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Fix CVE-2024-5535

Browse Source 
The first patch caused a QUIC test to fail, so backport the entire
series, which looks reasonable and adds good additional safeguards and
checks.

(cherry picked from commit f3cb03b52a)

Resolves: RHEL-45657
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Clemens Lang 2024-08-21 17:08:30 +02:00
parent 35940569f1
commit 8bdb45e21d
11 changed files with 2184 additions and 1 deletions
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109
0124-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
From 99fb785a5f85315b95288921a321a935ea29a51e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
same for the server list while we are about it.
CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 016135fe18..cf52b317cf 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3518,37 +3518,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+ * a match.
+ */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+ } else {
+ /* This should never happen */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
- j += client[j];
- j++;
}
- i += server[i];
- i++;
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
}
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
+ /*
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+ */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
--
2.46.0

39
0125-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 015255851371757d54c2560643eb3b3a88123cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:18:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when
processing NPN
In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
explicit and return a handshake failure alert.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 381a6c9d7b..1ab3c13d57 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1560,8 +1560,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
&selected, &selected_len,
PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
--
2.46.0

34
0126-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 6cc511826f09e513b4ec066d9b95acaf4f86d991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:22:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Use correctly formatted ALPN data in tserver
The QUIC test server was using incorrectly formatted ALPN data. With the
previous implementation of SSL_select_next_proto this went unnoticed. With
the new stricter implemenation it was failing.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
index 86187d06ff..15694e723f 100644
--- a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
+++ b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
if (srv->args.alpn == NULL) {
alpn = alpndeflt;
- alpnlen = sizeof(alpn);
+ alpnlen = sizeof(alpndeflt);
} else {
alpn = srv->args.alpn;
alpnlen = srv->args.alpnlen;
--
2.46.0

78
0127-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From 8e81c57adbbf703dfb63955f65599765fdacc741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:46:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Clarify the SSL_select_next_proto() documentation
We clarify the input preconditions and the expected behaviour in the event
of no overlap.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
index 05fee2fbec..79e1a252f6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
-B<protos_len>.
+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
+
+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
+SSL_select_next_proto().
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -154,7 +163,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
-B<out>, B<outlen>.
+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
+B<client> is invalid).
=back
--
2.46.0

172
0128-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
From add5c52a25c549cec4a730cdf96e2252f0a1862d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 16:35:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/10] Add a test for SSL_select_next_proto
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/sslapitest.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index ce163322cd..15cb9060cb 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11741,6 +11741,142 @@ static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
return testresult;
}
+static struct next_proto_st {
+ int serverlen;
+ unsigned char server[40];
+ int clientlen;
+ unsigned char client[40];
+ int expected_ret;
+ size_t selectedlen;
+ unsigned char selected[40];
+} next_proto_tests[] = {
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b', },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 10, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'b', 'c', 'd' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 0, { 0 },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ -1, { 0 },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 0, { 0 },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ -1, { 0 },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ },
+ {
+ 3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ }
+};
+
+static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
+{
+ struct next_proto_st *np = &next_proto_tests[idx];
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *out, *client, *server;
+ unsigned char outlen;
+ unsigned int clientlen, serverlen;
+
+ if (np->clientlen == -1) {
+ client = NULL;
+ clientlen = 0;
+ } else {
+ client = np->client;
+ clientlen = (unsigned int)np->clientlen;
+ }
+ if (np->serverlen == -1) {
+ server = NULL;
+ serverlen = 0;
+ } else {
+ server = np->server;
+ serverlen = (unsigned int)np->serverlen;
+ }
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_select_next_proto(&out, &outlen, server, serverlen,
+ client, clientlen),
+ np->expected_ret))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (np->selectedlen == 0) {
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(out) || !TEST_uchar_eq(outlen, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, outlen, np->selected, np->selectedlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12053,6 +12189,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake_retry, 16);
ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
return 1;
err:
--
2.46.0

1169
0129-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

39
0130-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 53f5677f358c4a4f69830d944ea40e71950673b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:41:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/10] Correct return values for
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg
Return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT in the event that we don't send the extension,
rather than EXT_RETURN_SENT. This actually makes no difference at all to
the current control flow since this return value is ignored in this case
anyway. But lets make it correct anyway.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 800654450e..66ed7dacf2 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1501,9 +1501,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif
--
2.46.0

62
0131-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 195e15421df113d7283aab2ccff8b8fb06df5465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 11:51:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Add ALPN validation in the client
The ALPN protocol selected by the server must be one that we originally
advertised. We should verify that it is.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 1ab3c13d57..ff9c009ee5 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1590,6 +1590,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
@@ -1608,6 +1610,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
--
2.46.0

