;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    for (i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
-+        borrow = _sub_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
-+
-+    return borrow;
-+}
-+
-+/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
-+static ossl_inline size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum)
-+{
-+    return (anum + modnum) * 3;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
-+ * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
-+ * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
-+ */
-+static void mod(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
-+               size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
-+    limb_t res;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    memset(tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    atmp = tmp;
-+    modtmp = &tmp[anum + modnum];
-+    rettmp = &tmp[(anum + modnum) * 2];
-+
-+    for (i = modnum; i <modnum + anum; i++)
-+        atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < modnum; i++)
-+        modtmp[i] = mod[i];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < anum * LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++) {
-+        rshift1(modtmp, anum + modnum);
-+        res = sub(rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
-+        cselect(res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
-+    }
-+
-+    memcpy(ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t) * modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/* necessary size of tmp for a _mul_add_limb() call with provided anum */
-+static ossl_inline size_t _mul_add_limb_numb(size_t anum)
-+{
-+    return 2 * (anum + 1);
-+}
-+
-+/* multiply a by m, add to ret, return carry */
-+static limb_t _mul_add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum,
-+                           limb_t m, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry = 0;
-+    limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
-+    size_t i;
-+
-+    memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (anum + 1) * 2);
-+
-+    r_odd = tmp;
-+    r_even = &tmp[anum + 1];
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < anum; i++) {
-+        /*
-+         * place the results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays
-+         * so that we have to worry about carry just once
-+         */
-+        if (i % 2 == 0)
-+            _mul_limb(&r_even[i], &r_even[i + 1], a[i], m);
-+        else
-+            _mul_limb(&r_odd[i], &r_odd[i + 1], a[i], m);
-+    }
-+    /* assert: add() carry here will be equal zero */
-+    add(r_even, r_even, r_odd, anum + 1);
-+    /*
-+     * while here it will not overflow as the max value from multiplication
-+     * is -2 while max overflow from addition is 1, so the max value of
-+     * carry is -1 (i.e. max int)
-+     */
-+    carry = add(ret, ret, &r_even[1], anum) + r_even[0];
-+
-+    return carry;
-+}
-+
-+static ossl_inline size_t mod_montgomery_limb_numb(size_t modnum)
-+{
-+    return modnum * 2 + _mul_add_limb_numb(modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * calculate a % mod, place result in ret
-+ * assumes that a is in Montgomery form with the R (Montgomery modulus) being
-+ * smallest power of two big enough to fit mod and that's also a power
-+ * of the count of number of bits in limb_t (B).
-+ * For calculation, we also need n', such that mod * n' == -1 mod B.
-+ * anum must be <= 2 * modnum
-+ * ret needs to be modnum words long
-+ * tmp needs to be mod_montgomery_limb_numb(modnum) limbs long
-+ */
-+static void mod_montgomery(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
-+                          size_t modnum, limb_t ni0, limb_t *tmp)
-+{
-+    limb_t carry, v;
-+    limb_t *res, *rp, *tmp2;
-+    ossl_ssize_t i;
-+
-+    res = tmp;
-+    /*
-+     * for intermediate result we need an integer twice as long as modulus
-+     * but keep the input in the least significant limbs
-+     */
-+    memset(res, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (modnum * 2));
-+    memcpy(&res[modnum * 2 - anum], a, sizeof(limb_t) * anum);
-+    rp = &res[modnum];
-+    tmp2 = &res[modnum * 2];
-+
-+    carry = 0;
-+
-+    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
-+    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
-+        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
-+        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
-+        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
-+        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
-+        rp[-1] = v;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* perform the final reduction by mod... */
-+    carry -= sub(ret, rp, mod, modnum);
-+
-+    /* ...conditionally */
-+    cselect(carry, ret, rp, ret, modnum);
-+}
-+
-+/* allocated buffer should be freed afterwards */
-+static void BN_to_limb(const BIGNUM *bn, limb_t *buf, size_t limbs)
-+{
-+    int i;
-+    int real_limbs = (BN_num_bytes(bn) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    limb_t *ptr = buf + (limbs - real_limbs);
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < real_limbs; i++)
-+         ptr[i] = bn->d[real_limbs - i - 1];
-+}
-+
-+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
-+static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
-+{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
-+
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint64_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
-+        return host;
-+    }
-+}
-+
-+#else
-+/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
-+static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
-+{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
-+
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint32_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
-+        return host;
-+    }
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * We assume that intermediate, possible_arg2, blinding, and ctx are used
-+ * similar to BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() arguments.
-+ * to_mod is RSA modulus.
-+ * buf and num is the serialization buffer and its length.
-+ *
-+ * Here we use classic/Montgomery multiplication and modulo. After the calculation finished
-+ * we serialize the new structure instead of BIGNUMs taking endianness into account.
