- new upstream release

2010-01-21 08:12:12 +00:00 · 2010-01-21 08:12:12 +00:00 · ae5568515b
commit ae5568515b
parent 79249339a7
20 changed files with 431 additions and 3117 deletions
--- a/.cvsignore
+++ b/.cvsignore
@ -1 +1 @@
-openssl-1.0.0-beta4-usa.tar.bz2
+openssl-1.0.0-beta5-usa.tar.bz2
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports.patch
@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c.backports openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c.backports	2008-11-12 04:57:49.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c	2009-11-18 14:11:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -87,9 +87,13 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PK
 		}
 	else	ret= *a;
 -	ret->save_type=type;
 -	ret->type=EVP_PKEY_type(type);
 -	switch (ret->type)
 +	if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type))
 +		{
 +		ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
 +		goto err;
 +		}
 +
 +	switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ret))
 		{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/p_lib.c.backports	2006-07-04 22:27:44.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/p_lib.c	2009-11-18 14:11:26.000000000 +0100
@@ -220,7 +220,10 @@ static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 		/* If we have an ENGINE release it */
 		if (pkey->engine)
 +			{
 			ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
 +			pkey->engine = NULL;
 +			}
 #endif
 		}
 	if (str)
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports	2009-10-31 20:21:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2009-11-18 14:11:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -1727,6 +1727,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, 
 			offset= -offset;
 		}
 	atm.type=ctm->type;
 +	atm.flags = 0;
 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports2.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports2.patch
@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/ca.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/ca.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/ca.c.backports2	2009-10-04 18:43:21.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/ca.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -215,7 +215,6 @@ static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, ch
 			 char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect,
 			 CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, 
 			 unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy);
 -static int fix_data(int nid, int *type);
 static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext);
 static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
 	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,char *subj,unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
@@ -2334,25 +2333,9 @@ static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, ch
 			continue;
 			}
 -		/*
 -		if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (email_dn == 0))
 -			continue;
 -		*/
 -		
 -		j=ASN1_PRINTABLE_type((unsigned char *)buf,-1);
 -		if (fix_data(nid, &j) == 0)
 -			{
 -			BIO_printf(bio_err,
 -				"invalid characters in string %s\n",buf);
 -			goto err;
 -			}
 -
 -		if ((ne=X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(&ne,nid,j,
 -			(unsigned char *)buf,
 -			strlen(buf))) == NULL)
 +		if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
 +				(unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0))
 			goto err;
 -
 -		if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(n,ne,-1, 0)) goto err;
 		}
 	if (spki == NULL)
 		{
@@ -2395,21 +2378,6 @@ err:
 	return(ok);
 	}
 -static int fix_data(int nid, int *type)
 -	{
 -	if (nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress)
 -		*type=V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
 -	if ((nid == NID_commonName) && (*type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING))
 -		*type=V_ASN1_T61STRING;
 -	if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_challengePassword) && (*type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING))
 -		*type=V_ASN1_T61STRING;
 -	if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName) && (*type == V_ASN1_T61STRING))
 -		return(0);
 -	if (nid == NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName)
 -		*type=V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
 -	return(1);
 -	}
 -
 static int check_time_format(const char *str)
 	{
 	return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str);
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c.backports2	2008-11-12 04:57:49.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD* EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(
 		if (!ameth->info)
 			goto err;
 		}
 +	else
 +		ameth->info = NULL;
 	if (pem_str)
 		{
@@ -308,6 +310,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD* EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(
 		if (!ameth->pem_str)
 			goto err;
 		}
 +	else
 +		ameth->pem_str = NULL;
 	ameth->pub_decode = 0;
 	ameth->pub_encode = 0;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, in
 		struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
 #endif
 	} server,client;
 -	int s=INVALID_SOCKET,cs;
 +	int s=INVALID_SOCKET,cs,addrlen;
 	unsigned char ip[4];
 	unsigned short port;
 	char *str=NULL,*e;
@@ -666,8 +666,10 @@ int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, in
 	if ((*p_getaddrinfo.f)(h,p,&hint,&res)) break;
 -	memcpy(&server, res->ai_addr,
 -		res->ai_addrlen<=sizeof(server)?res->ai_addrlen:sizeof(server));
 +	addrlen = res->ai_addrlen<=sizeof(server) ?
 +			res->ai_addrlen :
 +			sizeof(server);
 +	memcpy(&server, res->ai_addr, addrlen);
 	(*p_freeaddrinfo.f)(res);
 	goto again;
@@ -679,6 +681,7 @@ int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, in
 	memset((char *)&server,0,sizeof(server));
 	server.sa_in.sin_family=AF_INET;
 	server.sa_in.sin_port=htons(port);
 +	addrlen = sizeof(server.sa_in);
 	if (h == NULL || strcmp(h,"*") == 0)
 		server.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr=INADDR_ANY;
@@ -712,7 +715,7 @@ again:
 		bind_mode=BIO_BIND_NORMAL;
 		}
 #endif
 -	if (bind(s,&server.sa,sizeof(server)) == -1)
 +	if (bind(s,&server.sa,addrlen) == -1)
 		{
 #ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
 		err_num=get_last_socket_error();
@@ -740,7 +743,7 @@ again:
 			if (cs != INVALID_SOCKET)
 				{
 				int ii;
 -				ii=connect(cs,&client.sa,sizeof(client));
 +				ii=connect(cs,&client.sa,addrlen);
 				closesocket(cs);
 				if (ii == INVALID_SOCKET)
 					{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -335,11 +335,21 @@ static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const cha
 	if ( data->connected )
 		ret=writesocket(b->num,in,inl);
 	else
 +		{
 +		int peerlen = sizeof(data->peer);
 +
 +		if (data->peer.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
 +			peerlen = sizeof(data->peer.sa_in);
 +#if OPENSSL_USE_IVP6
 +		else if (data->peer.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
 +			peerlen = sizeof(data->peer.sa_in6);
 +#endif
 #if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
 -		ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, sizeof(data->peer));
 +		ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, peerlen);
 #else
 -		ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, sizeof(data->peer));
 +		ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, peerlen);
 #endif
 +		}
 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c.backports2	2009-06-17 13:47:54.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -1032,15 +1032,15 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, c
 				goto err;
 			if (al > j || bl > j)
 				{
 -				bn_wexpand(t,k*4);
 -				bn_wexpand(rr,k*4);
 +				if (bn_wexpand(t,k*4) == NULL) goto err;
 +				if (bn_wexpand(rr,k*4) == NULL) goto err;
 				bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d,a->d,b->d,
 					j,al-j,bl-j,t->d);
 				}
 			else	/* al <= j || bl <= j */
 				{
 -				bn_wexpand(t,k*2);
 -				bn_wexpand(rr,k*2);
 +				if (bn_wexpand(t,k*2) == NULL) goto err;
 +				if (bn_wexpand(rr,k*2) == NULL) goto err;
 				bn_mul_recursive(rr->d,a->d,b->d,
 					j,al-j,bl-j,t->d);
 				}
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c.backports2	2009-09-02 17:51:28.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *c
 	ret = DSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa);
 -	if (ret < 0)
 +	if (ret <= 0)
 		return ret;
 	*siglen = sltmp;
 	return 1;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/digest.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/digest.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/digest.c.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:07.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/digest.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -127,7 +127,8 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void)
 	{
 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
 -	EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
 +	if (ctx)
 +		EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
 	return ctx;
 	}
@@ -256,6 +257,12 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, c
 			{
 			ctx->update = type->update;
 			ctx->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(type->ctx_size);
 +			if (ctx->md_data == NULL)
 +				{
 +				EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX,
 +							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 +				return 0;
 +				}
 			}
 		}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -346,8 +353,17 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, 
 	if (in->md_data && out->digest->ctx_size)
 		{
 -		if (tmp_buf) out->md_data = tmp_buf;
 -		else out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
 +		if (tmp_buf)
 +			out->md_data = tmp_buf;
 +		else
 +			{
 +			out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
 +			if (!out->md_data)
 +				{
 +				EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 +				return 0;
 +				}
 +			}
 		memcpy(out->md_data,in->md_data,out->digest->ctx_size);
 		}
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_err.c.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:07.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_err.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR),"private key decode error"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),"private key encode error"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA)    ,"public key not rsa"},
 +{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER)        ,"unknown cipher"},
 +{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST)        ,"unknown digest"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM) ,"unknown pbe algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS),"unsuported number of rounds"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) ,"unsupported algorithm"},
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp.h.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:07.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp.h	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -1275,6 +1275,8 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR			 145
