145 changed files with 52871 additions and 27099 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz
+SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
--- a/.openssl.metadata
+++ b/.openssl.metadata
@ -1 +1 @@
-f20736d6aae36bcbfa9aba0d358c71601833bf27 SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz
+6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
--- a/SOURCES/0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 From 603a35802319c0459737e3f067369ceb990fe2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:01:41 +0200
 Subject: Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64
 (Was openssl-1.1.1-build.patch)
 ---
 Configurations/10-main.conf | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/Configurations/10-main.conf b/Configurations/10-main.conf
 index d7580bf3e1..a7dbfd7f40 100644
 --- a/Configurations/10-main.conf
 +++ b/Configurations/10-main.conf
@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ my %targets = (
         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
         asm_arch         => 'ppc64',
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-armv4" => {
@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ my %targets = (
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64" ],
         asm_arch         => 'aarch64',
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 From 3d5755df8d09ca841c0aca2d7344db060f6cc97f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:05:55 +0200
 Subject: Do not install html docs
 (was openssl-1.1.1-no-html.patch)
 ---
 Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 index 342e46d24d..9f369edf0e 100644
 --- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 +++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
 uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev
 -install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs
 +install_docs: install_man_docs
 uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs
 	$(RM) -r $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
 From 6790960076742a9053c624e26fbb87fcd5789e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:17:26 +0200
 Subject: Override default paths for the CA directory tree
 Also add default section to load crypto-policies configuration
 for TLS.
 It needs to be reverted before running tests.
 (was openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch)
 ---
 apps/CA.pl.in    |  2 +-
 apps/openssl.cnf | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/apps/CA.pl.in b/apps/CA.pl.in
 index c0afb96716..d6a5fabd16 100644
 --- a/apps/CA.pl.in
 +++ b/apps/CA.pl.in
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
 my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
 # Default values for various configuration settings.
 -my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
 +my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
 my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
 my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
 my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls	2021-07-06 13:41:39.204978272 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-07-06 13:49:50.362857683 +0200
@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
 [openssl_init]
 providers = provider_sect
 +# Load default TLS policy configuration
 +ssl_conf = ssl_module
 +alg_section = evp_properties
 +
 +[ evp_properties ]
 +#This section is intentionally added empty here
 +#to be tuned on particular systems
 # List of providers to load
 [provider_sect]
@@ -64,6 +66,13 @@ default = default_sect
 [default_sect]
 # activate = 1
 +[ ssl_module ]
 +
 +system_default = crypto_policy
 +
 +[ crypto_policy ]
 +
 +.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
 ####################################################################
 [ ca ]
@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
 ####################################################################
 [ CA_default ]
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
 certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
 crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
 database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
@@ -304,7 +313,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
 [ tsa_config1 ]
 # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
 serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
 crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
 signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
--- a/SOURCES/0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
 From 3d8fa9859501b07e02b76b5577e2915d5851e927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:27:18 +0200
 Subject: apps/ca: fix md option help text
 upstreamable
 (was openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch)
 ---
 apps/ca.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
 index 0f21b4fa1c..3d4b2c1673 100755
 --- a/apps/ca.c
 +++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
     {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"},
     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
 -    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256"},
 +    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256; see openssl help for list"},
     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "The CA private key"},
     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f',
      "Private key file format (ENGINE, other values ignored)"},
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 From 3f9deff30ae6efbfe979043b00cdf649b39793c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:51:34 +0200
 Subject: Disable signature verification with totally unsafe hash algorithms
 (was openssl-1.1.1-no-weak-verify.patch)
 ---
 crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
 index b7eed914b0..af62f0ef08 100644
 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
 +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int ASN1_item_verify_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         if (ret <= 1)
             goto err;
 +    } else if ((mdnid == NID_md5
 +               && ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY") == NULL) ||
 +               mdnid == NID_md4 || mdnid == NID_md2 || mdnid == NID_sha) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 +        goto err;
     } else {
         const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
 -- 
 2.26.2
--- a/SOURCES/0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
 From 5b2ec9a54037d7b007324bf53e067e73511cdfe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 14:00:16 +0100
 Subject: Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro
 The macro calls EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled() on the
 default context.
 ---
 include/openssl/crypto.h.in |  1 +
 include/openssl/fips.h      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/property_test.c        | 13 +++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/openssl/fips.h
 diff --git a/include/openssl/fips.h b/include/openssl/fips.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..c64f0f8e8f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/openssl/fips.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_H
 +# define OPENSSL_FIPS_H
 +# pragma once
 +
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 +# include <openssl/macros.h>
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +extern "C" {
 +# endif
 +
 +# define FIPS_mode() EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +}
 +# endif
 +#endif
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro	2021-06-29 12:14:58.851557698 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c	2021-06-29 12:17:14.630143832 +0200
@@ -488,6 +488,19 @@ static int test_property_list_to_string(
     return ret;
 }
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 +static int test_downstream_FIPS_mode(void)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    ret = TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes"))
 +          && TEST_true(FIPS_mode())
 +          && TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=no"))
 +          && TEST_false(FIPS_mode());
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     ADD_TEST(test_property_string);
@@ -500,6 +512,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_property);
     ADD_TEST(test_query_cache_stochastic);
     ADD_TEST(test_fips_mode);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_downstream_FIPS_mode);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_property_list_to_string, OSSL_NELEM(to_string_tests));
     return 1;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips	2021-03-16 00:09:55.814826432 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c	2021-03-16 00:15:55.129043811 +0100
@@ -12,11 +12,46 @@
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
 +# include <sys/types.h>
 +# include <sys/stat.h>
 +# include <fcntl.h>
 +# include <unistd.h>
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 +
 struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st {
     ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn *fn;
     struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st *next;
 };
 +# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
 +
 +static int kernel_fips_flag;
 +
 +static void read_kernel_fips_flag(void)
 +{
 +	char buf[2] = "0";
 +	int fd;
 +
 +	if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
 +		buf[0] = '1';
 +	} else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
 +		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
 +		close(fd);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (buf[0] == '1') {
 +		kernel_fips_flag = 1;
 +	}
 +
 +		return;
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()
 +{
 +	return kernel_fips_flag;
 +}
 +
 +
 struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA data;
@@ -121,6 +170,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL default_conte
 DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
 {
 +	 read_kernel_fips_flag();
     return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL)
         && context_init(&default_context_int);
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h
 --- openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips	2022-01-11 13:13:08.323238760 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h	2022-01-11 13:13:43.522558909 +0100
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB
                                 const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
 void ossl_provider_deinit_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
 +/* FIPS flag access */
 +int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag(void);
 +
 # ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 # endif
--- a/SOURCES/0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
 --- ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:44:12.545437892 +0100
 +++ ./apps/speed.c	2023-03-14 04:48:28.606729067 +0100
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 enum ec_curves_t {
 -    R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
 +    R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
     R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
@@ -376,8 +376,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
 };
 /* list of ecdsa curves */
 static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
 -    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -404,8 +402,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDS
 enum { R_EC_X25519 = ECDSA_NUM, R_EC_X448, EC_NUM };
 /* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
 static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
 -    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
 -    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -1422,8 +1418,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
      */
     static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
         /* Prime Curves */
 -        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
 -        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
 diff -up ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c
 --- ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves	2023-03-14 06:22:41.542310442 +0100
 +++ ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c	2023-03-21 11:24:18.378451683 +0100
@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
 static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
     /* prime field curves */
     /* secg curves */
 -    {"secp112r1", NID_secp112r1 },
 -    {"secp112r2", NID_secp112r2 },
 -    {"secp128r1", NID_secp128r1 },
 -    {"secp128r2", NID_secp128r2 },
 -    {"secp160k1", NID_secp160k1 },
 -    {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1 },
 -    {"secp160r2", NID_secp160r2 },
 -    {"secp192k1", NID_secp192k1 },
 -    {"secp224k1", NID_secp224k1 },
     {"secp224r1", NID_secp224r1 },
     {"secp256k1", NID_secp256k1 },
     {"secp384r1", NID_secp384r1 },
     {"secp521r1", NID_secp521r1 },
     /* X9.62 curves */
 -    {"prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1 },
 -    {"prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2 },
 -    {"prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3 },
 -    {"prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1 },
 -    {"prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2 },
 -    {"prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3 },
     {"prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1 },
     /* characteristic two field curves */
     /* NIST/SECG curves */
 -    {"sect113r1", NID_sect113r1 },
 -    {"sect113r2", NID_sect113r2 },
 -    {"sect131r1", NID_sect131r1 },
 -    {"sect131r2", NID_sect131r2 },
 -    {"sect163k1", NID_sect163k1 },
 -    {"sect163r1", NID_sect163r1 },
 -    {"sect163r2", NID_sect163r2 },
 -    {"sect193r1", NID_sect193r1 },
 -    {"sect193r2", NID_sect193r2 },
 -    {"sect233k1", NID_sect233k1 },
 -    {"sect233r1", NID_sect233r1 },
 -    {"sect239k1", NID_sect239k1 },
 -    {"sect283k1", NID_sect283k1 },
 -    {"sect283r1", NID_sect283r1 },
 -    {"sect409k1", NID_sect409k1 },
 -    {"sect409r1", NID_sect409r1 },
 -    {"sect571k1", NID_sect571k1 },
 -    {"sect571r1", NID_sect571r1 },
 -    /* X9.62 curves */
 -    {"c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 },
 -    {"c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 },
 -    {"c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 },
 -    {"c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 },
 -    {"c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 },
 -    {"c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 },
 -    {"c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 },
 -    {"c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 },
 -    {"c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 },
 -    /*
 -     * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
 -     * from X9.62]
 -     */
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 },
 -    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 },
 -    /* IPSec curves */
 -    {"Oakley-EC2N-3", NID_ipsec3 },
 -    {"Oakley-EC2N-4", NID_ipsec4 },
     /* brainpool curves */
 -    {"brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1 },
 -    {"brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1 },
     {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
     {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
     {"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] =
     {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1 },
     {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1 },
     {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1 },
 -    /* SM2 curve */
 -    {"SM2", NID_sm2 },
 };
 const char *OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(int nid)
 diff -up ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves ./test/acvp_test.inc
 --- ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves	2023-03-14 06:38:20.563712586 +0100
 +++ ./test/acvp_test.inc	2023-03-14 06:39:01.631080059 +0100
@@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_
 };
 static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
     {
 -        "SHA-1",
 -        "P-192",
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_pub0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_r0),
 -        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
 -        PASS,
 -    },
 -    {
         "SHA2-512",
         "P-521",
         ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg1),
 diff -up ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves ./test/ecdsatest.h
 --- ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:49:16.148154472 +0100
 +++ ./test/ecdsatest.h	2023-03-14 04:51:01.376096037 +0100
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
 } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
 static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
 -    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
 -     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
 -     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
 -     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
 -     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
 -     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
 -    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
 -     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
 -     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
 -     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
 -     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
 -     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
 -     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
 -     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
 diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
 --- ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:51:45.215488277 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t	2023-03-21 11:26:58.613885435 +0100
@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
     if disabled("ec");
 my @prime_curves = qw(
 -    secp112r1
 -    secp112r2
 -    secp128r1
 -    secp128r2
 -    secp160k1
 -    secp160r1
 -    secp160r2
 -    secp192k1
 -    secp224k1
     secp224r1
     secp256k1
     secp384r1
     secp521r1
 -    prime192v1
 -    prime192v2
 -    prime192v3
 -    prime239v1
 -    prime239v2
 -    prime239v3
     prime256v1
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
 -    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
 -    brainpoolP160r1
 -    brainpoolP160t1
 -    brainpoolP192r1
 -    brainpoolP192t1
 -    brainpoolP224r1
 -    brainpoolP224t1
     brainpoolP256r1
     brainpoolP256t1
     brainpoolP320r1
@@ -136,7 +110,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
     if !disabled("sm2");
 my @curve_aliases = qw(
 -    P-192
     P-224
     P-256
     P-384
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove	2023-07-06 10:30:10.152621369 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c	2023-07-06 10:34:00.557091758 +0200
@@ -74,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *n
 /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
 static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
 -    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
 -    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
 -    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
 -    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
 -    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
 -    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
 -    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
 -    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
 -    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
 -    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
 -    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
     {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
     {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
     {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
--- a/SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-22 13:10:45.718077845 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2022-03-22 13:12:46.626599016 +0100
@@ -895,6 +895,12 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **
     if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
         group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
 +    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +        EC_GROUP_free(group);
 +        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
     if (a) {
         EC_GROUP_free(*a);
         *a = group;
@@ -954,6 +959,11 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
         goto err;
     }
 +    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(ret->group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     ret->version = priv_key->version;
     if (priv_key->privateKey) {
 diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 index a84e088c19..6c37bf78ae 100644
 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -1724,6 +1724,11 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
         goto err;
     }
     if (named_group == group) {
 +        if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
 +            goto err;
 +        }
 +#if 0
         /*
          * If we did not find a named group then the encoding should be explicit
          * if it was specified
@@ -1739,6 +1744,7 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
             goto err;
         }
         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
 +#endif
     } else {
         EC_GROUP_free(group);
         group = named_group;
 diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
 index 4890b0555e..e11aec5b3b 100644
 --- a/test/ectest.c
 +++ b/test/ectest.c
@@ -2301,10 +2301,11 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
     if (!TEST_ptr(params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld))
         || !TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL))
         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx), 0)
 -        || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
 +        || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
                                           EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params), 0))
         goto err;
 -
 +/* As creating the key should fail, the rest of the test is pointless */
 +# if 0
     /*- Check that all the set values are retrievable -*/
     /* There should be no match to a group name since the generator changed */
@@ -2433,6 +2434,7 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
 #endif
         )
         goto err;
 +#endif
     ret = 1;
 err:
     BN_free(order_out);
@@ -2714,21 +2716,21 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
     /* Compute keyexchange in both directions */
     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx1 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey1, NULL))
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 1)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
 +            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 0)
 +/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, NULL, &sslen), 1)
             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, sslen)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1))
 +            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1)*/)
         goto err;
     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx2 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey2, NULL))
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
 +            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
 +/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, NULL, &t), 1)
             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, t)
             || !TEST_int_le(sslen, t)
 -            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1))
 +            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1) */)
         goto err;
 -
 +#if 0
     /* Both sides should expect the same shared secret */
     if (!TEST_mem_eq(buf1, sslen, buf2, t))
         goto err;
@@ -2780,7 +2782,7 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
             /* compare with previous result */
             || !TEST_mem_eq(buf1, t, buf2, sslen))
         goto err;
 -
 +#endif
     ret = 1;
  err:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-21 16:55:46.005558779 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-03-21 16:56:12.636792762 +0100
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime_nc = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime = NULL;
 static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = NULL;
 -static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;
 +/*static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_tri_nc = NULL;
@@ -990,9 +990,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC, "EC")
 DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC")
 -DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 -IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)
 -IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")
 +/*DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 +/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)*/
 +/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
 IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params_namedcurve(bld_prime_nc)
         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params(bld_prime)
         || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime_nc))
 -        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))
 +/*        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     TEST_info("Generating EC keys...");
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC, "EC", EC_params);
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
 -    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
 +/*    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_nc);
     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_explicit);
@@ -1389,8 +1389,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 -        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 -        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 +/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 +/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
 -    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
 +/*    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime_nc);
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC);
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
 -    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
 +/*    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-25 11:20:50.920949208 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt	2022-03-25 11:21:13.177147598 +0100
@@ -121,18 +121,6 @@ AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEB
 3ev1gTwRBduzqqlwd54AUSgI+pjttW8zrWNitO8H1sf59MPWOESKxNtZ1+Nl
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 -PrivateKey = EC_EXPLICIT
 ------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
 -MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
 -AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
 -///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
 -AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEE5JcIvn36opqjEm/k59Al40rBAxWM2TPG
 -l0L13Je51zHpfXQ9Z2o7IQicMXP4wSfJ0qCgg2bgydqoxlYrlLGuVQIhAP////8A
 -AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgec92jwduadCk
 -OjoNRI+YT5Be5TkzZXzYCyTLkMOikDmhRANCAATtECEhQbLEaiUj/Wu0qjcr81lL
 -46dx5zYgArz/iaSNJ3W80oO+F7v04jlQ7wxQzg96R0bwKiMeq5CcW9ZFt6xg
 ------END PRIVATE KEY-----
 -
 PrivateKey = B-163
 -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
 MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUDnQW0mLiHVha/jqFznX/K
--- a/SOURCES/0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
 diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
 --- ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 13:42:38.865508269 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t	2023-03-14 13:43:36.237021635 +0100
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- public key
 subtest 'Check loading of fips and non-fips keys' => sub {
     plan skip_all => "FIPS is disabled"
 -        if $no_fips;
 +        if 1; #Red Hat specific, original value is $no_fips;
     plan tests => 2;
 diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
 --- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 10:13:11.342056559 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t	2023-03-14 10:14:42.643873496 +0100
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
 plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a shared library build on Windows"
     if $^O eq 'MSWin32' && !disabled("shared");
 -plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 +plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_protect_test",
                  data_file("server.pem"),
 diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
 --- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 10:13:38.106296042 +0100
 +++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t	2023-03-14 10:16:56.496071178 +0100
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
 plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-ec build"
     if disabled("ec");
 -plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 +plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
 my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_vfy_test",
                  data_file("server.crt"),     data_file("client.crt"),
--- a/SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
 -# For FIPS
 -# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
 -# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
 -# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g. [fips_sect] which is
 -# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
 -# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
 -# .include fipsmodule.cnf
 -
 [openssl_init]
 providers = provider_sect
 # Load default TLS policy configuration
@@ -42,23 +42,27 @@ [ evp_properties ]
 #This section is intentionally added empty here
 #to be tuned on particular systems
 -# List of providers to load
 -[provider_sect]
 -default = default_sect
 -# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
 -# included fipsmodule.cnf.
 -# fips = fips_sect
 +# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
 +# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
 +# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160
 +# Symmetric Ciphers: Blowfish, CAST, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4,RC5, SEED
 +# Key Derivation Function (KDF): PBKDF1
 +# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
 +# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
 +# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 -# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
 -# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
 -#
 -# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
 -# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
 -# becomes unavailable in openssl.  As a consequence applications depending on
 -# OpenSSL may not work correctly which could lead to significant system
 -# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
 -[default_sect]
 -# activate = 1
 +[provider_sect]
 +default = default_sect
 +##legacy = legacy_sect
 +##
 +[default_sect]
 +activate = 1
 +
 +##[legacy_sect]
 +##activate = 1
 +
 +#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
 +.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
 [ ssl_module ]
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:09:38.079040853 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-09-09 12:11:56.646224876 +0200
@@ -273,6 +273,14 @@ significant.
 All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made
 available to the provider.
 +=head3 Loading the legacy provider
 +
 +Uncomment the sections that start with ## in openssl.cnf
 +to enable the legacy provider.
 +Note: In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
 +security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
 +to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 +
 =head3 Default provider and its activation
 If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
--- a/SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx	2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
 # to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
 [provider_sect]
 -default = default_sect
 +##default = default_sect
 ##legacy = legacy_sect
 ##
 -[default_sect]
 -activate = 1
 +##[default_sect]
 +##activate = 1
 ##[legacy_sect]
 ##activate = 1
--- a/SOURCES/0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit	2021-09-22 11:56:49.452507975 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-09-22 11:57:19.371764742 +0200
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ unless ($no_fips) {
                              "recipes",
                              "90-test_sslapi_data",
                              "dhparams.pem")])),
 -                 "running sslapitest");
 +                 "running sslapitest - FIPS");
 }
 unlink $tmpfilename;
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index e95d2657f46c..7af0eab3fce0 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
         goto end;
     }
 +    if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
 +        testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
 +        goto end;
 +    }
 +
     /* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
                                        TLS_client_method(),
@@ -1292,6 +1297,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls_sendfile(int tls_version, const char *cipher)
         goto end;
     }
 +    if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
 +        testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
 +        goto end;
 +    }
 +
     /* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
                                        TLS_client_method(),
--- a/SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch
@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
 #Note: provider_conf_activate() is introduced in downstream only. It is a rewrite
 #(partial) of the function provider_conf_load() under the 'if (activate) section.
 #If there is any change to this section, after deleting it in provider_conf_load()
 #ensure that you also add those changes to the provider_conf_activate() function.
 #additionally please add this check for cnf explicitly as shown below.
 #'ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;'
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact	2022-05-12 12:44:31.199034948 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c	2022-05-12 12:49:17.468318373 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/trace.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/safestack.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
@@ -136,58 +136,18 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
     return 0;
 }
 -static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
 -                              const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
 +static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,const char *name,
 +                                  const char *value, const char *path,
 +                                  int soft, const CONF *cnf)
 {
 -    int i;
 -    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
 -    int soft = 0;
 -    OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
 -    const char *path = NULL;
 -    long activate = 0;
     int ok = 0;
 -
 -    name = skip_dot(name);
 -    OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
 -    /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
 -    ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
 -
 -    if (!ecmds) {
 -        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
 -                       "section=%s not found", value);
 -        return 0;
 -    }
 -
 -    /* Find the needed data first */
 -    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
 -        CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
 -        const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
 -        const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
 -
 -        OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
 -                    confname, confvalue);
 -
 -        /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
 -
 -        /* Override provider name to use */
 -        if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
 -            name = confvalue;
 -        else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
 -            soft = 1;
 -        /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
 -        else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
 -            path = confvalue;
 -        else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
 -            activate = 1;
 -    }
 -
 -    if (activate) {
 -        PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
 -            = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
 -                                    &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
 +    OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
 +    PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
 +        = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
 +                                &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
         if (pcgbl == NULL || !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pcgbl->lock)) {
 -            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +           ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
         }
         if (!prov_already_activated(name, pcgbl->activated_providers)) {
@@ -216,7 +176,7 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
             if (path != NULL)
                 ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
 -            ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
 +            ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
             if (ok) {
                 if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
@@ -244,8 +204,59 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
             }
             if (!ok)
                 ossl_provider_free(prov);
 +        } else { /* No reason to activate the provider twice, returning OK */
 +            ok = 1;
         }
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
 +    return ok;
 +}
 +
 +static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
 +                              const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
 +{
 +    int i;
 +    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
 +    int soft = 0;
 +    const char *path = NULL;
 +    long activate = 0;
 +    int ok = 0;
 +
 +    name = skip_dot(name);
 +    OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
 +    /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
 +    ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
 +
 +    if (!ecmds) {
 +        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
 +                       "section=%s not found", value);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Find the needed data first */
 +    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
 +        CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
 +        const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
 +        const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
 +
 +        OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
 +                    confname, confvalue);
 +
 +        /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
 +
 +        /* Override provider name to use */
 +        if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
 +            name = confvalue;
 +        else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
 +            soft = 1;
 +        /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
 +        else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
 +            path = confvalue;
 +        else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
 +            activate = 1;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (activate) {
 +       ok = provider_conf_activate(libctx, name, value, path, soft, cnf);
     } else {
         OSSL_PROVIDER_INFO entry;
@@ -306,6 +317,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
             return 0;
     }
 +    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag() != 0) { /* XXX from provider_conf_load */
 +        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf);
 +#  define FIPS_LOCAL_CONF           OPENSSLDIR "/fips_local.cnf"
 +
 +        if (access(FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, R_OK) == 0) {
 +            CONF *fips_conf = NCONF_new_ex(libctx, NCONF_default());
 +            if (NCONF_load(fips_conf, FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, NULL) <= 0)
 +                return 0;
 +
 +            if (provider_conf_load(libctx, "fips", "fips_sect", fips_conf) != 1) {
 +                NCONF_free(fips_conf);
 +                return 0;
 +            }
 +            NCONF_free(fips_conf);
 +        } else {
 +            if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
 +        /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even wwhen the test is failed so check explicitly */
 +        if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +        if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +        if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
     return 1;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac	2023-01-05 10:03:44.864869710 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c	2023-01-05 10:15:17.041606472 +0100
@@ -172,11 +172,27 @@ DEP_FINI_ATTRIBUTE void cleanup(void)
 }
 #endif
 +#define HMAC_LEN 32
 +/*
 + * The __attribute__ ensures we've created the .rodata1 section
 + * static ensures it's zero filled
 +*/
 +static const unsigned char __attribute__ ((section (".rodata1"))) fips_hmac_container[HMAC_LEN] = {0};
 +
 /*
  * Calculate the HMAC SHA256 of data read using a BIO and read_cb, and verify
  * the result matches the expected value.
  * Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
  */
 +#ifndef __USE_GNU
 +#define __USE_GNU
 +#include <dlfcn.h>
 +#undef __USE_GNU
 +#else
 +#include <dlfcn.h>
 +#endif
 +#include <link.h>
 +
 static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
                             unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
@@ -189,9 +205,20 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
 +    Dl_info info;
 +    void *extra_info = NULL;
 +    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
 +    unsigned long paddr;
 +    unsigned long off = 0;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
 +    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
 +                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
 +        goto err;
 +    lm = extra_info;
 +    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
 +
     mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
     if (mac == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -205,13 +233,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
     if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
         goto err;
 -    while (1) {
 -        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read);
 +    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
         if (status != 1)
             break;
         if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
             goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
     }
 +
 +    if (off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE > paddr) {
 +        int delta = paddr - off;
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            goto err;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
 +        memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            goto err;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
 +    while (bytes_read > 0) {
 +        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
 +        if (status != 1)
 +            break;
 +        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
 +            goto err;
 +	off += bytes_read;
 +    }
 +
     if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
         goto err;
@@ -285,8 +342,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(fips_state_lock);
     }
 -    if (st == NULL
 -            || st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
 +    if (st == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
         goto end;
     }
@@ -305,8 +361,9 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
     if (ev == NULL)
         goto end;
 -    module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
 -                                         &checksum_len);
 +    module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
 +    checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
 +
     if (module_checksum == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
         goto end;
@@ -356,7 +413,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
     ok = 1;
 end:
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
 -    OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
     OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
     if (st != NULL) {
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-11-18 09:39:53.386817874 +0100
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -my $no_check = disabled("fips");
 +my $no_check = 1;
 plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
     if $no_check;
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-11-18 09:59:02.315619486 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -my $no_check = disabled("fips");
 +my $no_check = 1;
 plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
     if $no_check;
 plan tests => 1;
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t	2021-11-18 09:59:55.365072074 +0100
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 use platform;
 -plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
 +plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
 plan tests => 29;
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t	2021-11-18 10:22:54.179659682 +0100
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 plan tests =>
     ($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t	2021-11-18 10:18:53.391721164 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 $ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
 diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
 --- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-11-18 10:32:17.734196705 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-11-18 10:18:30.695538445 +0100
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
 use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
     if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
 --- /dev/null	2021-11-16 15:27:32.915000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/test/fipsmodule.cnf	2021-11-18 11:15:34.538060408 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
 +[fips_sect]
 +activate = 1
--- a/SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx	2021-11-22 13:09:28.232560235 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c	2021-11-22 13:12:22.272058910 +0100
@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **ar
     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
     CONF *conf = NULL;
 +    BIO_printf(bio_err, "This command is not enabled in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL build, please consult Red Hat documentation to learn how to enable FIPS mode\n");
 +    return 1;
 +
     if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
         goto end;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:18:51.081406990 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod	2021-11-22 13:19:02.897508738 +0100
@@ -158,10 +158,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and
 Error Number to Error String Conversion.
 -=item B<fipsinstall>
 -
 -FIPS configuration installation.
 -
 =item B<gendsa>
 Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:24:51.359509501 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-11-22 13:26:02.360121820 +0100
@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax wi
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
 L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
 L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
 L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:21:13.812636065 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod	2021-11-22 13:24:12.278172847 +0100
@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 -A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
 -is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
 -of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
 -This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
 -purposes:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
 -
 -This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
 -run each time the module is used.
 -
 -=item - Verify the module's checksum.
 -
 -This is done each time the module is used.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
 -used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
 -
 -The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
 -whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
 -section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<activate>
 -
 -If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
 -significant.
 -
 -=item B<install-version>
 -
 -A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
 -
 -=item B<conditional-errors>
 -
 -The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
 -Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
 -accessible from this point on.
 -Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
 -generation, or the CRNG output test).
 -Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
 -continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
 -Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
 -continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
 -operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
 -
 -=item B<security-checks>
 -
 -This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
 -such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
 -A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
 -are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
 -the relevant Security Policy.
 -
 -=item B<module-mac>
 -
 -The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
 -
 -=item B<install-status>
 -
 -An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
 -This should only be written after the module has
 -successfully passed its self tests during installation.
 -If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
 -loads.
 -
 -=item B<install-mac>
 -
 -A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
 -changes to that value.
 -It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -For example:
 -
 - [fips_sect]
 - activate = 1
 - install-version = 1
 - conditional-errors = 1
 - security-checks = 1
 - module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
 - install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
 - install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
 -
 -=head1 NOTES
 -
 -When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
 -B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
 -non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
 -See L<config(5)>.
 -
 -=head1 SEE ALSO
 -
 -L<config(5)>
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
 +This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
 +automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
 +environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
 +for more information.
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:18:13.850086386 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod	2021-11-22 13:18:24.607179038 +0100
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ A simple self test callback is shown bel
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 -L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
 L<fips_config(5)>,
 L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
 L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
 --- openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac	2022-01-11 13:26:33.279906225 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in	2022-01-11 13:33:18.757994419 +0100
@@ -8,236 +8,11 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS confi
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 B<openssl fipsinstall>
 -[B<-help>]
 -[B<-in> I<configfilename>]
 -[B<-out> I<configfilename>]
 -[B<-module> I<modulefilename>]
 -[B<-provider_name> I<providername>]
 -[B<-section_name> I<sectionname>]
 -[B<-verify>]
 -[B<-mac_name> I<macname>]
 -[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
 -[B<-noout>]
 -[B<-quiet>]
 -[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
 -[B<-no_security_checks>]
 -[B<-self_test_onload>]
 -[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
 -[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
 -[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 -
 -This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
 -This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
 -in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always
 -verifies its MAC, but optionally only needs to run the KAT's once,
 -at installation.
 -
 -The generated configuration file consists of:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item - A MAC of the FIPS module file.
 -
 -=item - A test status indicator.
 -
 -This indicates if the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run.
 -
 -=item - A MAC of the status indicator.
 -
 -=item - A control for conditional self tests errors.
 -
 -By default if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails then the FIPS module
 -will enter an error state, and no services or cryptographic algorithms will be
 -able to be accessed after this point.
 -The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered.
 -If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered.
 -Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation
 -(e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying
 -the operation if the module error state is not entered.
 -
 -=item - A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done.
 -
 -This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
 -such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
 -The default value of '1' will perform the checks.
 -If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must
 -be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -This file is described in L<fips_config(5)>.
 -
 -=head1 OPTIONS
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<-help>
 -
 -Print a usage message.
 -
 -=item B<-module> I<filename>
 -
 -Filename of the FIPS module to perform an integrity check on.
 -The path provided in the filename is used to load the module when it is
 -activated, and this overrides the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MODULES>.
 -
 -=item B<-out> I<configfilename>
 -
 -Filename to output the configuration data to; the default is standard output.
 -
 -=item B<-in> I<configfilename>
 -
 -Input filename to load configuration data from.
 -Must be used if the B<-verify> option is specified.
 -
 -=item B<-verify>
 -
 -Verify that the input configuration file contains the correct information.
 -
 -=item B<-provider_name> I<providername>
 -
 -Name of the provider inside the configuration file.
 -The default value is C<fips>.
 -
 -=item B<-section_name> I<sectionname>
 -
 -Name of the section inside the configuration file.
 -The default value is C<fips_sect>.
 -
 -=item B<-mac_name> I<name>
 -
 -Specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm which will be used.
 -The MAC mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
 -used when building OpenSSL.
 -To see the list of supported MAC's use the command
 -C<openssl list -mac-algorithms>.  The default is B<HMAC>.
 -
 -=item B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>
 -
 -Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
 -A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
 -documentation.
 -Common control strings used for this command are:
 -
 -=over 4
 -
 -=item B<key>:I<string>
 -
 -Specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains
 -printable characters only).
 -The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
 -If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
 -configured is used.
 -
 -=item B<hexkey>:I<string>
 -
 -Specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
 -The key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
 -If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
 -configured is used.
 -
 -=item B<digest>:I<string>
 -
 -Used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains printable
 -characters only).
 -The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
 -To see the list of supported digests, use the command
 -C<openssl list -digest-commands>.
 -The default digest is SHA-256.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -=item B<-noout>
 -
 -Disable logging of the self tests.
 -
 -=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
 -
 -Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
 -fails as described above.
 -
 -=item B<-no_security_checks>
 -
 -Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
 -
 -=item B<-self_test_onload>
 -
 -Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
 -"MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. Without these fields
 -the self tests KATS will run each time the module is loaded. This option could be
 -used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each
 -target machine. Once the self tests have run on the target machine the user
 -could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
 -mechanism.
 -
 -=item B<-quiet>
 -
 -Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
 -
 -=item B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>,
 -B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>
 -
 -The corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by
 -name.
 -Either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt.
 -Refer to the entries for B<st-desc> and B<st-type> in L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)> for
 -values that can be used.
 -
 -=item B<-config> I<parent_config>
 -
 -Test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file.
 -A previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration
 -data that is included by the base C<parent_config> configuration file.
 -See L<config(5)> for further information on how to set up a provider section.
 -All other options are ignored if '-config' is used.
 -
 -=back
 -
 -=head1 NOTES
 -
 -Self tests results are logged by default if the options B<-quiet> and B<-noout>
 -are not specified, or if either of the options B<-corrupt_desc> or
 -B<-corrupt_type> are used.
 -If the base configuration file is set up to autoload the fips module, then the
 -fips module will be loaded and self tested BEFORE the fipsinstall application
 -has a chance to set up its own self test callback. As a result of this the self
 -test output and the options B<-corrupt_desc> and B<-corrupt_type> will be ignored.
 -For normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider
 -when generating the fips configuration file.
 -
 -=head1 EXAMPLES
 -
 -Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
 -for the module, and save the F<fips.cnf> configuration file:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips
 -
 -Verify that the configuration file F<fips.cnf> contains the correct info:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf  -provider_name fips -verify
 -
 -Corrupt any self tests which have the description C<SHA1>:
 -
 - openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
 -         -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'
 -
 -Validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file:
 -
 - export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
 - export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
 - openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf'
 -
 -
 -=head1 SEE ALSO
 -
 -L<config(5)>,
 -L<fips_config(5)>,
 -L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)>,
 -L<EVP_MAC(3)>
 +This command is disabled.
 +Please consult Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation to learn how to correctly
 +enable FIPS mode on Red Hat Enterprise
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
--- a/SOURCES/0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit	2021-12-21 15:14:04.210431584 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c	2021-12-21 15:46:05.554085125 +0100
@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ static int EVP_MAC_loop(int algindex, vo
     for (count = 0; COND(c[algindex][testnum]); count++) {
         size_t outl;
 +        if (mctx == NULL)
 +            return -1;
 +
         if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, NULL, 0, NULL)
             || !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, buf, lengths[testnum])
             || !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac, &outl, sizeof(mac)))
--- a/SOURCES/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3	2022-07-18 16:01:41.159543735 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c	2022-07-18 16:24:30.251388248 +0200
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
     BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
     int ret = -1;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int validate = 0;
 +#endif
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -262,6 +272,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 #endif
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int validate = 0;
 +#endif
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -354,8 +367,21 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
     if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, priv_key, pub_key))
         goto err;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     dh->pub_key = pub_key;
     dh->priv_key = priv_key;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) <= 0) {
 +        abort();
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     dh->dirty_cnt++;
     ok = 1;
  err:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188 openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188	2023-11-08 10:58:05.910031253 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2023-11-08 10:59:42.338526883 +0100
@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@ static int ec_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey
     eckey->dirty_cnt++;
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ossl_ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_KEY);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     pairwise_test = 1;
 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3	2022-07-25 13:42:46.814952053 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c	2022-07-25 13:52:12.292065706 +0200
@@ -488,6 +488,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, u
     }
     ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    {
 +        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(privk));
 +        int check = 0;
 +
 +        if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +
 +        check = ossl_ec_key_public_check(pecdhctx->peerk, bn_ctx);
 +        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 +
 +        if (check <= 0) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +#endif
     retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 11:44:18.451884117 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c	2023-02-20 12:39:46.037063842 +0100
@@ -982,8 +982,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
     int selection;
     int ecdh_mode;
     EC_GROUP *gen_group;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    void *ecdsa_sig_ctx;
 +#endif
 };
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
 +void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx);
 +int do_ec_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
 +#endif
 +
 static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
                          const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -1002,6 +1011,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx,
         OPENSSL_free(gctx);
         gctx = NULL;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (gctx != NULL)
 +        gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = ecdsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
 +#endif
     return gctx;
 }
@@ -1272,6 +1285,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_C
     if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* Pairwise consistency test */
 +    if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0
 +        && do_ec_pct(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx, "sha256", ec) != 1)
 +        abort();
 +#endif
     if (gctx->group_check != NULL)
         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec, gctx->group_check);
@@ -1341,7 +1359,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
     if (gctx == NULL)
         return;
 -
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    ecdsa_freectx(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx);
 +    gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = NULL;
 +#endif
     EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
     BN_free(gctx->p);
     BN_free(gctx->a);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 11:50:23.035194347 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c	2023-02-20 12:19:10.809768979 +0100
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #include "crypto/ec.h"
 #include "prov/der_ec.h"
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ typedef struct {
 #endif
 } PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
 -static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 +void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 {
     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx;
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx
     return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
 }
 -static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
 +void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
 {
     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_
     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +int do_ec_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec)
 +{
 +    static const unsigned char data[32];
 +    unsigned char sigbuf[256];
 +    size_t siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, sizeof(sigbuf)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init },
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 16:04:27.103364713 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c	2023-02-20 16:14:13.848119419 +0100
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
     /* ACVP test parameters */
     OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
 +    void *prov_rsa_ctx;
 #endif
 };
@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GE
     return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
 +void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
 +int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
 +#endif
 +
 static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
                       const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int
     if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
         goto err;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (gctx != NULL)
 +        gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
 +#endif
     return gctx;
 err:
@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_
     rsa = rsa_tmp;
     rsa_tmp = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* Pairwise consistency test */
 +    if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
 +        abort();
 +#endif
  err:
     BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
     RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
@@ -645,6 +662,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx
 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
     ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
     gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
 +    rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
 +    gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
 #endif
     BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
     OPENSSL_free(gctx);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 16:04:22.548327811 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c	2023-02-20 16:17:50.064871695 +0100
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
 -static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
 +OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA
     return 1;
 }
 -static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 +void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
     char *propq_copy = NULL;
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsac
     return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
 }
 -static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
 +void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@@ -1504,6 +1504,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ct
     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +int do_rsa_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *rsa)
 +{
 +    static const unsigned char data[32];
 +    unsigned char *sigbuf = NULL;
 +    size_t siglen = 0;
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, NULL, &siglen, 0) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if ((sigbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen)) == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, siglen) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (rsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
 +        goto err;
 +    ret = 1;
 +
 + err:
 +    OPENSSL_free(sigbuf);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
 index e0d139d..35f23b2 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
             rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
             rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
             rsa->iqmp = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +            abort();
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         }
     }
     return ok;
--- a/SOURCES/0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 17:11:36.146638536 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c	2022-05-05 17:12:00.138848787 +0200
@@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM param_group_list
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 25),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 26),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "EC", 27),
 -#  endif
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x25519", "X25519", "X25519", 28),
     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x448", "X448", "X448", 29),
 +#  endif
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are as per RFC 7919 */
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.fipsmin2 openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.fipsmin2	2022-05-05 11:42:58.596848856 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c	2022-05-05 11:55:42.997562712 +0200
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void);
 #define ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, CHECK) { { NAMES, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, FUNC }, CHECK }
 #define ALG(NAMES, FUNC) ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, NULL)
 -
 extern OSSL_FUNC_core_thread_start_fn *c_thread_start;
 int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
@@ -191,13 +190,13 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx
                                               &fips_prov_ossl_ctx_method);
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
 -    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
         return 0;
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))
@@ -281,10 +280,11 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests
      * KECCAK-KMAC-128 and KECCAK-KMAC-256 as hashes are mostly useful for
      * KMAC128 and KMAC256.