-+ */
-+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
-+                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-+                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
-+                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                           unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+{
-+    limb_t *l_im = NULL, *l_mul = NULL, *l_mod = NULL;
-+    limb_t *l_ret = NULL, *l_tmp = NULL, l_buf;
-+    size_t l_im_count = 0, l_mul_count = 0, l_size = 0, l_mod_count = 0;
-+    size_t l_tmp_count = 0;
-+    int ret = 0;
-+    size_t i;
-+    unsigned char *tmp;
-+    const BIGNUM *arg1 = intermediate;
-+    const BIGNUM *arg2 = (possible_arg2 == NULL) ? blinding->Ai : possible_arg2;
-+
-+    l_im_count  = (BN_num_bytes(arg1)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    l_mul_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg2)   + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+    l_mod_count = (BN_num_bytes(to_mod) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+
-+    l_size = l_im_count > l_mul_count ? l_im_count : l_mul_count;
-+    l_im  = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    l_mul = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    l_mod = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    if ((l_im == NULL) || (l_mul == NULL) || (l_mod == NULL))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    BN_to_limb(arg1,   l_im,  l_size);
-+    BN_to_limb(arg2,   l_mul, l_size);
-+    BN_to_limb(to_mod, l_mod, l_mod_count);
-+
-+    l_ret = OPENSSL_malloc(2 * l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+
-+    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
-+        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count) ?
-+                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count);
-+        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    } else {
-+        l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count) ?
-+                      mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count);
-+        l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+    }
-+
-+    if ((l_ret == NULL) || (l_tmp == NULL))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
-+        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
-+        mod_montgomery(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count,
-+                       blinding->m_ctx->n0[0], l_tmp);
-+    } else {
-+        limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
-+        mod(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count, l_tmp);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
-+    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
-+        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    memset(buf, 0, num);
-+    tmp = buf + num - BN_num_bytes(to_mod);
-+    for (i = 0; i < l_mod_count; i++) {
-+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
-+        l_buf = be64(l_ret[i]);
-+#else
-+        l_buf = be32(l_ret[i]);
-+#endif
-+        if (i == 0) {
-+            int delta = LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - ((l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE) - num);
-+
-+            memcpy(tmp, ((char *)&l_buf) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - delta, delta);
-+            tmp += delta;
-+        } else {
-+            memcpy(tmp, &l_buf, LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
-+            tmp += LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
-+        }
-+    }
-+    ret = num;
-+
-+ err:
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_im);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_mul);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_mod);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_tmp);
-+    OPENSSL_free(l_ret);
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- #
- # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
- BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
- BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
- BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
-+BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
-diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-         BN_free(d);
-     }
- 
--    if (blinding)
--        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-+    if (blinding) {
-+        /*
-+         * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
-+         * 0-padded BN BE serialization
-+         */
-+        j = ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(ret, blinding, unblind, rsa->n, ctx,
-+                                   buf, num);
-+        if (j == 0)
-             goto err;
--
--    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
-+    } else {
-+        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
-+        if (j < 0)
-+            goto err;
-+    }
- 
-     switch (padding) {
-     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
-index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
---- a/include/crypto/bn.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
-@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
-                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
-+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
-+                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
-+                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
-+                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
- 
- #endif
-diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
---- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
- # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
- # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
- # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
-+# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
- 
- /*
-  * BN reason codes.
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-From bbcf509bd046b34cca19c766bbddc31683d0858b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
- PEM_read_bio_ex
-
-In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
-allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
-the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
-responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
-free if the caller frees them even on failure.
-
-Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.
-
-Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.
-
-CVE-2022-4450
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
---- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-@@ -957,7 +957,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
-     *data = pem_malloc(len, flags);
-     if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) {
-         pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
-+        *header = NULL;
-         pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
-+        *data = NULL;
-         goto end;
-     }
-     BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
--- 
-2.39.1
-
-From 2bd611267868a008afa576846ba71566bd0d4d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
-
-Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
-ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
-error.
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
----
- test/pemtest.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
-index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
---- a/test/pemtest.c
-+++ b/test/pemtest.c
-@@ -83,9 +83,39 @@ static int test_invalid(void)
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-+static int test_empty_payload(void)
-+{
-+    BIO *b;
-+    static char *emptypay =
-+        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-+        "-\n" /* Base64 EOF character */
-+        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
-+    char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
-+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
-+    long len;
-+    int ret = 0;
-+
-+    b = BIO_new_mem_buf(emptypay, strlen(emptypay));
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(b))
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    /* Expected to fail because the payload is empty */
-+    if (!TEST_false(PEM_read_bio_ex(b, &name, &header, &data, &len, 0)))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    ret = 1;
-+ err:
-+    OPENSSL_free(name);
-+    OPENSSL_free(header);
-+    OPENSSL_free(data);
-+    BIO_free(b);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
-     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
-     ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
-+    ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
-     return 1;
- }
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-From c3829dd8825c654652201e16f8a0a0c46ee3f344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 16:18:14 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
-
-If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
-be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
-BIO is eventually freed.
-
-Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
-Buehler.