 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR			 146
 #define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA			 106
 +#define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER				 160
 +#define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST				 161
 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM			 121
 #define EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS		 135
 #define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM			 156
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c.backports2	2008-11-05 19:38:57.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c	2010-01-07 23:17:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -174,12 +174,26 @@ int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_
 	if (cipher_nid == -1)
 		cipher = NULL;
 	else
 +		{
 		cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid);
 +		if (!cipher)
 +			{
 +			EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT,EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
 +			return 0;
 +			}
 +		}
 	if (md_nid == -1)
 		md = NULL;
 	else
 +		{
 		md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid);
 +		if (!md)
 +			{
 +			EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT,EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
 +			return 0;
 +			}
 +		}
 	if (!keygen(ctx, pass, passlen, param, cipher, md, en_de))
 		{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.backports2	2010-01-07 23:16:07.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -208,7 +208,16 @@ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
 	ret->mt_blinding=NULL;
 	ret->bignum_data=NULL;
 	ret->flags=ret->meth->flags;
 -	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data);
 +	if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data))
 +		{
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 +	if (ret->engine)
 +		ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
 +#endif
 +		OPENSSL_free(ret);
 +		return(NULL);
 +		}
 +
 	if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret))
 		{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c.backports2	2009-10-18 16:42:27.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c	2010-01-07 23:16:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -200,7 +200,13 @@ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
 	ret->lookup_crls = 0;
 	ret->cleanup = 0;
 -	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data);
 +	if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data))
 +		{
 +		sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs);
 +		OPENSSL_free(ret);
 +		return NULL;
 +		}
 +
 	ret->references=1;
 	return ret;
 	}
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-binutils.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-binutils.patch
@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl.binutils openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl.binutils	2009-11-12 15:17:29.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl	2009-11-12 17:26:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ my $code;
 sub round1_step
 {
     my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
 +    $T_i = unpack("l",pack("l", hex($T_i))); # convert to 32-bit signed decimal
     $code .= " mov	0*4(%rsi),	%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[0] */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= <<EOF;
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ EOF
 sub round2_step
 {
     my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
 +    $T_i = unpack("l",pack("l", hex($T_i))); # convert to 32-bit signed decimal
     $code .= " mov	1*4(%rsi),	%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[1] */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " mov	%edx,		%r12d		/* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ EOF
 sub round3_step
 {
     my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
 +    $T_i = unpack("l",pack("l", hex($T_i))); # convert to 32-bit signed decimal
     $code .= " mov	5*4(%rsi),	%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[5] */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " mov	%ecx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) y' = %ecx */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= <<EOF;
@@ -91,6 +94,7 @@ EOF
 sub round4_step
 {
     my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_;
 +    $T_i = unpack("l",pack("l", hex($T_i))); # convert to 32-bit signed decimal
     $code .= " mov	0*4(%rsi),	%r10d		/* (NEXT STEP) X[0] */\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " mov	\$0xffffffff,	%r11d\n" if ($pos == -1);
     $code .= " xor	%edx,		%r11d		/* (NEXT STEP) not z' = not %edx*/\n"
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl.binutils openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl.binutils	2009-11-12 15:17:29.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl	2009-11-12 17:24:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ ___
 sub BODY_20_39 {
 my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
 my $j=$i+1;
 -my $K=($i<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6;
 +my $K=($i<40)?0x6ed9eba1:-0x359d3e2a;
 $code.=<<___ if ($i<79);
 	lea	$K($xi,$e),$f
 	mov	`4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ sub BODY_40_59 {
 my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
 my $j=$i+1;
 $code.=<<___;
 -	lea	0x8f1bbcdc($xi,$e),$f
 +	lea	-0x70e44324($xi,$e),$f
 	mov	`4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi
 	mov	$b,$t0
 	mov	$b,$t1
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-client-reneg.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-client-reneg.patch
@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
 Do not enforce the renegotiation extension on the client - too many broken servers remain.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.client-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.client-reneg	2009-11-12 15:17:29.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c	2009-11-18 14:04:19.000000000 +0100
@@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		{
 +#if 0
 		/* Because the client does not see any renegotiation during an
 		   attack, we must enforce this on all server hellos, even the
 		   first */
@@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 			return 0;
 			}
 +#endif
 		return 1;
 		}
@@ -1126,12 +1128,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		return 0;
 		}
 +#if 0
 	if (!renegotiate_seen
 		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 		return 0;
 		}
 +#endif
 	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
 		{
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-cve-2009-4355.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-cve-2009-4355.patch
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
 ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
 call CRYPTO_free_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
 restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
 This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
 has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
 CVE-2009-4355.
 [Steve Henson]
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c.compleak openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c.compleak	2008-12-13 18:19:40.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c	2010-01-13 22:06:20.000000000 +0100
@@ -136,15 +136,6 @@ struct zlib_state
 static int zlib_stateful_ex_idx = -1;
 -static void zlib_stateful_free_ex_data(void *obj, void *item,
 -	CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int ind,long argl, void *argp)
 -	{
 -	struct zlib_state *state = (struct zlib_state *)item;
 -	inflateEnd(&state->istream);
 -	deflateEnd(&state->ostream);
 -	OPENSSL_free(state);
 -	}
 -
 static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	int err;
@@ -188,6 +179,12 @@ static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *
 static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 +	struct zlib_state *state =
 +		(struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
 +			zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
 +	inflateEnd(&state->istream);
 +	deflateEnd(&state->ostream);
 +	OPENSSL_free(state);
 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP,ctx,&ctx->ex_data);
 	}
@@ -402,7 +399,7 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
 			if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
 				zlib_stateful_ex_idx =
 					CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP,
 -						0,NULL,NULL,NULL,zlib_stateful_free_ex_data);
 +						0,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL);
 			CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_COMP);
 			if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
 				goto err;
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-ipv6.patch
@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c.dtls-ipv6 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c.dtls-ipv6	2009-11-09 15:09:53.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/b_sock.c	2009-11-23 08:50:45.000000000 +0100
@@ -822,7 +822,8 @@ int BIO_accept(int sock, char **addr)
 	if (sizeof(sa.len.i)!=sizeof(sa.len.s) && sa.len.i==0)
 		{
 		OPENSSL_assert(sa.len.s<=sizeof(sa.from));
 -		sa.len.i = (unsigned int)sa.len.s;
 +		sa.len.i = (int)sa.len.s;
 +		/* use sa.len.i from this point */
 		}
 	if (ret == INVALID_SOCKET)
 		{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c.dtls-ipv6 openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c.dtls-ipv6	2009-10-15 19:41:44.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c	2010-01-07 17:31:00.000000000 +0100
@@ -108,11 +108,13 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp=
 typedef struct bio_dgram_data_st
 	{
 +	union {
 +		struct sockaddr sa;
 +		struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -	struct sockaddr_storage peer;
 -#else
 -	struct sockaddr_in peer;
 +		struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
 #endif
 +	} peer;
 	unsigned int connected;
 	unsigned int _errno;
 	unsigned int mtu;
@@ -278,28 +280,38 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out,
 	int ret=0;
 	bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
 +	struct	{
 +	/*
 +	 * See commentary in b_sock.c. <appro>
 +	 */
 +	union	{ size_t s; int i; } len;
 +	union	{
 +		struct sockaddr sa;
 +		struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -	struct sockaddr_storage peer;
 -#else
 -	struct sockaddr_in peer;
 +		struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
 #endif
 -	int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
 +		} peer;
 +	} sa;
 +
 +	sa.len.s=0;
 +	sa.len.i=sizeof(sa.peer);
 	if (out != NULL)
 		{
 		clear_socket_error();
 -		memset(&peer, 0x00, peerlen);
 -		/* Last arg in recvfrom is signed on some platforms and
 -		 * unsigned on others. It is of type socklen_t on some
 -		 * but this is not universal. Cast to (void *) to avoid
 -		 * compiler warnings.
