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Redefine sslarch for x86_64_v2 arch

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This commit is contained in:
Eduard Abdullin 2025-02-18 17:46:53 +03:00 committed by eabdullin
commit e530f5c8f7
5 changed files with 363 additions and 4 deletions
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4
0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
View File

@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ index 8360991ce4..33c23efb0d 100644
+
+ if ((ciphers_path = secure_getenv("OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE")) == NULL)
+ ciphers_path = SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (access(ciphers_path, R_OK) == 0) {
+ CONF *conf = NCONF_new_ex(NULL, NCONF_default());
+ char *value = NULL;
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ index 8360991ce4..33c23efb0d 100644
+ } else {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s", SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ }
+
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ slen = strlen(suffix);
+ len = strlen(buf);
+

13
0141-print-pq-group.patch
View File

@ -17,3 +17,16 @@ index 3b3c0dd0b38f5..026315406e298 100644
BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: ");
switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(key)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index b98464256e..eb3d7e24f6 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3734,7 +3734,7 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc) && sc->s3.did_kex)
id = sc->s3.group_id;
else
- id = sc->session->kex_group;
+ id = (sc->session != NULL) ? sc->session->kex_group : NID_undef;
ret = tls1_group_id2nid(id, 1);
break;
}

93
0142-CVE-2024-13176-Minerva.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index b876edbfac36e..af52e2ced6914 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
* out by Colin Percival,
* http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
*/
-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
{
@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
unsigned int t4 = 0;
#endif
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- bn_check_top(m);
-
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return 0;
@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
} else
#endif
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
return ret;
}
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ bn_check_top(m);
+ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont))
+ return 0;
+ bn_correct_top(rr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
{
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 19384eba186b5..3f8d65c1bf1a1 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "crypto/ec.h"
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "ec_local.h"
@@ -1265,10 +1266,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
goto err;
/*-
- * Exponent e is public.
- * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be
+ * fixed top.
*/
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
+ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
goto err;
ret = 1;
diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
index 47d9b44f879f0..bdee28625ce60 100644
--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
*/
int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
BN_CTX *ctx);
int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,