      */
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +    /* We don't certify KECCAK in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
       ossl_keccak_kmac_128_functions },
     { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 -      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions },
 +      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions }, */
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips
     ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
          ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
 -    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions),
 +    /* We don't certify 3DES in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
 +    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions), */
 #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
     { { NULL, NULL, NULL }, NULL }
 };
@@ -356,8 +357,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[]
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_GMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_gmac_functions },
     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_hmac_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify KMAC in our FIPS provider */
 +    /*{ PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions }, */
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
@@ -392,8 +394,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     { PROV_NAMES_ECDH, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdh_keyexch_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /*{ PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },*/
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
       ossl_kdf_tls1_prf_keyexch_functions },
@@ -403,12 +406,14 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 -    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions }, */
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_signature_functions },
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -    { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
 +    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions }, */
     { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions },
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
@@ -438,8 +443,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
       PROV_DESCS_DHX },
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 -    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
 -      PROV_DESCS_DSA },
 +    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
 +      PROV_DESCS_DSA }, */
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_RSA },
@@ -448,14 +454,15 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     { PROV_NAMES_EC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ec_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_EC },
 -    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
 +    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
 +    /* { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_X25519 },
     { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_X448 },
     { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_ED25519 },
     { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_keymgmt_functions,
 -      PROV_DESCS_ED448 },
 +      PROV_DESCS_ED448 }, */
 #endif
     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions,
       PROV_DESCS_TLS1_PRF_SIGN },
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 12:36:32.335069046 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc	2022-05-05 12:40:02.427966128 +0200
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_DIGEST st_kat_digest
 /*- CIPHER TEST DATA */
 /* DES3 test data */
 +#if 0
 static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_pt[] = {
     0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
     0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_
     0x51, 0x65, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1F, 0x25, 0xB5, 0x0F,
     0x73, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0x0D, 0xA7
 };
 -
 +#endif
 /* AES-256 GCM test data */
 static const unsigned char aes_256_gcm_key[] = {
     0x92, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x6f, 0x5c,
@@ -235,6 +236,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_128_ecb_c
 };
 static const ST_KAT_CIPHER st_kat_cipher_tests[] = {
 +#if 0
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
     {
         {
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_CIPHER st_kat_cipher
         ITM(des_ede3_cbc_iv),
     },
 #endif
 +#endif
     {
         {
             OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_CIPHER_AES_GCM,
@@ -1424,8 +1427,9 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_bin_key[
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 /* dsa 2048 */
 +#if 0
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 static const unsigned char dsa_p[] = {
     0xa2, 0x9b, 0x88, 0x72, 0xce, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x23,
     0xb7, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x7e,
@@ -1549,8 +1553,8 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dsa_key[] = {
     ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, dsa_priv),
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
 -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 -
 +#endif
 +#endif
 static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
     {
         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_RSA,
@@ -1583,6 +1587,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
     },
 # endif
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 +#if 0
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
     {
         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_DSA,
@@ -1595,6 +1600,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
          */
     },
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 +#endif
 };
 static const ST_KAT_ASYM_CIPHER st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[] = {
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c.fipsmin2 openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c.fipsmin2	2022-05-05 11:42:58.597848865 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c	2022-05-05 11:43:30.141126336 +0200
@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
                   OSSL_NELEM(dh_safe_prime_keyver_data));
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 +#if 0 /* Red Hat FIPS provider doesn't have fips=yes property on DSA */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_keygen_data));
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_paramgen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_paramgen_data));
@@ -1483,6 +1484,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_siggen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_siggen_data));
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_sigver_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_sigver_data));
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 +#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(ecdsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_keygen_data));
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:18:46.370911817 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c	2022-05-05 14:30:02.117911993 +0200
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
 #include <assert.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
@@ -725,8 +726,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     if (!test_get_libctx(&libctx, &nullprov, config_file, &libprov, prov_name))
         return 0;
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
 -    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
 +    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
 +        ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
 +    }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dh_safeprime_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
@@ -746,7 +750,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(kem_invalid_keytype);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
 +    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
 +        ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
 +    }
 #endif
     return 1;
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:46:00.631590335 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t	2022-05-05 13:46:06.999644496 +0200
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
 plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-dsa build"
     if disabled("dsa");
 -my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 +my $no_fips = 1;
 plan tests =>
     ($no_fips ? 0 : 2)          # FIPS related tests
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:47:55.217564900 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t	2022-05-05 13:48:02.824629600 +0200
@@ -207,8 +207,7 @@ SKIP: {
 }
 SKIP : {
 -    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1
 -        if disabled("dsa");
 +    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1;
     subtest DSA => sub {
         my $testtext_prefix = 'DSA';
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:55:05.257292637 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t	2022-05-05 13:58:35.307150750 +0200
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
 +    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing), no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-resign", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-outform", "DER",
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-noattr", "-nodetach", "-stream",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&zero_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
 my @smime_cms_tests = (
 -    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
         "-nodetach", "-keyid",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
 +    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
         "-signer", $smrsa1,
         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
 +    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
         "-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:43:04.276857033 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2022-05-05 14:43:35.975138234 +0200
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ my @files = qw(
                 evpciph_aes_cts.txt
                 evpciph_aes_wrap.txt
                 evpciph_aes_stitched.txt
 -                evpciph_des3_common.txt
                 evpkdf_hkdf.txt
                 evpkdf_pbkdf1.txt
                 evpkdf_pbkdf2.txt
@@ -66,12 +65,6 @@ push @files, qw(
                 evppkey_dh.txt
                ) unless $no_dh;
 push @files, qw(
 -                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
 -                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
 -               ) unless $no_des;
 -push @files, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
 -push @files, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
 -push @files, qw(
                 evppkey_ecc.txt
                 evppkey_ecdh.txt
                 evppkey_ecdsa.txt
@@ -91,6 +84,7 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
                      evpciph_cast5.txt
                      evpciph_chacha.txt
                      evpciph_des.txt
 +                     evpciph_des3_common.txt
                      evpciph_idea.txt
                      evpciph_rc2.txt
                      evpciph_rc4.txt
@@ -117,6 +111,12 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
                      evppkey_kdf_tls1_prf.txt
                      evppkey_rsa.txt
                     );
 +push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
 +push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
 +push @defltfiles, qw(
 +                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
 +                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
 +               ) unless $no_des;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
 push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_sm2.txt) unless $no_sm2;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:46:32.721700697 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt	2022-05-05 14:51:40.205418897 +0200
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ Input = 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E54100
 Output = 00BDA1B7E87608BCBF470F12157F4C07
 +Availablein = default
 Title = KMAC Tests (From NIST)
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
@@ -338,12 +339,14 @@ Ctrl = xof:0
 OutputSize = 32
 BlockSize = 168
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 3B1FBA963CD8B0B59E8C1A6D71888B7143651AF8BA0A7070C0979E2811324AA5
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -351,6 +354,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1F5B4E6CCA02209E0DCB5CA635B89A15E271ECC760071DFD805FAA38F9729230
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -359,12 +363,14 @@ Output = 20C570C31346F703C9AC36C61C03CB6
 OutputSize = 64
 BlockSize = 136
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
 Custom = ""
 Output = 75358CF39E41494E949707927CEE0AF20A3FF553904C86B08F21CC414BCFD691589D27CF5E15369CBBFF8B9A4C2EB17800855D0235FF635DA82533EC6B759B69
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -374,12 +380,14 @@ Ctrl = size:64
 Title = KMAC XOF Tests (From NIST)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -387,6 +395,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -395,6 +404,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
 XOF = 1
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -409,6 +420,7 @@ Custom = ""
 Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
 XOF = 1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -419,6 +431,7 @@ XOF = 1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string (from NIST ACVP)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
 Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -429,12 +442,14 @@ XOF = 1
 Title = KMAC XOF Tests via ctrl (From NIST)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
 Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -442,6 +457,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -450,6 +466,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
 Ctrl = xof:1
 Ctrl = size:32
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 00010203
@@ -457,6 +474,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
 Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -464,6 +482,7 @@ Custom = ""
 Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
 Ctrl = xof:1
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -474,6 +493,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string via ctrl (from NIST ACVP)
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
 Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -484,6 +504,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
 Title = KMAC long customisation string negative test
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC128
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -492,6 +513,7 @@ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
 Title = KMAC output is too large
 +Availablein = default
 MAC = KMAC256
 Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 16:02:59.745500635 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t	2022-05-05 16:10:24.071348890 +0200
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ sub testssl {
         my @exkeys = ();
         my $ciphers = '-PSK:-SRP:@SECLEVEL=0';
 -        if (!$no_dsa) {
 +        if (!$no_dsa && $provider ne "fips") {
             push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", $Dkey;
         }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-06 16:25:57.296926271 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-05-06 16:27:42.712850840 +0200
@@ -1387,6 +1387,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
          * so no legacy tests.
          */
 #endif
 +    if (is_fips == 0) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(DSA);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(DSA);
@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PROTECTED_PVK(DSA);
 # endif
 #endif
 +    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(EC);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(EC);
@@ -1411,10 +1413,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTri2G);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTri2G);
 # endif
 +    if (is_fips == 0) {
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED25519);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED448);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X25519);
         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X448);
 +    }
         /*
          * ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448 have no support for
          * PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(), so no legacy tests.
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c.dfc openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c.dfc	2022-05-12 13:31:21.957638329 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c	2022-05-12 13:31:49.587984867 +0200
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, reqflag = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 +    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_256_cbc();
 #endif
     prog = opt_init(argc, argv, req_options);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c.fips_list_curves openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c.fips_list_curves	2022-05-19 11:46:22.682519422 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c	2022-05-19 11:50:44.559828701 +0200
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
 +        if ((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
 +            continue;
 +
         if (comment == NULL)
             comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
         if (sname == NULL)
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.nokrsa openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.nokrsa	2022-05-19 13:32:32.536708638 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2022-05-19 13:42:29.734002959 +0200
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
     ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
 +    if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(ctx->libctx))
 +        ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
 +
     /*
      * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
      * if theose algorithms are not available.
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.fipskeylen openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.fipskeylen	2022-05-23 14:58:07.764281242 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c	2022-05-23 15:10:29.327993616 +0200
@@ -692,6 +692,19 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprs
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
     int ret;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
 +
 +    if (rsabits < 2048) {
 +        if (rsabits != 1024
 +            && rsabits != 1280
 +            && rsabits != 1536
 +            && rsabits != 1792) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +# endif
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
@@ -770,6 +770,19 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, co
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
     size_t rslen;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
 +
 +    if (rsabits < 2048) {
 +        if (rsabits != 1024
 +            && rsabits != 1280
 +            && rsabits != 1536
 +            && rsabits != 1792) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +# endif
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c.minfips openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c.minfips	2023-06-24 09:58:57.773344910 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c	2023-06-26 09:18:06.843859405 +0200
@@ -79,7 +79,11 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
 -        if ((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
 +        if (((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512r1)
 +            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512t1)) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
             continue;
         if (comment == NULL)
--- a/SOURCES/0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats	2022-01-19 13:10:00.635830783 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c	2022-01-19 13:11:43.309342656 +0100
@@ -362,6 +362,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
     if (ev == NULL)
         goto end;
 +    /*
 +     * Run the KAT's before HMAC verification according to FIPS-140-3 requirements
 +     */
 +    if (kats_already_passed == 0) {
 +        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
     checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
@@ -411,18 +421,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
             kats_already_passed = 1;
         }
     }
 -
 -    /*
 -     * Only runs the KAT's during installation OR on_demand().
 -     * NOTE: If the installation option 'self_test_onload' is chosen then this
 -     * path will always be run, since kats_already_passed will always be 0.
 -     */
 -    if (on_demand_test || kats_already_passed == 0) {
 -        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
 -            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
 -            goto end;
 -        }
 -    }
     ok = 1;
 end:
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
--- a/SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
@ -1,473 +0,0 @@
 From 243201772cc6d583fae9eba81cb2c2c7425bc564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 17:24:44 +0100
 Subject: Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures
 For RHEL 9.0, we want to phase out SHA1. One of the steps to do that is
 disabling SHA1 signatures. Introduce a new configuration option in the
 alg_section named 'rh-allow-sha1-signatures'. This option defaults to
 false. If set to false (or unset), any signature creation or
 verification operations that involve SHA1 as digest will fail.
 This also affects TLS, where the signature_algorithms extension of any
 ClientHello message sent by OpenSSL will no longer include signatures
 with the SHA1 digest if rh-allow-sha1-signatures is false. For servers
 that request a client certificate, the same also applies for
 CertificateRequest messages sent by them.
 For signatures created using the EVP_PKEY API, this is a best-effort
 check that will deny signatures in cases where the digest algorithm is
 known. This means, for example, that that following steps will still
 work:
 $> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
 $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig
 $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1
 whereas these will not:
 $> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
 $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig -pkeyopt digest:sha1
 $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1 -pkeyopt digest:sha1
 This happens because in the first case, OpenSSL's signature
 implementation does not know that it is signing a SHA1 hash (it could be
 signing arbitrary data).
 Resolves: rhbz#2031742
 ---
 crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c                          | 13 ++++
 crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                         | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                        | 15 ++++
 doc/man5/config.pod                           | 11 +++
 include/internal/cryptlib.h                   |  3 +-
 include/internal/sslconf.h                    |  4 +
 providers/common/securitycheck.c              | 20 +++++
 providers/common/securitycheck_default.c      |  9 ++-
 providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 11 ++-
 .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 +
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 20 ++++-
 ssl/t1_lib.c                                  |  8 ++
 util/libcrypto.num                            |  2 +
 13 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
 index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -57,6 +58,18 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
                 return 0;
             }
 +        } else if (strcmp(oval->name, "rh-allow-sha1-signatures") == 0) {
 +            int m;
 +
 +            /* Detailed error already reported. */
 +            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
 +                return 0;
 +
 +            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(
 +                    NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf), m > 0, 0)) {
 +                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
 +                return 0;
 +            }
         } else {
             ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
                            "name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -16,6 +16,71 @@
 #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */
 #include "evp_local.h"
 +typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
 +    int allowed;
 +} OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
 +
 +static void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs = vldsigs;
 +
 +    if (ldsigs != NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(ldsigs);
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +static void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
 +{
 +    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
 +}
 +
 +static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method = {
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY,
 +    ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new,
 +    ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free,
 +};
 +
 +static OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(
 +        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
 +{
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (loadconfig && !OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
 +        return 0;
 +#endif
 +
 +    return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES,
 +                                 &ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method);
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
 +        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
 +
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_SHA1_SIGNATURES") != NULL)
 +        /* used in tests */
 +        return 1;
 +#endif
 +
 +    return ldsigs != NULL ? ldsigs->allowed : 0;
 +}
 +
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
 +                                                  int loadconfig)
 +{
 +    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
 +        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
 +
 +    if (ldsigs == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    ldsigs->allowed = allow;
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
@@ -258,6 +323,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         }
     }
 +    if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
 +        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);
 +        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)
 +                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
 +            goto err;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (ver) {
         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 index 2b9c6c2351..3c5a1e6f5d 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "internal/ffc.h"
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "evp_local.h"
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -946,6 +947,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
         return -2;
     }
 +    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
 +            && md != NULL
 +            && ctx->pkey != NULL
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
 +            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
 +        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
 +        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
 +                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
 +            return -1;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (fallback)
         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, 0, (void *)(md));
 diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
 index 77a8055e81..aa1be5ca7f 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -304,6 +304,17 @@ Within the algorithm properties section, the following names have meaning:
 The value may be anything that is acceptable as a property query
 string for EVP_set_default_properties().
 +=item B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures>
 +
 +The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is not set,
 +it behaves as if it was set to B<no>.
 +
 +When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
 +digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
 +option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
 +that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
 +B<no>.
 +
 =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
 The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is
 diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 index 1291299b6e..e234341e6a 100644
 --- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 +++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX           16
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_BIO_CORE_INDEX                17
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_CHILD_PROVIDER_INDEX          18
 -# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   19
 +# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES      19
 +# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   20
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_LOW_PRIORITY          -1
 # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY       0
 diff --git a/include/internal/sslconf.h b/include/internal/sslconf.h
 index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
 --- a/include/internal/sslconf.h
 +++ b/include/internal/sslconf.h
@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ int conf_ssl_name_find(const char *name, size_t *idx);
 void conf_ssl_get_cmd(const SSL_CONF_CMD *cmd, size_t idx, char **cmdstr,
                       char **arg);
 +/* Methods to support disabling all signatures with legacy digests */
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig);
 +int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
 +                                                  int loadconfig);
 #endif
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 /*
  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
@@ -235,6 +236,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
             mdnid = -1; /* disallowed by security checks */
     }
 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
 +
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
 +        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
 +         * it. */
 +        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)
 +            mdnid = -1;
 +#endif
 +
     return mdnid;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
 int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 }
 int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
 -                                    ossl_unused int sha1_allowed)
 +                                    int sha1_allowed)
 {
     int mdnid;
 +    int ldsigs_allowed;
     static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
         { NID_md5,       OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5       },
@@ -36,8 +38,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
         { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
     };
 -    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, 1);
 +    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);
 +    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);
     if (mdnid == NID_undef)
         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
 +    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)
 +        mdnid = -1;
     return mdnid;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 index 28fd7c498e..fa3822f39f 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -124,12 +124,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
         mdprops = ctx->propq;
     if (mdname != NULL) {
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
         WPACKET pkt;
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
 -        int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
 -                                                            sha1_allowed);
 +        int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 +#else
 +        int sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
 +        md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
 +                                                            sha1_allowed);
         if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
             if (md == NULL)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 index 865d49d100..99b228e82c 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -237,7 +237,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 +#else
 +    sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                     sha1_allowed);
     if (md_nid < 0) {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
 +#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256
 OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
@@ -289,10 +291,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
     if (mdname != NULL) {
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
 +        int md_nid;
 +        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -        int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
 +#else
 +        int sha1_allowed = 0;
 +#endif
 +        md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                      sha1_allowed);
 -        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
         if (md == NULL
             || md_nid <= 0
@@ -1348,8 +1355,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
 -        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
 +        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
 +            pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
 +        }
 +#endif
 +    }
 +
     if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
         && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index fc32bb3556..4b74ee1a34 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
@@ -1145,11 +1146,13 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
         = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
     EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
     int ret = 0;
 +    int ldsigs_allowed;
     if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
         goto err;
     ERR_set_mark();
 +    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0);
     for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
          i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
         EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
@@ -1169,6 +1172,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
             cache[i].enabled = 0;
             continue;
         }
 +        if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
 +                && !ldsigs_allowed) {
 +            cache[i].enabled = 0;
 +            continue;
 +        }
         if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
             cache[i].enabled = 0;
 diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
 index 10b4e57d79..2d3c363bb0 100644
 --- a/util/libcrypto.num
 +++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5426,3 +5426,5 @@ ASN1_TIME_print_ex                      5553	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      5556	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     5557	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_safe_getenv                        ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 -- 
 2.35.1
--- a/SOURCES/0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch
@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips	2022-02-21 12:35:24.829893907 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c	2022-02-21 13:01:22.711622967 +0100
@@ -85,17 +85,41 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
     EVP_KDF *kdf;
     EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx;
     OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
 +    char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
     if (n <= 0)
         return 0;
 -    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
 -    if (kdf == NULL)
 +    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()) {
 +        const char *nofips = "-fips";
 +        size_t len = propq ? strlen(propq) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
 +                                                 strlen(nofips) + 1;
 +        char *ptr = NULL;
 +
 +        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
 +        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
 +            ptr = adjusted_propq;
 +            if (propq) {
 +                memcpy(ptr, propq, strlen(propq));
 +                ptr += strlen(propq);
 +                *ptr = ',';
 +                ptr++;
 +            }
 +            memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +    kdf = adjusted_propq ? EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", adjusted_propq) : EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
 +    if (kdf == NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         return 0;
 +    }
     ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
     EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
 -    if (ctx == NULL)
 +    if (ctx == NULL) {
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         return 0;
 +    }
     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
                                             (char *)EVP_MD_get0_name(md_type),
@@ -127,6 +149,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
         } OSSL_TRACE_END(PKCS12_KEYGEN);
     }
     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
     return res;
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps	2022-02-21 16:37:07.908923682 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c	2022-02-21 17:38:44.555345633 +0100
@@ -765,15 +765,34 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
     if (macver) {
         EVP_KDF *pkcs12kdf;
 +        char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
 +        const char *nofips = "-fips";
 +        size_t len = app_get0_propq() ? strlen(app_get0_propq()) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
 +                                                            strlen(nofips) + 1;
 +        char *ptr = NULL;
 +
 +        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
 +        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
 +                ptr = adjusted_propq;
 +                if (app_get0_propq()) {
 +                    memcpy(ptr, app_get0_propq(), strlen(app_get0_propq()));
 +                    ptr += strlen(app_get0_propq());
 +                    *ptr = ',';
 +                    ptr++;
 +                }
 +                memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
 +        }
         pkcs12kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(app_get0_libctx(), "PKCS12KDF",
 -                                  app_get0_propq());
 +                                  adjusted_propq ? adjusted_propq : app_get0_propq());
         if (pkcs12kdf == NULL) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying PKCS12 MAC; no PKCS12KDF support.\n");
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Use -nomacver if MAC verification is not required.\n");
 +            OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
             goto end;
         }
         EVP_KDF_free(pkcs12kdf);
 +        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
         /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
         if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
             /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */
--- a/SOURCES/0051-Support-different-R_BITS-lengths-for-KBKDF.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0051-Support-different-R_BITS-lengths-for-KBKDF.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
 From c63599ee9708d543205a9173207ee7167315c624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 15:44:18 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Allow SHA1 in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes
 References: rhbz#2055796
 ---
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c        | 19 ++++++++++-
 doc/man5/config.pod           |  7 +++-
 ssl/t1_lib.c                  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |  7 ++--
 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 index ff3ca83de6..a549c1c111 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/dane.h"
 +#include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "crypto/x509.h"
 #include "x509_local.h"
@@ -3440,14 +3441,30 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
 {
     int secbits = -1;
     int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
 +    int nid;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
     if (level <= 0)
         return 1;
     if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
         level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
 -    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
 +    if (ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = ctx->libctx;
 +    else if (cert->libctx)
 +        libctx = cert->libctx;
 +    else
 +        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
 +
 +    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
         return 0;
 +    if (nid == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
 +            && ctx->param->auth_level < 3)
 +        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
 +        return 1;
 +
     return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
 }
 diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
 index aa1be5ca7f..aa69e2b844 100644
 --- a/doc/man5/config.pod
 +++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
 digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
 option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
 that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
 -B<no>.
 +B<no>.  Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature
 +algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 2, despite the definition of
 +security level 2 of 112 bits of security, which SHA1 does not meet.  Because
 +TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key
 +material, disabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or
 +newer.
 =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include "crypto/x509.h"
 #include "internal/sslconf.h"
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
@@ -1561,19 +1562,27 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
         return 0;
     }
 -    /*
 -     * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
 -     * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
 -     */
 -    sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
 -    sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
 -    secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
 -    if (secbits == 0 ||
 -        !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
 -                      md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
 -                      (void *)sigalgstr)) {
 -        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 -        return 0;
 +
 +    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
 +            && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
 +        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
 +    } else {
 +        /*
 +         * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
 +         * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
 +         */
 +        sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
 +        sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
 +        secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
 +        if (secbits == 0 ||
 +            !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
 +                          md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
 +                          (void *)sigalgstr)) {
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
     }
     /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
     s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
@@ -2106,6 +2115,14 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
         }
     }
 +    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
 +            && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
 +        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
 +        return 1;
 +    }
 +
     /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
     secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
     sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
@@ -2977,6 +2994,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
 {
     /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
     int secbits, nid, pknid;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
 +
     /* Don't check signature if self signed */
     if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
         return 1;
@@ -2985,6 +3004,25 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
     /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
     if (nid == NID_undef)
         nid = pknid;
 +
 +    if (x && x->libctx)
 +        libctx = x->libctx;
 +    else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = ctx->libctx;
 +    else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx)
 +        libctx = s->ctx->libctx;
 +    else
 +        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
 +
 +    if (nid == NID_sha1
 +            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
 +            && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3)
 +                || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 3)
 +            ))
 +        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
 +         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
 +        return 1;
 +
     if (s)
         return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
     else
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
     run(app([@args]));
 }
 -plan tests => 163;
 +plan tests => 162;
 # Canonical success
 ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -387,8 +387,9 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"
 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
     "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
 -ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
 -    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
 +## rh-allow-sha1-signatures=yes allows this to pass despite -auth_level 1
 +#ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
 +#    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
 ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
     "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
 -- 
 2.35.1
--- a/SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch
@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num
 --- openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale	2022-06-01 12:35:52.667498724 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num	2022-06-01 12:36:08.112633093 +0200
@@ -5425,6 +5425,8 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_provider              5555	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      5556	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     5557	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     ? 	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_safe_getenv                        ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp	2022-11-25 12:50:22.449760653 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c	2022-11-25 12:51:19.416350584 +0100
@@ -342,7 +342,12 @@ int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char
 #endif
 }
 -int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
 +int
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif
 +OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
 {
     int t;
@@ -352,7 +354,12 @@ int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, c
     return t;
 }
 -int OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
 +int
 +#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif
 +OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
 {
     int t;
     size_t i;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
 --- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp	2022-11-25 18:19:05.669769076 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t	2022-11-25 18:31:20.993392678 +0100
@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ foreach my $libname (@libnames) {
                 s| .*||;
                 # Drop OpenSSL dynamic version information if there is any
                 s|\@\@.+$||;
 +                s|\@.+$||;
                 # Return the result
                 $_
             }
--- a/SOURCES/0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
@ -1,540 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc	2022-06-24 17:14:33.634692729 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c	2022-06-24 17:16:08.966540605 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  * Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
  * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
  */
 +/* Red Hat build implements some extra limitations in providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c */
 int ossl_rsa_check_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa, int operation)
 {
     int protect = 0;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 16:04:47.000091901 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c	2022-05-02 16:14:50.922443581 +0200
@@ -132,6 +132,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsac
     return rsa_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT);
 }
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +static int fips_padding_allowed(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
 +{
 +    if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING
 +        || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +# endif
 +
 static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
                        size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
 {
@@ -141,6 +152,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, u
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +# endif
 +
     if (out == NULL) {
         size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
@@ -202,6 +220,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, u
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 +# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +# endif
 +
     if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) {
         if (out == NULL) {
             *outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 17:04:07.610782138 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t	2022-05-02 17:06:03.595814620 +0200
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       \&final_compare
     ],
 -    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
 +    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
         "-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
         $smrsa1,
@@ -865,5 +865,8 @@ sub check_availability {
     return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
         if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
 +    return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
 +        if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
 +
     return "";
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 17:26:37.962838053 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t	2022-05-02 17:34:20.297950449 +0200
@@ -483,6 +483,18 @@ sub testssl {
             # the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
             my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
             my $ciphersuites = "";
 +            my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
 +AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
 +AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
 +	    );
             foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
                 if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
                     note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
@@ -494,11 +506,16 @@ sub testssl {
                     } else {
                         $cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
                     }
 -                    ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
 -                                 $cipher,
 -                                 "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
 -                                 $flag || ()])),
 -                       "Testing $cipher");
 +                    if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
 +                        note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
 +                        ok(1);
 +                    } else {
 +                        ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
 +                                     $cipher,
 +                                     "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
 +                                     $flag || ()])),
 +                           "Testing $cipher");
 +                    }
                 }
             }
             next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen	2022-06-16 14:26:19.383530498 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt	2022-06-16 14:39:53.637777701 +0200
@@ -263,12 +263,13 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974
 Output = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
 # RSA decrypt
 -
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
 Input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
 Output = "Hello World"
 # Corrupted ciphertext
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt = RSA-2048
 Input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
 Output = "Hello World"
@@ -665,36 +666,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mN
 h90qjKHS9PvY4Q==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a
 Output=6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=640db1acc58e0568fe5407e5f9b701dff8c3c91e716c536fc7fcec6cb5b71c1165988d4a279e1577d730fc7a29932e3f00c81515236d8d8e31017a7a09df4352d904cdeb79aa583adcc31ea698a4c05283daba9089be5491f67c1a4ee48dc74bbbe6643aef846679b4cb395a352d5ed115912df696ffe0702932946d71492b44
 Output=750c4047f547e8e41411856523298ac9bae245efaf1397fbe56f9dd5
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=423736ed035f6026af276c35c0b3741b365e5f76ca091b4e8c29e2f0befee603595aa8322d602d2e625e95eb81b2f1c9724e822eca76db8618cf09c5343503a4360835b5903bc637e3879fb05e0ef32685d5aec5067cd7cc96fe4b2670b6eac3066b1fcf5686b68589aafb7d629b02d8f8625ca3833624d4800fb081b1cf94eb
 Output=d94ae0832e6445ce42331cb06d531a82b1db4baad30f746dc916df24d4e3c2451fff59a6423eb0e1d02d4fe646cf699dfd818c6e97b051
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755
 Output=52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=36f6e34d94a8d34daacba33a2139d00ad85a9345a86051e73071620056b920e219005855a213a0f23897cdcd731b45257c777fe908202befdd0b58386b1244ea0cf539a05d5d10329da44e13030fd760dcd644cfef2094d1910d3f433e1c7c6dd18bc1f2df7f643d662fb9dd37ead9059190f4fa66ca39e869c4eb449cbdc439
 Output=8da89fd9e5f974a29feffb462b49180f6cf9e802
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -719,36 +726,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64
 eG2e4XlBcKjI6A==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0181af8922b9fcb4d79d92ebe19815992fc0c1439d8bcd491398a0f4ad3a329a5bd9385560db532683c8b7da04e4b12aed6aacdf471c34c9cda891addcc2df3456653aa6382e9ae59b54455257eb099d562bbe10453f2b6d13c59c02e10f1f8abb5da0d0570932dacf2d0901db729d0fefcc054e70968ea540c81b04bcaefe720e
 Output=8ff00caa605c702830634d9a6c3d42c652b58cf1d92fec570beee7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=018759ff1df63b2792410562314416a8aeaf2ac634b46f940ab82d64dbf165eee33011da749d4bab6e2fcd18129c9e49277d8453112b429a222a8471b070993998e758861c4d3f6d749d91c4290d332c7a4ab3f7ea35ff3a07d497c955ff0ffc95006b62c6d296810d9bfab024196c7934012c2df978ef299aba239940cba10245
 Output=2d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=018802bab04c60325e81c4962311f2be7c2adce93041a00719c88f957575f2c79f1b7bc8ced115c706b311c08a2d986ca3b6a9336b147c29c6f229409ddec651bd1fdd5a0b7f610c9937fdb4a3a762364b8b3206b4ea485fd098d08f63d4aa8bb2697d027b750c32d7f74eaf5180d2e9b66b17cb2fa55523bc280da10d14be2053
 Output=74fc88c51bc90f77af9d5e9a4a70133d4b4e0b34da3c37c7ef8e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641
 Output=a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec
 Output=2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -773,36 +786,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+W
 Ya4qnqZe1onjY5o=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80
 Output=087820b569e8fa8d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5
 Output=4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a
 Output=d94cd0e08fa404ed89
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0
 Output=6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60
 Output=df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -827,36 +846,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/
 aD0x7TDrmEvkEro=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8
 Output=4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e
 Output=b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065
 Output=bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4
 Output=fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2
 Output=28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -881,36 +906,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/
 MSwGUGLx60i3nRyDyw==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5
 Output=af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad
 Output=a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967
 Output=308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf
 Output=15c5b9ee1185
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723
 Output=21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -935,36 +966,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hq
 Yejn5Ly8mU2q+jBcRQ==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3
 Output=4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f
 Output=5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65
 Output=b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8
 Output=684e3038c5c041f7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab
 Output=32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -989,36 +1026,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4
 FMlxv0gq65dqc3DC
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1
 Output=47aae909
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6
 Output=1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b
 Output=d976fc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac
 Output=d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478
 Output=bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1043,36 +1086,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15E
 2MiPa249Z+lh3Luj0A==
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61
 Output=050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d
 Output=4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f
 Output=8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0
 Output=fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2
 Output=4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1103,36 +1152,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSc
 tKo5Eb69iFQvBb4=
 -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72
 Output=f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8
 Output=81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3
 Output=fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858
 Output=f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e
 Output=53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d
 +Availablein = default
 Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
--- a/SOURCES/0060-FIPS-KAT-signature-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0060-FIPS-KAT-signature-tests.patch
@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 15:49:24.786455707 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c	2022-04-04 16:06:13.250271963 +0200
@@ -393,6 +393,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
     const OSSL_PARAM *param_priv_key = NULL, *param_pub_key = NULL;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    const OSSL_PARAM *param_sign_kat_k = NULL;
 +    BIGNUM *sign_kat_k = NULL;
 +#endif
     unsigned char *pub_key = NULL;
     size_t pub_key_len;
     const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
@@ -408,7 +412,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
     if (include_private)
         param_priv_key =
             OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY);
 -
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    param_sign_kat_k =
 +        OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K);
 +#endif
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(ec));
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -481,6 +489,17 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
         && !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ec, pub_point))
         goto err;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (param_sign_kat_k) {
 +        if ((sign_kat_k = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
 +            goto err;
 +        BN_set_flags(sign_kat_k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_sign_kat_k, &sign_kat_k))
 +            goto err;
 +        ec->sign_kat_k = sign_kat_k;
 +    }
 +#endif
     ok = 1;
  err:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 17:01:35.725323127 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c	2022-04-04 17:03:42.000427050 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
 #include "crypto/bn.h"
 #include "ec_local.h"
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
 +#endif
 +
 int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
                           BIGNUM **rp)
 {
@@ -126,6 +130,11 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
         goto err;
     do {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +       if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
 +           BN_copy(k, eckey->sign_kat_k);
 +       } else {
 +#endif
         /* get random k */
         do {
             if (dgst != NULL) {
@@ -141,7 +150,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
                 }
             }
         } while (BN_is_zero(k));
 -
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        }
 +#endif
         /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
         if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 13:48:52.231172299 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2022-04-04 14:00:35.077368605 +0200
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
     EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
     EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
     BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    BN_clear_free(r->sign_kat_k);
 +#endif
     OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
     OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 13:46:57.576161867 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h	2022-04-04 13:48:07.827780835 +0200
@@ -298,6 +298,9 @@ struct ec_key_st {
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
 #endif
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    BIGNUM *sign_kat_k;
 +#endif
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
     char *propq;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h
 --- openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 14:06:15.717370014 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h	2022-04-04 14:07:35.376071229 +0200
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID             "distid"
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY             "pub"
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY            "priv"
 +#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K   "rh_sign_kat_k"
 /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P               "p"
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 14:21:03.043180906 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c	2022-04-04 14:38:33.949406645 +0200
@@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ end:
 # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PUBLIC_KEY                                            \
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NULL, 0)
 # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PRIVATE_KEY                                           \
 -    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0)
 +    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0),                          \
 +    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, NULL, 0)
 # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_OTHER_PARAMETERS                                      \
     OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL),                   \
     OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_INCLUDE_PUBLIC, NULL)
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat	2022-05-10 15:10:32.502185265 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c	2022-05-10 15:13:21.465653720 +0200
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 #include "self_test.h"
 #include "self_test_data.inc"
 +int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
 +
 static int self_test_digest(const ST_KAT_DIGEST *t, OSSL_SELF_TEST *st,
                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
     unsigned char sig[256];
     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
 +    BIGNUM *K = NULL;
     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -462,6 +465,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
     bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
     if (bnctx == NULL)
         goto err;
 +    K = BN_CTX_get(bnctx);
 +    if (K == NULL || BN_bin2bn(dgst, sizeof(dgst), K) == NULL)
 +        goto err;
     bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
     if (bld == NULL)
@@ -469,6 +475,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
     if (!add_params(bld, t->key, bnctx))
         goto err;
 +    /* set K for ECDSA KAT tests */
 +    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, K))
 +        goto err;
     params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
     /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to load the DSA key into */
@@ -689,11 +698,13 @@ static int self_test_kas(OSSL_SELF_TEST
 static int self_test_signatures(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
     int i, ret = 1;
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 1;
     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_sign_tests); ++i) {
         if (!self_test_sign(&st_kat_sign_tests[i], st, libctx))
             ret = 0;
     }
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
     return ret;
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat	2022-05-16 17:37:34.962807400 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc	2022-05-16 17:48:10.709376779 +0200
@@ -1399,7 +1399,151 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_ke
     ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv),
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
 +static const unsigned char ec224r1_kat_sig[] = {
 +0x30, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x1c, 0x2f, 0x24, 0x30, 0x96, 0x3b, 0x39, 0xe0, 0xab, 0xe2, 0x5a, 0x6f, 0xe0,
 +0x40, 0x7e, 0x19, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0x34, 0x6c, 0xc8, 0xce,
 +0x02, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xe1, 0xac, 0xfd, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x36, 0xcd, 0xdd, 0x22,
 +0x2a, 0x2d, 0x29, 0x64, 0x70, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x3e, 0x18, 0x51, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x3c
 +};
 +static const char ecd_prime_curve_name384[] = "secp384r1";
 +/*
 +priv:
 +    58:12:2b:94:be:29:23:13:83:f5:c4:20:e8:22:34:
 +    54:73:49:91:10:05:e9:10:e9:d7:2d:72:9c:5e:6a:
 +    ba:8f:6d:d6:e4:a7:eb:e0:ae:e3:d4:c9:aa:33:87:
 +    4c:91:87
 +pub:
 +    04:d1:86:8b:f5:c4:a2:f7:a5:92:e6:85:2a:d2:92:
 +    81:97:0a:8d:fa:09:3f:84:6c:17:43:03:43:49:23:
 +    77:c4:31:f4:0a:a4:de:87:ac:5c:c0:d1:bc:e4:43:
 +    7f:8d:44:e1:3b:5f:bc:27:c8:79:0f:d0:31:9f:a7:
 +    6d:de:fb:f7:da:19:40:fd:aa:83:dc:69:ce:a6:f3:
 +    4d:65:20:1c:66:82:80:03:f7:7b:2e:f3:b3:7c:1f:
 +    11:f2:a3:bf:e8:0e:88
 +*/
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv384[] = {
 +    0x58, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x94, 0xbe, 0x29, 0x23, 0x13, 0x83, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0x20, 0xe8, 0x22, 0x34,
 +    0x54, 0x73, 0x49, 0x91, 0x10, 0x05, 0xe9, 0x10, 0xe9, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x9c, 0x5e, 0x6a,
 +    0xba, 0x8f, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0xeb, 0xe0, 0xae, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0x33, 0x87,
 +    0x4c, 0x91, 0x87
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub384[] = {
 +    0x04, 0xd1, 0x86, 0x8b, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xa2, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0x92, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x92,
 +    0x81, 0x97, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x09, 0x3f, 0x84, 0x6c, 0x17, 0x43, 0x03, 0x43, 0x49, 0x23,
 +    0x77, 0xc4, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x0a, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x87, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xc0, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x43,
 +    0x7f, 0x8d, 0x44, 0xe1, 0x3b, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0x27, 0xc8, 0x79, 0x0f, 0xd0, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xa7,
 +    0x6d, 0xde, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x19, 0x40, 0xfd, 0xaa, 0x83, 0xdc, 0x69, 0xce, 0xa6, 0xf3,
 +    0x4d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x1c, 0x66, 0x82, 0x80, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xf3, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x1f,
 +    0x11, 0xf2, 0xa3, 0xbf, 0xe8, 0x0e, 0x88
 +};
 +static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key384[] = {
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name384),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub384),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv384),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ec384r1_kat_sig[] = {
 +0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xd5, 0x57, 0x1b, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x66, 0x68, 0x8a, 0x98,
 +0xe3, 0x9c, 0xce, 0x7f, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xdc, 0x84, 0x5a, 0x65, 0xdc, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0x7e, 0xf3, 0x9b,
 +0xa0, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0x02, 0xc7, 0x82, 0xe0, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xa5, 0xda, 0x55, 0x27, 0xbf, 0x79,
 +0xee, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x14, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x67, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x68, 0xe7,
 +0x71, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xe8, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0x76, 0x49, 0x31, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x33,
 +0x16, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0xdb, 0x93, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0xb3, 0xd3, 0x30,
 +0x98, 0x81, 0x6f, 0xb0, 0xc9, 0x30, 0x2f
 +};
 +static const char ecd_prime_curve_name521[] = "secp521r1";
 +/*
 +priv:
 +    00:44:0f:96:31:a9:87:f2:5f:be:a0:bc:ef:0c:ae:
 +    58:cc:5f:f8:44:9e:89:86:7e:bf:db:ce:cb:0e:20:
 +    10:4a:11:ec:0b:51:1d:e4:91:ca:c6:40:fb:c6:69:
 +    ad:68:33:9e:c8:f5:c4:c6:a5:93:a8:4d:a9:a9:a2:
 +    af:fe:6d:cb:c2:3b
 +pub:
 +    04:01:5f:58:a9:40:0c:ee:9b:ed:4a:f4:7a:3c:a3:
 +    89:c2:f3:7e:2c:f4:b5:53:80:ae:33:7d:36:d1:b5:
 +    18:bd:ef:a9:48:00:ea:88:ee:00:5c:ca:07:08:b5:
 +    67:4a:c3:2b:10:c6:07:b0:c2:45:37:b7:1d:e3:6c:
 +    e1:bf:2c:44:18:4a:aa:01:af:75:40:6a:e3:f5:b2:
 +    7f:d1:9d:1b:8b:29:1f:91:4d:db:93:bf:bd:8c:b7:
 +    6a:8d:4b:2c:36:2a:6b:ab:54:9d:7b:31:99:a4:de:
 +    c9:10:c4:f4:a3:f4:6d:94:97:62:16:a5:34:65:1f:
 +    42:cd:8b:9e:e6:db:14:5d:a9:8d:19:95:8d
 +*/
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv521[] = {
 +    0x00, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x31, 0xa9, 0x87, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xbc, 0xef, 0x0c, 0xae,
 +    0x58, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xf8, 0x44, 0x9e, 0x89, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0xdb, 0xce, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0x20,
 +    0x10, 0x4a, 0x11, 0xec, 0x0b, 0x51, 0x1d, 0xe4, 0x91, 0xca, 0xc6, 0x40, 0xfb, 0xc6, 0x69,
 +    0xad, 0x68, 0x33, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xa8, 0x4d, 0xa9, 0xa9, 0xa2,
 +    0xaf, 0xfe, 0x6d, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x3b
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub521[] = {
 +    0x04, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x58, 0xa9, 0x40, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x9b, 0xed, 0x4a, 0xf4, 0x7a, 0x3c, 0xa3,
 +    0x89, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xf4, 0xb5, 0x53, 0x80, 0xae, 0x33, 0x7d, 0x36, 0xd1, 0xb5,
 +    0x18, 0xbd, 0xef, 0xa9, 0x48, 0x00, 0xea, 0x88, 0xee, 0x00, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x07, 0x08, 0xb5,
 +    0x67, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x2b, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x07, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x1d, 0xe3, 0x6c,
 +    0xe1, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x18, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x75, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xe3, 0xf5, 0xb2,
 +    0x7f, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0x93, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x8c, 0xb7,
 +    0x6a, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0x36, 0x2a, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x54, 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x31, 0x99, 0xa4, 0xde,
 +    0xc9, 0x10, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0x94, 0x97, 0x62, 0x16, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x65, 0x1f,
 +    0x42, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x9e, 0xe6, 0xdb, 0x14, 0x5d, 0xa9, 0x8d, 0x19, 0x95, 0x8d
 +};
 +static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key521[] = {
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name521),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub521),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv521),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ec521r1_kat_sig[] = {
 +0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x02, 0x42, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x9c, 0xc8, 0x5b, 0xdd, 0x0b, 0x7f, 0x69, 0x7e,
 +0xdb, 0x83, 0x58, 0x67, 0x63, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xfa, 0x40, 0x29, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xde, 0xe9, 0x96, 0x65,
 +0xe6, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0xe9, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x62, 0xb8,
 +0x6c, 0xc1, 0x36, 0x19, 0x65, 0xff, 0xab, 0xcf, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x4b, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x89,
 +0xcf, 0xf8, 0x72, 0x7b, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x02, 0x02, 0x42, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x77, 0xb8, 0xcb, 0xa2,
 +0xe2, 0x1f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0x16, 0xb5, 0x8e, 0xad, 0xe3, 0xc3, 0xac, 0xb7, 0xb2, 0x51, 0x8f,
 +0xf9, 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x5c, 0x4a, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0xbb, 0x5a,
 +0x92, 0x69, 0xec, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x35, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xc9, 0x69, 0xa7, 0xaa, 0x94, 0xf9,
 +0xf9, 0x50, 0x87, 0x7b, 0x5d, 0x87, 0xe3, 0xd6, 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x6e
 +};
 +static const char ecd_prime_curve_name256[] = "prime256v1";
 +/*
 +priv:
 +    84:88:11:3f:a9:c9:9e:23:72:8b:40:cb:a2:b1:88:
 +    01:1e:92:48:af:13:2d:9b:33:8e:6d:43:40:30:c7:
 +    30:fa
 +pub:
 +    04:22:58:b6:f9:01:3b:8c:a6:9b:9f:ae:75:fc:73:
 +    cf:1b:f0:81:dc:55:a3:cc:5d:81:46:85:06:32:34:
 +    99:0d:c5:7e:a1:95:bb:21:73:33:40:4b:35:17:f6:
 +    8e:26:61:46:94:2c:4c:ac:9b:20:f8:08:72:25:74:
 +    98:66:c4:63:a6
 +*/
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv256[] = {
 +    0x84, 0x88, 0x11, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x23, 0x72, 0x8b, 0x40, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x88,
 +    0x01, 0x1e, 0x92, 0x48, 0xaf, 0x13, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8e, 0x6d, 0x43, 0x40, 0x30, 0xc7,
 +    0x30, 0xfa
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub256[] = {
 +    0x04, 0x22, 0x58, 0xb6, 0xf9, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xa6, 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xae, 0x75, 0xfc, 0x73,
 +    0xcf, 0x1b, 0xf0, 0x81, 0xdc, 0x55, 0xa3, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x81, 0x46, 0x85, 0x06, 0x32, 0x34,
 +    0x99, 0x0d, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xa1, 0x95, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x73, 0x33, 0x40, 0x4b, 0x35, 0x17, 0xf6,
 +    0x8e, 0x26, 0x61, 0x46, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x9b, 0x20, 0xf8, 0x08, 0x72, 0x25, 0x74,
 +    0x98, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x63, 0xa6
 +};
 +static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key256[] = {
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name256),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub256),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv256),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 +};
 +static const unsigned char ec256v1_kat_sig[] = {
 +0x30, 0x46, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x11, 0x27, 0x06, 0x51, 0x2b, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0xa6,
 +0x85, 0xaa, 0xf4, 0x66, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x54, 0x0a, 0x10, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x87, 0xfc, 0xa2, 0xbc, 0x8f,
 +0x3c, 0x58, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x41, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x72, 0x94, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x52, 0xca, 0x21,
 +0x82, 0x66, 0x7a, 0x68, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0x3b, 0x12, 0x71, 0x4d, 0x56, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xdd, 0xca, 0x2b,
 +0x18, 0xa3, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x0d, 0xfa, 0x9c, 0x66
 +};
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 static const char ecd_bin_curve_name[] = "sect233r1";
 static const unsigned char ecd_bin_priv[] = {
@@ -1571,8 +1715,42 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
         ecdsa_prime_key,
         /*
          * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
 -         * So there is no expected KAT for this case.