-
-Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
-index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
---- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
-+++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
-@@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
- static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
-                             void *parg);
- 
-+/*
-+ * On success, the returned BIO owns the input BIO as part of its BIO chain.
-+ * On failure, NULL is returned and the input BIO is owned by the caller.
-+ *
-+ * Unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream()
-+ */
- BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
- {
-     NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL;
-     BIO *asn_bio = NULL;
-     const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
-     ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
-+    BIO *pop_bio = NULL;
- 
-     if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
-         ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-@@ -69,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-     out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
-     if (out == NULL)
-         goto err;
-+    pop_bio = asn_bio;
- 
--    BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free);
--    BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
-+    if (BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free) <= 0
-+            || BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free) <= 0
-+            || BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux) <= 0)
-+        goto err;
- 
-     /*
--     * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
--     * needs.
-+     * Now let the callback prepend any digest, cipher, etc., that the BIO's
-+     * ASN1 structure needs.
-      */
- 
-     sarg.out = out;
-     sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
-     sarg.boundary = NULL;
- 
--    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
-+    /*
-+     * The asn1_cb(), must not have mutated asn_bio on error, leaving it in the
-+     * middle of some partially built, but not returned BIO chain.
-+     */
-+    if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) {
-+        /*
-+         * ndef_aux is now owned by asn_bio so we must not free it in the err
-+         * clean up block
-+         */
-+        ndef_aux = NULL;
-         goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * We must not fail now because the callback has prepended additional
-+     * BIOs to the chain
-+     */
- 
-     ndef_aux->val = val;
-     ndef_aux->it = it;
-@@ -91,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-     ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
-     ndef_aux->out = out;
- 
--    BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
--
-     return sarg.ndef_bio;
- 
-  err:
-+    /* BIO_pop() is NULL safe */
-+    (void)BIO_pop(pop_bio);
-     BIO_free(asn_bio);
-     OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
-     return NULL;
--- 
-2.39.1
-
-From f040f2577891d2bdb7610566c172233844cf673a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
- handled correctly
-
-Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
----
- test/recipes/80-test_cms.t  | 15 +++++++++++++--
- test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
-
-diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
-index 5dc6a3aebe..ec11bfc253 100644
---- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
-+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
- use POSIX;
- use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
- use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
--use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
-+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file with/;
- use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
- 
- setup("test_cms");
-@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
- my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
-     = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
- 
--plan tests => 6;
-+plan tests => 7;
- 
- my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
- 
-@@ -584,3 +584,14 @@ sub check_availability {
- 
-     return "";
- }
-+
-+# Check that we get the expected failure return code
-+with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 6; } },
-+    sub {
-+        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-encrypt',
-+                    '-in', srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"),
-+                    '-stream', '-recip',
-+                    srctop_file("test/smime-certs", "badrsa.pem"),
-+                   ])),
-+            "Check failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled correctly");
-+    });
-diff --git a/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..f824fc2267
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-+MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIToTV4Z0iuK08vZP20oTh//hC8BDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADAtMSswKQYD
-+VfcDEyJTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTE5MTEyMDA2NTQxOFoY
-+DzIwNTIwOTI3MDY1NDE4WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5BbGljZSBMb3ZlbGFjZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
-+AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALT0iehYOBY+TZp/T5K2KNI05Hwr+E3wP6XTvyi6WWyTgBK9LCOw
-+I2juwdRrjFBmXkk7pWpjXwsA3A5GOtz0FpfgyC7OxsVcF7q4WHWZWleYXFKlQHJD73nQwXP968+A
-+/3rBX7PhO0DBbZnfitOLPgPEwjTtdg0VQQ6Wz+CRQ/YbHPKaw7aRphZO63dKvIKp4cQVtkWQHi6s
-+yTjGsgkLcLNau5LZDQUdsGV+SAo3nBdWCRYV+I65x8Kf4hCxqqmjV3d/2NKRu0BXnDe/N+iDz3X0
-+zEoj0fqXgq4SWcC0nsG1lyyXt1TL270I6ATKRGJWiQVCCpDtc0NT6vdJ45bCSxgCAwEAAaOBlzCB
-+lDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB4GA1UdEQQXMBWBE2FsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGUwEwYDVR0lBAww
-+CgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDwYDVR0PAQH/BAUDAwfAADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUu/bMsi0dBhIcl64papAQ0yBm
-+ZnMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUeF8OWnjYa+RUcD2z3ez38fL6wEcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggEBABbW
-+eonR6TMTckehDKNOabwaCIcekahAIL6l9tTzUX5ew6ufiAPlC6I/zQlmUaU0iSyFDG1NW14kNbFt
-+5CAokyLhMtE4ASHBIHbiOp/ZSbUBTVYJZB61ot7w1/ol5QECSs08b8zrxIncf+t2DHGuVEy/Qq1d
-+rBz8d4ay8zpqAE1tUyL5Da6ZiKUfWwZQXSI/JlbjQFzYQqTRDnzHWrg1xPeMTO1P2/cplFaseTiv
-+yk4cYwOp/W9UAWymOZXF8WcJYCIUXkdcG/nEZxr057KlScrJmFXOoh7Y+8ON4iWYYcAfiNgpUFo/
-+j8BAwrKKaFvdlZS9k1Ypb2+UQY75mKJE9Bg=
-+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 2c6c9d439b484e1ba9830d8454a34fa4f80fdfe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:45:42 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
- (1.1.1)
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
----
- CHANGES                  | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
- crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c  |  2 +-
- include/openssl/x509v3.h |  2 +-
- test/v3nametest.c        |  8 ++++++++
- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-index 87a5eff47c..e54ddc55c9 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
-         return -1;
-     switch (a->type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
--        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
-+        result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
-         break;
- 
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
-diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-index 90fa3592ce..e61c0f29d4 100644
---- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
-         OTHERNAME *otherName;   /* otherName */
-         ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
-         ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
--        ASN1_TYPE *x400Address;
-+        ASN1_STRING *x400Address;
-         X509_NAME *directoryName;
-         EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
-         ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
-diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
-index d1852190b8..37819da8fd 100644
---- a/test/v3nametest.c
-+++ b/test/v3nametest.c
-@@ -646,6 +646,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
-             0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
-         },
-         15
-+    }, {
-+        /*
-+         * Regression test for CVE-2023-0286.