238
0143-CVE-2024-12797.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 436b397346..df2eed7594 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1910,6 +1910,7 @@ static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
{
size_t certidx;
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+ int v_ok;
if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
@@ -1919,9 +1920,19 @@ static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
- && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ v_ok = ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk);
+ if (v_ok <= 0 && sc->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ERR_clear_last_mark();
+ SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (v_ok > 0 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
@@ -2071,10 +2082,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
- if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- }
+
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
@@ -2089,12 +2097,17 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
- if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
+ if (i <= 0 && s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ERR_clear_last_mark();
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
diff --git a/test/rpktest.c b/test/rpktest.c
index ac824798f1..624d366508 100644
--- a/test/rpktest.c
+++ b/test/rpktest.c
@@ -89,12 +89,14 @@ static int rpk_verify_server_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* idx = 13 - resumption with client authentication
* idx = 14 - resumption with client authentication, no ticket
* idx = 15 - like 0, but use non-default libctx
+ * idx = 16 - like 7, but with SSL_VERIFY_PEER connection should fail
+ * idx = 17 - like 8, but with SSL_VERIFY_PEER connection should fail
*
- * 16 * 2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 2048 tests
+ * 18 * 2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 2048 tests
*/
static int test_rpk(int idx)
{
-# define RPK_TESTS 16
+# define RPK_TESTS 18
# define RPK_DIMS (2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2)
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
@@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
int idx_cert, idx_prot;
int client_auth = 0;
int resumption = 0;
+ int want_error = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
long server_verify_result = 0;
long client_verify_result = 0;
OSSL_LIB_CTX *test_libctx = NULL;
@@ -188,7 +191,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
/* Can't get other_key if it's ECDSA */
if (other_pkey == NULL && idx_cert == 0
- && (idx == 4 || idx == 6 || idx == 7)) {
+ && (idx == 4 || idx == 6 || idx == 7 || idx == 16)) {
testresult = TEST_skip("EDCSA disabled");
goto end;
}
@@ -266,8 +269,10 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
goto end;
/* Only a private key */
if (idx == 1) {
- if (idx_server_server_rpk == 0 || idx_client_server_rpk == 0)
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 0 || idx_client_server_rpk == 0) {
expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ }
} else {
/* Add certificate */
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_use_certificate_file(serverssl, cert_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1))
@@ -333,12 +338,14 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
client_expected = -1;
if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, other_pkey)))
goto end;
+ SSL_set_verify(clientssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, rpk_verify_client_cb);
client_verify_result = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
break;
case 8:
if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1)
client_expected = -1;
/* no peer keys */
+ SSL_set_verify(clientssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, rpk_verify_client_cb);
client_verify_result = X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED;
break;
case 9:
@@ -370,9 +377,13 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(clientssl, privkey_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1))
goto end;
/* Since there's no cert, this is expected to fail without RPK support */
- if (!idx_server_client_rpk || !idx_client_client_rpk)
+ if (!idx_server_client_rpk || !idx_client_client_rpk) {
expected = 0;
- SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, rpk_verify_server_cb);
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, NULL);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, rpk_verify_server_cb);
+ }
client_auth = 1;
break;
case 11:
@@ -449,31 +460,52 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, pkey)))
goto end;
break;
+ case 16:
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1) {
+ /* wrong expected server key */
+ expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ }
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, other_pkey)))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 17:
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1) {
+ /* no expected server keys */
+ expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ }
+ break;
}
- ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+ ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, want_error);
if (!TEST_int_eq(expected, ret))
goto end;
+ if (expected <= 0) {
+ testresult = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Make sure client gets RPK or certificate as configured */
- if (expected == 1) {
- if (idx_server_server_rpk && idx_client_server_rpk) {
- if (!TEST_long_eq(SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl), client_verify_result))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_rpk(clientssl)))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
- goto end;
- } else {
- if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(clientssl)))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
- goto end;
- }
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk && idx_client_server_rpk) {
+ if (!TEST_long_eq(SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl), client_verify_result))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_rpk(clientssl)))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(clientssl)))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
+ goto end;
}
if (idx == 9) {
@@ -500,8 +532,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
goto end;
} else {
- /* only if connection is expected to succeed */
- if (expected == 1 && !TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(serverssl)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(serverssl)))
goto end;
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
goto end;
@@ -591,7 +622,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
}
ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
- if (!TEST_int_eq(expected, ret))
+ if (!TEST_true(ret))
goto end;
verify = SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl);
if (!TEST_int_eq(client_expected, verify))

19
openssl.spec
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.2.2
Release: 15%{?dist}.alma.1
Release: 16%{?dist}.alma.1
Epoch: 1
Source: openssl-%{version}.tar.gz
Source2: Makefile.certificate
@ -184,7 +184,11 @@ Patch139: 0139-CVE-2024-6119.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26197
Patch140: 0140-prov_no-cache.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25959
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26722
Patch141: 0141-print-pq-group.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429
Patch142: 0142-CVE-2024-13176-Minerva.patch
Patch143: 0143-CVE-2024-12797.patch
License: Apache-2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -542,9 +546,20 @@ touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_prefix}/include/openssl/engine.h
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Tue Feb 04 2025 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.2.2-15.alma.1
* Tue Feb 18 2025 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.2.2-16.alma.1
- Redefine sslarch for x86_64_v2 arch
* Wed Jan 29 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-16
- Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation (CVE-2024-13176)
Resolves: RHEL-70879
- Load system default cipher string from crypto-policies configuration file
should ignore errors.
Related: RHEL-71132
- RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as expected (CVE-2024-12797)
Resolves: RHEL-76754
- Fix segfault on printing the temp key from s_client when connection is not established
Resolves: RHEL-79045
* Thu Jan 02 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-15
- Fix providers no_cache behavior
Resolves: RHEL-71903