new upstream version

2013-02-19 13:57:39 +01:00 · 2013-02-19 13:57:39 +01:00 · dc696fdac4
commit dc696fdac4
parent 0fd0958b75
14 changed files with 654 additions and 1685 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ openssl-1.0.0a-usa.tar.bz2
 /openssl-1.0.1a-usa.tar.xz
 /openssl-1.0.1b-usa.tar.xz
 /openssl-1.0.1c-usa.tar.xz
 /openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-fips-pkcs8.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-fips-pkcs8.patch
@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0/crypto/pem/pem_all.c.pkcs8 openssl-1.0.0/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0/crypto/pem/pem_all.c.pkcs8	2006-11-06 20:53:37.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0/crypto/pem/pem_all.c	2012-04-26 17:17:35.765317652 +0200
@@ -147,7 +147,37 @@ IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7, PEM_STRIN
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
 					PEM_STRING_X509, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +static int fips_PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +	{
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
 +			return PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, x, enc,
 +						(char *)kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +		else
 +                	return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey,
 +                ((x->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)?PEM_STRING_DSA:(x->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)?PEM_STRING_RSA:PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY),
 +                        bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 +static int fips_PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +	{
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
 +			return PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(fp, x, enc,
 +						(char *)kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +		else
 +                	return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey,
 +                ((x->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)?PEM_STRING_DSA:(x->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)?PEM_STRING_RSA:PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY),
 +                        fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
 +	}
 +#endif
 +
 +#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -193,7 +223,49 @@ RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RS
 #endif
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +
 +int PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(k, x);
 +
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 +int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(k, x);
 +
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +#else
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(RSAPrivateKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
 +
 +#endif
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC, RSAPublicKey)
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, RSA_PUBKEY)
@@ -223,7 +295,47 @@ DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp,
 	return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa);	/* will free pktmp */
 }
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +
 +int PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(k, x);
 +
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 +int PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(k, x);
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +#else
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(DSAPrivateKey, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSA, DSAPrivateKey)
 +
 +#endif
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, DSA_PUBKEY)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
@@ -269,8 +381,49 @@ EC_KEY *PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *b
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP, PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS, ECPKParameters)
 +
 +
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 +
 +int PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(k, x);
 +
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 +int PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
 +                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
 +                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
 +{
 +	EVP_PKEY *k;
 +	int ret;
 +	k = EVP_PKEY_new();
 +	if (!k)
 +		return 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(k, x);
 +	ret = fips_PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(k);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 +#else
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY, ECPrivateKey)
 +#endif
 +
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, EC_PUBKEY)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-backports.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-backports.patch
@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c.backports openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c.backports	2012-02-28 15:47:16.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c	2012-05-15 17:44:14.584128501 +0200
@@ -175,12 +175,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *k
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	if (key->pkey)
 		{
 +		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
 		ret = key->pkey;
 		}
 	else
 +		{
 		key->pkey = ret;
 -	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 +		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 +		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	return ret;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_lib.c.backports	2012-04-17 17:20:17.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_lib.c	2012-05-15 17:42:43.880139566 +0200
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 -	SSL_kDHr,
 +	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
 -	SSL_kDHr,
 +	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	0,
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 -	SSL_kDHr,
 +	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	0,
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 -	SSL_kDHr,
 +	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 -	SSL_kECDHe,
 +	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -2685,7 +2685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
 -	SSL_kECDHe,
 +	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA384,
@@ -2799,7 +2799,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 -	SSL_kECDHe,
 +	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES128GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -2815,7 +2815,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 -	SSL_kECDHe,
 +	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES256GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_pkt.c.backports openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_pkt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_pkt.c.backports	2012-04-17 15:20:19.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2012-05-15 17:43:48.470555889 +0200
@@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int typ
 	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
 	 */
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
 +				&& !s->renegotiate
 				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
 		*(p++) = 0x1;
 	else
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-backports2.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-backports2.patch