 +         * We provide this value in our build
 +         */
 +        ITM(ec224r1_kat_sig)
 +    },
 +    {
 +        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
 +        "EC",
 +        "SHA-256",
 +        ecdsa_prime_key384,
 +        /*
 +         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
 +         * We provide this value in our build
 +         */
 +        ITM(ec384r1_kat_sig)
 +    },
 +    {
 +        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
 +        "EC",
 +        "SHA-256",
 +        ecdsa_prime_key521,
 +        /*
 +         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
 +         * We provide this value in our build
 +         */
 +        ITM(ec521r1_kat_sig)
 +    },
 +    {
 +        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
 +        "EC",
 +        "SHA-256",
 +        ecdsa_prime_key256,
 +        /*
 +         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
 +         * We provide this value in our build
          */
 +        ITM(ec256v1_kat_sig)
     },
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     {
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat	2022-05-30 14:48:53.180999124 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c	2022-05-30 14:58:52.841286228 +0200
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@
 #define S390X_OFF_RN(n)                 (4 * n)
 #define S390X_OFF_Y(n)                  (4 * n)
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
 +#endif
 +
 static int ec_GFp_s390x_nistp_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                                   const BIGNUM *scalar,
                                   size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[],
@@ -183,11 +187,21 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign
          * because kdsa instruction constructs an in-range, invertible nonce
          * internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness.
          */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +       if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
 +           BN_bn2binpad(eckey->sign_kat_k, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len), len);
 +           /* Turns KDSA internal nonce-generation off. */
 +           fc |= S390X_KDSA_D;
 +       } else {
 +#endif
          if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(eckey->libctx, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len),
                                 (size_t)len, 0) != 1) {
              ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
              goto ret;
          }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        }
 +#endif
     } else {
         /* Reconstruct k = (k^-1)^-1. */
         if (ossl_ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group, k, kinv, NULL) == 0
--- a/SOURCES/0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch
@ -1,570 +0,0 @@
 From 5f4f350ce797a7cd2fdca84c474ee196da9d6fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 17:25:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider
 For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default
 provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more
 lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think
 continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the
 published chosen-prefix collision attacks.
 As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS
 provider.
 This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail:
 - 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1.
 - 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and
  evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default",
  which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled.
 - 80-test_cms: Re-create all certificates in test/smime-certificates
  with SHA256 signatures while keeping the same private keys. These
  certificates were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the
  FIPS provider.
  Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default
  provider, where SHA-1 is available.
 - 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with
  the FIPS provider.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c |  4 --
 .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 --
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |  8 +--
 test/acvp_test.inc                            | 20 -------
 .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt        |  7 +++
 .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 51 +++++++++++++++-
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |  4 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  4 ++
 test/smime-certs/smdh.pem                     | 18 +++---
 test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
 test/smime-certs/smec1.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smec2.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smec3.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
 test/smime-certs/smroot.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
 19 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 index fa3822f39f..c365d7b13a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -128,11 +128,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
         int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
         int sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
         md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                             sha1_allowed);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 index 99b228e82c..44a22832ec 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
         return 0;
     }
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -    sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
     sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                     sha1_allowed);
     if (md_nid < 0) {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index f66d7705c3..34f45175e8 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -292,11 +292,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
         int md_nid;
         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
 -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
 -#else
         int sha1_allowed = 0;
 -#endif
         md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
                                                      sha1_allowed);
@@ -1355,8 +1351,10 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
         && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
 +#else
         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
 -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
         if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
             pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
         }
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
 index ad11d3ae1e..73b24bdb0c 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.inc
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -1841,17 +1841,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
         FAIL
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        3072,
 -        "SHA1",
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_msg),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_n),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_e),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_sig),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -        PASS
 -    },
     {
         "x931",
         3072,
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 index f36982845d..51e507a61c 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
 Title = ECDSA tests
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
 # Digest too long
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Digest too short
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Digest invalid
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Invalid signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -79,12 +84,14 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # BER signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 index b8d8bb2993..8dd566067b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ NDL6WCBbets=
 Title = RSA tests
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -112,24 +113,28 @@ Ctrl = digest:SHA512-224
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123456789ABC"
 Output = 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
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = 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
 Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 # Leading zero in the signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # Mismatched digest
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Corrupted signature
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -144,6 +150,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # parameter is not NULLt
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -151,42 +158,49 @@ Output = 3ec3fc29eb6e122bd7aa361cd09fe1bcbe85311096a7b9e4799cedfb2351ce0ab7fe4e7
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # embedded digest too long
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # embedded digest too short
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # Garbage after DigestInfo
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
 Output = 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
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 +Availablein = default
 VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = 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
 Result = KEYOP_ERROR
 # invalid tag for parameter
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048
 Ctrl = digest:sha1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Verify using public key
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = digest:SHA1
 Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -370,6 +385,8 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
 Output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
 # Verify using salt length auto detect
 +# In the FIPS provider on RHEL-9, the default digest for PSS signatures is SHA-256
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:auto
@@ -404,6 +421,10 @@ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DD
 Result = VERIFY_ERROR
 # Verify using default parameters, explicitly setting parameters
 +# NOTE: RSA-PSS-DEFAULT contains a restriction to use SHA1 as digest, which
 +# RHEL-9 does not support in FIPS mode; all these tests are thus marked
 +# Availablein = default.
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:20
@@ -412,6 +433,7 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Verify explicitly setting parameters "digest" salt length
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
@@ -420,18 +442,21 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Verify using salt length larger than minimum
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:30
 Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Verify using maximum salt length
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:max
 Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
 Output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
 # Attempt to change salt length below minimum
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
@@ -439,21 +464,25 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Attempt to change padding mode
 # Note this used to return PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
 # but it is limited because setparams only returns 0 or 1.
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Attempt to change digest
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
 Ctrl = digest:sha256
 Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
 # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD
 Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
 Reason = invalid salt length
 # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
 +Availablein = default
 Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD2
 Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
 Reason = invalid salt length
@@ -472,36 +501,42 @@ CAltWyuLbfXWce9jd8CSHLI8Jwpw4lmOb/idGfEFrMLT8Ms18pKA4Thrb2TE7yLh
 4fINDOjP+yJJvZohNwIDAQAB
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=cd8b6538cb8e8de566b68bd067569dbf1ee2718e
 Output=9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=e35befc17a1d160b9ce35fbd8eb16e7ee491d3fd
 Output=3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0652ec67bcee30f9d2699122b91c19abdba89f91
 Output=666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=39c21c4cceda9c1adf839c744e1212a6437575ec
 Output=4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=36dae913b77bd17cae6e7b09453d24544cebb33c
 Output=1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-1
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -517,36 +552,42 @@ swU7R97S7NSkyu/WFIM9yLtiLzF+0Ha4BX/o3j+ESArV6D5KYZBKTySPs5cCc1fh
 0w5GMTmBXG/U/VrFuBcqRSMOy2MYoE8UVdhOWosCAwEAAQ==
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2715a49b8b0012cd7aee84c116446e6dfe3faec0
 Output=586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=2dac956d53964748ac364d06595827c6b4f143cd
 Output=80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=28d98c46cccafbd3bc04e72f967a54bd3ea12298
 Output=484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=0866d2ff5a79f25ef668cd6f31b42dee421e4c0e
 Output=84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=6a5b4be4cd36cc97dfde9995efbf8f097a4a991a
 Output=82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-9
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -564,36 +605,42 @@ F7jfF3jbOB3OCctK0FilEQAac4GY7ifPVaE7dUU5kGWC7IsXS9WNXR89dnxhNyGu
 BQIDAQAB
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=9596bb630cf6a8d4ea4600422b9eba8b13675dd4
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=b503319399277fd6c1c8f1033cbf04199ea21716
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=50aaede8536b2c307208b275a67ae2df196c7628
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=aa0b72b8b371ddd10c8ae474425ccccf8842a294
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
 Input=fad3902c9750622a2bc672622c48270cc57d3ea8
 Output=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
 +Availablein = default
 Verify=RSA-PSS-10
 Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
 Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1329,11 +1376,13 @@ Title = RSA FIPS tests
 # FIPS tests
 -# Verifying with SHA1 is permitted in fips mode for older applications
 +# Verifying with SHA1 is not permitted on RHEL-9 in FIPS mode
 +Availablein = fips
 DigestVerify = SHA1
 Key = RSA-2048
 Input = "Hello "
 Output = 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
 +Result = DIGESTVERIFYINIT_ERROR
 # Verifying with a 1024 bit key is permitted in fips mode for older applications
 DigestVerify = SHA256
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index 48a92f735d..34afe91b88 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
         "-certfile", $smroot,
         "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&final_compare
     ],
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
     [ "signed zero-length content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont_zero, "-md", "sha1",
         "-certfile", $smroot, "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&zero_compare
     ],
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index 8c52b637fc..ff75c5b6ec 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ sub testssl {
                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
           }
 +        SKIP: {
 +          skip "SSLv3 is not supported by the FIPS provider", 4
 +              if $provider eq "fips";
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
@@ -402,6 +405,7 @@ sub testssl {
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
 +         }
         SKIP: {
             skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 4
--- a/SOURCES/0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
 From e3d6fca1af033d00c47bcd8f9ba28fcf1aa476aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:02:49 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] fips: Expose a FIPS indicator
 FIPS 140-3 requires us to indicate whether an operation was using
 approved services or not. The FIPS 140-3 implementation guidelines
 provide two basic approaches to doing this: implicit indicators, and
 explicit indicators.
 Implicit indicators are basically the concept of "if the operation
 passes, it was approved". We were originally aiming for implicit
 indicators in our copy of OpenSSL. However, this proved to be a problem,
 because we wanted to certify a signature service, and FIPS 140-3
 requires that a signature service computes the digest to be signed
 within the boundaries of the FIPS module. Since we were planning to
 certify fips.so only, this means that EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify
 would have to be blocked. Unfortunately, EVP_SignFinal uses
 EVP_PKEY_sign internally, but outside of fips.so and thus outside of the
 FIPS module boundary. This means that using implicit indicators in
 combination with certifying only fips.so would require us to block both
 EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal, which are the two APIs currently used
 by most users of OpenSSL for signatures.
 EVP_DigestSign would be acceptable, but has only been added in 3.0 and
 is thus not yet widely used.
 As a consequence, we've decided to introduce explicit indicators so that
 EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal can continue to work for now, but
 FIPS-aware applications can query the explicit indicator to check
 whether the operation was approved.
 To avoid affecting the ABI and public API too much, this is implemented
 as an exported symbol in fips.so and a private header, so applications
 that wish to use this will have to dlopen(3) fips.so, locate the
 function using dlsym(3), and then call it. These applications will have
 to build against the private header in order to use the returned
 pointer.
 Modify util/mkdef.pl to support exposing a symbol only for a specific
 provider identified by its name and path.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 doc/build.info                      |   6 ++
 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 providers/fips/fipsprov.c           |  71 +++++++++++++
 providers/fips/indicator.h          |  66 ++++++++++++
 util/mkdef.pl                       |  25 ++++-
 util/providers.num                  |   1 +
 6 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 create mode 100644 providers/fips/indicator.h
 diff --git a/doc/build.info b/doc/build.info
 index b0aa4297a4..af235113bb 100644
 --- a/doc/build.info
 +++ b/doc/build.info
@@ -4389,6 +4389,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
 GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
 DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
 GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
 +DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 +GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 DEPEND[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
 GENERATE[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
 DEPEND[man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
@@ -4631,6 +4635,7 @@ html/man7/ct.html \
 html/man7/des_modes.html \
 html/man7/evp.html \
 html/man7/fips_module.html \
 +html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-digest.html \
 html/man7/life_cycle-kdf.html \
@@ -4754,6 +4759,7 @@ man/man7/ct.7 \
 man/man7/des_modes.7 \
 man/man7/evp.7 \
 man/man7/fips_module.7 \
 +man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-digest.7 \
 man/man7/life_cycle-kdf.7 \
 diff --git a/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..23db2b395c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
 +=pod
 +
 +=head1 NAME
 +
 +fips_module_indicators - Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS module indicators guide
 +
 +=head1 DESCRIPTION
 +
 +This guide documents how the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS provider
 +implements Approved Security Service Indicators according to the FIPS 140-3
 +Implementation Guidelines, section 2.4.C. See
 +L<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf>
 +for the FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidelines.
 +
 +For all approved services except signatures, the Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider
 +uses the return code as the indicator as understood by FIPS 140-3. That means
 +that every operation that succeeds denotes use of an approved security service.
 +Operations that do not succeed may not have been approved security services, or
 +may have been used incorrectly.
 +
 +For signatures, an explicit indicator API is available to determine whether
 +a selected operation is an approved security service, in combination with the
 +return code of the operation. For a signature operation to be approved, the
 +explicit indicator must claim it as approved, and it must succeed.
 +
 +=head2 Querying the explicit indicator
 +
 +The Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider exports a symbol named
 +I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> that provides information on which signature
 +operations are approved security functions. To use this function, either link
 +against I<fips.so> directly, or load it at runtime using dlopen(3) and
 +dlsym(3).
 +
 +    #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
 +    #include "providers/fips/indicator.h"
 +
 +    void *provider = dlopen("/usr/lib64/ossl-modules/fips.so", RTLD_LAZY);
 +    if (provider == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALORITHM *(*redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator)(int) \
 +        = dlsym(provider, "redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator");
 +    if (redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
 +        fprintf(stderr, "Does your copy of fips.so have the required Red Hat"
 +                        " patches?\n");
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +Note that this uses the I<providers/fips/indicator.h> header, which is not
 +public. Install the I<openssl-debugsource> package from the I<BaseOS-debuginfo>
 +repository using I<dnf debuginfo-install openssl> and include
 +I</usr/src/debug/openssl-3.*/> in the compiler's include path.
 +
 +I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> expects an operation ID as its only
 +argument. Currently, the only supported operation ID is I<OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE> to
 +obtain the indicators for signature operations. On success, the return value is
 +a pointer to an array of I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_STRUCT>s. On failure, NULL is
 +returned. The last entry in the array is indicated by I<algorithm_names> being
 +NULL.
 +
 +    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
 +        const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
 +        const char *property_definition; /* key */
 +        const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
 +    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
 +
 +    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
 +        int function_id;
 +        int approved;
 +    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
 +
 +The I<algorithm_names> field is a colon-separated list of algorithm names from
 +one of the I<PROV_NAMES_...> constants, e.g., I<PROV_NAMES_RSA>. strtok(3) can
 +be used to locate the appropriate entry. See the example below, where
 +I<algorithm> contains the algorithm name to search for:
 +
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicator_dispatch = NULL;
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *indicator =
 +        redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(operation_id);
 +    if (indicator == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for operation, probably using implicit"
 +                        " indicators.\n");
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +    for (; indicator->algorithm_names != NULL; ++indicator) {
 +        char *algorithm_names = strdup(indicator->algorithm_names);
 +        if (algorithm_names == NULL) {
 +            perror("strdup(3)");
 +            // handle error
 +        }
 +
 +        const char *algorithm_name = strtok(algorithm_names, ":");
 +        for (; algorithm_name != NULL; algorithm_name = strtok(NULL, ":")) {
 +            if (strcasecmp(algorithm_name, algorithm) == 0) {
 +                indicator_dispatch = indicator->indicators;
 +                free(algorithm_names);
 +                algorithm_names = NULL;
 +                break;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        free(algorithm_names);
 +    }
 +    if (indicator_dispatch == NULL) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for algorithm %s.\n", algorithm);
 +        // handle error
 +    }
 +
 +If an appropriate I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH> array is available for the
 +given algorithm name, it maps function IDs to their approval status. The last
 +entry is indicated by a zero I<function_id>. I<approved> is
 +I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED> if the operation is an approved security
 +service, or part of an approved security service, or
 +I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED> otherwise. Any other value is invalid.
 +Function IDs are I<OSSL_FUNC_*> constants from I<openssl/core_dispatch.h>,
 +e.g., I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE> or I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN>.
 +
 +Assuming I<function_id> is the function in question, the following code can be
 +used to query the approval status:
 +
 +    for (; indicator_dispatch->function_id != 0; ++indicator_dispatch) {
 +        if (indicator_dispatch->function_id == function_id) {
 +            switch (indicator_dispatch->approved) {
 +                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED:
 +                    // approved security service
 +                    break;
 +                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED:
 +                    // unapproved security service
 +                    break;
 +                default:
 +                    // invalid result
 +                    break;
 +            }
 +            break;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
 +=head1 SEE ALSO
 +
 +L<fips_module(7)>, L<provider(7)>
 +
 +=head1 COPYRIGHT
 +
 +Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 +
 +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
 +
 +=cut
 diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 index de391ce067..1cfd71c5cf 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include "prov/seeding.h"
 #include "self_test.h"
 #include "internal/core.h"
 +#include "indicator.h"
 static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
 static const char FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=no";
@@ -425,6 +426,68 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 };
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_rsa_signature_indicators[] = {
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
 +};
 +
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators[] = {
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
 +    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
 +};
 +
 +static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM redhat_indicator_fips_signature[] = {
 +    { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +        redhat_rsa_signature_indicators },
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 +    { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
 +        redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators },
 +#endif
 +    { NULL, NULL, NULL }
 +};
 +
 static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_asym_cipher[] = {
     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_asym_cipher_functions },
     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
@@ -527,6 +590,14 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void) {
     return NULL;
 }
 +const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id) {
 +    switch (operation_id) {
 +    case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
 +        return redhat_indicator_fips_signature;
 +    }
 +    return NULL;
 +}
 +
 static void fips_teardown(void *provctx)
 {
     OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx));
 diff --git a/providers/fips/indicator.h b/providers/fips/indicator.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..b323efe44c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/providers/fips/indicator.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + *
 + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 + * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
 +# define OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
 +# pragma once
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +extern "C" {
 +# endif
 +
 +# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED (0)
 +# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED (1)
 +
 +/*
 + * FIPS indicator dispatch table element.  function_id numbers and the
 + * functions are defined in core_dispatch.h, see macros with
 + * 'OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC' in their names.
 + *
 + * An array of these is always terminated by function_id == 0
 + */
 +typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
 +    int function_id;
 +    int approved;
 +} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
 +
 +/*
 + * Type to tie together algorithm names, property definition string and the
 + * algorithm implementation's FIPS indicator status in the form of a FIPS
 + * indicator dispatch table.
 + *
 + * An array of these is always terminated by algorithm_names == NULL
 + */
 +typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
 +    const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
 +    const char *property_definition; /* key */
 +    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
 +} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
 +
 +/**
 + * Query FIPS indicator status for the given operation.  Possible values for
 + * 'operation_id' are currently only OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE, as all other algorithms
 + * use implicit indicators.  The return value is an array of
 + * OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHMs, terminated by an entry with
 + * algorithm_names == NULL.  'algorithm_names' is a colon-separated list of
 + * algorithm names, 'property_definition' a comma-separated list of properties,
 + * and 'indicators' is a list of OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH structs.  This
 + * list is terminated by function_id == 0.  'function_id' is one of the
 + * OSSL_FUNC_* constants, e.g., OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL.
 + *
 + * If there is no entry in the returned struct for the given operation_id,
 + * algorithm name, or function_id, the algorithm is unapproved.
 + */
 +const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id);
 +
 +# ifdef __cplusplus
 +}
 +# endif
 +
 +#endif
 diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl
 index a1c76f7c97..eda39b71ee 100755
 --- a/util/mkdef.pl
 +++ b/util/mkdef.pl
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $ordinal_opts{filter} =
         return
             $item->exists()
             && platform_filter($item)
 -            && feature_filter($item);
 +            && feature_filter($item)
 +            && fips_filter($item, $name);
     };
 my $ordinals = OpenSSL::Ordinals->new(from => $ordinals_file);
@@ -205,6 +206,28 @@ sub feature_filter {
     return $verdict;
 }
 +sub fips_filter {
 +    my $item = shift;
 +    my $name = uc(shift);
 +    my @features = ( $item->features() );
 +
 +    # True if no features are defined
 +    return 1 if scalar @features == 0;
 +
 +    my @matches = grep(/^ONLY_.*$/, @features);
 +    if (@matches) {
 +        # There is at least one only_* flag on this symbol, check if any of
 +        # them match the name
 +        for (@matches) {
 +            if ($_ eq "ONLY_${name}") {
 +                return 1;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 sub sorter_unix {
     my $by_name = OpenSSL::Ordinals::by_name();
     my %weight = (
 diff --git a/util/providers.num b/util/providers.num
 index 4e2fa81b98..77879d0e5f 100644
 --- a/util/providers.num
 +++ b/util/providers.num
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 OSSL_provider_init                     1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 +redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator        1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:ONLY_PROVIDERS/FIPS
 -- 
 2.35.3
--- a/SOURCES/0067-ppc64le-Montgomery-multiply.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0067-ppc64le-Montgomery-multiply.patch
@ -1,703 +0,0 @@
 From 33ffd36afa7594aeb958a925f521cb287ca850c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
 Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 12:14:55 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Revert "Revert "bn: Add fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC
 Montgomery Multiplication""
 This reverts commit 712d9cc90e355b2c98a959d4e9398610d2269c9e.
 ---
 crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 581 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c                |  15 +
 crypto/bn/build.info              |   3 +-
 3 files changed, 598 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
 index e69de29bb2d1..0fb397bc5f12 100755
 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
 +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env perl
 +# Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +#
 +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 +
 +# ====================================================================
 +# Written by Amitay Isaacs <amitay@ozlabs.org>, Martin Schwenke
 +# <martin@meltin.net> & Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org> for
 +# the OpenSSL project.
 +# ====================================================================
 +
 +#
 +# Fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC Montgomery Multiplication
 +#
 +
 +# 2021
 +#
 +# Although this is a generic implementation for unrolling Montgomery
 +# Multiplication for arbitrary values of n, this is currently only
 +# used for n = 6 to improve the performance of ECC p384.
 +#
 +# Unrolling allows intermediate results to be stored in registers,
 +# rather than on the stack, improving performance by ~7% compared to
 +# the existing PPC assembly code.
 +#
 +# The ISA 3.0 implementation uses combination multiply/add
 +# instructions (maddld, maddhdu) to improve performance by an
 +# additional ~10% on Power 9.
 +#
 +# Finally, saving non-volatile registers into volatile vector
 +# registers instead of onto the stack saves a little more.
 +#
 +# On a Power 9 machine we see an overall improvement of ~18%.
 +#
 +
 +use strict;
 +use warnings;
 +
 +my ($flavour, $output, $dir, $xlate);
 +
 +# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
 +# $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
 +$output = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
 +$flavour = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] !~ m|\.| ? shift : undef;
 +
 +$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 +( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
 +( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 +die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
 +
 +open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour \"$output\""
 +    or die "can't call $xlate: $!";
 +
 +if ($flavour !~ /64/) {
 +	die "bad flavour ($flavour) - only ppc64 permitted";
 +}
 +
 +my $SIZE_T= 8;
 +
 +# Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
 +
 +# Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
 +my $sp	= "r1";
 +my $toc	= "r2";
 +my $rp	= "r3";
 +my $ap	= "r4";
 +my $bp	= "r5";
 +my $np	= "r6";
 +my $n0	= "r7";
 +my $num	= "r8";
 +
 +my $i	= "r9";
 +my $c0	= "r10";
 +my $bp0	= "r11";
 +my $bpi	= "r11";
 +my $bpj	= "r11";
 +my $tj	= "r12";
 +my $apj	= "r12";
 +my $npj	= "r12";
 +my $lo	= "r14";
 +my $c1	= "r14";
 +
 +# Non-volatile registers used for tp[i]
 +#
 +# 12 registers are available but the limit on unrolling is 10,
 +# since registers from $tp[0] to $tp[$n+1] are used.
 +my @tp = ("r20" .. "r31");
 +
 +# volatile VSRs for saving non-volatile GPRs - faster than stack
 +my @vsrs = ("v32" .. "v46");
 +
 +package Mont;
 +
 +sub new($$)
 +{
 +	my ($class, $n) = @_;
 +
 +	if ($n > 10) {
 +		die "Can't unroll for BN length ${n} (maximum 10)"
 +	}
 +
 +	my $self = {
 +		code => "",
 +		n => $n,
 +	};
 +	bless $self, $class;
 +
 +	return $self;
 +}
 +
 +sub add_code($$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->{code} .= $c;
 +}
 +
 +sub get_code($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	return $self->{code};
 +}
 +
 +sub get_function_name($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	return "bn_mul_mont_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
 +}
 +
 +sub get_label($$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $l) = @_;
 +
 +	return "L" . $l . "_" . $self->{n};
 +}
 +
 +sub get_labels($@)
 +{
 +	my ($self, @labels) = @_;
 +
 +	my %out = ();
 +
 +	foreach my $l (@labels) {
 +		$out{"$l"} = $self->get_label("$l");
 +	}
 +
 +	return \%out;
 +}
 +
 +sub nl($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code("\n");
 +}
 +
 +sub copy_result($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	my ($n) = $self->{n};
 +
 +	for (my $j = 0; $j < $n; $j++) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	std		$tp[$j],`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
 +___
 +	}
 +
 +}
 +
 +sub mul_mont_fixed($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	my ($n) = $self->{n};
 +	my $fname = $self->get_function_name();
 +	my $label = $self->get_labels("outer", "enter", "sub", "copy", "end");
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +
 +.globl	.${fname}
 +.align	5
 +.${fname}:
 +
 +___
 +
 +	$self->save_registers();
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$n0,0($n0)
 +
 +	ld		$bp0,0($bp)
 +
 +	ld		$apj,0($ap)
 +___
 +
 +	$self->mul_c_0($tp[0], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
 +
 +	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
 +___
 +		$self->mul($tp[$j], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$apj,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($ap)
 +___
 +
 +	$self->mul_last($tp[$n-1], $tp[$n], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	li		$tp[$n+1],0
 +
 +___
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	li		$i,0
 +	mtctr		$num
 +	b		$label->{"enter"}
 +
 +.align	4
 +$label->{"outer"}:
 +	ldx		$bpi,$bp,$i
 +
 +	ld		$apj,0($ap)
 +___
 +
 +	$self->mul_add_c_0($tp[0], $tp[0], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
 +
 +	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
 +___
 +		$self->mul_add($tp[$j], $tp[$j], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	addc		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
 +	addze		$tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
 +___
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +.align	4
 +$label->{"enter"}:
 +	mulld		$bpi,$tp[0],$n0
 +
 +	ld		$npj,0($np)
 +___
 +
 +	$self->mul_add_c_0($lo, $tp[0], $bpi, $npj, $c0);
 +
 +	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$npj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
 +___
 +		$self->mul_add($tp[$j-1], $tp[$j], $npj, $bpi, $c0);
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	addc		$tp[$n-1],$tp[$n],$c0
 +	addze		$tp[$n],$tp[$n+1]
 +
 +	addi		$i,$i,$SIZE_T
 +	bdnz		$label->{"outer"}
 +
 +	and.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
 +	bne		$label->{"sub"}
 +
 +	cmpld	$tp[$n-1],$npj
 +	blt		$label->{"copy"}
 +
 +$label->{"sub"}:
 +___
 +
 +	#
 +	# Reduction
 +	#
 +
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$bpj,`0*$SIZE_T`($np)
 +	subfc		$c1,$bpj,$tp[0]
 +	std		$c1,`0*$SIZE_T`($rp)
 +
 +___
 +	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld		$bpj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
 +	subfe		$c1,$bpj,$tp[$j]
 +	std		$c1,`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
 +
 +___
 +	}
 +
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	subfe		$c1,$npj,$tp[$n-1]
 +	std		$c1,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($rp)
 +
 +___
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	addme.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
 +	beq		$label->{"end"}
 +
 +$label->{"copy"}:
 +___
 +
 +	$self->copy_result();
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +
 +$label->{"end"}:
 +___
 +
 +	$self->restore_registers();
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	li		r3,1
 +	blr
 +.size .${fname},.-.${fname}
 +___
 +
 +}
 +
 +package Mont::GPR;
 +
 +our @ISA = ('Mont');
 +
 +sub new($$)
 +{
 +    my ($class, $n) = @_;
 +
 +    return $class->SUPER::new($n);
 +}
 +
 +sub save_registers($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	my $n = $self->{n};
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	std	$lo,-8($sp)
 +___
 +
 +	for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
 +		$self->{code}.=<<___;
 +	std	$tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
 +___
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +sub restore_registers($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	my $n = $self->{n};
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	ld	$lo,-8($sp)
 +___
 +
 +	for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
 +		$self->{code}.=<<___;
 +	ld	$tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
 +___
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->{code} .=<<___;
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Direct translation of C mul()
 +sub mul($$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
 +	addc		$r,$lo,$c
 +	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
 +	addze		$c,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
 +# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
 +sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld		$r,$a,$w
 +	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like mul() but does not to the final addition of CA into $c - an
 +# optimisation to save an instruction
 +sub mul_last($$$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
 +	addc		$r1,$lo,$c
 +	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
 +
 +	addze		$r2,$c
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
 +sub mul_add($$$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
 +	addc		$lo,$lo,$c
 +	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
 +	addze		$c,$c
 +	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
 +	addze		$c,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
 +# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
 +sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
 +	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
 +	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
 +	addze		$c,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +package Mont::GPR_300;
 +
 +our @ISA = ('Mont::GPR');
 +
 +sub new($$)
 +{
 +	my ($class, $n) = @_;
 +
 +	my $mont = $class->SUPER::new($n);
 +
 +	return $mont;
 +}
 +
 +sub get_function_name($)
 +{
 +	my ($self) = @_;
 +
 +	return "bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
 +}
 +
 +sub get_label($$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $l) = @_;
 +
 +	return "L" . $l . "_300_" . $self->{n};
 +}
 +
 +# Direct translation of C mul()
 +sub mul($$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c, $last) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	maddld		$r,$a,$w,$c
 +	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Save the last carry as the final entry
 +sub mul_last($$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	maddld		$r1,$a,$w,$c
 +	maddhdu		$r2,$a,$w,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
 +# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
 +sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mulld          $r,$a,$w
 +	mulhdu          $c,$a,$w
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
 +sub mul_add($$$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	maddld		$lo,$a,$w,$c
 +	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$c
 +	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
 +	addze		$c,$c
 +
 +___
 +}
 +
 +# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
 +# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
 +sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
 +{
 +	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
 +
 +	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	maddld		$lo,$a,$w,$r_in
 +	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$r_in
 +___
 +
 +	if ($r_out ne $lo) {
 +		$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	mr			$r_out,$lo
 +___
 +	}
 +
 +	$self->nl();
 +}
 +
 +
 +package main;
 +
 +my $code;
 +
 +$code.=<<___;
 +.machine "any"
 +.text
 +___
 +
 +my $mont;
 +
 +$mont = new Mont::GPR(6);
 +$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
 +$code .= $mont->get_code();
 +
 +$mont = new Mont::GPR_300(6);
 +$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
 +$code .= $mont->get_code();
 +
 +$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
 +
 +$code.=<<___;
 +.asciz  "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC by <amitay\@ozlabs.org>, <alastair\@d-silva.org>"
 +___
 +
 +print $code;
 +close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
 index 3ee76ea96574..1e9421bee213 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
                         const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
     int bn_mul4x_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
                           const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
 +    int bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
 +                             const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
 +                             const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
 +    int bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
 +                                 const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
 +                                 const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
     if (num < 4)
         return 0;
@@ -34,5 +40,14 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
      * no opportunity to figure it out...
      */
 +#if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && !defined(__ILP32__)
 +    if (num == 6) {
 +        if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300)
 +            return bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
 +        else
 +            return bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
 }
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
 index 4f8d0689b5ea..987a70ae263b 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/build.info
 +++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
   $BNASM_ppc32=bn_ppc.c bn-ppc.s ppc-mont.s
   $BNDEF_ppc32=OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
 -  $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32
 +  $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32 ppc64-mont-fixed.s
   $BNDEF_ppc64=$BNDEF_ppc32
   $BNASM_c64xplus=asm/bn-c64xplus.asm
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ GENERATE[parisc-mont.s]=asm/parisc-mont.pl
 GENERATE[bn-ppc.s]=asm/ppc.pl
 GENERATE[ppc-mont.s]=asm/ppc-mont.pl
 GENERATE[ppc64-mont.s]=asm/ppc64-mont.pl
 +GENERATE[ppc64-mont-fixed.s]=asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
 GENERATE[alpha-mont.S]=asm/alpha-mont.pl
 From 01ebad0d6e3a09bc9e32350b402901471610a3dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
 Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:21:06 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix unrolled montgomery multiplication for POWER9
 In the reference C implementation in bn_asm.c, tp[num + 1] contains the
 carry bit for accumulations into tp[num]. tp[num + 1] is only ever
 assigned, never itself incremented.
 ---
 crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
 index 0fb397bc5f12..e27d0ad93d85 100755
 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
 +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 # Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
 # Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
 +my $ze	= "r0";
 my $sp	= "r1";
 my $toc	= "r2";
 my $rp	= "r3";
@@ -192,6 +193,7 @@ ($)
 	$self->save_registers();
 	$self->add_code(<<___);
 +	li		$ze,0
 	ld		$n0,0($n0)
 	ld		$bp0,0($bp)
@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ ($)
 	$self->add_code(<<___);
 	addc		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
 -	addze		$tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
 +	addze		$tp[$n+1],$ze
 ___
 	$self->add_code(<<___);
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ ($)
 	and.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
 	bne		$label->{"sub"}
 -	cmpld	$tp[$n-1],$npj
 +	cmpld		$tp[$n-1],$npj
 	blt		$label->{"copy"}
 $label->{"sub"}:
--- a/SOURCES/0071-AES-GCM-performance-optimization.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0071-AES-GCM-performance-optimization.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0072-ChaCha20-performance-optimizations-for-ppc64le.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0072-ChaCha20-performance-optimizations-for-ppc64le.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
 From 4a2239bd7d444c30c55b20ea8b4aeadafdfe1afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 13:59:37 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use OAEP in KATs, support fixed OAEP seed
 Review by our lab for FIPS 140-3 certification expects the RSA
 encryption and decryption tests to use a supported padding mode, not raw
 RSA signatures. Switch to RSA-OAEP for the self tests to fulfill that.
 The FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance specifies in section 10.3.A
 "Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test Requirements" that a self-test may be
 a known-answer test, a comparison test, or a fault-detection test.
 Comparison tests are not an option, because they would require
 a separate implementation of RSA-OAEP, which we do not have. Fault
 detection tests require implementing fault detection mechanisms into the
 cryptographic algorithm implementation, we we also do not have.
 As a consequence, a known-answer test must be used to test RSA
 encryption and decryption, but RSA encryption with OAEP padding is not
 deterministic, and thus encryption will always yield different results
 that could not be compared to known answers. For this reason, this
 change explicitly sets the seed in OAEP (see RFC 8017 section 7.1.1),
 which is the source of randomness for RSA-OAEP, to a fixed value. This
 setting is only available during self-test execution, and the parameter
 set using EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() will be ignored otherwise.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h                        |  8 ++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c                         | 34 ++++++--
 include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  3 +
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             | 83 +++++++++++--------
 providers/fips/self_test_kats.c               |  7 ++
 .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 41 ++++++++-
 6 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
 index ea70da05ad..dde57a1a0e 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
@@ -193,4 +193,12 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to
                                          int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
                                          int flen);
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *param,
 +                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
 +                                             const char *redhat_st_seed);
 +
 #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_RSA_LOCAL_H */
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 index d9be1a4f98..b2f7f7dc4b 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                                    param, plen, NULL, NULL);
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
 /*
  * Perform the padding as per NIST 800-56B 7.2.2.3
  *      from (K) is the key material.
@@ -51,12 +55,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
  * Step numbers are included here but not in the constant time inverse below
  * to avoid complicating an already difficult enough function.
  */
 -int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 -                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 -                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 -                                            const unsigned char *param,
 -                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 -                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                             const unsigned char *param,
 +                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
 +                                             const char *redhat_st_seed)
 {
     int rv = 0;
     int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
@@ -107,6 +112,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
     memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
     /* step 3d: generate random byte string */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (redhat_st_seed != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
 +        memcpy(seed, redhat_st_seed, mdlen);
 +    } else
 +#endif
     if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, mdlen, 0) <= 0)
         goto err;
@@ -138,6 +148,18 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     return rv;
 }
 +int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 +                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 +                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
 +                                            const unsigned char *param,
 +                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
 +                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
 +{
 +    return ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(libctx, to, tlen, from,
 +                                                    flen, param, plen, md,
 +                                                    mgf1md, NULL);
 +}
 +
 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                     const unsigned char *from, int flen,
                                     const unsigned char *param, int plen,
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 59a6e79566..11216fb8f8 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL               "oaep-label"
 #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION       "tls-client-version"
 #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION   "tls-negotiated-version"
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
 +#endif
 /*
  * Encoder / decoder parameters
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index 4e30ec56dd..0103c87528 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -1294,15 +1294,22 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_priv_key[] = {
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
 -/*-
 - * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE directly in the expansion of the
 - * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
 - * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
 - */
 -static const char pad_mode_none[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE;
 -
 +/*-
 + * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP directly in the expansion of the
 + * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
 + * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
 + */
 +static const char pad_mode_oaep[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP;
 +static const char oaep_fixed_seed[] = {
 +    0xf6, 0x10, 0xef, 0x0a, 0x97, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x25,
 +    0x97, 0xcf, 0x8e, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x51, 0x2f, 0xab,
 +    0x2e, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0xe6
 +};
 +
 static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_enc_params[] = {
 -    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_none),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_oaep),
 +    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED,
 +                       oaep_fixed_seed),
     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
 };
@@ -1335,43 +1348,43 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_expected_sig[256] = {
     0x2c, 0x68, 0xf0, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xd2, 0x56, 0xd6
 };
 -static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[256] = {
 +static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[208] = {
    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
 };
 static const unsigned char rsa_asym_expected_encrypt[256] = {
 -    0x54, 0xac, 0x23, 0x96, 0x1d, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x8b,
 -    0x8f, 0x36, 0x33, 0xd0, 0xf4, 0x02, 0xa2, 0x61,
 -    0xb1, 0x13, 0xd4, 0x4a, 0x46, 0x06, 0x37, 0x3c,
 -    0xbf, 0x40, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x64, 0xdc,
 -    0x22, 0x22, 0xaf, 0x36, 0x79, 0x62, 0x45, 0xf0,
 -    0x97, 0x82, 0x22, 0x44, 0x86, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0xfa,
 -    0xac, 0x03, 0x21, 0x84, 0x3f, 0x31, 0xad, 0x2a,
 -    0xa4, 0x6e, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xfc,
 -    0xf1, 0x62, 0xce, 0x82, 0x12, 0x45, 0xc9, 0x35,
 -    0xb0, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0x99, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b, 0x5a,
 -    0xd3, 0x46, 0xdb, 0xf9, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x49, 0xbd,
 -    0x1e, 0xe8, 0xda, 0xac, 0x61, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xda,
 -    0xfc, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x74, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x18,
 -    0x86, 0x3e, 0x20, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0xe1, 0x04, 0xb7,
 -    0x38, 0x43, 0xb1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0xc1, 0x39,
 -    0x4d, 0xe1, 0xd3, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x87,
 -    0x1f, 0x74, 0xb5, 0x69, 0xfd, 0x33, 0xd6, 0x21,
 -    0x7c, 0x61, 0x60, 0x28, 0xca, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xa0,
 -    0xbb, 0xc8, 0x73, 0xa9, 0x82, 0xf8, 0x6b, 0xd8,
 -    0xf0, 0xc9, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0x8c,
 -    0xd4, 0xa2, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0x04, 0xad, 0xaa,
 -    0x11, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0xce, 0x83, 0x29, 0x56, 0x69,
 -    0xbb, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xef, 0xca, 0x2d, 0xcd, 0x52,
 -    0xc8, 0xf1, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x6d, 0x9c,
 -    0x3d, 0x69, 0xcc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xe6,
 -    0xbb, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xdc, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0x24, 0x93,
 -    0x03, 0x46, 0xa2, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x5d,
 -    0x68, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0x30, 0xdb, 0xf5,
 -    0x4f, 0x0f, 0xad, 0xc7, 0xd0, 0xaa, 0x47, 0xd9,
 -    0x9f, 0x85, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0x6c, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x04,
 -    0x29, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0x66, 0x7d, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xaa,
 -    0x05, 0x52, 0x55, 0xc1, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x90, 0xab,
 +    0x6c, 0x21, 0xc1, 0x9e, 0x94, 0xee, 0xdf, 0x74,
 +    0x3a, 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x04, 0x1a, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x7c,
 +    0x42, 0xac, 0x7e, 0x28, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xe2, 0x4e,
 +    0x87, 0xd4, 0x00, 0x69, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x0b,
 +    0xc1, 0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0x21, 0x39, 0x4f, 0x25,
 +    0x22, 0x1f, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x62, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x89,
 +    0xdb, 0x38, 0x32, 0x88, 0x21, 0x1d, 0x89, 0xf1,
 +    0xe0, 0x14, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x50,
 +    0xb0, 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x2f, 0x49, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x17,
 +    0x9e, 0x60, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0x77, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa2,
 +    0xcf, 0x16, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x4a, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xcb,
 +    0x1e, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x27, 0x06, 0x9d,
 +    0xf4, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x7e,
 +    0xfd, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x82, 0x62, 0x0f,
 +    0x29, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0xd3,
 +    0x51, 0x92, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x39, 0x9d, 0xdd, 0x06,
 +    0xff, 0xb1, 0xb0, 0xd5, 0x61, 0x03, 0x8f, 0x25,
 +    0x5c, 0x49, 0x12, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x67, 0x61, 0x78,
 +    0xb3, 0xe3, 0xc4, 0xf6, 0x36, 0x16, 0xa9, 0x04,
 +    0x91, 0x0a, 0x4b, 0x27, 0x28, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7c,
 +    0x65, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x71, 0x84, 0xe7, 0x47,
 +    0x79, 0x83, 0x91, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x79, 0xce,
 +    0x49, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x34, 0xac, 0x61, 0xe0,
 +    0xe6, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x10, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x9a, 0xd6,
 +    0xed, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x99,
 +    0xde, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x11, 0x16, 0xa2, 0x18, 0x30,
 +    0x30, 0xdc, 0x95, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20,
 +    0xc4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x1e, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xbb,
 +    0x29, 0x94, 0x27, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0xab, 0xb4, 0x27,
 +    0x8b, 0x4d, 0xe1, 0xcb, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x66,
 +    0x41, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xeb, 0x61, 0x4c, 0x77, 0x5a,
 +    0xee, 0xb0, 0xca, 0x99, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xbe, 0x06
 };
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 index 064794d9bf..b6d5e8e134 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -647,14 +647,21 @@ static int self_test_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return ret;
 }
 +int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
 +
 static int self_test_asym_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
     int i, ret = 1;
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 1;
 +
     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_asym_cipher_tests); ++i) {
         if (!self_test_asym_cipher(&st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[i], st, libctx))
             ret = 0;
     }
 +
 +    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
 +
     return ret;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +# include "crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h"
 +#endif
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ typedef struct {
     /* TLS padding */
     unsigned int client_version;
     unsigned int alt_version;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 } PROV_RSA_CTX;
 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
@@ -190,12 +196,21 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
             return 0;
         }
         ret =
 -            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(
 +#else
 +            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(
 +#endif
 +                                                    prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
                                                     rsasize, in, inlen,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_label,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_labellen,
                                                     prsactx->oaep_md,
 -                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md);
 +                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +                                                    , prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed
 +#endif
 +                                                    );
         if (!ret) {
             OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
@@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->oaep_md);
     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
     OPENSSL_free(prsactx->oaep_label);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
 }
@@ -445,6 +463,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
                     NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
@@ -454,6 +475,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx,
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@@ -563,6 +588,18 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         prsactx->oaep_labellen = tmp_labellen;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED);
 +    if (p != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
 +        void *tmp_oaep_seed = NULL;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &tmp_oaep_seed, 0, NULL))
 +            return 0;
 +        OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
 +        prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed = (char *)tmp_oaep_seed;
 +    }
 +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 +
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION);
     if (p != NULL) {
         unsigned int client_version;
 -- 
 2.37.1
--- a/SOURCES/0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
 From 97ac06e5a8e3a8699279c06eeb64c8e958bad7bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 17:45:40 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use digest_sign & digest_verify in self test
 In review for FIPS 140-3, the lack of a self-test for the digest_sign
 and digest_verify provider functions was highlighted as a problem. NIST
 no longer provides ACVP tests for the RSA SigVer primitive (see
 https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1347). Because FIPS 140-3
 recommends the use of functions that compute the digest and signature
 within the module, we have been advised in our module review that the
 self tests should also use the combined digest and signature APIs, i.e.
 the digest_sign and digest_verify provider functions.