267
0132-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
From 7c95191434415d1c9b7fe9b130df13cce630b6b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:09:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add explicit testing of ALN and NPN in sslapitest
We already had some tests elsewhere - but this extends that testing with
additional tests.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/sslapitest.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 229 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 15cb9060cb..7a55a2b721 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11877,6 +11877,231 @@ static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
return ret;
}
+static const unsigned char fooprot[] = {3, 'f', 'o', 'o' };
+static const unsigned char barprot[] = {3, 'b', 'a', 'r' };
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+static int npn_advert_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ default:
+ case 0:
+ *out = fooprot;
+ *outlen = sizeof(fooprot);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 1:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 2:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int npn_select_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *fooprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 3:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *barprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 4:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ default:
+ case 2:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the NPN callbacks
+ * Test 0: advert = foo, select = foo
+ * Test 1: advert = <empty>, select = foo
+ * Test 2: no advert
+ * Test 3: advert = foo, select = bar
+ * Test 4: advert = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
+ */
+static int test_npn(int idx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(), 0, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+ &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(sctx, npn_advert_cb, &idx);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(cctx, npn_select_cb, &idx);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
+ NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 4) {
+ /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
+ if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *prot;
+ unsigned int protlen;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(serverssl, &prot, &protlen);
+ switch (idx) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, barprot + 1, *barprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ default:
+ TEST_error("Should not get here");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) */
+
+static int alpn_select_cb2(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ case 0:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *fooprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 2:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *barprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 3:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ default:
+ case 1:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the ALPN callbacks
+ * Test 0: client = foo, select = foo
+ * Test 1: client = <empty>, select = none
+ * Test 2: client = foo, select = bar (should fail)
+ * Test 3: client = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
+ */
+static int test_alpn(int idx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ const unsigned char *prots = fooprot;
+ unsigned int protslen = sizeof(fooprot);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(), 0, 0,
+ &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb2, &idx);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
+ NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 1) {
+ prots = NULL;
+ protslen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success! */
+ if (!TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, prots, protslen)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 2 || idx == 3) {
+ /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
+ if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *prot;
+ unsigned int protlen;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(clientssl, &prot, &protlen);
+ switch (idx) {
+ case 0:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ default:
+ TEST_error("Should not get here");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12190,6 +12415,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_npn, 5);
+#endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_alpn, 4);
return 1;
err:
--
2.46.0

199
0133-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
From 301b870546d1c7b2d8f0d66e04a2596142f0399f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 14:29:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Add a test for an empty NextProto message
It is valid according to the spec for a NextProto message to have no
protocols listed in it. The OpenSSL implementation however does not allow
us to create such a message. In order to check that we work as expected
when communicating with a client that does generate such messages we have
to use a TLSProxy test.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/recipes/70-test_npn.t | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm | 9 ++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm | 1 +
4 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
create mode 100644 util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f82e71af6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_npn";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+ if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+ if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+ if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs NPN enabled"
+ if disabled("nextprotoneg");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
+ if disabled("tls1_2");
+
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+ undef,
+ cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+ srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+ (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 1;
+
+my $npnseen = 0;
+
+# Test 1: Check sending an empty NextProto message from the client works. This is
+# valid as per the spec, but OpenSSL does not allow you to send it.
+# Therefore we must be prepared to receive such a message but we cannot
+# generate it except via TLSProxy
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&npn_filter);
+$proxy->clientflags("-nextprotoneg foo -no_tls1_3");
+$proxy->serverflags("-nextprotoneg foo");
+$proxy->start();
+ok($npnseen && TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Empty NPN message");
+
+sub npn_filter
+{
+ my $proxy = shift;
+ my $message;
+
+ # The NextProto message always appears in flight 2
+ return if $proxy->flight != 2;
+
+ foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+ if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+ # Our TLSproxy NextProto message support doesn't support parsing of
+ # the message. If we repack it just creates an empty NextProto
+ # message - which is exactly the scenario we want to test here.
+ $message->repack();
+ $npnseen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
index ce22187569..fb41b2ffc8 100644
--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
@@ -384,6 +384,15 @@ sub create_message
[@message_frag_lens]
);
$message->parse();
+ } elsif ($mt == MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+ $message = TLSProxy::NextProto->new(
+ $server,
+ $data,
+ [@message_rec_list],
+ $startoffset,
+ [@message_frag_lens]
+ );
+ $message->parse();
} else {
#Unknown message type
$message = TLSProxy::Message->new(
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e18347546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::NextProto;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+ my $class = shift;
+ my ($server,
+ $data,
+ $records,
+ $startoffset,
+ $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+
+ my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+ $server,
+ TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ $data,
+ $records,
+ $startoffset,
+ $message_frag_lens);
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+ # We don't support parsing at the moment
+}
+
+# This is supposed to reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes.
+# For now though since we don't support parsing we just create an empty NextProto
+# message - this capability is used in test_npn
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+ my $self = shift;
+ my $data;
+
+ $data = pack("C32", 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
+ $self->data($data);
+}
+1;
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
index 3de10eccb9..b707722b6b 100644
--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use TLSProxy::CertificateRequest;
use TLSProxy::CertificateVerify;
use TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
use TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
+use TLSProxy::NextProto;
my $have_IPv6;
my $IP_factory;
--
2.46.0

17
openssl.spec
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.2.2
Release: 3%{?dist}
Release: 4%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -159,6 +159,17 @@ Patch121: 0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
Patch122: 0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch
# HKDF regression with older provider implementations
Patch123: 0123-kdf-Preserve-backward-compatibility-with-older-provi.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717
Patch124: 0124-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Patch125: 0125-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch
Patch126: 0126-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch
Patch127: 0127-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch
Patch128: 0128-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Patch129: 0129-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch
Patch130: 0130-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch
Patch131: 0131-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch
Patch132: 0132-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch
Patch133: 0133-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch
License: ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -498,6 +509,10 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Wed Aug 21 2024 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-4
- Fix CVE-2024-5535: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread
Resolves: RHEL-45657
* Sat Jun 22 2024 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-3
- Replace HKDF backward compatibility patch with the official one
Related: RHEL-40823