@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c.backports2	2012-01-05 14:46:27.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c	2012-11-14 20:27:50.240211707 +0100
@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
 +		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
 +				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -1039,6 +1041,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
 +		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
 +			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 		if (secret_key)
 			{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c.backports2	2011-01-03 02:30:58.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c	2012-11-20 22:13:05.722766980 +0100
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
 +	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2	2012-11-14 20:27:49.696199811 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h	2012-11-14 20:27:50.240211707 +0100
@@ -282,16 +282,23 @@ extern "C" {
 #  endif
 # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
 #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
 -#   define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
 +#   if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4 /* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
 +#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)		 (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
 +#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({	\
 +	__uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b);	\
 +	(high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret;	 })
 +#   else
 +#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
 	register BN_ULONG ret;		\
 	asm ("dmultu	%1,%2"		\
 	     : "=h"(ret)		\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l");	\
 	ret;			})
 -#   define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)	\
 +#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\
 	asm ("dmultu	%2,%3"		\
 	     : "=l"(low),"=h"(high)	\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b));
 +#    endif
 #  endif
 # endif		/* cpu */
 #endif		/* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.backports2	2012-11-14 20:27:50.238211664 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c	2012-11-20 22:10:06.350891703 +0100
@@ -968,8 +968,6 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
 	if (!gctx->iv_set)
 		return -1;
 -	if (!ctx->encrypt && gctx->taglen < 0)
 -		return -1;
 	if (in)
 		{
 		if (out == NULL)
@@ -1011,6 +1009,8 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
 		{
 		if (!ctx->encrypt)
 			{
 +			if (gctx->taglen < 0)
 +				return -1;
 			if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
 					ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
 				return -1;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.backports2	2012-01-25 18:56:24.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c	2012-11-14 20:27:50.241211729 +0100
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT
 	void (*gcm_gmult_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16])	= ctx->gmult;
 #endif
 -	if (ctx->mres)
 +	if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares)
 		GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
 	if (is_endian.little) {
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl.backports2	2012-11-14 20:27:50.293212866 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl	2012-11-20 22:20:15.015041719 +0100
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
 $code.=<<___;
 	teq	$Xi,sp
 	bne	.L_00_15		@ [((11+4)*5+2)*3]
 +	sub	sp,sp,#25*4
 ___
 	&BODY_00_15(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
 	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
@@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	ldr	$K,.LK_20_39		@ [+15+16*4]
 -	sub	sp,sp,#25*4
 	cmn	sp,#0			@ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39
 .L_20_39_or_60_79:
 ___
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c.backports2	2012-04-15 19:23:41.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2012-11-20 22:23:21.684755182 +0100
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 		}
 -		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
 +		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
 			goto err;
 		}
@@ -1403,6 +1403,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
 	 */
 +	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
 +	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
 +		{
 +		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
 +			{
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
 +			goto err;
 +			}
 +		}
 +
 	if (ret < 0) ret=1;
 	if (0)
 		{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c.backports2	2011-05-11 15:37:52.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c	2012-11-14 20:27:50.241211729 +0100
@@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT
 	{
 	/* Set digest values to defaults */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 -	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
 +	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 -	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
 +	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 	}
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports2	2012-01-05 11:22:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2012-11-20 22:25:29.243509755 +0100
@@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509
 #endif
 /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
 -X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
 +CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
@@ -2345,9 +2345,17 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
 -	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
 -	return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
 +	return c->pkeys + i;
 +	}
 +
 +X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
 +	{
 +	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
 +	cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
 +	if (!cpk)
 +		return NULL;
 +	return cpk->x509;
 	}
 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
@@ -2780,7 +2788,9 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
 	{
 -	if (s->cert != NULL)
 +	if (s->server)
 +		return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
 +	else if (s->cert != NULL)
 		return(s->cert->key->x509);
 	else
 		return(NULL);
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h.backports2	2012-11-14 20:27:50.056207682 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h	2012-11-20 22:25:29.244509777 +0100
@@ -814,7 +814,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_O
 int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
 int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
 int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
 -X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *);
 +CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
 +X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
 int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
@@ -1065,7 +1066,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
 +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c.backports2	2012-03-21 22:32:57.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c	2012-11-20 22:25:29.244509777 +0100
@@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *
 	return 1;
 	}
 -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1782,42 +1782,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 -	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
 - 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
 - 	 * the certificate has changed.