 Modify the signature self-test to use these instead by switching to
 EVP_DigestSign and EVP_DigestVerify. This requires adding more ifdefs to
 crypto/evp/m_sigver.c to make these functions usable in the FIPS module.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/evp/m_sigver.c           | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 37 +++++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
     return 0;
 }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 /*
  * If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         reinit = 0;
         if (e == NULL)
             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
         else
             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     }
     if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -139,8 +142,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     locpctx = ctx->pctx;
     ERR_set_mark();
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(locpctx))
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     /* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
     if (reinit
@@ -225,8 +230,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             signature =
                 evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
                                               supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             if (signature == NULL)
                 goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
             break;
         }
         if (signature == NULL)
@@ -310,6 +317,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
             if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
                 ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             } else {
                 /* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
                 ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
@@ -318,11 +326,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
                     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
                     goto err;
                 }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
             }
             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
         }
     }
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
@@ -334,6 +344,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
             goto err;
         }
     }
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     if (ver) {
         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
@@ -366,6 +377,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
     return 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     /*
      * If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
@@ -437,6 +449,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
         ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
     ret = 1;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
  end:
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -479,7 +492,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
     return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
                           NULL);
 }
 -#endif /* FIPS_MDOE */
 int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
 {
@@ -541,23 +553,29 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
     return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
 }
 -#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
                         size_t *siglen)
 {
 -    int sctx = 0, r = 0;
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +    int r = 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int sctx = 0;
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (pctx == NULL
             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX
             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     if (sigret == NULL || (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
         return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
                                                          sigret, siglen,
                                                          sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
     if (dctx == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -566,8 +584,10 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
                                                   sigret, siglen,
                                                   *siglen);
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     return r;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -639,6 +659,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
         }
     }
     return 1;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 }
 int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
@@ -669,21 +690,27 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
 int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
                           size_t siglen)
 {
 -    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     int r = 0;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     unsigned int mdlen = 0;
     int vctx = 0;
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     if (pctx == NULL
             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX
             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
         goto legacy;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
         return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
                                                            sig, siglen);
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
     dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
     if (dctx == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -691,8 +718,10 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     r = dctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(dctx->op.sig.algctx,
                                                     sig, siglen);
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     return r;
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
  legacy:
     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -732,6 +761,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     if (vctx || !r)
         return r;
     return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 }
 int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -757,4 +787,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
         return -1;
     return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
 }
 -#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -444,11 +444,14 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
     int ret = 0;
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
 +    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 +    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *sctx = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 -    unsigned char sig[256];
     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *K = NULL;
 +    const char *msg = "Hello World!";
 +    unsigned char sig[256];
     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -488,23 +491,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
         || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
         goto err;
 -    /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to use for the signing operation */
 -    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, NULL);
 -    if (sctx == NULL
 -        || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(sctx) <= 0)
 -        goto err;
 -
 -    /* set signature parameters */
 -    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST,
 -                                         t->mdalgorithm,
 -                                         strlen(t->mdalgorithm) + 1))
 -        goto err;
 +    /* Create a EVP_MD_CTX to use for the signature operation, assign signature
 +     * parameters and sign */
     params_sig = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
 +    md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
 +    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 +    if (md == NULL || ctx == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
 +    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
 +        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0
 +        || EVP_DigestSign(ctx, sig, &siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0
 +        || EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx) <= 0)
         goto err;
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_sign(sctx, sig, &siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0
 -        || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(sctx) <= 0
 +    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    sctx = NULL;
 +
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
 +    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
         || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
         goto err;
@@ -509,14 +510,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
         goto err;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
 -    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(sctx, sig, siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0)
 +    if (EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sig, siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0)
         goto err;
     ret = 1;
 err:
     BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 -    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
 +    EVP_MD_free(md);
 +    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
     OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
     OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
 -- 
 2.37.1
--- a/SOURCES/0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch
@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
 From e385647549c467fe263b68b72dd21bdfb875ee88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:51:16 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIPS: Use FFDHE2048 in self test
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 342 +++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index a29cc650b5..1b5623833f 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -821,188 +821,190 @@ static const ST_KAT_DRBG st_kat_drbg_tests[] =
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 /* DH KAT */
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 p */
 static const unsigned char dh_p[] = {
 -    0xdc, 0xca, 0x15, 0x11, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25,
 -    0xf5, 0x21, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x54, 0x27, 0x89, 0xe0,
 -    0x01, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x66,
 -    0xf7, 0x40, 0x64, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x8b,
 -    0xe6, 0x10, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x8b, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xbe,
 -    0x39, 0xdb, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x85, 0xbf, 0x24, 0xce,
 -    0x68, 0x80, 0xad, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x7c, 0x6d,
 -    0x01, 0x5e, 0x61, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x4d,
 -    0xe1, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0x41, 0xff, 0xde,
 -    0x9d, 0x41, 0x84, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x38, 0xbb,
 -    0x02, 0x1d, 0xae, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x2d, 0x17,
 -    0x82, 0xac, 0xc6, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xb0,
 -    0x23, 0x2c, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x97,
 -    0xb3, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0xac, 0xaf, 0xb9,
 -    0x8f, 0x06, 0x66, 0x08, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x4e, 0xc7,
 -    0xdd, 0xb6, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x99, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0xc1,
 -    0xb5, 0x98, 0x25, 0xda, 0x84, 0x32, 0x07, 0x7d,
 -    0xef, 0x69, 0x56, 0x46, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x20, 0x82,
 -    0x3c, 0x95, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x76, 0xd4,
 -    0x73, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x36, 0x1c,
 -    0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0x2f, 0x32, 0x9b,
 -    0x82, 0x09, 0x9b, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x50,
 -    0xf4, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x62, 0xa3, 0x31,
 -    0x88, 0xb0, 0x27, 0x98, 0xba, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x44,
 -    0xb9, 0x46, 0xfe, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xc5,
 -    0xa1, 0x23, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x97, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x80,
 -    0xda, 0x8c, 0xac, 0x88, 0xe0, 0x92, 0xb1, 0x12,
 -    0x70, 0x60, 0xff, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x57, 0x99, 0x94,
 -    0x01, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xc7,
 -    0x62, 0x45, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x22, 0x31, 0xc1,
 -    0x7d, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xef, 0x0d,
 -    0xb9, 0x9f, 0x9c, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x69
 -};
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +    0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a,
 +    0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
 +    0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95,
 +    0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb,
 +    0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
 +    0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8,
 +    0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a,
 +    0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
 +    0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0,
 +    0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3,
 +    0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
 +    0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77,
 +    0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72,
 +    0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
 +    0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a,
 +    0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61,
 +    0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
 +    0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68,
 +    0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4,
 +    0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
 +    0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70,
 +    0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec,
 +    0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
 +    0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff,
 +    0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32, 0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83,
 +    0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
 +    0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05,
 +    0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2,
 +    0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
 +    0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97,
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +};
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 q */
 static const unsigned char dh_q[] = {
 -    0x89, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x67, 0x17, 0xef, 0x03, 0x9e,
 -    0x60, 0x3e, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0xe4, 0x83,
 -    0x74, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x5c, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xea,
 -    0x11, 0xac, 0xb5, 0x7d
 -};
 +    0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +    0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d,
 +    0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
 +    0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a,
 +    0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd,
 +    0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
 +    0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec,
 +    0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01, 0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd,
 +    0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
 +    0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68,
 +    0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79,
 +    0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
 +    0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb,
 +    0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39,
 +    0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
 +    0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd,
 +    0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0,
 +    0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
 +    0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34,
 +    0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51, 0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa,
 +    0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
 +    0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8,
 +    0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76,
 +    0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
 +    0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff,
 +    0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1,
 +    0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
 +    0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02,
 +    0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9,
 +    0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
 +    0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b,
 +    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +};
 +/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 g */
 static const unsigned char dh_g[] = {
 -    0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb8, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0xf6, 0x01, 0x39,
 -    0x35, 0x1d, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x12, 0x66, 0x80, 0x5f,
 -    0xdf, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xd1, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xa0,
 -    0x05, 0x0c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x24, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9f,
 -    0x6a, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x8f,
 -    0xfe, 0x88, 0xd6, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x89, 0x4a,
 -    0x3d, 0x53, 0x5f, 0xc8, 0x21, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xd4,
 -    0x24, 0x87, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x8c,
 -    0x51, 0xe9, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x9c, 0x7c, 0x20,
 -    0x3e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x31, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0x25,
 -    0x63, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x53,
 -    0xd3, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xef, 0xd9,
 -    0x67, 0x7c, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x77, 0xd6, 0xdc,
 -    0xe2, 0xa1, 0x96, 0x37, 0x95, 0xca, 0x64, 0xb9,
 -    0x2d, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xac, 0x6d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x43,
 -    0x1d, 0xe5, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x60, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x86,
 -    0x89, 0xc9, 0xec, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x24, 0x8c, 0x16,
 -    0xed, 0x09, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x40,
 -    0x6d, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x23,
 -    0x7b, 0x97, 0x34, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xfa,
 -    0xe0, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xed, 0x30, 0xd6,
 -    0x91, 0x87, 0xda, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0xe2,
 -    0xaa, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x61,
 -    0x66, 0x55, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x1c, 0x6b, 0x4a,
 -    0x37, 0x97, 0x63, 0xb0, 0xa9, 0x16, 0x58, 0xef,
 -    0xc8, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x4f,
 -    0x21, 0x37, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x10, 0x17, 0x2c, 0xf3,
 -    0x9b, 0x83, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x8a,
 -    0xb8, 0x25, 0x16, 0xec, 0xab, 0x99, 0x5f, 0xa4,
 -    0x21, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0x80, 0x74,
 -    0xc3, 0x9d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x1e, 0xe4,
 -    0xe9, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x20, 0xea, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x32
 +    0x02
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
 -    0x14, 0x33, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x0a,
 -    0x30, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x70,
 -    0xd2, 0x96, 0x8a, 0xba, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc8, 0x15,
 -    0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
 +    0x01, 0xdc, 0x2a, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x71, 0x57, 0x0f,
 +    0xcd, 0x93, 0x65, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x56, 0x6d,
 +    0xc5, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xad, 0x8d,
 +    0x6c, 0xdc, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x94
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
 -    0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
 -    0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
 -    0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
 -    0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
 -    0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
 -    0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
 -    0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
 -    0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
 -    0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
 -    0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
 -    0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
 -    0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
 -    0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
 -    0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
 -    0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
 -    0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
 -    0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
 -    0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
 -    0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
 -    0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
 -    0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
 -    0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
 -    0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
 -    0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
 -    0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
 -    0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
 -    0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
 -    0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
 -    0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
 -    0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
 -    0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
 -    0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
 +    0x00, 0xc4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x69, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x05,
 +    0x55, 0x2a, 0x7e, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x02, 0xbb, 0x7f,
 +    0xcc, 0x63, 0x74, 0xee, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x98, 0x43,
 +    0x0e, 0x29, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x44, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x23,
 +    0x81, 0xca, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x01, 0x4a,
 +    0x1a, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x0b,
 +    0xb9, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x14, 0x01, 0x62, 0x3c,
 +    0x8a, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xbb, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x63,
 +    0xb7, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x0b, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x38,
 +    0x10, 0x0f, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x24, 0xf6,
 +    0xe3, 0x70, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x7a,
 +    0x87, 0x49, 0x64, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x75, 0x3b, 0x94,
 +    0xc8, 0x09, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x92,
 +    0xb9, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x47, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x44,
 +    0x3b, 0xe3, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x53,
 +    0xd8, 0xfb, 0x06, 0x44, 0xdb, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0x13,
 +    0x2b, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x30,
 +    0xd6, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x59, 0xba, 0x1b,
 +    0xbf, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
 +    0x0b, 0x54, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x3d,
 +    0xe8, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x52, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x18,
 +    0x6f, 0xa3, 0x27, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xc3, 0x81,
 +    0xcb, 0xae, 0x23, 0x11, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x6f,
 +    0x23, 0x17, 0x40, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0xb7,
 +    0x34, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0x98, 0x39,
 +    0xbf, 0x2e, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xad, 0xed,
 +    0x1b, 0x5e, 0x47, 0x90, 0x49, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x71,
 +    0x5f, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x35, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xce,
 +    0x58, 0x60, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0x70, 0x04,
 +    0x2a, 0x6a, 0x98, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xae, 0x69,
 +    0x95, 0xf9, 0x99, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0xed,
 +    0x61, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x05, 0xe9, 0xf2,
 +    0x32
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
 -    0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,
 -    0x96, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x24, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x87, 0x7d,
 -    0xd0, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x56, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x58,
 -    0xaa, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x32,
 -    0x23, 0x51, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0xb5, 0xdb,
 -    0xfa, 0x97, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x30, 0xf0,
 -    0x2d, 0x31, 0x14, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xb1, 0xc0,
 -    0xe0, 0x24, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x98, 0xbc,
 -    0xa9, 0xe6, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x80, 0x86, 0x22, 0xf1,
 -    0x81, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6e,
 -    0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x67, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x97,
 -    0x70, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x05,
 -    0xfb, 0x77, 0xf5, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xd3,
 -    0x3c, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0x0f,
 -    0xec, 0xb6, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x11, 0xe7,
 -    0x7a, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xb1,
 -    0x50, 0xf2, 0x16, 0x87, 0x35, 0x78, 0xfb, 0x96,
 -    0x46, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3d, 0xe8, 0xef, 0xbf,
 -    0xce, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x22,
 -    0xa3, 0x4f, 0x14, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x98,
 -    0x4c, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0x42,
 -    0xe5, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x8c,
 -    0xa1, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x75, 0x98, 0x0d, 0xde,
 -    0x7f, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x36, 0x52, 0x38, 0x20,
 -    0xd4, 0x31, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x22,
 -    0x89, 0x78, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x72, 0xf3,
 -    0x39, 0xca, 0xeb, 0x99, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0xe3,
 -    0x01, 0x26, 0x8b, 0xc9, 0x97, 0x89, 0xc9, 0xb2,
 -    0x55, 0x71, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x3f, 0x00,
 -    0x7f, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x1c, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x51,
 -    0x9c, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x02, 0xab, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x0f,
 -    0x34, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x8b
 +    0x00, 0xef, 0x15, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x56, 0xa3, 0x79,
 +    0x40, 0x58, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x56, 0xad, 0xcb, 0xda,
 +    0x8c, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x25, 0x29,
 +    0x9e, 0x43, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x84,
 +    0xbc, 0x85, 0xd0, 0x94, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x27, 0x57,
 +    0xe4, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x08, 0xf5,
 +    0x74, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x56, 0xd2, 0x09, 0xc8, 0x68,
 +    0xef, 0xed, 0x18, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x2e, 0x95, 0x6c,
 +    0xba, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x1b, 0xf6,
 +    0x15, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x20,
 +    0x76, 0x43, 0x51, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d,
 +    0xd6, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0x18, 0x33, 0xd1, 0xa3,
 +    0x3b, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x13, 0x7a,
 +    0x53, 0xde, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x77,
 +    0x6b, 0xf8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x70, 0x8c, 0xba, 0x73,
 +    0x80, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0xda, 0x53,
 +    0x4d, 0x3c, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x37, 0xce, 0xb1,
 +    0xde, 0x45, 0x97, 0x58, 0x65, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0x05,
 +    0xbb, 0xc3, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x59, 0x7a,
 +    0x99, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x61, 0xe5,
 +    0x1a, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xee, 0xe9,
 +    0xa9, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x91,
 +    0x0d, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x7e, 0x1d, 0x31,
 +    0x79, 0xf1, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0xb2, 0x4f,
 +    0x22, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x72, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xe4,
 +    0x1c, 0x35, 0x96, 0x61, 0x98, 0x39, 0xfb, 0x7e,
 +    0x6d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x69, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x59,
 +    0xbb, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x36, 0x84,
 +    0x5e, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x8a,
 +    0xba, 0x59, 0x88, 0x47, 0xc4, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xbd,
 +    0x78, 0x76, 0x24, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x56, 0x44, 0xc2,
 +    0x4a, 0xc2, 0xd5, 0x3a, 0x59, 0x40, 0xab, 0x87,
 +    0x64
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_secret_expected[] = {
 -    0x08, 0xff, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x9a,
 -    0x7d, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x12, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x6a,
 -    0xb5, 0x11, 0x64, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0x76, 0x77, 0x0c,
 -    0x8c, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xc2, 0x33, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xfe,
 -    0x70, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x81, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x9e, 0xd2,
 -    0x3b, 0x21, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xe8, 0x78, 0x69, 0x21,
 -    0xed, 0xca, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x68, 0xb1, 0x61, 0x53,
 -    0xfa, 0x01, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x2c, 0x90, 0xdd,
 -    0xab, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x81, 0x67, 0x70, 0xa9, 0x87,
 -    0x10, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xab, 0x83, 0xb6, 0xe4,
 -    0x6e, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x43, 0x0d,
 -    0x61, 0x87, 0xda, 0xa3, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xcd,
 -    0x73, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x33,
 -    0x64, 0xf5, 0x04, 0x20, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x4b, 0xfe,
 -    0xaf, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x43, 0x85, 0x05, 0xa5, 0x9a,
 -    0x4a, 0x40, 0xda, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x73,
 -    0xdb, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x74, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x23, 0xad,
 -    0x88, 0x32, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x58, 0x2d, 0x38, 0xf0,
 -    0xa6, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0xb8, 0x79,
 -    0x9e, 0x42, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x32, 0xe9,
 -    0x81, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x42, 0x97, 0x57, 0xb2,
 -    0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xaa, 0x1f, 0xf6,
 -    0xed, 0x93, 0xd7, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xae,
 -    0xd9, 0x0c, 0xaf, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x2b, 0xc6, 0x57,
 -    0x0f, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x1a,
 -    0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x63,
 -    0xf9, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x56, 0xf9,
 -    0x58, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x47, 0x94, 0x86,
 -    0xbe, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xd5,
 -    0xcb, 0x4f, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0x00,
 -    0xfb, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x82, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x82, 0x52,
 -    0x6a, 0x97, 0xd1, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xea, 0xf6
 +    0x56, 0x13, 0xe3, 0x12, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xe5,
 +    0x08, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x90, 0x9d, 0xf5,
 +    0x1a, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x50, 0x93,
 +    0x5b, 0xf4, 0x11, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xa5,
 +    0x80, 0xae, 0x01, 0x3d, 0x66, 0x92, 0xc0, 0x3e,
 +    0x5f, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x82, 0x39,
 +    0x72, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x94, 0xe5, 0x04,
 +    0x7c, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc4, 0x9d,
 +    0xc1, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xec, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xa3, 0x7c,
 +    0x07, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x1d, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x47,
 +    0x4b, 0x94, 0x05, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0xae,
 +    0x7b, 0x21, 0x86, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x62, 0x38, 0x08,
 +    0xea, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x7c, 0xef, 0x19,
 +    0xf8, 0x29, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xde, 0xe8,
 +    0xb8, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xa1, 0x16, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x8f,
 +    0x48, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x1e,
 +    0x2a, 0x66, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x18, 0xe9, 0xd2,
 +    0xfd, 0xa2, 0x4e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x2e, 0x88, 0x3d,
 +    0x7d, 0xac, 0x15, 0x18, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xba, 0xd4,
 +    0x0e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x4a, 0xb4,
 +    0x49, 0x8f, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x62, 0x8c, 0xc6, 0x66,
 +    0x20, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0xed, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x88, 0x46,
 +    0xa7, 0x67, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc5, 0x22, 0x95, 0xa0,
 +    0x23, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xa7, 0x70,
 +    0x1c, 0xac, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x50, 0x3c,
 +    0xe4, 0x23, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xda, 0x2f,
 +    0xf4, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xe4, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x25,
 +    0x86, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x46, 0x16, 0xbc,
 +    0x41, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x19, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x02,
 +    0x87, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x04,
 +    0x82, 0xd2, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0xb1,
 +    0x41, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x0c, 0x89
 };
 static const ST_KAT_PARAM dh_group[] = {
 -- 
 2.35.3
--- a/SOURCES/0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c	2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
 # include <fcntl.h>
 # include <unistd.h>
 # include <sys/time.h>
 +# include <sys/random.h>
 +# include <openssl/evp.h>
 static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
 static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
@@ -342,66 +342,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
      */
 -
 -    /*
 -     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
 -     *
 -     * Known OSs that should support this:
 -     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
 -     * - Solaris since 11.3
 -     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
 -     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
 -     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
 -     *
 -     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
 -     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
 -     */
 -#  if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
 -#    if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
 -    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
 -
 -    if (getentropy != NULL) {
 -        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
 -            return (ssize_t)buflen;
 -        if (errno != ENOSYS)
 -            return -1;
 -    }
 -#    elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
 -
 -    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
 -	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
 -
 -    return -1;
 -#    else
 -    union {
 -        void *p;
 -        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
 -    } p_getentropy;
 -
 -    /*
 -     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
 -     * call this function often.
 -     */
 -    ERR_set_mark();
 -    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
 -    ERR_pop_to_mark();
 -    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
 -        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
 -#    endif
 -#  endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
 -
 -    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
 -#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
 -    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
 -#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
 -    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
 -#  elif (defined(__DragonFly__)  && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
 -     || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
 -    return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
 -#  else
 -    errno = ENOSYS;
 -    return -1;
 -#  endif
 +    /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
 +    return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, buflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
 }
 #  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c	2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
 #endif
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    prediction_resistance = 1;
 +#endif
     /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
     if (drbg->parent != NULL
 -            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
 +            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
 +        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
 +#else
         reseed_required = 1;
 +#endif
 +        }
     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
         if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c	2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
     size_t entropy_available;
     RAND_POOL *pool;
 -    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
 +    /*
 +     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
 +     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
 +     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
 +     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
 +     * amount of entropy.
 +     */
 +    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
     if (pool == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c	2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
      * to the nearest byte.  If the entropy is of less than full quality,
      * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
      */
 -    bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
 +    /*
 +     * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
 +     * + 128 bits during initial seeding
 +     */
 +    bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
     if (bytes_needed < min_len)
         bytes_needed = min_len;
     if (bytes_needed > max_len)
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
 --- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg	2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h	2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * The value is in bytes.
  */
 -#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
 +#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ   32
 /*
  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
--- a/SOURCES/0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:11:27.211413931 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c	2022-08-05 13:11:34.151475891 +0200
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ void ossl_ffc_params_init(FFC_PARAMS *pa
 void ossl_ffc_params_cleanup(FFC_PARAMS *params)
 {
 -    BN_free(params->p);
 -    BN_free(params->q);
 -    BN_free(params->g);
 -    BN_free(params->j);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->p);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->q);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->g);
 +    BN_clear_free(params->j);
     OPENSSL_free(params->seed);
     ossl_ffc_params_init(params);
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:08:31.875848536 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:09:35.438416025 +0200
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
 -    BN_free(r->n);
 -    BN_free(r->e);
 +    BN_clear_free(r->n);
 +    BN_clear_free(r->e);
     BN_clear_free(r->d);
     BN_clear_free(r->p);
     BN_clear_free(r->q);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:14:58.827303241 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c	2022-08-05 13:16:24.530068399 +0200
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
 -    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
 +    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:12:40.552068717 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c	2022-08-05 13:13:34.324548799 +0200
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provct
 static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
 {
     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
 -    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
 +    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 }
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:48:32.221345774 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:49:16.138741452 +0200
@@ -744,12 +744,16 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *g
 void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
 {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
 +#else
     if (point == NULL)
         return;
     if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
         point->meth->point_finish(point);
     OPENSSL_free(point);
 +#endif
 }
 void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
--- a/SOURCES/0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch
@ -1,906 +0,0 @@
 From 2290280617183863eb15425b8925765966723725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 09:27:12 +0200
 Subject: KDF: Add FIPS indicators
 FIPS requires a number of restrictions on the parameters of the various
 key derivation functions implemented in OpenSSL. The KDFs that use
 digest algorithms usually should not allow SHAKE (due to FIPS 140-3 IG
 C.C). Additionally, some application-specific KDFs have further
 restrictions defined in SP 800-135r1.
 Generally, all KDFs shall use a key-derivation key length of at least
 112 bits due to SP 800-131Ar2 section 8. Additionally any use of a KDF
 to generate and output length of less than 112 bits will also set the
 indicator to unapproved.
 Add explicit indicators to all KDFs usable in FIPS mode except for
 PBKDF2 (which has its specific FIPS limits already implemented). The
 indicator can be queried using EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params() after setting
 the required parameters and keys for the KDF.
 Our FIPS provider implements SHA1, SHA2 (both -256 and -512, and the
 truncated variants -224 and -384) and SHA3 (-256 and -512, and the
 truncated versions -224 and -384), as well as SHAKE-128 and -256.
 The SHAKE functions are generally not allowed in KDFs. For the rest, the
 support matrix is:
 KDF         | SHA-1 | SHA-2 | SHA-2 truncated  | SHA-3 | SHA-3 truncated
 ==========================================================================
 KBKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 HKDF         |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 TLS1PRF      |       | SHA-{256,384,512} only   |       |
 SSHKDF       |   x   |   x   |         x        |       |
 SSKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 X9.63KDF     |       |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 X9.42-ASN1   |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
 TLS1.3PRF    |       | SHA-{256,384} only       |       |
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
 Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
 ---
 include/crypto/evp.h                      |   7 ++
 include/openssl/core_names.h              |   1 +
 include/openssl/kdf.h                     |   4 +
 providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c     | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c    |  82 ++++++++++++++++--
 providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c   |  75 +++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c    | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c |  74 +++++++++++++++-
 providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c  |  67 ++++++++++++++-
 9 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
 index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/evp.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ struct evp_mac_st {
     OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
 };
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +/* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8: Deriving
 + * Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of the
 + * key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112 bits". */
 +# define EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
 +#endif
 +
 struct evp_kdf_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 6bed5a8a67..680bfbc7cc 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO    "supp-pubinfo"
 #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO   "supp-privinfo"
 #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS     "use-keybits"
 +#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
 /* Known KDF names */
 #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF           "HKDF"
 diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
 index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/kdf.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int EVP_KDF_names_do_all(const EVP_KDF *kdf,
 # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY        1
 # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY         2
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV     65
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI     66
 #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 67
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_3_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
     size_t data_len;
     unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
     size_t info_len;
 +    int is_tls13;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_HKDF;
 static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     switch (ctx->mode) {
     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
     default:
@@ -332,15 +342,78 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
         size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
 -        if (sz == 0)
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (sz == 0 || !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz))
             return 0;
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
     }
 -    return -2;
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
 +            != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (ctx->is_tls13) {
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")
 +                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
 +                /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic
 +                 * Module Validation Program, Section 2.4.B, (5): "The TLS 1.3
 +                 * key derivation function documented in Section 7.1 of RFC
 +                 * 8446. This is considered an approved CVL because the
 +                 * underlying functions performed within the TLS 1.3 KDF map to
 +                 * NIST approved standards, namely: SP 800-133rev2 (Section 6.3
 +                 * Option #3), SP 800-56Crev2, and SP 800-108."
 +                 *
 +                 * RFC 8446 appendix B.4 only lists SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        } else {
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                        EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                /* HKDF is a SP 800-56Cr2 TwoStep KDF, for which all SHA-1,
 +                 * SHA-2 and SHA-3 are approved. SHAKE is not approved, because
 +                 * of FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +                 * extendable-output functions may only be used as the
 +                 * standalone algorithms." */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -348,6 +421,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -677,6 +753,17 @@ static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     return ret;
 }
 +static void *kdf_tls1_3_new(void *provctx)
 +{
 +    KDF_HKDF *hkdf = kdf_hkdf_new(provctx);
 +
 +    if (hkdf != NULL)
 +        hkdf->is_tls13 = 1;
 +
 +    return hkdf;
 +}
 +
 +
 static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
                              const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
@@ -692,6 +779,11 @@ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     switch (ctx->mode) {
     default:
         return 0;
@@ -769,7 +861,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 }
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
 -    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_derive },
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
 index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ typedef struct {
     kbkdf_mode mode;
     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
 +    /* HMAC digest algorithm, if any; used to compute FIPS indicator */
 +    PROV_DIGEST digest;
 +
     /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
     int r;
     unsigned char *ki;
@@ -70,6 +73,9 @@ typedef struct {
     size_t iv_len;
     int use_l;
     int use_separator;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KBKDF;
 /* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
@@ -138,6 +144,7 @@ static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
 +    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init);
     if (h == 0)
         goto done;
@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         return 0;
     }
 +    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
 +        return 0;
 +
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
     if (p != NULL
         && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
@@ -363,20 +378,77 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
 -    if (p == NULL)
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->ki_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." Note that the digest is only used when the MAC
 +         * algorithm is HMAC. */
 +        if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
 +                && EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
 +            const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +            if (md != NULL
 +                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
         return -2;
 -    /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
 -    return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
                                                    ossl_unused void *provctx)
 {
 -    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
 -        { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
 +    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 }
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
 index c592ba72f1..4a52b38266 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ typedef struct {
     char type; /* X */
     unsigned char *session_id;
     size_t session_id_len;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_SSHKDF;
 static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -126,6 +129,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
         return 0;
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
                   ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
                   ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
@@ -194,10 +203,67 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms."
 +         *
 +         * Additionally, SP 800-135r1 section 5.2 specifies that the hash
 +         * function used in SSHKDF "is one of the hash functions specified in
 +         * FIPS 180-3.", which rules out SHA-3 and truncated variants of SHA-2.
 +         * */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-224")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
 +            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -205,6 +271,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
 index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ typedef struct {
     unsigned char *salt;
     size_t salt_len;
     size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
 +    int is_x963kdf;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_SSKDF;
 #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct {
 static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
     return ctx;
 }
 +static void *x963kdf_new(void *provctx)
 +{
 +    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = sskdf_new(provctx);
 +
 +    if (ctx)
 +        ctx->is_x963kdf = 1;
 +
 +    return ctx;
 +}
 +
 static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
 {
     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
@@ -361,6 +376,11 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
     }
     md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
         /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
         int ret;
@@ -442,6 +462,11 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
                           ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
 }
@@ -514,10 +539,74 @@ static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx)))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
 -    return -2;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." */
 +        if (ctx->macctx == NULL
 +                || (ctx->macctx != NULL &&
 +                    EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC))) {
 +            if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +
 +            /* Table H-3 in ANS X9.63-2001 says that 160-bit hash functions
 +             * should only be used for 80-bit key agreement, but FIPS 140-3
 +             * requires a security strength of 112 bits, so SHA-1 cannot be
 +             * used with X9.63. See the discussion in
 +             * https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1403#issuecomment-1435300395.
 +             */
 +            if (ctx->is_x963kdf
 +                    && ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                    && EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -525,6 +614,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -545,7 +637,7 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
 };
 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
 -    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ typedef struct {
     /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
     unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
     size_t seedlen;
 +
 +    /* MAC digest algorithm; used to compute FIPS indicator */
 +    PROV_DIGEST digest;
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } TLS1_PRF;
 static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -129,6 +136,7 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
 +    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
     ctx->provctx = provctx;
 }
@@ -157,6 +165,10 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         }
     }
 +    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
 +        return 0;
 +
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
         OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
         ctx->sec = NULL;
@@ -232,10 +247,60 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
 static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->seclen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* SP 800-135r1 section 4.2.2 says TLS 1.2 KDF is approved when "(3)
 +         * P_HASH uses either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512." */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
 +                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
@@ -243,6 +308,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
 index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
 #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/kdf.h>
 #include <openssl/params.h>
 #include <openssl/proverr.h>
 #include "internal/packet.h"
 #include "internal/der.h"
 +#include "internal/nelem.h"
 +#include "crypto/evp.h"
 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ typedef struct {
     const unsigned char *cek_oid;
     size_t cek_oid_len;
     int use_keybits;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int fips_indicator;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 } KDF_X942;
 /*
@@ -460,6 +466,10 @@ static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
         return 0;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
                            der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
     OPENSSL_free(der);
@@ -563,10 +573,58 @@ static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
 -    return -2;
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx)))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
 +         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
 +         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
 +         * bits". */
 +        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
 +         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
 +         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
 +         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
 +         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
 +         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
 +        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
 +         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
 +         * algorithms." */
 +        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
 +                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
 +                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -574,6 +632,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0080-rand-Forbid-truncated-hashes-SHA-3-in-FIPS-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0080-rand-Forbid-truncated-hashes-SHA-3-in-FIPS-prov.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch
@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
 From 4de5fa26873297f5c2eeed53e5c988437f837f55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 13:53:31 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] signature: Remove X9.31 padding from FIPS prov
 The current draft of FIPS 186-5 [1] no longer contains specifications
 for X9.31 signature padding. Instead, it contains the following
 information in Appendix E:
 > ANSI X9.31 was withdrawn, so X9.31 RSA signatures were removed from
 > this standard.
 Since this situation is unlikely to change in future revisions of the
 draft, and future FIPS 140-3 validations of the provider will require
 X9.31 to be disabled or marked as not approved with an explicit
 indicator, disallow this padding mode now.
 Remove the X9.31 tests from the acvp test, since they will always fail
 now.
 [1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5-draft.pdf
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |   6 +
 test/acvp_test.inc                            | 214 ------------------
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 34f45175e8..49e7f9158a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -1233,7 +1233,13 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
             err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
             goto cont;
         case RSA_X931_PADDING:
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
 +#else /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +            err_extra_text = "X.931 padding no longer allowed in FIPS mode,"
 +                             " since it was removed from FIPS 186-5";
 +            goto bad_pad;
 +#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         cont:
             if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
                                RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
 diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
 index 73b24bdb0c..96a72073f9 100644
 --- a/test/acvp_test.inc
 +++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -1204,13 +1204,6 @@ static const struct rsa_siggen_st rsa_siggen_data[] = {
         ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        2048,
 -        "SHA384",
 -        ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -    },
     {
         "pss",
         2048,
@@ -1622,202 +1615,6 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_sigverpss_1_sig[] = {
     0x5c, 0xea, 0x8a, 0x92, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x11, 0x4b,
 };
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_n[] = {
 -    0xa0, 0x16, 0x14, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xad,
 -    0xd7, 0x07, 0x31, 0x6d, 0xfc, 0xba, 0x25, 0x83,
 -    0x09, 0xa0, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x22, 0x87,
 -    0xd6, 0xbd, 0x13, 0xd9, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0xf7, 0xe6,
 -    0x48, 0xdb, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x8c,
 -    0xea, 0xbe, 0xe0, 0x04, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x3b, 0x73,
 -    0xdc, 0xc5, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xef, 0xea, 0x10,
 -    0x46, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xb9, 0x93, 0xbc, 0xa0, 0xb6,
 -    0x06, 0x02, 0x82, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x54, 0xec, 0x79,
 -    0x50, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xd7,
 -    0x26, 0xcd, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0x0f, 0x26, 0x5b,
 -    0x1f, 0x21, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x3f, 0x02,
 -    0x8c, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0x70, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0x41,
 -    0xfd, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x12, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x6e, 0x0f,
 -    0x19, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0x31, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x0e, 0xdf,
 -    0x08, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x4b, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x8d, 0x7d,
 -    0x6e, 0xea, 0xc7, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x84, 0x54,
 -    0x7f, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x29, 0x96, 0x39, 0x4c, 0x3e,
 -    0x85, 0xec, 0x22, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x04,
 -    0x2f, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xae, 0x47, 0x79,
 -    0x59, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x17, 0xae, 0x16,
 -    0x38, 0x66, 0x4e, 0xff, 0x45, 0x7f, 0xac, 0x5e,
 -    0x75, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x8b,
 -    0x3d, 0x08, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x11, 0xba, 0xa8,
 -    0xc3, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x89,
 -    0x27, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x7b,
 -    0x39, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x3d, 0x62,
 -    0xb6, 0xd4, 0x43, 0xd0, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0xc1, 0x73,
 -    0x3d, 0x99, 0x37, 0xbe, 0x62, 0x13, 0x6a, 0x8b,
 -    0xeb, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x2a, 0x8b, 0x4f, 0x7f,
 -    0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x3e, 0x08, 0x1b, 0xb5, 0x77,
 -    0xd3, 0xdc, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x59, 0xf6, 0x33,
 -    0x47, 0xa0, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x66,
 -    0x24, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xc1, 0xd4,
 -    0x11, 0x6c, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0xd7, 0x8a, 0x53, 0x5c,
 -    0xb2, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x14, 0x29, 0x0f, 0xcf, 0x28,
 -    0x32, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0x17, 0xf6, 0xbc, 0x0e, 0xb8,
 -    0x99, 0x7c, 0x14, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0xe4,
 -    0x31, 0xbe, 0x54, 0x64, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x1d, 0xb0,
 -    0x37, 0xcc, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x07,
 -    0x37, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x65, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xfe, 0x60,
 -    0x6a, 0x64, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x5b, 0x9a,
 -    0x28, 0x61, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xd7, 0x0d, 0x56, 0x1e,
 -    0x4d, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x4e,
 -    0xaa, 0x37, 0x23, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0x69, 0x66, 0x81,
 -    0xc8, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0f, 0x28, 0x31, 0x9a,
 -    0x2d, 0xe5, 0x79, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0xca, 0x60, 0x45,
 -    0xf7, 0x83, 0x73, 0x5a, 0x01, 0x29, 0xda, 0xf7,
 -
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_e[] = {
 -    0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_msg[] = {
 -    0x82, 0x2e, 0x41, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0x47,
 -    0xec, 0xf1, 0x79, 0xcc, 0x05, 0xef, 0xdb, 0xcd,
 -    0xca, 0x8b, 0x8e, 0x61, 0x45, 0xad, 0xa6, 0xd9,
 -    0xd7, 0x4b, 0x15, 0xf4, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x2a, 0x52,
 -    0xe3, 0x44, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x41,
 -    0x50, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x13, 0x49, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x54,
 -    0x97, 0xfd, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0x5c,
 -    0xc1, 0x37, 0x58, 0x17, 0x63, 0x19, 0x9c, 0xcf,
 -    0xee, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x06, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x47,
 -    0xd1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x59, 0x97, 0x02, 0x01,
 -    0x31, 0x45, 0x8c, 0xe1, 0x5c, 0xac, 0xe7, 0x5f,
 -    0x6a, 0x23, 0xda, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0x25, 0xc6, 0x67,
 -    0xea, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x0f, 0x41,
 -    0xb5, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x7e, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0xaa, 0xbd,
 -    0xe2, 0x8d, 0xad, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x29, 0x70, 0xca,
 -    0x1b, 0x38, 0x21, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0xaf, 0x00,
 -
 -};
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_sig[] = {
 -    0x29, 0xa9, 0x3a, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x1b, 0xdb,
 -    0xaf, 0x0b, 0x47, 0x5b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x8c, 0xc3,
 -    0x70, 0xbe, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x65, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1e,
 -    0x95, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x76, 0x79, 0xf1, 0x00,
 -    0x71, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x7b, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0x18,
 -    0xc4, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x31, 0x04, 0x3f, 0xfc,
 -    0x36, 0x06, 0x20, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x62, 0xf2, 0xb5,
 -    0x79, 0x0a, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0x4f,
 -    0x9a, 0x17, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x64, 0x48, 0x09, 0x75,
 -    0xff, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x36, 0xca, 0xca, 0x1d, 0x74,
 -    0x99, 0xbe, 0x5c, 0x94, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xf4,
 -    0x59, 0x7e, 0x17, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0xb1,
 -    0xda, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x34, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x19,
 -    0x0a, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0xef, 0x82,
 -    0xd4, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xbe, 0x15, 0x73, 0xac, 0xef,
 -    0x05, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0x8a, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0x8e, 0xa5,
 -    0xee, 0xfb, 0x28, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xa4, 0x2b, 0xd2,
 -    0x85, 0x2b, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x04,
 -    0xa0, 0x49, 0x24, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xcf,
 -    0x73, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0x70, 0xda, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x5a,
 -    0x28, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xbd, 0x2a, 0x7c,
 -    0x8e, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x8d,
 -    0x76, 0xea, 0x70, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x63, 0x74,
 -    0xbc, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x1b, 0x75,
 -    0x82, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x55, 0xd4, 0xbd,
 -    0x14, 0xde, 0x58, 0x56, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x4e, 0x57,
 -    0x0d, 0x54, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x86, 0x8c, 0xcb, 0x07,
 -    0x9f, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xc2, 0x08, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x05,
 -    0x3b, 0xc8, 0xd2, 0x15, 0x68, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0x3c,
 -    0x4e, 0x85, 0xa9, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xca,
 -    0xca, 0xa8, 0x27, 0x89, 0x61, 0x4e, 0x1f, 0x57,
 -    0x2d, 0x99, 0x10, 0x3f, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x96, 0x5e,
 -    0x2f, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xea, 0x65, 0x2a,
 -    0x22, 0x35, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0x13, 0x89, 0x05, 0x2e,
 -    0x19, 0x73, 0x1d, 0x70, 0x74, 0x98, 0x15, 0x4b,
 -    0xab, 0x56, 0x52, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x42, 0x95, 0x6a,
 -    0x46, 0x2c, 0x78, 0xff, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x48, 0x10,
 -    0x38, 0x25, 0xab, 0x32, 0x7c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x5d,
 -    0x6f, 0x45, 0x54, 0x74, 0x2d, 0x93, 0x56, 0x52,
 -    0x11, 0x34, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x4f,
 -    0x37, 0x14, 0x75, 0xac, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xda,
 -    0x38, 0x06, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x59,
 -    0x1b, 0x5d, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x39, 0x37,
 -    0x44, 0x85, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x06, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x15,
 -    0x35, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x27, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xec,
 -    0x30, 0x37, 0x20, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x11, 0x61, 0xc0,
 -    0xdb, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x26, 0x78, 0x27, 0xb9, 0x13,
 -    0xc9, 0x1a, 0xa7, 0x67, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0xcb,
 -};
 -
 -#define rsa_sigverx931_1_n rsa_sigverx931_0_n
 -#define rsa_sigverx931_1_e rsa_sigverx931_0_e
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_msg[] = {
 -    0x79, 0x02, 0xb9, 0xd2, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x02, 0xc8,
 -    0x2a, 0x94, 0x92, 0x14, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x8d,
 -    0xb2, 0xf6, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0xf9,
 -    0xa8, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xac, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0x34, 0xf3,
 -    0xda, 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x70, 0x92, 0xfb, 0x40, 0x26,
 -    0xc7, 0x9b, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0x10, 0x11, 0xcf, 0x7f,
 -    0x23, 0xd0, 0xed, 0x55, 0x52, 0x6d, 0xd3, 0xb2,
 -    0x56, 0x53, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xb5,
 -    0xfd, 0xd0, 0x45, 0x4f, 0x62, 0x40, 0x54, 0x42,
 -    0x68, 0xd5, 0xe5, 0xdd, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x94, 0x59,
 -    0x1a, 0x57, 0x13, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xcc, 0xbd,
 -    0x4c, 0x2e, 0xc8, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x68, 0xd0, 0x72,
 -    0x6a, 0x94, 0xd2, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x86, 0x45,
 -    0x95, 0xaa, 0x50, 0xda, 0x35, 0xeb, 0x69, 0x44,
 -    0x1f, 0xf3, 0x3a, 0x51, 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x08, 0x42,
 -    0x12, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0x21, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x87, 0x55,
 -};
 -
 -static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_sig[] = {
 -    0x3b, 0xba, 0xb3, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0x29, 0xb5,
 -    0xf9, 0x94, 0xf1, 0x00, 0x5c, 0x16, 0x67, 0x67,
 -    0x73, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x7e, 0x07, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0x95,
 -    0xeb, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0xa9, 0x70, 0x5a,
 -    0xee, 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x69, 0x85, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xe3,
 -    0xdc, 0xe2, 0x73, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x69,
 -    0x08, 0x03, 0x17, 0xd6, 0x50, 0x21, 0x14, 0x23,
 -    0x8c, 0xe6, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x14,
 -    0x81, 0xb1, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0xd2, 0xbe, 0x58, 0x75,
 -    0x94, 0x74, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0xf6, 0x1f,
 -    0x73, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x5f, 0xbd, 0xbf, 0x59, 0x37,
 -    0x5b, 0x98, 0x54, 0xad, 0x3a, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xef,
 -    0xcb, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x84, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0x60,
 -    0xb8, 0xc3, 0x8d, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xa0, 0x91, 0x94,
 -    0xb7, 0xd7, 0xb1, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xee, 0x81, 0x93,
 -    0xfc, 0x41, 0xf0, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x52, 0xde,
 -    0x80, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x68, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0x50, 0x1b,
 -    0x08, 0x3f, 0x40, 0xde, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x81, 0x99,
 -    0x7f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x27, 0xd4, 0xfb,
 -    0xcd, 0xc5, 0x7a, 0xea, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x66, 0xef,
 -    0x55, 0x3f, 0x85, 0xea, 0x84, 0xc5, 0x0a, 0xf6,
 -    0x3c, 0x40, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xbe,
 -    0x61, 0x41, 0xd3, 0xb1, 0x08, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0xf9,
 -    0x6e, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63,
 -    0x3e, 0x41, 0x33, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x27, 0xa4, 0xd9,
 -    0x3a, 0x20, 0x2b, 0x39, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x82, 0x48,
 -    0xd6, 0x5b, 0x58, 0x85, 0x44, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0xfd,
 -    0xfb, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xac, 0xbc, 0xba, 0x16,
 -    0x92, 0x0e, 0x20, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8,
 -    0x00, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x41, 0x46, 0x38, 0xb6, 0x54,
 -    0x70, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x62, 0x97, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x66,
 -    0x5a, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x27, 0x56,
 -    0x60, 0x5b, 0x0c, 0x52, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x99,
 -    0x55, 0x11, 0x62, 0x52, 0x09, 0x48, 0x53, 0x90,
 -    0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe3, 0x4c, 0xe3,
 -    0xa8, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x5c, 0x59, 0x25,
 -    0x99, 0x30, 0xde, 0x57, 0x6a, 0x84, 0x25, 0x34,
 -    0x3e, 0x64, 0x11, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x70,
 -    0xd2, 0x5c, 0x0e, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x24, 0x53, 0x75,
 -    0x98, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x01, 0x6a, 0x14, 0xed, 0xc3,
 -    0x6f, 0xc4, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x59, 0x53,
 -    0x81, 0x3a, 0x86, 0x31, 0xfc, 0x9e, 0xbf, 0x6c,
 -    0x52, 0x93, 0x86, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x07,
 -    0x8a, 0x40, 0x33, 0x64, 0xb2, 0x70, 0x48, 0x85,
 -    0x05, 0x59, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x6b, 0x9a, 0xad, 0xab,
 -    0x20, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x6d, 0xde, 0xcf, 0x22, 0x0b,
 -    0xea, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0x1c, 0x39, 0x3a, 0xfd, 0xa4,
 -    0xde, 0x54, 0xae, 0xde, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb0, 0x6d,
 -};
 -
 static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
     {
         "pkcs1", /* pkcs1v1.5 */
@@ -1841,17 +1638,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
         FAIL
     },
 -    {
 -        "x931",
 -        3072,
 -        "SHA256",
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_msg),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_n),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_e),
 -        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_sig),
 -        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
 -        FAIL
 -    },
     {
         "pss",
         4096,
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
 From e1eba21921ceeffa45ffd2115868c14e4c7fb8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:08:24 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] hmac: Add explicit FIPS indicator for key length
 NIST SP 800-131Ar2, table 9 "Approval Status of MAC Algorithms"
 specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and
 are legacy use for HMAC verification.
