Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dmitry Belyavskiy
2c5c3fcced Rebasing to OpenSSL 3.2.1
Resolves: RHEL-26271
2024-04-15 10:41:31 +02:00
Clemens Lang
9a075c13c3 Mark RSA-OAEP as approved in FIPS mode
Switch explicit FIPS indicator for RSA-OAEP to approved following
clarification with CMVP. Additionally, backport a check required by
SP800-56Br2 6.4.1.2.1 (3.c).

Resolves: RHEL-14083
2023-10-26 12:42:29 +02:00
Clemens Lang
0dea6db970 Change explicit FIPS indicator for RSA decryption to unapproved
Resolves: rhbz#2179379
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
2023-03-24 16:00:24 +01:00
Clemens Lang
1bd2a0cee3 Add missing patchfile, fix gettable params
Add the patchfile that was committed but not referenced in the spec
file. Fix the patch to apply on openssl 3.0.7 and fix the gettable FIPS
indicator parameter for the RSA asymmetric cipher implementation.

Resolves: rhbz#2179379
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
2023-03-21 12:08:19 +01:00
Clemens Lang
1bd49c394a Add explicit FIPS indicator to RSA encryption and RSASVE
NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and key
agreement schemes, but explicit key confirmation is not implemented and
cannot be implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider
does not implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on
its callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP encryption and RSASVE
as unapproved until we have received clarification from NIST on how
library modules such as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation.

This does not affect RSA-OAEP decryption, because it is approved as
a component according to the FIPS 140-3 IG, section 2.4.G.

Resolves: rhbz#2179379
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
2023-03-17 16:54:55 +01:00