-+         */
-+        {
-+            0xa3, 0x00
-+        },
-+        2
-     }
- };
- 
--- 
-2.39.1
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
-
-The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
-that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
-value even if it is excessively large.
-
-There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
-OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
-perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
-new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
-
-An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
-obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
-Service attack.
-
-The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
-functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
-similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
-DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
-
-CVE-2023-3446
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
- crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  | 3 ++-
- include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
- include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
-         return 0;
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
-      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
- DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
- DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
- DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
-+DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
- DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
-index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
- # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
- #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
- # endif
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-+#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
-+# endif
- 
- # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
- # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
- 
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /*
-  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
-- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-  *
-  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
-  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
- #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
- #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
- #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
-+#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
- #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
- obviously invalid
-
-If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
-is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
-
-We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
-q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
-q value.
-
-Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
-such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
-computations.
-
-Fixes CVE-2023-3817
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
- /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
- int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
- {
--    int ok = 0, r;
-+    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
- 
-@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
-     if (t2 == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
--    if (dh->q) {
-+    if (dh->q != NULL) {
-+        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
-+            q_good = 1;
-+        else
-+            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (q_good) {
-         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
-             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
-         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
-
-We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
-DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
-
-This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
-
-It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
-differ.  DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
-sets a flag for the excessively sized Q.  This behaviour is mimicked in
-DH_check_pub_key().
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
-
-(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
-Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
- crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
- crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 10 ++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
- include/openssl/dh.h    |  6 ++++--
- include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
-@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 
-     *ret = 0;
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+
-+    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
-+        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
-+        /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
-+         * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
-+         * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
-+        ok = 1;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-     if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
-         goto err;
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
-     "parameter encoding error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
-     "unable to check generator"},
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
-         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-         goto err;
-     }
-+
-+    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
- #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-     if (FIPS_mode()
-         && (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
- DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
- DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
- DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
-+DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
- DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
- DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
- DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
-index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dh.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
-@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
- /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
- # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
- 
--/* DH_check error codes */
-+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
- # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
- # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
- # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
- # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
- # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
--# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
-+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
- # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
-+/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
-+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
- 
- /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
- # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
-diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
---- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
- #  define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD                             202
- #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
- #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
-+#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
- #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
- #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
- 
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-detected-addr-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6 openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c
---- openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c.addr-ipv6	2021-07-16 15:14:08.491986682 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1k/apps/s_socket.c	2021-07-16 15:23:21.271329197 +0200
-@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
-     const BIO_ADDRINFO *next;
-     int sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, sock_port;
-     const BIO_ADDR *sock_address;
-+    int sock_family_fallback = AF_UNSPEC;
-+    const BIO_ADDR *sock_address_fallback = NULL;
-     int sock_options = BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR;
-     int ret = 0;
- 
-@@ -244,6 +246,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
-             && BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(next) == sock_protocol) {
-         if (sock_family == AF_INET
-                 && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET6) {
-+            /* In case AF_INET6 is returned but not supported by the
-+             * kernel, retry with the first detected address family */
-+            sock_family_fallback = sock_family;
-+            sock_address_fallback = sock_address;
-             sock_family = AF_INET6;
-             sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(next);
-         } else if (sock_family == AF_INET6
-@@ -253,6 +259,10 @@ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const ch
-     }
- 
-     asock = BIO_socket(sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