 Add an explicit indicator that will mark shorter key lengths as
 unsupported. The indicator can be queries from the EVP_MAC_CTX object
 using EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() with the
  OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
 parameter.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/crypto/evp.h                       |  7 +++++++
 include/openssl/core_names.h               |  1 +
 include/openssl/evp.h                      |  3 +++
 providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
 index 76fb990de4..1e2240516e 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/evp.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -196,6 +196,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_ed448_pkey_method(void);
 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void);
 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void);
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +/* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms specifies key
 + * lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and legacy use for
 + * HMAC verification. */
 +# define EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
 +#endif
 +
 struct evp_mac_st {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
     int name_id;
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index c019afbbb0..94fab83193 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE             "size"                    /* size_t */
 #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE       "block-size"              /* size_t */
 #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE    "tls-data-size"           /* size_t */
 +#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
 /* Known MAC names */
 #define OSSL_MAC_NAME_BLAKE2BMAC    "BLAKE2BMAC"
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index 49e8e1df78..a5e78efd6e 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1192,6 +1192,9 @@ void EVP_MD_do_all_provided(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
                             void *arg);
 /* MAC stuff */
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
                        const char *properties);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
 index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 +#include "crypto/evp.h"
 +
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
 #include "prov/provider_util.h"
@@ -244,6 +246,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -265,6 +270,18 @@ static int hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
             && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, hmac_block_size(macctx)))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR)) != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        /* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms
 +         * specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation
 +         * and legacy use for HMAC verification. */
 +        if (macctx->keylen < EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return 1;
 }
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
 From 754862899058cfb5f2341c81f9e04dd2f7b37056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:37:17 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] pbkdf2: Set minimum password length of 8 bytes
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
 "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the
 vendor shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
 a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper
 bound for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random.
 This probability shall take into account not only the length of the
 password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The
 decision on the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is
 the vendor’s, but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the
 decision."
 We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's
 ACVP testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer
 passwords combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error)
 would cause the module to fail ACVP testing.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 index 2a0ae63acc..aa0adce5e6 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
 #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN   (128 / 8)
 +/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
 + * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
 + * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
 + * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
 + * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
 + * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
 + * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
 + * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
 + * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
 + *
 + * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
 + * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
 + * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
 + * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
 +#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
@@ -186,9 +201,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
     }
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
 +        if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
 +            && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
         if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
             return 0;
 +    }
     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
         if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
@@ -297,6 +318,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
     }
     if (lower_bound_checks) {
 +        if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
             return 0;
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
 From 52b347703ba2b98a0efee86c1a483c2f0f9f73d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 12:52:59 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Disallow SHAKE in OAEP and PSS in FIPS prov
 According to FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C, the SHAKE digest algorithms
 must not be used in higher-level algorithms (such as RSA-OAEP and
 RSASSA-PSS):
 "To be used in an approved mode of operation, the SHA-3 hash functions
 may be implemented either as part of an approved higher-level algorithm,
 for example, a digital signature algorithm, or as the standalone
 functions. The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 extendable-output functions may
 only be used as the standalone algorithms."
 Add a check to prevent their use as message digest in PSS signatures and
 as MGF1 hash function in both OAEP and PSS.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 index d9be1a4f98..dfe9c9f0e8 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -73,9 +73,23 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         return 0;
 #endif
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
     if (mgf1md == NULL)
         mgf1md = md;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
     if (mdlen <= 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
@@ -181,9 +195,23 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 #endif
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     if (mgf1md == NULL)
         mgf1md = md;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
     if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 index 33874bfef8..e8681b0351 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
         mgf1Hash = Hash;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +#endif
 +
     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
@@ -164,6 +172,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
         mgf1Hash = Hash;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
 +        goto err;
 +#endif
 +
     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
 -- 
 2.39.0
--- a/SOURCES/0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
 From a325a23bc83f4efd60130001c417ca5b96bdbff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:33:02 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] signature: Add indicator for PSS salt length
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
 salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 ≤ sLen ≤ hLen, where hLen is the length of
 the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 It is not exactly clear from this text whether hLen refers to the
 message digest or the hash function used for the mask generation
 function MGF1. PKCS#1 v2.1 suggests it is the former:
 | Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of
 | the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of
 | RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1.
 | Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of
 | the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former
 | case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain
 | Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13]
 | Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
 | from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts
 | the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the
 | original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.
 Since OpenSSL defaults to creating signatures with the maximum salt
 length, blocking the use of longer salts would probably lead to
 significant problems in practice. Instead, introduce an explicit
 indicator that can be obtained from the EVP_PKEY_CTX object using
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() with the
  OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
 parameter.
 We also add indicator for RSA_NO_PADDING here to avoid patch-over-patch.
 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 ++++
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 94fab83193..69c59f0b46 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES    \
     OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
 #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE
 +#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
 /* Asym cipher parameters */
 #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST                   OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index a5e78efd6e..f239200465 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -797,6 +797,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
 __owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
                               int *outl);
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 __owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
                          EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 __owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 49e7f9158a..0c45008a00 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -1127,6 +1127,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
         }
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +        if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
 +            if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
 +            } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +            }
 +        } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
 +            if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
 +                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +        }
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     return 1;
 }
@@ -1136,6 +1151,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0089-PSS-salt-length-from-provider.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0089-PSS-salt-length-from-provider.patch
@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
 From 0879fac692cb1bff0ec4c196cb364d970ad3ecec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 14:33:57 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Obtain PSS salt length from provider
 Rather than computing the PSS salt length again in core using
 ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string, which calls rsa_ctx_to_pss and computes the
 salt length, obtain it from the provider using the
 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID param to handle the case where the
 interpretation of the magic constants in the provider differs from that
 of OpenSSL core.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c   | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
 index 20ed816918..997567fdbf 100644
 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
 +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
 #include "cms_local.h"
@@ -191,7 +192,10 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
     int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
     X509_ALGOR *alg;
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
 -    ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
 +    unsigned char aid[128];
 +    const unsigned char *pp = aid;
 +    size_t aid_len = 0;
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2];
     CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
     if (pkctx != NULL) {
@@ -205,10 +209,17 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
     /* We don't support it */
     if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
         return 0;
 -    os = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
 -    if (os == NULL)
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
 +        OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
 +    params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 +
 +    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
 +        return 0;
 +    if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
 +        return 0;
 +    if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
         return 0;
 -    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
     return 1;
 }
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
 index c15554505b..61ec53d424 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -637,22 +637,30 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const void *asn,
     if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
         return 2;
     if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
 -        ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
 -        os1 = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
 -        if (!os1)
 +        unsigned char aid[128];
 +        size_t aid_len = 0;
 +        OSSL_PARAM params[2];
 +
 +        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
 +            OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
 +        params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 +
 +        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
             return 0;
 -        /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
 -        if (alg2) {
 -            ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
 -            if (!os2) {
 -                ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
 +        if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
 +            return 0;
 +
 +        if (alg1 != NULL) {
 +            const unsigned char *pp = aid;
 +            if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg1, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
 +        if (alg2 != NULL) {
 +            const unsigned char *pp = aid;
 +            if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg2, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
                 return 0;
 -            }
 -            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
 -                            V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
         }
 -        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
 -                        V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
 +
         return 3;
     }
     return 2;
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0090-signature-Clamp-PSS-salt-len-to-MD-len.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0090-signature-Clamp-PSS-salt-len-to-MD-len.patch
@ -1,338 +0,0 @@
 From 9cc914ff3e1fda124bdc76d72ebc9349ec19f8ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 12:35:33 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] signature: Clamp PSS salt len to MD len
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
 salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
 the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
 default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
 not use more than the digest legth when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
 not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
 verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
 work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
 digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
 SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c                        | 18 ++++++++-
 crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c                          | 26 ++++++++++--
 doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod                | 11 ++++-
 doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod                |  5 +++
 include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
 include/openssl/rsa.h                         |  3 ++
 providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 40 ++++++++++++++-----
 test/recipes/25-test_req.t                    |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
 index 61ec53d424..e69a98d116 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
     const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
     EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
     int saltlen;
 +    int saltlenMax = -1;
     if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
         return NULL;
@@ -457,14 +458,27 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
         return NULL;
     if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen) <= 0)
         return NULL;
 -    if (saltlen == -1) {
 +    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
         saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
 -    } else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
 +    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
 +        /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm",
 +         * subsection 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in
 +         * bytes) of the salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where
 +         * hLen is the length of the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 +         *
 +         * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default
 +         * does not violate FIPS 186-4. */
 +        saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
 +        saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
 +    }
 +    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
         saltlen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pk) - EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd) - 2;
         if ((EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
             saltlen--;
         if (saltlen < 0)
             return NULL;
 +        if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
 +            saltlen = saltlenMax;
     }
     return ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 index 33874bfef8..430c36eb2a 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -61,11 +61,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
      *      -1      sLen == hLen
      *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
      *      -3      salt length is maximized
 +     *      -4      salt length is autorecovered from signature
      *      -N      reserved
      */
     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
         sLen = hLen;
 -    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
 +    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -112,7 +113,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
         goto err;
     }
 -    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
 +    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
 +            && sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX
 +            && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED,
                        "expected: %d retrieved: %d", sLen,
                        maskedDBLen - i);
@@ -160,6 +163,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
     int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
     unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +    int sLenMax = -1;
     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
         mgf1Hash = Hash;
@@ -172,13 +176,25 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
      *      -1      sLen == hLen
      *      -2      salt length is maximized
      *      -3      same as above (on signing)
 +     *      -4      salt length is min(hLen, maximum salt length)
      *      -N      reserved
      */
 +    /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
 +     * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
 +     * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
 +     * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 +     *
 +     * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
 +     * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
         sLen = hLen;
 -    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
 +    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN
 +            || sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
         sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
 -    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
 +    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
 +        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
 +        sLenMax = hLen;
 +    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -195,6 +211,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
     }
     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
         sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
 +        if (sLenMax >= 0 && sLen > sLenMax)
 +            sLen = sLenMax;
     } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
         goto err;
 diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
 index 3075eaafd6..9b96f42dbc 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -270,8 +270,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding() gets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() sets the RSA PSS salt length to I<saltlen>.
 As its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. If this function is
 -not called then the maximum salt length is used when signing and auto detection
 -when verifying. Three special values are supported:
 +not called then the salt length is maximized up to the digest length when
 +signing and auto detection when verifying. Four special values are supported:
 =over 4
@@ -289,6 +289,13 @@ causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the
 B<PSS> block structure when verifying.  When signing, it has the same
 meaning as B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX>.
 +=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>
 +
 +causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B<PSS> block
 +structure when verifying, like B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO>.  When signing, the salt
 +length is maximized up to a maximum of the digest length to comply with FIPS
 +186-4 section 5.5.
 +
 =back
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() gets the RSA PSS salt length for I<ctx>.
 diff --git a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
 index 1ce32cc443..13d053e262 100644
 --- a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
 +++ b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ Use the maximum salt length.
 Auto detect the salt length.
 +=item "auto-digestmax" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>)
 +
 +Auto detect the salt length when verifying.  Maximize the salt length up to the
 +digest size when signing to comply with FIPS 186-4 section 5.5.
 +
 =back
 =back
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 69c59f0b46..5779f41427 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST "digest"
 #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX    "max"
 #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO   "auto"
 +#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX "auto-digestmax"
 /* Key generation parameters */
 #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS             OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS
 diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
 index a55c9727c6..daf55bc6d4 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp);
 # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO   -2
 /* Set salt length to maximum possible */
 # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX    -3
 +/* Auto-detect on verify, set salt length to min(maximum possible, digest
 + * length) on sign */
 +# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX  -4
 /* Old compatible max salt length for sign only */
 # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN    -2
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 index 0c45008a00..1a787d77db 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
     prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
     prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
     prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
 -    /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
 -    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
 +    /* Maximum up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
 +    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
     prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
     return prsactx;
 }
@@ -200,13 +200,27 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
 static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int saltlen = ctx->saltlen;
 - 
 +    int saltlenMax = -1;
 +
 +    /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
 +     * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
 +     * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
 +     * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
 +     *
 +     * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
 +     * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
     if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
         saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
 -    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
 +    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
 +        saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
 +        saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
 +    }
 +    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
         saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md) - 2;
         if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
             saltlen--;
 +        if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
 +            saltlen = saltlenMax;
     }
     if (saltlen < 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -411,8 +425,8 @@ static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
     prsactx->operation = operation;
 -    /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
 -    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
 +    /* Maximize up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
 +    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
     prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
     switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
@@ -1110,6 +1124,9 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
             case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
                 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
                 break;
 +            case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
 +                value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
 +                break;
             default:
                 {
                     int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
@@ -1297,6 +1314,8 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
                 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
             else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
                 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
 +            else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) == 0)
 +                saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
             else
                 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
             break;
@@ -1305,11 +1324,11 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         }
         /*
 -         * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
 -         * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
 -         * lowest saltlen number possible.
 +         * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
 +         * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently lowest
 +         * saltlen number possible.
          */
 -        if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
 +        if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
             return 0;
         }
@@ -1317,6 +1336,7 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
         if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
             switch (saltlen) {
             case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
 +            case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
                 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
                     ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH,
                                    "Cannot use autodetected salt length");
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
 index e615f1b338..35541aed12 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests with RSA-PSS" => sub {
         ok(!run(app(["openssl", "req",
                      "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
                      "-new", "-out", "testreq-rsapss3.pem", "-utf8",
 -                     "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-4",
 +                     "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-5",
                      "-key", srctop_file("test", "testrsapss.pem")])),
            "Generating request with expected failure");
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap	2022-11-22 12:27:30.994530801 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c	2022-11-22 12:32:15.916875495 +0100
@@ -264,6 +264,14 @@ static int rsasve_generate(PROV_RSA_CTX
             *secretlen = nlen;
         return 1;
     }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     /*
      * Step (2): Generate a random byte string z of nlen bytes where
      *            1 < z < n - 1
@@ -307,6 +315,13 @@ static int rsasve_recover(PROV_RSA_CTX *
         return 1;
     }
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     /* Step (2): check the input ciphertext 'inlen' matches the nlen */
     if (inlen != nlen) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
--- a/SOURCES/0092-provider-improvements.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0092-provider-improvements.patch
@ -1,705 +0,0 @@
 From 98642df4ba886818900ab7e6b23703544e6addd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 10:46:32 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Propagate selection all the way on key export
 EVP_PKEY_eq() is used to check, among other things, if a certificate
 public key corresponds to a private key. When the private key belongs to
 a provider that does not allow to export private keys this currently
 fails as the internal functions used to import/export keys ignored the
 selection given (which specifies that only the public key needs to be
 considered) and instead tries to export everything.
 This patch allows to propagate the selection all the way down including
 adding it in the cache so that a following operation actually looking
 for other selection parameters does not mistakenly pick up an export
 containing only partial information.
 Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
 index b06730dc7a..2d0238ee27 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
                               export_cb, export_cbarg);
 }
 -void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
 +void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                          int selection)
 {
     struct evp_keymgmt_util_try_import_data_st import_data;
     OP_CACHE_ELEM *op;
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
      */
     if (pk->dirty_cnt == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
         /* If this key is already exported to |keymgmt|, no more to do */
 -        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
 +        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
         if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
             void *ret = op->keydata;
@@ -157,13 +158,13 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
     /* Setup for the export callback */
     import_data.keydata = NULL;  /* evp_keymgmt_util_try_import will create it */
     import_data.keymgmt = keymgmt;
 -    import_data.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
 +    import_data.selection = selection;
     /*
      * The export function calls the callback (evp_keymgmt_util_try_import),
      * which does the import for us.  If successful, we're done.
      */
 -    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
 +    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, selection,
                                  &evp_keymgmt_util_try_import, &import_data))
         /* If there was an error, bail out */
         return NULL;
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
         return NULL;
     }
     /* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
 -    op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
 +    op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
     if (op != NULL && op->keydata != NULL) {
         void *ret = op->keydata;
@@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
         evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk, 0);
     /* Add the new export to the operation cache */
 -    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata)) {
 +    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata,
 +                                        selection)) {
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
         evp_keymgmt_freedata(keymgmt, import_data.keydata);
         return NULL;
@@ -232,7 +234,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking)
 }
 OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
 +                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                                     int selection)
 {
     int i, end = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_num(pk->operation_cache);
     OP_CACHE_ELEM *p;
@@ -243,14 +246,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
      */
     for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
         p = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_value(pk->operation_cache, i);
 -        if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt)
 +        if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt && (p->selection & selection) == selection)
             return p;
     }
     return NULL;
 }
 -int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                   EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata)
 +int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                   void *keydata, int selection)
 {
     OP_CACHE_ELEM *p = NULL;
@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
             return 0;
         p->keydata = keydata;
         p->keymgmt = keymgmt;
 +        p->selection = selection;
         if (!EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(keymgmt)) {
             OPENSSL_free(p);
@@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
             ok = 1;
             if (keydata1 != NULL) {
                 tmp_keydata =
 -                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2);
 +                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2,
 +                                                        selection);
                 ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
             }
             if (ok) {
@@ -411,7 +416,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
             ok = 1;
             if (keydata2 != NULL) {
                 tmp_keydata =
 -                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1);
 +                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1,
 +                                                        selection);
                 ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
             }
             if (ok) {
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
 index 70d17ec37e..905e9c9ce4 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -1822,6 +1822,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 {
     EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
     EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
 +    int selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
     void *keydata = NULL;
     int check;
@@ -1883,7 +1884,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
             if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(pk->lock))
                 goto end;
 -            op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
 +            op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt,
 +                                                       selection);
             /*
              * If |tmp_keymgmt| is present in the operation cache, it means
@@ -1938,7 +1940,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt); /* refcnt-- */
         /* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
 -        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
 +        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
         if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
             void *tmp_keydata = op->keydata;
@@ -1949,7 +1951,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
         }
         /* Add the new export to the operation cache */
 -        if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata)) {
 +        if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata,
 +                                            selection)) {
             CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
             evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
             keydata = NULL;
@@ -1964,7 +1967,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     }
 #endif  /* FIPS_MODULE */
 -    keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
 +    keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
  end:
     /*
 diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
 index f601b72807..dbbdcccbda 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/evp.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ int evp_cipher_asn1_to_param_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type,
 typedef struct {
     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
     void *keydata;
 +    int selection;
 } OP_CACHE_ELEM;
 DEFINE_STACK_OF(OP_CACHE_ELEM)
@@ -778,12 +779,14 @@ EVP_PKEY *evp_keymgmt_util_make_pkey(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
 int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
                             OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
 -void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 +void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                          int selection);
 OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 +                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                                     int selection);
 int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
 -int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                   EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
 +int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                   void *keydata, int selection);
 void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
 void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
                                 int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
 -- 
 2.38.1
 From 504427eb5f32108dd64ff7858012863fe47b369b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:58:28 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Update documentation for keymgmt export utils
 Change function prototypes and explain how to use the selection
 argument.
 Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
 diff --git a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
 index 1fee9f6ff9..7099e44964 100644
 --- a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
 +++ b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM
  int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
                              OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
 - void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 + void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                           int selection);
  OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                                      EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 +                                                      EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                                      int selection);
  int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
 - int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
 -                                    EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
 + int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
 +                                    void *keydata, int selection);
  void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
  void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
                                  int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
@@ -65,6 +67,11 @@ evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata() can be used to add key object data to a
 given key I<target> via a B<EVP_KEYMGMT> interface.  This is used as a
 helper for L<EVP_PKEY_fromdata(3)>.
 +In all functions that take a I<selection> argument, the selection is used to
 +constraint the information requested on export. It is also used in the cache
 +so that key data is guaranteed to contain all the information requested in
 +the selection.
 +
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 evp_keymgmt_export_to_provider() and evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata()
 -- 
 2.38.1
 From e5202fbd461cb6c067874987998e91c6093e5267 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 12:18:26 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add test for EVP_PKEY_eq
 This tests that the comparison work even if a provider can only return
 a public key.
 Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
 diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.c b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
 index d556551bb6..5e92e72d4b 100644
 --- a/test/fake_rsaprov.c
 +++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
@@ -22,24 +22,34 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_has;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_query_operation_name_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_query;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_import;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_export;
 +static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_load;
 static int has_selection;
 static int imptypes_selection;
 +static int exptypes_selection;
 static int query_id;
 +struct fake_rsa_keydata {
 +    int selection;
 +    int status;
 +};
 +
 static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(void *provctx)
 {
 -    unsigned char *keydata = OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key;
 -    TEST_ptr(keydata);
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(key = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct fake_rsa_keydata))))
 +        return NULL;
     /* clear test globals */
     has_selection = 0;
     imptypes_selection = 0;
 +    exptypes_selection = 0;
     query_id = 0;
 -    return keydata;
 +    return key;
 }
 static void fake_rsa_keymgmt_free(void *keydata)
@@ -67,14 +77,104 @@ static const char *fake_rsa_keymgmt_query(int id)
 static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_import(void *keydata, int selection,
                                    const OSSL_PARAM *p)
 {
 -    unsigned char *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
     /* key was imported */
 -    *fake_rsa_key = 1;
 +    fake_rsa_key->status = 1;
     return 1;
 }
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_n[] =
 +   "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
 +   "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
 +   "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
 +   "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
 +   "\xF5";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_e[] = "\x11";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_d[] =
 +    "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
 +    "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
 +    "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
 +    "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_p[] =
 +    "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
 +    "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
 +    "\x0D";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_q[] =
 +    "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
 +    "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
 +    "\x89";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmp1[] =
 +    "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
 +    "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmq1[] =
 +    "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
 +    "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
 +    "\x51";
 +
 +static unsigned char fake_rsa_iqmp[] =
 +    "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
 +    "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
 +
 +OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv)
 +{
 +    if (priv) {
 +        OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, fake_rsa_d,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_d) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, fake_rsa_p,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_p) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, fake_rsa_q,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_q) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, fake_rsa_dmp1,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_dmp1) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, fake_rsa_dmq1,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_dmq1) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, fake_rsa_iqmp,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_iqmp) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_END
 +        };
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
 +    } else {
 +        OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
 +                          sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
 +            OSSL_PARAM_END
 +        };
 +        return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
 +    }
 +}
 +
 +static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_export(void *keydata, int selection,
 +                                   OSSL_CALLBACK *param_callback, void *cbarg)
 +{
 +    OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +    int ret;
 +
 +    if (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0)))
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    ret = param_callback(params, cbarg);
 +    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_import_key_types[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
@@ -95,19 +195,33 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes(int selection)
     return fake_rsa_import_key_types;
 }
 +static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_export_key_types[] = {
 +    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
 +    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
 +    OSSL_PARAM_END
 +};
 +
 +static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes(int selection)
 +{
 +    /* record global for checking */
 +    exptypes_selection = selection;
 +
 +    return fake_rsa_export_key_types;
 +}
 +
 static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
 -    unsigned char *key = NULL;
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
 -    if (reference_sz != sizeof(key))
 +    if (reference_sz != sizeof(*key))
         return NULL;
 -    key = *(unsigned char **)reference;
 -    if (*key != 1)
 +    key = *(struct fake_rsa_keydata **)reference;
 +    if (key->status != 1)
         return NULL;
     /* detach the reference */
 -    *(unsigned char **)reference = NULL;
 +    *(struct fake_rsa_keydata  **)reference = NULL;
     return key;
 }
@@ -129,7 +243,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 {
     unsigned char *gctx = genctx;
     static const unsigned char inited[] = { 1 };
 -    unsigned char *keydata;
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata;
     if (!TEST_ptr(gctx)
         || !TEST_mem_eq(gctx, sizeof(*gctx), inited, sizeof(inited)))
@@ -138,7 +252,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     if (!TEST_ptr(keydata = fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(NULL)))
         return NULL;
 -    *keydata = 2;
 +    keydata->status = 2;
     return keydata;
 }
@@ -156,6 +270,9 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH fake_rsa_keymgmt_funcs[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_import },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT_TYPES,
         (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_export },
 +    { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_TYPES,
 +        (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_LOAD, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_load },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_INIT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen_init },
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen },
@@ -191,14 +308,14 @@ static int fake_rsa_sig_sign_init(void *ctx, void *provkey,
                                   const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     unsigned char *sigctx = ctx;
 -    unsigned char *keydata = provkey;
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata = provkey;
     /* we must have a ctx */
     if (!TEST_ptr(sigctx))
         return 0;
     /* we must have some initialized key */
 -    if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata[0], 0))
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata->status, 0))
         return 0;
     /* record that sign init was called */
@@ -289,7 +406,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
     unsigned char *storectx = loaderctx;
     OSSL_PARAM params[4];
     int object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY;
 -    void *key = NULL;
 +    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
     int rv = 0;
     switch (*storectx) {
@@ -307,7 +424,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
         /* The address of the key becomes the octet string */
         params[2] =
             OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_REFERENCE,
 -                                              &key, sizeof(key));
 +                                              &key, sizeof(*key));
         params[3] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
         rv = object_cb(params, object_cbarg);
         *storectx = 1;
 diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.h b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
 index 57de1ecf8d..190c46a285 100644
 --- a/test/fake_rsaprov.h
 +++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
 /* Fake RSA provider implementation */
 OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa_start(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 void fake_rsa_finish(OSSL_PROVIDER *p);
 +OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv);
 diff --git a/test/provider_pkey_test.c b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
 index 5c398398f4..3b190baa5e 100644
 --- a/test/provider_pkey_test.c
 +++ b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
@@ -176,6 +176,67 @@ end:
     return ret;
 }
 +static int test_pkey_eq(void)
 +{
 +    OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
 +    OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa = NULL;
 +    EVP_PKEY *pkey_fake = NULL;
 +    EVP_PKEY *pkey_dflt = NULL;
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +    OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +    int ret = 0;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(fake_rsa = fake_rsa_start(libctx)))
 +        return 0;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(deflt = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "default")))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    /* Construct a public key for fake-rsa */
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
 +        || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
 +                                                      "provider=fake-rsa"))
 +        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
 +        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_fake, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
 +                                        params))
 +        || !TEST_ptr(pkey_fake))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    ctx = NULL;
 +    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +    params = NULL;
 +
 +    /* Construct a public key for default */
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
 +        || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
 +                                                      "provider=default"))
 +        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
 +        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_dflt, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
 +                                        params))
 +        || !TEST_ptr(pkey_dflt))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    ctx = NULL;
 +    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +    params = NULL;
 +
 +    /* now test for equality */
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey_fake, pkey_dflt), 1))
 +        goto end;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 +end:
 +    fake_rsa_finish(fake_rsa);
 +    OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(deflt);
 +    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_fake);
 +    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_dflt);
 +    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 static int test_pkey_store(int idx)
 {
     OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
@@ -235,6 +296,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_pkey_sig);
     ADD_TEST(test_alternative_keygen_init);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_pkey_eq);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_pkey_store, 2);
     return 1;
 -- 
 2.38.1
 From 2fea56832780248af2aba2e4433ece2d18428515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 10:25:15 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] Drop explicit check for engines in opt_legacy_okay
 The providers indication should always indicate that this is not a
 legacy request.
 This makes a check for engines redundant as the default return is that
 legacy is ok if there are no explicit providers.
 Fixes #19662
 Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19671)
 ---
 apps/lib/apps.c                    |  8 --------
 test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
 diff --git a/apps/lib/apps.c b/apps/lib/apps.c
 index 3d52e030ab7e258f9cd983b2d9755d954cb3aee5..bbe0d009efb35fcf1a902c86cbddc61e657e57f1 100644
 --- a/apps/lib/apps.c
 +++ b/apps/lib/apps.c
@@ -3405,14 +3405,6 @@ int opt_legacy_okay(void)
 {
     int provider_options = opt_provider_option_given();
     int libctx = app_get0_libctx() != NULL || app_get0_propq() != NULL;
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 -    ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_first();
 -
 -    if (e != NULL) {
 -        ENGINE_free(e);
 -        return 1;
 -    }
 -#endif
     /*
      * Having a provider option specified or a custom library context or
      * property query, is a sure sign we're not using legacy.
 diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
 new file mode 100755
 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..183499f3fd93f97e8a4a30681a9f383d2f6e0c56
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env perl
 +# Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +#
 +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 +# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 +
 +use strict;
 +use warnings;
 +
 +use OpenSSL::Test;
 +
 +setup("test_legacy");
 +
 +plan tests => 3;
 +
 +ok(run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-out', 'rand.txt', '256'])), "Generate random file");
 +
 +ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', 'rand.txt'])), "Generate a digest");
 +
 +ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', '-propquery', 'foo=1',
 +             'rand.txt'])), "Fail to generate a digest");
 -- 
 2.38.1
--- a/SOURCES/0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
@ -1,344 +0,0 @@
 From 8a2d1b22ede5eeca4d104bb027b84f3ecfc69549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 12:51:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] DH: Disable FIPS 186-4 type parameters in FIPS mode
 For DH parameter and key pair generation/verification, the DSA
 procedures specified in FIPS 186-4 are used. With the release of FIPS
 186-5 and the removal of DSA, the approved status of these groups is in
 peril. Once the transition for DSA ends (this transition will be 1 year
 long and start once CMVP has published the guidance), no more
 submissions claiming DSA will be allowed. Hence, FIPS 186-type
 parameters will also be automatically non-approved.
 In the FIPS provider, disable validation of any DH parameters that are
 not well-known groups, and remove DH parameter generation completely.
 Adjust tests to use well-known groups or larger DH groups where this
 change would now cause failures, and skip tests that are expected to
 fail due to this change.
 Related: rhbz#2169757, rhbz#2169757
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/dh/dh_backend.c                       | 10 ++++
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c                         | 12 ++--
 crypto/dh/dh_gen.c                           | 12 +++-
 crypto/dh/dh_key.c                           | 13 ++--
 crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c                         | 10 +++-
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c |  5 ++
 test/endecode_test.c                         |  4 +-
 test/evp_libctx_test.c                       |  2 +-
 test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c           | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
 test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h           |  1 +
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                   |  4 +-
 test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t               |  3 +
 12 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
 index 726843fd30..24c65ca84f 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ int ossl_dh_params_fromdata(DH *dh, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if (!dh_ffc_params_fromdata(dh, params))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (!ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) {
 +        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                       "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                       " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines"
 +                       " were removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     param_priv_len =
         OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN);
     if (param_priv_len != NULL
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 0b391910d6..75581ca347 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -57,13 +57,15 @@ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
     if (nid != NID_undef)
         return 1;
 +
     /*
 -     * OR
 -     * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
 -     * validity tests.
 +     * FIPS 186-4 explicit domain parameters are no longer supported in FIPS mode.
      */
 -    return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
 -                                              FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +    return 0;
 }
 #else
 int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
 index aec6b85316..9c55121067 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
@@ -38,18 +38,26 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
 int ossl_dh_generate_ffc_parameters(DH *dh, int type, int pbits, int qbits,
                                     BN_GENCB *cb)
 {
 -    int ret, res;
 +    int ret = 0;
 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    int res;
 +
     if (type == DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_2_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
     else
 -#endif
         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
 +#else
 +    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +#endif
     if (ret > 0)
         dh->dirty_cnt++;
     return ret;
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 index 4e9705beef..14c0b0b6b3 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -308,8 +308,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                 goto err;
         } else {
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 -            if (dh->params.q == NULL)
 -                goto err;
 +            ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                           "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer"
 +                           " allowed in FIPS mode, since the required"
 +                           " generation routines were removed from FIPS"
 +                           " 186-5");
 +            goto err;
 #else
             if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
                 /* secret exponent length, must satisfy 2^(l-1) <= p */
@@ -330,9 +334,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                     if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
                         goto err;
                 }
 -            } else
 -#endif
 -            {
 +            } else {
                 /* Do a partial check for invalid p, q, g */
                 if (!ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
                                                      FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL))
@@ -348,6 +350,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
                                                    priv_key))
                     goto err;
             }
 +#endif
         }
     }
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
 index f201eede0d..30f90d15be 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static DH *ffc_params_generate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx,
                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
                                                 pcb);
     else
 -# endif
 -    /* For FIPS we always use the DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_4 generator */
 -    if (dctx->paramgen_type >= DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
         rv = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(libctx, &ret->params,
                                                 FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
                                                 pcb);
 +# else
 +    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
 +    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
 +                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
 +                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
 +                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
 +# endif
     if (rv <= 0) {
         DH_free(ret);
         return NULL;
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 index 9a7dde7c66..b3e7bca5ac 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -414,6 +414,11 @@ static int dh_validate(const void *keydata, int selection, int checktype)
     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
         return 1; /* nothing to validate */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /* In FIPS provider, always check the domain parameters to disallow
 +     * operations on keys with FIPS 186-4 params. */
 +    selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
 +#endif
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0) {
         /*
          * Both of these functions check parameters. DH_check_params_ex()
 diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
 index e3f7b81f69..1b63daaed5 100644
 --- a/test/endecode_test.c
 +++ b/test/endecode_test.c
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *make_template(const char *type, OSSL_PARAM *genparams)
      * for testing only. Use a minimum key size of 2048 for security purposes.
      */
     if (strcmp(type, "DH") == 0)
 -        return get_dh512(keyctx);
 +        return get_dh2048(keyctx);
     if (strcmp(type, "X9.42 DH") == 0)
 -        return get_dhx512(keyctx);
 +        return get_dhx_ffdhe2048(keyctx);
 # endif
     /*
 diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 index 2448c35a14..92d484fb12 100644
 --- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
 +++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int do_dh_param_keygen(int tstid, const BIGNUM **bn)
     if (!TEST_ptr(gen_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey_parm, NULL))
         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gen_ctx), 0)
 -        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey), expected))
 +        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey) == 1, expected))
         goto err;
     if (expected) {
 diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
 index 4bdadc4143..e5186e4b4a 100644
 --- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
 +++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
@@ -116,6 +116,68 @@ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
                           dhx512_q, sizeof(dhx512_q));
 }
 +EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 +{
 +    /* This is RFC 7919 ffdhe2048, since Red Hat removes support for
 +     * non-well-known groups in FIPS mode. */
 +    static unsigned char dhx_p[] = {
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58,
 +        0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
 +        0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41,
 +        0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb, 0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
 +        0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8, 0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02,
 +        0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
 +        0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0, 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55,
 +        0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
 +        0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77, 0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda,
 +        0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
 +        0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82,
 +        0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
 +        0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3,
 +        0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
 +        0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1,
 +        0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
 +        0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff, 0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32,
 +        0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83, 0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
 +        0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83,
 +        0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2, 0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
 +        0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +    };
 +    static unsigned char dhx_g[] = {
 +        0x02
 +    };
 +    static unsigned char dhx_q[] = {
 +        0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c,
 +        0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d, 0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
 +        0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20,
 +        0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
 +        0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01,
 +        0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd, 0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
 +        0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68, 0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa,
 +        0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
 +        0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed,
 +        0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
 +        0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1,
 +        0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
 +        0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51,
 +        0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
 +        0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70,
 +        0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76, 0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
 +        0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19,
 +        0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
 +        0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02, 0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1,
 +        0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
 +        0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
 +        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 +    };
 +
 +    return get_dh_from_pg(libctx, "X9.42 DH",
 +                          dhx_p, sizeof(dhx_p),
 +                          dhx_g, sizeof(dhx_g),
 +                          dhx_q, sizeof(dhx_q));
 +}
 +
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
     static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
 diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
 index f0e8709062..2ff6d6e721 100644
 --- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
 +++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libct);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 EVP_PKEY *get_dh4096(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index cabbe3ecdf..efe56c5665 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -627,10 +627,10 @@ my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
     ],
     [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH",
 -      [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
 +      [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
         "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ],
 -      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
 +      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
         "-in", "{output}.cms", "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
       \&final_compare
     ]
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 index 8c52b637fc..31ed54621b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ sub testssl {
             skip "skipping dhe1024dsa test", 1
                 if ($no_dh);
 +            skip "FIPS 186-4 type DH groups are no longer supported by the FIPS provider", 1
 +                if $provider eq "fips";
 +
             ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])),
                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
           }
 -- 
 2.40.1
--- a/SOURCES/0101-CVE-2022-4203-nc-match.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0101-CVE-2022-4203-nc-match.patch
@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
 From c927a3492698c254637da836762f9b1f86cffabc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 08:49:13 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Fix type confusion in nc_match_single()
 This function assumes that if the "gen" is an OtherName, then the "base"
 is a rfc822Name constraint. This assumption is not true in all cases.
 If the end-entity certificate contains an OtherName SAN of any type besides
 SmtpUtf8Mailbox and the CA certificate contains a name constraint of
 OtherName (of any type), then "nc_email_eai" will be invoked, with the
 OTHERNAME "base" being incorrectly interpreted as a ASN1_IA5STRING.
 Reported by Corey Bonnell from Digicert.