 -		 */
 +		memset(&sa.peer, 0x00, sizeof(sa.peer));
 		dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
 -		ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,(struct sockaddr *)&peer,(void *)&peerlen);
 +		ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,&sa.peer.sa,(void *)&sa.len);
 +		if (sizeof(sa.len.i)!=sizeof(sa.len.s) && sa.len.i==0)
 +			{
 +			OPENSSL_assert(sa.len.s<=sizeof(sa.peer));
 +			sa.len.i = (int)sa.len.s;
 +			}
 		dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
 		if ( ! data->connected  && ret >= 0)
 -			BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer);
 +			BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &sa.peer);
 		BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -323,25 +335,10 @@ static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const cha
 	if ( data->connected )
 		ret=writesocket(b->num,in,inl);
 	else
 -#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -		if (data->peer.ss_family == AF_INET)
 #if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
 -			ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 +		ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, sizeof(data->peer));
 #else
 -			ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 -		else
 -#if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
 -			ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
 -#else
 -			ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
 -#endif
 -#else
 -#if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
 -		ret=sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#else
 -		ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&data->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 +		ret=sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, &data->peer.sa, sizeof(data->peer));
 #endif
 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
@@ -428,11 +425,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, 
 		else
 			{
 #endif
 +			switch (to->sa_family)
 +				{
 +				case AF_INET:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in));
 +					break;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -			memcpy(&(data->peer),to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
 -#else
 -			memcpy(&(data->peer),to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 +				case AF_INET6:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in6));
 +					break;
 +#endif
 +				default:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa));
 +					break;
 +				}
 #if 0
 			}
 #endif
@@ -537,41 +543,62 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, 
 		if ( to != NULL)
 			{
 			data->connected = 1;
 +			switch (to->sa_family)
 +				{
 +				case AF_INET:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in));
 +					break;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -			memcpy(&(data->peer),to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
 -#else
 -			memcpy(&(data->peer),to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 +				case AF_INET6:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in6));
 +					break;
 +#endif
 +				default:
 +					memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa));
 +					break;
 +				}
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			data->connected = 0;
 -#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -			memset(&(data->peer), 0x00, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
 -#else
 -			memset(&(data->peer), 0x00, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 +			memset(&(data->peer), 0x00, sizeof(data->peer));
 			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER:
 -		to = (struct sockaddr *) ptr;
 -
 +		switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
 +			{
 +			case AF_INET:
 +				ret=sizeof(data->peer.sa_in);
 +				break;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -		memcpy(to, &(data->peer), sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
 -		ret = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
 -#else
 -		memcpy(to, &(data->peer), sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -		ret = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
 -#endif
 +			case AF_INET6:
 +				ret=sizeof(data->peer.sa_in6);
 +				break;
 +#endif
 +			default:
 +				ret=sizeof(data->peer.sa);
 +				break;
 +			}
 +		if (num==0 || num>ret)
 +			num=ret;
 +		memcpy(ptr,&data->peer,(ret=num));
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER:
 		to = (struct sockaddr *) ptr;
 -
 +		switch (to->sa_family)
 +			{
 +			case AF_INET:
 +				memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in));
 +				break;
 #if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
 -		memcpy(&(data->peer), to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
 -#else
 -		memcpy(&(data->peer), to, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
 -#endif
 +			case AF_INET6:
 +				memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa_in6));
 +				break;
 +#endif
 +			default:
 +				memcpy(&data->peer,to,sizeof(data->peer.sa));
 +				break;
 +			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT:
 		memcpy(&(data->next_timeout), ptr, sizeof(struct timeval));
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-reneg.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-reneg.patch
@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_both.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-reneg	2009-11-02 14:37:17.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_both.c	2010-01-07 17:35:19.000000000 +0100
@@ -764,6 +764,24 @@ int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, i
 		p+=i;
 		l=i;
 +	/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
 +	 * renegotiation checks
 +	 */
 +	if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 +		{
 +		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 +		memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
 +		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
 +		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
 +		}
 +	else
 +		{
 +		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 +		memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
 +		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
 +		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
 +		}
 +
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
 		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
 		 * I do this.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c.dtls-reneg	2009-07-24 13:52:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c	2010-01-07 17:44:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -286,16 +286,44 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
 +			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +			if (ret == 2)
 +				{
 +				s->hit = 1;
 +				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 +				else
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 +				s->init_num=0;
 +				break;
 +				}
 +#endif
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
 			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
 +				else
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +				}
 +			else
 +				{
 +				skip = 1;
 +				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +				}
 +#else
 				}
 			else
 				skip=1;
 +
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +#endif
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
@@ -437,11 +465,36 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 				{
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +				/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
 +				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 +					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 +				else
 +#endif
 +				
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 				}
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
 +		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
 +			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
 +			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 +			s->init_num=0;
 +		break;
 +
 +		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
 +		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
 +			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
 +			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +			s->init_num=0;
 +		break;
 +#endif
 +
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
 			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
@@ -554,8 +607,14 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
 		{
 +		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
 		if ((s->session == NULL) ||
 			(s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +			!sess->session_id_length ||
 +#else
 +			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
 +#endif
 			(s->session->not_resumable))
 			{
 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -635,7 +694,15 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			*(p++)=comp->id;
 			}
 		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
 -		
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 +			{
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +			goto err;
 +			}
 +#endif		
 +
 		l=(p-d);
 		d=buf;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_lib.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_lib.c
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c.dtls-reneg	2009-09-09 19:05:42.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2010-01-07 17:44:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -305,8 +305,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 			if (s->hit)
 -				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 +				{
 +				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 +				else
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 +				}
 +#else
 +			if (s->hit)
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 +#endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -321,10 +331,24 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				dtls1_start_timer(s);
 				ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
 +				else
 +					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +				}
 +			else
 +				{
 +				skip = 1;
 +				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +				}
 +#else
 				}
 			else
 				skip=1;
 +
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +#endif
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
@@ -519,11 +543,34 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (s->hit)
 				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 +				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 +#endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
 +		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
 +			ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
 +			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 +			s->init_num=0;
 +			break;
 +
 +		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
 +		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
 +			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
 +			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 +			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 +			s->init_num=0;
 +			break;
 +
 +#endif
 +
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
@@ -749,6 +796,8 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		p+=sl;
 		/* put the cipher */
 +		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
 +			return -1;
 		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
 		p+=i;
@@ -762,6 +811,14 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
 #endif
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 +			{
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +			return -1;
 +			}
 +#endif
 +
 		/* do the header */
 		l=(p-d);
 		d=buf;
@@ -1384,3 +1441,114 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s
 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 +
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 +	{
 +	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
 +		{
 +		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
 +		int len, slen;
 +		unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
 +		HMAC_CTX hctx;
 +		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
 +		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
 +		unsigned char key_name[16];
 +
 +		/* get session encoding length */
 +		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
 +		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
 + 		 * too long
 + 		 */
 +		if (slen > 0xFF00)
 +			return -1;
 +		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
 + 		 * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
 + 		 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
 + 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
 + 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
 + 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
 + 		 */
 +		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
 +			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
 +			EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
 +			return -1;
 +		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
 +		if (!senc)
 +			return -1;
 +		p = senc;
 +		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
 +
 +		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
 +		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
 +		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
 +		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
 +		 * from parent ctx.