 - 	 */
 -	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 -		{
 -		int r;
 -		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
 -		switch (r)
 -			{
 -			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
 -			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
 -				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 -				break;
 -			/* status request response should be sent */
 -			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
 -				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
 -					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
 -				else
 -					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 -				break;
 -			/* something bad happened */
 -			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
 -				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 -				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -				goto err;
 -			}
 -		}
 -	else
 -		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 -
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
 		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
 		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
 -		 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
 +		 * so this has to happen here in
 +		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 		int r = 1;
@@ -1869,8 +1839,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			}
 	}
 -#endif
  err:
 +#endif
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1888,6 +1858,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
 +	{
 +	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 +	int al;
 +
 +	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
 + 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
 + 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
 +	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
 + 	 */
 +	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 +		{
 +		int r;
 +		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
 +		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
 +		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
 +		if (certpkey == NULL)
 +			{
 +			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 +			return 1;
 +			}
 +		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
 +		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
 +		 */
 +		s->cert->key = certpkey;
 +		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
 +		switch (r)
 +			{
 +			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
 +			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
 +				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 +				break;
 +			/* status request response should be sent */
 +			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
 +				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
 +					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
 +				else
 +					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 +				break;
 +			/* something bad happened */
 +			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
 +				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 +				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +				goto err;
 +			}
 +		}
 +	else
 +		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 +
 + err:
 +	switch (ret)
 +		{
 +		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
 +			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
 +			return -1;
 +
 +		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
 +			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
 +			return 1; 
 +
 +		default:
 +			return 1;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -2414,7 +2449,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
 	 */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
 -		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
 +		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
@@ -2425,7 +2460,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
 -		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
 +		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 	return 1;
 	}
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-ccm-init-str.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-ccm-init-str.patch
@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.init-str openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.init-str	2012-09-06 17:20:45.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c	2012-09-06 17:18:30.000000000 +0200
@@ -1216,6 +1216,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_C
 			vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len*8, &cctx->ks);
 			CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
 					&cctx->ks, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt);
 +			cctx->str = NULL;
 			cctx->key_set = 1;
 			break;
 			}
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-issuer-hash.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-issuer-hash.patch
@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash	2011-06-22 04:18:06.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c	2012-12-21 17:18:38.101308997 +0100
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_has
 	char *f;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 +	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
 	ret=strlen(f);
 	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-manfix.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-manfix.patch
@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix	2010-02-23 15:09:22.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:15.277264650 +0100
@@ -54,35 +54,37 @@ in PEM format concatenated together.
 =item B<-untrusted file>
 A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
 +in PEM format concatenated together.
 =item B<-purpose purpose>
 -the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
 -will be done. Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>,
 -B<nssslserver>, B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION>
 -section for more information.
 +The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
 +B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
 +Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
 +B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
 +information.
 =item B<-help>
 -prints out a usage message.
 +Print out a usage message.
 =item B<-verbose>
 -print extra information about the operations being performed.
 +Print extra information about the operations being performed.
 =item B<-issuer_checks>
 -print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
 -of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
 -certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
 -does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
 -verify process several rejections may take place.
 +Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the
 +current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was
 +rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that
 +anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
 +rejections may take place.
 =item B<-policy arg>
 -Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set
 -(see RFC3280 et al). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric
 -form. This argument can appear more than once.
 +Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
 +RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
 +This argument can appear more than once.
 =item B<-policy_check>
@@ -90,41 +92,40 @@ Enables certificate policy processing.
 =item B<-explicit_policy>
 -Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
 +Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
 =item B<-inhibit_any>
 -Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
 +Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
 =item B<-inhibit_map>
 -Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC3280 et al).
 +Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
 =item B<-policy_print>
 -Print out diagnostics, related to policy checking
 +Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
 =item B<-crl_check>
 -Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to lookup a valid CRL.
 +Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
 If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs. 
 =item B<-crl_check_all>
 Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
 -to lookup valid CRLs.
 +to look up valid CRLs.
 =item B<-ignore_critical>
 Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
 -supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by
 -RFC3280 et al). If this option is set critical extensions are
 -ignored.
 +supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
 +If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
 =item B<-x509_strict>
 -Disable workarounds for broken certificates which have to be disabled
 -for strict X.509 compliance.
 +For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
 +certificates.
 =item B<-extended_crl>
@@ -142,16 +143,15 @@ because it doesn't add any security.
 =item B<->
 -marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
 +Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
 certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
 with a B<->.
 =item B<certificates>
 -one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
 -then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
 -all be in PEM format.