 CVE-2022-4203
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
 index 70a7e8304e..5101598512 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
 static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
 -static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
 +static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *sub,
 +                           GENERAL_NAME *gen);
 static int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *sub, const X509_NAME *nm);
 static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
 static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
@@ -472,14 +473,17 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
 {
     GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
     int i, r, match = 0;
 +    int effective_type = gen->type;
 +
     /*
      * We need to compare not gen->type field but an "effective" type because
      * the otherName field may contain EAI email address treated specially
      * according to RFC 8398, section 6
      */
 -    int effective_type = ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) &&
 -                          (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
 -                           NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) ? GEN_EMAIL : gen->type;
 +    if (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
 +        (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) == NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) {
 +        effective_type = GEN_EMAIL;
 +    }
     /*
      * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
@@ -488,7 +492,10 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
     for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
         sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
 -        if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
 +        if (effective_type != sub->base->type
 +            || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
 +                OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
 +                        sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
             continue;
         if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
             return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
@@ -497,7 +504,7 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
             continue;
         if (match == 0)
             match = 1;
 -        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
 +        r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
         if (r == X509_V_OK)
             match = 2;
         else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
@@ -511,12 +518,15 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
     for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
         sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
 -        if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
 +        if (effective_type != sub->base->type
 +            || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
 +                OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
 +                        sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
             continue;
         if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
             return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
 -        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
 +        r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
         if (r == X509_V_OK)
             return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
         else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
@@ -528,15 +538,22 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
 }
 -static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
 +static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *gen,
 +                           GENERAL_NAME *base)
 {
     switch (gen->type) {
     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
 -        /*
 -         * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
 -         * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
 -         */
 -        return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
 +        switch (effective_type) {
 +        case GEN_EMAIL:
 +            /*
 +             * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
 +             * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
 +             */
 +            return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
 +
 +        default:
 +            return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
 +        }
     case GEN_DIRNAME:
         return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From fe6842f5a5dc2fb66da7fb24bf4343a3aeedd50a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 19:45:09 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 02/18] Add testcase for nc_match_single type confusion
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/certs/setup.sh               | 11 +++++++++++
 test/recipes/25-test_verify.t     |  5 ++++-
 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
 diff --git a/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..cf279de5ea
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDRDCCAiygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAfMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0
 +IE5DIENBIG90aGVybmFtZTAgFw0yMjEyMTMxODMzMTZaGA8yMTIyMTIxNDE4MzMx
 +NlowMTEvMC0GA1UECgwmTkMgZW1haWwgaW4gb3RoZXJuYW1lIFRlc3QgQ2VydGlm
 +aWNhdGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDPgeoakqHk1zYt
 +JZpEC0qkJPU/X0lfI+6GY2LHFY9KOSFqqmTXxrUtjQc3SdpQvBZhPuMZ8p82Jid2
 +kkRHnWs0uqX9NtLO923yQalYvP6Mt3fokcYgw/C9b+I/q1PKUyN0kPB6McROguD5
 +Jz2DcEufJBhbpyay1bFjEI2DAQJKDP/U7uH0EA7kH/27UMk0vfvL5uVjDvlo8i6S
 +Ul8+u0cDV5ZFJW2VAJKLU3wp6IY4fZl9UqkHZuRQpMJGqAjAleWOIEpyyvfGGh0b
 +75n3GJ+4YZ7CIBEgY7K0nIbKxtcDZPvmtbYg3g1tkPMTHcodFT7yEdqkBTJ5AGL7
 +6U850OhjAgMBAAGjdzB1MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTBz0k+q6d4c3aM+s2IyOF/QP6zCTAf
 +BgNVHSMEGDAWgBTwhghX7uNdMejZ3f4XorqOQoMqwTAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMCgGA1Ud
 +EQQhMB+gHQYIKwYBBQUHCAegEQwPZm9vQGV4YW1wbGUub3JnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
 +CwUAA4IBAQAhxbCEVH8pq0aUMaLWaodyXdCqA0AKTFG6Mz9Rpwn89OwC8FylTEru
 +t+Bqx/ZuTo8YzON8h9m7DIrQIjZKDLW/g5YbvIsxIVV9gWhAGohdsIyMKRBepSmr
 +NxJQkO74RLBTamfl0WUCVM4HqroflFjBBG67CTJaQ9cH9ug3TKxaXCK1L6iQAXtq
 +enILGai98Byo0LCFH4MQOhmhV1BDT2boIG/iYb5VKCTSX25vhaF+PNBhUoysjW0O
 +vhQX8vrw42QRr4Qi7VfUBXzrbRTzxjOc4yqki7h2DcEdpginqe+aGyaFY+H9m/ka
 +1AR5KN8h5SYKltSXknjs0pp1w4k49aHl
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..f9b9b07b80
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDPjCCAiagAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
 +IENBMCAXDTIyMTIxMzE4MTgwM1oYDzIxMjIxMjE0MTgxODAzWjAfMR0wGwYDVQQD
 +DBRUZXN0IE5DIENBIG90aGVybmFtZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCC
 +AQoCggEBAN0Dx+ei8CgtRKnDcYiLwX4vrA48at/o/zfX24X/WZZM1o9HUKo1FQBN
 +vhESJu+gqPxuIePrk+/L25XdRqwCKk8wkWX0XIz18q5orOHUUFAWNK3g0FDj6N8H
 +d8urNIbDJ44FCx+/0n8Ppiht/EYN3aVOW5enqbgZ+EEt+3AUG6ibieRdGri9g4oh
 +IIx60MmVHLbuT/TcVZxaeWyTl6iWmsYosUyqlhTtu1uGtbVtkCAhBYloVvz4J5eA
 +mVu/JuJbsNxbxVeO9Q8Kj6nb4jPPdGvZ3JPcabbWrz5LwaereBf5IPrXEVdQTlYB
 +gI0pTz2CEDHSIrd7jzRUX/9EC2gMk6UCAwEAAaOBjzCBjDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTAD
 +AQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU8IYIV+7jXTHo2d3+F6K6jkKDKsEw
 +HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwLAYDVR0eBCUwI6EhMB+g
 +HQYIKwYBBQUHCAegEQwPZm9vQGV4YW1wbGUub3JnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB
 +AQDPI5uZd8DhSNKMvYF5bxOshd6h6UJ7YzZS7K6fhiygltdqzkHQ/5+4yiuUkDe4
 +hOZlH8MCfXQy5jVZDTk24yNchpdfie5Bswn4SmQVQh3QyzOLxizoh0rLCf2PHueu
 +dNVNhfiiJNJ5kd8MIuVG7CPK68dP0QrVR+DihROuJgvGB3ClKttLrgle19t4PFRR
 +2wW6hJT9aXEjzLNyN1QFZKoShuiGX4xwjZh7VyKkV64p8hjojhcLk6dQkel+Jw4y
 +OP26XbVfM8/6KG8f6WAZ8P0qJwHlhmi0EvRTnEpAM8WuenOeZH6ERZ9uZbRGh6xx
 +LKQu2Aw2+bOEZ2vUtz0dBhX8
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..d3e300ac2f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
 +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
 +MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQDdA8fnovAoLUSp
 +w3GIi8F+L6wOPGrf6P8319uF/1mWTNaPR1CqNRUATb4REibvoKj8biHj65Pvy9uV
 +3UasAipPMJFl9FyM9fKuaKzh1FBQFjSt4NBQ4+jfB3fLqzSGwyeOBQsfv9J/D6Yo
 +bfxGDd2lTluXp6m4GfhBLftwFBuom4nkXRq4vYOKISCMetDJlRy27k/03FWcWnls
 +k5eolprGKLFMqpYU7btbhrW1bZAgIQWJaFb8+CeXgJlbvybiW7DcW8VXjvUPCo+p
 +2+Izz3Rr2dyT3Gm21q8+S8Gnq3gX+SD61xFXUE5WAYCNKU89ghAx0iK3e480VF//
 +RAtoDJOlAgMBAAECggEAMFSJlCyEFlER3Qq9asXe9eRgXEuXdmfZ2aEVIuf8M/sR
 +B0tpxxKtCUA24j5FL+0CzxKZTCFBnDRIzCyTbf1aOa9t+CzXyUZmP3/p4EdgmabF
 +dcl93FZ+X7kfF/VUGu0Vmv+c12BH3Fu0cs5cVohlMecg7diu6zCYok43F+L5ymRy
 +2mTcKkGc0ShWizj8Z9R3WJGssZOlxbxa/Zr4rZwRC24UVhfN8AfGWYx/StyQPQIw
 +gtbbtOmwbyredQmY4jwNqgrnfZS9bkWwJbRuCmD5l7lxubBgcHQpoM+DQVeOLZIq
 +uksFXeNfal9G5Bo747MMzpD7dJMCGmX+gbMY5oZF+QKBgQDs2MbY4nbxi+fV+KuV
 +zUvis8m8Lpzf3T6NLkgSkUPRN9tGr95iLIrB/bRPJg5Ne02q/cT7d86B9rpE42w7
 +eeIF9fANezX2AF8LUqNZhIR23J3tfB/eqGlJRZeMNia+lD09a7SWGwrS7sufY1I+
 +JQGcHx77ntt+eQT1MUJ1skF06QKBgQDu4z+TW4QIA5ItxIReVdcfh5e3xLkzDEVP
 +3KNo9tpXxvPwqapdeBh6c9z4Lqe3MKr5UPlDvVW+o40t6OjKxDCXczB8+JAM0OyX
 +8V+K3zXXUxRgieSd3oMncTylSWIvouPP3aW37B67TKdRlRHgaBrpJT2wdk3kYR4t
 +62J1eDdjXQKBgQDMsY0pZI/nskJrar7geM1c4IU5Xg+2aj/lRFqFsYYrC1s3fEd2
 +EYjan6l1vi4eSLKXVTspGiIfsFzLrMGdpXjyLduJyzKXqTp7TrBebWkOUR0sYloo
 +1OQprzuKskJJ81P6AVvRXw27vyW8Wtp5WwJJK5xbWq/YXj8qqagGkEiCAQKBgQCc
 +RK3XAFurPmLGa7JHX5Hc/z8BKMAZo6JHrsZ6qFiGaRA0U1it0hz5JYfcFfECheSi
 +ORUF+fn4PlbhPGXkFljPCbwjVBovOBA9CNl+J6u50pAW4r1ZhDB5gbqxSQLgtIaf
 ++JcqbFxiG6+sT36lNJS+BO2I3KrxhZJPaZY7z8szxQKBgQDRy70XzwOk8jXayiF2
 +ej2IN7Ow9cgSE4tLEwR/vCjxvOlWhA3jC3wxoggshGJkpbP3DqLkQtwQm0h1lM8J
 +QNtFwKzjtpf//bTlfFq08/YxWimTPMqzcV2PgRacB8P3yf1r8T7M4fA5TORCDWpW
 +5FtOCFEmwQHTR8lu4c63qfxkEQ==
 +-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
 index b9766aab20..2240cd9df0 100755
 --- a/test/certs/setup.sh
 +++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ REQMASK=MASK:0x800 ./mkcert.sh req badalt7-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 7" \
     "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
     "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
 +# Certs for CVE-2022-4203 testcase
 +
 +NC="excluded;otherName:SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org" ./mkcert.sh genca \
 +    "Test NC CA othername" nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
 +    root-key root-cert
 +
 +./mkcert.sh req alt-email-key "O = NC email in othername Test Certificate" | \
 +    ./mkcert.sh geneealt bad-othername-key bad-othername-cert \
 +    nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
 +    "otherName.1 = SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org"
 +
 # RSA-PSS signatures
 # SHA1
 ./mkcert.sh genee PSS-SHA1 ee-key ee-pss-sha1-cert ca-key ca-cert \
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 index 4613489f57..e6a2bca731 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
     run(app([@args]));
 }
 -plan tests => 162;
 +plan tests => 163;
 # Canonical success
 ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
 ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
    "Name constraints nested DNS name excluded");
 +ok(!verify("bad-othername-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["nccaothername-cert"], ),
 +   "CVE-2022-4203 type confusion test");
 +
 #Check that we get the expected failure return code
 with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
      sub {
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0105-CVE-2023-0216-pkcs7-deref.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0105-CVE-2023-0216-pkcs7-deref.patch
@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
 From 934a04f0e775309cadbef0aa6b9692e1b12a76c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:45:23 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 08/18] Do not dereference PKCS7 object data if not set
 Fixes CVE-2023-0216
 Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
 index 753f1276e6..936e50da54 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -414,6 +414,8 @@ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
 static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
 {
 +    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
 +        return NULL;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
         return p7->d.sign->cert;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
@@ -423,6 +425,8 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
 static STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *pkcs7_get_recipient_info(const PKCS7 *p7)
 {
 +    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
 +        return NULL;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
         return p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7))
@@ -440,13 +444,17 @@ void ossl_pkcs7_resolve_libctx(PKCS7 *p7)
     const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx);
     const char *propq = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_propq(ctx);
 -    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
 -    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
 -    STACK_OF(X509) *certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
 +    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos;
 +    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
 +    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
 -    if (ctx == NULL)
 +    if (ctx == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
         return;
 +    rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
 +    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
 +    certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
 +
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
         ossl_x509_set0_libctx(sk_X509_value(certs, i), libctx, propq);
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From 67813d8a4d110f4174bbd2fee8a2f15388e324b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:56:20 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 09/18] Add test for d2i_PKCS7 NULL dereference
 Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t                    | 7 +++++--
 test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
 index 37cd43dc6b..d61cd6abad 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use strict;
 use warnings;
 use File::Spec;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file data_file/;
 setup("test_pkcs7");
 -plan tests => 3;
 +plan tests => 4;
 require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@ subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7d' => sub {
     tconversion( -type => 'p7d', -in => srctop_file("test", "pkcs7-1.pem"),
                  -args => ["pkcs7"] );
 };
 +
 +my $malformed = data_file('malformed.pkcs7');
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs7", "-in", $malformed])));
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..e30d1b582c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
 +-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
 +MAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAg==
 +-----END PKCS7-----
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0106-CVE-2023-0217-dsa.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0106-CVE-2023-0217-dsa.patch
@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
 From 23985bac83fd50c8e29431009302b5442f985096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: slontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
 Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:05:04 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Fix NULL deference when validating FFC public key.
 Fixes CVE-2023-0217
 When attempting to do a BN_Copy of params->p there was no NULL check.
 Since BN_copy does not check for NULL this is a NULL reference.
 As an aside BN_cmp() does do a NULL check, so there are other checks
 that fail because a NULL is passed. A more general check for NULL params
 has been added for both FFC public and private key validation instead.
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c |  9 +++++++++
 include/internal/ffc.h        |  1 +
 test/ffc_internal_test.c      | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
 index 9f6525a2c8..442303e4b3 100644
 --- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
 +++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(const FFC_PARAMS *params,
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     *ret = 0;
 +    if (params == NULL || pub_key == NULL || params->p == NULL) {
 +        *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(NULL);
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -107,6 +112,10 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(const BIGNUM *upper, const BIGNUM *priv,
     *ret = 0;
 +    if (priv == NULL || upper == NULL) {
 +        *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
     if (BN_cmp(priv, BN_value_one()) < 0) {
         *ret |= FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL;
         goto err;
 diff --git a/include/internal/ffc.h b/include/internal/ffc.h
 index 732514a6c2..b8b7140857 100644
 --- a/include/internal/ffc.h
 +++ b/include/internal/ffc.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 # define FFC_ERROR_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
 # define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL      0x10
 # define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_LARGE      0x20
 +# define FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM      0x40
 /*
  * Finite field cryptography (FFC) domain parameters are used by DH and DSA.
 diff --git a/test/ffc_internal_test.c b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
 index 2c97293573..9f67bd29b9 100644
 --- a/test/ffc_internal_test.c
 +++ b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
@@ -510,6 +510,27 @@ static int ffc_public_validate_test(void)
     if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
         goto err;
 +    /* Fail if params is NULL */
 +    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(NULL, pub, &res)))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
 +        goto err;
 +    res = -1;
 +    /* Fail if pubkey is NULL */
 +    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, NULL, &res)))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
 +        goto err;
 +    res = -1;
 +
 +    BN_free(params->p);
 +    params->p = NULL;
 +    /* Fail if params->p is NULL */
 +    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
 +        goto err;
 +
     ret = 1;
 err:
     DH_free(dh);
@@ -567,6 +588,16 @@ static int ffc_private_validate_test(void)
     if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, priv, &res)))
         goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(NULL, priv, &res)))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
 +        goto err;
 +    res = -1;
 +    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, NULL, &res)))
 +        goto err;
 +    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
 +        goto err;
 +
     ret = 1;
 err:
     DH_free(dh);
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From c1b4467a7cc129a74fc5205b80a5c47556b99416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:57:59 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 11/18] Prevent creating DSA and DH keys without parameters
 through import
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 ---
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c  | 4 ++--
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 index 58a5fd009f..c2d87b4a7f 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ static int dh_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
         return 0;
 -    if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
 -        ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
 +    /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
 +    ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
         int include_private =
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
 index 100e917167..881680c085 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -199,8 +199,9 @@ static int dsa_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
         return 0;
 -    if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
 -        ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
 +    /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
 +    ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
 +
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
         int include_private =
             selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY ? 1 : 0;
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From fab4973801bdc11c29c4c8ccf65cf39cbc63ce9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:59:52 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 12/18] Do not create DSA keys without parameters by decoder
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c                        | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/x509.h                         |  3 +++
 .../encode_decode/decode_der2key.c            |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
 index bc90ddd89b..77790faa1f 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -745,6 +745,30 @@ DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
     return key;
 }
 +/* Called from decoders; disallows provided DSA keys without parameters. */
 +DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 +{
 +    DSA *key = NULL;
 +    const unsigned char *data;
 +    const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
 +
 +    data = *pp;
 +    key = d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(NULL, &data, length);
 +    if (key == NULL)
 +        return NULL;
 +    DSA_get0_pqg(key, &p, &q, &g);
 +    if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL) {
 +        DSA_free(key);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +    *pp = data;
 +    if (a != NULL) {
 +        DSA_free(*a);
 +        *a = key;
 +    }
 +    return key;
 +}
 +
 int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
 diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
 index 1f00178e89..0c42730ee9 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/x509.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
@@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ void ossl_X509_PUBKEY_INTERNAL_free(X509_PUBKEY *xpub);
 RSA *ossl_d2i_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
 int ossl_i2d_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
 +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 +DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
 +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 DH *ossl_d2i_DH_PUBKEY(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
 int ossl_i2d_DH_PUBKEY(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
 index ebc2d24833..d6ad738ef3 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void *dsa_d2i_PKCS8(void **key, const unsigned char **der, long der_len,
                              (key_from_pkcs8_t *)ossl_dsa_key_from_pkcs8);
 }
 -# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY                 (d2i_of_void *)d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
 +# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY                 (d2i_of_void *)ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
 # define dsa_free                       (free_key_fn *)DSA_free
 # define dsa_check                      NULL
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From 7e37185582995b35f885fec9dcc3670af9ffcbef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 18:46:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 13/18] Add test for DSA pubkey without param import and check
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t             |  48 ++++++++++++++----
 .../91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem        |  12 +++++
 .../dsapub_noparam.der                        | Bin 0 -> 108 bytes
 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
 diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
 index 612a3e3d6c..015d7805db 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
@@ -11,19 +11,24 @@ use strict;
 use warnings;
 use File::Spec;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file with/;
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 sub pkey_check {
     my $f = shift;
 +    my $pubcheck = shift;
 +    my @checkopt = ('-check');
 -    return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', '-check', '-text',
 +    @checkopt = ('-pubcheck', '-pubin') if $pubcheck;
 +
 +    return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', @checkopt, '-text',
                     '-in', $f]));
 }
 sub check_key {
     my $f = shift;
     my $should_fail = shift;
 +    my $pubcheck = shift;
     my $str;
@@ -33,11 +38,10 @@ sub check_key {
     $f = data_file($f);
     if ( -s $f ) {
 -        if ($should_fail) {
 -            ok(!pkey_check($f), $str);
 -        } else {
 -            ok(pkey_check($f), $str);
 -        }
 +        with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == $should_fail; } },
 +            sub {
 +                ok(pkey_check($f, $pubcheck), $str);
 +            });
     } else {
         fail("Missing file $f");
     }
@@ -66,15 +70,37 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
     "dhpkey.pem"
     )) unless disabled("dh");
 +my @negative_pubtests = ();
 +
 +push(@negative_pubtests, (
 +    "dsapub_noparam.der"
 +    )) unless disabled("dsa");
 +
 +my @positive_pubtests = ();
 +
 +push(@positive_pubtests, (
 +    "dsapub.pem"
 +    )) unless disabled("dsa");
 +
 plan skip_all => "No tests within the current enabled feature set"
 -    unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests;
 +    unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests
 +           && @negative_pubtests && @positive_pubtests;
 -plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests);
 +plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests)
 +              + scalar(@negative_pubtests) + scalar(@positive_pubtests);
 foreach my $t (@negative_tests) {
 -    check_key($t, 1);
 +    check_key($t, 1, 0);
 }
 foreach my $t (@positive_tests) {
 -    check_key($t, 0);
 +    check_key($t, 0, 0);
 +}
 +
 +foreach my $t (@negative_pubtests) {
 +    check_key($t, 1, 1);
 +}
 +
 +foreach my $t (@positive_pubtests) {
 +    check_key($t, 0, 1);
 }
 diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..0ff4bd83ed
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
 +MIIBvzCCATQGByqGSM44BAEwggEnAoGBAIjbXpOVVciVNuagg26annKkghIIZFI4
 +4WdMomnV+I/oXyxHbZTBBBpW9xy/E1+yMjbp4GmX+VxyDj3WxUWxXllzL+miEkzD
 +9Xz638VzIBhjFbMvk1/N4kS4bKVUd9yk7HfvYzAdnRphk0WI+RoDiDrBNPPxSoQD
 +CEWgvwgsLIDhAh0A6dbz1IQpQwGF4+Ca28x6OO+UfJJv3ggeZ++fNwKBgQCA9XKV
 +lRrTY8ALBxS0KbZjpaIXuUj5nr3i1lIDyP3ISksDF0ekyLtn6eK9VijX6Pm65Np+
 +4ic9Nr5WKLKhPaUSpLNRx1gDqo3sd92hYgiEUifzEuhLYfK/CsgFED+l2hDXtJUq
 +bISNSHVwI5lsyNXLu7HI1Fk8F5UO3LqsboFAngOBhAACgYATxFY89nEYcUhgHGgr
 +YDHhXBQfMKnTKYdvon4DN7WQ9ip+t4VUsLpTD1ZE9zrM2R/B04+8C6KGoViwyeER
 +kS4dxWOkX71x4X2DlNpYevcR53tNcTDqmMD7YKfDDmrb0lftMyfW8aESaiymVMys
 +DRjhKHBjdo0rZeSM8DAk3ctrXA==
 +-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
 diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8135f1ca94da914b6829421e0c13f6daa731862
 GIT binary patch
 literal 108
 zcmXpIGT>xm*J|@PXTieE%*wz71<Xv0AT}3_&&0^YB*etj0OvEYF$n`XLd*y;pgagL
 U3o&W4F|x9<gY>|F5F-Nv0Bz9(=Kufz
 literal 0
 HcmV?d00001
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From 2ad9928170768653d19d81881deabc5f9c1665c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 14:57:04 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 18/18] Internaly declare the DSA type for no-deprecated builds
 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
 (cherry picked from commit 7a21a1b5fa2dac438892cf3292d1f9c445d870d9)
 ---
 include/crypto/types.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/include/crypto/types.h b/include/crypto/types.h
 index 0d81404091..0a75f03a3f 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/types.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/types.h
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD;
 typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
 typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
 #  endif
 +#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 +typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
 +#  endif
 # endif
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0108-CVE-2023-0401-pkcs7-md.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0108-CVE-2023-0401-pkcs7-md.patch
@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
 From d3b6dfd70db844c4499bec6ad6601623a565e674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 09:27:53 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 15/18] pk7_doit.c: Check return of BIO_set_md() calls
 These calls invoke EVP_DigestInit() which can fail for digests
 with implicit fetches. Subsequent EVP_DigestUpdate() from BIO_write()
 or EVP_DigestFinal() from BIO_read() will segfault on NULL
 dereference. This can be triggered by an attacker providing
 PKCS7 data digested with MD4 for example if the legacy provider
 is not loaded.
 If BIO_set_md() fails the md BIO cannot be used.
 CVE-2023-0401
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 ---
 crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
 index bde9ac4787..5e562fbea5 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ static int pkcs7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg,
     }
     (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
 -    BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
 +    if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
 +        EVP_MD_free(fetched);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
     EVP_MD_free(fetched);
     if (*pbio == NULL)
         *pbio = btmp;
@@ -522,7 +526,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
             }
             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
 -            BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
 +            if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
 +                EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
 +                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
 +                goto err;
 +            }
             EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
             if (out == NULL)
                 out = btmp;
 -- 
 2.39.1
 From a0f2359613f50b5ca6b74b78bf4b54d7dc925fd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 17:07:24 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 16/18] Add testcase for missing return check of BIO_set_md()
 calls
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 ---
 test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                  | 15 ++++++++--
 test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 index fd53683e6b..d45789de70 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
 use POSIX;
 use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
 use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with data_file/;
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
 $no_rc2 = 1 if disabled("legacy");
 -plan tests => 13;
 +plan tests => 14;
 ok(run(test(["pkcs7_test"])), "test pkcs7");
@@ -941,6 +941,17 @@ subtest "CMS binary input tests\n" => sub {
        "verify binary input with -binary missing -crlfeol");
 };
 +# Test case for missing MD algorithm (must not segfault)
 +
 +with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 4; } },
 +    sub {
 +        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'smime', '-verify', '-noverify',
 +                    '-inform', 'PEM',
 +                    '-in', data_file("pkcs7-md4.pem"),
 +                   ])),
 +            "Check failure of EVP_DigestInit is handled correctly");
 +    });
 +
 sub check_availability {
     my $tnam = shift;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..ecff611deb
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
 +-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
 +MIIFhAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIFdTCCBXECAQExDjAMBggqhkiG9w0CBAUAMB0GCSqG
 +SIb3DQEHAaAQBA5UZXN0IGNvbnRlbnQNCqCCAyQwggMgMIICCKADAgECAgECMA0G
 +CSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMA0xCzAJBgNVBAMMAkNBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIx
 +MTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTCCASIwDQYJ
 +KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKj/iVhhha7e2ywP1XP74reoG3p1YCvU
 +fTxzdrWu3pMvfySQbckc9Io4zZ+igBZWy7Qsu5PlFx//DcZD/jE0+CjYdemju4iC
 +76Ny4lNiBUVN4DGX76qdENJYDZ4GnjK7GwhWXWUPP2aOwjagEf/AWTX9SRzdHEIz
 +BniuBDgj5ed1Z9OUrVqpQB+sWRD1DMFkrUrExjVTs5ZqghsVi9GZq+Seb5Sq0pbl
 +V/uMkWSKPCQWxtIZvoJgEztisO0+HbPK+WvfMbl6nktHaKcpxz9K4iIntO+QY9fv
 +0HJJPlutuRvUK2+GaN3VcxK4Q8ncQQ+io0ZPi2eIhA9h/nk0H0qJH7cCAwEAAaN9
 +MHswHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4HmCKX4XOiMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLQR
 +M/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUH
 +AwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEB
 +AEG0PE9hQuXlvtUULv9TQ2BXy9MmTjOk+dQwxDhAXYBYMUB6TygsqvPXwpDwz8MS
 +EPGCRqh5cQwtPoElQRU1i4URgcQMZquXScwNFcvE6AATF/PdN/+mOwtqFrlpYfs3
 +IJIpYL6ViQg4n8pv+b/pCwMmhewQLwCGs9+omHNTOwKjEiVoNaprAfj5Lxt15fS2
 ++zZW0mT9Y4kfEypetrqSAjh8CDK+vaQhkeKdDfJyBfjS4ALfxvCkT3mQnsWFJ9CU
 +TVG3uw6ylSPT3wN3RE0Ofa4rI5PESogQsd/DgBc7dcDO3yoPKGjycR3/GJDqqCxC
 +e9dr6FJEnDjaDf9zNWyTFHExggITMIICDwIBATASMA0xCzAJBgNVBAMMAkNBAgEC
 +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIEBQCggdQwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq
 +hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjMwMTE4MTU0NzExWjAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxEgQQRXO4TKpp
 +RgA4XHb8bD1pczB5BgkqhkiG9w0BCQ8xbDBqMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBKjALBglghkgB
 +ZQMEARYwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAECMAoGCCqGSIb3DQMHMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgIAgDAN
 +BggqhkiG9w0DAgIBQDAHBgUrDgMCBzANBggqhkiG9w0DAgIBKDANBgkqhkiG9w0B
 +AQEFAASCAQAe+xlm/TGg/s/7b0xBc3FFnmmUDEe7ljkehIx61OnBV9ZWA+LcBX/7
 +kmMSMdaHjRq4w8FmwBMLzn0ttXVqf0QuPbBF/E6X5EqK9lpOdkUQhNiN2v+ZfY6c
 +lrH4ADsSD9D+UHw0sxo5KEF+PPuneUfYCJZosFUJosBbuSEXK0C9yfJoDKVE8Syp
 +0vdqh73ogLeNgZLAUGSSB66OmHDxwgAj4qPAv6FHFBy1Xs4uFZER5vniYrH9OrAk
 +Z6XdvzDoYZC4XcGMDtcOpOM6D4owqy5svHPDw8wIlM4GVhrTw7CQmuBz5uRNnf6a
 +ZK3jZIxG1hr/INaNWheHoPIhPblYaVc6
 +-----END PKCS7-----
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0109-fips-Zeroize-out-in-fips-selftest.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0109-fips-Zeroize-out-in-fips-selftest.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 From 9dbc6069665690bd238caa7622647ea8ac94124f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 11:01:44 +0100
 Subject: fips: Zeroize `out` in fips selftest
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Resolves: rhbz#2169314
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
 index 80d048a847..11a989209c 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
         goto err;
     ret = 1;
 err:
 +    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
     EVP_MAC_free(mac);
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
 From 589eb3898896c1ac916bc20069ecd5adb8534850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:31:08 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] GCM: Implement explicit FIPS indicator for IV gen
 Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
 uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
 this. Provide an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be generated
 internally at its entirety randomly."
 Resolves: rhbz#2168289
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
 .../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c    |  4 +++
 .../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c                | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 680bfbc7cc..832502a034 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE             "cts_mode"     /* utf8_string */
 /* For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form */
 #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS  "alg_id_param" /* octet_string */
 +#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
 #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT                    \
     "tls1multi_maxsndfrag" /* uint */
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index 49e8e1df78..ec2ba46fbd 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -746,6 +746,10 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 __owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
                            const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
 /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
 index fa383165d8..716add7339 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_aead_known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN, NULL, 0),
 +    /* normally we would hide this under an #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but that does
 +     * not work in ciphercommon.c because it is compiled only once into
 +     * libcommon.a */
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_cipher_aead_gettable_ctx_params(
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
 index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
@@ -224,6 +224,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
             || !getivgen(ctx, p->data, p->data_size))
             return 0;
     }
 +
 +    /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
 +     * ciphercommon_gcm.c is only compiled once into libcommon.a, so ifdefs do
 +     * not work here. */
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
 +         * Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
 +         * uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
 +         * this. This provides an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be
 +         * generated internally at its entirety randomly." Note that one of the
 +         * conditions of this option is that "The IV length shall be at least
 +         * 96 bits (per SP 800-38D)." We do not specically check for this
 +         * condition here, because gcm_iv_generate will fail in this case. */
 +        if (ctx->enc && !ctx->iv_gen_rand)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator)) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     return 1;
 }
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/0111-fips-Use-salt-16-bytes-in-PBKDF2-selftest.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0111-fips-Use-salt-16-bytes-in-PBKDF2-selftest.patch
@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
 From 56090fca0a0c8b6cf1782aced0a02349358aae7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 12:22:03 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fips: Use salt >= 16 bytes in PBKDF2 selftest
 NIST SP 800-132 [1] section 5.1 says "[t]he length of the
 randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least
 128 bits", which implies that the salt for PBKDF2 must be at least 16
 bytes long (see also Appendix A.2.1).
 The FIPS 140-3 IG [2] section 10.3.A requires that "the lengths and the
 properties of the Password and Salt parameters, as well as the desired
 length of the Master Key used in a CAST shall be among those supported
 by the module in the approved mode."
 As a consequence, the salt length in the self test must be at least 16
 bytes long for FIPS 140-3 compliance. Switch the self test to use the
 only test vector from RFC 6070 that uses salt that is long enough to
 fulfil this requirement. Since RFC 6070 does not provide expected
 results for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256, use the output from [3], which was
 generated with python cryptography, which was tested against the RFC
 6070 vectors with HMAC-SHA1.
 [1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-132
 [2]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
 [3]: https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20429)
 (cherry picked from commit 451cb23c41c90d5a02902b3a77551aa9ee1c6956)
 ---
 providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 index 8ae8cd6f4a..03adf28f3c 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
 +++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -361,19 +361,29 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM x963kdf_params[] = {
 };
 static const char pbkdf2_digest[] = "SHA256";
 +/*
 + * Input parameters from RFC 6070, vector 5 (because it is the only one with
 + * a salt >= 16 bytes, which NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1 requires). The
 + * expected output is taken from
 + *   https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md,
 + * which ran these test vectors with SHA-256.
 + */
 static const unsigned char pbkdf2_password[] = {
 -    0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x00, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72,
 -    0x64
 +    0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64, 0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53,
 +    0x57, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x44, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64
 };
 static const unsigned char pbkdf2_salt[] = {
 -    0x73, 0x61, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x74
 +    0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74,
 +    0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54,
 +    0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74
 };
 static const unsigned char pbkdf2_expected[] = {
 -    0x89, 0xb6, 0x9d, 0x05, 0x16, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x89,
 -    0x3c, 0x69, 0x62, 0x26, 0x65, 0x0a, 0x86, 0x87,
 +    0x34, 0x8c, 0x89, 0xdb, 0xcb, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x14, 0xb8,
 +    0x11, 0x6e, 0x84, 0xcf, 0x2b, 0x17, 0x34, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0x18, 0x00, 0x18,
 +    0x1c
 };
 static int pbkdf2_iterations = 4096;
 -static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 1;
 +static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 0;
 static const ST_KAT_PARAM pbkdf2_params[] = {
     ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, pbkdf2_digest),
     ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, pbkdf2_password),
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
 From fa96a2f493276e7a57512e8c3d535052586f1525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:32:04 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] pbdkf2: Set indicator if pkcs5 param disabled checks
 The pbkdf2 implementation in the FIPS provider supports the checks
 required by NIST, but allows disabling these checks by setting the
 OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5 parameter to 1. The implementation must indicate
 that the use of this configuration is not approved in FIPS mode. Add an
 explicit indicator to provide this indication.
 Resolves: rhbz#2175145
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 index aa0adce5e6..6df8c6d321 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -251,11 +251,42 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
 +
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
 +            != NULL) {
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        /* The lower_bound_checks parameter enables checks required by FIPS. If
 +         * those checks are disabled, the PBKDF2 implementation will also
 +         * support non-approved parameters (e.g., salt lengths < 16 bytes, see
 +         * NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1). */
 +        if (!ctx->lower_bound_checks)
 +            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 -    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
 -        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
 -    return -2;
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +
 +        any_valid = 1;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (!any_valid)
 +        return -2;
 +
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -263,6 +294,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
 {
     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
         OSSL_PARAM_END
     };
     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
 From ee6e381e4140efd5365ddf27a12055859103cf59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:39:15 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] asymciphers, kem: Add explicit FIPS indicator
 NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and key
 agreement schemes, but explicit key confirmation is not implemented and
 cannot be implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider
 does not implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on
 its callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST did clarify
 that OpenSSL can claim KTS-OAEP and RSASVE as approved, but we did add
 an indicator to mark them as unapproved previously and should thus keep
 the indicator available.
 This does not affect RSA-OAEP decryption, because it is approved as
 a component according to the FIPS 140-3 IG, section 2.4.G.
 Resolves: rhbz#2179331
 Resolves: RHEL-14083
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 ---
 include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  2 ++
 include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
 .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 19 ++++++++++++
 providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c       | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 832502a034..e15d208421 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
 #endif
 +#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR    "redhat-fips-indicator"
 /*
  * Encoder / decoder parameters
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* KEM parameters */
 #define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION            "operation"
 +#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
 /* OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION values */
 #define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION_RSASVE     "RSASVE"
 diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
 index ec2ba46fbd..3803b03422 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/evp.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1764,6 +1764,10 @@ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 size_t EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(void);
 OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(size_t idx);
 # endif
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
 +# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
 +
 EVP_KEYMGMT *EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
                                const char *properties);
 int EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -452,6 +452,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
         return 0;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 +         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 +         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
 +         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
 +         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
 +         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
 +         * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
 +         * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSA-OAEP. */
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
     return 1;
 }
@@ -465,6 +483,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
@@ -151,11 +151,38 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
 static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
 {
     PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +
 +    if (ctx == NULL)
 +        return 0;
 +
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
 +    if (p != NULL) {
 +        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
 +         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
 +         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for key agreement or key transport, but
 +         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
 +         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
 +         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
 +         * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
 +         * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSASVE. */
 +        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
 +
 +        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
 +            return 0;
 +    }
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 -    return ctx != NULL;
 +    return 1;
 }
 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_rsakem_ctx_params[] = {
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
 -- 
 2.39.2
--- a/SOURCES/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
@ -1,539 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index e90e5dc03339..f391e756475c 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ PROV_R_BN_ERROR:160:bn error
 PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED:102:cipher operation failed
 PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED:205:derivation function init failed
 PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:174:digest not allowed
 +PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED:233:ems not enabled
 PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK:186:entropy source strength too weak
 PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG:188:error instantiating drbg
 PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY:189:error retrieving entropy
 diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
 index 173a81d28bbe..5e5be567a578 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -21,11 +21,12 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME "module-filename" /* utf8_ptr */
 /* Well known parameter names that Providers can define */
 -#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME            "name"                /* utf8_ptr */
 -#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION         "version"             /* utf8_ptr */
 -#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO       "buildinfo"           /* utf8_ptr */
 -#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS          "status"              /* uint */
 -#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks"     /* uint */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME               "name"                /* utf8_ptr */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION            "version"             /* utf8_ptr */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO          "buildinfo"           /* utf8_ptr */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS             "status"              /* uint */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS    "security-checks"     /* uint */
 +#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"  /* uint */
 /* Self test callback parameters */
 #define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SELF_TEST_PHASE  "st-phase" /* utf8_string */
 diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
 index 0fdf5440c7cb..3f29369b3f92 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ extern "C" {
  */
 # define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks"
 +/*
 + * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
 + * This is disabled by default.
 + *
 + * Type: OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
 + */
 +# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"
 +
 # ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 # endif
 diff --git a/include/openssl/proverr.h b/include/openssl/proverr.h
 index 3685430f5d3e..bf4dc135f592 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/proverr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/proverr.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 # define PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED                   102
 # define PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED           205
 # define PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED                        174
 +# define PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED                           233
 # define PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK          186
 # define PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG                  188
 # define PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY                  189
 diff --git a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
 index 4a7f85f71186..62e60cc0103f 100644
 --- a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
 +++ b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid(const EVP_MD *md);
 int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
                                     int sha1_allowed);
 int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 diff --git a/providers/common/provider_err.c b/providers/common/provider_err.c
 index f6144072aa04..954aabe80cfc 100644
 --- a/providers/common/provider_err.c
 +++ b/providers/common/provider_err.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA PROV_str_reasons[] = {
     "derivation function init failed"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
     "digest not allowed"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED), "ems not enabled"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK),
     "entropy source strength too weak"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 index de7f0d3a0a57..63c875ecd0b7 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return 0;
 }
 +/* Disable the ems check in the default provider */
 +int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 +{
 +    return 0;
 +}
 +
 int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
                                     int sha1_allowed)
 {
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
 index b7659bd395c3..2bc8a5992685 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
 +++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 {
@@ -30,6 +31,11 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
 }
 +int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 +{
 +    return FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(libctx);
 +}
 +
 int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
                                     int sha1_allowed)
 {
 diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 index b86b27d236f3..b881f46f36ad 100644
 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
 +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_provider_query_operation_fn fips_query;
 #define ALG(NAMES, FUNC) ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, NULL)
 extern OSSL_FUNC_core_thread_start_fn *c_thread_start;
 int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 /*
  * Should these function pointers be stored in the provider side provctx? Could
@@ -82,7 +83,9 @@ typedef struct fips_global_st {
     const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle;
     SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS selftest_params;
     int fips_security_checks;
 +    int fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
     const char *fips_security_check_option;
 +    const char *fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option;
 } FIPS_GLOBAL;
 static void *fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -94,6 +97,9 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     fgbl->fips_security_checks = 1;
     fgbl->fips_security_check_option = "1";
 +    fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 1; /* Enabled by default */
 +    fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option = "1";
 +
     return fgbl;
 }
@@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM fips_param_types[] = {
     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_PTR, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
 +    OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
     OSSL_PARAM_END
 };
@@ -119,9 +126,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
     * NOTE: inside core_get_params() these will be loaded from config items
     * stored inside prov->parameters (except for
     * OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME).
 -    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS is not a self test parameter.
 +    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS and
 +    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK are not self test parameters.
     */
 -    OSSL_PARAM core_params[8], *p = core_params;
 +    OSSL_PARAM core_params[9], *p = core_params;
     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
             OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME,
@@ -151,6 +159,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
             OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS,
             (char **)&fgbl->fips_security_check_option,
             sizeof(fgbl->fips_security_check_option));
 +    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
 +            OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
 +            (char **)&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option,
 +            sizeof(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option));
     *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
     if (!c_get_params(fgbl->handle, core_params)) {
@@ -187,6 +199,9 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS);
     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_security_checks))
         return 0;
 +    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK);
 +    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check))
 +        return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -703,6 +718,11 @@ int OSSL_provider_init_int(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
         && strcmp(fgbl->fips_security_check_option, "0") == 0)
         fgbl->fips_security_checks = 0;
 +    /* Disable the ems check if it's disabled in the fips config file. */
 +    if (fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option != NULL
 +        && strcmp(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option, "0") == 0)
 +        fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 0;
 +
     ossl_prov_cache_exported_algorithms(fips_ciphers, exported_fips_ciphers);
     if (!SELF_TEST_post(&fgbl->selftest_params, 0)) {
@@ -898,6 +918,15 @@ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return fgbl->fips_security_checks;
 }
 +int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 +{
 +    FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx,
 +                                              OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX,
 +                                              &fips_prov_ossl_ctx_method);
 +
 +    return fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
 +}
 +
 void OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_CALLBACK **cb,
                                  void **cbarg)
 {
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 index 8a3807308408..2c2dbf31cc0b 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
  *     A(0) = seed
  *     A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
  */
 +
 +/*
 + * Low level APIs (such as DH) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
 + * internal use.
 + */
 +#include "internal/deprecated.h"
 +
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -60,6 +67,7 @@
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
 #include "prov/provider_util.h"
 +#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
 #include "e_os.h"
 static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
@@ -78,6 +86,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
                         unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
 #define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
 +#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST        "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
 +#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE   13
 /* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
 typedef struct {
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
                                const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
 +    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
         return 0;
@@ -181,6 +192,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
         ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 #endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    /*
 +     * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
 +     * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
 +     * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
 +     * as "extended master secret".
 +     */
 +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
 +    if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +            && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
 +                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
 +    ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
 +#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
 +    if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
 +        if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +                && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
 +                          TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
                         ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
 diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
 index 3a8242d2d8c8..b0fbb504689e 100644
 --- a/test/sslapitest.c
 +++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static char *tmpfilename = NULL;
 static char *dhfile = NULL;
 static int is_fips = 0;
 +static int fips_ems_check = 0;
 #define LOG_BUFFER_SIZE 2048
 static char server_log_buffer[LOG_BUFFER_SIZE + 1] = {0};
@@ -796,7 +797,7 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
 {
     SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
     SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
 -    int testresult = 0;
 +    int testresult = 0, status;
     if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
                              TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
@@ -812,19 +813,25 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
         goto end;
     }
 -    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)) {
 -        printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
 -        goto end;
 -    }
 -
 -    if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
 -        printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
 -        goto end;
 -    }
 -
 -    if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
 -        printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
 -        goto end;
 +    status = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
 +    if (fips_ems_check) {
 +        if (status == 1) {
 +            printf("When FIPS uses the EMS check a connection that doesnt use EMS should fail\n");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +    } else {
 +        if (!status) {
 +            printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +        if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
 +            printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
 +        if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
 +            printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
 +            goto end;
 +        }
     }
     testresult = 1;
@@ -10740,9 +10747,24 @@ int setup_tests(void)
             && !TEST_false(OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "default")))
         return 0;
 -    if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0)
 +    if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0) {
 +        OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL;
 +        OSSL_PARAM params[2];
 +
         is_fips = 1;
 +        prov = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "fips");
 +        if (prov != NULL) {
 +            /* Query the fips provider to check if the check ems option is enabled */
 +            params[0] =
 +                OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
 +                                         &fips_ems_check);
 +            params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 +            OSSL_PROVIDER_get_params(prov, params);
 +            OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(prov);
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     /*
      * We add, but don't load the test "tls-provider". We'll load it when we
      * need it.
