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Redefine sslarch for x86_64_v2 arch

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This commit is contained in:
Eduard Abdullin 2026-01-28 11:03:13 +00:00 committed by root
commit 2bc6ba69fc
13 changed files with 3689 additions and 2 deletions
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2258
0058-Fix-PPC-register-processing.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

485
0059-CVE-2025-11187.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
From a26d82c5b141c706bc97455cde511e710c2510a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 14:31:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] pkcs12: Validate salt and keylength in PBMAC1
The keylength value must be present and we accept
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE at maximum.
The salt ASN.1 type must be OCTET STRING.
Fixes CVE-2025-11187
Reported by Stanislav Fort (Aisle Research) and Petr Simecek (Aisle Research).
Reported independently also by Hamza (Metadust).
---
crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index f8d0bbd109b..8bb4e30529d 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -123,8 +123,6 @@ static int PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
- keylen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->keylength);
- pbkdf2_salt = pbkdf2_param->salt->value.octet_string;
if (pbkdf2_param->prf == NULL) {
kdf_hmac_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
@@ -139,6 +137,22 @@ static int PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq,
goto err;
}
+ /* Validate salt is an OCTET STRING choice */
+ if (pbkdf2_param->salt == NULL
+ || pbkdf2_param->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pbkdf2_salt = pbkdf2_param->salt->value.octet_string;
+
+ /* RFC 9579 specifies missing key length as invalid */
+ if (pbkdf2_param->keylength != NULL)
+ keylen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->keylength);
+ if (keylen <= 0 || keylen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, pbkdf2_salt->data, pbkdf2_salt->length,
ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->iter), kdf_md, keylen, key) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
From a749dcdb7c944c18af8bf1ce3bd2dbe38e5dcb68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 15:25:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Add testcase for PKCS12 with invalid PBMAC1 key length
---
test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t | 10 +++++++---
.../pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2702 bytes
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
index 06fa85af0f3..ff720894c9b 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ $ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
-plan tests => $no_fips ? 47 : 53;
+plan tests => $no_fips ? 53 : 59;
# Test different PKCS#12 formats
ok(run(test(["pkcs12_format_test"])), "test pkcs12 formats");
@@ -235,8 +235,12 @@ unless ($no_fips) {
}
}
-# Test pbmac1 pkcs12 bad files, RFC 9579
-for my $file ("pbmac1_256_256.bad-iter.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.no-len.p12")
+# Test pbmac1 pkcs12 bad files, RFC 9579 and CVE-2025-11187
+for my $file ("pbmac1_256_256.bad-iter.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt.p12",
+ "pbmac1_256_256.no-len.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12",
+ "pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt-type.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.negative-len.p12",
+ "pbmac1_256_256.no-salt.p12", "pbmac1_256_256.very-big-len.p12",
+ "pbmac1_256_256.zero-len.p12")
{
my $path = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", $file);
with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7548d0f29edd967854aa1a7c9e3a02a09e856f6d
GIT binary patch
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
From ed778fcfb24d7623e7b2ce9beee4af9243767402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 19:31:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Additional PKCS12 PBMAC1 malformed testcase files
---
.../pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12 | Bin 2702 -> 2703 bytes
.../pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt-type.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2702 bytes
.../pbmac1_256_256.negative-len.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2703 bytes
.../pbmac1_256_256.no-salt.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2692 bytes
.../pbmac1_256_256.very-big-len.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2711 bytes
.../pbmac1_256_256.zero-len.p12 | Bin 0 -> 2702 bytes
6 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt-type.p12
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.negative-len.p12
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.no-salt.p12
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.very-big-len.p12
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.zero-len.p12
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-len.p12
index 7548d0f29edd967854aa1a7c9e3a02a09e856f6d..a1acf2fc21b1cb17b40911f7dd126b48c91d50a7 100644
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt-type.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-salt-type.p12
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new file mode 100644
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V5S0iUgTSqA9L1d+j4@yk=wB`Z-!=dM
literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.zero-len.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.zero-len.p12
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0e63eb6077fd94da26ba86f1b6230daab5f5ea3d
GIT binary patch
literal 2702
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MEzPyHz#!0n06<CBdjJ3c
literal 0
HcmV?d00001

