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RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as expected (CVE-2024-12797)

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Resolves: RHEL-76756
This commit is contained in:
Dmitry Belyavskiy 2025-02-12 13:15:51 +01:00
parent 8d05945dc2
commit 5946116ede
3 changed files with 254 additions and 3 deletions
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10
0025-for-tests.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx 2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf 2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ providers = provider_sect
# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
[provider_sect]
@ -16,3 +16,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
##[legacy_sect]
##activate = 1
-#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
-.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
+##Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
+#.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
####################################################################

238
0140-CVE-2024-12797.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 436b397346..df2eed7594 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1910,6 +1910,7 @@ static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
{
size_t certidx;
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+ int v_ok;
if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
@@ -1919,9 +1920,19 @@ static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
- && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ v_ok = ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk);
+ if (v_ok <= 0 && sc->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ERR_clear_last_mark();
+ SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (v_ok > 0 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
@@ -2071,10 +2082,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
- if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- }
+
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
@@ -2089,12 +2097,17 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
- if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
+ if (i <= 0 && s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ERR_clear_last_mark();
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
diff --git a/test/rpktest.c b/test/rpktest.c
index ac824798f1..624d366508 100644
--- a/test/rpktest.c
+++ b/test/rpktest.c
@@ -89,12 +89,14 @@ static int rpk_verify_server_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* idx = 13 - resumption with client authentication
* idx = 14 - resumption with client authentication, no ticket
* idx = 15 - like 0, but use non-default libctx
+ * idx = 16 - like 7, but with SSL_VERIFY_PEER connection should fail
+ * idx = 17 - like 8, but with SSL_VERIFY_PEER connection should fail
*
- * 16 * 2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 2048 tests
+ * 18 * 2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 2048 tests
*/
static int test_rpk(int idx)
{
-# define RPK_TESTS 16
+# define RPK_TESTS 18
# define RPK_DIMS (2 * 4 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2)
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
@@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
int idx_cert, idx_prot;
int client_auth = 0;
int resumption = 0;
+ int want_error = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
long server_verify_result = 0;
long client_verify_result = 0;
OSSL_LIB_CTX *test_libctx = NULL;
@@ -188,7 +191,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
/* Can't get other_key if it's ECDSA */
if (other_pkey == NULL && idx_cert == 0
- && (idx == 4 || idx == 6 || idx == 7)) {
+ && (idx == 4 || idx == 6 || idx == 7 || idx == 16)) {
testresult = TEST_skip("EDCSA disabled");
goto end;
}
@@ -266,8 +269,10 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
goto end;
/* Only a private key */
if (idx == 1) {
- if (idx_server_server_rpk == 0 || idx_client_server_rpk == 0)
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 0 || idx_client_server_rpk == 0) {
expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ }
} else {
/* Add certificate */
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_use_certificate_file(serverssl, cert_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1))
@@ -333,12 +338,14 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
client_expected = -1;
if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, other_pkey)))
goto end;
+ SSL_set_verify(clientssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, rpk_verify_client_cb);
client_verify_result = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
break;
case 8:
if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1)
client_expected = -1;
/* no peer keys */
+ SSL_set_verify(clientssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, rpk_verify_client_cb);
client_verify_result = X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED;
break;
case 9:
@@ -370,9 +377,13 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(clientssl, privkey_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1))
goto end;
/* Since there's no cert, this is expected to fail without RPK support */
- if (!idx_server_client_rpk || !idx_client_client_rpk)
+ if (!idx_server_client_rpk || !idx_client_client_rpk) {
expected = 0;
- SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, rpk_verify_server_cb);
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, NULL);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, rpk_verify_server_cb);
+ }
client_auth = 1;
break;
case 11:
@@ -449,31 +460,52 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, pkey)))
goto end;
break;
+ case 16:
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1) {
+ /* wrong expected server key */
+ expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ }
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_add_expected_rpk(clientssl, other_pkey)))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 17:
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk == 1 && idx_client_server_rpk == 1) {
+ /* no expected server keys */
+ expected = 0;
+ want_error = SSL_ERROR_SSL;
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ }
+ break;
}
- ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+ ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, want_error);
if (!TEST_int_eq(expected, ret))
goto end;
+ if (expected <= 0) {
+ testresult = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Make sure client gets RPK or certificate as configured */
- if (expected == 1) {
- if (idx_server_server_rpk && idx_client_server_rpk) {
- if (!TEST_long_eq(SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl), client_verify_result))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_rpk(clientssl)))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
- goto end;
- } else {
- if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(clientssl)))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
- goto end;
- if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
- goto end;
- }
+ if (idx_server_server_rpk && idx_client_server_rpk) {
+ if (!TEST_long_eq(SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl), client_verify_result))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_rpk(clientssl)))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(clientssl)))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
+ goto end;
}
if (idx == 9) {
@@ -500,8 +532,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(clientssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk))
goto end;
} else {
- /* only if connection is expected to succeed */
- if (expected == 1 && !TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(serverssl)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(SSL_get0_peer_certificate(serverssl)))
goto end;
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(serverssl), TLSEXT_cert_type_x509))
goto end;
@@ -591,7 +622,7 @@ static int test_rpk(int idx)
}
ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
- if (!TEST_int_eq(expected, ret))
+ if (!TEST_true(ret))
goto end;
verify = SSL_get_verify_result(clientssl);
if (!TEST_int_eq(client_expected, verify))

9
openssl.spec
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.2.2
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ Patch131: 0131-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch
Patch132: 0132-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch
Patch133: 0133-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch
Patch136: 0136-CVE-2024-6119.patch
Patch140: 0140-CVE-2024-12797.patch
License: ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ export HASHBANGPERL=/usr/bin/perl
enable-cms enable-md2 enable-rc5 enable-ktls enable-fips\
no-mdc2 no-ec2m no-sm2 no-sm4 enable-buildtest-c++\
shared ${sslarch} $RPM_OPT_FLAGS '-DDEVRANDOM="\"/dev/urandom\"" -DREDHAT_FIPS_VERSION="\"%{fips}\""'\
-Wl,--allow-multiple-definition
-Wl,--allow-multiple-definition -D_GNU_SOURCE
# Do not run this in a production package the FIPS symbols must be patched-in
#util/mkdef.pl crypto update
@ -510,6 +511,10 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Wed Jan 29 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-7
- RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as expected (CVE-2024-12797)
Resolves: RHEL-76756
* Thu Sep 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-6
- rebuilt
Related: RHEL-55339