@@ -10816,6 +10838,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     if (privkey8192 == NULL)
         goto err;
 +    if (fips_ems_check) {
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
 +        ADD_TEST(test_no_ems);
 +#endif
 +        return 1;
 +    }
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || !defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ktls, NUM_KTLS_TEST_CIPHERS * 4);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
 --- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx	2023-04-17 13:04:21.078501747 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt	2023-04-17 13:11:03.189059638 +0200
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 Title = TLS12 PRF tests (from NIST test vectors)
 +Availablein = default
 KDF = TLS1-PRF
 Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
 Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
@@ -21,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3
 Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
 Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
 +Availablein = fips
 +KDF = TLS1-PRF
 +Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
 +Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
 +Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
 +Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
 +Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
 +Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
 +Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
 +
 KDF = TLS1-PRF
 Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
 Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems	2023-05-05 11:15:57.934415272 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c	2023-05-05 11:39:03.578163778 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/trace.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
 static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
     }
  err:
 -    if (fatal)
 -        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +    if (fatal) {
 +        /* The calls to this function are local so it's safe to implement the check */
 +        if (FIPS_mode() && seed1_len >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
 +            && memcmp(seed1, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
 +	else
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +    }
     else
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems	2023-05-05 17:14:04.663800271 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c	2023-05-05 17:20:33.764599507 +0200
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "../ssl_local.h"
 #include "statem_local.h"
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION     1
@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s
 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
 {
 -    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
 +    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
 +        if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
 +            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
 +            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
 +        }
         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 +    }
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
             || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
 --- openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems	2023-07-11 12:35:27.951610366 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in	2023-07-11 12:36:25.234754680 +0200
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL
      * interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
      */
 # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG                     SSL_OP_BIT(31)
 +# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS                     SSL_OP_BIT(48)
 /*
  * Option "collections."
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems	2023-07-11 12:36:51.465278672 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c	2023-07-11 12:44:53.365675720 +0200
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_c
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
                      SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
 +        SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
         SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems	2023-07-12 13:54:22.508235187 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod	2023-07-12 13:56:51.089613902 +0200
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended ma
 default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
 B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
 +B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
 +This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
 +
 B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
 default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
 B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
 --- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems	2023-07-12 15:39:57.732206731 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod	2023-07-12 15:53:45.722885419 +0200
@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ automatically loaded when the system is
 environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
 for more information.
 +Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
 +OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
 +should have format
 +
 + [fips_sect]
 + tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
 + activate = 1
 +
 +The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
 +presence of extended master secret or not.
 +
 +The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
 +
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
--- a/SOURCES/0115-CVE-2023-0464.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0115-CVE-2023-0464.patch
@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
 index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
 };
 struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
 +    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
 +    size_t node_count;
 +    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
 +    size_t node_maximum;
 +
     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
     int nlevel;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
 X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
 -                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
 +                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
 +                                             int extra_data);
 void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
 int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
                            const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
 index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
 X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
 -                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 +                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
 +                                             int extra_data)
 {
     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
 +    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
 +    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
 +        return NULL;
 +
     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
     if (node == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
     }
     node->data = data;
     node->parent = parent;
 -    if (level) {
 +    if (level != NULL) {
         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
             if (level->anyPolicy)
                 goto node_error;
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
         }
     }
 -    if (tree) {
 +    if (extra_data) {
         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
         }
     }
 +    tree->node_count++;
     if (parent)
         parent->nchild++;
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
 index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
 #include "pcy_local.h"
 +/*
 + * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
 + * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
 + *
 + * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
 + * door on CVE-2023-0464.
 + */
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
 +# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
 +#endif
 +
 static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
                            X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
                            int indent)
@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
     }
 +    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
 +    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
 +
     /*
      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
      *
@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
     if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
                                      OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
         goto bad_tree;
 -    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
 +    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
         goto bad_tree;
     }
@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
  */
 static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 -                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
 +                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
 +                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 {
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
     int i, matched = 0;
@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
         if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
 -            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
 +            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
                 return 0;
             matched = 1;
         }
     }
     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
 -        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
 +        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
             return 0;
     }
     return 1;
@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 -                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
 +                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
 +                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 {
     int i;
@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
 -        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
 +        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
             return 0;
     }
     return 1;
@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
 -    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
 +    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
     if (last->anyPolicy &&
             ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
 -                                       last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
 +                                       last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
             node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
 -                                              tree);
 +                                              tree, 1);
         }
         if (!tree->user_policies) {
             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
         cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
 -        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
 +        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
--- a/SOURCES/0116-CVE-2023-0465.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0116-CVE-2023-0465.patch
@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         goto memerr;
     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
 -        int i;
 +        int i, cbcalled = 0;
         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
 -        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
 +        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 +            if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
 +                cbcalled = 1;
             CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
                        ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
         }
 +        if (!cbcalled) {
 +            /* Should not be able to get here */
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
 +        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
         return 1;
     }
     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
 diff --git a/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..244af3292b
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
 +IENBMCAXDTIzMDMwODEyMjMxNloYDzIxMjMwMzA5MTIyMzE2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
 +DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd
 +j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz
 +n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W
 +l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l
 +YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc
 +ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9
 +CLNNsUcCAwEAAaN7MHkwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zALBgNVHQ8EBAMCAQYwHQYD
 +VR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uE
 +PXyAmslTnE1y96NSMBkGA1UdIAQSMBAwDgYMKwYBBAGBgVy8+0cBMA0GCSqGSIb3
 +DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBbE+MO9mewWIUY2kt85yhl0oZtvVxbn9K2Hty59ItwJGRNfzx7
 +Ge7KgawkvNzMOXmj6qf8TpbJnf41ZLWdRyVZBVyIwrAKIVw1VxfGh8aEifHKN97H
 +unZkBPcUkAhUJSiC1BOD/euaMYqOi8QwiI702Q6q1NBY1/UKnV/ZIBLecnqfj9vZ
 +7T0wKxrwGYBztP4pNcxCmBoD9Dg+Dx3ZElo0WXyO4SOh/BgrsKJHKyhbuTpjrI/g
 +DhcINRp6+lIzuFBtJ67+YXnAEspb3lKMk0YL/LXrCNF2scdmNfOPwHi+OKBqt69C
 +9FJyWFEMxx2qm/ENE9sbOswgJRnKkaAqHBHx
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..0fcd6372b3
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDTTCCAjWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
 +Fw0yMzAzMDgxMjIzMzJaGA8yMTIzMDMwOTEyMjMzMlowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
 +dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY
 +YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT
 +5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l
 +Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1
 +U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5
 +ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn
 +iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjgakwgaYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4H
 +mCKX4XOiMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMAkGA1UdEwQC
 +MAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1w
 +bGUwKQYDVR0gBCIwIDAOBgwrBgEEAYGBXLz7RwEwDgYMKwYBBAGBgVy8+0cBMA0G
 +CSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQArwtwNO++7kStcJeMg3ekz2D/m/8UEjTA1rknBjQiQ
 +P0FK7tNeRqus9i8PxthNWk+biRayvDzaGIBV7igpDBPfXemDgmW9Adc4MKyiQDfs
 +YfkHi3xJKvsK2fQmyCs2InVDaKpVAkNFcgAW8nSOhGliqIxLb0EOLoLNwaktou0N
 +XQHmRzY8S7aIr8K9Qo9y/+MLar+PS4h8l6FkLLkTICiFzE4/wje5S3NckAnadRJa
 +QpjwM2S6NuA+tYWuOcN//r7BSpW/AZKanYWPzHMrKlqCh+9o7sthPd72+hObG9kx
 +wSGdzfStNK1I1zM5LiI08WtXCvR6AfLANTo2x1AYhSxF
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..2f06d7433f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDPTCCAiWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
 +Fw0yMzAzMDgxMjIzMjNaGA8yMTIzMDMwOTEyMjMyM1owGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
 +dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY
 +YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT
 +5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l
 +Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1
 +U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5
 +ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn
 +iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjgZkwgZYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4H
 +mCKX4XOiMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMAkGA1UdEwQC
 +MAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1w
 +bGUwGQYDVR0gBBIwEDAOBgwrBgEEAYGBXLz7RwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEB
 +AGbWslmAAdMX3+5ChcnFrX+NqDGoyhb3PTgWdtlQB5qtWdIt4rSxN50OcQxFTX0D
 +QOBabSzR0DDKrgfBe4waL19WsdEvR9GyO4M7ASze/A3IEZue9C9k0n7Vq8zDaAZl
 +CiR/Zqo9nAOuhKHMgmC/NjUlX7STv5pJVgc4SH8VEKmSRZDmNihaOalUtK5X8/Oa
 +dawKxsZcaP5IKnOEPPKjtVNJxBu5CXywJHsO0GcoDEnEx1/NLdFoJ6WFw8NuTyDK
 +NGLq2MHEdyKaigHQlptEs9bXyu9McJjzbx0uXj3BenRULASreccFej0L1RU6jDlk
 +D3brBn24UISaFRZoB7jsjok=
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
 index c3f7ac14b5..a57d9f38dc 100755
 --- a/test/certs/mkcert.sh
 +++ b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
@@ -119,11 +119,12 @@ genca() {
     local OPTIND=1
     local purpose=
 -    while getopts p: o
 +    while getopts p:c: o
     do
         case $o in
         p) purpose="$OPTARG";;
 -        *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
 +        c) certpol="$OPTARG";;
 +        *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU][-c policyoid] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
            return 1;;
         esac
     done
@@ -146,6 +147,10 @@ genca() {
     if [ -n "$NC" ]; then
         exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC")
     fi
 +    if [ -n "$certpol" ]; then
 +        exts=$(printf "%s\ncertificatePolicies = %s\n" "$exts" "$certpol")
 +    fi
 +
     csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
     echo "$csr" |
         cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
 diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
 index 2240cd9df0..76ceadc7d8 100755
 --- a/test/certs/setup.sh
 +++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -440,3 +440,9 @@ OPENSSL_SIGALG=ED448 OPENSSL_KEYALG=ed448 ./mkcert.sh genee ed448 \
 # critical id-pkix-ocsp-no-check extension
 ./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-ocsp-nocheck ca-key ca-cert "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5=critical,DER:05:00"
 +
 +# certificatePolicies extension
 +./mkcert.sh genca -c "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1" "CA" ca-key ca-pol-cert root-key root-cert
 +./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
 +# We can create a cert with a duplicate policy oid - but its actually invalid!
 +./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies-bad ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1,1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 index 2a4c36e86d..818c9ac50d 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
     run(app([@args]));
 }
 -plan tests => 163;
 +plan tests => 165;
 # Canonical success
 ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -516,3 +516,14 @@ SKIP: {
     ok(run(app([ qw(openssl verify -trusted), $rsapluscert_file, $cert_file ])),
        'Mixed key + cert file test');
 }
 +
 +# Certificate Policies
 +ok(verify("ee-cert-policies", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
 +          "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
 +          "-explicit_policy"),
 +   "Certificate policy");
 +
 +ok(!verify("ee-cert-policies-bad", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
 +           "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
 +           "-explicit_policy"),
 +   "Bad certificate policy");
--- a/SOURCES/0117-CVE-2023-0466.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0117-CVE-2023-0466.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
 index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
 B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
 -X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
 -by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
 +X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
 +Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
 +policy checking.
 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
 by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
 The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
 and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
 +The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
 +enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
 +The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
 +
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 Copyright 2009-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
--- a/SOURCES/0118-CVE-2023-1255.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0118-CVE-2023-1255.patch
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
 +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
 .align	4
 .Lxts_dec_tail4x:
 	add	$inp,$inp,#16
 -	vld1.32	{$dat0},[$inp],#16
 +	tst	$tailcnt,#0xf
 	veor	$tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
 	vst1.8	{$tmp1},[$out],#16
 	veor	$tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
 	veor	$tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
 	vst1.8	{$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
 +	b.eq	.Lxts_dec_abort
 +	vld1.32	{$dat0},[$inp],#16
 	b	.Lxts_done
 .align	4
 .Lxts_outer_dec_tail:
--- a/SOURCES/0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms	2023-05-18 14:03:56.360555106 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c	2023-05-18 14:13:33.765183185 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
 static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -810,12 +811,16 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
     if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
         if (!cipher) {
 +            if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_128_cbc();
 +            } else {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
 -            cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 +                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 -            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 -            goto end;
 +                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 +                goto end;
 #endif
 +           }
         }
         if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) {
 diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
 --- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms	2023-05-22 10:06:50.276528155 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c	2023-05-22 10:08:58.406073945 +0200
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
@@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(C
             return 0;
         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
             return 0;
 +        if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
     } else if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -484,6 +489,11 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encryp
         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
             goto err;
 +
 +        if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
 +                goto err;
 +        }
     }
     if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)
--- a/SOURCES/0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
 index 01cde00e98..c0e55197a0 100644
 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
 +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -443,6 +443,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
     first = 1;
     bl = NULL;
 +    /*
 +     * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
 +     *
 +     * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
 +     * >
 +     * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
 +     * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
 +     * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
 +     * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
 +     * > decimal).
 +     *
 +     * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
 +     * i.e. 586 bytes long.
 +     *
 +     * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
 +     */
 +    if (len > 586)
 +        goto err;
 +
     while (len > 0) {
         l = 0;
         use_bn = 0;
--- a/SOURCES/0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch
@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
 index bdfc4d02a3f0..548665fba265 100644
 --- a/crypto/context.c
 +++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include "internal/bio.h"
 #include "internal/provider.h"
 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
 +#include "crypto/rand.h"
 # include <sys/types.h>
 # include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -271,6 +272,20 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return NULL;
 }
 +
 +void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void)
 +{
 +    int dynidx = default_context_int.dyn_indexes[OSSL_LIB_CTX_DRBG_INDEX];
 +
 +    /* early release of the DRBG in global default libctx, no locking */
 +    if (dynidx != -1) {
 +        void *data;
 +
 +        data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx);
 +        ossl_rand_ctx_free(data);
 +        CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx, NULL);
 +    }
 +}
 #endif
 OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
 diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
 index c453d3226133..f341d915db76 100644
 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
     rand_meth_lock = NULL;
 # endif
 +    ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx();
     rand_inited = 0;
 }
@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ static void *rand_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
     return NULL;
 }
 -static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
 +void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
 {
     RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
@@ -494,7 +495,7 @@ static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
 static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD rand_drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
     OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_PRIORITY_2,
     rand_ossl_ctx_new,
 -    rand_ossl_ctx_free,
 +    ossl_rand_ctx_free,
 };
 static RAND_GLOBAL *rand_get_global(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
 diff --git a/engines/e_dasync.c b/engines/e_dasync.c
 index 5a303a9f8528..7974106ae219 100644
 --- a/engines/e_dasync.c
 +++ b/engines/e_dasync.c
@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
 static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
 +                                  void *ptr);
 +static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 +                                  const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 +                                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
 +
 static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type,
                                              int arg, void *ptr);
 static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
@@ -171,6 +179,12 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc(void)
     return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
 }
 +static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
 +static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_256_ctr(void)
 +{
 +    return _hidden_aes_256_ctr;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 in this engine. Set up
  * once only during engine bind and can then be reused many times.
@@ -192,8 +206,10 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
 static void destroy_ciphers(void)
 {
     EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
 +    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
     EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1);
     _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
 +    _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
     _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
 }
@@ -202,6 +218,7 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
 static int dasync_cipher_nids[] = {
     NID_aes_128_cbc,
 +    NID_aes_256_ctr,
     NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
     0
 };
@@ -284,6 +301,30 @@ static int bind_dasync(ENGINE *e)
         _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
     }
 +    _hidden_aes_256_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                              1  /* block size */,
 +                                              32 /* key len */);
 +    if (_hidden_aes_256_ctr == NULL
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,16)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                          EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
 +                                          | EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE
 +                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
 +                                          | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                         dasync_aes256_init_key)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                              dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                            dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                         dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl)
 +            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
 +                                sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) {
 +        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
 +        _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
 +    }
 +
     _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(
                                                 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
                                                 16 /* block size */,
@@ -445,6 +486,9 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
     case NID_aes_128_cbc:
         *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc();
         break;
 +    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
 +        *cipher = dasync_aes_256_ctr();
 +        break;
     case NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1:
         *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1();
         break;
@@ -779,6 +823,29 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
     return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
 }
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
 +                                  void *ptr)
 +{
 +    return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
 +}
 +
 +static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 +                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
 +{
 +    return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
 +}
 +
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 +                               const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
 +{
 +    return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
 +}
 +
 +static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 +{
 +    return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
 +}
 +
 /*
  * AES128 CBC HMAC SHA1 Implementation
 diff --git a/include/crypto/rand.h b/include/crypto/rand.h
 index 6a71a339c812..165deaf95c5e 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/rand.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/rand.h
@@ -125,4 +125,5 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_nonce(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
 size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
 int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
 +void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl);
 #endif
 diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 index 1291299b6e50..934d4b089c20 100644
 --- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
 +++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ int ossl_lib_ctx_run_once(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned int idx,
 int ossl_lib_ctx_onfree(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn onfreefn);
 const char *ossl_lib_ctx_get_descriptor(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
 +void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void);
 +
 OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_crypto_ex_data_get_ossl_lib_ctx(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
 int ossl_crypto_new_ex_data_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int class_index, void *obj,
                                CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
 diff --git a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
 index 4da1e64cb6da..3f352db9df3a 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
@@ -11,9 +11,30 @@ use warnings;
 use OpenSSL::Test;
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 -plan tests => 3;
 +plan tests => 5;
 setup("test_rand");
 ok(run(test(["rand_test"])));
 ok(run(test(["drbgtest"])));
 ok(run(test(["rand_status_test"])));
 +
 +SKIP: {
 +    skip "engine is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
 +        if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
 +
 +    my $success;
 +    my @randdata;
 +    my $expected = '0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10';
 +
 +    @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'ossltest', '-hex', '16' ]),
 +                    capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
 +    chomp(@randdata);
 +    ok($success and $randdata[0] eq $expected,
 +       "rand with ossltest: Check rand output is as expected");
 +
 +    @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'dasync', '-hex', '16' ]),
 +                    capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
 +    chomp(@randdata);
 +    ok($success and length($randdata[0]) == 32,
 +       "rand with dasync: Check rand output is of expected length");
 +}
--- a/SOURCES/0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
 index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
 --- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
 +++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
         return 0;
 -    if (inl == 0) {
 -        *outl = 0;
 -        return 1;
 -    }
 +    /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
 +    if (out != NULL) {
 +        if (inl == 0) {
 +            if (outl != NULL)
 +                *outl = 0;
 +            return 1;
 +        }
 -    if (outsize < inl) {
 -        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
 -        return 0;
 +        if (outsize < inl) {
 +            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
 +            return 0;
 +        }
     }
     if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
--- a/SOURCES/0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch
@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     if (nid != NID_undef)
         return 1;
 +    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
 +    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
         return 0;
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
 index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dh.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
 #  include <openssl/dherr.h>
 #  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
 -#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
 +#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS        10000
 +#  endif
 +
 +#  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
 +#   define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
 #  endif
 #  define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
 diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
 index 7b587f3cfa..f8dd8f3aa7 100644
 --- a/test/dhtest.c
 +++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
         goto err1;
     /* check fails, because p is way too small */
 -    if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
 +    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
         goto err2;
     i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
     ERR_clear_error();
 +    /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
 +    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
 +            || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
 +        goto err3;
 +
 +    /*
 +     * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
 +     */
 +    if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
 +        goto err3;
 +
     /*
      * II) key generation
      */
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
         goto err3;
     /* ... and check whether it is valid */
 -    if (!DH_check(a, &i))
 +    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
         goto err3;
     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
             || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
--- a/SOURCES/0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index aef6f9b1b7..fbe2797569 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
 #else
 -    int ok = 0, r;
 +    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
     int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
         goto err;
     if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
 +        if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
 +            q_good = 1;
 +        else
 +            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (q_good) {
         if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
         else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
 diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
 index f8dd8f3aa7..d02b3b7c58 100644
 --- a/test/dhtest.c
 +++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
     ERR_clear_error();
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
 +        goto err3;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
 +        goto err3;
 +    if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
 +        || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
 +        goto err3;
 +
     /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
     if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
             || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
     if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
         goto err3;
 +    /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
 +    ERR_clear_error();
 +
     /*
      * II) key generation
      */
--- a/SOURCES/0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch
@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
 index d2ed3fd378..6a819590e6 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -223,6 +223,42 @@ static int evp_cipher_init_internal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
             return 0;
     }
 +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
 +    /*
 +     * Fix for CVE-2023-5363
 +     * Passing in a size as part of the init call takes effect late
 +     * so, force such to occur before the initialisation.
 +     *
 +     * The FIPS provider's internal library context is used in a manner
 +     * such that this is not an issue.
 +     */
 +    if (params != NULL) {
 +        OSSL_PARAM param_lens[3] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END,
 +                                     OSSL_PARAM_END };
 +        OSSL_PARAM *q = param_lens;
 +        const OSSL_PARAM *p;
 +
 +        p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); 
 +        if (p != NULL)
 +            memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
 +
 +        /*
 +         * Note that OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN is a synomym for
 +         * OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN so both are covered here.
 +         */
 +        p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN);
 +        if (p != NULL)
 +            memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
 +
 +        if (q != param_lens) {
 +            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, param_lens)) {
 +                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
 +                return 0;
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
     if (enc) {
         if (ctx->cipher->einit == NULL) {
             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
 diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
 index cfffa21350..2318bf6a68 100644
 --- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
 +++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -4851,6 +4851,253 @@ static int test_ecx_not_private_key(int tst)
     return options;
 }
 +static int aes_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 +    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
 +    int outlen, tmplen;
 +    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
 +    unsigned char outtag[16];
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
 +            || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
 +                                            &gcm_ivlen);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
 +            || (gcm_aad != NULL
 +                && !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
 +                                                gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
 +                                            gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
 +                                                  outtag, sizeof(outtag));
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ctx, params))
 +            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s)
 +            || !TEST_mem_eq(outtag, gcm_tag_s, gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 +err:
 +    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 +static int aes_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
 +                           const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 +    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
 +    int outlen;
 +    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
 +
 +    if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")) == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
 +                                            &gcm_ivlen);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
 +            || (gcm_aad != NULL
 +                && !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
 +                                                gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
 +                                            gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s))
 +            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
 +                                                  (void*)gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
 +            ||!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 +err:
 +    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 +static int test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
 +{
 +    /* AES-GCM test data obtained from NIST public test vectors */
 +    static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = {
 +        0xd0, 0xc2, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x9f, 0x30, 0xd8, 0x0b, 0x89, 0x14, 0xbb, 0xbf,
 +        0xb7, 0x2f, 0x73, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x70, 0x15, 0x84,
 +        0x8a, 0x7b, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0x16, 0xf1, 0x8b,
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = {
 +        0xb6, 0xdc, 0xda, 0x95, 0xac, 0x99, 0x77, 0x76, 0x25, 0xae, 0x87, 0xf8,
 +        0xa3, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xca,
 +        0x1a, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0xf4, 0x5f, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0xce, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0x14,
 +        0x12, 0x6f, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x17, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x09,
 +        0xdd, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0xdd, 0xf3, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x49, 0xb8,
 +        0xb3, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x5d, 0x4f, 0xad, 0x30, 0x91, 0x08, 0xbc, 0xbe, 0x24,
 +        0x01, 0x0f, 0xbe, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x53, 0xb0,
 +        0x95, 0x90, 0xac, 0x7b, 0x1f, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0x99, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x54,
 +        0xd0, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0xcc, 0x91, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x9b, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0xdc,
 +        0x63, 0xea, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0xed, 0x68, 0x57, 0x27, 0x6b,
 +        0x68, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0x51, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x3d,
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = {
 +        0xb8, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x36, 0x44, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x32, 0x91, 0x07,
 +        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x81,
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = {
 +        0xff, 0x4f, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0x51, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xf3,
 +        0xe2, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xed,
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = {
 +        0xbd, 0x06, 0x38, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0x72, 0x0e, 0xf2, 0xea, 0x63,
 +        0xdb, 0x99, 0x6c, 0x21,
 +    };
 +
 +    return aes_gcm_encrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
 +                           gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
 +                           gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag))
 +        && aes_gcm_decrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
 +                           gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
 +                           gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag));
 +}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 +static int rc4_encrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
 +                       const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
 +                       const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 +    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
 +    int outlen, tmplen;
 +    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
 +
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
 +            || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
 +                                            &rc4_key_s);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
 +                                            rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if (!TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 +err:
 +    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 +static int rc4_decrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
 +                       const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
 +                       const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
 +{
 +    int ret = 0;
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
 +    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
 +    int outlen;
 +    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
 +    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
 +        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
 +    };
 +
 +    if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")) == NULL)
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
 +                                            &rc4_key_s);
 +
 +    if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
 +            || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
 +                                            rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
 +            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
 +        goto err;
 +
 +    ret = 1;
 +err:
 +    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 +
 +static int test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
 +{
 +    /* RC4 test data obtained from RFC 6229 */
 +    static const struct {
 +        unsigned char key[5];
 +        unsigned char padding[11];
 +    } rc4_key = {
 +        {   /* Five bytes of key material */
 +            0x83, 0x32, 0x22, 0x77, 0x2a,
 +        },
 +        {   /* Random padding to 16 bytes */
 +            0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x32, 0x91
 +        }
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char rc4_pt[] = {
 +        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
 +        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
 +    };
 +    static const unsigned char rc4_ct[] = {
 +        0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a,
 +        0x2e, 0x87, 0x9e, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xef, 0xda
 +    };
 +
 +    if (lgcyprov == NULL)
 +        return TEST_skip("Test requires legacy provider to be loaded");
 +
 +    return rc4_encrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
 +                       rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct))
 +        && rc4_decrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
 +                       rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct));
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     OPTION_CHOICE o;
@@ -4994,6 +5241,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ecx_short_keys, OSSL_NELEM(ecxnids));
 +    /* Test cases for CVE-2023-5363 */
 +    ADD_TEST(test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363);
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 +    ADD_TEST(test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363);
 +#endif
 +
     return 1;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 From 0d873f9f647764df147d818a6e998b1c318bac31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 15:30:26 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Add SP800-56Br2 6.4.1.2.1 (3.c) check
 The code did not yet check that the length of the RSA key is positive
 and even.
 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [8b268541d9aabee51699aef22963407362830ef9]
 ---
 crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c | 5 +++++
 test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c        | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
 index fc8f19b487..e6b79e953d 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
@@ -403,6 +403,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
         return 0;
     }
 +    /* (Step 3.c): check that the modulus length is a positive even integer */
 +    if (nbits <= 0 || (nbits & 0x1)) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
     if (ctx == NULL)
 diff --git a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
 index 7660019f47..aa58bbbe6c 100644
 --- a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
 +++ b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ static int test_invalid_keypair(void)
           && TEST_true(BN_add_word(n, 1))
           && TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2048))
           && TEST_true(BN_sub_word(n, 1))
 +          /* check that validation fails if len(n) is not even */
 +          && TEST_true(BN_lshift1(n, n))
 +          && TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2049))
 +          && TEST_true(BN_rshift1(n, n))
           /* check p  */
           && TEST_true(BN_sub_word(p, 2))
           && TEST_true(BN_mul(n, p, q, ctx))
 -- 
 2.41.0
--- a/SOURCES/0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch
@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 index 7ba2beae7f..e20eb62081 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -249,6 +249,18 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
  */
 int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
 {
 +    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
 +    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
 +        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
 +        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
 +        return 1;
 +    }
 +
     return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
 }
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 index 4152397426..f76ac0dd14 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
 - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
     "parameter encoding error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
     "unable to check generator"},
 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 index d84ea99241..afc49f5cdc 100644
 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
 +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
         goto err;
     }
 +    if (dh->params.q != NULL
 +        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
         return 0;
@@ -267,6 +273,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
         return 0;
     }
 +    if (dh->params.q != NULL
 +        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
         return 0;
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index e51504b7ab..36de321b74 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
 DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
 DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
 DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
 +DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
 DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
 DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
 DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS:114:bad ffc parameters
 diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
 index bb24d131eb..519327f795 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
 - * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
 index 6533260f20..50e0cf54be 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dh.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
 #   define DH_GENERATOR_3          3
 #   define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
 -/* DH_check error codes */
 +/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
 /*
  * NB: These values must align with the equivalently named macros in
  * internal/ffc.h.
@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
 #   define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
 #   define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
 #   define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
 -#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
 +#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
 #   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
 #   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL            0x80
 -#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100
 +#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
 /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
 #   define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
 diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
 index 5d2a762a96..074a70145f 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
 - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #  define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
 #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
 #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
 +#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
 #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
 #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
--- a/SOURCES/0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
 index 51c2283db915d..0928a30c2d37b 100644
 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
     tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
     if (tmparr == NULL)
         goto end;
 +    OPENSSL_free(*pext);
     *pext = tmparr;
     *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
     ret = 1;
--- a/SOURCES/0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
 index 9f86134d923fb..2e601bb9c24be 100755
 --- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
 +++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
 my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
 my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
    $VSXFRAME += 128;	# local variables
 -   $VSXFRAME += 13*16;	# v20-v31 offload
 +   $VSXFRAME += 12*16;	# v20-v31 offload
 my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
 -	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
 +	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
 +	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 +	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
 +	addi	r11,r11,32
 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
 -	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
 +	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
 +	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 +	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
 +	addi	r11,r11,32
 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@
 	mtspr	256,r12				# restore vrsave
 	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v21,r10,$sp
 -	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v22,r11,$sp
 +	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	lvx	v23,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v24,r11,$sp
 +	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	lvx	v25,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v26,r11,$sp
 +	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	lvx	v27,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v28,r11,$sp
 +	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
 	addi	r11,r11,32
 -	lvx	v29,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
 	addi	r10,r10,32
 -	lvx	v30,r11,$sp
 -	lvx	v31,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
 +	addi	r11,r11,32
 +	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
 +	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
 	$POP	r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
 	$POP	r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
 	$POP	r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
--- a/SOURCES/0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch
@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
 index fc8f19b48770b..bcbdd24fb8199 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
         return 0;
     nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
 +    if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     /*
      * (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
@@ -324,7 +329,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
         goto err;
     }
 -    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
 +    /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
 +    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
 #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
     if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
 #else
 diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
 index dc7cc64533af2..f8088df14d36c 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
     "dhpkey.pem"
     )) unless disabled("dh");
 -my @negative_pubtests = ();
 +my @negative_pubtests = ("rsapub_17k.pem");  # Too big RSA public key
 push(@negative_pubtests, (
     "dsapub_noparam.der"
 diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000000..9a2eaedaf1b22
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
 +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
 +MIIIbzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCCFwAMIIIVwKCCE4Ang+cE5H+hg3RbapDAHqR
 +B9lUnp2MlAwsZxQ/FhYepaR60bFQeumbu7817Eo5YLMObVI99hF1C4u/qcpD4Jph
 +gZt87/JAYDbP+DIh/5gUXCL9m5Fp4u7mvZaZdnlcftBvR1uKUTCAwc9pZ/Cfr8W2
 +GzrRODzsNYnk2DcZMfe2vRDuDZRopE+Y+I72rom2SZLxoN547N1daM/M/CL9KVQ/
 +XMI/YOpJrBI0jI3brMRhLkvLckwies9joufydlGbJkeil9H7/grj3fQZtFkZ2Pkj
 +b87XDzRVX7wsEpAgPJxskL3jApokCp1kQYKG+Uc3dKM9Ade6IAPK7VKcmbAQTYw2
 +gZxsc28dtstazmfGz0ACCTSMrmbgWAM3oPL7RRzhrXDWgmYQ0jHefGh8SNTIgtPq
 +TuHxPYkDMQNaf0LmDGCxqlnf4b5ld3YaU8zZ/RqIRx5v/+w0rJUvU53qY1bYSnL1
 +vbqKSnN2mip0GYyQ4AUgkS1NBV4rGYU/VTvzEjLfkg02KOtHKandvEoUjmZPzCT0
 +V2ZhGc8K1UJNGYlIiHqCdwCBoghvly/pYajTkDXyd6BsukzA5H3IkZB1xDgl035j
 +/0Cr7QeZLEOdi9fPdSSaBT6OmD0WFuZfJF0wMr7ucRhWzPXvSensD9v7MBE7tNfH
 +SLeTSx8tLt8UeWriiM+0CnkPR1IOqMOxubOyf1eV8NQqEWm5wEQG/0IskbOKnaHa
 +PqLFJZn/bvyL3XK5OxVIJG3z6bnRDOMS9SzkjqgPdIO8tkySEHVSi/6iuGUltx3Y
 +Fmq6ye/r34ekyHPbfn6UuTON7joM6SIXb5bHM64x4iMVWx4hMvDjfy0UqfywAUyu
 +C1o7BExSMxxFG8GJcqR0K8akpPp7EM588PC+YuItoxzXgfUJnP3BQ1Beev2Ve7/J
 +xeGZH0N4ntfr+cuaLAakAER9zDglwChWflw3NNFgIdAgSxXv3XXx5xDXpdP4lxUo
 +F5zAN4Mero3yV90FaJl7Vhq/UFVidbwFc15jUDwaE0mKRcsBeVd3GOhoECAgE0id
 +aIPT20z8oVY0FyTJlRk7QSjo8WjJSrHY/Fn14gctX07ZdfkufyL6w+NijBdYluvB
 +nIrgHEvpkDEWoIa8qcx0EppoIcmqgMV2mTShfFYSybsO33Pm8WXec2FXjwhzs1Pi
 +R/BuIW8rHPI67xqWm0h8dEw11vtfi9a/BBBikFHe59KBjMTG+lW/gADNvRoTzGh7
 +kN4+UVDS3jlSisRZZOn1XoeQtpubNYWgUsecjKy45IwIj8h1SHgn3wkmUesY0woN
 +mOdoNtq+NezN4RFtbCOHhxFVpKKDi/HQP2ro0ykkXMDjwEIVf2Lii1Mg9UP8m+Ux
 +AOqkTrIkdogkRx+70h7/wUOfDIFUq2JbKzqxJYamyEphcdAko7/B8efQKc61Z93O
 +f2SHa4++4WI7wIIx18v5KV4M/cRmrfc8w9WRkQN3gBT5AJMuqwcSHVXBWvNQeGmi
 +ScMh7X6cCZ0daEujqb8svq4WgsJ8UT4GaGBRIYtt7QUKEh+JQwNJzneRYZ3pzpaH
 +UJeeoYobMlkp3rM9cYzdq90nBQiI9Jsbim9m9ggb2dMOS5CsI9S/IuG2O5uTjfxx
 +wkwsd5nLDFtNXHYZ7W6XlVJ1Rc6zShnEmdCn3mmibb6OaMUmun2yl9ryEjVSoXLP
 +fSA8W9K9yNhKTRkzdXJfqlC+s/ovX2xBGxsuOoUDaXhRVz0qmpKIHeSFjIP4iXq4
 +y8gDiwvM3HbZfvVonbg6siPwpn4uvw3hesojk1DKAENS52i6U3uK2fs1ALVxsFNS
 +Yh914rDu0Q3e4RXVhURaYzoEbLCot6WGYeCCfQOK0rkETMv+sTYYscC8/THuW7SL
 +HG5zy9Ed95N1Xmf8J+My7gM7ZFodGdHsWvdzEmqsdOFh6IVx/VfHFX0MDBq0t6lZ
 +eRvVgVCfu3gkYLwPScn/04E02vOom51ISKHsF/I11erC66jjNYV9BSpH8O7sAHxZ
 +EmPT2ZVVRSgivOHdQW/FZ3UZQQhVaVSympo2Eb4yWEMFn84Q8T+9Honj6gnB5PXz
 +chmeCsOMlcg1mwWwhn0k+OAWEZy7VRUk5Ahp0fBAGJgwBdqrZ3kM356DjUkVBiYq
 +4eHyvafNKmjf2mnFsI3g2NKRNyl1Lh63wyCFx60yYvBUfXF/W9PFJbD9CiP83kEW
 +gV36gxTsbOSfhpO1OXR90ODy0kx06XzWmJCUugK8u9bx4F/CjV+LIHExuNJiethC
 +A8sIup/MT0fWp4RO/SsVblGqfoqJTaPnhptQzeH2N07pbWkxeMuL6ppPuwFmfVjK
 +FJndqCVrAukcPEOQ16iVURuloJMudqYRc9QKkJFsnv0W/iMNbqQGmXe8Q/5qFiys
 +26NIQBiE2ad9hNLnoccEnmYSRgnW3ZPSKuq5TDdYyDqTZH2r8cam65pr3beKw2XC
 +xw4cc7VaxiwGC2Mg2wRmwwPaTjrcEt6sMa3RjwFEVBxBFyM26wnTEZsTBquCxV0J
 +pgERaeplkixP2Q0m7XAdlDaob973SM2vOoUgypzDchWmpx7u775bnOfU5CihwXl+
 +k0i09WZuT8bPmhEAiGCw5sNzMkz1BC2cCZFfJIkE2vc/wXYOrGxBTJo0EKaUFswa
 +2dnP/u0bn+VksBUM7ywW9LJSXh4mN+tpzdeJtxEObKwX1I0dQxSPWmjd2++wMr9q
 +Unre5fCrDToy2H7C2VKSpuOCT2/Kv4JDQRWwI4KxQOpn0UknAGNmfBoTtpIZ3LEb
 +77oBUJdMQD7tQBBLL0a6f1TdK0dHVprWWawJ+gGFMiMQXqAqblHcxFKWuHv9bQID
 +AQAB
 +-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
--- a/SOURCES/0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
 index 448a3c3043c1c..9010fa6c4638c 100644
 --- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
 +++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
                                      const struct translation_st *translation,
                                      struct translation_ctx_st *ctx)
 {
 +    char *p2 = NULL;
     int ret;
     if ((ret = default_check(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
@@ -1146,13 +1147,25 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
     if (state == PRE_CTRL_TO_PARAMS) {
         ctx->p2 = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(ctx->p1);
         ctx->p1 = 0;
 +    } else if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
 +        /*
 +         * We're translating from params to ctrl and setting the curve name.
 +         * The ctrl function needs it to be a NID, but meanwhile, we need
 +         * space to get the curve name from the param.  |ctx->name_buf| is
 +         * sufficient for that.
 +         * The double indirection is necessary for default_fixup_args()'s
 +         * call of OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string() to be done correctly.
 +         */
 +        p2 = ctx->name_buf;
 +        ctx->p2 = &p2;
 +        ctx->sz = sizeof(ctx->name_buf);
     }
     if ((ret = default_fixup_args(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
         return ret;
     if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
 -        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(ctx->p2);
 +        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(p2);
         ctx->p2 = NULL;
     }
@@ -2789,6 +2802,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_setget_params_to_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
             if (translation->fixup_args != NULL)
                 fixup = translation->fixup_args;
             ctx.action_type = translation->action_type;
 +            ctx.ctrl_cmd = translation->ctrl_num;
         }
         ctx.pctx = pctx;
         ctx.params = params;
--- a/SOURCES/0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch
@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
 index 6fd4184af5a52..80ce31b3bca66 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
         return NULL;
     }
 +
 +    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
     return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
 }
@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
 {
     if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
         return NULL;
 +
 +    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
     return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
                                    ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
                                    pass, passlen,
@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
         return NULL;
     }
 +
 +    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
 +        return NULL;
 +    }
 +
     p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
     if (p7s != NULL) {
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
 index 67a885a45f89e..68ff54d0e90ee 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
         return 0;
     }
 +    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
 +        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
 +        return 0;
 +    }
 +
     salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
     saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
     if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
 index 62230bc6187ff..1e5b5495991a4 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
         } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
 -            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
 -                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
 +            if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
 +                    || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
 +                                &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
                 goto err;
         } else {
             continue;
 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
 index 49a0da5f819c4..8228315eeaa3a 100644
 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
 +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
     int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
 -    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
 +    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
 +        if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
 +            return 0;
         mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
 -    else
 +    } else {
         mdalgs = NULL;
 +    }
     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
 index 1f0cb4d501488..b2c376249646d 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 use strict;
 use warnings;
 -use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
 +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file with/;
 use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
 use Encode;
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
 }
 $ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
 -plan tests => 13;
 +plan tests => 17;
 # Test different PKCS#12 formats
 ok(run(test(["pkcs12_format_test"])), "test pkcs12 formats");
@@ -148,4 +148,25 @@ ok(grep(/subject=CN = server.example/, @pkcs12info) == 1,
 # Test that the expected friendly name is present in the output
 ok(grep(/testname/, @pkcs12info) == 1, "test friendly name in output");
 +# Test some bad pkcs12 files
 +my $bad1 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad1.p12");
 +my $bad2 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad2.p12");
 +my $bad3 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad3.p12");
 +
 +with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
 +     sub {
 +        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:"])),
 +           "test bad pkcs12 file 1");
 +
 +        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:",
 +                    "-nomacver"])),
 +           "test bad pkcs12 file 1 (nomacver)");
 +
 +        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad2, "-password", "pass:"])),
 +           "test bad pkcs12 file 2");
 +
 +        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad3, "-password", "pass:"])),
 +           "test bad pkcs12 file 3");
 +     });
 +
 SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp));
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f3387c7e356e4aa374729f3f3939343557b9c09
 GIT binary patch
 literal 85
 zcmV-b0IL5mQvv}4Fbf6=Duzgg_YDCD0Wd)@F)$4V31Egu0c8UO0s#d81R(r{)waiY
 rfR=Py6XX<mRyon58xHv)BAVy}k(l(hJwF5pk-=q7<yb@T0s;sC$etR(
 literal 0
 HcmV?d00001
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..113cb6f1cd523e880db869f518e60142dc875115
 GIT binary patch
 literal 104
 zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8zIDI;AmiIz{|#&(B{FI%FM#V$jZQ?
 z@Tpc|>#<$m7-wj)xrauuD`}hF=<J_T`^8$QMBK7d>Ng9=0`~S~)@=J%OiUaM0Oze6
 AD*ylh
 literal 0
 HcmV?d00001
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef86a1d86fb0bc09471ca2596d82e7d521d973a4
 GIT binary patch
 literal 104
 zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8%fB((ZJAvmyI)_&4V$OnT3gwm4QWp
 zJ2GXlSm>oA$5$MVJL*60=F*5iN*C_e&wD%dwCM*q{=+OBX|Z+F7XSHN#>B+I003La
 BAqM~e
 literal 0
 HcmV?d00001
--- a/SOURCES/0136-CVE-2024-6119.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0136-CVE-2024-6119.patch
@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
 From 97ebe37033e8884f4cca5544a74376633c665e11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2024 21:04:11 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH] Avoid type errors in EAI-related name check logic.
 The incorrectly typed data is read only, used in a compare operation, so
 neither remote code execution, nor memory content disclosure were possible.
 However, applications performing certificate name checks were vulnerable to
 denial of service.
 The GENERAL_TYPE data type is a union, and we must take care to access the
 correct member, based on `gen->type`, not all the member fields have the same
 structure, and a segfault is possible if the wrong member field is read.
 The code in question was lightly refactored with the intent to make it more
 obviously correct.
 CVE-2024-6119
 (cherry picked from commit 1486960d6cdb052e4fc0109a56a0597b4e902ba1)
 ---
 crypto/x509/v3_utl.c                          | 78 +++++++++++++------
 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t               | 12 ++-
 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem    | 21 +++++
 .../25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem        | 16 ++++
 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh          | 41 ++++++++++
 5 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
 create mode 100755 test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
 diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
 index 1a18174995..a09414c972 100644
 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
 +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
@@ -916,36 +916,64 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
             ASN1_STRING *cstr;
             gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
 -            if ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)) {
 -                if (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
 -                    NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox) {
 -                    san_present = 1;
 -
 -                    /*
 -                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected and we
 -                     * treat it as no match
 -                     */
 -                    if (gen->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
 -                        cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
 -
 -                        /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
 -                        if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, 0, equal, flags,
 -                                                chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
 -                            break;
 -                    }
 -                } else
 +            switch (gen->type) {
 +            default:
 +                continue;
 +            case GEN_OTHERNAME:
 +		switch (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id)) {
 +                default:
                     continue;
 -            } else {
 -                if ((gen->type != check_type) && (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME))
 +                case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox:
 +                    /*-
 +                     * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8398#section-3
 +                     *
 +                     *   Due to name constraint compatibility reasons described
 +                     *   in Section 6, SmtpUTF8Mailbox subjectAltName MUST NOT
 +                     *   be used unless the local-part of the email address
 +                     *   contains non-ASCII characters. When the local-part is
 +                     *   ASCII, rfc822Name subjectAltName MUST be used instead
 +                     *   of SmtpUTF8Mailbox. This is compatible with legacy
 +                     *   software that supports only rfc822Name (and not
 +                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox). [...]