-+	if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET && sock_family_fallback != AF_UNSPEC) {
-+       asock = BIO_socket(sock_family_fallback, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0);
-+       sock_address = sock_address_fallback;
-+	}
-     if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET
-         || !BIO_listen(asock, sock_address, sock_options)) {
-         BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-ec-curves.patch

@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c
---- openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1h/apps/speed.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
-@@ -490,90 +490,30 @@ static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2];
- #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
- 
- enum {
--    R_EC_P160,
--    R_EC_P192,
-     R_EC_P224,
-     R_EC_P256,
-     R_EC_P384,
-     R_EC_P521,
--#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
--    R_EC_K163,
--    R_EC_K233,
--    R_EC_K283,
--    R_EC_K409,
--    R_EC_K571,
--    R_EC_B163,
--    R_EC_B233,
--    R_EC_B283,
--    R_EC_B409,
--    R_EC_B571,
--#endif
--    R_EC_BRP256R1,
--    R_EC_BRP256T1,
--    R_EC_BRP384R1,
--    R_EC_BRP384T1,
--    R_EC_BRP512R1,
--    R_EC_BRP512T1,
-     R_EC_X25519,
-     R_EC_X448
- };
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- static OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[] = {
--    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
--    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
-     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
-     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
-     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
-     {"ecdsap521", R_EC_P521},
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
--    {"ecdsak163", R_EC_K163},
--    {"ecdsak233", R_EC_K233},
--    {"ecdsak283", R_EC_K283},
--    {"ecdsak409", R_EC_K409},
--    {"ecdsak571", R_EC_K571},
--    {"ecdsab163", R_EC_B163},
--    {"ecdsab233", R_EC_B233},
--    {"ecdsab283", R_EC_B283},
--    {"ecdsab409", R_EC_B409},
--    {"ecdsab571", R_EC_B571},
--# endif
--    {"ecdsabrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1},
--    {"ecdsabrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1},
--    {"ecdsabrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1},
--    {"ecdsabrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1},
--    {"ecdsabrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1},
--    {"ecdsabrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1}
- };
- # define ECDSA_NUM       OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_choices)
- 
- static double ecdsa_results[ECDSA_NUM][2];    /* 2 ops: sign then verify */
- 
- static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[] = {
--    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
--    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
-     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
-     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
-     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
-     {"ecdhp521", R_EC_P521},
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
--    {"ecdhk163", R_EC_K163},
--    {"ecdhk233", R_EC_K233},
--    {"ecdhk283", R_EC_K283},
--    {"ecdhk409", R_EC_K409},
--    {"ecdhk571", R_EC_K571},
--    {"ecdhb163", R_EC_B163},
--    {"ecdhb233", R_EC_B233},
--    {"ecdhb283", R_EC_B283},
--    {"ecdhb409", R_EC_B409},
--    {"ecdhb571", R_EC_B571},
--# endif
--    {"ecdhbrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1},
--    {"ecdhbrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1},
--    {"ecdhbrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1},
--    {"ecdhbrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1},
--    {"ecdhbrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1},
--    {"ecdhbrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1},
-     {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519},
-     {"ecdhx448", R_EC_X448}
- };
-@@ -1502,31 +1442,10 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
-         unsigned int bits;
-     } test_curves[] = {
-         /* Prime Curves */
--        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
--        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
-         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
-         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
-         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
-         {"nistp521", NID_secp521r1, 521},
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
--        /* Binary Curves */
--        {"nistk163", NID_sect163k1, 163},
--        {"nistk233", NID_sect233k1, 233},
--        {"nistk283", NID_sect283k1, 283},
--        {"nistk409", NID_sect409k1, 409},
--        {"nistk571", NID_sect571k1, 571},
--        {"nistb163", NID_sect163r2, 163},
--        {"nistb233", NID_sect233r1, 233},
--        {"nistb283", NID_sect283r1, 283},
--        {"nistb409", NID_sect409r1, 409},
--        {"nistb571", NID_sect571r1, 571},
--# endif
--        {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 256},
--        {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 256},
--        {"brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 384},
--        {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 384},
--        {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 512},
--        {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 512},
-         /* Other and ECDH only ones */
-         {"X25519", NID_X25519, 253},
-         {"X448", NID_X448, 448}
-@@ -2026,9 +1945,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
- #  endif
- 
- #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
--    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
--    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
--    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
-+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P224][0] = count / 1000;
-+    ecdsa_c[R_EC_P224][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
-+    for (i = R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
-         ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
-         ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2;
-         if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0)
-@@ -2040,7 +1959,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
-             }
-         }
-     }
--#   ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+#   if 0
-     ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
-     ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2;
-     for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
-@@ -2071,8 +1990,8 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
-     }
- #   endif
- 
--    ecdh_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000;
--    for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
-+    ecdh_c[R_EC_P224][0] = count / 1000;
-+    for (i = R_EC_P256; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) {
-         ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
-         if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0)
-             ecdh_doit[i] = 0;
-@@ -2082,7 +2001,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
-             }
-         }
-     }
--#   ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+#   if 0
-     ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000;
-     for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) {
-         ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
---- openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c.curves	2020-09-22 14:55:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1h/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c	2020-11-06 13:27:15.659288431 +0100
-@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GRO
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-+    if (BN_num_bits(p) < 224) {
-+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     if (ctx == NULL) {
-         ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-         if (ctx == NULL)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h
---- openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h.curves	2020-11-06 13:27:15.627288114 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/ecdsatest.h	2020-11-06 13:27:15.660288441 +0100
-@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
- } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
- 
- static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
--    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
--    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
--     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
--     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
--     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
--     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
--     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
--     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
--     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
--    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
--     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
--     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
--     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
--     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