 -
 +One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
 +will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
 +in PEM format.
 =back
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod.manfix	2013-01-10 10:26:11.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod	2013-01-30 17:35:38.952458133 +0100
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<x509>
 [B<-purpose>]
 [B<-dates>]
 [B<-modulus>]
 +[B<-pubkey>]
 [B<-fingerprint>]
 [B<-alias>]
 [B<-noout>]
@@ -136,6 +137,10 @@ section for more information.
 this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
 +=item B<-pubkey>
 +
 +outputs the the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
 +
 =item B<-modulus>
 this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:47.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)|EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)> 
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ public key algorithm.
 L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod.manfix	2009-10-01 01:40:50.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod.manfix	2010-12-02 14:45:25.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 =head1 HISTORY
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod.manfix	2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod	2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
 +=pod
 +
 +=head1 NAME
 +
 +EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
 +
 +=head1 SYNOPSIS
 +
 + #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +
 + int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
 + int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 +			unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
 +			const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
 +
 +=head1 DESCRIPTION
 +
 +The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
 +context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
 +
 +The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data
 +using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
 +B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
 +buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
 +before the call the B<routlen> parameter should contain the length of the
 +B<rout> buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to
 +B<rout> and the amount of data written to B<routlen>.
 +
 +=head1 NOTES
 +
 +Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification
 +operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be 
 +used.
 +
 +Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
 +signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
 +in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
 +
 +After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control
 +operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
 +operation.
 +
 +The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same
 +context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
 +
 +=head1 RETURN VALUES
 +
 +EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() return 1 for success
 +and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
 +indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
 +
 +=head1 EXAMPLE
 +
 +Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
 +
 + #include <openssl/evp.h>
 + #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 +
 + EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
 + unsigned char *rout, *sig;
 + size_t routlen, siglen; 
 + EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
 + /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up
 +  * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
 +  */
 + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
 + if (!ctx)
 +	/* Error occurred */
 + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx) <= 0)
 +	/* Error */
 + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
 +	/* Error */
 + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
 +	/* Error */
 +
 + /* Determine buffer length */
 + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 +	/* Error */
 +
 + rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
 +
 + if (!rout)
 +	/* malloc failure */
 + 
 + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 +	/* Error */
 +
 + /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
 +
 +=head1 SEE ALSO
 +
 +L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 +L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 +
 +=head1 HISTORY
 +
 +These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
 +
 +=cut
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.manfix	2009-10-18 17:28:59.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod	2013-01-30 17:34:16.315630759 +0100
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabl
 an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
 set by an application.
 +=back
 +
 =head1 NOTES
 The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod /dev/null
 --- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
 +++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
 -=pod
 -
 -=head1 NAME
 -
 -EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init, EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
 -
 -=head1 SYNOPSIS
 -
 - #include <openssl/evp.h>
 -
 - int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
 - int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 -			unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
 -			const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
 -
 -=head1 DESCRIPTION
 -
 -The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
 -context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
 -
 -The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() function recovers signed data
 -using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
 -B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
 -buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
 -before the call the B<routlen> parameter should contain the length of the
 -B<rout> buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to
 -B<rout> and the amount of data written to B<routlen>.
 -
 -=head1 NOTES
 -
 -Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification
 -operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be 
 -used.
 -
 -Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
 -signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
 -in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
 -
 -After the call to EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() algorithm specific control
 -operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
 -operation.
 -
 -The function EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() can be called more than once on the same
 -context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
 -
 -=head1 RETURN VALUES
 -
 -EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() return 1 for success
 -and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
 -indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
 -
 -=head1 EXAMPLE
 -
 -Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
 -
 - #include <openssl/evp.h>
 - #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 -
 - EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
 - unsigned char *rout, *sig;
 - size_t routlen, siglen; 
 - EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
 - /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up
 -  * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
 -  */
 - ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
 - if (!ctx)
 -	/* Error occurred */
 - if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(ctx) <= 0)
 -	/* Error */
 - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
 -	/* Error */
 - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
 -	/* Error */
 -
 - /* Determine buffer length */
 - if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 -	/* Error */
 -
 - rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
 -
 - if (!rout)
 -	/* malloc failure */
 - 
 - if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 -	/* Error */
 -
 - /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
 -
 -=head1 SEE ALSO
 -
 -L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
 -L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 -
 -=head1 HISTORY
 -
 -These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
 -
 -=cut
 -- 
--- a/openssl-1.0.1c-verify-error.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1c-verify-error.patch
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
 From 5bb6d96558ff6013826e3362f4c81513e3df23ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2012 15:48:42 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Make verify return errors.
