more fixes from upstream CVS

- fix DSA key pairwise check (#878597)
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2012-11-20 22:33:42 +01:00
parent d8e7bfc73b
commit 12aab15a03
3 changed files with 296 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c.backports2 2012-01-05 14:46:27.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c 2012-09-07 10:34:42.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c 2012-11-14 20:27:50.240211707 +0100
@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
@ -19,9 +19,20 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/apps/cms.c
if (secret_key)
{
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c.backports2 2011-01-03 02:30:58.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c 2012-11-20 22:13:05.722766980 +0100
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **
if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
stmp.data = NULL;
+ stmp.length = 0;
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
if(ret < 0) return ret;
*out = stmp.data;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2 2012-09-06 17:25:22.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h 2012-09-07 10:22:43.000000000 +0200
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2 2012-11-14 20:27:49.696199811 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h 2012-11-14 20:27:50.240211707 +0100
@@ -282,16 +282,23 @@ extern "C" {
# endif
# elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
@ -48,9 +59,30 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/bn/b
# endif
# endif /* cpu */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c.backports2 2012-11-14 20:27:50.238211664 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/evp/e_aes.c 2012-11-20 22:10:06.350891703 +0100
@@ -968,8 +968,6 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
if (!gctx->iv_set)
return -1;
- if (!ctx->encrypt && gctx->taglen < 0)
- return -1;
if (in)
{
if (out == NULL)
@@ -1011,6 +1009,8 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
{
if (!ctx->encrypt)
{
+ if (gctx->taglen < 0)
+ return -1;
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
return -1;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.backports2 2012-01-25 18:56:24.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2012-09-07 10:24:56.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2012-11-14 20:27:50.241211729 +0100
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT
void (*gcm_gmult_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult;
#endif
@ -60,9 +92,57 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/m
GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
if (is_endian.little) {
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
--- openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl.backports2 2012-11-14 20:27:50.293212866 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl 2012-11-20 22:20:15.015041719 +0100
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
$code.=<<___;
teq $Xi,sp
bne .L_00_15 @ [((11+4)*5+2)*3]
+ sub sp,sp,#25*4
___
&BODY_00_15(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V));
&BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V));
@@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
ldr $K,.LK_20_39 @ [+15+16*4]
- sub sp,sp,#25*4
cmn sp,#0 @ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39
.L_20_39_or_60_79:
___
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c.backports2 2012-04-15 19:23:41.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2012-11-20 22:23:21.684755182 +0100
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
}
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
@@ -1403,6 +1403,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
+ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
if (ret < 0) ret=1;
if (0)
{
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c.backports2 2011-05-11 15:37:52.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2012-09-07 10:33:54.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2012-11-14 20:27:50.241211729 +0100
@@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT
{
/* Set digest values to defaults */
@ -80,10 +160,212 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_cert.c
#endif
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports2 2012-01-05 11:22:39.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2012-11-20 22:25:29.243509755 +0100
@@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509
#endif
/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
CERT *c;
@@ -2345,9 +2345,17 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(NULL);
}
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
- return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ return c->pkeys + i;
+ }
+
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ if (!cpk)
+ return NULL;
+ return cpk->x509;
}
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
@@ -2780,7 +2788,9 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
- if (s->cert != NULL)
+ if (s->server)
+ return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
+ else if (s->cert != NULL)
return(s->cert->key->x509);
else
return(NULL);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h.backports2 2012-11-14 20:27:50.056207682 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2012-11-20 22:25:29.244509777 +0100
@@ -814,7 +814,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_O
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *);
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
@@ -1065,7 +1066,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c.backports2 2012-03-21 22:32:57.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c 2012-09-07 10:33:54.000000000 +0200
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c 2012-11-20 22:25:29.244509777 +0100
@@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *
return 1;
}
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
{
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1782,42 +1782,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
- * the certificate has changed.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
- {
- int r;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r)
- {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
{
/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
* but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
- * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+ * so this has to happen here in
+ * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
int r = 1;
@@ -1869,8 +1839,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
}
-#endif
err:
+#endif
switch (ret)
{
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1888,6 +1858,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
}
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ int al;
+
+ /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+ * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (certpkey == NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+ * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r)
+ {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -2414,7 +2449,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
@ -92,7 +374,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c.backports2 openssl-1.0.1c/ssl/t1_lib.c
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
@@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
@@ -2425,7 +2460,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const u
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)

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@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips openssl-1.0.1c/crypto/dsa/dsa_
+ unsigned char tbs[] = "DSA Pairwise Check Data";
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((pk=EVP_PKEY_new()) != NULL)
+ if ((pk=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, dsa);

View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implem
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1c
# Do not forget to bump SHLIB_VERSION on version upgrades
Release: 8%{?dist}
Release: 9%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -431,6 +431,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
* Tue Nov 20 2012 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1c-9
- more fixes from upstream CVS
- fix DSA key pairwise check (#878597)
* Thu Nov 15 2012 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1c-8
- use 1024 bit DH parameters in s_server as 512 bit is not allowed
in FIPS mode and it is quite weak anyway