--     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
--     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
--     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
-     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
-     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
-      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
---- openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves	2020-11-06 13:58:36.402895540 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1h/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t	2020-11-06 13:59:38.508484498 +0100
-@@ -20,45 +20,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
-     if disabled("ec");
- 
- my @prime_curves = qw(
--    secp112r1
--    secp112r2
--    secp128r1
--    secp128r2
--    secp160k1
--    secp160r1
--    secp160r2
--    secp192k1
--    secp224k1
-     secp224r1
-     secp256k1
-     secp384r1
-     secp521r1
--    prime192v1
--    prime192v2
--    prime192v3
--    prime239v1
--    prime239v2
--    prime239v3
-     prime256v1
--    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
--    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
--    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
--    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
--    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
--    brainpoolP160r1
--    brainpoolP160t1
--    brainpoolP192r1
--    brainpoolP192t1
--    brainpoolP224r1
--    brainpoolP224t1
--    brainpoolP256r1
--    brainpoolP256t1
--    brainpoolP320r1
--    brainpoolP320t1
--    brainpoolP384r1
--    brainpoolP384t1
--    brainpoolP512r1
--    brainpoolP512t1
- );
- 
- my @binary_curves = qw(
-@@ -115,7 +81,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
-     if !disabled("sm2");
- 
- my @curve_aliases = qw(
--    P-192
-     P-224
-     P-256
-     P-384

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-edk2-build.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.299548432 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
-@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+#include "internal/numbers.h"
- #include "crypto/evp.h"
- 
- static int pkey_kdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c	2020-05-18 12:57:18.648288904 +0200
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/kdf.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include "internal/numbers.h"
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
- #include "crypto/evp.h"
- #include "kdf_local.h"
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:56:05.646655554 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2020-05-18 12:58:51.088090896 +0200
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
- #include "crypto/fips.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/dso.h"
--#ifdef __linux
-+#if defined(__linux) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
- # include <sys/syscall.h>
- # include <sys/random.h>
- # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h.edk2-build openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h.edk2-build	2020-05-18 12:55:53.296548406 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/fips.h	2020-05-18 12:55:53.340548788 +0200
-@@ -50,10 +50,6 @@
- #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- 
--#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
--# error FIPS is disabled.
--#endif
--
- #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- 
- int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff);
-@@ -97,4 +93,8 @@ void fips_set_selftest_fail(void);
- 
- void FIPS_get_timevec(unsigned char *buf, unsigned long *pctr);
- 
-+#else
-+
-+# define fips_in_post() 0
-+
- #endif

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch

@@ -1,408 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.863389837 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info	2020-04-23 13:31:55.847069892 +0200
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- LIBS=../../libcrypto
- SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
--        randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
-+        randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \
-         rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
- 
- INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.818390686 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
-@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
- 
- 
- /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
--static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
-+static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
- 
- static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
- 
-@@ -201,8 +201,13 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secu
-     drbg->parent = parent;
- 
-     if (parent == NULL) {
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-+        drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
-+        drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
-+#else
-         drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
-         drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
-+#endif
- #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
-         drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
-         drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
-+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
-+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Implementation of the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include "crypto/rand.h"
-+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-+#include "rand_local.h"
-+
-+static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
-+static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
-+    = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
-+
-+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-+                              unsigned int *md_size)
-+{
-+    int r;
-+    size_t n;
-+    unsigned char *p;
-+
-+    n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool);
-+    if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
-+        p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
-+        r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-+        if (r != 0)
-+            memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
-+        rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
-+        return r;
-+    }
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
-+{
-+    rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
-+    crngt_pool = NULL;
-+}
-+
-+int rand_crngt_init(void)
-+{
-+    unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
-+
-+    if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 1, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
-+        return 0;
-+    if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) {
-+        OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
-+        return 1;
-+    }
-+    rand_crngt_cleanup();
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init)
-+{
-+    return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)
-+        && rand_crngt_init()
-+        && OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup);
-+}
-+
-+int rand_crngt_single_init(void)
-+{
-+    return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init);
-+}
-+
-+size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-+                              unsigned char **pout,
-+                              int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
-+                              int prediction_resistance)
-+{
-+    unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+    unsigned int sz;
-+    RAND_POOL *pool;
-+    size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
-+    int attempts = 3;
-+
-+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init))
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
-+        s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
-+        if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz)
-+            || memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
-+            || !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
-+            goto err;
-+        memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz);
-+        t += s;
-+        attempts++;
-+    }
-+    r = t;
-+    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-+err:
-+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
-+    rand_pool_free(pool);
-+    return r;
-+}
-+
-+void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-+                                unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-+{
-+    OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-+}
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.470397250 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,15 @@
- # define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL             (60*60)   /* 1 hour */
- # define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL              (7*60)    /* 7 minutes */
- 
--
-+/*
-+ * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
-+ * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.  The size is somewhat
-+ * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
-+ * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
-+ *
-+ * The value is in bytes.