207
0060-CVE-2025-15467.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
From 190ba58c0a1d995d4da8b017054d4b74d138291c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Igor Ustinov <igus68@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:13:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Correct handling of AEAD-encrypted CMS with inadmissibly
long IV
Fixes CVE-2025-15467
---
crypto/evp/evp_lib.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index 9eae1d421c2..58fa7ce43b4 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -228,10 +228,9 @@ int evp_cipher_get_asn1_aead_params(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type,
if (type == NULL || asn1_params == NULL)
return 0;
- i = ossl_asn1_type_get_octetstring_int(type, &tl, NULL, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
- if (i <= 0)
+ i = ossl_asn1_type_get_octetstring_int(type, &tl, iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+ if (i <= 0 || i > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
return -1;
- ossl_asn1_type_get_octetstring_int(type, &tl, iv, i);
memcpy(asn1_params->iv, iv, i);
asn1_params->iv_len = i;
From 6fb47957bfb0aef2deaa7df7aebd4eb52ffe20ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Igor Ustinov <igus68@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:15:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Some comments to clarify functions usage
---
crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c b/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c
index 382576364be..e73bda64e3d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ static ossl_inline void asn1_type_init_oct(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct,
oct->flags = 0;
}
+/*
+ * This function copies 'anum' to 'num' and the data of 'oct' to 'data'.
+ * If the length of 'data' > 'max_len', copies only the first 'max_len'
+ * bytes, but returns the full length of 'oct'; this allows distinguishing
+ * whether all the data was copied.
+ */
static int asn1_type_get_int_oct(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct, int32_t anum,
long *num, unsigned char *data, int max_len)
{
@@ -106,6 +112,13 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * This function decodes an int-octet sequence and copies the integer to 'num'
+ * and the data of octet to 'data'.
+ * If the length of 'data' > 'max_len', copies only the first 'max_len'
+ * bytes, but returns the full length of 'oct'; this allows distinguishing
+ * whether all the data was copied.
+ */
int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num,
unsigned char *data, int max_len)
{
@@ -162,6 +175,13 @@ int ossl_asn1_type_set_octetstring_int(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * This function decodes an octet-int sequence and copies the data of octet
+ * to 'data' and the integer to 'num'.
+ * If the length of 'data' > 'max_len', copies only the first 'max_len'
+ * bytes, but returns the full length of 'oct'; this allows distinguishing
+ * whether all the data was copied.
+ */
int ossl_asn1_type_get_octetstring_int(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num,
unsigned char *data, int max_len)
{
From 1e8f5c7cd2c46b25a2877e8f3f4bbf954fbcdf77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Igor Ustinov <igus68@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2026 11:35:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Test for handling of AEAD-encrypted CMS with inadmissibly
long IV
---
test/cmsapitest.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++-
test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t | 3 +-
.../encDataWithTooLongIV.pem | 11 ++++++
3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/encDataWithTooLongIV.pem
diff --git a/test/cmsapitest.c b/test/cmsapitest.c
index 88d519fd148..472d30c9e5d 100644
--- a/test/cmsapitest.c
+++ b/test/cmsapitest.c
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include "../crypto/cms/cms_local.h" /* for d.signedData and d.envelopedData */
#include "testutil.h"
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
static X509 *cert = NULL;
static EVP_PKEY *privkey = NULL;
static char *derin = NULL;
+static char *too_long_iv_cms_in = NULL;
static int test_encrypt_decrypt(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
@@ -479,6 +480,38 @@ static int test_encrypted_data_aead(void)
return ret;
}
+static int test_cms_aesgcm_iv_too_long(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *out = NULL;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+ unsigned long err = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(cmsbio = BIO_new_file(too_long_iv_cms_in, "r")))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(cms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(cmsbio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Must fail cleanly (no crash) */
+ if (!TEST_false(CMS_decrypt(cms, privkey, cert, NULL, out, 0)))
+ goto end;
+ err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (!TEST_ulong_ne(err, 0))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(ERR_GET_LIB(err), ERR_LIB_CMS))
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(ERR_GET_REASON(err), CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR))
+ goto end;
+
+ ret = 1;
+end:
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ BIO_free(cmsbio);
+ BIO_free(out);
+ return ret;
+}
+
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile derfile\n")
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -493,7 +526,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
if (!TEST_ptr(certin = test_get_argument(0))
|| !TEST_ptr(privkeyin = test_get_argument(1))
- || !TEST_ptr(derin = test_get_argument(2)))
+ || !TEST_ptr(derin = test_get_argument(2))
+ || !TEST_ptr(too_long_iv_cms_in = test_get_argument(3)))
return 0;
certbio = BIO_new_file(certin, "r");
@@ -529,6 +563,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_CMS_add1_cert);
ADD_TEST(test_d2i_CMS_bio_NULL);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_d2i_CMS_decode, 2);
+ ADD_TEST(test_cms_aesgcm_iv_too_long);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
index af00355a9d6..182629e71a0 100644
--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ plan tests => 1;
ok(run(test(["cmsapitest", srctop_file("test", "certs", "servercert.pem"),
srctop_file("test", "certs", "serverkey.pem"),
- srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_cmsapi_data", "encryptedData.der")])),
+ srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_cmsapi_data", "encryptedData.der"),
+ srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_cmsapi_data", "encDataWithTooLongIV.pem")])),
"running cmsapitest");
diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/encDataWithTooLongIV.pem b/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/encDataWithTooLongIV.pem
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4323cd2fb0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/encDataWithTooLongIV.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CMS-----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+-----END CMS-----

24
0061-CVE-2025-15468.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From 7da6afe3dac7d65b30f87f2c5d305b6e699bc5dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kubec <kubec@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2026 14:33:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ossl_quic_get_cipher_by_char(): Add a NULL guard before
dereferencing SSL_CIPHER
Fixes CVE-2025-15468
---
ssl/quic/quic_impl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c b/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
index 87c1370a8d6..89c108a9734 100644
--- a/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
+++ b/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
@@ -5222,6 +5222,8 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ossl_quic_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+ if (ciph == NULL)
+ return NULL;
if ((ciph->algorithm2 & SSL_QUIC) == 0)
return NULL;

266
0062-CVE-2025-15469.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
From ef48810aafdc3b8c6c4a85e52314caeec0cb596c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2026 01:21:58 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] Report truncation in oneshot `openssl dgst -sign`
Previously input was silently truncated at 16MB, now if the input is
longer than limit, an error is reported.
The bio_to_mem() apps helper function was changed to return 0 or 1,
and return the size of the result via an output size_t pointer.
Fixes CVE-2025-15469
---
apps/dgst.c | 7 +++---
apps/include/apps.h | 2 +-
apps/lib/apps.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
apps/pkeyutl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++---------------
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/dgst.c b/apps/dgst.c
index 94415128d7f..7168b5f8b84 100644
--- a/apps/dgst.c
+++ b/apps/dgst.c
@@ -721,12 +721,11 @@ static int do_fp_oneshot_sign(BIO *out, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, BIO *in, int sep, int b
{
int res, ret = EXIT_FAILURE;
size_t len = 0;
- int buflen = 0;
- int maxlen = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+ size_t buflen = 0;
+ size_t maxlen = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
uint8_t *buf = NULL, *sig = NULL;
- buflen = bio_to_mem(&buf, maxlen, in);
- if (buflen <= 0) {
+ if (!bio_to_mem(&buf, &buflen, maxlen, in)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Read error in %s\n", file);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/apps/include/apps.h b/apps/include/apps.h
index 6a23dbbb131..c9471ddc4ed 100644
--- a/apps/include/apps.h
+++ b/apps/include/apps.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def);
X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *str, int chtype, int multirdn,
const char *desc);
void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in);
+int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, size_t maxlen, BIO *in);
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value);
int x509_ctrl_string(X509 *x, const char *value);
int x509_req_ctrl_string(X509_REQ *x, const char *value);
diff --git a/apps/lib/apps.c b/apps/lib/apps.c
index 0e436582030..76f3c1683b2 100644
--- a/apps/lib/apps.c
+++ b/apps/lib/apps.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include "apps.h"
#include "internal/sockets.h" /* for openssl_fdset() */
+#include "internal/numbers.h" /* for LONG_MAX */
#include "internal/e_os.h"
#ifdef _WIN32
@@ -2010,45 +2011,45 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *cp, int chtype, int canmulti,
}
/*
- * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return
- * it.
+ * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer.
+ * The return value is one on success, zero on error.
+ * If `maxlen` is non-zero, at most `maxlen` bytes are returned, or else, if
+ * the input is longer than `maxlen`, an error is returned.
+ * If `maxlen` is zero, the limit is effectively `SIZE_MAX`.
*/
-
-int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
+int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, size_t maxlen, BIO *in)
{
+ unsigned char tbuf[4096];
BIO *mem;
- int len, ret;
- unsigned char tbuf[1024];
+ BUF_MEM *bufm;
+ size_t sz = 0;
+ int len;
mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (mem == NULL)
- return -1;
+ return 0;
for (;;) {
- if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024)
- len = maxlen;
- else
- len = 1024;
- len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
- if (len < 0) {
- BIO_free(mem);
- return -1;
- }
- if (len == 0)
+ if ((len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, 4096)) == 0)
break;
- if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
+ if (len < 0
+ || BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len
+ || sz > SIZE_MAX - len
+ || ((sz += len) > maxlen && maxlen != 0)) {
BIO_free(mem);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
- if (maxlen != -1)
- maxlen -= len;
-
- if (maxlen == 0)
- break;
}
- ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out);
- BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+
+ /* So BIO_free orphans BUF_MEM */
+ (void)BIO_set_close(mem, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bufm);
BIO_free(mem);
- return ret;
+ *out = (unsigned char *)bufm->data;
+ *outlen = bufm->length;
+ /* Tell BUF_MEM to orphan data */
+ bufm->data = NULL;
+ BUF_MEM_free(bufm);
+ return 1;
}
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value)
diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
index deecec6bcd7..2681114fba1 100644
--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
+++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx,
EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in,
- int filesize, unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
+ int filesize, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
unsigned char **out, size_t *poutlen);
static int only_nomd(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
char hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, rev = 0, *prog;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL, *secret = NULL;
OPTION_CHOICE o;
- int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1;
+ size_t buf_inlen = 0, siglen = 0;
int keyform = FORMAT_UNDEF, peerform = FORMAT_UNDEF;
int keysize = -1, pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY;
int engine_impl = 0;
@@ -508,31 +508,31 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (sigfile != NULL) {
BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb");
+ size_t maxsiglen = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
if (sigbio == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open signature file %s\n", sigfile);
goto end;
}
- siglen = bio_to_mem(&sig, keysize * 10, sigbio);
- BIO_free(sigbio);
- if (siglen < 0) {
+ if (!bio_to_mem(&sig, &siglen, maxsiglen, sigbio)) {
+ BIO_free(sigbio);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature data\n");
goto end;
}
+ BIO_free(sigbio);
}
/* Raw input data is handled elsewhere */
if (in != NULL && !rawin) {
/* Read the input data */
- buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, -1, in);
- if (buf_inlen < 0) {
+ if (!bio_to_mem(&buf_in, &buf_inlen, 0, in)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
goto end;
}
if (rev) {
size_t i;
unsigned char ctmp;
- size_t l = (size_t)buf_inlen;
+ size_t l = buf_inlen;
for (i = 0; i < l / 2; i++) {
ctmp = buf_in[i];
@@ -547,7 +547,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
&& (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
if (buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Error: The non-raw input data length %d is too long - max supported hashed size is %d\n",
+ "Error: The non-raw input data length %zd is too long - "
+ "max supported hashed size is %d\n",
buf_inlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
goto end;
}
@@ -558,8 +559,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
rv = do_raw_keyop(pkey_op, mctx, pkey, in, filesize, sig, siglen,
NULL, 0);
} else {
- rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
- buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
+ rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, buf_in, buf_inlen);
}
if (rv == 1) {
BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verified Successfully\n");
@@ -578,8 +578,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
buf_outlen = kdflen;
rv = 1;
} else {
- rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
- buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen, NULL, (size_t *)&secretlen);
+ rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, &buf_outlen,
+ buf_in, buf_inlen, NULL, &secretlen);
}
if (rv > 0
&& (secretlen > 0 || (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE
@@ -589,8 +589,8 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (secretlen > 0)
secret = app_malloc(secretlen, "secret output");
rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op,
- buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
- buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen, secret, (size_t *)&secretlen);
+ buf_out, &buf_outlen,
+ buf_in, buf_inlen, secret, &secretlen);
}
}
if (rv <= 0) {
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx,
EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in,
- int filesize, unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
+ int filesize, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
unsigned char **out, size_t *poutlen)
{
int rv = 0;
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx,
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading raw input data\n");
goto end;
}
- rv = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, (size_t)siglen, mbuf, buf_len);
+ rv = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, siglen, mbuf, buf_len);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
buf_len = BIO_read(in, mbuf, filesize);
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx,
goto end;
}
}
- rv = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, sig, (size_t)siglen);
+ rv = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, sig, siglen);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN:
for (;;) {

30
0063-CVE-2025-66199.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 04a93ac145041e3ef0121a2688cf7c1b23780519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Igor Ustinov <igus68@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 14:02:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Check the received uncompressed certificate length to prevent
excessive pre-decompression allocation.
The patch was proposed by Tomas Dulka and Stanislav Fort (Aisle Research).
Fixes: CVE-2025-66199
---
ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index 9e0c853c0d2..f82d8dcdac1 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -2877,6 +2877,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
goto err;
}
+ /* Prevent excessive pre-decompression allocation */
+ if (expected_length > sc->max_cert_list) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length || comp_length == 0) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto err;

64
0064-CVE-2025-68160.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 701aa270db8ad424cece68702b9bb2e05290af9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2026 11:52:09 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap buffer overflow in BIO_f_linebuffer
When a FIO_f_linebuffer is part of a bio chain, and the next BIO
preforms short writes, the remainder of the unwritten buffer is copied
unconditionally to the internal buffer ctx->obuf, which may not be
sufficiently sized to handle the remaining data, resulting in a buffer
overflow.
Fix it by only copying data when ctx->obuf has space, flushing to the
next BIO to increase available storage if needed.
Fixes CVE-2025-68160
---
crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c b/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c
index 1dfcac8f2ea..e4af2a8c4ff 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c
@@ -187,14 +187,34 @@ static int linebuffer_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
while (foundnl && inl > 0);
/*
* We've written as much as we can. The rest of the input buffer, if
- * any, is text that doesn't and with a NL and therefore needs to be
- * saved for the next trip.
+ * any, is text that doesn't end with a NL and therefore we need to try
+ * free up some space in our obuf so we can make forward progress.
*/
- if (inl > 0) {
- memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, inl);
- ctx->obuf_len += inl;
- num += inl;
+ while (inl > 0) {
+ size_t avail = (size_t)ctx->obuf_size - (size_t)ctx->obuf_len;
+ size_t to_copy;
+
+ if (avail == 0) {
+ /* Flush buffered data to make room */
+ i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ return num > 0 ? num : i;
+ }
+ if (i < ctx->obuf_len)
+ memmove(ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf + i, ctx->obuf_len - i);
+ ctx->obuf_len -= i;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ to_copy = inl > (int)avail ? avail : (size_t)inl;
+ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, to_copy);
+ ctx->obuf_len += (int)to_copy;
+ in += to_copy;
+ inl -= (int)to_copy;
+ num += (int)to_copy;
}
+
return num;
}

67
0065-CVE-2025-69418.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 1a556ff619473af9e179b202284a961590d5a2bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Norbert Pocs <norbertp@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 15:04:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix OCB AES-NI/HW stream path unauthenticated/unencrypted
trailing bytes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When ctx->stream (e.g., AES‑NI or ARMv8 CE) is available, the fast path
encrypts/decrypts full blocks but does not advance in/out pointers. The
tail-handling code then operates on the base pointers, effectively reprocessing
the beginning of the buffer while leaving the actual trailing bytes
unencrypted (encryption) or using the wrong plaintext (decryption). The
authentication checksum excludes the true tail.
CVE-2025-69418
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/srt/issues/58
Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertp@openssl.org>
---
crypto/modes/ocb128.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
index ce72baf6da5..8a5d7c7db00 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks
&& ctx->stream != NULL) {
- size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks;
+ size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks, processed_bytes = 0;
/*
* See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand
@@ -351,6 +351,9 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keyenc,
(size_t)ctx->sess.blocks_processed + 1, ctx->sess.offset.c,
(const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->sess.checksum.c);
+ processed_bytes = num_blocks * 16;
+ in += processed_bytes;
+ out += processed_bytes;
} else {
/* Loop through all full blocks to be encrypted */
for (i = ctx->sess.blocks_processed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) {
@@ -429,7 +432,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks
&& ctx->stream != NULL) {
- size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks;
+ size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks, processed_bytes = 0;
/*
* See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand
@@ -443,6 +446,9 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keydec,
(size_t)ctx->sess.blocks_processed + 1, ctx->sess.offset.c,
(const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->sess.checksum.c);
+ processed_bytes = num_blocks * 16;
+ in += processed_bytes;
+ out += processed_bytes;
} else {
OCB_BLOCK tmp;

37
0066-CVE-2025-69420.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 6453d278557c8719233793730ec500c84aea55d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bob Beck <beck@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2026 11:29:48 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Verify ASN1 object's types before attempting to access them
as a particular type
Issue was reported in ossl_ess_get_signing_cert but is also present in
ossl_ess_get_signing_cert_v2.
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/srt/issues/61
Fixes CVE-2025-69420
---
crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 3876e30f47b..40dab687d1c 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ossl_ess_get_signing_cert(const PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
const unsigned char *p;
attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate);
- if (attr == NULL)
+ if (attr == NULL || attr->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = attr->value.sequence->data;
return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2 *ossl_ess_get_signing_cert_v2(const PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
const unsigned char *p;
attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2);
- if (attr == NULL)
+ if (attr == NULL || attr->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = attr->value.sequence->data;
return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);

28
0067-CVE-2025-69421.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 0a2ecb95993b588d2156dd6527459cc3983aabd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Dinh <andrewd@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2026 01:24:30 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add NULL check to PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex
Address CVE-2025-69421
Add NULL check for oct parameter
---
crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c
index 606713b9ee9..1614da44042 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c
@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ void *PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *ret;
int outlen = 0;
+ if (oct == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt_ex(algor, pass, passlen, oct->data, oct->length,
&out, &outlen, 0, libctx, propq))
return NULL;

136
0068-CVE-2025-69419.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c b/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
index b7a5284fa59fa..7be233db5e0b2 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
@@ -123,7 +123,10 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
return -1;
}
- /* Now work out output format and string type */
+ /*
+ * Now work out output format and string type.
+ * These checks should be in sync with the checks in type_str.
+ */
outform = MBSTRING_ASC;
if (mask & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING)
str_type = V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING;
@@ -191,7 +194,11 @@ int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
case MBSTRING_UTF8:
outlen = 0;
- traverse_string(in, len, inform, out_utf8, &outlen);
+ ret = traverse_string(in, len, inform, out_utf8, &outlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING);
+ return -1;
+ }
cpyfunc = cpy_utf8;
break;
}
@@ -286,9 +293,29 @@ static int out_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg)
static int type_str(unsigned long value, void *arg)
{
- unsigned long types = *((unsigned long *)arg);
+ unsigned long usable_types = *((unsigned long *)arg);
+ unsigned long types = usable_types;
const int native = value > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : ossl_fromascii(value);
+ /*
+ * Clear out all the types which are not checked later. If any of those
+ * is present in the mask, then the UTF8 type will be added and checked
+ * below.
+ */
+ types &= B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING | B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+ | B_ASN1_IA5STRING | B_ASN1_T61STRING | B_ASN1_BMPSTRING
+ | B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING | B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+
+ /*
+ * If any other types were in the input mask, they're effectively treated
+ * as UTF8
+ */
+ if (types != usable_types)
+ types |= B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
+
+ /*
+ * These checks should be in sync with ASN1_mbstring_ncopy.
+ */
if ((types & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) && !(ossl_isdigit(native)
|| native == ' '))
types &= ~B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING;
@@ -356,6 +383,8 @@ static int cpy_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg)
p = arg;
/* We already know there is enough room so pass 0xff as the length */
ret = UTF8_putc(*p, 0xff, value);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
*p += ret;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 17f7372026c3b..01e2269444cba 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -198,8 +198,10 @@ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen,
orflags = CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253;
if (type & BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8) {
unsigned char utfbuf[6];
- int utflen;
- utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof(utfbuf), c);
+ int utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof(utfbuf), c);
+
+ if (utflen < 0)
+ return -1; /* error happened with UTF8 */
for (i = 0; i < utflen; i++) {
/*
* We don't need to worry about setting orflags correctly
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
index 50adce6b26fd2..8b5f2909e8d96 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
@@ -213,6 +213,11 @@ char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen)
/* re-run the loop emitting UTF-8 string */
for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) {
j = bmp_to_utf8(asctmp+asclen, uni+i, unilen-i);
+ /* when UTF8_putc fails */
+ if (j < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(asctmp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (j == 4) i += 4;
else i += 2;
asclen += j;
diff --git a/test/asn1_internal_test.c b/test/asn1_internal_test.c
index e08e2a11be9b7..56af2b369b4dd 100644
--- a/test/asn1_internal_test.c
+++ b/test/asn1_internal_test.c
@@ -554,6 +554,22 @@ static int posix_time_test(void)
return 1;
}
+static int test_mbstring_ncopy(void)
+{
+ ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+ const unsigned char in[] = { 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFE };
+ int inlen = 4;
+ int inform = MBSTRING_UNIV;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(&str, in, inlen, inform, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, 0, 0), -1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(&str, in, inlen, inform, B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING, 0, 0), -1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(&str, in, inlen, inform, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, 0, 0), -1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(&str, in, inlen, inform, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 0, 0), -1))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_TEST(test_tbl_standard);
@@ -565,5 +581,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_unicode_range);
ADD_TEST(test_obj_create);
ADD_TEST(test_obj_nid_undef);
+ ADD_TEST(test_mbstring_ncopy);
return 1;
}

52
0069-CVE-2026-22795.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index 7b2cabdc428a9..d0611433261dc 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -2847,8 +2847,9 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
- if (atyp == NULL) {
+ if (atyp == NULL || atyp->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
NCONF_free(cnf);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ASN1_generate_nconf failed\n");
goto end;
}
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
index 10b581612dbb2..d0236e34fe9df 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
@@ -196,11 +196,17 @@ static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName))) {
+ if (attrib->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+ return 0;
fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
+ }
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID))) {
+ if (attrib->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ return 0;
lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
+ }
switch (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag)) {
case NID_keyBag:
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 02444d983c476..7798846b16ec1 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -1229,6 +1229,8 @@ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
ASN1_TYPE *astype;
if ((astype = get_attribute(sk, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest)) == NULL)
return NULL;
+ if (astype->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ return NULL;
return astype->value.octet_string;
}

37
openssl.spec
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.5.1
Release: 5%{?dist}.alma.1
Release: 7%{?dist}.alma.1
Epoch: 1
Source0: openssl-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: fips-hmacify.sh
@ -99,6 +99,18 @@ Patch0054: 0054-Temporarily-disable-SLH-DSA-FIPS-self-tests.patch
Patch0055: 0055-Add-a-define-to-disable-symver-attributes.patch
Patch0056: 0056-Fix-incorrect-check-of-unwrapped-key-size.patch
Patch0057: 0057-Do-not-make-key-share-choice-in-tls1_set_groups.patch
Patch0058: 0058-Fix-PPC-register-processing.patch
Patch0059: 0059-CVE-2025-11187.patch
Patch0060: 0060-CVE-2025-15467.patch
Patch0061: 0061-CVE-2025-15468.patch
Patch0062: 0062-CVE-2025-15469.patch
Patch0063: 0063-CVE-2025-66199.patch
Patch0064: 0064-CVE-2025-68160.patch
Patch0065: 0065-CVE-2025-69418.patch
Patch0066: 0066-CVE-2025-69420.patch
Patch0067: 0067-CVE-2025-69421.patch
Patch0068: 0068-CVE-2025-69419.patch
Patch0069: 0069-CVE-2026-22795.patch
License: Apache-2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -458,9 +470,30 @@ touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_prefix}/include/openssl/engine.h
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Mon Jan 12 2026 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.5.1-5.alma.1
* Wed Jan 28 2026 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.5.1-7.alma.1
- Redefine sslarch for x86_64_v2 arch
* Fri Jan 16 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.5.1-7
- Fix CVE-2025-11187 CVE-2025-15467 CVE-2025-15468 CVE-2025-15469
CVE-2025-66199 CVE-2025-68160 CVE-2025-69418 CVE-2025-69419 CVE-2025-69420
CVE-2025-69421 CVE-2026-22795 CVE-2026-22796
Resolves: RHEL-142062
Resolves: RHEL-141985
Resolves: RHEL-142053
Resolves: RHEL-142049
Resolves: RHEL-142045
Resolves: RHEL-142041
Resolves: RHEL-142037
Resolves: RHEL-142033
Resolves: RHEL-142029
Resolves: RHEL-142008
Resolves: RHEL-142025
Resolves: RHEL-142021
* Wed Jan 07 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.5.1-6
- Fix AES/GCM ppc64le encrypt/decrypt
Resolves: RHEL-139108
* Thu Dec 11 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 1:3.5.1-5
- Do not make key share choice in tls1_set_groups()
Resolves: RHEL-130992