 ---
 CHANGES       |    3 +++
 Makefile.org  |    2 +-
 apps/verify.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 test/Makefile |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
 index 55273ea..43d16cb 100644
 --- a/Makefile.org
 +++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ rehash.time: certs apps
 		[ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
 		OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
 		export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
 -		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \
 +		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
 		touch rehash.time; \
 	else :; fi
 diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
 index 0f34b86..893670f 100644
 --- a/apps/verify.c
 +++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -222,11 +222,19 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 		}
 -	if (argc < 1) check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
 +	ret = 0;
 +	if (argc < 1)
 +		{ 
 +		if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
 +			ret = -1;
 +		}
 	else
 +		{
 		for (i=0; i<argc; i++)
 -			check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
 -	ret=0;
 +			if (1 != check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
 +				ret = -1;
 +		}
 +
 end:
 	if (ret == 1) {
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
@@ -252,7 +260,7 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
 	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
 	apps_shutdown();
 -	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 +	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
 	}
 static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
 diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
 index 09e6848..4c9eabc 100644
 --- a/test/Makefile
 +++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ test_ecdh:
 test_verify:
 	@echo "The following command should have some OK's and some failures"
 	@echo "There are definitly a few expired certificates"
 -	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs ../certs/*.pem
 +	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs/demo ../certs/demo/*.pem
 test_dh:
 	@echo "Generate a set of DH parameters"
 -- 
 1.7.7.6
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch
@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
 From 08f8933fa34d242383a1e12d4701acb1855686bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Nick Alcock <nix@esperi.org.uk>
 Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 17:44:11 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix POD errors to stop make install_docs dying with pod2man
 2.5.0+
 podlators 2.5.0 has switched to dying on POD syntax errors. This means
 that a bunch of long-standing erroneous POD in the openssl documentation
 now leads to fatal errors from pod2man, halting installation.
 Unfortunately POD constraints mean that you have to sort numeric lists
 in ascending order if they start with 1: you cannot do 1, 0, 2 even if
 you want 1 to appear first. I've reshuffled such (alas, I wish there
 were a better way but I don't know of one).
 (cherry picked from commit 5cc270774258149235f69e1789b3370f57b0e27b)
 ---
 doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod   |    2 ++
 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod    |    8 ++++----
 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod |    4 ++++
 doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod                    |   10 +++++-----
 doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod                   |   10 +++++-----
 doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod              |   10 +++++-----
 doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod                  |   10 +++++-----
 7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
 index a883f6c..60e8332 100644
 --- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
 +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabled.
 an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
 set by an application.
 +=back
 +
 =head1 NOTES
 The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
 index 632b556..5e66133 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
 =over 4
 -=item 1
 -
 -The operation succeeded.
 -
 =item 0
 A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
 the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
 to find out the reason.
 +=item 1
 +
 +The operation succeeded.
 +
 =back
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
 index b80e25b..7e60df5 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return
 Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
 +=over 4
 +
 =item > 0
 PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
@@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
 PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
 will be sent and the connection setup fails.
 +=back
 +
 =cut
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
 index cc724c0..b1c34d1 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
@@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 =over 4
 -=item 1
 -
 -The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 -established.
 -
 =item 0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 +=item 1
 +
 +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 +established.
 +
 =item E<lt>0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
 index cc56ebb..946ca89 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 =over 4
 -=item 1
 -
 -The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 -established.
 -
 =item 0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 +=item 1
 +
 +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 +established.
 +
 =item E<lt>0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
 index 2435764..7f8cf24 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 =over 4
 -=item 1
 -
 -The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 -established.
 -
 =item 0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 +=item 1
 +
 +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 +established.