 +		 */
 +		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
 +			{
 +			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
 +							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
 +				{
 +				OPENSSL_free(senc);
 +				return -1;
 +				}
 +			}
 +		else
 +			{
 +			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
 +			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
 +					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
 +			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
 +					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
 +			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
 +			}
 +		l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
 +		/* Skip ticket length for now */
 +		p += 2;
 +		/* Output key name */
 +		macstart = p;
 +		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
 +		p += 16;
 +		/* output IV */
 +		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
 +		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
 +		/* Encrypt session data */
 +		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
 +		p += len;
 +		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
 +		p += len;
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 +
 +		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
 +		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
 +		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 +
 +		p += hlen;
 +		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
 +		/* Total length */
 +		len = p - (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 +		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
 +		s2n(len - 18, p);  /* Ticket length */
 +
 +		/* number of bytes to write */
 +		s->init_num= len;
 +		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
 +		s->init_off=0;
 +		OPENSSL_free(senc);
 +
 +		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
 +		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 +		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
 +			SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
 +
 +		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
 +		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
 +		}
 +
 +	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
 +	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 +	}
 +#endif
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_locl.h.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_locl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_locl.h.dtls-reneg	2009-11-23 08:36:03.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_locl.h	2010-01-07 17:44:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 -
 +int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -949,6 +949,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 +#endif
 int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
@@ -1030,6 +1033,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 +
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
 #define tlsext_tick_md	EVP_sha1
 #else
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.dtls-reneg	2009-11-23 08:36:04.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2010-01-07 17:44:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -170,9 +170,6 @@
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
 -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 -static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 -#endif
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
 	{
@@ -1827,6 +1824,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 +
 	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
 	n2s(p, ticklen);
@@ -2991,7 +2989,7 @@ err:
  */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 -static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
 +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ok;
 	long n;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.dtls-reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.dtls-reneg	2009-11-23 08:36:04.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c	2010-01-07 17:44:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 +	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -359,7 +360,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
 		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
 		}
 -	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
 +	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -423,7 +425,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 		skip_ext:
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 -	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
 +	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
@@ -440,7 +443,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 		}
 #endif
 -	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
 +	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		int i;
 		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
@@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
 		s2n(0,ret);
 		}
 -        if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
 +	if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
         {
           int el;
@@ -540,7 +544,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 +	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -579,7 +584,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
 		}
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 -	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
 +	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
 +	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
@@ -757,7 +763,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
 +	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -784,7 +791,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
 			}
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
 +	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -814,7 +822,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
 +	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
@@ -858,8 +867,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 				return 0;
 			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 			}
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
 -						&& s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
 +		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 			{
 			if (size < 5) 
@@ -1027,7 +1036,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
 +	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1073,7 +1083,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
 			}
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
 +	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
@@ -1103,7 +1114,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 				}
 			}
 #endif
 -		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
 +		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
 			 * a status request message.
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-err.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-err.patch
@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
 Better error reporting for unsafe renegotiation.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.reneg-err openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.reneg-err	2009-11-09 19:45:42.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c	2009-11-20 17:56:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE),	"SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW),	"SSL_new"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK),	"SSL_peek"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
@@ -526,6 +528,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),"unknown remote error type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION)   ,"unknown ssl version"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE)         ,"unknown state"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),"unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER)    ,"unsupported cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported compression algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE),"unsupported digest type"},
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.reneg-err openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.reneg-err	2009-11-12 15:17:29.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h	2009-11-20 17:56:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -1934,7 +1934,9 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE			 185
 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW					 186
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 300
 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 302
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 301
 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 303
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK					 270
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 281
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 282
@@ -2231,6 +2233,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE			 253
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION			 254
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE				 255
 +#define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED	 338
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER			 256
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 257
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE			 326
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c.reneg-err openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c.reneg-err	2009-11-12 15:17:29.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c	2009-11-20 17:57:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -497,6 +497,11 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
 		goto err;
 #else
 +		if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +			{
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 +			goto err;
 +			}
 		/* we are talking sslv2 */
 		/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
 		 * sslv2 stuff. */
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.reneg-err openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.reneg-err	2009-11-18 14:04:19.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c	2009-11-20 17:56:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -636,6 +636,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			{
 			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 			return 0;
 			}
 		return 1;
@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
  	if (s->new_session && !renegotiate_seen
  		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
  		{
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
  		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
  		return 0;
  		}
@@ -993,6 +995,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			{
 			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 			return 0;
 			}
 #endif
@@ -1133,6 +1136,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 		return 0;
 		}
 #endif
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-scsv.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-scsv.patch
@ -1,793 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
 -	int off=0;
 +	unsigned int off=0, clr=0;
 	SSL *con=NULL;
 	int s,k,width,state=0;
 	char *cbuf=NULL,*sbuf=NULL,*mbuf=NULL;
@@ -660,6 +660,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
 			off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
 +		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_server_connect") == 0)
 +			{ off|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
 +		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0)
 +			{ clr|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -870,6 +874,9 @@ bad:
 		SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,SSL_OP_ALL|off);
 	else
 		SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,off);
 +
 +	if (clr)
 +		SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr);
 	/* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( 
 	 * Setting read ahead solves this problem.
 	 */
@@ -1725,6 +1732,8 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s
 							 EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp));
 		EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
 	}
 +	BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
 +			SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT");
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 	comp=SSL_get_current_compression(s);
 	expansion=SSL_get_current_expansion(s);
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -2212,6 +2212,8 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 			con->kssl_ctx->client_princ);
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 +	BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
 +		      SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
 	return(1);
 	}
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.scsv	2007-08-24 00:49:13.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 =head1 NAME
 -SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options - manipulate SSL engine options
 +SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -11,26 +11,41 @@ SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SS
  long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
  long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);
 + long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
 + long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options);
 +
  long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);
  long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);
 + long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl);
 +
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 +Note: all these functions are implemented using macros.
 +
 SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ctx>.
 Options already set before are not cleared!
 SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.
 Options already set before are not cleared!
 +SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options>
 +to B<ctx>.
 +
 +SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.
 +
 SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B<ctx>.
 SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B<ssl>.
 +SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports
 +secure renegotiation.
 +
 =head1 NOTES
 The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options.
 The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical B<or>
 -operation (|). Options can only be added but can never be reset.
 +operation (|).
 SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external)
 protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of
@@ -199,7 +214,7 @@ Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.
 When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
 (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial
 -handshake).  This option is not needed for clients.
 +handshake). This option is not needed for clients.
 =item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
@@ -209,15 +224,63 @@ of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless sess
 If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will
 not be used by clients or servers.
 +=item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
 +
 +See the B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for a discussion of the purpose of
 +this option
 +
 =back
 +=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION
 +
 +OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
 +described in draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation (FIXME: replace by RFC). This
 +counters a prefix attack described in the draft and elsewhere (FIXME: need full
 +reference).
 +
 +This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be
 +aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure
 +renegotiation is referred to as I<patched>. A server not supporting secure
 +renegotiation is referred to as I<unpatched>.
 +
 +If an unpatched client attempts to connect to a patched OpenSSL server then
 +the attempt will succeed but renegotiation is not permitted. As required
 +by the standard a B<no_renegotiation> alert is sent back to the client if
 +the TLS v1.0 protocol is used. If SSLv3.0 is used then renegotiation results
 +in a fatal B<handshake_failed> alert.
 +
 +If a patched OpenSSL client attempts to connect to an unpatched server
 +then the connection will fail because it is not possible to determine
 +whether an attack is taking place.
 +
 +If the option B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then the
 +above restrictions are relaxed. Renegotiation is permissible and initial
 +connections to unpatched servers will succeed.
 +
 +This option should be used with caution because it leaves both clients and
 +servers vulnerable. However unpatched servers and clients are likely to be
 +around for some time and refusing to connect to unpatched servers or denying
 +renegotion altogether may be unacceptable. So applications may be forced to
 +tolerate unsafe renegotiation for the immediate future.
 +
 +The function SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer
 +supports secure renegotiation. 
 +
 +The deprecated SSLv2 protocol does not support secure renegotiation at all.
 +
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask
 after adding B<options>.
 +SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask
 +after clearing B<options>.
 +
 SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask.
 +SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports
 +secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not.
 +
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>,
@@ -240,4 +303,10 @@ Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not inc
 can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always
 enabled).
 +SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() were first added in OpenSSL
 +0.9.8m.
 +
 +B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> was first added in OpenSSL
 +0.9.8m.
 +
 =cut
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_clnt.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 -			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
 			}
 #endif		
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 -			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			return -1;
 			}
 #endif
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY)          ,"no publickey"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION)      ,"no renegotiation"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST)    ,"digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER)      ,"no shared cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK)    ,"no verify callback"},
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT)    ,"serverhello tlsext"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ)            ,"short read"},
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG			0x00000001L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG			0x00000002L
 +/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
 +#define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT			0x00000004L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L /* can break some security expectations */
 #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x00000010L
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER		0x00000020L
@@ -518,7 +520,6 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG			0x00000080L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG				0x00000100L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG			0x00000200L
 -#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION	0x00000400L
 /* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
  * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.  Usually (depending on the application protocol)
@@ -544,6 +545,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION	0x00010000L
 /* Don't use compression even if supported */
 #define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION				0x00020000L
 +/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
 +#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION	0x00040000L
 /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
 /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
@@ -599,17 +602,25 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
 +#define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \
 +	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
 #define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \
 	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
 +#define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \
 +	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
 #define SSL_get_options(ssl) \
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
 +#define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
 +	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
 #define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
 +#define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
 +	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
 #define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
 	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
 #define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
@@ -617,6 +628,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
 +#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
 +	SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
 void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
 void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
@@ -1389,6 +1402,10 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT	74
 #define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN			75
 +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT			76
 +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS			77
 +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE			78
 +
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
 #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -2119,6 +2136,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED			 190
 #define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE			 191
 #define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY				 192
 +#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION				 339
 #define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST			 324
 #define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER				 193
 #define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK			 194
@@ -2158,6 +2176,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO		 216
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO			 217
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO		 218
 +#define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING		 345
 #define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT			 275
 #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED		 277
 #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ				 219
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_lib.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_lib.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2010-01-07 23:38:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -1041,8 +1041,12 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v
 	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
 		return(s->options|=larg);
 +	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
 +		return(s->options&=~larg);
 	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
 		return(s->mode|=larg);
 +	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
 +		return(s->mode &=~larg);
 	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
 		return(s->max_cert_list);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
@@ -1062,6 +1066,10 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v
 			return 0;
 		s->max_send_fragment = larg;
 		return 1;
 +	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
 +		if (s->s3)
 +			return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
 +		else return 0;
 	default:
 		return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
 		}
@@ -1148,8 +1156,12 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,l
 		return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
 	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
 		return(ctx->options|=larg);
 +	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
 +		return(ctx->options&=~larg);
 	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
 		return(ctx->mode|=larg);
 +	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
 +		return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
 		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
 			return 0;
@@ -1357,6 +1369,22 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
 		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
 +	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
 +	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
 +	 */
 +	if (p != q && !s->new_session)
 +		{
 +		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
 +			{
 +			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
 +			};
 +		j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
 +		p+=j;
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +		fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
 +#endif
 +		}
 +
 	return(p-q);
 	}
@@ -1366,6 +1394,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
 	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	int i,n;
 +	if (s->s3)
 +		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 	if ((num%n) != 0)
@@ -1383,6 +1413,26 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
 	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
 		{
 +		/* Check for SCSV */
 +		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
 +			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
 +			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
 +			{
 +			/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
 +			if (s->new_session)
 +				{
 +				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
 +				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
 +				goto err;
 +				}
 +			s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
 +			p += n;
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +			fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
 +#endif
 +			continue;
 +			}
 +
 		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
 		p+=n;
 		if (c != NULL)
@@ -1642,6 +1692,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
 	}
 #endif
 #endif
 +	/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
 +	 * deployed might change this.
 +	 */
 +	ret->options = SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
 	return(ret);
 err:
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl3.h.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl3.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl3.h.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:38.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl3.h	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 +/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
 +#define SSL3_CK_SCSV				0x030000FF
 +
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5			0x03000001
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA			0x03000002
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 			0x03000003
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	/* TLS extensions*/
 -	if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
 +	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
 		{
 		if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
 			{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_pkt.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_pkt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_pkt.c.scsv	2009-07-14 17:28:44.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -1120,7 +1120,25 @@ start:
 		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
 		goto start;
 		}
 -
 +	/* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
 +	 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
 +	 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
 +	 */
 +	if (s->server &&
 +		SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
 +    		!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
 +		(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
 +		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
 +		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 +		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
 +		!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +		
 +		{
 +		/*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
 +		rr->length = 0;
 +		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
 +		goto start;
 +		}
 	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
 		{
 		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
@@ -1150,6 +1168,21 @@ start:
 				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
 				return(0);
 				}
 +			/* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
 +			 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
 +			 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
 +			 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
 +			 * expects it to succeed.
 +			 *
 +			 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
 +			 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
 +			 */
 +			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
 +				{
 +				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 +				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
 +				goto f_err;
 +				}
 			}
 		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
 			{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	/* TLS extensions*/
 -	if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
 +	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
 		{
 		if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
 			{
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.scsv	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c	2010-01-07 23:38:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -275,8 +275,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
 -	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
 -	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
 +	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
 +	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
 +					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
 		return p;
 	ret+=2;
@@ -315,8 +316,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 		ret+=size_str;
 		}
 -        /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
 -        {
 +        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
 +        if (s->new_session)
 +          {
           int el;
           if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
@@ -504,8 +506,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
 -	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
 -	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
 +	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
 +	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
 		return p;
 	ret+=2;
@@ -633,24 +635,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 -	s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 -		{
 -		if (s->new_session
 -			&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 -			{
 -			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 -			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 -			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 -			return 0;
 -			}
 -		return 1;
 -		}
 +		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
 	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
 -		return 1;
 +		goto ri_check;
 	while (data <= (d+n-4))
 		{
@@ -658,7 +649,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		n2s(data,size);
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
 -	   		return 1;
 +	   		goto ri_check;
 #if 0
 		fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
 #endif
@@ -971,17 +962,22 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 		data+=size;
 		}
 -  
 - 	if (s->new_session && !renegotiate_seen
 - 		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 - 		{
 -		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 - 		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 - 		return 0;
 - 		}
 - 
 	*p = data;
 +
 +	ri_check:
 +
 +	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
 +
 +	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
 +		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +		{
 +		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 +	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
 +				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 +		return 0;
 +		}
 +
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -995,21 +991,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 -		{
 -#if 0
 -		/* Because the client does not see any renegotiation during an
 -		   attack, we must enforce this on all server hellos, even the
 -		   first */
 -		if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 -			{
 -			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 -			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 -			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 -			return 0;
 -			}
 -#endif
 -		return 1;
 -		}
 +		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -1019,7 +1001,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		n2s(data,size);
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
 -	   		return 1;
 +	   		goto ri_check;
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
@@ -1143,16 +1125,6 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		return 0;
 		}
 -#if 0
 -	if (!renegotiate_seen
 -		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 -		{
 -		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 -		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 -		return 0;
 -		}
 -#endif
 -
 	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
 		{
  		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
@@ -1175,6 +1147,26 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		}
 	*p = data;
 +
 +	ri_check:
 +
 +	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
 +	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
 +	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
 +	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
 +	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
 +	 * absence on initial connect only.
 +	 */
 +	if (!renegotiate_seen && 
 +		(s->new_session || !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT))
 +		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +		{
 +		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
 +				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 +		return 0;
 +		}
 +
 	return 1;
 	}
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_reneg.c.scsv openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_reneg.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_reneg.c.scsv	2009-11-09 19:45:42.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_reneg.c	2010-01-07 23:37:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(
         memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
 	       s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n",
 +		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
 +#endif
         }
     *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
 -    
 +
 + 
     return 1;
     }
@@ -166,7 +171,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ex
     if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
 -        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         return 0;
         }
@@ -174,9 +179,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ex
 	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
 -        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         return 0;
         }
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n",
 +				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
 +#endif
     s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
@@ -206,6 +215,10 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(
         memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
 	       s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n",
 +    		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
 +#endif
         }
     *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
@@ -249,7 +262,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ex
     if(ilen != expected_len)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
 -        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         return 0;
         }
@@ -257,7 +270,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ex
 	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
 -        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
         return 0;
         }
     d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
@@ -269,6 +282,11 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ex
         *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         return 0;
         }
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
 +    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n",
 +				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
 +#endif
 +    s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
     return 1;
     }
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg.patch
@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_cb.c.reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_cb.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_cb.c.reneg	2009-10-15 20:48:47.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_cb.c	2009-11-12 15:02:30.000000000 +0100
@@ -669,6 +669,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int c
 		extname = "server ticket";
 		break;
 +		case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
 +		extname = "renegotiate";
 +		break;
 +
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 		case TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input:
 		extname = "opaque PRF input";
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c.reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c.reneg	2009-11-12 14:57:48.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_client.c	2009-11-12 15:01:48.000000000 +0100
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status           - request certificate status from server\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket        - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
 #endif
 +	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
 	}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -657,6 +658,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 #endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0)
 			off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
 +		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
 +			off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c.reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c.reneg	2009-11-12 14:57:48.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/apps/s_server.c	2009-11-12 15:01:48.000000000 +0100
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err,"                 not specified (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT2);
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug  - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket    - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
 +	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
 #endif
 	}
@@ -1013,6 +1014,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			verify_return_error = 1;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0)
 			{ off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; }
 +		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
 +			off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/tls1.h.reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/tls1.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/tls1.h.reneg	2009-11-12 14:57:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/tls1.h	2009-11-12 15:02:30.000000000 +0100
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ extern "C" {
 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input		?? */
 #endif
 +/* Temporary extension type */
 +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate                 0xff01
 +
 /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
 #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
 /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.reneg openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c.reneg	2009-11-08 15:36:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/t1_lib.c	2009-11-12 15:02:30.000000000 +0100
@@ -315,6 +315,30 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
 		ret+=size_str;
 		}
 +        /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
 +        {
 +          int el;
 +          
 +          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
 +              {
 +              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +              return NULL;
 +              }
 +
 +          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 +          
 +          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
 +          s2n(el,ret);
 +
 +          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
 +              {
 +              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +              return NULL;
 +              }
 +
 +          ret += el;
 +        }
 +
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
@@ -490,6 +514,31 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
 		s2n(0,ret);
 		}
 +
 +        if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
 +        {
 +          int el;
 +          
 +          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
 +              {
 +              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +              return NULL;
 +              }
 +
 +          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 +          
 +          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
 +          s2n(el,ret);
 +
 +          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
 +              {
 +              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 +              return NULL;
 +              }
 +
 +          ret += el;
 +        }
 +
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
@@ -574,11 +623,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	unsigned short size;
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 +	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 +
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 +	s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 +		{
 +		if (s->new_session
 +			&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +			{
 +			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 +			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +			return 0;
 +			}
 		return 1;
 +		}
 	n2s(data,len);
 	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
@@ -790,6 +851,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 				return 0;
 				}
 			}
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
 +			{
 +			if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
 +				return 0;
 +			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 +			}
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
 						&& s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 			{
@@ -894,6 +961,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 		data+=size;
 		}
 +  
 + 	if (s->new_session && !renegotiate_seen
 + 		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 + 		{
 + 		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 + 		return 0;
 + 		}
 + 
 	*p = data;
 	return 1;
@@ -905,11 +980,22 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	unsigned short size;
 	unsigned short len;  
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 -
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
 +	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 +		{
 +		/* Because the client does not see any renegotiation during an
 +		   attack, we must enforce this on all server hellos, even the
 +		   first */
 +		if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +			{
 +			/* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
 +			*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +			return 0;
 +			}
 		return 1;
 +		}
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -1025,7 +1111,12 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
 			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
 			}
 -
 +		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
 +			{
 +			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
 +				return 0;
 +			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 +			}
 		data+=size;		
 		}
@@ -1035,6 +1126,13 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 		return 0;
 		}
 +	if (!renegotiate_seen
 +		&& !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 +		{
 +		*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
 +		return 0;
 +		}
 +
 	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
 		{
  		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tls-comp.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tls-comp.patch
@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.tls-comp openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c.tls-comp	2010-01-07 18:45:46.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl_err.c	2010-01-07 22:46:10.000000000 +0100
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT)    ,"clienthello tlsext"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"compressed length too long"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED)  ,"compression disabled"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE)   ,"compression failure"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),"compression id not within private range"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),"compression library error"},
@@ -357,8 +358,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"invalid compression algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE)       ,"invalid purpose"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),"invalid ticket keys length"},
@@ -421,6 +424,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX)          ,"null ssl ctx"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},
@@ -451,6 +455,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),"renegotiation encoding err"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH),"renegotiation mismatch"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING),"required cipher missing"},
 +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),"required compresssion algorithm missing"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"},
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.tls-comp openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h.tls-comp	2010-01-07 18:45:46.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/ssl.h	2010-01-07 22:47:07.000000000 +0100
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 	long timeout;
 	long time;
 -	int compress_meth;		/* Need to lookup the method */
 +	unsigned int compress_meth;	/* Need to lookup the method */
 	const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned long cipher_id;	/* when ASN.1 loaded, this
@@ -2051,6 +2051,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR			 139
 #define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT			 226
 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG		 140
 +#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED			 343
 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE			 141
 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE	 307
 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR			 142
@@ -2079,8 +2080,10 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
 +#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 341
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE				 278
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE			 328
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH		 325
@@ -2143,6 +2146,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX				 195
 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED			 196
 #define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED		 197
 +#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
 #define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE		 297
 #define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG			 327
 #define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 198
@@ -2173,6 +2177,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR		 336
 #define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH			 337
 #define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING			 215
 +#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING	 342
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO		 216
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO			 217
 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO		 218
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.tls-comp openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c.tls-comp	2010-01-07 17:53:12.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2010-01-07 22:47:07.000000000 +0100
@@ -895,10 +895,31 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 +	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
 +	 * using compression.
 +	 */
 +	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
 +		{
 +		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
 +		goto f_err;
 +		}
 #else
 	j= *(p++);
 -	if ((j == 0) || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
 +	if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
 +		{
 +		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
 +		goto f_err;
 +		}
 +	if (j == 0)
 		comp=NULL;
 +	else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
 +		{
 +		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
 +		goto f_err;
 +		}
 	else
 		comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c.tls-comp openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c.tls-comp	2010-01-07 17:53:12.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2010-01-07 22:46:10.000000000 +0100
@@ -1088,7 +1088,50 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
 	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 -	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
 +	/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
 +	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
 +		{
 +		int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
 +		/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
 +		/* Can't disable compression */
 +		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
 +			{
 +			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
 +			goto f_err;
 +			}
 +		/* Look for resumed compression method */
 +		for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
 +			{
 +			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
 +			if (comp_id == comp->id)
 +				{
 +				s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
 +				break;
 +				}
 +			}
 +		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
 +			{
 +			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
 +			goto f_err;
 +			}
 +		/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
 +		for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
 +			{
 +			if (q[m] == comp_id)
 +				break;
 +			}
 +		if (m >= i)
 +			{
 +			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
 +			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
 +			goto f_err;
 +			}
 +		}
 +	else if (s->hit)
 +		comp = NULL;
 +	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
 		{ /* See if we have a match */
 		int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
@@ -1112,6 +1155,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		else
 			comp=NULL;
 		}
 +#else
 +	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
 +	 * using compression.
 +	 */
 +	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
 +		{
 +		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
 +		goto f_err;
 +		}
 #endif
 	/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tlsver.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tlsver.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
 Fix handling of future TLS versions.
 diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c.tlsver openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c
 --- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c.tlsver	2010-01-12 22:20:15.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/ssl/s23_srvr.c	2010-01-13 22:02:47.000000000 +0100
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
 			 (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 			 ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
 -				|| (p[9] == p[1])))
 +				|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
 			{
 			/*
 			 * SSLv3 or tls1 header
@@ -339,6 +339,13 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
 #endif
 				}
 +			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
 +			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
 +			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
 +			 * this....
 +			 */
 +			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 +				v[1]=0xff;
 			else
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
 			if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-cipher-change.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-cipher-change.patch
@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta3/ssl/ssl.h.cipher-change openssl-1.0.0-beta3/ssl/ssl.h
+diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta5/ssl/ssl.h.cipher-change openssl-1.0.0-beta5/ssl/ssl.h
--- openssl-1.0.0-beta3/ssl/ssl.h.cipher-change	2009-08-05 18:22:45.000000000 +0200
+--- openssl-1.0.0-beta5/ssl/ssl.h.cipher-change	2010-01-20 18:12:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta3/ssl/ssl.h	2009-08-05 18:27:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta5/ssl/ssl.h	2010-01-20 18:13:04.000000000 +0100
-@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
+@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG			0x00000001L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG			0x00000002L
 /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
 #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT			0x00000004L
 -#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L
 +#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L /* can break some security expectations */
 #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x00000010L
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER		0x00000020L
 #define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING			0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
-@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 /* SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless.
  *             This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure
+diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta5/Configure.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta5/Configure
--- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure.enginesdir	2009-11-12 12:17:59.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.0-beta5/Configure.enginesdir	2010-01-20 18:07:05.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure	2009-11-12 12:19:45.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta5/Configure	2010-01-20 18:10:48.000000000 +0100
@@ -622,6 +622,7 @@ my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
 my $prefix="";
 my $libdir="";
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure
 			elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/)
 				{
 				$install_prefix=$1;
-@@ -1055,7 +1060,7 @@ chop $prefix if $prefix =~ /.\/$/;
+@@ -1053,7 +1058,7 @@ chop $prefix if $prefix =~ /.\/$/;
 $openssldir=$prefix . "/ssl" if $openssldir eq "";
 $openssldir=$prefix . "/" . $openssldir if $openssldir !~ /(^\/|^[a-zA-Z]:[\\\/])/;
@ -29,18 +29,18 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta4/Configure
 print "IsMK1MF=$IsMK1MF\n";
-@@ -1676,7 +1681,7 @@ while (<IN>)
+@@ -1673,7 +1678,7 @@ while (<IN>)
- 		# $foo is to become "$prefix/lib$multilib/engines";
+ 		}
- 		# as Makefile.org and engines/Makefile are adapted for
+ 	elsif	(/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/)
- 		# $multilib suffix.
+ 		{
-		my $foo = "$prefix/lib/engines";
+-		my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines";
 +		my $foo = "$enginesdir";
 		$foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
 		print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n";
 		}
-diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/engines/Makefile.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta4/engines/Makefile
+diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta5/engines/Makefile.enginesdir openssl-1.0.0-beta5/engines/Makefile
--- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/engines/Makefile.enginesdir	2009-11-10 02:52:52.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.0-beta5/engines/Makefile.enginesdir	2010-01-16 21:06:09.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/engines/Makefile	2009-11-12 12:23:06.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta5/engines/Makefile	2010-01-20 18:07:05.000000000 +0100
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ install:
 				sfx=".so"; \
 				cp cyg$$l.dll $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines/$$pfx$$l$$sfx.new; \
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-fips.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-fips.patch
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8j/README.warning openssl-0.9.8j/README
+diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta5/README.warning openssl-1.0.0-beta5/README
--- openssl-0.9.8j/README.warning	2009-01-07 11:50:53.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.0-beta5/README.warning	2010-01-20 16:00:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j/README	2009-01-14 17:43:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta5/README	2010-01-21 09:06:11.000000000 +0100
-@@ -5,6 +5,31 @@
+@@ -5,6 +5,35 @@
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
@ -15,9 +15,15 @@ diff -up openssl-0.9.8j/README.warning openssl-0.9.8j/README
 + 
 + This version also contains a few differences from the upstream code
 + some of which are:
-+   * The FIPS integrity verification check is implemented differently
+   * There are added changes forward ported from the upstream OpenSSL
-+     from the upstream FIPS validated OpenSSL module. It verifies
+     0.9.8 FIPS branch however the FIPS integrity verification check
-+     HMAC-SHA256 checksum of the whole libcrypto shared library.
