applied upstream fixes (fix regression in X509_CRL_digest)

openssl-1.1.0-backports.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 3f60b8fbdc9b17572a86457fe5b11437c0d3fbc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2017 17:11:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Use correct signature algorithm list when sending or
+ checking.
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2297)
+---
+ ssl/ssl_locl.h           |  2 +-
+ ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c |  2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c             | 12 ++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index 4079b31..9a997cf 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ __owur size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                                  const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen);
+ __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
+ __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
+-__owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs);
++__owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs);
+ __owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+                                    const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s);
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+index d36d194..ad89e93 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+@@ -2002,7 +2002,7 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+     if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+         const unsigned char *psigs;
+         unsigned char *etmp = p;
+-        nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
++        nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+         /* Skip over length for now */
+         p += 2;
+         nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 1205f99..b75e568 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+         tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+ };
+ #endif
+-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
++size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
+ {
+     /*
+      * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+     }
+ #endif
+     /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+-    if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
++    if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+         *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+         return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+     } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+-    sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
++    sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+     for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
+         if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+             break;
+@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+         size_t salglen;
+         const unsigned char *salg;
+         unsigned char *etmp;
+-        salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
++        salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
+ 
+         /*-
+          * check for enough space.
+@@ -3396,7 +3396,7 @@ void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+      * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
+      * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
+      */
+-    sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
++    sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
+     for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
+         switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+@@ -3491,7 +3491,7 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+         conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+         conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+     } else
+-        conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
++        conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
+     if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
+         pref = conf;
+         preflen = conflen;
+-- 
+2.9.3
+
+From b431b094330da3e54805c49fb262192e34bc3864 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 17:43:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] X509_CRL_digest() - ensure precomputed sha1 hash before
+ returning it
+
+X509_CRL_digest() didn't check if the precomputed sha1 hash was actually
+present.  This also makes sure there's an appropriate flag to check.
+
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2314)
+(cherry picked from commit 6195848b2eea627c47f74b63eb2ba3dc3d5b6436)
+---
+ crypto/x509/x_all.c | 2 +-
+ crypto/x509/x_crl.c | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+index 59f96a5..124dd2d 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
+ int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type,
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+ {
+-    if (type == EVP_sha1()) {
++    if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) {
+         /* Asking for SHA1; always computed in CRL d2i. */
+         if (len != NULL)
+             *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_crl.c b/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
+index da9c6b6..dbed850 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_crl.c
+@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+             if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
+                 return 0;
+         }
++
++        crl->flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+         break;
+ 
+     case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+-- 
+2.9.3
+

openssl.spec

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.1.0d
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Release: 2%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ Patch42: openssl-1.1.0-fips.patch
 Patch43: openssl-1.1.0-afalg-eventfd2.patch
 Patch44: openssl-1.1.0-bio-fd-preserve-nl.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
+Patch60: openssl-1.1.0-backports.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch43 -p1 -b .eventfd2
 %patch44 -p1 -b .preserve-nl
 
+%patch60 -p1 -b .backports
 
 %build
 # Figure out which flags we want to use.
@@ -428,6 +430,9 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Feb  1 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.0d-2
+- applied upstream fixes (fix regression in X509_CRL_digest)
+
 * Thu Jan 26 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.1.0d-1
 - update to upstream version 1.1.0d