 +
 =item E<lt>0
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
 diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
 index 89911ac..42a89b7 100644
 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
 +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
@@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
 =over 4
 -=item 1
 -
 -The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
 -and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
 -
 =item 0
 The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
 The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
 erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
 +=item 1
 +
 +The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
 +and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
 +
 =item -1
 The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
 -- 
 1.7.9.5
 From 147dbb2fe3bead7a10e2f280261b661ce7af7adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
 Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 18:24:03 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix for SSL_get_certificate
 Now we set the current certificate to the one used by a server
 there is no need to call ssl_get_server_send_cert which will
 fail if we haven't sent a certificate yet.
 ---
 ssl/ssl_lib.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 index 14d143d..ff5a85a 100644
 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2792,9 +2792,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
 	{
 -	if (s->server)
 -		return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
 -	else if (s->cert != NULL)
 +	if (s->cert != NULL)
 		return(s->cert->key->x509);
 	else
 		return(NULL);
 -- 
 1.7.9.5
 From 9fe4603b8245425a4c46986ed000fca054231253 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
 Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 14:55:32 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Check DTLS_BAD_VER for version number.
 The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
 DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
 check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.
 PR:2984
 (cherry picked from commit d980abb22e22661e98e5cee33d760ab0c7584ecc)
 ---
 ssl/s3_cbc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
 index 02edf3f..443a31e 100644
 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
 +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
 	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
 	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
 -	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
 +	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
 		 * non-constant time.
 -- 
 1.7.9.5
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-fips.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-fips.patch
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-issuer-hash.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-issuer-hash.patch
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c.issuer-hash	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c	2013-02-19 12:46:11.315788592 +0100
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_has
 	char *f;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 +	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
 	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
 		goto err;
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-secure-getenv.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-secure-getenv.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_api.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_api.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_api.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_api.c.secure-getenv	2011-09-02 13:20:32.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_api.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_api.c	2012-09-10 20:20:24.803968961 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_api.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.531188124 +0100
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@
 # define NDEBUG
 #endif
@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_api.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cryp
 	}
 #if 0 /* There's no way to provide error checking with this function, so
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c.secure-getenv	2008-11-05 19:38:55.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c	2012-09-10 20:22:46.228970661 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.531188124 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
  *
  */
@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cryp
 		return BUF_strdup(file);
 	len = strlen(X509_get_default_cert_area());
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/engine/eng_list.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_list.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/engine/eng_list.c.secure-getenv	2010-03-27 19:28:13.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_list.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/engine/eng_list.c	2012-09-10 20:20:46.106452027 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_list.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.536188233 +0100
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  */
@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/engine/eng_list.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cr
 #endif
 		iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
 		if(!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) ||
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c.secure-getenv	2012-09-10 20:10:26.079391932 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-19 13:02:02.492187275 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c	2012-09-10 20:20:31.383118153 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.537188254 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypt
 		OpenSSLDie(__FILE__, __LINE__, \
                 "Digest MD5 forbidden in FIPS mode!");
 	return private_MD5_Init(c);
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_init.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_init.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_init.c.secure-getenv	2012-09-10 20:10:26.066391638 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-19 13:02:02.428185882 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_init.c	2012-09-10 20:23:27.634908822 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/o_init.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.538188276 +0100
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
  *
  */
@ -117,19 +117,19 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_init.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/o_in
 		{
 		buf[0] = '1';
 		}