 +                     *
 +                     *   SmtpUTF8Mailbox is encoded as UTF8String.
 +                     *
 +                     * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected, and
 +                     * we ignore the invalid SAN (neither set san_present nor
 +                     * consider it a candidate for equality).  This does mean
 +                     * that the subject CN may be considered, as would be the
 +                     * case when the malformed SmtpUtf8Mailbox SAN is instead
 +                     * simply absent.
 +                     *
 +                     * When CN-ID matching is not desirable, applications can
 +                     * choose to turn it off, doing so is at this time a best
 +                     * practice.
 +                     */
 +                    if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL
 +                        || gen->d.otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
 +                        continue;
 +                    alt_type = 0;
 +                    cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
 +                    break;
 +                }
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_EMAIL:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL)
                     continue;
 -            }
 -            san_present = 1;
 -            if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
                 cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
 -            else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_DNS:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_DNS)
 +                    continue;
                 cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
 -            else
 +                break;
 +            case GEN_IPADD:
 +                if (check_type != GEN_IPADD)
 +                    continue;
                 cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
 +                break;
 +            }
 +            san_present = 1;
             /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
             if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
                                       chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
 index 522982ddfb..e18735d89a 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ setup("test_eai_data");
 #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_leaf.pem
 #./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_leaf.pem
 -plan tests => 12;
 +plan tests => 16;
 require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
 my $folder = "test/recipes/25-test_eai_data";
 my $ascii_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_leaf.pem");
 my $utf8_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_leaf.pem");
 +my $kdc_pem   = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-cert.pem");
 my $ascii_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_chain.pem");
 my $utf8_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_chain.pem");
 +my $kdc_chain_pem  = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-root-cert.pem");
 my $out;
 my $outcnt = 0;
@@ -56,10 +58,18 @@ SKIP: {
 ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
 ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
 ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
 ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem,  $ascii_pem])));
 +# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an DNS name, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_hostname", 'mx1.example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an email address, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
 +ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'joe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +# We expect SmtpUTF8Mailbox to be a UTF8 String, not an IA5String.
 +ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'moe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem,  $kdc_pem])));
 +
 #Check that we get the expected failure return code
 with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
      sub {
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..e8a2c6f55d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARSb290
 +MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxU
 +RVNULkVYQU1QTEUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC6wfP+
 +6go79dkpo/dGLMlPZ7Gw/Q6gUYrCWZWUEgEeRVHCrqOlgUEyA+PcWas/XDPUxXry
 +BQlJHLvlqamAQn8gs4QPBARFYWKNiTVGyaRkgNA1N5gqyZdrP9UE+ZJmdqxRAAe8
 +vvpGZWSgevPhLUiSCFYDiD0Rtji2Hm3rGUrReQFBQDEw2pNGwz9zIaxUs08kQZcx
 +Yzyiplz5Oau+R/6sAgUwDlrD9xOlUxx/tA/MSDIfkK8qioU11uUZtO5VjkNQy/bT
 +7zQMmXxWgm2MIgOs1u4YN7YGOtgqHE9v9iPHHfgrkbQDtVDGQsa8AQEhkUDSCtW9
 +3VFAKx6dGNXYzFwfAgMBAAGjgcgwgcUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFR5tZycW19DmtbL4Zqj
 +te1c2vZLMAkGA1UdIwQCMAAwCQYDVR0TBAIwADCBjQYDVR0RBIGFMIGCoD8GBisG
 +AQUCAqA1MDOgDhsMVEVTVC5FWEFNUExFoSEwH6ADAgEBoRgwFhsGa3JidGd0GwxU
 +RVNULkVYQU1QTEWgHQYIKwYBBQUHCAmgERYPbW9lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tgQ9qb2VA
 +ZXhhbXBsZS5jb22CD214MS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA
 +T0xzVtVpRtaOzIhgzw7XQUdzWD5UEGSJJ1cBCOmKUWwDLTAouCYLFB4TbEE7MMUb
 +iuMy60bjmVtvfJIXorGUgSadRe5RWJ5DamJWvPA0Q9x7blnEcXqEF+9Td+ypevgU
 +UYHFmg83OYwxOsFXZ5cRuXMk3WCsDHQIBi6D1L6oDDZ2pfArs5mqm3thQKVlqyl1
 +El3XRYEdqAz/5eCOFNfwxF0ALxjxVr/Z50StUZU8I7Zfev6+kHhyrR7dqzYJImv9
 +0fTCOBEMjIETDsrA70OxAMu4V16nrWZdJdvzblS2qrt97Omkj+2kiPAJFB76RpwI
 +oDQ9fKfUOAmUFth2/R/eGA==
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000000..a74c96bf31
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 +MIICnDCCAYQCCQCBswYcrlZSHjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARS
 +b290MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQD
 +DARSb290MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqRj8S4kBbIUj
 +61kZfi6nE35Q38U140+qt4uAiwAhKumfVHlBM0zQ98WFt5zMHIBQwIb3yjc2zj+0
 +qzUnQfwm1r/RfcMmBPEti9Ge+aEMSsds2gMXziOFM8wd2aAFPy7UVE0XpEWofsRK
 +MGi61MKVdPSbGIxBwY9VW38/7D/wf1HtJe7y0xpuecR7GB2XAs+qST59NjuF+7wS
 +dLM8Hb3TATgeYbXXWsRJgwz+SPzExg5WmLnU+7y4brZ32dHtdSmkRVSgSlaIf7Xj
 +3Tc6Zi7I+W/JYk7hy1zUexVdWCak4PHcoWrXe0gNNN/t8VfLfMExt5z/HIylXnU7
 +pGUyqZlTGQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAHpLF1UCRy7b6Hk0rLokxI
 +lgwiH9BU9mktigAGASvkbllpt+YbUbWnuYAvpHBGiP1qZtfX2r96UrSJaGO9BEzT
 +Gp9ThnSjoj4Srul0+s/NArU22irFLmDzbalgevAmm9gMGkdqkiIm/mXbwrPj0ncl
 +KGicevXryVpvaP62eZ8cc3C4p97frMmXxRX8sTdQpD/gRI7prdEILRSKveqT+AEW
 +7rFGM5AOevb4U8ddop8A3D/kX0wcCAIBF6jCNk3uEJ57jVcagL04kPnVfdRiedTS
 +vfq1DRNcD29d1H/9u0fHdSn1/+8Ep3X+afQ3C6//5NvOEaXcIGO4QSwkprQydfv8
 +-----END CERTIFICATE-----
 diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
 new file mode 100755
 index 0000000000..7a8dbc719f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 +#! /usr/bin/env bash
 +
 +# Create a root CA, signing a leaf cert with a KDC principal otherName SAN, and
 +# also a non-UTF8 smtpUtf8Mailbox SAN followed by an rfc822Name SAN and a DNS
 +# name SAN.  In the vulnerable EAI code, the KDC principal `otherName` should
 +# trigger ASAN errors in DNS name checks, while the non-UTF8 `smtpUtf8Mailbox`
 +# should likewise lead to ASAN issues with email name checks.
 +
 +rm -f root-key.pem root-cert.pem
 +openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-root-key.pem \
 +        -x509 -subj /CN=Root -days 36524 -out kdc-root-cert.pem
 +
 +exts=$(
 +    printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s = " \
 +        "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
 +        "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
 +        "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
 +        "subjectAltName"
 +    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name"
 +    printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9;IA5:moe@example.com"
 +    printf "%s, " "email:joe@example.com"
 +    printf "%s\n" "DNS:mx1.example.com"
 +    printf "[kdc_princ_name]\n"
 +    printf "realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
 +    printf "principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq\n"
 +    printf "[kdc_principal_seq]\n"
 +    printf "name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1\n"
 +    printf "name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_components\n"
 +    printf "[kdc_principal_components]\n"
 +    printf "princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt\n"
 +    printf "princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
 +    )
 +
 +printf "%s\n" "$exts"
 +
 +openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-key.pem \
 +    -subj "/CN=TEST.EXAMPLE" |
 +    openssl x509 -req -out kdc-cert.pem \
 +        -CA "kdc-root-cert.pem" -CAkey "kdc-root-key.pem" \
 +        -set_serial 2 -days 36524 \
 +        -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts")
--- a/SOURCES/README.FIPS
+++ b/SOURCES/README.FIPS
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
 User guide for the FIPS Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OpenSSL Module
 =================================================================
 This package contains libraries which comprise the FIPS 140-2
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OPENSSL Module.
 The module files
 ================
 /usr/lib[64]/libcrypto.so.1.1.0
 /usr/lib[64]/libssl.so.1.1.0
 /usr/lib[64]/.libcrypto.so.1.1.0.hmac
 /usr/lib[64]/.libssl.so.1.1.0.hmac
 Dependencies
 ============
 The approved mode of operation requires kernel with /dev/urandom RNG running
 with properties as defined in the security policy of the module. This is
 provided by kernel packages with validated Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel
 Crytographic Module.
 Installation
 ============
 The RPM package of the module can be installed by standard tools recommended
 for installation of RPM packages on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (yum,
 rpm, RHN remote management tool).
 The RPM package dracut-fips must be installed for the approved mode of
 operation.
 Usage and API
 =============
 The module respects kernel command line FIPS setting. If the kernel command
 line contains option fips=1 the module will initialize in the FIPS approved
 mode of operation automatically. To allow for the automatic initialization the
 application using the module has to call one of the following API calls:
 - void OPENSSL_init_library(void) - this will do only a basic initialization
 of the library and does initialization of the FIPS approved mode without setting
 up EVP API with supported algorithms.
 - void OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) - this API function calls
 OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also adds all approved algorithms to the EVP API
 in the approved mode 
 - void SSL_library_init(void) - it calls OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also
 adds algorithms which are necessary for TLS protocol support and initializes
 the SSL library.
 To explicitely put the library to the approved mode the application can call
 the following function:
 - int FIPS_mode_set(int on) - if called with 1 as a parameter it will switch
 the library from the non-approved to the approved mode. If any of the selftests
 and integrity verification tests fail, the library is put into the error state
 and 0 is returned. If they succeed the return value is 1.
 To query the module whether it is in the approved mode or not:
 - int FIPS_mode(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the approved mode,
 0 otherwise.
 To query whether the module is in the error state:
 - int FIPS_selftest_failed(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the error
 state, 0 otherwise.
 To zeroize the FIPS RNG key and internal state the application calls:
 - void RAND_cleanup(void)
--- a/SOURCES/configuration-switch.h
+++ b/SOURCES/configuration-switch.h
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
 /* This file is here to prevent a file conflict on multiarch systems.  A
 * conflict will frequently occur because arch-specific build-time
 * configuration options are stored (and used, so they can't just be stripped
 * out) in configuration.h.  The original configuration.h has been renamed.
 * DO NOT INCLUDE THE NEW FILE DIRECTLY -- ALWAYS INCLUDE THIS ONE INSTEAD. */
 #ifdef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
 #error "Do not define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h!"
 #endif
 #define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
 #if defined(__i386__)
 #include "configuration-i386.h"
 #elif defined(__ia64__)
 #include "configuration-ia64.h"
 #elif defined(__mips64) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
 #include "configuration-mips64el.h"
 #elif defined(__mips64)
 #include "configuration-mips64.h"
 #elif defined(__mips) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
 #include "configuration-mipsel.h"
 #elif defined(__mips)
 #include "configuration-mips.h"
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__)
 #include <endian.h>
 #if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
 #include "configuration-ppc64.h"
 #else
 #include "configuration-ppc64le.h"
 #endif
 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
 #include "configuration-ppc.h"
 #elif defined(__s390x__)
 #include "configuration-s390x.h"
 #elif defined(__s390__)
 #include "configuration-s390.h"
 #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)
 #include "configuration-sparc64.h"
 #elif defined(__sparc__)
 #include "configuration-sparc.h"
 #elif defined(__x86_64__)
 #include "configuration-x86_64.h"
 #else
 #error "The openssl-devel package does not work your architecture?"
 #endif
 #undef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
--- a/SOURCES/ec_curve.c
+++ b/SOURCES/ec_curve.c
@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
 /*
 * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
 *
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */
 #include <string.h>
 #include "ec_local.h"
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 typedef struct {
    int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
     seed_len, param_len;
    unsigned int cofactor;      /* promoted to BN_ULONG */
 } EC_CURVE_DATA;
 /* the nist prime curves */
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F,
        0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
        /* b */
        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
        /* x */
        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
        /* y */
        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A,
        0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
        0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
        0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
        0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
        /* x */
        0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
        0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
        0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
        0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
        /* y */
        0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
        0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
        0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
        0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
        0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6];
 } _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17,
        0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA,
        /* p */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
        0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
        0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
        0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
        0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
        0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
        /* x */
        0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
        0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
        0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
        0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
        0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
        0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
        /* y */
        0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
        0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
        0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
        0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
        0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
        0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
        /* order */
        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
        0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
        0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
        0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
 } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1
    },
    {
        /* seed */
        0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1,
        0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90,
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        /* a */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
        /* b */
        0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
        0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
        0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
        /* x */
        0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
        0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
        0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
        /* y */
        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
        0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
        0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
        0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
    }
 };
 static const struct {
    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
 } _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
    {
        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
    },
    {
        /* no seed */
        /* p */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F,
        /* a */
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        /* b */
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
        /* x */
        0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95,
        0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9,
        0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98,
        /* y */
        0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc,
        0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19,
        0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8,
        /* order */
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B,
        0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
    }
 };
 typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
    int nid;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
    const char *comment;
 } ec_list_element;
 static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
    /* prime field curves */
    /* secg curves */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #else
    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
 #endif
    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
     "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
    /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
 #else
    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
 #endif
    /* X9.62 curves */
    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
 #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
     EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
 #else
     0,
 #endif
     "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
 };
 #define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
 static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
 {
    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
    EC_POINT *P = NULL;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order =
        NULL;
    int ok = 0;
    int seed_len, param_len;
    const EC_METHOD *meth;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const unsigned char *params;
    /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */
    if (curve.data == NULL)
        return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL);
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
    data = curve.data;
    seed_len = data->seed_len;
    param_len = data->param_len;
    params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
    params += seed_len;         /* skip seed */
    if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (curve.meth != 0) {
        meth = curve.meth();
        if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
            (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
    else {                      /* field_type ==
                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
 #endif
    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
    if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, P, x, y, ctx)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
        || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (seed_len) {
        if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) {
            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
    ok = 1;
 err:
    if (!ok) {
        EC_GROUP_free(group);
        group = NULL;
    }
    EC_POINT_free(P);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    BN_free(p);
    BN_free(a);
    BN_free(b);
    BN_free(order);
    BN_free(x);
    BN_free(y);
    return group;
 }
 EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
 {
    size_t i;
    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
    if (nid <= 0)
        return NULL;
    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
        if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
            ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
            break;
        }
    if (ret == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
        return NULL;
    }
    return ret;
 }
 size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
 {
    size_t i, min;
    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
        return curve_list_length;
    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
    }
    return curve_list_length;
 }
 /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
 typedef struct {
    const char *name;           /* NIST Name of curve */
    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
 } EC_NIST_NAME;
 static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = {
    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
    {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
    {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
    {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
    {"P-521", NID_secp521r1}
 };
 const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid)
 {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
        if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid)
            return nist_curves[i].name;
    }
    return NULL;
 }
 int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
 {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
        if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0)
            return nist_curves[i].nid;
    }
    return NID_undef;
 }
 #define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
 /*
 * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
 * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
 * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
 *
 * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
 *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
 */
 int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
    size_t i, seed_len;
    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
    const EC_METHOD *meth;
    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
    if (meth == NULL)
        return -1;
    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
    cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    /*
     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
     */
    param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order);
    len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
    if (len > param_len)
        param_len = len;
    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
    if (param_bytes == NULL)
        goto end;
    /* Create the bignums */
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
            goto end;
    }
    /*
     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
     */
    /* Get p, a & b */
    if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
        /* Get x & y */
        && EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
        /* Get order */
        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
        goto end;
   /*
     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
        if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
            goto end;
    }
    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
        data = curve.data;
        /* Get the raw order byte data */
        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
        if (data->field_type == field_type
            && param_len == data->param_len
            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
                             == 0) {
            ret = curve.nid;
            goto end;
        }
    }
    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
    ret = NID_undef;
 end:
    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    return ret;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/ectest.c
+++ b/SOURCES/ectest.c
--- a/SOURCES/genpatches
+++ b/SOURCES/genpatches
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 if [ $# -ne 2 ] ; then
    echo "Usage:"
    echo "   $0 <git-dir> <base-tag>"
    exit 1
 fi
 git_dir="$1"
 base_tag="$2"
 target_dir="$(pwd)"
 pushd "$git_dir" >/dev/null
 git format-patch -k -o "$target_dir" "$base_tag" >/dev/null
 popd >/dev/null
 echo "# Patches exported from source git"
 i=1
 for p in *.patch ; do
    printf "# "
    sed '/^Subject:/{s/^Subject: //;p};d' "$p"
    printf "Patch%s: %s\n" $i "$p"
    i=$(($i + 1))
 done
--- a/SOURCES/hobble-openssl
+++ b/SOURCES/hobble-openssl
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # Quit out if anything fails.
 set -e
 # Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
 # MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007 - expired, we do not remove it but do not enable it anyway
 # IDEA:  5,214,703 07/01/2012 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # RC5:   5,724,428 01/11/2015 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # EC:    ????????? ??/??/2020
 # SRP:   ????????? ??/??/2017 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
 # Remove assembler portions of IDEA, MDC2, and RC5.
 # (find crypto/rc5/asm -type f | xargs -r rm -fv)
 for c in `find crypto/bn -name "*gf2m.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for c in `find crypto/ec -name "ec2*.c" -o -name "ec_curve.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for c in `find test -name "ectest.c"`; do
 	echo Destroying $c
 	> $c
 done
 for h in `find crypto ssl apps test -name "*.h"` ; do
 	echo Removing EC2M references from $h
 	cat $h | \
 	awk    'BEGIN {ech=1;} \
 		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC2M/ {ech--; next;} \
                /^#[ \t]*if/ {if(ech < 1) ech--;} \
 		{if(ech>0) {;print $0};} \
 		/^#[ \t]*endif/ {if(ech < 1) ech++;}' > $h.hobbled && \
 	mv $h.hobbled $h
 done
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
 From a3f4cd5019b60649f6eb216ebe99caa43cd96f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:40:17 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] BIO_lookup_ex: use AI_ADDRCONFIG only if explicit host name
 is given
 The flag only affects which record types are queried (A or AAAA, or
 both), and when node is NULL, it prevents getaddrinfo returning the
 right address associated with the loopback interface.
 Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
 ---
 crypto/bio/b_addr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
 index b023bbda40..ea15601f3d 100644
 --- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
 +++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
         hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
 # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
 #  ifdef AF_UNSPEC
 -        if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
 +        if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC)
 #  endif
             hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
 # endif
 -- 
 2.30.2
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
 commit 9e885a707d604e9528b5491b78fb9c00f41193fc
 Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
 Date:   Thu Mar 26 15:59:00 2020 +0100
    s_server: Properly indicate ALPN protocol mismatch
    Return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from alpn_select_cb so that
    an alert is sent to the client on ALPN protocol mismatch.
    Fixes: #2708
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11415)
 diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
 index bcc83e562c..591c6c19c5 100644
 --- a/apps/s_server.c
 +++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
     if (SSL_select_next_proto
         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
          inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
 -        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 +        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
     }
     if (!s_quiet) {
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst	2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c	2019-03-15 15:53:46.622267688 +0100
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
     {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's',
      "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"},
     {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"},
 -    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"},
 +    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; see openssl help for list"},
     {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"},
     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"},
     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf
 --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build	2020-03-31 14:17:45.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ my %targets = (
         cxxflags         => add("-m64"),
         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-armv4" => {
@@ -718,6 +719,7 @@ my %targets = (
     "linux-aarch64" => {
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
 +        multilib         => "64",
     },
     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
 --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2020-04-07 16:44:23.539142108 +0200
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ uninstall_runtime_libs:
 install_man_docs:
 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing manpages"
 -	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 +	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)" --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX)
 uninstall_man_docs:
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ uninstall_man_docs:
 install_html_docs:
 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing HTML manpages"
 -	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 +	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR)" --type=html
 uninstall_html_docs:
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
 --- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 #endif
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
 static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_de
         TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
         | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
 -        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
 +        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
         tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
         final_ec_pt_formats
     },
@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
 }
 #endif
 +static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 +{
 +	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
 +	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
 +	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
 +
 +	    return 1;
 +}
 +
 static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 {
     s->ext.use_etm = 0;
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in
 --- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in.conf-paths	2018-06-20 16:48:09.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/CA.pl.in	2018-07-25 17:26:58.388624296 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
 my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
 # default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following
 -my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
 +my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
 my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
 my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
 my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
 diff -up openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf.conf-paths	2018-07-25 17:26:58.378624057 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.1.1-pre8/apps/openssl.cnf	2018-07-27 13:20:08.198513471 +0200
@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ oid_section		= new_oids
 # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only
 # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.)
 +# Load default TLS policy configuration
 +
 +openssl_conf = default_modules
 +
 +[ default_modules ]
 +
 +ssl_conf = ssl_module
 +
 +[ ssl_module ]
 +
 +system_default = crypto_policy
 +
 +[ crypto_policy ]
 +
 +.include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
 +
 [ new_oids ]
 # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'.
@@ -43,7 +59,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
 ####################################################################
 [ CA_default ]
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
 certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
 crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
 database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
@@ -329,7 +345,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
 [ tsa_config1 ]
 # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
 -dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
 +dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
 serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
 crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
 signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-0778.patch
@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
 From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
 The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
 This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
 Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 From b5fcb7e133725b8b2eb66f63f5142710ed63a6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:30 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Add documentation of BN_mod_sqrt()
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 doc/man3/BN_add.pod | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 From 3ef5c3034e5c545f34d6929568f3f2b10ac4bdf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:35 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Add a negative testcase for BN_mod_sqrt
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 ---
 test/bntest.c                          | 11 ++++++++++-
 test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
 index 1723d5ded5a8..53b0f559855c 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 /*
  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
 - * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
 + * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
 + * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
  */
 {
     BIGNUM *ret = in;
@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
             goto vrfy;
         }
 -        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
 -        i = 1;
 -        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
 -            goto end;
 -        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
 -            i++;
 -            if (i == e) {
 -                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
 -                goto end;
 +        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
 +        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
 +            if (i == 1) {
 +                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
 +                    goto end;
 +
 +            } else {
 +                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
 +                    goto end;
             }
 -            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
 -                goto end;
 +            if (BN_is_one(t))
 +                break;
 +        }
 +        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
 +        if (i >= e) {
 +            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
 +            goto end;
         }
         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
 diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
 index dccd4790ede7..1f5e37a4d183 100644
 --- a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
 +++ b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 =head1 NAME
 BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
 -BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
 +BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
 arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
  int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
 + BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
 +
  int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
  int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -87,6 +89,12 @@ L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>.
 BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
 result in I<r>.
 +BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I<a> such that
 +C<in^2 = a (mod p)>. The modulus I<p> must be a
 +prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned.
 +The result is stored into I<in> which can be NULL. The result will be
 +newly allocated in that case.
 +
 BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
 (C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
 BN_mul().
@@ -108,7 +116,10 @@ the arguments.
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 -For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
 +The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I<p> is
 +not a prime), or NULL.
 +
 +For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
 value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
 The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
 diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
 index 390dd800733e..1cab660bcafb 100644
 --- a/test/bntest.c
 +++ b/test/bntest.c
@@ -1729,8 +1729,17 @@ static int file_modsqrt(STANZA *s)
             || !TEST_ptr(ret2 = BN_new()))
         goto err;
 +    if (BN_is_negative(mod_sqrt)) {
 +        /* A negative testcase */
 +        if (!TEST_ptr_null(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx)))
 +            goto err;
 +
 +        st = 1;
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
     /* There are two possible answers. */
 -    if (!TEST_true(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
 +    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_mod_sqrt(ret, a, p, ctx))
             || !TEST_true(BN_sub(ret2, p, ret)))
         goto err;
 diff --git a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
 index 5ea4d031f271..e28cc6bfb02e 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/10-test_bn_data/bnmod.txt
@@ -2799,3 +2799,15 @@ P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
 ModSqrt = a1d52989f12f204d3d2167d9b1e6c8a6174c0c786a979a5952383b7b8bd186
 A = 2eee37cf06228a387788188e650bc6d8a2ff402931443f69156a29155eca07dcb45f3aac238d92943c0c25c896098716baa433f25bd696a142f5a69d5d937e81
 P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
 +
 +# Negative testcases for BN_mod_sqrt()
 +
 +# This one triggers an infinite loop with unfixed implementation
 +# It should just fail.
 +ModSqrt = -1
 +A = 20a7ee
 +P = 460201
 +
 +ModSqrt = -1
 +A = 65bebdb00a96fc814ec44b81f98b59fba3c30203928fa5214c51e0a97091645280c947b005847f239758482b9bfc45b066fde340d1fe32fc9c1bf02e1b2d0ed
 +P = 9df9d6cc20b8540411af4e5357ef2b0353cb1f2ab5ffc3e246b41c32f71e951f
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-1292.patch
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
 From e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 12:40:24 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] c_rehash: Do not use shell to invoke openssl
 Except on VMS where it is safe.
 This fixes CVE-2022-1292.
 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e5fd1728ef4c7a5bf7c7a7163ca60370460a6e23]
 ---
 tools/c_rehash.in | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
 index fa7c6c9fef91..83c1cc80e08a 100644
 --- a/tools/c_rehash.in
 +++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -152,6 +152,23 @@ sub check_file {
 	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 }
 +sub compute_hash {
 +    my $fh;
 +    if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) {
 +        # VMS uses the open through shell
 +        # The file names are safe there and list form is unsupported
 +        if (!open($fh, "-|", join(' ', @_))) {
 +            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +    } else {
 +        if (!open($fh, "-|", @_)) {
 +            print STDERR "Cannot compute hash on '$fname'\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +    }
 +    return (<$fh>, <$fh>);
 +}
 # Link a certificate to its subject name hash value, each hash is of
 # the form <hash>.<n> where n is an integer. If the hash value already exists
@@ -161,10 +178,12 @@ sub check_file {
 sub link_hash_cert {
 		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		$fname =~ s/\"/\\\"/g;
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" x509 $x509hash -fingerprint -noout -in "$fname"`;
 +		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
 +						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +						   "-in", $fname);
 		chomp $hash;
 		chomp $fprint;
 +		return if !$hash;
 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 		my $suffix = 0;
@@ -202,10 +221,12 @@ sub link_hash_cert {
 sub link_hash_crl {
 		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		$fname =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = `"$openssl" crl $crlhash -fingerprint -noout -in '$fname'`;
 +		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
 +						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +						   "-in", $fname);
 		chomp $hash;
 		chomp $fprint;
 +		return if !$hash;
 		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 		my $suffix = 0;
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2068.patch
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
 From 9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Daniel Fiala <daniel@openssl.org>
 Date: Sun, 29 May 2022 20:11:24 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix file operations in c_rehash.
 CVE-2022-2068
 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9639817dac8bbbaa64d09efad7464ccc405527c7]
 ---
 tools/c_rehash.in | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/tools/c_rehash.in b/tools/c_rehash.in
 index cfd18f5da110..9d2a6f6db73b 100644
 --- a/tools/c_rehash.in
 +++ b/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -104,52 +104,78 @@ foreach (@dirlist) {
 }
 exit($errorcount);
 +sub copy_file {
 +    my ($src_fname, $dst_fname) = @_;
 +
 +    if (open(my $in, "<", $src_fname)) {
 +        if (open(my $out, ">", $dst_fname)) {
 +            print $out $_ while (<$in>);
 +            close $out;
 +        } else {
 +            warn "Cannot open $dst_fname for write, $!";
 +        }
 +        close $in;
 +    } else {
 +        warn "Cannot open $src_fname for read, $!";
 +    }
 +}
 +
 sub hash_dir {
 -	my %hashlist;
 -	print "Doing $_[0]\n";
 -	chdir $_[0];
 -	opendir(DIR, ".");
 -	my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
 -	closedir DIR;
 -	if ( $removelinks ) {
 -		# Delete any existing symbolic links
 -		foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
 -			if (-l $_) {
 -				print "unlink $_" if $verbose;
 -				unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -	FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
 -		# Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
 -		my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
 -		if (!$cert && !$crl) {
 -			print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
 -			next;
 -		}
 -		link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
 -		link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
 -	}
 +    my $dir = shift;
 +    my %hashlist;
 +
 +    print "Doing $dir\n";
 +
 +    if (!chdir $dir) {
 +        print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot chdir to '$dir', $!\n";
 +        return;
 +    }
 +
 +    opendir(DIR, ".") || print STDERR "WARNING: Cannot opendir '.', $!\n";
 +    my @flist = sort readdir(DIR);
 +    closedir DIR;
 +    if ( $removelinks ) {
 +        # Delete any existing symbolic links
 +        foreach (grep {/^[\da-f]+\.r{0,1}\d+$/} @flist) {
 +            if (-l $_) {
 +                print "unlink $_\n" if $verbose;
 +                unlink $_ || warn "Can't unlink $_, $!\n";
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +    FILE: foreach $fname (grep {/\.(pem)|(crt)|(cer)|(crl)$/} @flist) {
 +        # Check to see if certificates and/or CRLs present.
 +        my ($cert, $crl) = check_file($fname);
 +        if (!$cert && !$crl) {
 +            print STDERR "WARNING: $fname does not contain a certificate or CRL: skipping\n";
 +            next;
 +        }
 +        link_hash_cert($fname) if ($cert);
 +        link_hash_crl($fname) if ($crl);
 +    }
 +
 +    chdir $pwd;
 }
 sub check_file {
 -	my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
 -	my $fname = $_[0];
 -	open IN, $fname;
 -	while(<IN>) {
 -		if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
 -			my $hdr = $1;
 -			if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
 -				$is_cert = 1;
 -				last if ($is_crl);
 -			} elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
 -				$is_crl = 1;
 -				last if ($is_cert);
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -	close IN;
 -	return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 +    my ($is_cert, $is_crl) = (0,0);
 +    my $fname = $_[0];
 +
 +    open(my $in, "<", $fname);
 +    while(<$in>) {
 +        if (/^-----BEGIN (.*)-----/) {
 +            my $hdr = $1;
 +            if ($hdr =~ /^(X509 |TRUSTED |)CERTIFICATE$/) {
 +                $is_cert = 1;
 +                last if ($is_crl);
 +            } elsif ($hdr eq "X509 CRL") {
 +                $is_crl = 1;
 +                last if ($is_cert);
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +    close $in;
 +    return ($is_cert, $is_crl);
 }
 sub compute_hash {
@@ -177,76 +203,48 @@ sub compute_hash {
 # certificate fingerprints
 sub link_hash_cert {
 -		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "x509", $x509hash,
 -						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 -						   "-in", $fname);
 -		chomp $hash;
 -		chomp $fprint;
 -		return if !$hash;
 -		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 -		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 -		my $suffix = 0;
 -		# Search for an unused hash filename
 -		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"}) {
 -			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 -			if ($hashlist{"$hash.$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 -				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate certificate $fname\n";
 -				return;
 -			}
 -			$suffix++;
 -		}
 -		$hash .= ".$suffix";
 -		if ($symlink_exists) {
 -			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 -		} else {
 -			print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -                        if (open($in, "<", $fname)) {
 -                            if (open($out,">", $hash)) {
 -                                print $out $_ while (<$in>);
 -                                close $out;
 -                            } else {
 -                                warn "can't open $hash for write, $!";
 -                            }
 -                            close $in;
 -                        } else {
 -                            warn "can't open $fname for read, $!";
 -                        }
 -		}
 -		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 +    link_hash($_[0], 'cert');
 }
 # Same as above except for a CRL. CRL links are of the form <hash>.r<n>
 sub link_hash_crl {
 -		my $fname = $_[0];
 -		my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl, "crl", $crlhash,
 -						   "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 -						   "-in", $fname);
 -		chomp $hash;
 -		chomp $fprint;
 -		return if !$hash;
 -		$fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 -		$fprint =~ tr/://d;
 -		my $suffix = 0;
 -		# Search for an unused hash filename
 -		while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"}) {
 -			# Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 -			if ($hashlist{"$hash.r$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 -				print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate CRL $fname\n";
 -				return;
 -			}
 -			$suffix++;
 -		}
 -		$hash .= ".r$suffix";
 -		if ($symlink_exists) {
 -			print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 -		} else {
 -			print "cp $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 -			system ("cp", $fname, $hash);
 -                        warn "Can't copy, $!" if ($? >> 8) != 0;
 -		}
 -		$hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 +    link_hash($_[0], 'crl');
 +}
 +
 +sub link_hash {
 +    my ($fname, $type) = @_;
 +    my $is_cert = $type eq 'cert';
 +
 +    my ($hash, $fprint) = compute_hash($openssl,
 +                                       $is_cert ? "x509" : "crl",
 +                                       $is_cert ? $x509hash : $crlhash,
 +                                       "-fingerprint", "-noout",
 +                                       "-in", $fname);
 +    chomp $hash;
 +    chomp $fprint;
 +    return if !$hash;
 +    $fprint =~ s/^.*=//;
 +    $fprint =~ tr/://d;
 +    my $suffix = 0;
 +    # Search for an unused hash filename
 +    my $crlmark = $is_cert ? "" : "r";
 +    while(exists $hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"}) {
 +        # Hash matches: if fingerprint matches its a duplicate cert
 +        if ($hashlist{"$hash.$crlmark$suffix"} eq $fprint) {
 +            my $what = $is_cert ? 'certificate' : 'CRL';
 +            print STDERR "WARNING: Skipping duplicate $what $fname\n";
 +            return;
 +        }
 +        $suffix++;
 +    }
 +    $hash .= ".$crlmark$suffix";
 +    if ($symlink_exists) {
 +        print "link $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 +        symlink $fname, $hash || warn "Can't symlink, $!";
 +    } else {
 +        print "copy $fname -> $hash\n" if $verbose;
 +        copy_file($fname, $hash);
 +    }
 +    $hashlist{$hash} = $fprint;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-2097.patch
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 From 919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
 Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:00:22 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES OCB encrypt/decrypt for x86 AES-NI
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt operate by having a fast-path
 that performs operations on 6 16-byte blocks concurrently (the
 "grandloop") and then proceeds to handle the "short" tail (which can
 be anywhere from 0 to 5 blocks) that remain.
 As part of initialization, the assembly initializes $len to the true
 length, less 96 bytes and converts it to a pointer so that the $inp
 can be compared to it. Each iteration of "grandloop" checks to see if
 there's a full 96-byte chunk to process, and if so, continues. Once
 this has been exhausted, it falls through to "short", which handles
 the remaining zero to five blocks.
 Unfortunately, the jump at the end of "grandloop" had a fencepost
 error, doing a `jb` ("jump below") rather than `jbe` (jump below or
 equal). This should be `jbe`, as $inp is pointing to the *end* of the
 chunk currently being handled. If $inp == $len, that means that
 there's a whole 96-byte chunk waiting to be handled. If $inp > $len,
 then there's 5 or fewer 16-byte blocks left to be handled, and the
 fall-through is intended.
 The net effect of `jb` instead of `jbe` is that the last 16-byte block
 of the last 96-byte chunk was completely omitted. The contents of
 `out` in this position were never written to. Additionally, since
 those bytes were never processed, the authentication tag generated is
 also incorrect.
 The same fencepost error, and identical logic, exists in both
 aesni_ocb_encrypt and aesni_ocb_decrypt.
 This addresses CVE-2022-2097.
 Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
 Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/919925673d6c9cfed3c1085497f5dfbbed5fc431]
 ---
 crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
 index fe2b26542ab6..812758e02e04 100644
 --- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
 +++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4);
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
 -	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
 +	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
 &set_label("short");
 	&add		($len,16*6);
@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ sub aesni_generate6
 	&pxor		($rndkey1,$inout5);
 	&movdqu		(&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5);
 	&cmp		($inp,$len);			# done yet?
 -	&jb		(&label("grandloop"));
 +	&jbe		(&label("grandloop"));
 &set_label("short");
 	&add		($len,16*6);
 From 9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alex Chernyakhovsky <achernya@google.com>
 Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 12:02:37 +1000
 Subject: [PATCH] AES OCB test vectors
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Add test vectors for AES OCB for x86 AES-NI multiple of 96 byte issue.
 Co-authored-by: Alejandro Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
 Co-authored-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9131afdca30b6d1650af9ea6179569a80ab8cb06]
 ---
 test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
 index 1c02ea1e9c2d..e12670d9a4b4 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
 +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
@@ -1188,6 +1188,56 @@ Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B21
 Operation = DECRYPT
 Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR
 +#Test vectors generated to validate aesni_ocb_encrypt on x86
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = C14DFF7D62A13C4A3422456207453190
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B819333
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = D47D84F6FF912C79B6A4223AB9BE2DB8
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC204
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 41970D13737B7BD1B5FBF49ED4412CA5
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = BE0228651ED4E48A11BDED68D953F3A0
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 17BC6E10B16E5FDC52836E7D589518C7
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = E84AAC18666116990A3A37B3A5FC55BD
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED
 +
 +Cipher = aes-128-ocb
 +Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 +IV = 000000000001020304050607
 +Tag = 3E5EA7EE064FE83B313E28D411E91EAD
 +Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D
 +Ciphertext = F5186C9CC3506386919B6FD9443956E05B203313F8AB35E916AB36932EBDDCD2945901BABE7CF29404929F322F954C916065FABF8F1E52F4BD7C538C0F96899519DBC6BC504D837D8EBD1436B45D33F528CB642FA2EB2C403FE604C12B8193332374120A78A1171D23ED9E9CB1ADC20412C017AD0CA498827C768DDD99B26E91EDB8681700FF30366F07AEDE8CEACC1F39BE69B91BC808FA7A193F7EEA43137B11CF99263D693AEBDF8ADE1A1D838DED48D9E09F452F8E6FBEB76A3DED47611C
 +
 Title = AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007
 # Using the same key twice for encryption is always banned.
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 8e257b86e5812c6e1cfa9e8e5f5660ac7bed899d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:03:40 +0000
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 03/18] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
 A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
 implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
@ -14,20 +14,23 @@ Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
 CVE-2022-4304
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
 crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
 crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
 crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
- crypto/bn/build.info    |   2 +-
+ crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
- crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 604 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  19 +-
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
- include/crypto/bn.h     |   6 +
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
- 6 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+ include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
 include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-index 72457b34cf..6061ebb4c0 100644
+index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
@ -51,11 +54,24 @@ index 72457b34cf..6061ebb4c0 100644
 BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
 {
     BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
 index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
 +    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
 +    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-index c9a7ecf298..8c428f919d 100644
+index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
+@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
     } cb;
 };
@ -77,24 +93,25 @@ index c9a7ecf298..8c428f919d 100644
  * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
  *
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
-index c4ba51b265..f4ff619239 100644
+index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/build.info
 +++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ $COMMON=bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c \
+@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
-         bn_mod.c bn_conv.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \
+         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
-         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_sqr.c \
+         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
         bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
-        bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c
+-        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
-+        bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c rsa_sup_mul.c
+        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
- SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON $BNASM bn_print.c bn_err.c bn_srp.c
+        rsa_sup_mul.c
- DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$BNDEF
+ 
- IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
+ INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
+index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
 +#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
 +#include <stddef.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
@ -102,7 +119,6 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +#include <openssl/bn.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
 +#include "internal/endian.h"
 +#include "internal/numbers.h"
 +#include "internal/constant_time.h"
 +#include "bn_local.h"
@ -110,7 +126,8 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +# if BN_BYTES == 8
 +typedef uint64_t limb_t;
 +#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
-+typedef uint128_t limb2_t;
+/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
 +typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
 +#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
 +#  endif
 +#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
@ -536,7 +553,7 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +
 +    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
 +    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
-+        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum-1] * ni0, tmp2);
+        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
 +        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
 +        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
 +        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
@ -564,38 +581,48 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
 +static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
 +{
-+    uint64_t big = 0;
+    const union {
-+    DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
+        long one;
 +        char little;
 +    } is_endian = { 1 };
 +
-+    if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    if (is_endian.little) {
 +        uint64_t big = 0;
 +
 +        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
 +        return big;
 +    } else {
 +        return host;
-+
+    }
 +    big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
 +    big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
 +    big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
 +    big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
 +    big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
 +    big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
 +    big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
 +    big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
 +    return big;
 +}
 +
 +#else
 +/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
 +static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
 +{
-+    uint32_t big = 0;
+    const union {
-+    DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
+        long one;
 +        char little;
 +    } is_endian = { 1 };
 +
-+    if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    if (is_endian.little) {
 +        uint32_t big = 0;
 +
 +        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
 +        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
 +        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
 +        return big;
 +    } else {
 +        return host;
-+
+    }
 +    big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
 +    big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
 +    big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
 +    big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
 +    return big;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
@ -666,7 +693,7 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +
 +    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
 +    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
@ -699,11 +726,29 @@ index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
 diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
 --- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
 +++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 +# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 #
 # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
 BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
 BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
 BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
 +BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
 BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-index 381c659352..7e8b791fba 100644
+index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-@@ -469,13 +469,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         BN_free(d);
     }
@ -720,8 +765,6 @@ index 381c659352..7e8b791fba 100644
             goto err;
 -
 -    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 -    if (j < 0)
 -        goto err;
 +    } else {
 +        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 +        if (j < 0)
@ -731,20 +774,32 @@ index 381c659352..7e8b791fba 100644
     switch (padding) {
     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
-index cf69bea848..cd45654210 100644
+index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/bn.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
-@@ -114,4 +114,10 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_bn_get_libctx(BN_CTX *ctx);
+@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- 
+ int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- extern const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2;
+ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
- 
+                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
 +int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
 +                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
 +                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
 +                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
 +                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+
+ 
 #endif
 diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
 index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
 --- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
 +++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
 # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
 # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
 +# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
 /*
  * BN reason codes.
 -- 
 2.39.1
--- a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 63bcf189be73a9cc1264059bed6f57974be74a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From bbcf509bd046b34cca19c766bbddc31683d0858b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 04/18] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
 PEM_read_bio_ex
 In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
@ -23,26 +23,26 @@ Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-index f9ff80162a..85c47fb627 100644
+index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-@@ -989,7 +989,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
+@@ -957,7 +957,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
- 
+     *data = pem_malloc(len, flags);
- out_free:
+     if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) {
-     pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
+         pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
-+    *header = NULL;
+        *header = NULL;
-     pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
+         pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
-+    *data = NULL;
+        *data = NULL;
- end:
+         goto end;
-     EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+     }
-     pem_free(name, flags, 0);
+     BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
 -- 
 2.39.1
-From cbafa34b5a057794c5c08cd4657038e1f643c1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2bd611267868a008afa576846ba71566bd0d4d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 05/18] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
 Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
 ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
-index a8d2d49bb5..a5d28cb256 100644
+index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
 --- a/test/pemtest.c
 +++ b/test/pemtest.c
-@@ -96,6 +96,35 @@ static int test_cert_key_cert(void)
+@@ -83,9 +83,39 @@ static int test_invalid(void)
     return 1;
 }
@ -93,11 +93,8 @@ index a8d2d49bb5..a5d28cb256 100644
 +
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     if (!TEST_ptr(pemfile = test_get_argument(0)))
@@ -103,5 +132,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
     ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
     ADD_TEST(test_cert_key_cert);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
     return 1;
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz`	`SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz`
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`f20736d6aae36bcbfa9aba0d358c71601833bf27 SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz`	`6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz`