rpms/openssl
8
1
Fork 1
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

Rebasing to OpenSSL 3.2.1

Browse Source 
Resolves: RHEL-26271
This commit is contained in:
Dmitry Belyavskiy 2024-04-04 10:44:19 +02:00
parent 8e5beb7708
commit 2c5c3fcced
75 changed files with 3992 additions and 17705 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ openssl-1.0.0a-usa.tar.bz2
/openssl-3.0.1-hobbled.tar.xz
/openssl-3.0.7-hobbled.tar.gz
/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz
/openssl-3.2.1.tar.gz

12
0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch
View File

@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tm
index 342e46d24d..9f369edf0e 100644
--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev
uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev ## Uninstall the software and libraries
-install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs
+install_docs: install_man_docs
-install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs ## Install manpages and HTML documentation
+install_docs: install_man_docs ## Install manpages
uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs
$(RM) -r $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)
uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs ## Uninstall manpages and HTML documentation
$(RM) -r "$(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)"
--
2.26.2

127
0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
View File

@ -6,20 +6,19 @@ Subject: Add support for PROFILE=SYSTEM system default cipherlist
(was openssl-1.1.1-system-cipherlist.patch)
---
Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl | 5 ++
Configure | 10 +++-
Configure | 11 +++-
doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in | 9 ++++
include/openssl/ssl.h.in | 5 ++
ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 4 +-
test/cipherlist_test.c | 2 +
util/libcrypto.num | 1 +
8 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
7 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
index 9f369edf0e..c52389f831 100644
--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
@@ -269,6 +269,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
@@ -324,6 +324,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
DOCDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/doc/$(BASENAME)
HTMLDIR=$(DOCDIR)/html
@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ index 9f369edf0e..c52389f831 100644
# MANSUFFIX is for the benefit of anyone who may want to have a suffix
# appended after the manpage file section number. "ssl" is popular,
# resulting in files such as config.5ssl rather than config.5.
@@ -292,6 +296,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
@@ -347,6 +351,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
CXX={- $config{CXX} ? "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)$config{CXX}" : '' -}
CPPFLAGS={- our $cppflags1 = join(" ",
(map { "-D".$_} @{$config{CPPDEFINES}}),
@ -38,11 +37,54 @@ index 9f369edf0e..c52389f831 100644
(map { "-I".$_} @{$config{CPPINCLUDES}}),
@{$config{CPPFLAGS}}) -}
CFLAGS={- join(' ', @{$config{CFLAGS}}) -}
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index cca1ac8d16..2ae1cd0bc2 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use OpenSSL::config;
my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
$SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<feature> ...] [enable-<feature> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]thread-pool] [[no-]default-thread-pool] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<feature> ...] [enable-<feature> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]thread-pool] [[no-]default-thread-pool] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
my $banner = <<"EOF";
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ EOF
# given with --prefix.
# This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
# (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
+#
+# --system-ciphers-file A file to read cipher string from when the PROFILE=SYSTEM
+# cipher is specified (default).
+#
# --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner
#
# -w Don't wait after showing a Configure warning
@@ -394,6 +398,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
$config{openssldir}="";
$config{processor}="";
$config{libdir}="";
+$config{system_ciphers_file}="";
my $auto_threads=1; # enable threads automatically? true by default
my $default_ranlib;
@@ -1047,6 +1052,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
die "FIPS key too long (64 bytes max)\n"
if length $1 > 64;
}
+ elsif (/^--system-ciphers-file=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $config{system_ciphers_file}=$1;
+ }
elsif (/^--banner=(.*)$/)
{
$banner = $1 . "\n";
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
index b4ed3e51d5..2122e6bdfd 100644
--- a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
@@ -187,6 +187,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher suites are sensibly ordered by default.
@@ -190,6 +190,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher suites are sensibly ordered by default.
The cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently B<eNULL>.
@ -78,7 +120,7 @@ diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index b1d3f7919e..f7cc7fed48 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -1411,6 +1411,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
@@ -1455,6 +1455,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
return ret;
}
@ -91,7 +133,7 @@ index b1d3f7919e..f7cc7fed48 100644
+ const char *ciphers_path;
+ unsigned len, slen;
+
+ if ((ciphers_path = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE")) == NULL)
+ if ((ciphers_path = secure_getenv("OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE")) == NULL)
+ ciphers_path = SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE;
+ fp = fopen(ciphers_path, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL || fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) == NULL) {
@ -160,10 +202,10 @@ index b1d3f7919e..f7cc7fed48 100644
/*
* To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
@@ -1456,7 +1513,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
@@ -1499,7 +1556,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
if (num_of_ciphers > 0) {
co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers);
if (co_list == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (co_list == NULL)
- return NULL; /* Failure */
+ goto err;
}
@ -179,12 +221,10 @@ index b1d3f7919e..f7cc7fed48 100644
}
/*
@@ -1568,9 +1624,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
@@ -1611,7 +1667,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max);
if (ca_list == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(co_list);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(co_list);
- return NULL; /* Failure */
+ goto err;
}
@ -252,7 +292,7 @@ index d14d5819ba..48d491219a 100644
+ SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
goto err2;
goto err;
diff --git a/test/cipherlist_test.c b/test/cipherlist_test.c
index 380f0727fc..6922a87c30 100644
--- a/test/cipherlist_test.c
@ -266,58 +306,7 @@ index 380f0727fc..6922a87c30 100644
+#endif
ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_explicit);
ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_clear);
return 1;
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index 404a706fab..e81fa9ec3e 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5282,3 +5282,4 @@ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_input_structure ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_provider 5555 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strcasecmp 5556 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strncasecmp 5557 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ossl_safe_getenv ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ADD_TEST(test_stdname_cipherlist);
--
2.26.2
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure.sys-default openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure.sys-default 2021-06-29 11:47:58.978144386 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure 2021-06-29 11:52:01.631126260 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use OpenSSL::config;
my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
$SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
my $banner = <<"EOF";
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ EOF
# given with --prefix.
# This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
# (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
+#
+# --system-ciphers-file A file to read cipher string from when the PROFILE=SYSTEM
+# cipher is specified (default).
+#
# --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner
#
# -w Don't wait after showing a Configure warning
@@ -385,6 +389,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
$config{openssldir}="";
$config{processor}="";
$config{libdir}="";
+$config{system_ciphers_file}="";
my $auto_threads=1; # enable threads automatically? true by default
my $default_ranlib;
@@ -987,6 +992,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
die "FIPS key too long (64 bytes max)\n"
if length $1 > 64;
}
+ elsif (/^--system-ciphers-file=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $config{system_ciphers_file}=$1;
+ }
elsif (/^--banner=(.*)$/)
{
$banner = $1 . "\n";

59
0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
View File

@ -1,9 +1,25 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c
--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips 2021-03-16 00:09:55.814826432 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c 2021-03-16 00:15:55.129043811 +0100
@@ -12,11 +12,46 @@
#include "internal/provider.h"
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
From aa3aebf132959e7e44876042efaf9ff24ffe0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/35] 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
Patch-name: 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
Patch-id: 9
Patch-status: |
# Add check to see if fips flag is enabled in kernel
From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
---
crypto/context.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/internal/provider.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
index e294ea1512..51002ba79a 100644
--- a/crypto/context.c
+++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -16,6 +16,41 @@
#include "crypto/decoder.h"
#include "crypto/context.h"
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
@ -11,11 +27,6 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha1
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st {
ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn *fn;
struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st *next;
};
+# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+
+static int kernel_fips_flag;
@ -25,7 +36,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha1
+ char buf[2] = "0";
+ int fd;
+
+ if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
+ if (secure_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
+ buf[0] = '1';
+ } else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+ while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
@ -46,20 +57,21 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha1
+
+
struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA data;
@@ -121,6 +170,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL default_conte
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock, *rand_crngt_lock;
OSSL_EX_DATA_GLOBAL global;
@@ -336,6 +371,7 @@ static int default_context_inited = 0;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
{
+ read_kernel_fips_flag();
return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL)
&& context_init(&default_context_int);
}
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h
--- openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips 2022-01-11 13:13:08.323238760 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h 2022-01-11 13:13:43.522558909 +0100
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL))
goto err;
diff --git a/include/internal/provider.h b/include/internal/provider.h
index 18937f84c7..1446bf7afb 100644
--- a/include/internal/provider.h
+++ b/include/internal/provider.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
void ossl_provider_deinit_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
@ -69,3 +81,6 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips openssl-3.0.1/incl
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
# endif
--
2.41.0

87
0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,29 @@
diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
--- ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec 2023-03-13 16:50:09.278933578 +0100
+++ ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c 2023-03-21 12:38:57.696531941 +0100
@@ -32,38 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
From 37fae351c6fef272baf383469181aecfcac87592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/35] 0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
Patch-name: 0010-Add-changes-to-ectest-and-eccurve.patch
Patch-id: 10
Patch-status: |
# Instead of replacing ectest.c and ec_curve.c, add the changes as a patch so
# that new modifications made to these files by upstream are not lost.
From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
---
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c | 844 -------------------------------------------
test/ectest.c | 174 +--------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1010 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
index b5b2f3342d..d32a768fe6 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -30,38 +30,6 @@ typedef struct {
} EC_CURVE_DATA;
/* the nist prime curves */
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
- unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_192 = {
- {
@ -35,11 +54,9 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
- }
-};
-
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
} _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
{
@@ -200,187 +168,6 @@ static const struct {
}
};
@ -228,10 +245,12 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
@@ -423,294 +210,6 @@ static const struct {
@@ -421,294 +208,6 @@ static const struct {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/* the secg prime curves (minus the nist and x9.62 prime curves) */
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
- unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6];
-} _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1 = {
- {
@ -518,11 +537,9 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
- }
-};
-
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
} _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
{
@@ -745,102 +244,6 @@ static const struct {
}
};
@ -626,10 +643,12 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -2238,198 +1641,6 @@ static const struct {
@@ -2236,198 +1639,6 @@ static const struct {
*/
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
- unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6];
-} _EC_brainpoolP160r1 = {
- {
@ -820,12 +839,10 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
- }
-};
-
-static const struct {
- EC_CURVE_DATA h;
static const struct {
EC_CURVE_DATA h;
unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
} _EC_brainpoolP256r1 = {
{
@@ -2854,8 +2065,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
@@ -2854,8 +2065,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
/* X9.62 curves */
@ -834,7 +851,7 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
# if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
@@ -2899,25 +2108,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
@@ -2899,25 +2108,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
/* prime field curves */
/* secg curves */
@ -860,7 +877,7 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
{NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
@@ -2945,18 +2135,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
@@ -2945,18 +2135,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
# endif
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
/* X9.62 curves */
@ -879,7 +896,7 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
# if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
@@ -3053,22 +2231,12 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
@@ -3053,22 +2231,12 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0,
"X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
# endif
@ -902,7 +919,7 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
/* IPSec curves */
{NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0,
@@ -3079,18 +2247,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[
@@ -3079,18 +2247,6 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"},
# endif
/* brainpool curves */
@ -921,9 +938,10 @@ diff -up ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.remove-ec ./crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, &_EC_brainpoolP256r1.h, 0,
"RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
{NID_brainpoolP256t1, &_EC_brainpoolP256t1.h, 0,
diff -up ./test/ectest.c.remove-ec ./test/ectest.c
--- ./test/ectest.c.remove-ec 2023-03-13 18:39:30.544642912 +0100
+++ ./test/ectest.c 2023-03-20 07:27:26.403212965 +0100
diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
index afef85b0e6..4890b0555e 100644
--- a/test/ectest.c
+++ b/test/ectest.c
@@ -175,184 +175,26 @@ static int prime_field_tests(void)
|| !TEST_ptr(p = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(a = BN_new())
@ -1117,11 +1135,14 @@ diff -up ./test/ectest.c.remove-ec ./test/ectest.c
|| !TEST_int_eq(1, BN_check_prime(p, ctx, NULL))
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
@@ -3015,7 +2857,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
return 0;
ADD_TEST(parameter_test);
ADD_TEST(ossl_parameter_test);
- ADD_TEST(cofactor_range_test);
+ /* ADD_TEST(cofactor_range_test); */
ADD_ALL_TESTS(cardinality_test, crv_len);
ADD_TEST(prime_field_tests);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
--
2.41.0

114
0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,25 @@
diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
--- ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves 2023-03-14 04:44:12.545437892 +0100
+++ ./apps/speed.c 2023-03-14 04:48:28.606729067 +0100
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];
From 4a275f852b61238161c053774736dc07b3ade200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:46:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/48] 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
Patch-name: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
Patch-id: 11
Patch-status: |
# remove unsupported EC curves
---
apps/speed.c | 8 +---
crypto/evp/ec_support.c | 87 ------------------------------------
test/acvp_test.inc | 9 ----
test/ecdsatest.h | 17 -------
test/recipes/15-test_genec.t | 27 -----------
5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index cace25eda1..d527f12f18 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1]; /* 1 op: derivation */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
enum ec_curves_t {
@ -10,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
@@ -376,8 +376,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
@@ -395,8 +395,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
};
/* list of ecdsa curves */
static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
@ -19,8 +37,8 @@ diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
{"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
{"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
{"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -404,8 +402,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDS
enum { R_EC_X25519 = ECDSA_NUM, R_EC_X448, EC_NUM };
@@ -423,8 +421,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
};
/* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
- {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
@ -28,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
{"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
{"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
{"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -1422,8 +1418,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -1442,8 +1438,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
*/
static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
/* Prime Curves */
@ -37,9 +55,10 @@ diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
{"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
{"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
{"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
diff -up ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c
--- ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves 2023-03-14 06:22:41.542310442 +0100
+++ ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c 2023-03-21 11:24:18.378451683 +0100
diff --git a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
index 1ec10143d2..82b95294b4 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
/* prime field curves */
@ -130,7 +149,7 @@ diff -up ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c
{"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
{"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
{"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] =
@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
{"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1 },
{"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1 },
{"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1 },
@ -139,13 +158,33 @@ diff -up ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c
};
const char *OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(int nid)
diff -up ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves ./test/acvp_test.inc
--- ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves 2023-03-14 06:38:20.563712586 +0100
+++ ./test/acvp_test.inc 2023-03-14 06:39:01.631080059 +0100
@@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_
@@ -150,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *name)
/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
- {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
- {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
- {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
- {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
- {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
- {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
- {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
- {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
- {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
- {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
- {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
{"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
{"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
{"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
index ad11d3ae1e..894a0bff9d 100644
--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
+++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -211,15 +211,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_s1[] = {
0xB1, 0xAC,
};
static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
{
- {
- "SHA-1",
- "P-192",
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
@ -154,13 +193,13 @@ diff -up ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves ./test/acvp_test.inc
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
- PASS,
- },
- {
{
"SHA2-512",
"P-521",
ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg1),
diff -up ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves ./test/ecdsatest.h
--- ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves 2023-03-14 04:49:16.148154472 +0100
+++ ./test/ecdsatest.h 2023-03-14 04:51:01.376096037 +0100
diff --git a/test/ecdsatest.h b/test/ecdsatest.h
index 63fe319025..06b5c0aac5 100644
--- a/test/ecdsatest.h
+++ b/test/ecdsatest.h
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
} ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
@ -185,10 +224,11 @@ diff -up ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves ./test/ecdsatest.h
/* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
{NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
"699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
--- ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves 2023-03-14 04:51:45.215488277 +0100
+++ ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t 2023-03-21 11:26:58.613885435 +0100
@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
index 2dfed387ca..c733b68f83 100644
--- a/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
+++ b/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-ec build"
if disabled("ec");
my @prime_curves = qw(
@ -234,24 +274,6 @@ diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
P-224
P-256
P-384
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove 2023-07-06 10:30:10.152621369 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c 2023-07-06 10:34:00.557091758 +0200
@@ -74,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *n
/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
--
2.41.0
static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
- {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
- {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
- {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
- {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
- {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
- {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
- {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
- {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
- {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
- {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
- {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
{"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
{"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
{"P-384", NID_secp384r1},

11
0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
View File

@ -21,11 +21,12 @@ diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_
+plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_protect_test",
data_file("server.pem"),
diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
--- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests 2023-03-14 10:13:38.106296042 +0100
+++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t 2023-03-14 10:16:56.496071178 +0100
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
data_file("prot_RSA.pem"),
diff --git a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
index f722800e27..26a01786bb 100644
--- a/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
+++ b/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-cmp build"
plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-ec build"
if disabled("ec");

40
0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit 2021-09-22 11:56:49.452507975 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-09-22 11:57:19.371764742 +0200
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ unless ($no_fips) {
"recipes",
"90-test_sslapi_data",
"dhparams.pem")])),
- "running sslapitest");
+ "running sslapitest - FIPS");
}
unlink $tmpfilename;
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index e95d2657f46c..7af0eab3fce0 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
goto end;
}
+ if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
+ testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(),
@@ -1292,6 +1297,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls_sendfile(int tls_version, const char *cipher)
goto end;
}
+ if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
+ testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(),

165
0032-Force-fips.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +1,21 @@
#Note: provider_conf_activate() is introduced in downstream only. It is a rewrite
#(partial) of the function provider_conf_load() under the 'if (activate) section.
#If there is any change to this section, after deleting it in provider_conf_load()
#ensure that you also add those changes to the provider_conf_activate() function.
#additionally please add this check for cnf explicitly as shown below.
#'ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;'
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact 2022-05-12 12:44:31.199034948 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c 2022-05-12 12:49:17.468318373 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
From 2c110cf5551a3869514e697d8dc06682b62ca57d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:59:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 16/48] 0032-Force-fips.patch
Patch-name: 0032-Force-fips.patch
Patch-id: 32
Patch-status: |
# We load FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly
---
crypto/provider_conf.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/provider_conf.c b/crypto/provider_conf.c
index 058fb58837..5274265a70 100644
--- a/crypto/provider_conf.c
+++ b/crypto/provider_conf.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@ -16,143 +24,25 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provi
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/safestack.h>
#include <openssl/provider.h>
@@ -136,58 +136,18 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
return 0;
}
-static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
- const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
+static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,const char *name,
+ const char *value, const char *path,
+ int soft, const CONF *cnf)
{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
- int soft = 0;
- OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
- const char *path = NULL;
- long activate = 0;
int ok = 0;
-
- name = skip_dot(name);
- OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
- /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
- ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
-
- if (!ecmds) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
- "section=%s not found", value);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Find the needed data first */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
- CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
- const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
- const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
-
- OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
- confname, confvalue);
-
- /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
-
- /* Override provider name to use */
- if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
- name = confvalue;
- else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
- soft = 1;
- /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
- else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
- path = confvalue;
- else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
- activate = 1;
- }
-
- if (activate) {
- PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
- = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
- &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
+ PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
+ = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
+ &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
if (pcgbl == NULL || !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pcgbl->lock)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!prov_already_activated(name, pcgbl->activated_providers)) {
@@ -216,7 +176,7 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
if (path != NULL)
ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
- ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
+ ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
if (ok) {
if (ok == 1) {
if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
@@ -244,8 +204,59 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
}
if (!ok)
@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_L
if (ok <= 0)
ossl_provider_free(prov);
+ } else { /* No reason to activate the provider twice, returning OK */
+ } else {
+ ok = 1;
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
+ const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
+ int soft = 0;
+ const char *path = NULL;
+ long activate = 0;
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ name = skip_dot(name);
+ OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
+ /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
+ ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
+
+ if (!ecmds) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
+ "section=%s not found", value);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the needed data first */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
+ CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
+ const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
+ const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
+
+ OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
+ confname, confvalue);
+
+ /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
+
+ /* Override provider name to use */
+ if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
+ name = confvalue;
+ else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
+ soft = 1;
+ /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
+ else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
+ path = confvalue;
+ else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
+ activate = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (activate) {
+ ok = provider_conf_activate(libctx, name, value, path, soft, cnf);
} else {
OSSL_PROVIDER_INFO entry;
@@ -306,6 +317,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
@@ -309,6 +311,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
return 0;
}
@ -174,7 +64,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provi
+ if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even wwhen the test is failed so check explicitly */
+ /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even when the test is failed so check explicitly */
+ if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
@ -186,3 +76,6 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provi
return 1;
}
--
2.41.0

286
0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
View File

@ -1,9 +1,34 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac 2023-01-05 10:03:44.864869710 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c 2023-01-05 10:15:17.041606472 +0100
@@ -172,11 +172,27 @@ DEP_FINI_ATTRIBUTE void cleanup(void)
From 831d0025257fd3746ab3fe30c05dbbfc0043f78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/49] 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
Patch-name: 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
Patch-id: 33
Patch-status: |
# # Embed HMAC into the fips.so
# Modify fips self test as per
# https://github.com/simo5/openssl/commit/9b95ef8bd2f5ac862e5eee74c724b535f1a8578a
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
providers/fips/self_test.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
test/fipsmodule.cnf | 2 +
test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t | 2 +-
8 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/fipsmodule.cnf
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
index b8dc9817b2..28f536d13c 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -230,11 +230,133 @@ err:
return ok;
}
#endif
+#define HMAC_LEN 32
+/*
@ -17,6 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
* the result matches the expected value.
* Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
*/
+
+#ifndef __USE_GNU
+#define __USE_GNU
+#include <dlfcn.h>
@ -25,11 +51,116 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#endif
+#include <link.h>
+
+static int verify_integrity_rodata(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio,
+ OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
+ unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
+ const char *event_type)
+{
+ int ret = 0, status;
+ unsigned char out[MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE];
+ size_t bytes_read = 0, out_len = 0;
+ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ Dl_info info;
+ void *extra_info = NULL;
+ struct link_map *lm = NULL;
+ unsigned long paddr;
+ unsigned long off = 0;
+
+ if (expected_len != HMAC_LEN)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+
+ if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
+ &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
+ goto err;
+ lm = extra_info;
+ paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
+
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", DIGEST_NAME, 0);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
+ goto err;
+
+ while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1)
+ break;
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+ goto err;
+ off += bytes_read;
+ }
+
+ if (off < paddr) {
+ int delta = paddr - off;
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+ goto err;
+ off += bytes_read;
+ }
+
+ /* read away the buffer */
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* check that it is the expect bytes, no point in continuing otherwise */
+ if (memcmp(expected, buf, HMAC_LEN) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* replace in-file HMAC buffer with the original zeros */
+ memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, HMAC_LEN))
+ goto err;
+ off += HMAC_LEN;
+
+ while (bytes_read > 0) {
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1)
+ break;
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+ goto err;
+ off += bytes_read;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
+ goto err;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(ev, out);
+ if (expected_len != out_len
+ || memcmp(expected, out, out_len) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
@@ -189,9 +205,20 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
@@ -247,12 +369,23 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
@ -39,6 +170,9 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
+ unsigned long paddr;
+ unsigned long off = 0;
if (!integrity_self_test(ev, libctx))
goto err;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+ if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
@ -50,7 +184,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
if (mac == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -205,13 +233,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
@@ -266,13 +399,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
goto err;
@ -95,8 +229,16 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
goto err;
@@ -285,8 +342,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(fips_state_lock);
@@ -282,6 +444,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
@@ -335,8 +498,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
return 0;
}
- if (st == NULL
@ -105,30 +247,77 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/provi
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
goto end;
}
@@ -305,8 +361,9 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
@@ -345,8 +507,14 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
if (ev == NULL)
goto end;
- module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
- &checksum_len);
+ if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
+ module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
+ checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
+ } else {
+ module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
+ &checksum_len);
+ }
+
if (module_checksum == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
goto end;
@@ -356,7 +413,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
ok = 1;
@@ -354,14 +522,27 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
bio_module = (*st->bio_new_file_cb)(st->module_filename, "rb");
/* Always check the integrity of the fips module */
- if (bio_module == NULL
- || !verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
- module_checksum, checksum_len, st->libctx,
- ev, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
+ if (bio_module == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
-
+ if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
+ if (!verify_integrity_rodata(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
+ module_checksum, checksum_len,
+ st->libctx, ev,
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!verify_integrity(bio_module, st->bio_read_ex_cb,
+ module_checksum, checksum_len,
+ st->libctx, ev,
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_MODULE_INTEGRITY)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MODULE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
/* This will be NULL during installation - so the self test KATS will run */
if (st->indicator_data != NULL) {
/*
@@ -420,7 +601,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
end:
EVP_RAND_free(testrand);
OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
- OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
if (st != NULL) {
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-11-18 09:39:53.386817874 +0100
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
diff --git a/test/fipsmodule.cnf b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f05d0dedbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/fipsmodule.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[fips_sect]
+activate = 1
diff --git a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
index 4e3a6d85e8..e8255ba974 100644
--- a/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+++ b/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
@ -137,10 +326,11 @@ diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/
plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
if $no_check;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-11-18 09:59:02.315619486 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
index ce594817d5..00cebacff8 100644
--- a/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+++ b/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
@ -149,34 +339,37 @@ diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/
plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
if $no_check;
plan tests => 1;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t 2021-11-18 09:59:55.365072074 +0100
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
diff --git a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
index b8b136d110..8242f4ebc3 100644
--- a/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
+++ b/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
-plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
+plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
plan tests => 29;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t 2021-11-18 10:22:54.179659682 +0100
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
# Compatible options for pedantic FIPS compliance
my @pedantic_okay =
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
index c8f145405b..56a2ec5dc4 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
plan skip_all => "Configuration loading is turned off"
if disabled("autoload-config");
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
plan tests =>
($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t 2021-11-18 10:18:53.391721164 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
index 195b85ea8c..92d48dbf7d 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ setup("test_ssl_new");
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
@ -185,20 +378,19 @@ diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/re
$ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-11-18 10:32:17.734196705 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-11-18 10:18:30.695538445 +0100
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
diff --git a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
index 18d9f3d204..71780d8caa 100644
--- a/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
+++ b/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ setup("test_sslapi");
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
my $fipsmodcfg_filename = "fipsmodule.cnf";
my $fipsmodcfg = bldtop_file("test", $fipsmodcfg_filename);
--
2.44.0
plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
--- /dev/null 2021-11-16 15:27:32.915000000 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/test/fipsmodule.cnf 2021-11-18 11:15:34.538060408 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[fips_sect]
+activate = 1

387
0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,27 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c
--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx 2021-11-22 13:09:28.232560235 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c 2021-11-22 13:12:22.272058910 +0100
@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **ar
From a9825123e7ab3474d2794a5706d9bed047959c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 18/35] 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
Patch-name: 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
Patch-id: 34
Patch-status: |
# Comment out fipsinstall command-line utility
From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
---
apps/fipsinstall.c | 3 +
doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in | 272 +---------------------------
doc/man1/openssl.pod | 4 -
doc/man5/config.pod | 1 -
doc/man5/fips_config.pod | 104 +----------
doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod | 1 -
6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/fipsinstall.c b/apps/fipsinstall.c
index e1ef645b60..db92cb5fb2 100644
--- a/apps/fipsinstall.c
+++ b/apps/fipsinstall.c
@@ -375,6 +375,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
CONF *conf = NULL;
@ -11,160 +31,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c
if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
goto end;
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:18:51.081406990 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod 2021-11-22 13:19:02.897508738 +0100
@@ -158,10 +158,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and
Error Number to Error String Conversion.
-=item B<fipsinstall>
-
-FIPS configuration installation.
-
=item B<gendsa>
Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:24:51.359509501 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod 2021-11-22 13:26:02.360121820 +0100
@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax wi
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:21:13.812636065 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod 2021-11-22 13:24:12.278172847 +0100
@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
-is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
-of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
-This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
-purposes:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
-
-This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
-run each time the module is used.
-
-=item - Verify the module's checksum.
-
-This is done each time the module is used.
-
-=back
-
-This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
-used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
-
-The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
-whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
-section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<activate>
-
-If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
-significant.
-
-=item B<install-version>
-
-A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
-
-=item B<conditional-errors>
-
-The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
-Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
-accessible from this point on.
-Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
-generation, or the CRNG output test).
-Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
-continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
-Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
-continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
-operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
-
-=item B<security-checks>
-
-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
-A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
-are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
-the relevant Security Policy.
-
-=item B<module-mac>
-
-The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
-
-=item B<install-status>
-
-An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
-This should only be written after the module has
-successfully passed its self tests during installation.
-If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
-loads.
-
-=item B<install-mac>
-
-A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
-changes to that value.
-It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
-
-=back
-
-For example:
-
- [fips_sect]
- activate = 1
- install-version = 1
- conditional-errors = 1
- security-checks = 1
- module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
- install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
- install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
-B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
-non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
-See L<config(5)>.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<config(5)>
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
+This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
+automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
+environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
+for more information.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:18:13.850086386 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod 2021-11-22 13:18:24.607179038 +0100
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ A simple self test callback is shown bel
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<fips_config(5)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
--- openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac 2022-01-11 13:26:33.279906225 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in 2022-01-11 13:33:18.757994419 +0100
@@ -8,236 +8,11 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS confi
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
index b1768b7f91..b6b00e27d8 100644
--- a/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
@@ -8,275 +8,9 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS configuration installation
=head1 SYNOPSIS
B<openssl fipsinstall>
@ -179,14 +50,18 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
-[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
-[B<-noout>]
-[B<-quiet>]
-[B<-pedantic>]
-[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
-[B<-no_security_checks>]
-[B<-ems_check>]
-[B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>]
-[B<-self_test_onload>]
-[B<-self_test_oninstall>]
-[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
-[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
-[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
-This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
@ -315,6 +190,14 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
-
-Disable logging of the self tests.
-
-=item B<-pedantic>
-
-Configure the module so that it is strictly FIPS compliant rather
-than being backwards compatible. This enables conditional errors,
-security checks etc. Note that any previous configuration options will
-be overwritten and any subsequent configuration options that violate
-FIPS compliance will result in an error.
-
-=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
-
-Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
@ -324,6 +207,20 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
-
-Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
-
-Enabling the configuration option "no-fips-securitychecks" provides another way to
-turn off the check at compile time.
-
-=item B<-ems_check>
-
-Configure the module to enable a run-time Extended Master Secret (EMS) check
-when using the TLS1_PRF KDF algorithm. This check is disabled by default.
-See RFC 7627 for information related to EMS.
-
-=item B<-no_drbg_truncated_digests>
-
-Configure the module to not allow truncated digests to be used with Hash and
-HMAC DRBGs. See FIPS 140-3 IG D.R for details.
-
-=item B<-self_test_onload>
-
-Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
@ -334,6 +231,14 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
-could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
-mechanism.
-
-This is the default.
-
-=item B<-self_test_oninstall>
-
-The converse of B<-self_test_oninstall>. The two fields related to the
-"test status indicator" and "MAC status indicator" are written to the
-output configuration file.
-
-=item B<-quiet>
-
-Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
@ -369,6 +274,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
-For normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider
-when generating the fips configuration file.
-
-The B<-self_test_oninstall> option was added and the
-B<-self_test_onload> option was made the default in OpenSSL 3.1.
-
-The command and all remaining options were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
@ -404,3 +314,160 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl.pod b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
index d9c22a580f..d5ec3b9a6a 100644
--- a/doc/man1/openssl.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl.pod
@@ -135,10 +135,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and manipulation.
Error Number to Error String Conversion.
-=item B<fipsinstall>
-
-FIPS configuration installation.
-
=item B<gendsa>
Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
index 714a10437b..bd05736220 100644
--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax will have to be modified.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
index 2255464304..1c15e32a5c 100644
--- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
-is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
-of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
-This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
-purposes:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
-
-This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
-run each time the module is used.
-
-=item - Verify the module's checksum.
-
-This is done each time the module is used.
-
-=back
-
-This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
-used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
-
-The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
-whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
-section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<activate>
-
-If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
-significant.
-
-=item B<install-version>
-
-A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
-
-=item B<conditional-errors>
-
-The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
-Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
-accessible from this point on.
-Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
-generation, or the CRNG output test).
-Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
-continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
-Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
-continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
-operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
-
-=item B<security-checks>
-
-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
-A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
-are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
-the relevant Security Policy.
-
-=item B<module-mac>
-
-The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
-
-=item B<install-status>
-
-An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
-This should only be written after the module has
-successfully passed its self tests during installation.
-If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
-loads.
-
-=item B<install-mac>
-
-A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
-changes to that value.
-It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
-
-=back
-
-For example:
-
- [fips_sect]
- activate = 1
- install-version = 1
- conditional-errors = 1
- security-checks = 1
- module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
- install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
- install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
-B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
-non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
-See L<config(5)>.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<config(5)>
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
+This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
+automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
+environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
+for more information.
=head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
index 4f908888ba..ef00247770 100644
--- a/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ want to operate in a FIPS approved manner. The algorithms are:
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<fips_config(5)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
--
2.41.0

226
0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 2022-07-18 16:01:41.159543735 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c 2022-07-18 16:24:30.251388248 +0200
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
From b300beb172d5813b01b93bfd62fe191f8187fe1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 12:05:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 20/48] 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
Patch-name: 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
Patch-id: 44
Patch-status: |
# Extra public/private key checks required by FIPS-140-3
---
crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 26 ++++++++++
.../implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c | 19 ++++++++
providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c | 24 +++++++++-
providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c | 18 +++++++
.../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c | 37 +++++++++++++--
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 4e9705beef..83773cceea 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
int ret = -1;
@ -11,7 +30,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
return 0;
}
@ -57,25 +76,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
dh->dirty_cnt++;
ok = 1;
err:
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188 openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188 2023-11-08 10:58:05.910031253 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2023-11-08 10:59:42.338526883 +0100
@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@ static int ec_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (ossl_ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx) <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
pairwise_test = 1;
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3 2022-07-25 13:42:46.814952053 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c 2022-07-25 13:52:12.292065706 +0200
@@ -488,6 +488,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, u
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
index 43caedb6df..73873f9758 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
@@ -489,6 +489,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
}
ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
@ -101,13 +106,14 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3 open
retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise 2023-02-20 11:44:18.451884117 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c 2023-02-20 12:39:46.037063842 +0100
@@ -982,8 +982,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
int selection;
int ecdh_mode;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
index a37cbbdba8..bca3f3c674 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
@@ -989,8 +989,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
EC_GROUP *gen_group;
unsigned char *dhkem_ikm;
size_t dhkem_ikmlen;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ void *ecdsa_sig_ctx;
+#endif
@ -122,10 +128,10 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise ope
static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
@@ -1002,6 +1011,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx,
OPENSSL_free(gctx);
@@ -1009,6 +1018,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
gctx = NULL;
}
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (gctx != NULL)
+ gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = ecdsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
@ -133,7 +139,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise ope
return gctx;
}
@@ -1272,6 +1285,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_C
@@ -1279,6 +1292,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
@ -145,8 +151,8 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise ope
+#endif
if (gctx->group_check != NULL)
ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec, gctx->group_check);
@@ -1341,7 +1359,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec,
@@ -1348,7 +1367,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
if (gctx == NULL)
return;
@ -155,12 +161,70 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise ope
+ ecdsa_freectx(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx);
+ gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
OPENSSL_clear_free(gctx->dhkem_ikm, gctx->dhkem_ikmlen);
EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
BN_free(gctx->p);
BN_free(gctx->a);
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise 2023-02-20 11:50:23.035194347 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c 2023-02-20 12:19:10.809768979 +0100
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
index 3ba12c4889..ff49f8fcd8 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
/* ACVP test parameters */
OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
+ void *prov_rsa_ctx;
#endif
};
@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
+void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
+int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
+#endif
+
static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
goto err;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (gctx != NULL)
+ gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
+#endif
return gctx;
err:
@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
rsa = rsa_tmp;
rsa_tmp = NULL;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* Pairwise consistency test */
+ if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
+ abort();
+#endif
err:
BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
@@ -645,6 +661,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
+ rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
+ gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
#endif
BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
OPENSSL_free(gctx);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
index 865d49d100..ebeb30e002 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#include "crypto/ec.h"
#include "prov/der_ec.h"
@ -170,7 +234,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
@ -180,7 +244,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ typedef struct {
#endif
unsigned int nonce_type;
} PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
-static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
@ -188,7 +252,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise
{
PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx;
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig,
return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
@ -197,7 +261,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise
{
PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_
@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx)
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
}
@ -233,66 +297,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init },
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise 2023-02-20 16:04:27.103364713 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c 2023-02-20 16:14:13.848119419 +0100
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
/* ACVP test parameters */
OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
+ void *prov_rsa_ctx;
#endif
};
@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GE
return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
+void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
+int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
+#endif
+
static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int
if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
goto err;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (gctx != NULL)
+ gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
+#endif
return gctx;
err:
@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_
rsa = rsa_tmp;
rsa_tmp = NULL;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* Pairwise consistency test */
+ if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
+ abort();
+#endif
err:
BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
@@ -645,6 +662,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
+ rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
+ gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
#endif
BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
OPENSSL_free(gctx);
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise 2023-02-20 16:04:22.548327811 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c 2023-02-20 16:17:50.064871695 +0100
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
index cd5de6bd51..d4261e8f7d 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
@ -301,7 +310,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise op
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
@ -310,7 +319,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise op
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen)
return 1;
}
@ -319,7 +328,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise op
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
char *propq_copy = NULL;
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsac
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
@ -328,7 +337,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise op
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@@ -1504,6 +1504,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ct
@@ -1455,6 +1455,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
}
@ -388,3 +397,6 @@ index e0d139d..35f23b2 100644
}
}
return ok;
--
2.41.0

1176
0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

42
0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats 2022-01-19 13:10:00.635830783 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c 2022-01-19 13:11:43.309342656 +0100
@@ -362,6 +362,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
From ba6e65e2f7e7fe8d9cd62e1e7e345bc41dda424f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 13:12:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 21/46] 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
Patch-name: 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
Patch-id: 47
Patch-status: |
# # Execute KATS before HMAC verification
From-dist-git-commit: 5c67b5adc311af297f425c09e3e1ac7ca8483911
---
providers/fips/self_test.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
index e3a629018a..3c09bd8638 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -401,6 +401,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
if (ev == NULL)
goto end;
@ -15,14 +30,13 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats openssl-3.0.1/provid
+ }
+ }
+
if (st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
@@ -451,18 +461,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS *st, int on_demand_test)
}
}
@@ -411,18 +421,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
kats_already_passed = 1;
}
}
-
- /*
- * Only runs the KAT's during installation OR on_demand().
- * NOTE: If the installation option 'self_test_onload' is chosen then this
@ -34,6 +48,10 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats openssl-3.0.1/provid
- goto end;
- }
- }
ok = 1;
end:
OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
-
/* Verify that the RNG has been restored properly */
rng = ossl_rand_get0_private_noncreating(st->libctx);
if (rng != NULL)
--
2.41.0

228
0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +1,20 @@
From 243201772cc6d583fae9eba81cb2c2c7425bc564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 17:24:44 +0100
Subject: Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures
From 4f9167db05cade673f98f1a00efd57136e97b460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 22/49] 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
For RHEL 9.0, we want to phase out SHA1. One of the steps to do that is
disabling SHA1 signatures. Introduce a new configuration option in the
alg_section named 'rh-allow-sha1-signatures'. This option defaults to
false. If set to false (or unset), any signature creation or
verification operations that involve SHA1 as digest will fail.
This also affects TLS, where the signature_algorithms extension of any
ClientHello message sent by OpenSSL will no longer include signatures
with the SHA1 digest if rh-allow-sha1-signatures is false. For servers
that request a client certificate, the same also applies for
CertificateRequest messages sent by them.
For signatures created using the EVP_PKEY API, this is a best-effort
check that will deny signatures in cases where the digest algorithm is
known. This means, for example, that that following steps will still
work:
$> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
$> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig
$> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1
whereas these will not:
$> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
$> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig -pkeyopt digest:sha1
$> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1 -pkeyopt digest:sha1
This happens because in the first case, OpenSSL's signature
implementation does not know that it is signing a SHA1 hash (it could be
signing arbitrary data).
Resolves: rhbz#2031742
Patch-name: 0049-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
Patch-id: 49
Patch-status: |
# # Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures rhbz#2070977
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c | 13 ++++
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/context.c | 14 ++++
crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c | 13 +++
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 15 ++++
doc/man5/config.pod | 11 +++
doc/man5/config.pod | 13 +++
include/crypto/context.h | 3 +
include/internal/cryptlib.h | 3 +-
include/internal/sslconf.h | 4 +
providers/common/securitycheck.c | 20 +++++
@ -49,8 +24,54 @@ Resolves: rhbz#2031742
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 20 ++++-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 8 ++
util/libcrypto.num | 2 +
13 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
15 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
index fb4816d89b..c04920fe14 100644
--- a/crypto/context.c
+++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
void *fips_prov;
#endif
+ void *legacy_digest_signatures;
+
unsigned int ischild:1;
};
@@ -223,6 +225,10 @@ static int context_init(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
#endif
+ ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(ctx);
+ if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
/* Low priority. */
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
ctx->child_provider = ossl_child_prov_ctx_new(ctx);
@@ -366,6 +372,11 @@ static void context_deinit_objs(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
}
#endif
+ if (ctx->legacy_digest_signatures != NULL) {
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(ctx->legacy_digest_signatures);
+ ctx->legacy_digest_signatures = NULL;
+ }
+
/* Low priority. */
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (ctx->child_provider != NULL) {
@@ -663,6 +674,9 @@ void *ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int index)
return ctx->fips_prov;
#endif
+ case OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX:
+ return ctx->legacy_digest_signatures;
+
default:
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@ -83,18 +104,20 @@ index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
"name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
index 3a979f4bd4..fd3a4b79df 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -16,6 +16,71 @@
@@ -15,6 +15,73 @@
#include "internal/provider.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h" /* includes SIZE_MAX */
#include "evp_local.h"
+#include "crypto/context.h"
+
+typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
+ int allowed;
+} OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
+
+static void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
+void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
+{
+ OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs = vldsigs;
+
@ -103,27 +126,25 @@ index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
+ }
+}
+
+static void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
+ OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES* ldsigs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
+ /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
+ * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
+ * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
+ ldsigs->allowed = 0;
+ return ldsigs;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method = {
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY,
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new,
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free,
+};
+
+static OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
+{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (loadconfig && !OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+
+ return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES,
+ &ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method);
+ return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX);
+}
+
+int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
@ -137,6 +158,9 @@ index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+
+ /* Warning: This patch differs from the same patch in CentOS and RHEL here,
+ * because the default on Fedora is to allow SHA-1 and support disabling
+ * it, while CentOS/RHEL disable it by default and allow enabling it. */
+ return ldsigs != NULL ? ldsigs->allowed : 0;
+}
+
@ -154,11 +178,10 @@ index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
+ ldsigs->allowed = allow;
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
@@ -258,6 +323,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -253,6 +320,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
}
}
@ -178,7 +201,7 @@ index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index 2b9c6c2351..3c5a1e6f5d 100644
index 268b1617e3..248f655d0f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
@ -189,7 +212,7 @@ index 2b9c6c2351..3c5a1e6f5d 100644
#include "evp_local.h"
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -946,6 +947,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
@@ -951,6 +952,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
return -2;
}
@ -211,7 +234,7 @@ index 2b9c6c2351..3c5a1e6f5d 100644
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, 0, (void *)(md));
diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
index 77a8055e81..aa1be5ca7f 100644
index bd05736220..ed34ff4b9c 100644
--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -304,6 +304,17 @@ Within the algorithm properties section, the following names have meaning:
@ -232,20 +255,31 @@ index 77a8055e81..aa1be5ca7f 100644
=item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>. If the value is
diff --git a/include/crypto/context.h b/include/crypto/context.h
index 7369a730fb..55b74238c8 100644
--- a/include/crypto/context.h
+++ b/include/crypto/context.h
@@ -46,3 +46,6 @@ void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void);
#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
void ossl_threads_ctx_free(void *);
#endif
+
+void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *);
+void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *);
diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
index 1291299b6e..e234341e6a 100644
index 64851fd8ed..8e01a77ddc 100644
--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX 16
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_BIO_CORE_INDEX 17
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_CHILD_PROVIDER_INDEX 18
-# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES 19
+# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES 19
+# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES 20
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_THREAD_INDEX 19
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_DECODER_CACHE_INDEX 20
-# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES 20
+# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES_INDEX 21
+# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES 21
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_LOW_PRIORITY -1
# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY 0
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
int ossl_lib_ctx_is_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
diff --git a/include/internal/sslconf.h b/include/internal/sslconf.h
index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
--- a/include/internal/sslconf.h
@ -260,7 +294,7 @@ index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
+ int loadconfig);
#endif
diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
index 0d3acdbe56..fe694c4e96 100644
--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
@ -271,7 +305,7 @@ index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
/*
* FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
@@ -235,6 +236,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
@@ -243,6 +244,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
mdnid = -1; /* disallowed by security checks */
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
@ -288,7 +322,7 @@ index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
}
diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
index 246323493e..2ca7a59f39 100644
--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
@ -299,7 +333,7 @@ index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
/* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -29,9 +30,10 @@ int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
}
int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
@ -311,7 +345,7 @@ index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
{ NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
@@ -36,8 +38,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
@@ -42,8 +44,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
{ NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
};
@ -325,10 +359,10 @@ index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
return mdnid;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
index 28fd7c498e..fa3822f39f 100644
index b89a0f6836..e0c26a13e4 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -124,12 +124,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
@@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (mdname != NULL) {
@ -350,10 +384,10 @@ index 28fd7c498e..fa3822f39f 100644
if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
if (md == NULL)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
index 865d49d100..99b228e82c 100644
index f158105e71..62355b89fe 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -237,7 +237,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
@@ -247,7 +247,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
@ -366,10 +400,10 @@ index 865d49d100..99b228e82c 100644
sha1_allowed);
if (md_nid < 0) {
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
index c1405f47ea..aeda1a7758 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
@ -377,7 +411,7 @@ index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
@ -385,7 +419,7 @@ index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
@@ -289,10 +291,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
@@ -301,10 +303,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
if (mdname != NULL) {
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
@ -403,7 +437,7 @@ index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid <= 0
@@ -1348,8 +1355,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
@@ -1392,8 +1399,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
@ -421,7 +455,7 @@ index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
&& !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index fc32bb3556..4b74ee1a34 100644
index 631e1fdef9..05dd7c5595 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
@ -432,21 +466,23 @@ index fc32bb3556..4b74ee1a34 100644
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
@@ -1145,11 +1146,13 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
@@ -1506,6 +1507,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
int ret = 0;
+ int ldsigs_allowed;
if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -1521,6 +1523,7 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
ERR_set_mark();
+ ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0);
/* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
@@ -1169,6 +1172,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
@@ -1542,6 +1545,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
cache[i].enabled = 0;
continue;
}
@ -459,15 +495,15 @@ index fc32bb3556..4b74ee1a34 100644
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
cache[i].enabled = 0;
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index 10b4e57d79..2d3c363bb0 100644
index ef97803327..8046454025 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5426,3 +5426,5 @@ ASN1_TIME_print_ex 5553 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strcasecmp 5556 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strncasecmp 5557 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_safe_getenv ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -5536,3 +5536,5 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_set_get_crl 5663 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons 5664 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_STORE_delete 5665 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_ADDR_copy 5666 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
--
2.35.1
2.44.0

2151
0051-Support-different-R_BITS-lengths-for-KBKDF.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

29
0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
- */
- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
- if (secbits == 0 ||
- !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
- md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
- return 0;
+
+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->session_ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3) {
+ /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
+ } else {
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->session_ctx, lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
@ -131,15 +131,15 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
}
+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->session_ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3) {
+ /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
@@ -2977,6 +2994,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
{
@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
int secbits, nid, pknid;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+
/* Don't check signature if self signed */
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
return 1;
@@ -2985,6 +3004,25 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
if (nid == NID_undef)
@ -159,21 +159,21 @@ index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
+ libctx = x->libctx;
+ else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = ctx->libctx;
+ else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = s->ctx->libctx;
+ else if (s && s->session_ctx && s->session_ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = s->session_ctx->libctx;
+ else
+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
+
+ if (nid == NID_sha1
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
+ && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3)
+ && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) < 3)
+ || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 3)
+ ))
+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
+ return 1;
+
if (s)
if (s != NULL)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
else
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644
run(app([@args]));
}
-plan tests => 163;
+plan tests => 162;
-plan tests => 193;
+plan tests => 192;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@ -203,4 +203,3 @@ index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644
"PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
--
2.35.1

9
0056-strcasecmp.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num
--- openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale 2022-06-01 12:35:52.667498724 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num 2022-06-01 12:36:08.112633093 +0200
@@ -5425,6 +5425,8 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_provider 5555 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strcasecmp 5556 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_strncasecmp 5557 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -5425,5 +5425,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons 5664 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_STORE_delete 5665 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_ADDR_copy 5666 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:SOCK
+OPENSSL_strcasecmp ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_strncasecmp ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_safe_getenv ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c

587
0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,25 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc 2022-06-24 17:14:33.634692729 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c 2022-06-24 17:16:08.966540605 +0200
From 012e319b3d5b936a9208b1c75c13d9c4a2d0cc04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 24/49] 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
Patch-name: 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
Patch-id: 58
Patch-status: |
# # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2053289
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
providers/common/securitycheck.c | 1 +
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 35 +++++
.../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt | 140 +++++++++++++-----
test/recipes/80-test_cms.t | 5 +-
test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t | 27 +++-
5 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
index fe694c4e96..f635b5aec8 100644
--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
* Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
* https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
@ -9,10 +28,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc openssl-3.0.1/pro
int ossl_rsa_check_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa, int operation)
{
int protect = 0;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad 2022-05-02 16:04:47.000091901 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c 2022-05-02 16:14:50.922443581 +0200
@@ -132,6 +132,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsac
diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
index 71bfa344d4..d548560f1f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -135,6 +135,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
return rsa_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT);
}
@ -30,7 +50,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pa
static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
@@ -141,6 +152,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, u
@@ -144,6 +155,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
@ -49,7 +69,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pa
if (out == NULL) {
size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
@@ -202,6 +220,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, u
@@ -206,6 +229,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
@ -68,75 +88,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pa
if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) {
if (out == NULL) {
*outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad 2022-05-02 17:04:07.610782138 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t 2022-05-02 17:06:03.595814620 +0200
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
+ [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
"-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
$smrsa1,
@@ -865,5 +865,8 @@ sub check_availability {
return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
+ return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
+ if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
+
return "";
}
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad 2022-05-02 17:26:37.962838053 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t 2022-05-02 17:34:20.297950449 +0200
@@ -483,6 +483,18 @@ sub testssl {
# the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
my $ciphersuites = "";
+ my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
+AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
+ );
foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
@@ -494,11 +506,16 @@ sub testssl {
} else {
$cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
}
- ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
- $cipher,
- "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
- $flag || ()])),
- "Testing $cipher");
+ if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
+ note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
+ ok(1);
+ } else {
+ ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
+ $cipher,
+ "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
+ $flag || ()])),
+ "Testing $cipher");
+ }
}
}
next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen 2022-06-16 14:26:19.383530498 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt 2022-06-16 14:39:53.637777701 +0200
@@ -263,12 +263,13 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
index 76ddc1ec60..62d55308b0 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
@@ -248,13 +248,13 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974002aa6e6160b481447c6819947c2d3b537a6e377
Output = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
# RSA decrypt
@ -146,12 +102,394 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Input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
Output = "Hello World"
# Corrupted ciphertext
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
Decrypt = RSA-2048
Input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
Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C70
Output = "Hello World"
@@ -665,36 +666,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mN
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# Corrupted ciphertext
# Note: output is generated synthethically by the Bleichenbacher workaround
Decrypt = RSA-2048
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C70
Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# Corrupted ciphertext
# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
Decrypt = RSA-2048
@@ -345,82 +345,90 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
# RSA decrypt
# a random positive test case
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test case decrypting to empty
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output =
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# invalid decrypting to max length message
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = 0f9b
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = 4f02
# positive test with 11 byte long value
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive that generates a 0 byte long synthetic message internally
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive that generates a 245 byte long synthetic message internally
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
Input = 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
Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
# (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -428,7 +436,7 @@ Input = 9b2ec9c0c917c98f1ad3d0119aec6be51ae3106e9af1914d48600ab6a2c0c0c8ae02a2dc
Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
# (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -436,7 +444,7 @@ Input = 782c2b59a21a511243820acedd567c136f6d3090c115232a82a5efb0b178285f55b5ec2d
Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
# plaintext
@@ -445,7 +453,7 @@ Input = 0096136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27f895d1faa51c800dafce73d001d60796cd4e2a
Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
# plaintext
@@ -454,7 +462,7 @@ Input = 96136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27f895d1faa51c800dafce73d001d60796cd4e2ac3
Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
# plaintext
@@ -463,7 +471,7 @@ Input = 0000587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f
Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthetic
# plaintext
@@ -472,7 +480,7 @@ Input = 587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f136c
Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
# to random 11 byte long synthetic plaintext
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -480,7 +488,7 @@ Input = 1786550ce8d8433052e01ecba8b76d3019f1355b212ac9d0f5191b023325a7e7714b7802
Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
# of padding
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -488,7 +496,7 @@ Input = 179598823812d2c58a7eb50521150a48bcca8b4eb53414018b6bca19f4801456c5e36a94
Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eighth
# byte of padding
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -496,7 +504,7 @@ Input = a7a340675a82c30e22219a55bc07cdf36d47d01834c1834f917f18b517419ce9de2a9646
Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
# byte
Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
@@ -551,53 +559,58 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
# RSA decrypt
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = 42
# simple positive test case
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test case with null padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = "lorem ipsum"
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 002c9ddc36ba4cf0038692b2d3a1c61a4bb3786a97ce2e46a3ba74d03158aeef456ce0f4db04dda3fe062268a1711250a18c69778a6280d88e133a16254e1f0e30ce8dac9b57d2e39a2f7d7be3ee4e08aec2fdbe8dadad7fdbf442a29a8fb40857407bf6be35596b8eefb5c2b3f58b894452c2dc54a6123a1a38d642e23751746597e08d71ac92704adc17803b19e131b4d1927881f43b0200e6f95658f559f912c889b4cd51862784364896cd6e8618f485a992f82997ad6a0917e32ae5872eaf850092b2d6c782ad35f487b79682333c1750c685d7d32ab3e1538f31dcaa5e7d5d2825875242c83947308dcf63ba4bfff20334c9c140c837dbdbae7a8dee72ff
Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
Decrypt = RSA-2049
Input = 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
@@ -661,14 +674,14 @@ ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAE=
PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthetic one
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output =
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
# in the last value
Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -676,46 +689,51 @@ Input = 7db0390d75fcf9d4c59cf27b264190d856da9abd11e92334d0e5f71005cfed865a711dfa
Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random invalid that generates a synthetic of maximum size
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = 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
# a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = "forty two"
# a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = "forty two"
# a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = "forty two"
# a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = "forty two"
# a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
+Availablein = default
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = "forty two"
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 5c8555f5cef627c15d37f85c7f5fd6e499264ea4b8e3f9112023aeb722eb38d8eac2be3751fd5a3785ab7f2d59fa3728e5be8c3de78a67464e30b21ee23b5484bb3cd06d0e1c6ad25649c8518165653eb80488bfb491b20c04897a6772f69292222fc5ef50b5cf9efc6d60426a449b6c489569d48c83488df629d695653d409ce49a795447fcec2c58a1a672e4a391401d428baaf781516e11e323d302fcf20f6eab2b2dbe53a48c987e407c4d7e1cb41131329138313d330204173a4f3ff06c6fadf970f0ed1005d0b27e35c3d11693e0429e272d583e57b2c58d24315c397856b34485dcb077665592b747f889d34febf2be8fce66c265fd9fc3575a6286a5ce88b4b413a08efc57a07a8f57a999605a837b0542695c0d189e678b53662ecf7c3d37d9dbeea585eebfaf79141118e06762c2381fe27ca6288edddc19fd67cd64f16b46e06d8a59ac530f22cd83cc0bc4e37feb52015cbb2283043ccf5e78a4eb7146827d7a466b66c8a4a4826c1bad68123a7f2d00fc1736525ff90c058f56
Output = 257906ca6de8307728
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
# second to last value from PRF
Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -723,7 +741,7 @@ Input = 758c215aa6acd61248062b88284bf43c13cb3b3d02410be4238607442f1c0216706e21a0
Output = 043383c929060374ed
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
# PRF
Decrypt = RSA-3072
@@ -731,35 +749,35 @@ Input = 7b22d5e62d287968c6622171a1f75db4b0fd15cdf3134a1895d235d56f8d8fe619f2bf48
Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
-FIPSversion = >=3.2.0
+Availablein = default
# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
Decrypt = RSA-3072
Input = 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
@@ -1106,36 +1124,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mNXb79cyY+NygUJ0OBgWbtfdY2
h90qjKHS9PvY4Q==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -194,7 +532,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -719,36 +726,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64
@@ -1160,36 +1184,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64e2EbcTLLfqc1bCMVHB53UVB8
eG2e4XlBcKjI6A==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -237,7 +575,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -773,36 +786,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+W
@@ -1214,36 +1244,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+WJ9N6z/c8J3nmNLsmARwsj38z
Ya4qnqZe1onjY5o=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -280,7 +618,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -827,36 +846,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/
@@ -1268,36 +1304,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/kSbj6XloJ5qGWywrQmUkz8Uq
aD0x7TDrmEvkEro=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -323,7 +661,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -881,36 +906,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/
@@ -1322,36 +1364,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/GOeBWKNKXF1fhgoPbAQHGn0B
MSwGUGLx60i3nRyDyw==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -366,7 +704,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -935,36 +966,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hq
@@ -1376,36 +1424,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hqziQG4iyeBY3bSuVAYnri/bCC
Yejn5Ly8mU2q+jBcRQ==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -409,7 +747,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -989,36 +1026,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4
@@ -1430,36 +1484,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4ohPIOWIGzfukQi8Y1vYdvLXS
FMlxv0gq65dqc3DC
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -452,7 +790,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1043,36 +1086,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15E
@@ -1484,36 +1544,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15EtXgyL2QF1iEdoZUZZmqof9xM
2MiPa249Z+lh3Luj0A==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -495,7 +833,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1103,36 +1152,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSc
@@ -1544,36 +1610,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSckFlJCf6zfby2VL63Jo7IAeWo
tKo5Eb69iFQvBb4=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@ -538,3 +876,74 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fips
Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
index 4e368c730b..879d5d76eb 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
+ [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
"-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
$smrsa1,
@@ -1118,6 +1118,9 @@ sub check_availability {
return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
+ return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
+ if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
+
return "";
}
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
index e2dcb68fb5..0775112b40 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -493,6 +493,18 @@ sub testssl {
# the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
my $ciphersuites = "";
+ my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
+AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
+AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
+ );
foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
@@ -504,11 +516,16 @@ sub testssl {
} else {
$cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
}
- ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
- $cipher,
- "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
- $flag || ()])),
- "Testing $cipher");
+ if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
+ note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
+ ok(1);
+ } else {
+ ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
+ $cipher,
+ "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
+ $flag || ()])),
+ "Testing $cipher");
+ }
}
}
next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
--
2.44.0

420
0060-FIPS-KAT-signature-tests.patch
View File

@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 15:49:24.786455707 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c 2022-04-04 16:06:13.250271963 +0200
@@ -393,6 +393,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
const OSSL_PARAM *param_priv_key = NULL, *param_pub_key = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ const OSSL_PARAM *param_sign_kat_k = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *sign_kat_k = NULL;
+#endif
unsigned char *pub_key = NULL;
size_t pub_key_len;
const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
@@ -408,7 +412,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
if (include_private)
param_priv_key =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY);
-
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ param_sign_kat_k =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K);
+#endif
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(ec));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -481,6 +489,17 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
&& !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ec, pub_point))
goto err;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (param_sign_kat_k) {
+ if ((sign_kat_k = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(sign_kat_k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_sign_kat_k, &sign_kat_k))
+ goto err;
+ ec->sign_kat_k = sign_kat_k;
+ }
+#endif
ok = 1;
err:
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 17:01:35.725323127 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c 2022-04-04 17:03:42.000427050 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "ec_local.h"
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
+#endif
+
int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp)
{
@@ -126,6 +130,11 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
goto err;
do {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
+ BN_copy(k, eckey->sign_kat_k);
+ } else {
+#endif
/* get random k */
do {
if (dgst != NULL) {
@@ -141,7 +150,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
}
}
} while (BN_is_zero(k));
-
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ }
+#endif
/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 13:48:52.231172299 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2022-04-04 14:00:35.077368605 +0200
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ BN_clear_free(r->sign_kat_k);
+#endif
OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 13:46:57.576161867 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h 2022-04-04 13:48:07.827780835 +0200
@@ -298,6 +298,9 @@ struct ec_key_st {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
#endif
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ BIGNUM *sign_kat_k;
+#endif
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
char *propq;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h
--- openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 14:06:15.717370014 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h 2022-04-04 14:07:35.376071229 +0200
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID "distid"
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY "pub"
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY "priv"
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K "rh_sign_kat_k"
/* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P "p"
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature 2022-04-04 14:21:03.043180906 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c 2022-04-04 14:38:33.949406645 +0200
@@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ end:
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PUBLIC_KEY \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NULL, 0)
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PRIVATE_KEY \
- OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0)
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0), \
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, NULL, 0)
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_OTHER_PARAMETERS \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_INCLUDE_PUBLIC, NULL)
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat 2022-05-10 15:10:32.502185265 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c 2022-05-10 15:13:21.465653720 +0200
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#include "self_test.h"
#include "self_test_data.inc"
+int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
+
static int self_test_digest(const ST_KAT_DIGEST *t, OSSL_SELF_TEST *st,
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
unsigned char sig[256];
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *K = NULL;
size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -462,6 +465,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
if (bnctx == NULL)
goto err;
+ K = BN_CTX_get(bnctx);
+ if (K == NULL || BN_bin2bn(dgst, sizeof(dgst), K) == NULL)
+ goto err;
bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (bld == NULL)
@@ -469,6 +475,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
if (!add_params(bld, t->key, bnctx))
goto err;
+ /* set K for ECDSA KAT tests */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, K))
+ goto err;
params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
/* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to load the DSA key into */
@@ -689,11 +698,13 @@ static int self_test_kas(OSSL_SELF_TEST
static int self_test_signatures(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
int i, ret = 1;
+ REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 1;
for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_sign_tests); ++i) {
if (!self_test_sign(&st_kat_sign_tests[i], st, libctx))
ret = 0;
}
+ REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
return ret;
}
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat 2022-05-16 17:37:34.962807400 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc 2022-05-16 17:48:10.709376779 +0200
@@ -1399,7 +1399,151 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_ke
ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv),
ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
};
+static const unsigned char ec224r1_kat_sig[] = {
+0x30, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x1c, 0x2f, 0x24, 0x30, 0x96, 0x3b, 0x39, 0xe0, 0xab, 0xe2, 0x5a, 0x6f, 0xe0,
+0x40, 0x7e, 0x19, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0x34, 0x6c, 0xc8, 0xce,
+0x02, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xe1, 0xac, 0xfd, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x36, 0xcd, 0xdd, 0x22,
+0x2a, 0x2d, 0x29, 0x64, 0x70, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x3e, 0x18, 0x51, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x3c
+};
+static const char ecd_prime_curve_name384[] = "secp384r1";
+/*
+priv:
+ 58:12:2b:94:be:29:23:13:83:f5:c4:20:e8:22:34:
+ 54:73:49:91:10:05:e9:10:e9:d7:2d:72:9c:5e:6a:
+ ba:8f:6d:d6:e4:a7:eb:e0:ae:e3:d4:c9:aa:33:87:
+ 4c:91:87
+pub:
+ 04:d1:86:8b:f5:c4:a2:f7:a5:92:e6:85:2a:d2:92:
+ 81:97:0a:8d:fa:09:3f:84:6c:17:43:03:43:49:23:
+ 77:c4:31:f4:0a:a4:de:87:ac:5c:c0:d1:bc:e4:43:
+ 7f:8d:44:e1:3b:5f:bc:27:c8:79:0f:d0:31:9f:a7:
+ 6d:de:fb:f7:da:19:40:fd:aa:83:dc:69:ce:a6:f3:
+ 4d:65:20:1c:66:82:80:03:f7:7b:2e:f3:b3:7c:1f:
+ 11:f2:a3:bf:e8:0e:88
+*/
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv384[] = {
+ 0x58, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x94, 0xbe, 0x29, 0x23, 0x13, 0x83, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0x20, 0xe8, 0x22, 0x34,
+ 0x54, 0x73, 0x49, 0x91, 0x10, 0x05, 0xe9, 0x10, 0xe9, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x9c, 0x5e, 0x6a,
+ 0xba, 0x8f, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0xeb, 0xe0, 0xae, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0x33, 0x87,
+ 0x4c, 0x91, 0x87
+};
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub384[] = {
+ 0x04, 0xd1, 0x86, 0x8b, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xa2, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0x92, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x92,
+ 0x81, 0x97, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x09, 0x3f, 0x84, 0x6c, 0x17, 0x43, 0x03, 0x43, 0x49, 0x23,
+ 0x77, 0xc4, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x0a, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x87, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xc0, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x43,
+ 0x7f, 0x8d, 0x44, 0xe1, 0x3b, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0x27, 0xc8, 0x79, 0x0f, 0xd0, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xa7,
+ 0x6d, 0xde, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x19, 0x40, 0xfd, 0xaa, 0x83, 0xdc, 0x69, 0xce, 0xa6, 0xf3,
+ 0x4d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x1c, 0x66, 0x82, 0x80, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xf3, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x1f,
+ 0x11, 0xf2, 0xa3, 0xbf, 0xe8, 0x0e, 0x88
+};
+static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key384[] = {
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name384),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub384),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv384),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+};
+static const unsigned char ec384r1_kat_sig[] = {
+0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xd5, 0x57, 0x1b, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x66, 0x68, 0x8a, 0x98,
+0xe3, 0x9c, 0xce, 0x7f, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xdc, 0x84, 0x5a, 0x65, 0xdc, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0x7e, 0xf3, 0x9b,
+0xa0, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0x02, 0xc7, 0x82, 0xe0, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xa5, 0xda, 0x55, 0x27, 0xbf, 0x79,
+0xee, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x14, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x67, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x68, 0xe7,
+0x71, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xe8, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0x76, 0x49, 0x31, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x33,
+0x16, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0xdb, 0x93, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0xb3, 0xd3, 0x30,
+0x98, 0x81, 0x6f, 0xb0, 0xc9, 0x30, 0x2f
+};
+static const char ecd_prime_curve_name521[] = "secp521r1";
+/*
+priv:
+ 00:44:0f:96:31:a9:87:f2:5f:be:a0:bc:ef:0c:ae:
+ 58:cc:5f:f8:44:9e:89:86:7e:bf:db:ce:cb:0e:20:
+ 10:4a:11:ec:0b:51:1d:e4:91:ca:c6:40:fb:c6:69:
+ ad:68:33:9e:c8:f5:c4:c6:a5:93:a8:4d:a9:a9:a2:
+ af:fe:6d:cb:c2:3b
+pub:
+ 04:01:5f:58:a9:40:0c:ee:9b:ed:4a:f4:7a:3c:a3:
+ 89:c2:f3:7e:2c:f4:b5:53:80:ae:33:7d:36:d1:b5:
+ 18:bd:ef:a9:48:00:ea:88:ee:00:5c:ca:07:08:b5:
+ 67:4a:c3:2b:10:c6:07:b0:c2:45:37:b7:1d:e3:6c:
+ e1:bf:2c:44:18:4a:aa:01:af:75:40:6a:e3:f5:b2:
+ 7f:d1:9d:1b:8b:29:1f:91:4d:db:93:bf:bd:8c:b7:
+ 6a:8d:4b:2c:36:2a:6b:ab:54:9d:7b:31:99:a4:de:
+ c9:10:c4:f4:a3:f4:6d:94:97:62:16:a5:34:65:1f:
+ 42:cd:8b:9e:e6:db:14:5d:a9:8d:19:95:8d
+*/
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv521[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x31, 0xa9, 0x87, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xbc, 0xef, 0x0c, 0xae,
+ 0x58, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xf8, 0x44, 0x9e, 0x89, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0xdb, 0xce, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0x20,
+ 0x10, 0x4a, 0x11, 0xec, 0x0b, 0x51, 0x1d, 0xe4, 0x91, 0xca, 0xc6, 0x40, 0xfb, 0xc6, 0x69,
+ 0xad, 0x68, 0x33, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xa8, 0x4d, 0xa9, 0xa9, 0xa2,
+ 0xaf, 0xfe, 0x6d, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x3b
+};
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub521[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x58, 0xa9, 0x40, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x9b, 0xed, 0x4a, 0xf4, 0x7a, 0x3c, 0xa3,
+ 0x89, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xf4, 0xb5, 0x53, 0x80, 0xae, 0x33, 0x7d, 0x36, 0xd1, 0xb5,
+ 0x18, 0xbd, 0xef, 0xa9, 0x48, 0x00, 0xea, 0x88, 0xee, 0x00, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x07, 0x08, 0xb5,
+ 0x67, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x2b, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x07, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x1d, 0xe3, 0x6c,
+ 0xe1, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x18, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x75, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xe3, 0xf5, 0xb2,
+ 0x7f, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0x93, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x8c, 0xb7,
+ 0x6a, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0x36, 0x2a, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x54, 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x31, 0x99, 0xa4, 0xde,
+ 0xc9, 0x10, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0x94, 0x97, 0x62, 0x16, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x65, 0x1f,
+ 0x42, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x9e, 0xe6, 0xdb, 0x14, 0x5d, 0xa9, 0x8d, 0x19, 0x95, 0x8d
+};
+static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key521[] = {
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name521),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub521),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv521),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+};
+static const unsigned char ec521r1_kat_sig[] = {
+0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x02, 0x42, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x9c, 0xc8, 0x5b, 0xdd, 0x0b, 0x7f, 0x69, 0x7e,
+0xdb, 0x83, 0x58, 0x67, 0x63, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xfa, 0x40, 0x29, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xde, 0xe9, 0x96, 0x65,
+0xe6, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0xe9, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x62, 0xb8,
+0x6c, 0xc1, 0x36, 0x19, 0x65, 0xff, 0xab, 0xcf, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x4b, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x89,
+0xcf, 0xf8, 0x72, 0x7b, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x02, 0x02, 0x42, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x77, 0xb8, 0xcb, 0xa2,
+0xe2, 0x1f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0x16, 0xb5, 0x8e, 0xad, 0xe3, 0xc3, 0xac, 0xb7, 0xb2, 0x51, 0x8f,
+0xf9, 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x5c, 0x4a, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0xbb, 0x5a,
+0x92, 0x69, 0xec, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x35, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xc9, 0x69, 0xa7, 0xaa, 0x94, 0xf9,
+0xf9, 0x50, 0x87, 0x7b, 0x5d, 0x87, 0xe3, 0xd6, 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x6e
+};
+static const char ecd_prime_curve_name256[] = "prime256v1";
+/*
+priv:
+ 84:88:11:3f:a9:c9:9e:23:72:8b:40:cb:a2:b1:88:
+ 01:1e:92:48:af:13:2d:9b:33:8e:6d:43:40:30:c7:
+ 30:fa
+pub:
+ 04:22:58:b6:f9:01:3b:8c:a6:9b:9f:ae:75:fc:73:
+ cf:1b:f0:81:dc:55:a3:cc:5d:81:46:85:06:32:34:
+ 99:0d:c5:7e:a1:95:bb:21:73:33:40:4b:35:17:f6:
+ 8e:26:61:46:94:2c:4c:ac:9b:20:f8:08:72:25:74:
+ 98:66:c4:63:a6
+*/
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv256[] = {
+ 0x84, 0x88, 0x11, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x23, 0x72, 0x8b, 0x40, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x88,
+ 0x01, 0x1e, 0x92, 0x48, 0xaf, 0x13, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8e, 0x6d, 0x43, 0x40, 0x30, 0xc7,
+ 0x30, 0xfa
+};
+static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub256[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x22, 0x58, 0xb6, 0xf9, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xa6, 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xae, 0x75, 0xfc, 0x73,
+ 0xcf, 0x1b, 0xf0, 0x81, 0xdc, 0x55, 0xa3, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x81, 0x46, 0x85, 0x06, 0x32, 0x34,
+ 0x99, 0x0d, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xa1, 0x95, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x73, 0x33, 0x40, 0x4b, 0x35, 0x17, 0xf6,
+ 0x8e, 0x26, 0x61, 0x46, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x9b, 0x20, 0xf8, 0x08, 0x72, 0x25, 0x74,
+ 0x98, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x63, 0xa6
+};
+static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key256[] = {
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name256),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub256),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv256),
+ ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+};
+static const unsigned char ec256v1_kat_sig[] = {
+0x30, 0x46, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x11, 0x27, 0x06, 0x51, 0x2b, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0xa6,
+0x85, 0xaa, 0xf4, 0x66, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x54, 0x0a, 0x10, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x87, 0xfc, 0xa2, 0xbc, 0x8f,
+0x3c, 0x58, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x41, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x72, 0x94, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x52, 0xca, 0x21,
+0x82, 0x66, 0x7a, 0x68, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0x3b, 0x12, 0x71, 0x4d, 0x56, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xdd, 0xca, 0x2b,
+0x18, 0xa3, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x0d, 0xfa, 0x9c, 0x66
+};
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
static const char ecd_bin_curve_name[] = "sect233r1";
static const unsigned char ecd_bin_priv[] = {
@@ -1571,8 +1715,42 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
ecdsa_prime_key,
/*
* The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
- * So there is no expected KAT for this case.
+ * We provide this value in our build
+ */
+ ITM(ec224r1_kat_sig)
+ },
+ {
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
+ "EC",
+ "SHA-256",
+ ecdsa_prime_key384,
+ /*
+ * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
+ * We provide this value in our build
+ */
+ ITM(ec384r1_kat_sig)
+ },
+ {
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
+ "EC",
+ "SHA-256",
+ ecdsa_prime_key521,
+ /*
+ * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
+ * We provide this value in our build
+ */
+ ITM(ec521r1_kat_sig)
+ },
+ {
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
+ "EC",
+ "SHA-256",
+ ecdsa_prime_key256,
+ /*
+ * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
+ * We provide this value in our build
*/
+ ITM(ec256v1_kat_sig)
},
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
{
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat 2022-05-30 14:48:53.180999124 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c 2022-05-30 14:58:52.841286228 +0200
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@
#define S390X_OFF_RN(n) (4 * n)
#define S390X_OFF_Y(n) (4 * n)
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
+#endif
+
static int ec_GFp_s390x_nistp_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM *scalar,
size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[],
@@ -183,11 +187,21 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign
* because kdsa instruction constructs an in-range, invertible nonce
* internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness.
*/
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
+ BN_bn2binpad(eckey->sign_kat_k, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len), len);
+ /* Turns KDSA internal nonce-generation off. */
+ fc |= S390X_KDSA_D;
+ } else {
+#endif
if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(eckey->libctx, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len),
(size_t)len, 0) != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
goto ret;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ }
+#endif
} else {
/* Reconstruct k = (k^-1)^-1. */
if (ossl_ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group, k, kinv, NULL) == 0

2
0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
View File

@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ index de391ce067..1cfd71c5cf 100644
--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include "prov/seeding.h"
#include "self_test.h"
#include "crypto/context.h"
#include "internal/core.h"
+#include "indicator.h"

703
0067-ppc64le-Montgomery-multiply.patch
View File

@ -1,703 +0,0 @@
From 33ffd36afa7594aeb958a925f521cb287ca850c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 12:14:55 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Revert "Revert "bn: Add fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC
Montgomery Multiplication""
This reverts commit 712d9cc90e355b2c98a959d4e9398610d2269c9e.
---
crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 581 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c | 15 +
crypto/bn/build.info | 3 +-
3 files changed, 598 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
index e69de29bb2d1..0fb397bc5f12 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Amitay Isaacs <amitay@ozlabs.org>, Martin Schwenke
+# <martin@meltin.net> & Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org> for
+# the OpenSSL project.
+# ====================================================================
+
+#
+# Fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC Montgomery Multiplication
+#
+
+# 2021
+#
+# Although this is a generic implementation for unrolling Montgomery
+# Multiplication for arbitrary values of n, this is currently only
+# used for n = 6 to improve the performance of ECC p384.
+#
+# Unrolling allows intermediate results to be stored in registers,
+# rather than on the stack, improving performance by ~7% compared to
+# the existing PPC assembly code.
+#
+# The ISA 3.0 implementation uses combination multiply/add
+# instructions (maddld, maddhdu) to improve performance by an
+# additional ~10% on Power 9.
+#
+# Finally, saving non-volatile registers into volatile vector
+# registers instead of onto the stack saves a little more.
+#
+# On a Power 9 machine we see an overall improvement of ~18%.
+#
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+my ($flavour, $output, $dir, $xlate);
+
+# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
+# $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
+$output = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
+$flavour = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] !~ m|\.| ? shift : undef;
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour \"$output\""
+ or die "can't call $xlate: $!";
+
+if ($flavour !~ /64/) {
+ die "bad flavour ($flavour) - only ppc64 permitted";
+}
+
+my $SIZE_T= 8;
+
+# Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
+
+# Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
+my $sp = "r1";
+my $toc = "r2";
+my $rp = "r3";
+my $ap = "r4";
+my $bp = "r5";
+my $np = "r6";
+my $n0 = "r7";
+my $num = "r8";
+
+my $i = "r9";
+my $c0 = "r10";
+my $bp0 = "r11";
+my $bpi = "r11";
+my $bpj = "r11";
+my $tj = "r12";
+my $apj = "r12";
+my $npj = "r12";
+my $lo = "r14";
+my $c1 = "r14";
+
+# Non-volatile registers used for tp[i]
+#
+# 12 registers are available but the limit on unrolling is 10,
+# since registers from $tp[0] to $tp[$n+1] are used.
+my @tp = ("r20" .. "r31");
+
+# volatile VSRs for saving non-volatile GPRs - faster than stack
+my @vsrs = ("v32" .. "v46");
+
+package Mont;
+
+sub new($$)
+{
+ my ($class, $n) = @_;
+
+ if ($n > 10) {
+ die "Can't unroll for BN length ${n} (maximum 10)"
+ }
+
+ my $self = {
+ code => "",
+ n => $n,
+ };
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub add_code($$)
+{
+ my ($self, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->{code} .= $c;
+}
+
+sub get_code($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{code};
+}
+
+sub get_function_name($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return "bn_mul_mont_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
+}
+
+sub get_label($$)
+{
+ my ($self, $l) = @_;
+
+ return "L" . $l . "_" . $self->{n};
+}
+
+sub get_labels($@)
+{
+ my ($self, @labels) = @_;
+
+ my %out = ();
+
+ foreach my $l (@labels) {
+ $out{"$l"} = $self->get_label("$l");
+ }
+
+ return \%out;
+}
+
+sub nl($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code("\n");
+}
+
+sub copy_result($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ my ($n) = $self->{n};
+
+ for (my $j = 0; $j < $n; $j++) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ std $tp[$j],`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
+___
+ }
+
+}
+
+sub mul_mont_fixed($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ my ($n) = $self->{n};
+ my $fname = $self->get_function_name();
+ my $label = $self->get_labels("outer", "enter", "sub", "copy", "end");
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+
+.globl .${fname}
+.align 5
+.${fname}:
+
+___
+
+ $self->save_registers();
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $n0,0($n0)
+
+ ld $bp0,0($bp)
+
+ ld $apj,0($ap)
+___
+
+ $self->mul_c_0($tp[0], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
+
+ for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
+___
+ $self->mul($tp[$j], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
+ }
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $apj,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($ap)
+___
+
+ $self->mul_last($tp[$n-1], $tp[$n], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ li $tp[$n+1],0
+
+___
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ li $i,0
+ mtctr $num
+ b $label->{"enter"}
+
+.align 4
+$label->{"outer"}:
+ ldx $bpi,$bp,$i
+
+ ld $apj,0($ap)
+___
+
+ $self->mul_add_c_0($tp[0], $tp[0], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
+
+ for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
+___
+ $self->mul_add($tp[$j], $tp[$j], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
+ }
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ addc $tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
+ addze $tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
+___
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+.align 4
+$label->{"enter"}:
+ mulld $bpi,$tp[0],$n0
+
+ ld $npj,0($np)
+___
+
+ $self->mul_add_c_0($lo, $tp[0], $bpi, $npj, $c0);
+
+ for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $npj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
+___
+ $self->mul_add($tp[$j-1], $tp[$j], $npj, $bpi, $c0);
+ }
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ addc $tp[$n-1],$tp[$n],$c0
+ addze $tp[$n],$tp[$n+1]
+
+ addi $i,$i,$SIZE_T
+ bdnz $label->{"outer"}
+
+ and. $tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
+ bne $label->{"sub"}
+
+ cmpld $tp[$n-1],$npj
+ blt $label->{"copy"}
+
+$label->{"sub"}:
+___
+
+ #
+ # Reduction
+ #
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $bpj,`0*$SIZE_T`($np)
+ subfc $c1,$bpj,$tp[0]
+ std $c1,`0*$SIZE_T`($rp)
+
+___
+ for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $bpj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
+ subfe $c1,$bpj,$tp[$j]
+ std $c1,`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
+
+___
+ }
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ subfe $c1,$npj,$tp[$n-1]
+ std $c1,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($rp)
+
+___
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ addme. $tp[$n],$tp[$n]
+ beq $label->{"end"}
+
+$label->{"copy"}:
+___
+
+ $self->copy_result();
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+
+$label->{"end"}:
+___
+
+ $self->restore_registers();
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ li r3,1
+ blr
+.size .${fname},.-.${fname}
+___
+
+}
+
+package Mont::GPR;
+
+our @ISA = ('Mont');
+
+sub new($$)
+{
+ my ($class, $n) = @_;
+
+ return $class->SUPER::new($n);
+}
+
+sub save_registers($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ my $n = $self->{n};
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ std $lo,-8($sp)
+___
+
+ for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
+ $self->{code}.=<<___;
+ std $tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
+___
+ }
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+
+___
+}
+
+sub restore_registers($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ my $n = $self->{n};
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ ld $lo,-8($sp)
+___
+
+ for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
+ $self->{code}.=<<___;
+ ld $tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
+___
+ }
+
+ $self->{code} .=<<___;
+
+___
+}
+
+# Direct translation of C mul()
+sub mul($$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $lo,$a,$w
+ addc $r,$lo,$c
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+ addze $c,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
+# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
+sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $r,$a,$w
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like mul() but does not to the final addition of CA into $c - an
+# optimisation to save an instruction
+sub mul_last($$$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $lo,$a,$w
+ addc $r1,$lo,$c
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+
+ addze $r2,$c
+___
+}
+
+# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
+sub mul_add($$$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $lo,$a,$w
+ addc $lo,$lo,$c
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+ addze $c,$c
+ addc $r_out,$r_in,$lo
+ addze $c,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
+# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
+sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $lo,$a,$w
+ addc $r_out,$r_in,$lo
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+ addze $c,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+package Mont::GPR_300;
+
+our @ISA = ('Mont::GPR');
+
+sub new($$)
+{
+ my ($class, $n) = @_;
+
+ my $mont = $class->SUPER::new($n);
+
+ return $mont;
+}
+
+sub get_function_name($)
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return "bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
+}
+
+sub get_label($$)
+{
+ my ($self, $l) = @_;
+
+ return "L" . $l . "_300_" . $self->{n};
+}
+
+# Direct translation of C mul()
+sub mul($$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c, $last) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ maddld $r,$a,$w,$c
+ maddhdu $c,$a,$w,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+# Save the last carry as the final entry
+sub mul_last($$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ maddld $r1,$a,$w,$c
+ maddhdu $r2,$a,$w,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
+# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
+sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mulld $r,$a,$w
+ mulhdu $c,$a,$w
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
+sub mul_add($$$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ maddld $lo,$a,$w,$c
+ maddhdu $c,$a,$w,$c
+ addc $r_out,$r_in,$lo
+ addze $c,$c
+
+___
+}
+
+# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
+# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
+sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
+{
+ my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
+
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ maddld $lo,$a,$w,$r_in
+ maddhdu $c,$a,$w,$r_in
+___
+
+ if ($r_out ne $lo) {
+ $self->add_code(<<___);
+ mr $r_out,$lo
+___
+ }
+
+ $self->nl();
+}
+
+
+package main;
+
+my $code;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine "any"
+.text
+___
+
+my $mont;
+
+$mont = new Mont::GPR(6);
+$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
+$code .= $mont->get_code();
+
+$mont = new Mont::GPR_300(6);
+$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
+$code .= $mont->get_code();
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC by <amitay\@ozlabs.org>, <alastair\@d-silva.org>"
+___
+
+print $code;
+close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
index 3ee76ea96574..1e9421bee213 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
int bn_mul4x_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+ int bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+ const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+ const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+ int bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+ const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+ const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
if (num < 4)
return 0;
@@ -34,5 +40,14 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
* no opportunity to figure it out...
*/
+#if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && !defined(__ILP32__)
+ if (num == 6) {
+ if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300)
+ return bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+ else
+ return bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+ }
+#endif
+
return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
index 4f8d0689b5ea..987a70ae263b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/build.info
+++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
$BNASM_ppc32=bn_ppc.c bn-ppc.s ppc-mont.s
$BNDEF_ppc32=OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
- $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32
+ $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32 ppc64-mont-fixed.s
$BNDEF_ppc64=$BNDEF_ppc32
$BNASM_c64xplus=asm/bn-c64xplus.asm
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ GENERATE[parisc-mont.s]=asm/parisc-mont.pl
GENERATE[bn-ppc.s]=asm/ppc.pl
GENERATE[ppc-mont.s]=asm/ppc-mont.pl
GENERATE[ppc64-mont.s]=asm/ppc64-mont.pl
+GENERATE[ppc64-mont-fixed.s]=asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
GENERATE[alpha-mont.S]=asm/alpha-mont.pl
From 01ebad0d6e3a09bc9e32350b402901471610a3dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:21:06 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix unrolled montgomery multiplication for POWER9
In the reference C implementation in bn_asm.c, tp[num + 1] contains the
carry bit for accumulations into tp[num]. tp[num + 1] is only ever
assigned, never itself incremented.
---
crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
index 0fb397bc5f12..e27d0ad93d85 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
# Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
# Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
+my $ze = "r0";
my $sp = "r1";
my $toc = "r2";
my $rp = "r3";
@@ -192,6 +193,7 @@ ($)
$self->save_registers();
$self->add_code(<<___);
+ li $ze,0
ld $n0,0($n0)
ld $bp0,0($bp)
@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ ($)
$self->add_code(<<___);
addc $tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
- addze $tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
+ addze $tp[$n+1],$ze
___
$self->add_code(<<___);
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ ($)
and. $tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
bne $label->{"sub"}
- cmpld $tp[$n-1],$npj
+ cmpld $tp[$n-1],$npj
blt $label->{"copy"}
$label->{"sub"}:

1635
0071-AES-GCM-performance-optimization.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1493
0072-ChaCha20-performance-optimizations-for-ppc64le.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

40
0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
View File

@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h | 8 ++
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 34 ++++++--
include/openssl/core_names.h | 3 +
providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 83 +++++++++++--------
providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 7 ++
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 41 ++++++++-
6 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 41 +++++++++-
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 1 +
6 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
index ea70da05ad..dde57a1a0e 100644
@ -118,20 +118,6 @@ index d9be1a4f98..b2f7f7dc4b 100644
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen,
const unsigned char *param, int plen,
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 59a6e79566..11216fb8f8 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL "oaep-label"
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION "tls-client-version"
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION "tls-negotiated-version"
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
+#endif
/*
* Encoder / decoder parameters
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
index 4e30ec56dd..0103c87528 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@ -291,11 +277,11 @@ index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
/* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
unsigned int implicit_rejection;
} PROV_RSA_CTX;
static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
@@ -190,12 +196,21 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
return 0;
}
}
ret =
- ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
@ -335,9 +321,9 @@ index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
@@ -454,6 +475,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx,
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
@ -368,6 +354,18 @@ index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION);
if (p != NULL) {
unsigned int client_version;
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index c37ed7815f..70f7c50fe4 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ my %params = (
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION' => "tls-client-version",
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' => "tls-negotiated-version",
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' => "implicit-rejection",
+ 'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' => "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
# Encoder / decoder parameters
--
2.37.1

136
0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +1,25 @@
From 97ac06e5a8e3a8699279c06eeb64c8e958bad7bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 17:45:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use digest_sign & digest_verify in self test
From dc41625dc4a793f0e21188165711181ca085339b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/49]
0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
In review for FIPS 140-3, the lack of a self-test for the digest_sign
and digest_verify provider functions was highlighted as a problem. NIST
no longer provides ACVP tests for the RSA SigVer primitive (see
https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1347). Because FIPS 140-3
recommends the use of functions that compute the digest and signature
within the module, we have been advised in our module review that the
self tests should also use the combined digest and signature APIs, i.e.
the digest_sign and digest_verify provider functions.
Modify the signature self-test to use these instead by switching to
EVP_DigestSign and EVP_DigestVerify. This requires adding more ifdefs to
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c to make these functions usable in the FIPS module.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Patch-name: 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
Patch-id: 74
Patch-status: |
# [PATCH 29/46]
# 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 37 +++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 43 +++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
index fd3a4b79df..3e9f33c26c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
@ -34,7 +27,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
/*
* If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -125,8 +126,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
reinit = 0;
if (e == NULL)
ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
@ -45,7 +38,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
}
if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -139,8 +142,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -136,8 +139,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
locpctx = ctx->pctx;
ERR_set_mark();
@ -56,7 +49,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
/* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
if (reinit
@@ -225,8 +230,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -222,8 +227,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
signature =
evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
@ -67,7 +60,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
break;
}
if (signature == NULL)
@@ -310,6 +317,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -307,6 +314,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
@ -75,7 +68,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
} else {
/* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
@@ -318,11 +326,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -315,11 +323,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@ -89,7 +82,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
&& !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
&& !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
@@ -334,6 +344,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -331,6 +341,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
goto err;
}
}
@ -97,7 +90,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
if (ver) {
if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
@@ -366,6 +377,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -363,6 +374,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
return 0;
@ -105,7 +98,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
legacy:
/*
* If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
@@ -437,6 +449,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -434,6 +446,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
ret = 1;
@ -113,7 +106,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
end:
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -479,7 +492,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
@@ -476,7 +489,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
NULL);
}
@ -121,7 +114,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
{
@@ -541,23 +553,29 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
@@ -548,24 +560,31 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
}
@ -130,13 +123,19 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
size_t *siglen)
{
- int sctx = 0, r = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ int r = 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ int sctx = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (pctx == NULL
@ -146,26 +145,26 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
if (sigret == NULL || (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
sigret, siglen,
sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (sigret != NULL && (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
/* try dup */
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
if (dctx == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -566,8 +584,10 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
sigret, siglen,
*siglen);
@@ -580,7 +599,14 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
else
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
return r;
+#else
+ r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+ sigret, siglen,
+ sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
+ return r;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
legacy:
if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -639,6 +659,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -653,6 +679,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
}
}
return 1;
@ -173,7 +172,7 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
}
int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
@@ -669,21 +690,27 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
@@ -691,23 +718,30 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
{
@ -183,10 +182,16 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int mdlen = 0;
int vctx = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (pctx == NULL
@ -196,25 +201,25 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
sig, siglen);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
/* try dup */
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
if (dctx == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -691,8 +718,10 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
r = dctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(dctx->op.sig.algctx,
sig, siglen);
@@ -721,7 +755,13 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
else
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
return r;
+#else
+ r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+ sig, siglen);
+ return r;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
legacy:
if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -732,6 +761,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
@@ -762,6 +802,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
if (vctx || !r)
return r;
return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
@ -222,16 +227,16 @@ index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
}
int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -757,4 +787,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -794,4 +835,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
return -1;
return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
index 4ea10670c0..5eb27c8ed2 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -444,11 +444,14 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
@@ -450,10 +450,13 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
int ret = 0;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
@ -241,13 +246,12 @@ index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char sig[256];
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *K = NULL;
+ const char *msg = "Hello World!";
+ unsigned char sig[256];
size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -488,23 +491,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
@@ -487,23 +490,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
goto err;
@ -288,7 +292,7 @@ index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
goto err;
@@ -509,14 +510,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
@@ -513,14 +519,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
goto err;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
@ -309,5 +313,5 @@ index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
--
2.37.1
2.44.0

186
0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch
View File

@ -1,3 +1,79 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c 2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
size_t entropy_available;
RAND_POOL *pool;
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+ * amount of entropy.
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c 2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
* to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
* the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
*/
- bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
+ /*
+ * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
+ * + 128 bits during initial seeding
+ */
+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_needed < min_len)
bytes_needed = min_len;
if (bytes_needed > max_len)
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand 2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c 2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
#endif
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ prediction_resistance = 1;
+#endif
/* Reseed using our sources in addition */
entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
reseed_required = 1;
}
if (drbg->parent != NULL
- && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
+ && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
+ drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
+#else
reseed_required = 1;
+#endif
+ }
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg 2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h 2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
*
* The value is in bytes.
*/
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 32
/*
* Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand 2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c 2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
@ -9,8 +85,8 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsr
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
@@ -342,66 +342,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
@@ -339,70 +341,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
*/
@ -70,49 +146,40 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsr
-# elif (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
- || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
- return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
-# elif defined(__wasi__)
- if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
- return (ssize_t)buflen;
- return -1;
-# else
- errno = ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-# endif
+ /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
+ return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, buflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
+ int realbuflen = buflen > 32 ? 32 : buflen; /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
+ return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, realbuflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
}
# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand 2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c 2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
#endif
diff -up openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
--- openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c.xxx 2024-04-10 13:14:38.984033920 +0200
+++ openssl-3.2.1/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c 2024-04-10 13:15:20.565045748 +0200
@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ prediction_resistance = 1;
+#endif
/* Reseed using our sources in addition */
entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
reseed_required = 1;
}
if (drbg->parent != NULL
- && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
+ && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
+ drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
+#else
reseed_required = 1;
+#endif
+ }
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c 2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
size_t entropy_available;
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+ * amount of entropy.
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
size_t i;
RAND_POOL *pool;
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
@ -125,33 +192,26 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ran
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c 2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
* to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
* the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
*/
- bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
+ /*
+ * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
+ * + 128 bits during initial seeding
+ */
+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_needed < min_len)
bytes_needed = min_len;
if (bytes_needed > max_len)
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg 2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h 2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
*
* The value is in bytes.
*/
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 32
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 14999540ab..b05b84717b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
return ret;
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
- ERR_set_mark();
- dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- }
-#endif
-
- ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
+ ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
/*
* Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)

2
0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch
View File

@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rs
--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero 2022-08-05 13:08:31.875848536 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c 2022-08-05 13:09:35.438416025 +0200
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
- BN_free(r->n);
- BN_free(r->e);

70
0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch
View File

@ -42,15 +42,15 @@ Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
---
include/crypto/evp.h | 7 ++
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/kdf.h | 4 +
providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++--
providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c | 75 +++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c | 74 +++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c | 67 ++++++++++++++-
9 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c | 66 +++++++++++++-
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 1 +
9 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
@ -70,18 +70,6 @@ index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
struct evp_kdf_st {
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
int name_id;
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 6bed5a8a67..680bfbc7cc 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO "supp-pubinfo"
#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO "supp-privinfo"
#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS "use-keybits"
+#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
/* Known KDF names */
#define OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF "HKDF"
diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
--- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
@ -111,7 +99,7 @@ index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
size_t data_len;
unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
unsigned char *info;
size_t info_len;
+ int is_tls13;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
@ -145,10 +133,8 @@ index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (sz == 0 || !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz))
return 0;
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
}
- return -2;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
@ -203,8 +189,10 @@ index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
+ }
+ }
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
return 0;
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
}
- return -2;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
+ if (!any_valid)
@ -260,9 +248,9 @@ index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_derive },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
@ -277,9 +265,9 @@ index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
/* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
int r;
unsigned char *ki;
@@ -70,6 +73,9 @@ typedef struct {
size_t iv_len;
@@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ typedef struct {
int use_l;
int is_kmac;
int use_separator;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
@ -296,7 +284,7 @@ index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
return 0;
goto done;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
@ -308,7 +296,7 @@ index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
if (h == 0)
goto done;
@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 0;
}
}
+ if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
@ -512,10 +500,10 @@ diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/
index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ typedef struct {
unsigned char *salt;
@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ typedef struct {
size_t salt_len;
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
int is_kmac;
+ int is_x963kdf;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
@ -528,9 +516,9 @@ index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn sskdf_dup;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
return ctx;
}
@ -666,9 +654,9 @@ index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@ -704,8 +692,8 @@ index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
/*
* The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
}
}
@ -794,7 +782,7 @@ diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementation
index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@ -803,7 +791,7 @@ index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include "internal/der.h"
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
@ -901,6 +889,18 @@ index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index 70f7c50fe4..6618122417 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ my %params = (
'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO' => "supp-pubinfo",
'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO' => "supp-privinfo",
'KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS' => "use-keybits",
+ 'KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_ENTROPY' => "entropy",
'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_NONCE' => "nonce",
'KDF_PARAM_THREADS' => "threads", # uint32_t
--
2.39.2

3086
0080-rand-Forbid-truncated-hashes-SHA-3-in-FIPS-prov.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

41
0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch
View File

@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ parameter.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/crypto/evp.h | 7 +++++++
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/evp.h | 3 +++
providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
@ -39,18 +38,6 @@ index 76fb990de4..1e2240516e 100644
struct evp_mac_st {
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
int name_id;
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index c019afbbb0..94fab83193 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE "size" /* size_t */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE "block-size" /* size_t */
#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE "tls-data-size" /* size_t */
+#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
/* Known MAC names */
#define OSSL_MAC_NAME_BLAKE2BMAC "BLAKE2BMAC"
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
index 49e8e1df78..a5e78efd6e 100644
--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
@ -75,9 +62,9 @@ index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+
#include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
@@ -244,6 +246,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
@ -107,6 +94,30 @@ index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
return 1;
}
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index 6618122417..8b2d430f17 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -137,12 +137,13 @@ my %params = (
# If "engine",or "properties",are specified, they should always be paired
# with "cipher",or "digest".
- 'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' => '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER', # utf8 string
- 'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST', # utf8 string
- 'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' => '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES', # utf8 string
- 'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' => "size", # size_t
- 'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' => "block-size", # size_t
- 'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' => "tls-data-size", # size_t
+ 'MAC_PARAM_CIPHER' => '*ALG_PARAM_CIPHER', # utf8 string
+ 'MAC_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*ALG_PARAM_DIGEST', # utf8 string
+ 'MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES' => '*ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES', # utf8 string
+ 'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' => "size", # size_t
+ 'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' => "block-size", # size_t
+ 'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' => "tls-data-size", # size_t
+ 'MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator", # size_t
# KDF / PRF parameters
'KDF_PARAM_SECRET' => "secret", # octet string
--
2.38.1

2
0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
View File

@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ index 2a0ae63acc..aa0adce5e6 100644
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
@@ -186,9 +201,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
}

52
0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
View File

@ -40,23 +40,11 @@ Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/evp.h | 4 ++++
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 23 ++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 94fab83193..69c59f0b46 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES \
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
/* Asym cipher parameters */
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
index a5e78efd6e..f239200465 100644
--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
@ -111,6 +99,40 @@ index 49e7f9158a..0c45008a00 100644
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index 8b2d430f17..a109e44521 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -377,17 +377,18 @@ my %params = (
'EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM' => "kdf-ukm",
# Signature parameters
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' => "algorithm-id",
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' => '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' => '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' => "saltlen",
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' => "nonce-type",
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' => "instance",
- 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' => "context-string",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID' => "algorithm-id",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE' => '*PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES' => '*PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN' => "saltlen",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' => "nonce-type",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' => "instance",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' => "context-string",
# Asym cipher parameters
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',
--
2.38.1

114
0089-PSS-salt-length-from-provider.patch
View File

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
From 0879fac692cb1bff0ec4c196cb364d970ad3ecec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 14:33:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Obtain PSS salt length from provider
Rather than computing the PSS salt length again in core using
ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string, which calls rsa_ctx_to_pss and computes the
salt length, obtain it from the provider using the
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID param to handle the case where the
interpretation of the magic constants in the provider differs from that
of OpenSSL core.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
index 20ed816918..997567fdbf 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "cms_local.h"
@@ -191,7 +192,10 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
X509_ALGOR *alg;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
- ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+ unsigned char aid[128];
+ const unsigned char *pp = aid;
+ size_t aid_len = 0;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2];
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
if (pkctx != NULL) {
@@ -205,10 +209,17 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
/* We don't support it */
if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
return 0;
- os = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
- if (os == NULL)
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
return 0;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index c15554505b..61ec53d424 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -637,22 +637,30 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const void *asn,
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return 2;
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
- os1 = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
- if (!os1)
+ unsigned char aid[128];
+ size_t aid_len = 0;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
return 0;
- /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
- if (alg2) {
- ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
- if (!os2) {
- ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
+ if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (alg1 != NULL) {
+ const unsigned char *pp = aid;
+ if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg1, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (alg2 != NULL) {
+ const unsigned char *pp = aid;
+ if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg2, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
}
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+
return 3;
}
return 2;
--
2.38.1

338
0090-signature-Clamp-PSS-salt-len-to-MD-len.patch
View File

@ -1,338 +0,0 @@
From 9cc914ff3e1fda124bdc76d72ebc9349ec19f8ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 12:35:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] signature: Clamp PSS salt len to MD len
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest legth when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 18 ++++++++-
crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c | 26 ++++++++++--
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 11 ++++-
doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod | 5 +++
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/rsa.h | 3 ++
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 40 ++++++++++++++-----
test/recipes/25-test_req.t | 2 +-
8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 61ec53d424..e69a98d116 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
int saltlen;
+ int saltlenMax = -1;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
return NULL;
@@ -457,14 +458,27 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
return NULL;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen) <= 0)
return NULL;
- if (saltlen == -1) {
+ if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
- } else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
+ } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+ /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm",
+ * subsection 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in
+ * bytes) of the salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where
+ * hLen is the length of the hash function output block (in bytes)."
+ *
+ * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default
+ * does not violate FIPS 186-4. */
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
+ }
+ if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
saltlen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pk) - EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd) - 2;
if ((EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
saltlen--;
if (saltlen < 0)
return NULL;
+ if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
+ saltlen = saltlenMax;
}
return ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index 33874bfef8..430c36eb2a 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -61,11 +61,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
* -3 salt length is maximized
+ * -4 salt length is autorecovered from signature
* -N reserved
*/
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
sLen = hLen;
- } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -112,7 +113,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
+ if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
+ && sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX
+ && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED,
"expected: %d retrieved: %d", sLen,
maskedDBLen - i);
@@ -160,6 +163,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int sLenMax = -1;
if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
mgf1Hash = Hash;
@@ -172,13 +176,25 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is maximized
* -3 same as above (on signing)
+ * -4 salt length is min(hLen, maximum salt length)
* -N reserved
*/
+ /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
+ * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
+ * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
+ * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
+ *
+ * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
+ * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
sLen = hLen;
- } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
+ } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN
+ || sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
- } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+ sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ sLenMax = hLen;
+ } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -195,6 +211,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
}
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
+ if (sLenMax >= 0 && sLen > sLenMax)
+ sLen = sLenMax;
} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
goto err;
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
index 3075eaafd6..9b96f42dbc 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -270,8 +270,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding() gets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() sets the RSA PSS salt length to I<saltlen>.
As its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. If this function is
-not called then the maximum salt length is used when signing and auto detection
-when verifying. Three special values are supported:
+not called then the salt length is maximized up to the digest length when
+signing and auto detection when verifying. Four special values are supported:
=over 4
@@ -289,6 +289,13 @@ causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the
B<PSS> block structure when verifying. When signing, it has the same
meaning as B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX>.
+=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>
+
+causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B<PSS> block
+structure when verifying, like B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO>. When signing, the salt
+length is maximized up to a maximum of the digest length to comply with FIPS
+186-4 section 5.5.
+
=back
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() gets the RSA PSS salt length for I<ctx>.
diff --git a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
index 1ce32cc443..13d053e262 100644
--- a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ Use the maximum salt length.
Auto detect the salt length.
+=item "auto-digestmax" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>)
+
+Auto detect the salt length when verifying. Maximize the salt length up to the
+digest size when signing to comply with FIPS 186-4 section 5.5.
+
=back
=back
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 69c59f0b46..5779f41427 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST "digest"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX "max"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO "auto"
+#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX "auto-digestmax"
/* Key generation parameters */
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS
diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
index a55c9727c6..daf55bc6d4 100644
--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
+++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp);
# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO -2
/* Set salt length to maximum possible */
# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX -3
+/* Auto-detect on verify, set salt length to min(maximum possible, digest
+ * length) on sign */
+# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX -4
/* Old compatible max salt length for sign only */
# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN -2
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
index 0c45008a00..1a787d77db 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ /* Maximum up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
return prsactx;
}
@@ -200,13 +200,27 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
int saltlen = ctx->saltlen;
-
+ int saltlenMax = -1;
+
+ /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
+ * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
+ * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
+ * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
+ *
+ * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
+ * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
- } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
+ }
+ if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md) - 2;
if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
saltlen--;
+ if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
+ saltlen = saltlenMax;
}
if (saltlen < 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -411,8 +425,8 @@ static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
prsactx->operation = operation;
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ /* Maximize up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
@@ -1110,6 +1124,9 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
+ break;
default:
{
int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
@@ -1297,6 +1314,8 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
else
saltlen = atoi(p->data);
break;
@@ -1305,11 +1324,11 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
}
/*
- * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
- * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
- * lowest saltlen number possible.
+ * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
+ * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently lowest
+ * saltlen number possible.
*/
- if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
@@ -1317,6 +1336,7 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
switch (saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH,
"Cannot use autodetected salt length");
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
index e615f1b338..35541aed12 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests with RSA-PSS" => sub {
ok(!run(app(["openssl", "req",
"-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
"-new", "-out", "testreq-rsapss3.pem", "-utf8",
- "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-4",
+ "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-5",
"-key", srctop_file("test", "testrsapss.pem")])),
"Generating request with expected failure");
--
2.38.1

705
0092-provider-improvements.patch
View File

@ -1,705 +0,0 @@
From 98642df4ba886818900ab7e6b23703544e6addd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 10:46:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Propagate selection all the way on key export
EVP_PKEY_eq() is used to check, among other things, if a certificate
public key corresponds to a private key. When the private key belongs to
a provider that does not allow to export private keys this currently
fails as the internal functions used to import/export keys ignored the
selection given (which specifies that only the public key needs to be
considered) and instead tries to export everything.
This patch allows to propagate the selection all the way down including
adding it in the cache so that a following operation actually looking
for other selection parameters does not mistakenly pick up an export
containing only partial information.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
index b06730dc7a..2d0238ee27 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
export_cb, export_cbarg);
}
-void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection)
{
struct evp_keymgmt_util_try_import_data_st import_data;
OP_CACHE_ELEM *op;
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
*/
if (pk->dirty_cnt == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
/* If this key is already exported to |keymgmt|, no more to do */
- op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
+ op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
void *ret = op->keydata;
@@ -157,13 +158,13 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
/* Setup for the export callback */
import_data.keydata = NULL; /* evp_keymgmt_util_try_import will create it */
import_data.keymgmt = keymgmt;
- import_data.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
+ import_data.selection = selection;
/*
* The export function calls the callback (evp_keymgmt_util_try_import),
* which does the import for us. If successful, we're done.
*/
- if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
+ if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, selection,
&evp_keymgmt_util_try_import, &import_data))
/* If there was an error, bail out */
return NULL;
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
return NULL;
}
/* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
- op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
+ op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
if (op != NULL && op->keydata != NULL) {
void *ret = op->keydata;
@@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk, 0);
/* Add the new export to the operation cache */
- if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata)) {
+ if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata,
+ selection)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
evp_keymgmt_freedata(keymgmt, import_data.keydata);
return NULL;
@@ -232,7 +234,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking)
}
OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection)
{
int i, end = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_num(pk->operation_cache);
OP_CACHE_ELEM *p;
@@ -243,14 +246,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
*/
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
p = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_value(pk->operation_cache, i);
- if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt)
+ if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt && (p->selection & selection) == selection)
return p;
}
return NULL;
}
-int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata)
+int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ void *keydata, int selection)
{
OP_CACHE_ELEM *p = NULL;
@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
return 0;
p->keydata = keydata;
p->keymgmt = keymgmt;
+ p->selection = selection;
if (!EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(keymgmt)) {
OPENSSL_free(p);
@@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
ok = 1;
if (keydata1 != NULL) {
tmp_keydata =
- evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2);
+ evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2,
+ selection);
ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
}
if (ok) {
@@ -411,7 +416,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
ok = 1;
if (keydata2 != NULL) {
tmp_keydata =
- evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1);
+ evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1,
+ selection);
ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
}
if (ok) {
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index 70d17ec37e..905e9c9ce4 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -1822,6 +1822,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
{
EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+ int selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
void *keydata = NULL;
int check;
@@ -1883,7 +1884,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(pk->lock))
goto end;
- op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
+ op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt,
+ selection);
/*
* If |tmp_keymgmt| is present in the operation cache, it means
@@ -1938,7 +1940,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt); /* refcnt-- */
/* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
- op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
+ op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
void *tmp_keydata = op->keydata;
@@ -1949,7 +1951,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
}
/* Add the new export to the operation cache */
- if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata)) {
+ if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata,
+ selection)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
keydata = NULL;
@@ -1964,7 +1967,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
}
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
- keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
+ keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
end:
/*
diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
index f601b72807..dbbdcccbda 100644
--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
+++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ int evp_cipher_asn1_to_param_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type,
typedef struct {
EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
void *keydata;
+ int selection;
} OP_CACHE_ELEM;
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OP_CACHE_ELEM)
@@ -778,12 +779,14 @@ EVP_PKEY *evp_keymgmt_util_make_pkey(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
-void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection);
OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection);
int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
-int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
+int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ void *keydata, int selection);
void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
--
2.38.1
From 504427eb5f32108dd64ff7858012863fe47b369b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:58:28 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Update documentation for keymgmt export utils
Change function prototypes and explain how to use the selection
argument.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
diff --git a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
index 1fee9f6ff9..7099e44964 100644
--- a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
+++ b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM
int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
- void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection);
OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ int selection);
int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
- int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
- EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
+ int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+ void *keydata, int selection);
void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
@@ -65,6 +67,11 @@ evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata() can be used to add key object data to a
given key I<target> via a B<EVP_KEYMGMT> interface. This is used as a
helper for L<EVP_PKEY_fromdata(3)>.
+In all functions that take a I<selection> argument, the selection is used to
+constraint the information requested on export. It is also used in the cache
+so that key data is guaranteed to contain all the information requested in
+the selection.
+
=head1 RETURN VALUES
evp_keymgmt_export_to_provider() and evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata()
--
2.38.1
From e5202fbd461cb6c067874987998e91c6093e5267 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 12:18:26 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add test for EVP_PKEY_eq
This tests that the comparison work even if a provider can only return
a public key.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.c b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
index d556551bb6..5e92e72d4b 100644
--- a/test/fake_rsaprov.c
+++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
@@ -22,24 +22,34 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_has;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_query_operation_name_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_query;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_import;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_export;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_load;
static int has_selection;
static int imptypes_selection;
+static int exptypes_selection;
static int query_id;
+struct fake_rsa_keydata {
+ int selection;
+ int status;
+};
+
static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(void *provctx)
{
- unsigned char *keydata = OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *key;
- TEST_ptr(keydata);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(key = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct fake_rsa_keydata))))
+ return NULL;
/* clear test globals */
has_selection = 0;
imptypes_selection = 0;
+ exptypes_selection = 0;
query_id = 0;
- return keydata;
+ return key;
}
static void fake_rsa_keymgmt_free(void *keydata)
@@ -67,14 +77,104 @@ static const char *fake_rsa_keymgmt_query(int id)
static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_import(void *keydata, int selection,
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
{
- unsigned char *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
/* key was imported */
- *fake_rsa_key = 1;
+ fake_rsa_key->status = 1;
return 1;
}
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_n[] =
+ "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
+ "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
+ "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
+ "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
+ "\xF5";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_e[] = "\x11";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_d[] =
+ "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
+ "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
+ "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
+ "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_p[] =
+ "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+ "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
+ "\x0D";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_q[] =
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+ "\x89";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmp1[] =
+ "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
+ "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmq1[] =
+ "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
+ "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
+ "\x51";
+
+static unsigned char fake_rsa_iqmp[] =
+ "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
+ "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
+
+OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv)
+{
+ if (priv) {
+ OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, fake_rsa_d,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_d) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, fake_rsa_p,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_p) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, fake_rsa_q,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_q) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, fake_rsa_dmp1,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_dmp1) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, fake_rsa_dmq1,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_dmq1) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, fake_rsa_iqmp,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_iqmp) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
+ } else {
+ OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
+ sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
+ }
+}
+
+static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_export(void *keydata, int selection,
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *param_callback, void *cbarg)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0)))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = param_callback(params, cbarg);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_import_key_types[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
@@ -95,19 +195,33 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes(int selection)
return fake_rsa_import_key_types;
}
+static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_export_key_types[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes(int selection)
+{
+ /* record global for checking */
+ exptypes_selection = selection;
+
+ return fake_rsa_export_key_types;
+}
+
static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
{
- unsigned char *key = NULL;
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
- if (reference_sz != sizeof(key))
+ if (reference_sz != sizeof(*key))
return NULL;
- key = *(unsigned char **)reference;
- if (*key != 1)
+ key = *(struct fake_rsa_keydata **)reference;
+ if (key->status != 1)
return NULL;
/* detach the reference */
- *(unsigned char **)reference = NULL;
+ *(struct fake_rsa_keydata **)reference = NULL;
return key;
}
@@ -129,7 +243,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
{
unsigned char *gctx = genctx;
static const unsigned char inited[] = { 1 };
- unsigned char *keydata;
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata;
if (!TEST_ptr(gctx)
|| !TEST_mem_eq(gctx, sizeof(*gctx), inited, sizeof(inited)))
@@ -138,7 +252,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
if (!TEST_ptr(keydata = fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(NULL)))
return NULL;
- *keydata = 2;
+ keydata->status = 2;
return keydata;
}
@@ -156,6 +270,9 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH fake_rsa_keymgmt_funcs[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_import },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT_TYPES,
(void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_export },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_TYPES,
+ (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_LOAD, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_load },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_INIT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen },
@@ -191,14 +308,14 @@ static int fake_rsa_sig_sign_init(void *ctx, void *provkey,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
unsigned char *sigctx = ctx;
- unsigned char *keydata = provkey;
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata = provkey;
/* we must have a ctx */
if (!TEST_ptr(sigctx))
return 0;
/* we must have some initialized key */
- if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata[0], 0))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata->status, 0))
return 0;
/* record that sign init was called */
@@ -289,7 +406,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
unsigned char *storectx = loaderctx;
OSSL_PARAM params[4];
int object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY;
- void *key = NULL;
+ struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
int rv = 0;
switch (*storectx) {
@@ -307,7 +424,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
/* The address of the key becomes the octet string */
params[2] =
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_REFERENCE,
- &key, sizeof(key));
+ &key, sizeof(*key));
params[3] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
rv = object_cb(params, object_cbarg);
*storectx = 1;
diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.h b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
index 57de1ecf8d..190c46a285 100644
--- a/test/fake_rsaprov.h
+++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
/* Fake RSA provider implementation */
OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa_start(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
void fake_rsa_finish(OSSL_PROVIDER *p);
+OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv);
diff --git a/test/provider_pkey_test.c b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
index 5c398398f4..3b190baa5e 100644
--- a/test/provider_pkey_test.c
+++ b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
@@ -176,6 +176,67 @@ end:
return ret;
}
+static int test_pkey_eq(void)
+{
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey_fake = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey_dflt = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(fake_rsa = fake_rsa_start(libctx)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(deflt = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "default")))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Construct a public key for fake-rsa */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
+ "provider=fake-rsa"))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_fake, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ params))
+ || !TEST_ptr(pkey_fake))
+ goto end;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ params = NULL;
+
+ /* Construct a public key for default */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
+ "provider=default"))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_dflt, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ params))
+ || !TEST_ptr(pkey_dflt))
+ goto end;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ params = NULL;
+
+ /* now test for equality */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey_fake, pkey_dflt), 1))
+ goto end;
+
+ ret = 1;
+end:
+ fake_rsa_finish(fake_rsa);
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(deflt);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_fake);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_dflt);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int test_pkey_store(int idx)
{
OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
@@ -235,6 +296,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_pkey_sig);
ADD_TEST(test_alternative_keygen_init);
+ ADD_TEST(test_pkey_eq);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_pkey_store, 2);
return 1;
--
2.38.1
From 2fea56832780248af2aba2e4433ece2d18428515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 10:25:15 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Drop explicit check for engines in opt_legacy_okay
The providers indication should always indicate that this is not a
legacy request.
This makes a check for engines redundant as the default return is that
legacy is ok if there are no explicit providers.
Fixes #19662
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19671)
---
apps/lib/apps.c | 8 --------
test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100755 test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
diff --git a/apps/lib/apps.c b/apps/lib/apps.c
index 3d52e030ab7e258f9cd983b2d9755d954cb3aee5..bbe0d009efb35fcf1a902c86cbddc61e657e57f1 100644
--- a/apps/lib/apps.c
+++ b/apps/lib/apps.c
@@ -3405,14 +3405,6 @@ int opt_legacy_okay(void)
{
int provider_options = opt_provider_option_given();
int libctx = app_get0_libctx() != NULL || app_get0_propq() != NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_first();
-
- if (e != NULL) {
- ENGINE_free(e);
- return 1;
- }
-#endif
/*
* Having a provider option specified or a custom library context or
* property query, is a sure sign we're not using legacy.
diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..183499f3fd93f97e8a4a30681a9f383d2f6e0c56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test;
+
+setup("test_legacy");
+
+plan tests => 3;
+
+ok(run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-out', 'rand.txt', '256'])), "Generate random file");
+
+ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', 'rand.txt'])), "Generate a digest");
+
+ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', '-propquery', 'foo=1',
+ 'rand.txt'])), "Fail to generate a digest");
--
2.38.1

281
0101-CVE-2022-4203-nc-match.patch
View File

@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
From c927a3492698c254637da836762f9b1f86cffabc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 08:49:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Fix type confusion in nc_match_single()
This function assumes that if the "gen" is an OtherName, then the "base"
is a rfc822Name constraint. This assumption is not true in all cases.
If the end-entity certificate contains an OtherName SAN of any type besides
SmtpUtf8Mailbox and the CA certificate contains a name constraint of
OtherName (of any type), then "nc_email_eai" will be invoked, with the
OTHERNAME "base" being incorrectly interpreted as a ASN1_IA5STRING.
Reported by Corey Bonnell from Digicert.
CVE-2022-4203
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
index 70a7e8304e..5101598512 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
+static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *sub,
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen);
static int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *sub, const X509_NAME *nm);
static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
@@ -472,14 +473,17 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
{
GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
int i, r, match = 0;
+ int effective_type = gen->type;
+
/*
* We need to compare not gen->type field but an "effective" type because
* the otherName field may contain EAI email address treated specially
* according to RFC 8398, section 6
*/
- int effective_type = ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) &&
- (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
- NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) ? GEN_EMAIL : gen->type;
+ if (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
+ (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) == NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) {
+ effective_type = GEN_EMAIL;
+ }
/*
* Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
@@ -488,7 +492,10 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
- if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
+ if (effective_type != sub->base->type
+ || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
+ OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
+ sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
continue;
if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
@@ -497,7 +504,7 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
continue;
if (match == 0)
match = 1;
- r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+ r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
if (r == X509_V_OK)
match = 2;
else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
@@ -511,12 +518,15 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
- if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
+ if (effective_type != sub->base->type
+ || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
+ OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
+ sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
continue;
if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
- r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+ r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
if (r == X509_V_OK)
return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
@@ -528,15 +538,22 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
}
-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
+static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *gen,
+ GENERAL_NAME *base)
{
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_OTHERNAME:
- /*
- * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
- * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
- */
- return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
+ switch (effective_type) {
+ case GEN_EMAIL:
+ /*
+ * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
+ * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
+ */
+ return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
+
+ default:
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
+ }
case GEN_DIRNAME:
return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
--
2.39.1
From fe6842f5a5dc2fb66da7fb24bf4343a3aeedd50a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 19:45:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/18] Add testcase for nc_match_single type confusion
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
---
test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
test/certs/setup.sh | 11 +++++++++++
test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 5 ++++-
5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
diff --git a/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf279de5ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9b9b07b80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d3e300ac2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
index b9766aab20..2240cd9df0 100755
--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
+++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ REQMASK=MASK:0x800 ./mkcert.sh req badalt7-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 7" \
"email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
"IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+# Certs for CVE-2022-4203 testcase
+
+NC="excluded;otherName:SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org" ./mkcert.sh genca \
+ "Test NC CA othername" nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
+ root-key root-cert
+
+./mkcert.sh req alt-email-key "O = NC email in othername Test Certificate" | \
+ ./mkcert.sh geneealt bad-othername-key bad-othername-cert \
+ nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
+ "otherName.1 = SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org"
+
# RSA-PSS signatures
# SHA1
./mkcert.sh genee PSS-SHA1 ee-key ee-pss-sha1-cert ca-key ca-cert \
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
index 4613489f57..e6a2bca731 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
run(app([@args]));
}
-plan tests => 162;
+plan tests => 163;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
"Name constraints nested DNS name excluded");
+ok(!verify("bad-othername-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["nccaothername-cert"], ),
+ "CVE-2022-4203 type confusion test");
+
#Check that we get the expected failure return code
with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
sub {
--
2.39.1

750
0102-CVE-2022-4304-RSA-time-oracle.patch
View File

@ -1,750 +0,0 @@
From 8e257b86e5812c6e1cfa9e8e5f5660ac7bed899d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:03:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/18] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
crypto/bn/bn_blind.c | 14 -
crypto/bn/bn_local.h | 14 +
crypto/bn/build.info | 2 +-
crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 604 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 19 +-
include/crypto/bn.h | 6 +
6 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index 72457b34cf..6061ebb4c0 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
#define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER 32
-struct bn_blinding_st {
- BIGNUM *A;
- BIGNUM *Ai;
- BIGNUM *e;
- BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- int counter;
- unsigned long flags;
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
- int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
- CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-};
-
BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
{
BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
index c9a7ecf298..8c428f919d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
} cb;
};
+struct bn_blinding_st {
+ BIGNUM *A;
+ BIGNUM *Ai;
+ BIGNUM *e;
+ BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ int counter;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
+ int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
+
/*-
* BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
*
diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
index c4ba51b265..f4ff619239 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/build.info
+++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ $COMMON=bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c \
bn_mod.c bn_conv.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \
bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_sqr.c \
bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
- bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c
+ bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c rsa_sup_mul.c
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON $BNASM bn_print.c bn_err.c bn_srp.c
DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$BNDEF
IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
+#include "internal/endian.h"
+#include "internal/numbers.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+#include "bn_local.h"
+
+# if BN_BYTES == 8
+typedef uint64_t limb_t;
+# if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
+typedef uint128_t limb2_t;
+# define HAVE_LIMB2_T
+# endif
+# define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
+# define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 8
+# elif BN_BYTES == 4
+typedef uint32_t limb_t;
+typedef uint64_t limb2_t;
+# define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 32
+# define LIMB_BYTE_SIZE 4
+# define HAVE_LIMB2_T
+# else
+# error "Not supported"
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * For multiplication we're using schoolbook multiplication,
+ * so if we have two numbers, each with 6 "digits" (words)
+ * the multiplication is calculated as follows:
+ * A B C D E F
+ * x I J K L M N
+ * --------------
+ * N*F
+ * N*E
+ * N*D
+ * N*C
+ * N*B
+ * N*A
+ * M*F
+ * M*E
+ * M*D
+ * M*C
+ * M*B
+ * M*A
+ * L*F
+ * L*E
+ * L*D
+ * L*C
+ * L*B
+ * L*A
+ * K*F
+ * K*E
+ * K*D
+ * K*C
+ * K*B
+ * K*A
+ * J*F
+ * J*E
+ * J*D
+ * J*C
+ * J*B
+ * J*A
+ * I*F
+ * I*E
+ * I*D
+ * I*C
+ * I*B
+ * + I*A
+ * ==========================
+ * N*B N*D N*F
+ * + N*A N*C N*E
+ * + M*B M*D M*F
+ * + M*A M*C M*E
+ * + L*B L*D L*F
+ * + L*A L*C L*E
+ * + K*B K*D K*F
+ * + K*A K*C K*E
+ * + J*B J*D J*F
+ * + J*A J*C J*E
+ * + I*B I*D I*F
+ * + I*A I*C I*E
+ *
+ * 1+1 1+3 1+5
+ * 1+0 1+2 1+4
+ * 0+1 0+3 0+5
+ * 0+0 0+2 0+4
+ *
+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
+ * which requires n^2 multiplications and 2n full length additions
+ * as we can keep every other result of limb multiplication in two separate
+ * limbs
+ */
+
+#if defined HAVE_LIMB2_T
+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
+{
+ limb2_t t;
+ /*
+ * this is idiomatic code to tell compiler to use the native mul
+ * those three lines will actually compile to single instruction
+ */
+
+ t = (limb2_t)a * b;
+ *hi = t >> LIMB_BIT_SIZE;
+ *lo = (limb_t)t;
+}
+#elif (BN_BYTES == 8) && (defined _MSC_VER)
+/* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/intrinsics/umul128?view=msvc-170 */
+#pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
+{
+ *lo = _umul128(a, b, hi);
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * if the compiler doesn't have either a 128bit data type nor a "return
+ * high 64 bits of multiplication"
+ */
+static ossl_inline void _mul_limb(limb_t *hi, limb_t *lo, limb_t a, limb_t b)
+{
+ limb_t a_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)a;
+ limb_t a_hi = a >> 32;
+ limb_t b_low = (limb_t)(uint32_t)b;
+ limb_t b_hi = b >> 32;
+
+ limb_t p0 = a_low * b_low;
+ limb_t p1 = a_low * b_hi;
+ limb_t p2 = a_hi * b_low;
+ limb_t p3 = a_hi * b_hi;
+
+ uint32_t cy = (uint32_t)(((p0 >> 32) + (uint32_t)p1 + (uint32_t)p2) >> 32);
+
+ *lo = p0 + (p1 << 32) + (p2 << 32);
+ *hi = p3 + (p1 >> 32) + (p2 >> 32) + cy;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* add two limbs with carry in, return carry out */
+static ossl_inline limb_t _add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t carry)
+{
+ limb_t carry1, carry2, t;
+ /*
+ * `c = a + b; if (c < a)` is idiomatic code that makes compilers
+ * use add with carry on assembly level
+ */
+
+ *ret = a + carry;
+ if (*ret < a)
+ carry1 = 1;
+ else
+ carry1 = 0;
+
+ t = *ret;
+ *ret = t + b;
+ if (*ret < t)
+ carry2 = 1;
+ else
+ carry2 = 0;
+
+ return carry1 + carry2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * add two numbers of the same size, return overflow
+ *
+ * add a to b, place result in ret; all arrays need to be n limbs long
+ * return overflow from addition (0 or 1)
+ */
+static ossl_inline limb_t add(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t c = 0;
+ ossl_ssize_t i;
+
+ for(i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
+ c = _add_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], c);
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return number of limbs necessary for temporary values
+ * when multiplying numbers n limbs large
+ */
+static ossl_inline size_t mul_limb_numb(size_t n)
+{
+ return 2 * n * 2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * multiply two numbers of the same size
+ *
+ * multiply a by b, place result in ret; a and b need to be n limbs long
+ * ret needs to be 2*n limbs long, tmp needs to be mul_limb_numb(n) limbs
+ * long
+ */
+static void limb_mul(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
+ size_t i, j, k;
+
+ r_odd = tmp;
+ r_even = &tmp[2 * n];
+
+ memset(ret, 0, 2 * n * sizeof(limb_t));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ for (k = 0; k < i + n + 1; k++) {
+ r_even[k] = 0;
+ r_odd[k] = 0;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
+ /*
+ * place results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays so that
+ * we don't have to calculate overflow every time we get individual
+ * limb multiplication result
+ */
+ if (j % 2 == 0)
+ _mul_limb(&r_even[i + j], &r_even[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
+ else
+ _mul_limb(&r_odd[i + j], &r_odd[i + j + 1], a[i], b[j]);
+ }
+ /*
+ * skip the least significant limbs when adding multiples of
+ * more significant limbs (they're zero anyway)
+ */
+ add(ret, ret, r_even, n + i + 1);
+ add(ret, ret, r_odd, n + i + 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/* modifies the value in place by performing a right shift by one bit */
+static ossl_inline void rshift1(limb_t *val, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t shift_in = 0, shift_out = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ shift_out = val[i] & 1;
+ val[i] = shift_in << (LIMB_BIT_SIZE - 1) | (val[i] >> 1);
+ shift_in = shift_out;
+ }
+}
+
+/* extend the LSB of flag to all bits of limb */
+static ossl_inline limb_t mk_mask(limb_t flag)
+{
+ flag |= flag << 1;
+ flag |= flag << 2;
+ flag |= flag << 4;
+ flag |= flag << 8;
+ flag |= flag << 16;
+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
+ flag |= flag << 32;
+#endif
+ return flag;
+}
+
+/*
+ * copy from either a or b to ret based on flag
+ * when flag == 0, then copies from b
+ * when flag == 1, then copies from a
+ */
+static ossl_inline void cselect(limb_t flag, limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ /*
+ * would be more efficient with non volatile mask, but then gcc
+ * generates code with jumps
+ */
+ volatile limb_t mask;
+ size_t i;
+
+ mask = mk_mask(flag);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+#if (LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8)
+ ret[i] = constant_time_select_64(mask, a[i], b[i]);
+#else
+ ret[i] = constant_time_select_32(mask, a[i], b[i]);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static limb_t _sub_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t a, limb_t b, limb_t borrow)
+{
+ limb_t borrow1, borrow2, t;
+ /*
+ * while it doesn't look constant-time, this is idiomatic code
+ * to tell compilers to use the carry bit from subtraction
+ */
+
+ *ret = a - borrow;
+ if (*ret > a)
+ borrow1 = 1;
+ else
+ borrow1 = 0;
+
+ t = *ret;
+ *ret = t - b;
+ if (*ret > t)
+ borrow2 = 1;
+ else
+ borrow2 = 0;
+
+ return borrow1 + borrow2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * place the result of a - b into ret, return the borrow bit.
+ * All arrays need to be n limbs long
+ */
+static limb_t sub(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, limb_t *b, size_t n)
+{
+ limb_t borrow = 0;
+ ossl_ssize_t i;
+
+ for (i = n - 1; i > -1; i--)
+ borrow = _sub_limb(&ret[i], a[i], b[i], borrow);
+
+ return borrow;
+}
+
+/* return the number of limbs necessary to allocate for the mod() tmp operand */
+static ossl_inline size_t mod_limb_numb(size_t anum, size_t modnum)
+{
+ return (anum + modnum) * 3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate a % mod, place the result in ret
+ * size of a is defined by anum, size of ret and mod is modnum,
+ * size of tmp is returned by mod_limb_numb()
+ */
+static void mod(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
+ size_t modnum, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t *atmp, *modtmp, *rettmp;
+ limb_t res;
+ size_t i;
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, mod_limb_numb(anum, modnum) * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+
+ atmp = tmp;
+ modtmp = &tmp[anum + modnum];
+ rettmp = &tmp[(anum + modnum) * 2];
+
+ for (i = modnum; i <modnum + anum; i++)
+ atmp[i] = a[i-modnum];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < modnum; i++)
+ modtmp[i] = mod[i];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < anum * LIMB_BIT_SIZE; i++) {
+ rshift1(modtmp, anum + modnum);
+ res = sub(rettmp, atmp, modtmp, anum+modnum);
+ cselect(res, atmp, atmp, rettmp, anum+modnum);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ret, &atmp[anum], sizeof(limb_t) * modnum);
+}
+
+/* necessary size of tmp for a _mul_add_limb() call with provided anum */
+static ossl_inline size_t _mul_add_limb_numb(size_t anum)
+{
+ return 2 * (anum + 1);
+}
+
+/* multiply a by m, add to ret, return carry */
+static limb_t _mul_add_limb(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum,
+ limb_t m, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t carry = 0;
+ limb_t *r_odd, *r_even;
+ size_t i;
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (anum + 1) * 2);
+
+ r_odd = tmp;
+ r_even = &tmp[anum + 1];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < anum; i++) {
+ /*
+ * place the results from even and odd limbs in separate arrays
+ * so that we have to worry about carry just once
+ */
+ if (i % 2 == 0)
+ _mul_limb(&r_even[i], &r_even[i + 1], a[i], m);
+ else
+ _mul_limb(&r_odd[i], &r_odd[i + 1], a[i], m);
+ }
+ /* assert: add() carry here will be equal zero */
+ add(r_even, r_even, r_odd, anum + 1);
+ /*
+ * while here it will not overflow as the max value from multiplication
+ * is -2 while max overflow from addition is 1, so the max value of
+ * carry is -1 (i.e. max int)
+ */
+ carry = add(ret, ret, &r_even[1], anum) + r_even[0];
+
+ return carry;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline size_t mod_montgomery_limb_numb(size_t modnum)
+{
+ return modnum * 2 + _mul_add_limb_numb(modnum);
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate a % mod, place result in ret
+ * assumes that a is in Montgomery form with the R (Montgomery modulus) being
+ * smallest power of two big enough to fit mod and that's also a power
+ * of the count of number of bits in limb_t (B).
+ * For calculation, we also need n', such that mod * n' == -1 mod B.
+ * anum must be <= 2 * modnum
+ * ret needs to be modnum words long
+ * tmp needs to be mod_montgomery_limb_numb(modnum) limbs long
+ */
+static void mod_montgomery(limb_t *ret, limb_t *a, size_t anum, limb_t *mod,
+ size_t modnum, limb_t ni0, limb_t *tmp)
+{
+ limb_t carry, v;
+ limb_t *res, *rp, *tmp2;
+ ossl_ssize_t i;
+
+ res = tmp;
+ /*
+ * for intermediate result we need an integer twice as long as modulus
+ * but keep the input in the least significant limbs
+ */
+ memset(res, 0, sizeof(limb_t) * (modnum * 2));
+ memcpy(&res[modnum * 2 - anum], a, sizeof(limb_t) * anum);
+ rp = &res[modnum];
+ tmp2 = &res[modnum * 2];
+
+ carry = 0;
+
+ /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
+ for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
+ v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum-1] * ni0, tmp2);
+ v = v + carry + rp[-1];
+ carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
+ carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
+ rp[-1] = v;
+ }
+
+ /* perform the final reduction by mod... */
+ carry -= sub(ret, rp, mod, modnum);
+
+ /* ...conditionally */
+ cselect(carry, ret, rp, ret, modnum);
+}
+
+/* allocated buffer should be freed afterwards */
+static void BN_to_limb(const BIGNUM *bn, limb_t *buf, size_t limbs)
+{
+ int i;
+ int real_limbs = (BN_num_bytes(bn) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
+ limb_t *ptr = buf + (limbs - real_limbs);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < real_limbs; i++)
+ ptr[i] = bn->d[real_limbs - i - 1];
+}
+
+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
+static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
+{
+ uint64_t big = 0;
+ DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
+
+ if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+ return host;
+
+ big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
+ big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
+ big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
+ big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >> 8;
+ big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) << 8;
+ big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
+ big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
+ big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
+ return big;
+}
+
+#else
+/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
+static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
+{
+ uint32_t big = 0;
+ DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
+
+ if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+ return host;
+
+ big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+ big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
+ big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
+ big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
+ return big;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We assume that intermediate, possible_arg2, blinding, and ctx are used
+ * similar to BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() arguments.
+ * to_mod is RSA modulus.
+ * buf and num is the serialization buffer and its length.
+ *
+ * Here we use classic/Montgomery multiplication and modulo. After the calculation finished
+ * we serialize the new structure instead of BIGNUMs taking endianness into account.
+ */
+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
+ const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
+ const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
+ const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ limb_t *l_im = NULL, *l_mul = NULL, *l_mod = NULL;
+ limb_t *l_ret = NULL, *l_tmp = NULL, l_buf;
+ size_t l_im_count = 0, l_mul_count = 0, l_size = 0, l_mod_count = 0;
+ size_t l_tmp_count = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ const BIGNUM *arg1 = intermediate;
+ const BIGNUM *arg2 = (possible_arg2 == NULL) ? blinding->Ai : possible_arg2;
+
+ l_im_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg1) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
+ l_mul_count = (BN_num_bytes(arg2) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
+ l_mod_count = (BN_num_bytes(to_mod) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - 1) / LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
+
+ l_size = l_im_count > l_mul_count ? l_im_count : l_mul_count;
+ l_im = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+ l_mul = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+ l_mod = OPENSSL_zalloc(l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+
+ if ((l_im == NULL) || (l_mul == NULL) || (l_mod == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_to_limb(arg1, l_im, l_size);
+ BN_to_limb(arg2, l_mul, l_size);
+ BN_to_limb(to_mod, l_mod, l_mod_count);
+
+ l_ret = OPENSSL_malloc(2 * l_size * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+
+ if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
+ l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count) ?
+ mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_montgomery_limb_numb(l_mod_count);
+ l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ l_tmp_count = mul_limb_numb(l_size) > mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count) ?
+ mul_limb_numb(l_size) : mod_limb_numb(2 * l_size, l_mod_count);
+ l_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(l_tmp_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ if ((l_ret == NULL) || (l_tmp == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (blinding->m_ctx != NULL) {
+ limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
+ mod_montgomery(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count,
+ blinding->m_ctx->n0[0], l_tmp);
+ } else {
+ limb_mul(l_ret, l_im, l_mul, l_size, l_tmp);
+ mod(l_ret, l_ret, 2 * l_size, l_mod, l_mod_count, l_tmp);
+ }
+
+ /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
+ if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0, num);
+ tmp = buf + num - BN_num_bytes(to_mod);
+ for (i = 0; i < l_mod_count; i++) {
+#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
+ l_buf = be64(l_ret[i]);
+#else
+ l_buf = be32(l_ret[i]);
+#endif
+ if (i == 0) {
+ int delta = LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - ((l_mod_count * LIMB_BYTE_SIZE) - num);
+
+ memcpy(tmp, ((char *)&l_buf) + LIMB_BYTE_SIZE - delta, delta);
+ tmp += delta;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp, &l_buf, LIMB_BYTE_SIZE);
+ tmp += LIMB_BYTE_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = num;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(l_im);
+ OPENSSL_free(l_mul);
+ OPENSSL_free(l_mod);
+ OPENSSL_free(l_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_free(l_ret);
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
index 381c659352..7e8b791fba 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
@@ -469,13 +469,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
BN_free(d);
}
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ if (blinding) {
+ /*
+ * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
+ * 0-padded BN BE serialization
+ */
+ j = ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(ret, blinding, unblind, rsa->n, ctx,
+ buf, num);
+ if (j == 0)
goto err;
-
- j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
- if (j < 0)
- goto err;
+ } else {
+ j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
index cf69bea848..cd45654210 100644
--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
@@ -114,4 +114,10 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_bn_get_libctx(BN_CTX *ctx);
extern const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2;
+int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
+ const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
+ const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
+ const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, int num);
+
#endif
--
2.39.1

106
0103-CVE-2022-4450-pem-read-bio.patch
View File

@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
From 63bcf189be73a9cc1264059bed6f57974be74a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/18] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
PEM_read_bio_ex
In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
free if the caller frees them even on failure.
Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.
Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.
CVE-2022-4450
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
---
crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index f9ff80162a..85c47fb627 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -989,7 +989,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
out_free:
pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
+ *header = NULL;
pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
+ *data = NULL;
end:
EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
pem_free(name, flags, 0);
--
2.39.1
From cbafa34b5a057794c5c08cd4657038e1f643c1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/18] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
error.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
---
test/pemtest.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
index a8d2d49bb5..a5d28cb256 100644
--- a/test/pemtest.c
+++ b/test/pemtest.c
@@ -96,6 +96,35 @@ static int test_cert_key_cert(void)
return 1;
}
+static int test_empty_payload(void)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ static char *emptypay =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "-\n" /* Base64 EOF character */
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
+ char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ long len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ b = BIO_new_mem_buf(emptypay, strlen(emptypay));
+ if (!TEST_ptr(b))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Expected to fail because the payload is empty */
+ if (!TEST_false(PEM_read_bio_ex(b, &name, &header, &data, &len, 0)))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(name);
+ OPENSSL_free(header);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
if (!TEST_ptr(pemfile = test_get_argument(0)))
@@ -103,5 +132,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
ADD_TEST(test_cert_key_cert);
+ ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
return 1;
}
--
2.39.1

187
0104-CVE-2023-0215-UAF-bio.patch
View File

@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
From 8818064ce3c3c0f1b740a5aaba2a987e75bfbafd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 16:18:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
BIO is eventually freed.
Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
Buehler.
Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
index d94e3a3644..b9df3a7a47 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -49,13 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
void *parg);
-/* unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream() */
+/*
+ * On success, the returned BIO owns the input BIO as part of its BIO chain.
+ * On failure, NULL is returned and the input BIO is owned by the caller.
+ *
+ * Unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream()
+ */
BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL;
BIO *asn_bio = NULL;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
+ BIO *pop_bio = NULL;
if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
@@ -70,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
if (out == NULL)
goto err;
+ pop_bio = asn_bio;
- BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free);
- BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free);
+ if (BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free) <= 0
+ || BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free) <= 0
+ || BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux) <= 0)
+ goto err;
/*
- * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure
- * needs.
+ * Now let the callback prepend any digest, cipher, etc., that the BIO's
+ * ASN1 structure needs.
*/
sarg.out = out;
sarg.ndef_bio = NULL;
sarg.boundary = NULL;
- if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
+ /*
+ * The asn1_cb(), must not have mutated asn_bio on error, leaving it in the
+ * middle of some partially built, but not returned BIO chain.
+ */
+ if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * ndef_aux is now owned by asn_bio so we must not free it in the err
+ * clean up block
+ */
+ ndef_aux = NULL;
goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We must not fail now because the callback has prepended additional
+ * BIOs to the chain
+ */
ndef_aux->val = val;
ndef_aux->it = it;
@@ -92,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
ndef_aux->out = out;
- BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux);
-
return sarg.ndef_bio;
err:
+ /* BIO_pop() is NULL safe */
+ (void)BIO_pop(pop_bio);
BIO_free(asn_bio);
OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux);
return NULL;
--
2.39.1
From f596ec8a6f9f5fcfa8e46a73b60f78a609725294 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/18] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
handled correctly
Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
test/recipes/80-test_cms.t | 15 +++++++++++++--
test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
index 610f1cbc51..fd53683e6b 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
use POSIX;
use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with/;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
$no_rc2 = 1 if disabled("legacy");
-plan tests => 12;
+plan tests => 13;
ok(run(test(["pkcs7_test"])), "test pkcs7");
@@ -972,3 +972,14 @@ ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-verify',
return "";
}
+
+# Check that we get the expected failure return code
+with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 6; } },
+ sub {
+ ok(run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-encrypt',
+ '-in', srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"),
+ '-stream', '-recip',
+ srctop_file("test/smime-certs", "badrsa.pem"),
+ ])),
+ "Check failure during BIO setup with -stream is handled correctly");
+ });
diff --git a/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f824fc2267
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDbTCCAlWgAwIBAgIToTV4Z0iuK08vZP20oTh//hC8BDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FADAtMSswKQYD
+VfcDEyJTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgQXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTE5MTEyMDA2NTQxOFoY
+DzIwNTIwOTI3MDY1NDE4WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5BbGljZSBMb3ZlbGFjZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN
+AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALT0iehYOBY+TZp/T5K2KNI05Hwr+E3wP6XTvyi6WWyTgBK9LCOw
+I2juwdRrjFBmXkk7pWpjXwsA3A5GOtz0FpfgyC7OxsVcF7q4WHWZWleYXFKlQHJD73nQwXP968+A
+/3rBX7PhO0DBbZnfitOLPgPEwjTtdg0VQQ6Wz+CRQ/YbHPKaw7aRphZO63dKvIKp4cQVtkWQHi6s
+yTjGsgkLcLNau5LZDQUdsGV+SAo3nBdWCRYV+I65x8Kf4hCxqqmjV3d/2NKRu0BXnDe/N+iDz3X0
+zEoj0fqXgq4SWcC0nsG1lyyXt1TL270I6ATKRGJWiQVCCpDtc0NT6vdJ45bCSxgCAwEAAaOBlzCB
+lDAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB4GA1UdEQQXMBWBE2FsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGUwEwYDVR0lBAww
+CgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDwYDVR0PAQH/BAUDAwfAADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUu/bMsi0dBhIcl64papAQ0yBm
+ZnMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUeF8OWnjYa+RUcD2z3ez38fL6wEcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggEBABbW
+eonR6TMTckehDKNOabwaCIcekahAIL6l9tTzUX5ew6ufiAPlC6I/zQlmUaU0iSyFDG1NW14kNbFt
+5CAokyLhMtE4ASHBIHbiOp/ZSbUBTVYJZB61ot7w1/ol5QECSs08b8zrxIncf+t2DHGuVEy/Qq1d
+rBz8d4ay8zpqAE1tUyL5Da6ZiKUfWwZQXSI/JlbjQFzYQqTRDnzHWrg1xPeMTO1P2/cplFaseTiv
+yk4cYwOp/W9UAWymOZXF8WcJYCIUXkdcG/nEZxr057KlScrJmFXOoh7Y+8ON4iWYYcAfiNgpUFo/
+j8BAwrKKaFvdlZS9k1Ypb2+UQY75mKJE9Bg=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
--
2.39.1

110
0105-CVE-2023-0216-pkcs7-deref.patch
View File

@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
From 934a04f0e775309cadbef0aa6b9692e1b12a76c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:45:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/18] Do not dereference PKCS7 object data if not set
Fixes CVE-2023-0216
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
index 753f1276e6..936e50da54 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -414,6 +414,8 @@ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
{
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
return p7->d.sign->cert;
if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
@@ -423,6 +425,8 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
static STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *pkcs7_get_recipient_info(const PKCS7 *p7)
{
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
return p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
if (PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7))
@@ -440,13 +444,17 @@ void ossl_pkcs7_resolve_libctx(PKCS7 *p7)
const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx);
const char *propq = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_propq(ctx);
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
- if (ctx == NULL)
+ if (ctx == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
return;
+ rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
+ sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
+ certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
ossl_x509_set0_libctx(sk_X509_value(certs, i), libctx, propq);
--
2.39.1
From 67813d8a4d110f4174bbd2fee8a2f15388e324b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:56:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/18] Add test for d2i_PKCS7 NULL dereference
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t | 7 +++++--
test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 | 3 +++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
index 37cd43dc6b..d61cd6abad 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use strict;
use warnings;
use File::Spec;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file data_file/;
setup("test_pkcs7");
-plan tests => 3;
+plan tests => 4;
require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@ subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7d' => sub {
tconversion( -type => 'p7d', -in => srctop_file("test", "pkcs7-1.pem"),
-args => ["pkcs7"] );
};
+
+my $malformed = data_file('malformed.pkcs7');
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs7", "-in", $malformed])));
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e30d1b582c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
+MAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAg==
+-----END PKCS7-----
--
2.39.1

404
0106-CVE-2023-0217-dsa.patch
View File

@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
From 23985bac83fd50c8e29431009302b5442f985096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: slontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:05:04 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Fix NULL deference when validating FFC public key.
Fixes CVE-2023-0217
When attempting to do a BN_Copy of params->p there was no NULL check.
Since BN_copy does not check for NULL this is a NULL reference.
As an aside BN_cmp() does do a NULL check, so there are other checks
that fail because a NULL is passed. A more general check for NULL params
has been added for both FFC public and private key validation instead.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c | 9 +++++++++
include/internal/ffc.h | 1 +
test/ffc_internal_test.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
index 9f6525a2c8..442303e4b3 100644
--- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
+++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(const FFC_PARAMS *params,
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
+ if (params == NULL || pub_key == NULL || params->p == NULL) {
+ *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(NULL);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -107,6 +112,10 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(const BIGNUM *upper, const BIGNUM *priv,
*ret = 0;
+ if (priv == NULL || upper == NULL) {
+ *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (BN_cmp(priv, BN_value_one()) < 0) {
*ret |= FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL;
goto err;
diff --git a/include/internal/ffc.h b/include/internal/ffc.h
index 732514a6c2..b8b7140857 100644
--- a/include/internal/ffc.h
+++ b/include/internal/ffc.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
# define FFC_ERROR_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
# define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x10
# define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x20
+# define FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM 0x40
/*
* Finite field cryptography (FFC) domain parameters are used by DH and DSA.
diff --git a/test/ffc_internal_test.c b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
index 2c97293573..9f67bd29b9 100644
--- a/test/ffc_internal_test.c
+++ b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
@@ -510,6 +510,27 @@ static int ffc_public_validate_test(void)
if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
goto err;
+ /* Fail if params is NULL */
+ if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(NULL, pub, &res)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
+ goto err;
+ res = -1;
+ /* Fail if pubkey is NULL */
+ if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, NULL, &res)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
+ goto err;
+ res = -1;
+
+ BN_free(params->p);
+ params->p = NULL;
+ /* Fail if params->p is NULL */
+ if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
+ goto err;
+
ret = 1;
err:
DH_free(dh);
@@ -567,6 +588,16 @@ static int ffc_private_validate_test(void)
if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, priv, &res)))
goto err;
+ if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(NULL, priv, &res)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
+ goto err;
+ res = -1;
+ if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, NULL, &res)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
+ goto err;
+
ret = 1;
err:
DH_free(dh);
--
2.39.1
From c1b4467a7cc129a74fc5205b80a5c47556b99416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:57:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/18] Prevent creating DSA and DH keys without parameters
through import
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c | 4 ++--
providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
index 58a5fd009f..c2d87b4a7f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ static int dh_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
return 0;
- if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
- ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
+ /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
+ ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
int include_private =
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
index 100e917167..881680c085 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -199,8 +199,9 @@ static int dsa_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
return 0;
- if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
- ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
+ /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
+ ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
+
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
int include_private =
selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY ? 1 : 0;
--
2.39.1
From fab4973801bdc11c29c4c8ccf65cf39cbc63ce9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:59:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/18] Do not create DSA keys without parameters by decoder
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/x509.h | 3 +++
.../encode_decode/decode_der2key.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
index bc90ddd89b..77790faa1f 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -745,6 +745,30 @@ DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
return key;
}
+/* Called from decoders; disallows provided DSA keys without parameters. */
+DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ DSA *key = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
+
+ data = *pp;
+ key = d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(NULL, &data, length);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ DSA_get0_pqg(key, &p, &q, &g);
+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL) {
+ DSA_free(key);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *pp = data;
+ if (a != NULL) {
+ DSA_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
index 1f00178e89..0c42730ee9 100644
--- a/include/crypto/x509.h
+++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
@@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ void ossl_X509_PUBKEY_INTERNAL_free(X509_PUBKEY *xpub);
RSA *ossl_d2i_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int ossl_i2d_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ossl_d2i_DH_PUBKEY(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int ossl_i2d_DH_PUBKEY(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
index ebc2d24833..d6ad738ef3 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void *dsa_d2i_PKCS8(void **key, const unsigned char **der, long der_len,
(key_from_pkcs8_t *)ossl_dsa_key_from_pkcs8);
}
-# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY (d2i_of_void *)d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
+# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY (d2i_of_void *)ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
# define dsa_free (free_key_fn *)DSA_free
# define dsa_check NULL
--
2.39.1
From 7e37185582995b35f885fec9dcc3670af9ffcbef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 18:46:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 13/18] Add test for DSA pubkey without param import and check
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t | 48 ++++++++++++++----
.../91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem | 12 +++++
.../dsapub_noparam.der | Bin 0 -> 108 bytes
3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
index 612a3e3d6c..015d7805db 100644
--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
@@ -11,19 +11,24 @@ use strict;
use warnings;
use File::Spec;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file with/;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
sub pkey_check {
my $f = shift;
+ my $pubcheck = shift;
+ my @checkopt = ('-check');
- return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', '-check', '-text',
+ @checkopt = ('-pubcheck', '-pubin') if $pubcheck;
+
+ return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', @checkopt, '-text',
'-in', $f]));
}
sub check_key {
my $f = shift;
my $should_fail = shift;
+ my $pubcheck = shift;
my $str;
@@ -33,11 +38,10 @@ sub check_key {
$f = data_file($f);
if ( -s $f ) {
- if ($should_fail) {
- ok(!pkey_check($f), $str);
- } else {
- ok(pkey_check($f), $str);
- }
+ with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == $should_fail; } },
+ sub {
+ ok(pkey_check($f, $pubcheck), $str);
+ });
} else {
fail("Missing file $f");
}
@@ -66,15 +70,37 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
"dhpkey.pem"
)) unless disabled("dh");
+my @negative_pubtests = ();
+
+push(@negative_pubtests, (
+ "dsapub_noparam.der"
+ )) unless disabled("dsa");
+
+my @positive_pubtests = ();
+
+push(@positive_pubtests, (
+ "dsapub.pem"
+ )) unless disabled("dsa");
+
plan skip_all => "No tests within the current enabled feature set"
- unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests;
+ unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests
+ && @negative_pubtests && @positive_pubtests;
-plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests);
+plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests)
+ + scalar(@negative_pubtests) + scalar(@positive_pubtests);
foreach my $t (@negative_tests) {
- check_key($t, 1);
+ check_key($t, 1, 0);
}
foreach my $t (@positive_tests) {
- check_key($t, 0);
+ check_key($t, 0, 0);
+}
+
+foreach my $t (@negative_pubtests) {
+ check_key($t, 1, 1);
+}
+
+foreach my $t (@positive_pubtests) {
+ check_key($t, 0, 1);
}
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ff4bd83ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBvzCCATQGByqGSM44BAEwggEnAoGBAIjbXpOVVciVNuagg26annKkghIIZFI4
+4WdMomnV+I/oXyxHbZTBBBpW9xy/E1+yMjbp4GmX+VxyDj3WxUWxXllzL+miEkzD
+9Xz638VzIBhjFbMvk1/N4kS4bKVUd9yk7HfvYzAdnRphk0WI+RoDiDrBNPPxSoQD
+CEWgvwgsLIDhAh0A6dbz1IQpQwGF4+Ca28x6OO+UfJJv3ggeZ++fNwKBgQCA9XKV
+lRrTY8ALBxS0KbZjpaIXuUj5nr3i1lIDyP3ISksDF0ekyLtn6eK9VijX6Pm65Np+
+4ic9Nr5WKLKhPaUSpLNRx1gDqo3sd92hYgiEUifzEuhLYfK/CsgFED+l2hDXtJUq
+bISNSHVwI5lsyNXLu7HI1Fk8F5UO3LqsboFAngOBhAACgYATxFY89nEYcUhgHGgr
+YDHhXBQfMKnTKYdvon4DN7WQ9ip+t4VUsLpTD1ZE9zrM2R/B04+8C6KGoViwyeER
+kS4dxWOkX71x4X2DlNpYevcR53tNcTDqmMD7YKfDDmrb0lftMyfW8aESaiymVMys
+DRjhKHBjdo0rZeSM8DAk3ctrXA==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8135f1ca94da914b6829421e0c13f6daa731862
GIT binary patch
literal 108
zcmXpIGT>xm*J|@PXTieE%*wz71<Xv0AT}3_&&0^YB*etj0OvEYF$n`XLd*y;pgagL
U3o&W4F|x9<gY>|F5F-Nv0Bz9(=Kufz
literal 0
HcmV?d00001
--
2.39.1
From 2ad9928170768653d19d81881deabc5f9c1665c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 14:57:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] Internaly declare the DSA type for no-deprecated builds
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a21a1b5fa2dac438892cf3292d1f9c445d870d9)
---
include/crypto/types.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/crypto/types.h b/include/crypto/types.h
index 0d81404091..0a75f03a3f 100644
--- a/include/crypto/types.h
+++ b/include/crypto/types.h
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD;
typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
+# endif
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
--
2.39.1

63
0107-CVE-2023-0286-X400.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 2f7530077e0ef79d98718138716bc51ca0cad658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:45:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 14/18] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
(3.0)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
---
CHANGES.md | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/x509/v3_genn.c | 2 +-
include/openssl/x509v3.h.in | 2 +-
test/v3nametest.c | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
index c0a7166cd0..1741c2d2f6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case GEN_X400:
- result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
+ result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
break;
case GEN_EDIPARTY:
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in b/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
index d00a66a343..c087e3cf92 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
+++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
OTHERNAME *otherName; /* otherName */
ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
- ASN1_TYPE *x400Address;
+ ASN1_STRING *x400Address;
X509_NAME *directoryName;
EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
index 6d2e2f8e27..0341995dde 100644
--- a/test/v3nametest.c
+++ b/test/v3nametest.c
@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
},
15
+ }, {
+ /*
+ * Regression test for CVE-2023-0286.
+ */
+ {
+ 0xa3, 0x00
+ },
+ 2
}
};
--
2.39.1

150
0108-CVE-2023-0401-pkcs7-md.patch
View File

@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
From d3b6dfd70db844c4499bec6ad6601623a565e674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 09:27:53 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] pk7_doit.c: Check return of BIO_set_md() calls
These calls invoke EVP_DigestInit() which can fail for digests
with implicit fetches. Subsequent EVP_DigestUpdate() from BIO_write()
or EVP_DigestFinal() from BIO_read() will segfault on NULL
dereference. This can be triggered by an attacker providing
PKCS7 data digested with MD4 for example if the legacy provider
is not loaded.
If BIO_set_md() fails the md BIO cannot be used.
CVE-2023-0401
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
---
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index bde9ac4787..5e562fbea5 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ static int pkcs7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg,
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
- BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
+ if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ EVP_MD_free(fetched);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_MD_free(fetched);
if (*pbio == NULL)
*pbio = btmp;
@@ -522,7 +526,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
- BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
+ if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
if (out == NULL)
out = btmp;
--
2.39.1
From a0f2359613f50b5ca6b74b78bf4b54d7dc925fd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 17:07:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] Add testcase for missing return check of BIO_set_md()
calls
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
---
test/recipes/80-test_cms.t | 15 ++++++++--
test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
index fd53683e6b..d45789de70 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
use POSIX;
use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with data_file/;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
$no_rc2 = 1 if disabled("legacy");
-plan tests => 13;
+plan tests => 14;
ok(run(test(["pkcs7_test"])), "test pkcs7");
@@ -941,6 +941,17 @@ subtest "CMS binary input tests\n" => sub {
"verify binary input with -binary missing -crlfeol");
};
+# Test case for missing MD algorithm (must not segfault)
+
+with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 4; } },
+ sub {
+ ok(run(app(['openssl', 'smime', '-verify', '-noverify',
+ '-inform', 'PEM',
+ '-in', data_file("pkcs7-md4.pem"),
+ ])),
+ "Check failure of EVP_DigestInit is handled correctly");
+ });
+
sub check_availability {
my $tnam = shift;
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecff611deb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
+MIIFhAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIFdTCCBXECAQExDjAMBggqhkiG9w0CBAUAMB0GCSqG
+SIb3DQEHAaAQBA5UZXN0IGNvbnRlbnQNCqCCAyQwggMgMIICCKADAgECAgECMA0G
+CSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMA0xCzAJBgNVBAMMAkNBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIx
+MTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTCCASIwDQYJ
+KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKj/iVhhha7e2ywP1XP74reoG3p1YCvU
+fTxzdrWu3pMvfySQbckc9Io4zZ+igBZWy7Qsu5PlFx//DcZD/jE0+CjYdemju4iC
+76Ny4lNiBUVN4DGX76qdENJYDZ4GnjK7GwhWXWUPP2aOwjagEf/AWTX9SRzdHEIz
+BniuBDgj5ed1Z9OUrVqpQB+sWRD1DMFkrUrExjVTs5ZqghsVi9GZq+Seb5Sq0pbl
+V/uMkWSKPCQWxtIZvoJgEztisO0+HbPK+WvfMbl6nktHaKcpxz9K4iIntO+QY9fv
+0HJJPlutuRvUK2+GaN3VcxK4Q8ncQQ+io0ZPi2eIhA9h/nk0H0qJH7cCAwEAAaN9
+MHswHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4HmCKX4XOiMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLQR
+M/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUH
+AwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEB
+AEG0PE9hQuXlvtUULv9TQ2BXy9MmTjOk+dQwxDhAXYBYMUB6TygsqvPXwpDwz8MS
+EPGCRqh5cQwtPoElQRU1i4URgcQMZquXScwNFcvE6AATF/PdN/+mOwtqFrlpYfs3
+IJIpYL6ViQg4n8pv+b/pCwMmhewQLwCGs9+omHNTOwKjEiVoNaprAfj5Lxt15fS2
++zZW0mT9Y4kfEypetrqSAjh8CDK+vaQhkeKdDfJyBfjS4ALfxvCkT3mQnsWFJ9CU
+TVG3uw6ylSPT3wN3RE0Ofa4rI5PESogQsd/DgBc7dcDO3yoPKGjycR3/GJDqqCxC
+e9dr6FJEnDjaDf9zNWyTFHExggITMIICDwIBATASMA0xCzAJBgNVBAMMAkNBAgEC
+MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIEBQCggdQwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq
+hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjMwMTE4MTU0NzExWjAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxEgQQRXO4TKpp
+RgA4XHb8bD1pczB5BgkqhkiG9w0BCQ8xbDBqMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBKjALBglghkgB
+ZQMEARYwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAECMAoGCCqGSIb3DQMHMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgIAgDAN
+BggqhkiG9w0DAgIBQDAHBgUrDgMCBzANBggqhkiG9w0DAgIBKDANBgkqhkiG9w0B
+AQEFAASCAQAe+xlm/TGg/s/7b0xBc3FFnmmUDEe7ljkehIx61OnBV9ZWA+LcBX/7
+kmMSMdaHjRq4w8FmwBMLzn0ttXVqf0QuPbBF/E6X5EqK9lpOdkUQhNiN2v+ZfY6c
+lrH4ADsSD9D+UHw0sxo5KEF+PPuneUfYCJZosFUJosBbuSEXK0C9yfJoDKVE8Syp
+0vdqh73ogLeNgZLAUGSSB66OmHDxwgAj4qPAv6FHFBy1Xs4uFZER5vniYrH9OrAk
+Z6XdvzDoYZC4XcGMDtcOpOM6D4owqy5svHPDw8wIlM4GVhrTw7CQmuBz5uRNnf6a
+ZK3jZIxG1hr/INaNWheHoPIhPblYaVc6
+-----END PKCS7-----
--
2.39.1

26
0109-fips-Zeroize-out-in-fips-selftest.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
From 9dbc6069665690bd238caa7622647ea8ac94124f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 11:01:44 +0100
Subject: fips: Zeroize `out` in fips selftest
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Resolves: rhbz#2169314
---
providers/fips/self_test.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
index 80d048a847..11a989209c 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MAC_free(mac);
--
2.39.1

40
0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
View File

@ -12,24 +12,12 @@ internally at its entirety randomly."
Resolves: rhbz#2168289
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/evp.h | 4 +++
.../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c | 4 +++
.../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 5 ++--
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 680bfbc7cc..832502a034 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE "cts_mode" /* utf8_string */
/* For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form */
#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS "alg_id_param" /* octet_string */
+#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT \
"tls1multi_maxsndfrag" /* uint */
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
index 49e8e1df78..ec2ba46fbd 100644
--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
@ -44,7 +32,7 @@ index 49e8e1df78..ec2ba46fbd 100644
+
__owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
/*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
__owur int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
index fa383165d8..716add7339 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
@ -64,9 +52,9 @@ diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c b/providers/im
index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
@@ -224,6 +224,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|| !getivgen(ctx, p->data, p->data_size))
return 0;
@@ -238,6 +238,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
break;
}
}
+
+ /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
@ -96,6 +84,22 @@ index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
return 1;
}
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index a109e44521..64e9809387 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -101,8 +101,9 @@ my %params = (
'CIPHER_PARAM_SPEED' => "speed", # uint
'CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE' => "cts_mode", # utf8_string
# For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form
- 'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' => "alg_id_param",# octet_string
- 'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' => "xts_standard",# utf8_string
+ 'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' => "alg_id_param",# octet_string
+ 'CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator", # int
+ 'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' => "xts_standard",# utf8_string
'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT' => "tls1multi_maxsndfrag",# uint
'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE' => "tls1multi_maxbufsz", # size_t
--
2.39.1

82
0111-fips-Use-salt-16-bytes-in-PBKDF2-selftest.patch
View File

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
From 56090fca0a0c8b6cf1782aced0a02349358aae7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 12:22:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fips: Use salt >= 16 bytes in PBKDF2 selftest
NIST SP 800-132 [1] section 5.1 says "[t]he length of the
randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least
128 bits", which implies that the salt for PBKDF2 must be at least 16
bytes long (see also Appendix A.2.1).
The FIPS 140-3 IG [2] section 10.3.A requires that "the lengths and the
properties of the Password and Salt parameters, as well as the desired
length of the Master Key used in a CAST shall be among those supported
by the module in the approved mode."
As a consequence, the salt length in the self test must be at least 16
bytes long for FIPS 140-3 compliance. Switch the self test to use the
only test vector from RFC 6070 that uses salt that is long enough to
fulfil this requirement. Since RFC 6070 does not provide expected
results for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256, use the output from [3], which was
generated with python cryptography, which was tested against the RFC
6070 vectors with HMAC-SHA1.
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-132
[2]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
[3]: https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20429)
(cherry picked from commit 451cb23c41c90d5a02902b3a77551aa9ee1c6956)
---
providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
index 8ae8cd6f4a..03adf28f3c 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -361,19 +361,29 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM x963kdf_params[] = {
};
static const char pbkdf2_digest[] = "SHA256";
+/*
+ * Input parameters from RFC 6070, vector 5 (because it is the only one with
+ * a salt >= 16 bytes, which NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1 requires). The
+ * expected output is taken from
+ * https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md,
+ * which ran these test vectors with SHA-256.
+ */
static const unsigned char pbkdf2_password[] = {
- 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x00, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72,
- 0x64
+ 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64, 0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53,
+ 0x57, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x44, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64
};
static const unsigned char pbkdf2_salt[] = {
- 0x73, 0x61, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x74
+ 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74,
+ 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54,
+ 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74
};
static const unsigned char pbkdf2_expected[] = {
- 0x89, 0xb6, 0x9d, 0x05, 0x16, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x89,
- 0x3c, 0x69, 0x62, 0x26, 0x65, 0x0a, 0x86, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8c, 0x89, 0xdb, 0xcb, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x14, 0xb8,
+ 0x11, 0x6e, 0x84, 0xcf, 0x2b, 0x17, 0x34, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0x18, 0x00, 0x18,
+ 0x1c
};
static int pbkdf2_iterations = 4096;
-static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 1;
+static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 0;
static const ST_KAT_PARAM pbkdf2_params[] = {
ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, pbkdf2_digest),
ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, pbkdf2_password),
--
2.39.2

76
0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
View File

@ -21,32 +21,12 @@ Resolves: rhbz#2179331
Resolves: RHEL-14083
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/openssl/core_names.h | 2 ++
include/openssl/evp.h | 4 +++
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 19 ++++++++++++
providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 22 ++++++++++++++
providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++-
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 6 ++--
4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 832502a034..e15d208421 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern "C" {
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
#endif
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
/*
* Encoder / decoder parameters
@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ extern "C" {
/* KEM parameters */
#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION "operation"
+#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
/* OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION values */
#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION_RSASVE "RSASVE"
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
index ec2ba46fbd..3803b03422 100644
--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
@ -66,22 +46,25 @@ diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/impleme
index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
@@ -452,6 +452,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
@@ -462,6 +462,27 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
return 0;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
+ * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
+ * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
+ * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
+ * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
+ * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
+ * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
+ * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSA-OAEP. */
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+ * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP as unapproved until
+ * we have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such
+ * as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
+ fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
@ -97,13 +80,13 @@ index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
@@ -151,11 +151,38 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
@@ -151,11 +151,39 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
@ -123,9 +106,10 @@ index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
+ * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
+ * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
+ * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
+ * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
+ * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSASVE. */
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+ * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSASVE unapproved until we
+ * have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such as
+ * OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
@ -143,6 +127,30 @@ index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index 64e9809387..45ab0c8dc4 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ my %params = (
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION' => "tls-negotiated-version",
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION' => "implicit-rejection",
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED' => "redhat-kat-oaep-seed",
+ 'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
# Encoder / decoder parameters
@@ -438,8 +439,9 @@ my %params = (
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT' => "kat",
# KEM parameters
- 'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' => "operation",
- 'KEM_PARAM_IKME' => "ikme",
+ 'KEM_PARAM_OPERATION' => "operation",
+ 'KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "redhat-fips-indicator",
+ 'KEM_PARAM_IKME' => "ikme",
# Capabilities
--
2.39.2

612
0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
View File

@ -1,44 +1,72 @@
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index e90e5dc03339..f391e756475c 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ PROV_R_BN_ERROR:160:bn error
PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED:102:cipher operation failed
PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED:205:derivation function init failed
PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:174:digest not allowed
+PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED:233:ems not enabled
PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK:186:entropy source strength too weak
PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG:188:error instantiating drbg
PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY:189:error retrieving entropy
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 173a81d28bbe..5e5be567a578 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -21,11 +21,12 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME "module-filename" /* utf8_ptr */
From 9b02ad7225b74a5b9088b361caead0a41e570e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:40:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 48/48] 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
/* Well known parameter names that Providers can define */
-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME "name" /* utf8_ptr */
-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION "version" /* utf8_ptr */
-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO "buildinfo" /* utf8_ptr */
-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS "status" /* uint */
-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks" /* uint */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME "name" /* utf8_ptr */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION "version" /* utf8_ptr */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO "buildinfo" /* utf8_ptr */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS "status" /* uint */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks" /* uint */
+#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check" /* uint */
Patch-name: 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
Patch-id: 114
Patch-status: |
# We believe that some changes present in CentOS are not necessary
# because ustream has a check for FIPS version
---
doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod | 3 +++
doc/man5/fips_config.pod | 13 +++++++++++
include/openssl/fips_names.h | 8 +++++++
include/openssl/ssl.h.in | 1 +
providers/fips/fipsprov.c | 2 +-
providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
ssl/ssl_conf.c | 1 +
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 8 ++++++-
ssl/t1_enc.c | 11 ++++++++--
.../30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt | 10 +++++++++
test/sslapitest.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
/* Self test callback parameters */
#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SELF_TEST_PHASE "st-phase" /* utf8_string */
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
index ae6ca43282..b83c04a308 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended master secret extension, enabled by
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
+B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
+This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
+
B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
index 1c15e32a5c..f2cedaf88d 100644
--- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ for more information.
This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
+OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
+should have format
+
+ [fips_sect]
+ tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
+ activate = 1
+
+The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
+presence of extended master secret or not.
+
+The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
index 0fdf5440c7cb..3f29369b3f92 100644
index 5c77f6d691..8cdd5a6bf7 100644
--- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ extern "C" {
@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern "C" {
*/
# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks"
# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_DRBG_TRUNC_DIGEST "drbg-no-trunc-md"
+/*
+ * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
@ -51,228 +79,46 @@ index 0fdf5440c7cb..3f29369b3f92 100644
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
# endif
diff --git a/include/openssl/proverr.h b/include/openssl/proverr.h
index 3685430f5d3e..bf4dc135f592 100644
--- a/include/openssl/proverr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/proverr.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
# define PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED 102
# define PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED 205
# define PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED 174
+# define PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED 233
# define PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK 186
# define PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG 188
# define PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY 189
diff --git a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
index 4a7f85f71186..62e60cc0103f 100644
--- a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
+++ b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid(const EVP_MD *md);
int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
int sha1_allowed);
int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
diff --git a/providers/common/provider_err.c b/providers/common/provider_err.c
index f6144072aa04..954aabe80cfc 100644
--- a/providers/common/provider_err.c
+++ b/providers/common/provider_err.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA PROV_str_reasons[] = {
"derivation function init failed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
"digest not allowed"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED), "ems not enabled"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK),
"entropy source strength too weak"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),
diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
index de7f0d3a0a57..63c875ecd0b7 100644
--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
return 0;
}
+/* Disable the ems check in the default provider */
+int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
int sha1_allowed)
{
diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
index b7659bd395c3..2bc8a5992685 100644
--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
@@ -30,6 +31,11 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
}
+int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(libctx);
+}
+
int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
int sha1_allowed)
{
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
index 0b6de603e2..26a69ca282 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL *s, void *arg);
* interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
*/
# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG SSL_OP_BIT(31)
+# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS SSL_OP_BIT(48)
/*
* Disable RFC8879 certificate compression
* SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION: don't send compressed certificates,
diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
index b86b27d236f3..b881f46f36ad 100644
index 5ff9872bd8..eb9653a9df 100644
--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_provider_query_operation_fn fips_query;
#define ALG(NAMES, FUNC) ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, NULL)
extern OSSL_FUNC_core_thread_start_fn *c_thread_start;
int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
/*
* Should these function pointers be stored in the provider side provctx? Could
@@ -82,7 +83,9 @@ typedef struct fips_global_st {
const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle;
SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS selftest_params;
int fips_security_checks;
+ int fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
const char *fips_security_check_option;
+ const char *fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option;
} FIPS_GLOBAL;
static void *fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
@@ -94,6 +97,9 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
fgbl->fips_security_checks = 1;
fgbl->fips_security_check_option = "1";
+ fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 1; /* Enabled by default */
+ fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option = "1";
+
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
if (fgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_security_checks, 1);
- init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 0); /* Disabled by default */
+ init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 1); /* Enabled by default */
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 0);
return fgbl;
}
@@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM fips_param_types[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_PTR, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
@@ -119,9 +126,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
* NOTE: inside core_get_params() these will be loaded from config items
* stored inside prov->parameters (except for
* OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME).
- * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS is not a self test parameter.
+ * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS and
+ * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK are not self test parameters.
*/
- OSSL_PARAM core_params[8], *p = core_params;
+ OSSL_PARAM core_params[9], *p = core_params;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME,
@@ -151,6 +159,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS,
(char **)&fgbl->fips_security_check_option,
sizeof(fgbl->fips_security_check_option));
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
+ OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
+ (char **)&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option,
+ sizeof(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option));
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!c_get_params(fgbl->handle, core_params)) {
@@ -187,6 +199,9 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_security_checks))
return 0;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check))
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -703,6 +718,11 @@ int OSSL_provider_init_int(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
&& strcmp(fgbl->fips_security_check_option, "0") == 0)
fgbl->fips_security_checks = 0;
+ /* Disable the ems check if it's disabled in the fips config file. */
+ if (fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option != NULL
+ && strcmp(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option, "0") == 0)
+ fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 0;
+
ossl_prov_cache_exported_algorithms(fips_ciphers, exported_fips_ciphers);
if (!SELF_TEST_post(&fgbl->selftest_params, 0)) {
@@ -898,6 +918,15 @@ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
return fgbl->fips_security_checks;
}
+int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX,
+ &fips_prov_ossl_ctx_method);
+
+ return fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
+}
+
void OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_CALLBACK **cb,
void **cbarg)
{
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
index 8a3807308408..2c2dbf31cc0b 100644
index 25a6c79a2e..79bc7a9719 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
+
+/*
+ * Low level APIs (such as DH) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -60,6 +67,7 @@
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#include "e_os.h"
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
@@ -78,6 +86,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
typedef struct {
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
@@ -181,6 +192,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
if (ctx != NULL) {
kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
@@ -222,6 +223,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
}
}
+ /*
+ * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
@ -298,136 +144,49 @@ index 8a3807308408..2c2dbf31cc0b 100644
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 3a8242d2d8c8..b0fbb504689e 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static char *tmpfilename = NULL;
static char *dhfile = NULL;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 5146cedb96..086db98c33 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
+ SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 00b1ee531e..22cdabb308 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
static int is_fips = 0;
+static int fips_ems_check = 0;
#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 1
#define LOG_BUFFER_SIZE 2048
static char server_log_buffer[LOG_BUFFER_SIZE + 1] = {0};
@@ -796,7 +797,7 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
- int testresult = 0;
+ int testresult = 0, status;
if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
@@ -812,19 +813,25 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
goto end;
}
- if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)) {
- printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
- printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
- printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
- goto end;
+ status = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+ if (fips_ems_check) {
+ if (status == 1) {
+ printf("When FIPS uses the EMS check a connection that doesnt use EMS should fail\n");
+ goto end;
- if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!status) {
+ printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
+ goto end;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
+ printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
+ printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
}
testresult = 1;
@@ -10740,9 +10747,24 @@ int setup_tests(void)
&& !TEST_false(OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "default")))
return 0;
- if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0) {
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+
is_fips = 1;
+ prov = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "fips");
+ if (prov != NULL) {
+ /* Query the fips provider to check if the check ems option is enabled */
+ params[0] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
+ &fips_ems_check);
+ params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_get_params(prov, params);
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(prov);
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* We add, but don't load the test "tls-provider". We'll load it when we
* need it.
@@ -10816,6 +10838,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
if (privkey8192 == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (fips_ems_check) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
+ ADD_TEST(test_no_ems);
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || !defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ktls, NUM_KTLS_TEST_CIPHERS * 4);
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
--- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx 2023-04-17 13:04:21.078501747 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt 2023-04-17 13:11:03.189059638 +0200
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
Title = TLS12 PRF tests (from NIST test vectors)
+Availablein = default
KDF = TLS1-PRF
Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
@@ -21,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3
Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Availablein = fips
+KDF = TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
+Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
KDF = TLS1-PRF
Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems 2023-05-05 11:15:57.934415272 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c 2023-05-05 11:39:03.578163778 +0200
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 91238e6457..e8ad8ecd9e 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
@ -435,7 +194,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
}
@ -453,87 +212,40 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c
else
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems 2023-05-05 17:14:04.663800271 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c 2023-05-05 17:20:33.764599507 +0200
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
index 44040ff66b..deb6bf3fcb 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587c
Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 1
@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
--- openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems 2023-07-11 12:35:27.951610366 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in 2023-07-11 12:36:25.234754680 +0200
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL
* interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
*/
# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG SSL_OP_BIT(31)
+# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS SSL_OP_BIT(48)
/*
* Option "collections."
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c
--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems 2023-07-11 12:36:51.465278672 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c 2023-07-11 12:44:53.365675720 +0200
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_c
SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
+ SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
--- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems 2023-07-12 13:54:22.508235187 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod 2023-07-12 13:56:51.089613902 +0200
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended ma
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
+B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
+This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
+Availablein = fips
+KDF = TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
+Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems 2023-07-12 15:39:57.732206731 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod 2023-07-12 15:53:45.722885419 +0200
@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ automatically loaded when the system is
environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
for more information.
FIPSversion = <=3.1.0
KDF = TLS1-PRF
Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 169e3c7466..e67b5bb44c 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int test_client_cert_verify_cb(void)
STACK_OF(X509) *server_chain;
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
- int testresult = 0;
+ int testresult = 0, status;
+Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
+OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
+should have format
+
+ [fips_sect]
+ tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
+ activate = 1
+
+The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
+presence of extended master secret or not.
+
+The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION, 0,
--
2.41.0
Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

195
0115-CVE-2023-0464.patch
View File

@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
};
struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_count;
+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_maximum;
+
/* This is the tree 'level' data */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
int nlevel;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data);
void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data)
{
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
+ return NULL;
+
node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
if (node == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
node->data = data;
node->parent = parent;
- if (level) {
+ if (level != NULL) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
if (level->anyPolicy)
goto node_error;
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
- if (tree) {
+ if (extra_data) {
if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
+ tree->node_count++;
if (parent)
parent->nchild++;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
#include "pcy_local.h"
+/*
+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
+ *
+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
+#endif
+
static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
int indent)
@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
}
+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
+
/*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
*
@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
goto bad_tree;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
goto bad_tree;
}
@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
int i, matched = 0;
@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
int i;
@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
if (last->anyPolicy &&
ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
- tree);
+ tree, 1);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)

85
0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From ec8e4e25cc5e5c67313c5fd6af94fa248685c3d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 17:37:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 45/49] 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
Patch-name: 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
Patch-id: 115
Patch-status: |
# skip quic and pairwise tests temporarily
---
test/quicapitest.c | 4 +++-
test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t | 1 +
test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t | 10 ++++++++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/quicapitest.c b/test/quicapitest.c
index 41cf0fc7a8..0fb7492700 100644
--- a/test/quicapitest.c
+++ b/test/quicapitest.c
@@ -2139,7 +2139,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_cipher_find);
ADD_TEST(test_version);
#if defined(DO_SSL_TRACE_TEST)
- ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
+ if (is_fips == 0) {
+ ADD_TEST(test_ssl_trace);
+ }
#endif
ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis_ctx);
ADD_TEST(test_quic_forbidden_apis);
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
index c837d48fb4..6291c08c49 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_pairwise_fail.t
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
use strict;
use warnings;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file);
+use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT bldtop_dir srctop_file srctop_dir data_file with);
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
BEGIN {
@@ -31,28 +31,37 @@ run(test(["fips_version_test", "-config"
SKIP: {
skip "Skip RSA test because of no rsa in this build", 1
if disabled("rsa");
+ with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
+ sub {
ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
"-pairwise", "rsa"])),
"fips provider rsa keygen pairwise failure test");
+ });
}
SKIP: {
skip "Skip EC test because of no ec in this build", 2
if disabled("ec");
+ with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
+ sub {
ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
"-pairwise", "ec"])),
"fips provider ec keygen pairwise failure test");
+ });
skip "FIPS provider version is too old", 1
if !$fips_exit;
+ with({ exit_checker => sub {my $val = shift; return $val == 134; } },
+ sub {
ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
"-pairwise", "eckat"])),
"fips provider ec keygen kat failure test");
+ });
}
SKIP: {
skip "Skip DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 2
- if disabled("dsa");
+ if 1; #if disabled("dsa");
ok(run(test(["pairwise_fail_test", "-config", $provconf,
"-pairwise", "dsa", "-dsaparam", data_file("dsaparam.pem")])),
"fips provider dsa keygen pairwise failure test");
--
2.44.0

179
0116-CVE-2023-0465.patch
View File

@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
goto memerr;
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
- int i;
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
+ cbcalled = 1;
CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
}
+ if (!cbcalled) {
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
return 1;
}
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
diff --git a/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..244af3292b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTIzMDMwODEyMjMxNloYDzIxMjMwMzA5MTIyMzE2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
+DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd
+j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz
+n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W
+l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l
+YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc
+ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9
+CLNNsUcCAwEAAaN7MHkwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zALBgNVHQ8EBAMCAQYwHQYD
+VR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uE
+PXyAmslTnE1y96NSMBkGA1UdIAQSMBAwDgYMKwYBBAGBgVy8+0cBMA0GCSqGSIb3
+DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBbE+MO9mewWIUY2kt85yhl0oZtvVxbn9K2Hty59ItwJGRNfzx7
+Ge7KgawkvNzMOXmj6qf8TpbJnf41ZLWdRyVZBVyIwrAKIVw1VxfGh8aEifHKN97H
+unZkBPcUkAhUJSiC1BOD/euaMYqOi8QwiI702Q6q1NBY1/UKnV/ZIBLecnqfj9vZ
+7T0wKxrwGYBztP4pNcxCmBoD9Dg+Dx3ZElo0WXyO4SOh/BgrsKJHKyhbuTpjrI/g
+DhcINRp6+lIzuFBtJ67+YXnAEspb3lKMk0YL/LXrCNF2scdmNfOPwHi+OKBqt69C
+9FJyWFEMxx2qm/ENE9sbOswgJRnKkaAqHBHx
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0fcd6372b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f06d7433f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
index c3f7ac14b5..a57d9f38dc 100755
--- a/test/certs/mkcert.sh
+++ b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
@@ -119,11 +119,12 @@ genca() {
local OPTIND=1
local purpose=
- while getopts p: o
+ while getopts p:c: o
do
case $o in
p) purpose="$OPTARG";;
- *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
+ c) certpol="$OPTARG";;
+ *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU][-c policyoid] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
return 1;;
esac
done
@@ -146,6 +147,10 @@ genca() {
if [ -n "$NC" ]; then
exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC")
fi
+ if [ -n "$certpol" ]; then
+ exts=$(printf "%s\ncertificatePolicies = %s\n" "$exts" "$certpol")
+ fi
+
csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
echo "$csr" |
cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
index 2240cd9df0..76ceadc7d8 100755
--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
+++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -440,3 +440,9 @@ OPENSSL_SIGALG=ED448 OPENSSL_KEYALG=ed448 ./mkcert.sh genee ed448 \
# critical id-pkix-ocsp-no-check extension
./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-ocsp-nocheck ca-key ca-cert "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5=critical,DER:05:00"
+
+# certificatePolicies extension
+./mkcert.sh genca -c "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1" "CA" ca-key ca-pol-cert root-key root-cert
+./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
+# We can create a cert with a duplicate policy oid - but its actually invalid!
+./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies-bad ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1,1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
index 2a4c36e86d..818c9ac50d 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
run(app([@args]));
}
-plan tests => 163;
+plan tests => 165;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -516,3 +516,14 @@ SKIP: {
ok(run(app([ qw(openssl verify -trusted), $rsapluscert_file, $cert_file ])),
'Mixed key + cert file test');
}
+
+# Certificate Policies
+ok(verify("ee-cert-policies", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
+ "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
+ "-explicit_policy"),
+ "Certificate policy");
+
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-policies-bad", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
+ "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
+ "-explicit_policy"),
+ "Bad certificate policy");

84
0116-version-aliasing.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From a2673b5e2e95bcf54a1746bfd409cca688275e75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 46/49] 0116-version-aliasing.patch
Patch-name: 0116-version-aliasing.patch
Patch-id: 116
Patch-status: |
# Add version aliasing due to
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23534
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
crypto/evp/digest.c | 7 ++++++-
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c | 7 ++++++-
test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t | 1 +
util/libcrypto.num | 2 ++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 42331703da..3a280acc0e 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -553,7 +553,12 @@ legacy:
return ret;
}
-EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
+EVP_MD_CTX
+#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
+ symver ("EVP_MD_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
+#endif
+*EVP_MD_CTX_dup(const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *out = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index e9faf31057..5a29b8dbb7 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -1444,7 +1444,12 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key)
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX
+#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+__attribute__ ((symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@@OPENSSL_3.1.0"),
+ symver ("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup@OPENSSL_3.2.0")))
+#endif
+*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
diff --git a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
index 222b1886ae..7e2f65cccb 100644
--- a/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
+++ b/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ foreach (sort keys %stlibname) {
}
}
my @duplicates = sort grep { $symbols{$_} > 1 } keys %symbols;
+@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") && ($_ ne "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup") && ($_ ne "EVP_MD_CTX_dup") } @duplicates;
+@duplicates = grep {($_ ne "OPENSSL_strcasecmp") && ($_ ne "OPENSSL_strncasecmp") } @duplicates;
if (@duplicates) {
note "Duplicates:";
note join('\n', @duplicates);
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index 8046454025..068e9904e2 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5435,7 +5435,9 @@ X509_PUBKEY_set0_public_key 5562 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free 5563 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_trace_string 5564 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_MD_CTX_dup 5565 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_CTX_dup ? 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup 5566 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup ? 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_signed_bin2bn 5567 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_signed_bn2bin 5568 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_signed_lebin2bn 5569 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
--
2.44.0

27
0117-CVE-2023-0466.patch
View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
+policy checking.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

318
0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
From 242c746690dd1d0e500fa554c60536877d77776d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 17:08:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 47/49] 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
Patch-name: 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
Patch-id: 117
Patch-status: |
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23050
---
CHANGES.md | 13 +++++++
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod | 6 ++-
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod | 11 +++++-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
test/sslapitest.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
index ca29762ac2..4e21d0ddf9 100644
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ OpenSSL 3.2
### Changes between 3.2.0 and 3.2.1 [30 Jan 2024]
+ * Unknown entries in TLS SignatureAlgorithms, ClientSignatureAlgorithms
+ config options and the respective calls to SSL[_CTX]_set1_sigalgs() and
+ SSL[_CTX]_set1_client_sigalgs() that start with `?` character are
+ ignored and the configuration will still be used.
+
+ Similarly unknown entries that start with `?` character in a TLS
+ Groups config option or set with SSL[_CTX]_set1_groups_list() are ignored
+ and the configuration will still be used.
+
+ In both cases if the resulting list is empty, an error is returned.
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
* A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from
an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be
NULL, but OpenSSL did not correctly check for this case. A fix has been
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
index c26ef00306..f0566e148e 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ string B<list>. The string is a colon separated list of group names, for example
are B<P-256>, B<P-384>, B<P-521>, B<X25519>, B<X448>, B<brainpoolP256r1tls13>,
B<brainpoolP384r1tls13>, B<brainpoolP512r1tls13>, B<ffdhe2048>, B<ffdhe3072>,
B<ffdhe4096>, B<ffdhe6144> and B<ffdhe8192>. Support for other groups may be
-added by external providers.
+added by external providers. If a group name is preceded with the C<?>
+character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
SSL_set1_groups() and SSL_set1_groups_list() are similar except they set
supported groups for the SSL structure B<ssl>.
@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ The curve functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group
functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. The SSL_get_negotiated_group() function
was added in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
+Support for ignoring unknown groups in SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() and
+SSL_set1_groups_list() was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2013-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
index eb31006346..5b7de7d956 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ signature algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The B<str> parameter
must be a null terminated string consisting of a colon separated list of
elements, where each element is either a combination of a public key
algorithm and a digest separated by B<+>, or a TLS 1.3-style named
-SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256.
+SignatureScheme such as rsa_pss_pss_sha256. If a list entry is preceded
+with the C<?> character, it will be ignored if an implementation is missing.
+
SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(),
SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set
@@ -106,6 +108,13 @@ using a string:
L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)>,
L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Support for ignoring unknown signature algorithms in
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(), SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(),
+SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list()
+was added in OpenSSL 3.3.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 056aae3863..fe680449c5 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1052,9 +1052,15 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
size_t i;
uint16_t gid = 0;
char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
uint16_t *tmp =
OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
@@ -1070,13 +1076,14 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
if (gid == 0) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
- "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
- return 0;
+ /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
}
for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
- if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
- return 0;
+ if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
+ /* Duplicate group - ignore */
+ return 1;
+ }
garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
return 1;
}
@@ -1097,6 +1104,11 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
gcb.ctx = ctx;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
goto end;
+ if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid groups in '%s'", str);
+ goto end;
+ }
if (pext == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
@@ -2905,8 +2917,15 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
+
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
@@ -2931,8 +2950,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
break;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
@@ -2940,8 +2961,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
return 0;
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
- if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
- return 0;
+ if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
@@ -2949,15 +2972,17 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
break;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
}
- /* Reject duplicates */
+ /* Ignore duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
sarg->sigalgcnt--;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
}
return 1;
@@ -2973,6 +2998,11 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
+ if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 1c14f93ed1..184a0f1055 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "testutil.h"
#include "testutil/output.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
#include "internal/ktls.h"
#include "../ssl/ssl_local.h"
#include "../ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h"
@@ -3147,6 +3148,7 @@ static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = {
{validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0},
# endif
{NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1},
+ {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:?Invalid", 1, 1},
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1},
{NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0},
@@ -9276,6 +9278,64 @@ static int test_servername(int tst)
return testresult;
}
+static int test_unknown_sigalgs_groups(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = SSL_CTX_new_ex(libctx, NULL, TLS_server_method())))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx,
+ "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgslen, 2)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->conf_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx,
+ "RSA+SHA256:?nonexistent:?RSA+SHA512"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgslen, 2)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[0], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->cert->client_sigalgs[1], TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
+ "nonexistent"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
+ "?nonexistent1:?nonexistent2:?nonexistent3"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
+ "P-256:nonexistent"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx,
+ "P-384:?nonexistent:?P-521"),
+ 0))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_size_t_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, 2)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[0], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ctx->ext.supportedgroups[1], OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1))
+ goto end;
+#endif
+
+ ret = 1;
+ end:
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
&& (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
/*
@@ -11519,6 +11579,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multiblock_write, OSSL_NELEM(multiblock_cipherlist_data));
#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_servername, 10);
+ ADD_TEST(test_unknown_sigalgs_groups);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
&& (!defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2))
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_sigalgs_available, 6);
--
2.44.0

20
0118-CVE-2023-1255.patch
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_tail4x:
add $inp,$inp,#16
- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
+ tst $tailcnt,#0xf
veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
+ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort
+ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
b .Lxts_done
.align 4
.Lxts_outer_dec_tail:

80
0118-no-crl-memleak.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 105217c7d58c726f4e646177e0aaefb6115aad3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 15:22:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 48/49] 0118-no-crl-memleak.patch
Patch-name: 0118-no-crl-memleak.patch
Patch-id: 118
Patch-status: |
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23770
---
crypto/x509/by_file.c | 2 ++
test/recipes/60-test_x509_load_cert_file.t | 3 ++-
test/x509_load_cert_file_test.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/crypto/x509/by_file.c
index 5073c137a2..85923804ac 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/by_file.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_file.c
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type)
goto err;
}
count++;
+ X509_CRL_free(x);
+ x = NULL;
}
} else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL);
diff --git a/test/recipes/60-test_x509_load_cert_file.t b/test/recipes/60-test_x509_load_cert_file.t
index 75aeac362c..e329d7675c 100644
--- a/test/recipes/60-test_x509_load_cert_file.t
+++ b/test/recipes/60-test_x509_load_cert_file.t
@@ -12,4 +12,5 @@ setup("test_load_cert_file");
plan tests => 1;
-ok(run(test(["x509_load_cert_file_test", srctop_file("test", "certs", "leaf-chain.pem")])));
+ok(run(test(["x509_load_cert_file_test", srctop_file("test", "certs", "leaf-chain.pem"),
+ srctop_file("test", "certs", "cyrillic_crl.pem")])));
diff --git a/test/x509_load_cert_file_test.c b/test/x509_load_cert_file_test.c
index 4a736071ae..c07d329915 100644
--- a/test/x509_load_cert_file_test.c
+++ b/test/x509_load_cert_file_test.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "testutil.h"
static const char *chain;
+static const char *crl;
static int test_load_cert_file(void)
{
@@ -27,12 +28,15 @@ static int test_load_cert_file(void)
&& TEST_int_eq(sk_X509_num(certs), 4))
ret = 1;
+ if (crl != NULL && !TEST_true(X509_load_crl_file(lookup, crl, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)))
+ ret = 0;
+
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return ret;
}
-OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("cert.pem...\n")
+OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("cert.pem [crl.pem]\n")
int setup_tests(void)
{
@@ -45,6 +49,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
if (chain == NULL)
return 0;
+ crl = test_get_argument(1);
+
ADD_TEST(test_load_cert_file);
return 1;
}
--
2.44.0

170
0119-provider-sigalgs-in-signaturealgorithms-conf.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
From f5b48604779362c91a22080b6905413fbba28b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2024 11:18:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 49/49] 0119-provider-sigalgs-in-signaturealgorithms-conf.patch
Patch-name: 0119-provider-sigalgs-in-signaturealgorithms-conf.patch
Patch-id: 119
Patch-status: |
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22779
---
ssl/s3_lib.c | 8 ++++----
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 2 +-
ssl/ssl_local.h | 2 +-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index e8ec98c221..48a1aa0e61 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3685,13 +3685,13 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
return tls1_set_sigalgs(sc->cert, parg, larg, 0);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
- return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(sc->cert, parg, 0);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->ctx, sc->cert, parg, 0);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS:
return tls1_set_sigalgs(sc->cert, parg, larg, 1);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
- return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(sc->cert, parg, 1);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->ctx, sc->cert, parg, 1);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES:
{
@@ -3968,13 +3968,13 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 0);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
- return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 0);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx, ctx->cert, parg, 0);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS:
return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 1);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
- return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 1);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx, ctx->cert, parg, 1);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES:
return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(ctx->cert, parg, larg);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 1329841aaf..4d95ab71cd 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3078,7 +3078,7 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
return tls1_set_groups_list(ctx, NULL, NULL, parg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
- return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx, NULL, parg, 0);
default:
return 0;
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_local.h b/ssl/ssl_local.h
index 0d3acfbe66..a73b2c4770 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_local.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_local.h
@@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ __owur int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op);
-__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client);
+__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, CERT *c, const char *str, int client);
__owur int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
int client);
__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen,
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index fe680449c5..87f2ae7000 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
/* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
if (ctx->sigalg_list_len > 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->ssl_cert_info);
ctx->ssl_cert_info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu) * ctx->sigalg_list_len);
if (ctx->ssl_cert_info == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -2889,6 +2890,7 @@ typedef struct {
size_t sigalgcnt;
/* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
} sig_cb_st;
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
@@ -2913,7 +2915,8 @@ static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
- size_t i;
+ size_t i = 0;
+ int load_success = 0;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
@@ -2943,17 +2946,36 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
* in the table.
*/
if (p == NULL) {
- for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
- i++, s++) {
- if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
- sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
- break;
- }
+ /* Load provider sigalgs */
+ if (sarg->ctx) {
+ load_success = ssl_load_sigalgs(sarg->ctx);
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
- /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
- return ignore_unknown;
+ if (load_success) {
+ /* Check if a provider supports the sigalg */
+ for (i = 0; i < sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ if (sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name != NULL
+ && strcmp(etmp,
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] =
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].code_point;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
+ /* Check the built-in sigalgs */
+ if (!sarg->ctx || !load_success || i == sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+ i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i++, s++) {
+ if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
+ }
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
@@ -2992,10 +3014,11 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
-int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
{
sig_cb_st sig;
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+ sig.ctx = ctx;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
--
2.44.0

1354
0120-RSA-PKCS15-implicit-rejection.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

30
0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
index 01cde00e98..c0e55197a0 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -443,6 +443,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
first = 1;
bl = NULL;
+ /*
+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
+ *
+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
+ * >
+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
+ * > decimal).
+ *
+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
+ * i.e. 586 bytes long.
+ *
+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
+ */
+ if (len > 586)
+ goto err;
+
while (len > 0) {
l = 0;
use_bn = 0;

16
0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff -up openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c
--- openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c.xxx 2024-04-15 10:14:47.292448045 +0200
+++ openssl-3.2.1/test/sslapitest.c 2024-04-15 10:15:23.428396994 +0200
@@ -1020,9 +1020,10 @@ static int execute_test_large_message(co
/* sock must be connected */
static int ktls_chk_platform(int sock)
{
- if (!ktls_enable(sock))
+/* if (!ktls_enable(sock))
return 0;
- return 1;
+ return 1; */
+ return 0;
}
static int ping_pong_query(SSL *clientssl, SSL *serverssl)

244
0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch
View File

@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
index bdfc4d02a3f0..548665fba265 100644
--- a/crypto/context.c
+++ b/crypto/context.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "internal/bio.h"
#include "internal/provider.h"
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -271,6 +272,20 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
return NULL;
}
+
+void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void)
+{
+ int dynidx = default_context_int.dyn_indexes[OSSL_LIB_CTX_DRBG_INDEX];
+
+ /* early release of the DRBG in global default libctx, no locking */
+ if (dynidx != -1) {
+ void *data;
+
+ data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx);
+ ossl_rand_ctx_free(data);
+ CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx, NULL);
+ }
+}
#endif
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index c453d3226133..f341d915db76 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
# endif
+ ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx();
rand_inited = 0;
}
@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ static void *rand_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
return NULL;
}
-static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
{
RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
@@ -494,7 +495,7 @@ static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD rand_drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_PRIORITY_2,
rand_ossl_ctx_new,
- rand_ossl_ctx_free,
+ ossl_rand_ctx_free,
};
static RAND_GLOBAL *rand_get_global(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
diff --git a/engines/e_dasync.c b/engines/e_dasync.c
index 5a303a9f8528..7974106ae219 100644
--- a/engines/e_dasync.c
+++ b/engines/e_dasync.c
@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+ void *ptr);
+static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+
static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type,
int arg, void *ptr);
static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
@@ -171,6 +179,12 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc(void)
return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
}
+static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
+static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_256_ctr(void)
+{
+ return _hidden_aes_256_ctr;
+}
+
/*
* Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 in this engine. Set up
* once only during engine bind and can then be reused many times.
@@ -192,8 +206,10 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
static void destroy_ciphers(void)
{
EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1);
_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+ _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
}
@@ -202,6 +218,7 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
static int dasync_cipher_nids[] = {
NID_aes_128_cbc,
+ NID_aes_256_ctr,
NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
0
};
@@ -284,6 +301,30 @@ static int bind_dasync(ENGINE *e)
_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
}
+ _hidden_aes_256_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_ctr,
+ 1 /* block size */,
+ 32 /* key len */);
+ if (_hidden_aes_256_ctr == NULL
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,16)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
+ | EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE
+ | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ dasync_aes256_init_key)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl)
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
+ sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
+ _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
+ }
+
_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(
NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
16 /* block size */,
@@ -445,6 +486,9 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
case NID_aes_128_cbc:
*cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc();
break;
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ *cipher = dasync_aes_256_ctr();
+ break;
case NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1:
*cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1();
break;
@@ -779,6 +823,29 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
}
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+ void *ptr)
+{
+ return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
+}
+
+static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
+}
+
/*
* AES128 CBC HMAC SHA1 Implementation
diff --git a/include/crypto/rand.h b/include/crypto/rand.h
index 6a71a339c812..165deaf95c5e 100644
--- a/include/crypto/rand.h
+++ b/include/crypto/rand.h
@@ -125,4 +125,5 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_nonce(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl);
#endif
diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
index 1291299b6e50..934d4b089c20 100644
--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ int ossl_lib_ctx_run_once(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned int idx,
int ossl_lib_ctx_onfree(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn onfreefn);
const char *ossl_lib_ctx_get_descriptor(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void);
+
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_crypto_ex_data_get_ossl_lib_ctx(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
int ossl_crypto_new_ex_data_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int class_index, void *obj,
CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
diff --git a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
index 4da1e64cb6da..3f352db9df3a 100644
--- a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
+++ b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
@@ -11,9 +11,30 @@ use warnings;
use OpenSSL::Test;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
-plan tests => 3;
+plan tests => 5;
setup("test_rand");
ok(run(test(["rand_test"])));
ok(run(test(["drbgtest"])));
ok(run(test(["rand_status_test"])));
+
+SKIP: {
+ skip "engine is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
+ if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+ my $success;
+ my @randdata;
+ my $expected = '0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10';
+
+ @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'ossltest', '-hex', '16' ]),
+ capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
+ chomp(@randdata);
+ ok($success and $randdata[0] eq $expected,
+ "rand with ossltest: Check rand output is as expected");
+
+ @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'dasync', '-hex', '16' ]),
+ capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
+ chomp(@randdata);
+ ok($success and length($randdata[0]) == 32,
+ "rand with dasync: Check rand output is of expected length");
+}

30
0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
- if (inl == 0) {
- *outl = 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ if (inl == 0) {
+ if (outl != NULL)
+ *outl = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (outsize < inl) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
+ if (outsize < inl) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)

74
0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch
View File

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
if (nid != NID_undef)
return 1;
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
# include <openssl/dherr.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
# endif
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index 7b587f3cfa..f8dd8f3aa7 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err1;
/* check fails, because p is way too small */
- if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err2;
i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
+ goto err3;
+
+ /*
+ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
+ */
+ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err3;
/* ... and check whether it is valid */
- if (!DH_check(a, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
goto err3;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
|| !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)

57
0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index aef6f9b1b7..fbe2797569 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
#else
- int ok = 0, r;
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
goto err;
if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index f8dd8f3aa7..d02b3b7c58 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
+ goto err3;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+ if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
+ || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
+ goto err3;
+
/* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
|| !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err3;
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/

318
0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch
View File

@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index d2ed3fd378..6a819590e6 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -223,6 +223,42 @@ static int evp_cipher_init_internal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
return 0;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * Fix for CVE-2023-5363
+ * Passing in a size as part of the init call takes effect late
+ * so, force such to occur before the initialisation.
+ *
+ * The FIPS provider's internal library context is used in a manner
+ * such that this is not an issue.
+ */
+ if (params != NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM param_lens[3] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END,
+ OSSL_PARAM_END };
+ OSSL_PARAM *q = param_lens;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
+
+ /*
+ * Note that OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN is a synomym for
+ * OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN so both are covered here.
+ */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
+
+ if (q != param_lens) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, param_lens)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (enc) {
if (ctx->cipher->einit == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
index cfffa21350..2318bf6a68 100644
--- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -4851,6 +4851,253 @@ static int test_ecx_not_private_key(int tst)
return options;
}
+static int aes_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ int outlen, tmplen;
+ unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+ unsigned char outtag[16];
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")))
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
+ &gcm_ivlen);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
+ || (gcm_aad != NULL
+ && !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
+ gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
+ gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
+ outtag, sizeof(outtag));
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ctx, params))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s)
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(outtag, gcm_tag_s, gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
+ const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ int outlen;
+ unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
+ &gcm_ivlen);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
+ || (gcm_aad != NULL
+ && !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
+ gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
+ gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
+ (void*)gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
+ ||!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen)))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
+{
+ /* AES-GCM test data obtained from NIST public test vectors */
+ static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = {
+ 0xd0, 0xc2, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x9f, 0x30, 0xd8, 0x0b, 0x89, 0x14, 0xbb, 0xbf,
+ 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x73, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x70, 0x15, 0x84,
+ 0x8a, 0x7b, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0x16, 0xf1, 0x8b,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = {
+ 0xb6, 0xdc, 0xda, 0x95, 0xac, 0x99, 0x77, 0x76, 0x25, 0xae, 0x87, 0xf8,
+ 0xa3, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xca,
+ 0x1a, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0xf4, 0x5f, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0xce, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0x14,
+ 0x12, 0x6f, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x17, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x09,
+ 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0xdd, 0xf3, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x49, 0xb8,
+ 0xb3, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x5d, 0x4f, 0xad, 0x30, 0x91, 0x08, 0xbc, 0xbe, 0x24,
+ 0x01, 0x0f, 0xbe, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x53, 0xb0,
+ 0x95, 0x90, 0xac, 0x7b, 0x1f, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0x99, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x54,
+ 0xd0, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0xcc, 0x91, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x9b, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0xdc,
+ 0x63, 0xea, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0xed, 0x68, 0x57, 0x27, 0x6b,
+ 0x68, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0x51, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x3d,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = {
+ 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x36, 0x44, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x32, 0x91, 0x07,
+ 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x81,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = {
+ 0xff, 0x4f, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0x51, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xf3,
+ 0xe2, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xed,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = {
+ 0xbd, 0x06, 0x38, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0x72, 0x0e, 0xf2, 0xea, 0x63,
+ 0xdb, 0x99, 0x6c, 0x21,
+ };
+
+ return aes_gcm_encrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
+ gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
+ gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag))
+ && aes_gcm_decrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
+ gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
+ gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+static int rc4_encrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
+ const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
+ const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ int outlen, tmplen;
+ unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")))
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
+ &rc4_key_s);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
+ rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rc4_decrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
+ const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
+ const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ int outlen;
+ unsigned char outbuf[1024];
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
+ &rc4_key_s);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
+ rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
+{
+ /* RC4 test data obtained from RFC 6229 */
+ static const struct {
+ unsigned char key[5];
+ unsigned char padding[11];
+ } rc4_key = {
+ { /* Five bytes of key material */
+ 0x83, 0x32, 0x22, 0x77, 0x2a,
+ },
+ { /* Random padding to 16 bytes */
+ 0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x32, 0x91
+ }
+ };
+ static const unsigned char rc4_pt[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+ };
+ static const unsigned char rc4_ct[] = {
+ 0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a,
+ 0x2e, 0x87, 0x9e, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xef, 0xda
+ };
+
+ if (lgcyprov == NULL)
+ return TEST_skip("Test requires legacy provider to be loaded");
+
+ return rc4_encrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
+ rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct))
+ && rc4_decrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
+ rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct));
+}
+#endif
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
OPTION_CHOICE o;
@@ -4994,6 +5241,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ecx_short_keys, OSSL_NELEM(ecxnids));
+ /* Test cases for CVE-2023-5363 */
+ ADD_TEST(test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ ADD_TEST(test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363);
+#endif
+
return 1;
}

49
0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From 0d873f9f647764df147d818a6e998b1c318bac31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 15:30:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Add SP800-56Br2 6.4.1.2.1 (3.c) check
The code did not yet check that the length of the RSA key is positive
and even.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [8b268541d9aabee51699aef22963407362830ef9]
---
crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c | 5 +++++
test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
index fc8f19b487..e6b79e953d 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
@@ -403,6 +403,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
return 0;
}
+ /* (Step 3.c): check that the modulus length is a positive even integer */
+ if (nbits <= 0 || (nbits & 0x1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
+ return 0;
+ }
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
diff --git a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
index 7660019f47..aa58bbbe6c 100644
--- a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
+++ b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ static int test_invalid_keypair(void)
&& TEST_true(BN_add_word(n, 1))
&& TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2048))
&& TEST_true(BN_sub_word(n, 1))
+ /* check that validation fails if len(n) is not even */
+ && TEST_true(BN_lshift1(n, n))
+ && TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2049))
+ && TEST_true(BN_rshift1(n, n))
/* check p */
&& TEST_true(BN_sub_word(p, 2))
&& TEST_true(BN_mul(n, p, q, ctx))
--
2.41.0

143
0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch
View File

@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 7ba2beae7f..e20eb62081 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -249,6 +249,18 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
*/
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index 4152397426..f76ac0dd14 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
"parameter encoding error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
"unable to check generator"},
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index d84ea99241..afc49f5cdc 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
goto err;
}
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
@@ -267,6 +273,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
return 0;
}
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index e51504b7ab..36de321b74 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
+DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS:114:bad ffc parameters
diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
index bb24d131eb..519327f795 100644
--- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
+++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index 6533260f20..50e0cf54be 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
# define DH_GENERATOR_3 3
# define DH_GENERATOR_5 5
-/* DH_check error codes */
+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
/*
* NB: These values must align with the equivalently named macros in
* internal/ffc.h.
@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
# define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 0x04
# define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
# define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10
-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40
# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL 0x80
-# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100
+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
index 5d2a762a96..074a70145f 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
# define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE 100
# define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105
# define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 111
+# define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE 130
# define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 113
# define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 121

12
0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 51c2283db915d..0928a30c2d37b 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
if (tmparr == NULL)
goto end;
+ OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = tmparr;
*pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
ret = 1;

86
0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch
View File

@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
index 9f86134d923fb..2e601bb9c24be 100755
--- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
$VSXFRAME += 128; # local variables
- $VSXFRAME += 13*16; # v20-v31 offload
+ $VSXFRAME += 12*16; # v20-v31 offload
my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@
mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave
lvx v20,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v21,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v22,r11,$sp
+ lvx v21,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v23,r10,$sp
+ lvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v24,r11,$sp
+ lvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v25,r10,$sp
+ lvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v26,r11,$sp
+ lvx v25,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v27,r10,$sp
+ lvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v28,r11,$sp
+ lvx v27,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v29,r10,$sp
+ lvx v28,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v30,r11,$sp
- lvx v31,r10,$sp
+ lvx v29,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v30,r10,$sp
+ lvx v31,r11,$sp
$POP r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
$POP r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
$POP r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)

93
0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch
View File

@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
index fc8f19b48770b..bcbdd24fb8199 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
return 0;
nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+ if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
@@ -324,7 +329,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
goto err;
}
- ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+ /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
+ ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
#else
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
index dc7cc64533af2..f8088df14d36c 100644
--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
"dhpkey.pem"
)) unless disabled("dh");
-my @negative_pubtests = ();
+my @negative_pubtests = ("rsapub_17k.pem"); # Too big RSA public key
push(@negative_pubtests, (
"dsapub_noparam.der"
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..9a2eaedaf1b22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

47
0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
index 448a3c3043c1c..9010fa6c4638c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
const struct translation_st *translation,
struct translation_ctx_st *ctx)
{
+ char *p2 = NULL;
int ret;
if ((ret = default_check(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
@@ -1146,13 +1147,25 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
if (state == PRE_CTRL_TO_PARAMS) {
ctx->p2 = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(ctx->p1);
ctx->p1 = 0;
+ } else if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
+ /*
+ * We're translating from params to ctrl and setting the curve name.
+ * The ctrl function needs it to be a NID, but meanwhile, we need
+ * space to get the curve name from the param. |ctx->name_buf| is
+ * sufficient for that.
+ * The double indirection is necessary for default_fixup_args()'s
+ * call of OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string() to be done correctly.
+ */
+ p2 = ctx->name_buf;
+ ctx->p2 = &p2;
+ ctx->sz = sizeof(ctx->name_buf);
}
if ((ret = default_fixup_args(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
- ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(ctx->p2);
+ ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(p2);
ctx->p2 = NULL;
}
@@ -2789,6 +2802,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_setget_params_to_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
if (translation->fixup_args != NULL)
fixup = translation->fixup_args;
ctx.action_type = translation->action_type;
+ ctx.ctrl_cmd = translation->ctrl_num;
}
ctx.pctx = pctx;
ctx.params = params;

178
0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch
View File

@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
index 6fd4184af5a52..80ce31b3bca66 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
}
@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
{
if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
return NULL;
+
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
pass, passlen,
@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
if (p7s != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 67a885a45f89e..68ff54d0e90ee 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
index 62230bc6187ff..1e5b5495991a4 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
- if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
- &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
+ || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+ &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
goto err;
} else {
continue;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
index 49a0da5f819c4..8228315eeaa3a 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
- if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+ if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+ if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
+ return 0;
mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
- else
+ } else {
mdalgs = NULL;
+ }
flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
index 1f0cb4d501488..b2c376249646d 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
use strict;
use warnings;
-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file with/;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
use Encode;
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
}
$ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
-plan tests => 13;
+plan tests => 17;
# Test different PKCS#12 formats
ok(run(test(["pkcs12_format_test"])), "test pkcs12 formats");
@@ -148,4 +148,25 @@ ok(grep(/subject=CN = server.example/, @pkcs12info) == 1,
# Test that the expected friendly name is present in the output
ok(grep(/testname/, @pkcs12info) == 1, "test friendly name in output");
+# Test some bad pkcs12 files
+my $bad1 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad1.p12");
+my $bad2 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad2.p12");
+my $bad3 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad3.p12");
+
+with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
+ sub {
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:"])),
+ "test bad pkcs12 file 1");
+
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:",
+ "-nomacver"])),
+ "test bad pkcs12 file 1 (nomacver)");
+
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad2, "-password", "pass:"])),
+ "test bad pkcs12 file 2");
+
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad3, "-password", "pass:"])),
+ "test bad pkcs12 file 3");
+ });
+
SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp));
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f3387c7e356e4aa374729f3f3939343557b9c09
GIT binary patch
literal 85
zcmV-b0IL5mQvv}4Fbf6=Duzgg_YDCD0Wd)@F)$4V31Egu0c8UO0s#d81R(r{)waiY
rfR=Py6XX<mRyon58xHv)BAVy}k(l(hJwF5pk-=q7<yb@T0s;sC$etR(
literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..113cb6f1cd523e880db869f518e60142dc875115
GIT binary patch
literal 104
zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8zIDI;AmiIz{|#&(B{FI%FM#V$jZQ?
z@Tpc|>#<$m7-wj)xrauuD`}hF=<J_T`^8$QMBK7d>Ng9=0`~S~)@=J%OiUaM0Oze6
AD*ylh
literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef86a1d86fb0bc09471ca2596d82e7d521d973a4
GIT binary patch
literal 104
zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8%fB((ZJAvmyI)_&4V$OnT3gwm4QWp
zJ2GXlSm>oA$5$MVJL*60=F*5iN*C_e&wD%dwCM*q{=+OBX|Z+F7XSHN#>B+I003La
BAqM~e
literal 0
HcmV?d00001

87
openssl.spec
View File

@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.0.7
Release: 27%{?dist}
Version: 3.2.1
Release: 1%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -74,8 +74,6 @@ Patch12: 0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch
Patch13: 0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch
# Instructions to load legacy provider in openssl.cnf
Patch24: 0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
# Tmp: test name change
Patch31: 0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch
# We load FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly
Patch32: 0032-Force-fips.patch
# Embed HMAC into the fips.so
@ -94,8 +92,6 @@ Patch47: 0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch
Patch49: 0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049265
Patch50: 0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch
# Backport of patch for RHEL for Edge rhbz #2027261
Patch51: 0051-Support-different-R_BITS-lengths-for-KBKDF.patch
# Allow SHA1 in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes
Patch52: 0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
# Originally from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18103
@ -106,21 +102,9 @@ Patch52: 0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
Patch56: 0056-strcasecmp.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2053289
Patch58: 0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2069235
Patch60: 0060-FIPS-KAT-signature-tests.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2087147
Patch61: 0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch
Patch62: 0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2130708
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18883
Patch67: 0067-ppc64le-Montgomery-multiply.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/44a563dde1584cd9284e80b6e45ee5019be8d36c
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/345c99b6654b8313c792d54f829943068911ddbd
Patch71: 0071-AES-GCM-performance-optimization.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f596bbe4da779b56eea34d96168b557d78e1149
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7e1f3ffcc5bc15fb9a12b9e3bb202f544c6ed5aa
# hunks in crypto/ppccap.c from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f5485b97b6c9977c0d39c7669b9f97a879312447
Patch72: 0072-ChaCha20-performance-optimizations-for-ppc64le.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2102535
Patch73: 0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2102535
@ -149,71 +133,34 @@ Patch84: 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
Patch85: 0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142087
Patch88: 0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142087
Patch89: 0089-PSS-salt-length-from-provider.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142087
Patch90: 0090-signature-Clamp-PSS-salt-len-to-MD-len.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2144561
Patch91: 0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142517
Patch92: 0092-provider-improvements.patch
# FIPS-95
Patch93: 0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
# OpenSSL 3.0.8 CVEs
Patch101: 0101-CVE-2022-4203-nc-match.patch
Patch102: 0102-CVE-2022-4304-RSA-time-oracle.patch
Patch103: 0103-CVE-2022-4450-pem-read-bio.patch
Patch104: 0104-CVE-2023-0215-UAF-bio.patch
Patch105: 0105-CVE-2023-0216-pkcs7-deref.patch
Patch106: 0106-CVE-2023-0217-dsa.patch
Patch107: 0107-CVE-2023-0286-X400.patch
Patch108: 0108-CVE-2023-0401-pkcs7-md.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2169314
Patch109: 0109-fips-Zeroize-out-in-fips-selftest.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2168289
Patch110: 0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2175145
Patch111: 0111-fips-Use-salt-16-bytes-in-PBKDF2-selftest.patch
Patch112: 0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2179331
Patch113: 0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2157951
Patch114: 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
# skip quic and pairwise tests temporarily
Patch115: 0115-skip-quic-pairwise.patch
# Add version aliasing due to
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23534
Patch116: 0116-version-aliasing.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23050
Patch117: 0117-ignore-unknown-sigalgorithms-groups.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23770
Patch118: 0118-no-crl-memleak.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22779
Patch119: 0119-provider-sigalgs-in-signaturealgorithms-conf.patch
# X.509 policies minor CVEs
Patch115: 0115-CVE-2023-0464.patch
Patch116: 0116-CVE-2023-0465.patch
Patch117: 0117-CVE-2023-0466.patch
# AES-XTS CVE
Patch118: 0118-CVE-2023-1255.patch
#https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817
#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2153471
Patch120: 0120-RSA-PKCS15-implicit-rejection.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2160797
Patch121: 0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
Patch122: 0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19386
Patch123: 0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch
Patch125: 0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch
Patch126: 0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch
Patch127: 0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch
Patch128: 0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22403
Patch129: 0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch
Patch130: 0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20317
Patch131: 0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/050d26383d4e264966fb83428e72d5d48f402d35
Patch132: 0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/18c02492138d1eb8b6548cb26e7b625fb2414a2a
Patch133: 0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20780
Patch134: 0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362
Patch135: 0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch
# KTLS regression, temporary skip tests
Patch122: 0122-TMP-KTLS-test-skip.patch
License: ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -553,6 +500,10 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Wed Apr 03 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.1-1
- Rebasing OpenSSL to 3.2.1
Resolves: RHEL-26271
* Wed Feb 21 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-27
- Use certified FIPS module instead of freshly built one in Red Hat distribution
Related: RHEL-23474

2
sources
View File

@ -1 +1 @@
SHA512 (openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz) = 6c2bcd1cd4b499e074e006150dda906980df505679d8e9d988ae93aa61ee6f8c23c0fa369e2edc1e1a743d7bec133044af11d5ed57633b631ae479feb59e3424
SHA512 (openssl-3.2.1.tar.gz) = 29ea75964f78ef5bbe5783ed60d32917408ae4cb7d4aecdbbf2280bfdbc260c7cbabbc03bd179fc994fbee85cebc7213eeb5bfcde5c22db5e83edf2cebe7113f