diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
index b4b9a1a..cdc042b 100644
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,57 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2013-11-19 14:48:38.935251819 +0100
+@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *adin = NULL;
+ size_t adinlen = 0;
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ int locked;
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+ do
+ {
+ size_t rcnt;
+@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
+ while (count);
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+@@ -141,8 +143,13 @@ static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
+ static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
+ {
+ DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
++ int locked;
++
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+ if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
+ return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -150,8 +157,13 @@ static int fips_drbg_add(const void *see
+ double add_entropy)
+ {
+ DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
++ int locked;
++
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+ if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
+ return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c
---- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:18.378484894 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c 2013-11-15 16:54:19.584570380 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.390224209 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -340,6 +340,42 @@ static const unsigned char kat_RSA_X931_
0x60, 0x83, 0x18, 0x88, 0xA3, 0xF5, 0x59, 0xC3
};
@@ -72,7 +123,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT
# endif
#endif
@@ -96,8 +147,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/mo
if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen<len))
return -1;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
---- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:17.984476250 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:48.995215544 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {
unsigned int mres, ares;
block128_f block;
@@ -106,9 +157,196 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto
};
struct xts128_context {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2013-11-19 14:43:00.592829775 +0100
+@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
+ static double entropy=0;
+ static int initialized=0;
+
+-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
+- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
+- * (to prevent double locking) */
+-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
+-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+-
+
+ #ifdef PREDICT
+ int rand_predictable=0;
+@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
+ long md_c[2];
+ unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
+- int do_not_lock;
++ int locked;
+
+ /*
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+@@ -213,19 +207,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
+ * hash function.
+ */
+
+- /* check if we already have the lock */
+- if (crypto_lock_rand)
+- {
+- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- }
+- else
+- do_not_lock = 0;
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+
+- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ st_idx=state_index;
+
+ /* use our own copies of the counters so that even
+@@ -257,7 +240,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
+
+ md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+@@ -308,7 +292,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+
+- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+ /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
+ * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
+ * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
+@@ -319,7 +303,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
+ }
+ if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ entropy += add;
+- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+ assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
+@@ -344,6 +329,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
+ pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+ #endif
+ int do_stir_pool = 0;
++ int locked;
+
+ #ifdef PREDICT
+ if (rand_predictable)
+@@ -381,13 +367,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
+ * global 'md'.
+ */
+
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+-
+- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+
+ /* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the
+ * expansion
+@@ -461,9 +441,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
+
+ md_count[0] += 1;
+
+- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+
+ while (num > 0)
+ {
+@@ -515,10 +494,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
+ MD_Init(&m);
+ MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
+ MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+ MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ MD_Final(&m,md);
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ if (ok)
+@@ -548,32 +528,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
+
+ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
+ {
+- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ int ret;
+- int do_not_lock;
++ int locked;
+
+- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+- /* check if we already have the lock
+- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
+- if (crypto_lock_rand)
+- {
+- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- }
+- else
+- do_not_lock = 0;
+-
+- if (!do_not_lock)
+- {
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+-
+- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+- }
++ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
+
+ if (!initialized)
+ {
+@@ -583,13 +541,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
+
+ ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+- if (!do_not_lock)
+- {
+- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+-
+- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+- }
++ if (locked)
++ private_RAND_lock(0);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-19 14:32:25.182891113 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h 2013-11-19 14:32:03.546416472 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
+ int RAND_init_fips(void);
+ #endif
+
++int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
++
+ /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+ /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
---- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:18.110479014 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.122218330 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
#define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
@@ -120,27 +358,61 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/r
#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
-@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
- #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
-+#include "../fips/fips_rand_lcl.h"
- #endif
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2013-11-19 14:44:22.422624833 +0100
+@@ -181,6 +181,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
+ return 0;
+ }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-@@ -239,12 +240,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
++int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
++ {
++ static int crypto_lock_rand;
++ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
++ int do_lock;
++
++ if (!lock)
++ {
++ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* check if we already have the lock */
++ if (crypto_lock_rand)
++ {
++ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
++ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
++ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
++ do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
++ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
++ }
++ else
++ do_lock = 1;
++ if (do_lock)
++ {
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
++ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
++ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
++ }
++ return do_lock;
++ }
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+ /* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
+@@ -239,12 +274,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
double entropy)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
-+ ctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
++ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
-+ ctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
++ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 36aada5..3490af4 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1e
-Release: 33%{?dist}
+Release: 34%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
+* Tue Nov 19 2013 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34
+- fix locking and reseeding problems with FIPS drbg
+
* Fri Nov 15 2013 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-33
- additional changes required for FIPS validation