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/randfile.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv	2012-01-15 14:40:21.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c	2012-09-10 20:20:40.708329617 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/randfile.c	2013-02-19 13:03:06.971591052 +0100
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
+@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
- 
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
 /* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */
 #define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
 #endif
 +/* for secure_getenv */
 +#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
-@@ -275,8 +277,7 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, si
+@@ -277,8 +279,7 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, si
 	struct stat sb;
 #endif
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cryp
 	if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size)
 		{
 		if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size) >= size)
-@@ -284,8 +285,7 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, si
+@@ -286,8 +287,7 @@ const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, si
 		}
 	else
 		{
@ -149,9 +149,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/rand/randfile.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cryp
 #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
 		if (s == NULL)
 			{
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.secure-getenv	2010-02-19 19:26:23.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_dir.c	2012-09-10 20:21:16.641144451 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_dir.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.539188298 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto
 			if (dir)
 				ret=add_cert_dir(ld,dir,X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
 			else
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_file.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_file.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_file.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_file.c.secure-getenv	2012-09-10 20:10:26.016390503 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_file.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-19 13:02:02.236181701 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_file.c	2012-09-10 20:21:07.748942806 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/by_file.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.554188624 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
@ -191,9 +191,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/by_file.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypt
 			if (file)
 				ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx,file,
 					      X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.secure-getenv	2011-09-23 15:39:35.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2012-09-10 20:20:55.951675283 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.556188668 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
@ -212,9 +212,9 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/cryp
 			allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 		purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 		}
-diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1c/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c.secure-getenv openssl-1.0.1e/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c.secure-getenv	2008-03-16 22:05:44.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c.secure-getenv	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1c/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c	2012-09-10 20:21:26.759373897 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c	2013-02-19 13:02:02.557188690 +0100
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
  *        Implementation of control commands for GOST engine          *
  *            OpenSSL 0.9.9 libraries required                        *
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@ -20,9 +20,9 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.1c
+Version: 1.0.1e
 # Do not forget to bump SHLIB_VERSION on version upgrades
-Release: 12%{?dist}
+Release: 1%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Patch8: openssl-1.0.1c-perlfind.patch
 Patch9: openssl-1.0.1c-aliasing.patch
 # Bug fixes
 Patch23: openssl-1.0.1c-default-paths.patch
-Patch24: openssl-1.0.1c-issuer-hash.patch
+Patch24: openssl-1.0.1e-issuer-hash.patch
 # Functionality changes
 Patch33: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-ca-dir.patch
 Patch34: openssl-0.9.6-x509.patch
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Patch35: openssl-0.9.8j-version-add-engines.patch
 Patch36: openssl-1.0.0e-doc-noeof.patch
 Patch38: openssl-1.0.1-beta2-ssl-op-all.patch
 Patch39: openssl-1.0.1c-ipv6-apps.patch
-Patch40: openssl-1.0.1c-fips.patch
+Patch40: openssl-1.0.1e-fips.patch
 Patch45: openssl-0.9.8j-env-nozlib.patch
 Patch47: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
 Patch49: openssl-1.0.1a-algo-doc.patch
@ -67,16 +67,11 @@ Patch60: openssl-1.0.0d-apps-dgst.patch
 Patch63: openssl-1.0.0d-xmpp-starttls.patch
 Patch65: openssl-1.0.0e-chil-fixes.patch
 Patch66: openssl-1.0.1-pkgconfig-krb5.patch
-Patch67: openssl-1.0.0-fips-pkcs8.patch
+Patch68: openssl-1.0.1e-secure-getenv.patch
 Patch68: openssl-1.0.1c-secure-getenv.patch
 Patch69: openssl-1.0.1c-dh-1024.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch81: openssl-1.0.1-beta2-padlock64.patch
-Patch82: openssl-1.0.1c-backports.patch
+Patch82: openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch
 Patch83: openssl-1.0.1c-ccm-init-str.patch
 Patch84: openssl-1.0.1c-backports2.patch
 Patch85: openssl-1.0.1c-manfix.patch
 Patch86: openssl-1.0.1c-verify-error.patch
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -175,16 +170,11 @@ from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch63 -p1 -b .starttls
 %patch65 -p1 -b .chil
 %patch66 -p1 -b .krb5
 %patch67 -p1 -b .pkcs8
 %patch68 -p1 -b .secure-getenv
 %patch69 -p1 -b .dh1024
 %patch81 -p1 -b .padlock64
 %patch82 -p1 -b .backports
 %patch83 -p1 -b .init-str
 %patch84 -p1 -b .backports2
 %patch85 -p1 -b .manfix
 %patch86 -p1 -b .verify
 # Modify the various perl scripts to reference perl in the right location.
 perl util/perlpath.pl `dirname %{__perl}`
@ -440,6 +430,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 %changelog
 * Tue Feb 19 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-1
 - new upstream version
 * Wed Jan 30 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1c-12
 - more fixes from upstream
 - fix errors in manual causing build failure (#904777)
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@ -1 +1 @@
-3b75bb21452767ed1779fbce32625b95  openssl-1.0.1c-usa.tar.xz
+641677c116865e60601677329b514e2d  openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`3b75bb21452767ed1779fbce32625b95 openssl-1.0.1c-usa.tar.xz`	`641677c116865e60601677329b514e2d openssl-1.0.1e-usa.tar.xz`