+     is implemented differently from the upstream FIPS validated OpenSSL
 +     module. It verifies HMAC-SHA256 checksum of the whole shared
 +     libraries. For this reason the changes are ported to files in the
 +     crypto directory and not in a separate fips subdirectory. Also
 +     note that the FIPS integrity verification check requires unmodified
 +     libcrypto and libssl shared library files which means that it will
 +     fail if these files are modified for example by prelink.
 +   * The module respects the kernel FIPS flag /proc/sys/crypto/fips and
 +     tries to initialize the FIPS mode if it is set to 1 aborting if the
 +     FIPS mode could not be initialized. It is also possible to force the
@ -27,8 +33,6 @@ diff -up openssl-0.9.8j/README.warning openssl-0.9.8j/README
 +     will not automatically load the built in compression method ZLIB
 +     when initialized. Applications can still explicitely ask for ZLIB
 +     compression method.
 +   * There is added a support for EAP-FAST through TLS extension. This code
 +     is backported from OpenSSL upstream development branch.
 +
  DESCRIPTION
  -----------
--- a/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-version.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0-beta5-version.patch
@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 We have to keep the beta status on 3 as some applications (OpenSSH) incorrectly insist
 on having the same beta status of OpenSSL library as they were built against.
-diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/opensslv.h.version openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/opensslv.h
+diff -up openssl-1.0.0-beta5/crypto/opensslv.h.version openssl-1.0.0-beta5/crypto/opensslv.h
--- openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/opensslv.h.version	2009-11-12 15:17:28.000000000 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.0-beta5/crypto/opensslv.h.version	2010-01-20 18:16:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta4/crypto/opensslv.h	2009-11-13 12:39:08.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.0-beta5/crypto/opensslv.h	2010-01-20 20:20:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x10000004L
+-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x10000005L
 +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x10000003L
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- #define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0-fips-beta4 10 Nov 2009"
+ #define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0-fips-beta5 20 Jan 2010"
 #else
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 # 1.0.0 soversion = 10
 %define soversion 10
-%define beta beta4
+%define beta beta5
 # Number of threads to spawn when testing some threading fixes.
 %define thread_test_threads %{?threads:%{threads}}%{!?threads:1}
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 Summary: A general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.0.0
-Release: 0.19.%{beta}%{?dist}
+Release: 0.20.%{beta}%{?dist}
 # We remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source tarball
 # with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
 Source: openssl-%{version}-%{beta}-usa.tar.bz2
@ -38,43 +38,30 @@ Source11: README.FIPS
 Patch0: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-redhat.patch
 Patch1: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-defaults.patch
 Patch3: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-soversion.patch
-Patch4: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-enginesdir.patch
+Patch4: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-enginesdir.patch
 Patch5: openssl-0.9.8a-no-rpath.patch
 Patch6: openssl-0.9.8b-test-use-localhost.patch
 # Bug fixes
 Patch23: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-default-paths.patch
-Patch24: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-binutils.patch
+Patch24: openssl-0.9.8j-bad-mime.patch
 # Functionality changes
 Patch32: openssl-0.9.8g-ia64.patch
 Patch33: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-ca-dir.patch
 Patch34: openssl-0.9.6-x509.patch
 Patch35: openssl-0.9.8j-version-add-engines.patch
-Patch38: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-cipher-change.patch
+Patch38: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-cipher-change.patch
 Patch39: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-ipv6-apps.patch
-Patch40: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-fips.patch
+Patch40: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-fips.patch
 Patch41: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-fipscheck.patch
 Patch43: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-fipsmode.patch
 Patch44: openssl-1.0.0-beta3-fipsrng.patch
 Patch45: openssl-0.9.8j-env-nozlib.patch
-Patch47: openssl-0.9.8j-readme-warning.patch
+Patch47: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
 Patch48: openssl-0.9.8j-bad-mime.patch
 Patch49: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-algo-doc.patch
 Patch50: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls1-abi.patch
-Patch51: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-version.patch
+Patch51: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-version.patch
 Patch52: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-aesni.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch60: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg.patch
 # This one is not backported but has to be applied after reneg patch
 Patch61: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-client-reneg.patch
 Patch62: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports.patch
 Patch63: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-err.patch
 Patch64: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-ipv6.patch
 Patch65: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-dtls-reneg.patch
 Patch66: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-backports2.patch
 Patch67: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-reneg-scsv.patch
 Patch68: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tls-comp.patch
 Patch69: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-aesni.patch
 Patch70: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-tlsver.patch
 Patch71: openssl-1.0.0-beta4-cve-2009-4355.patch
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -135,7 +122,7 @@ from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch6 -p1 -b .use-localhost
 %patch23 -p1 -b .default-paths
-%patch24 -p1 -b .binutils
+%patch24 -p1 -b .bad-mime
 %patch32 -p1 -b .ia64
 %patch33 -p1 -b .ca-dir
@ -149,23 +136,10 @@ from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch44 -p1 -b .fipsrng
 %patch45 -p1 -b .env-nozlib
 %patch47 -p1 -b .warning
 %patch48 -p1 -b .bad-mime
 %patch49 -p1 -b .algo-doc
 %patch50 -p1 -b .dtls1-abi
 %patch51 -p1 -b .version
-
+%patch52 -p1 -b .aesni
 %patch60 -p1 -b .reneg
 %patch61 -p1 -b .client-reneg
 %patch62 -p1 -b .backports
 %patch63 -p1 -b .reneg-err
 %patch64 -p1 -b .dtls-ipv6
 %patch65 -p1 -b .dtls-reneg
 %patch66 -p1 -b .backports2
 %patch67 -p1 -b .scsv
 %patch68 -p1 -b .tls-comp
 %patch69 -p1 -b .aesni
 %patch70 -p1 -b .tlsver
 %patch71 -p1 -b .compleak
 # Modify the various perl scripts to reference perl in the right location.
 perl util/perlpath.pl `dirname %{__perl}`
@ -264,12 +238,9 @@ make -C test apps tests
 install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT{%{_bindir},%{_includedir},%{_libdir},%{_mandir},%{_libdir}/openssl}
 make INSTALL_PREFIX=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install
 make INSTALL_PREFIX=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install_docs
-# OpenSSL install doesn't use correct _libdir on 64 bit archs
+mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/engines $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/openssl
 [ "%{_libdir}" != /usr/lib ] && mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/lib*.so.%{soversion} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/
 mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/engines $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/openssl
 mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/man/* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/
 rmdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/man
 mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ || :
 rename so.%{soversion} so.%{version} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.so.%{soversion}
 for lib in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.so.%{version} ; do
 	chmod 755 ${lib}
@ -414,6 +385,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun -p /sbin/ldconfig
 %changelog
 * Wed Jan 20 2010 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.0-0.20.beta5
 - new upstream release
 * Thu Jan 14 2010 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.0-0.19.beta4
 - fix CVE-2009-4355 - leak in applications incorrectly calling
  CRYPTO_free_all_ex_data() before application exit (#546707)
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@ -1 +1 @@
-1fc0e41c230d0698f834413dfba864ad  openssl-1.0.0-beta4-usa.tar.bz2
+531160d84017cb52e3c23b52cca0d5cf  openssl-1.0.0-beta5-usa.tar.bz2
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`openssl-1.0.0-beta4-usa.tar.bz2`	`openssl-1.0.0-beta5-usa.tar.bz2`
`@ -1 +1 @@`
	`1fc0e41c230d0698f834413dfba864ad openssl-1.0.0-beta4-usa.tar.bz2`	`531160d84017cb52e3c23b52cca0d5cf openssl-1.0.0-beta5-usa.tar.bz2`