-+ */
-+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
- 
- /*
-  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
-@@ -44,6 +52,8 @@
-  */
- # define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH                         INT32_MAX
- 
-+/* The default nonce */
-+# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING                "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"
- 
- /*
-  * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
-@@ -296,4 +306,22 @@ int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *
- /* initializes the AES-CTR DRBG implementation */
- int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
-+ * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
-+ */
-+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-+                              unsigned int *md_size);
-+extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-+                                unsigned int *md_size);
-+int rand_crngt_init(void);
-+void rand_crngt_cleanup(void);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Expose the run once initialisation function for the unit tests because.
-+ * they need to restart from scratch to validate the first block is skipped
-+ * properly.
-+ */
-+int rand_crngt_single_init(void);
-+
- #endif
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h
---- openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h.crng-test	2020-04-23 13:30:45.824390573 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h	2020-04-23 13:30:45.864389819 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAN
- 
- void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
- 
-+/* CRNG test entropy filter callbacks. */
-+size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-+                              unsigned char **pout,
-+                              int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
-+                              int prediction_resistance);
-+void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-+                                unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
-+
- /*
-  * RAND_POOL functions
-  */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c.crng-test	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c	2020-04-23 13:30:45.865389800 +0200
-@@ -150,6 +150,31 @@ static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
-     return t->noncelen;
- }
- 
-+ /*
-+ * Disable CRNG testing if it is enabled.
-+ * If the DRBG is ready or in an error state, this means an instantiate cycle
-+ * for which the default personalisation string is used.
-+ */
-+static int disable_crngt(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-+{
-+    static const char pers[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
-+    const int instantiate = drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
-+
-+    if (drbg->get_entropy != rand_crngt_get_entropy)
-+        return 1;
-+
-+     if ((instantiate && !RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg))
-+        || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_drbg_get_entropy,
-+                                              &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
-+                                              &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
-+                                              &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce))
-+        || (instantiate
-+            && !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, (const unsigned char *)pers,
-+                                      sizeof(pers) - 1)))
-+        return 0;
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
- static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
- {
-     int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
-@@ -175,7 +200,8 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA
-     if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
-         return 0;
-     if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
--                                           kat_nonce, NULL))) {
-+                                           kat_nonce, NULL))
-+        || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) {
-         failures++;
-         goto err;
-     }
-@@ -293,7 +319,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DAT
-     unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
-     int ret = 0;
- 
--    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
-+	|| !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg)))
-         goto err;
- 
-     /*
-@@ -740,6 +767,10 @@ static int test_rand_drbg_reseed(void)
-         || !TEST_ptr_eq(private->parent, master))
-         return 0;
- 
-+    /* Disable CRNG testing for the master DRBG */
-+    if (!TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
-+        return 0;
-+
-     /* uninstantiate the three global DRBGs */
-     RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private);
-     RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public);
-@@ -964,7 +995,8 @@ static int test_rand_seed(void)
-     size_t rand_buflen;
-     size_t required_seed_buflen = 0;
- 
--    if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()))
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
-+        || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
-         return 0;
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
-@@ -1013,6 +1045,95 @@ static int test_rand_add(void)
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * A list of the FIPS DRGB types.
-+ */
-+static const struct s_drgb_types {
-+    int nid;
-+    int flags;
-+} drgb_types[] = {
-+    { NID_aes_128_ctr,  0                   },
-+    { NID_aes_192_ctr,  0                   },
-+    { NID_aes_256_ctr,  0                   },
-+};
-+
-+/* Six cases for each covers seed sizes up to 32 bytes */
-+static const size_t crngt_num_cases = 6;
-+
-+static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx;
-+
-+static int crngt_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
-+                            unsigned int *md_size)
-+{
-+    size_t i, z;
-+
-+    if (!TEST_int_lt(crngt_idx, crngt_num_cases))
-+        return 0;
-+    /* Generate a block of unique data unless this is the duplication point */
-+    z = crngt_idx++;
-+    if (z > 0 && crngt_case == z)
-+        z--;
-+    for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++)
-+        buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z);
-+    return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-+}
-+
-+static int test_crngt(int n)
-+{
-+    const struct s_drgb_types *dt = drgb_types + n / crngt_num_cases;
-+    RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
-+    unsigned char buff[100];
-+    size_t ent;
-+    int res = 0;
-+    int expect;
-+
-+    if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_single_init()))
-+        return 0;
-+    rand_crngt_cleanup();
-+
-+    if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
-+        return 0;
-+    ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ;
-+    crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases;
-+    crngt_idx = 0;
-+    crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb;
-+    if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_init()))
-+        goto err;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
-+    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy,
-+                                           &rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy,
-+                                           &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
-+                                           &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce)))
-+        goto err;
-+#endif
-+    expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > ent;
-+    if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), expect))
-+        goto err;
-+    if (!expect)
-+        goto fin;
-+    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > 2 * ent;
-+    if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0), expect))
-+        goto err;
-+    if (!expect)
-+        goto fin;
-+    if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
-+        goto err;
-+
-+fin:
-+    res = 1;
-+err:
-+    if (!res)
-+        TEST_note("DRBG %zd case %zd block %zd", n / crngt_num_cases,
-+                  crngt_case, crngt_idx);
-+    uninstantiate(drbg);
-+    RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
-+    crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
-+    return res;
-+}
-+
- int setup_tests(void)
- {
-     app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-@@ -1025,5 +1146,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
- #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
-     ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread);
- #endif
-+    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_crngt, crngt_num_cases * OSSL_NELEM(drgb_types));
-     return 1;
- }

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fips-curves.patch

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.fips-curves openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.fips-curves	2020-05-18 12:59:54.839643980 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c	2020-05-18 12:59:54.852644093 +0200
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
- #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "internal/nelem.h"
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ static const struct {
- 
- typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
-     int nid;
-+    int fips_allowed;
-     const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-     const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
-     const char *comment;
-@@ -246,23 +248,23 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
-     /* prime field curves */
-     /* secg curves */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
--    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
-+    {NID_secp224r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
-      "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
- #else
--    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
-+    {NID_secp224r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
-      "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
- #endif
--    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
-+    {NID_secp256k1, 0, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
-      "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
-     /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
--    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h,
-+    {NID_secp384r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h,
- # if defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
-      EC_GFp_s390x_nistp384_method,
- # else
-      0,
- # endif
-      "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
--    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h,
-+    {NID_secp521r1, 1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h,
- # if defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
-      EC_GFp_s390x_nistp521_method,
- # elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
- # endif
-      "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
-     /* X9.62 curves */
--    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
-+    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
- #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
-      EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
- # elif defined(S390X_EC_ASM)
-@@ -404,6 +406,10 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
-         if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
-+            if (!curve_list[i].fips_allowed && FIPS_mode()) {
-+                ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME);
-+                return NULL;
-+            }
-             ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
-             break;
-         }
-@@ -418,19 +424,31 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int
- 
- size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
- {
--    size_t i, min;
-+    size_t i, j, num;
-+    int fips_mode = FIPS_mode();
- 
--    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
--        return curve_list_length;
-+    num = curve_list_length;
-+    if (fips_mode)
-+        for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
-+            if (!curve_list[i].fips_allowed)
-+                --num;
-+        }
- 
--    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
-+    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0) {
-+        return num;
-+    }
- 
--    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
--        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
--        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
-+    for (i = 0, j = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
-+        if (j >= nitems)
-+            break;
-+        if (!fips_mode || curve_list[i].fips_allowed) {
-+            r[j].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
-+            r[j].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
-+            ++j;
-+        }
-     }
- 
--    return curve_list_length;
-+    return num;
- }
- 
- /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-curves openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.fips-curves	2020-05-18 12:59:54.797643616 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c	2020-05-18 13:03:54.748725463 +0200
-@@ -678,6 +678,36 @@ static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] =
- #endif
- };
- 
-+static const uint16_t tls12_fips_sigalgs[] = {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
-+#endif
-+
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
-+
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
-+#endif
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
-+    TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
-+#endif
-+};
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
-     TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
-@@ -894,6 +924,8 @@ static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_leg
-     }
-     if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
-         return NULL;
-+    if (FIPS_mode()) /* We do not allow legacy SHA1 signatures in FIPS mode */
-+        return NULL;
-     if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
-         const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
- 
-@@ -954,6 +986,9 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int se
-     } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
-         *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-         return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
-+    } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+        *psigs = tls12_fips_sigalgs;
-+        return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_fips_sigalgs);
-     } else {
-         *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-         return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
-@@ -973,6 +1008,9 @@ int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s,
-     if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
-         sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-         siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
-+    } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+        sigs = tls12_fips_sigalgs;
-+        siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_fips_sigalgs);
-     } else {
-         sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-         siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
-@@ -1617,6 +1655,8 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SS
-     if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
-             || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
-             || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
-+        if (FIPS_mode())
-+            return 0;
-         /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
-         if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
-             return 0;
-@@ -2842,6 +2882,13 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatale
-                 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
-                 size_t sent_sigslen;
- 
-+                if (fatalerrs && FIPS_mode()) {
-+                    /* There are no suitable legacy algorithms in FIPS mode */
-+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
-+                             SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
-+                             SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
-+                    return 0;
-+                }
-                 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
-                     if (!fatalerrs)
-                         return 1;