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eabdullin 2024-09-09 11:55:14 +03:00
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109
0129-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
From 99fb785a5f85315b95288921a321a935ea29a51e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
same for the server list while we are about it.
CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 016135fe18..cf52b317cf 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3518,37 +3518,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+ * a match.
+ */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+ } else {
+ /* This should never happen */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
- j += client[j];
- j++;
}
- i += server[i];
- i++;
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
}
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
+ /*
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+ */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
--
2.46.0

39
0130-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 015255851371757d54c2560643eb3b3a88123cf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:18:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when
processing NPN
In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
explicit and return a handshake failure alert.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 381a6c9d7b..1ab3c13d57 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1560,8 +1560,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
&selected, &selected_len,
PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
--
2.46.0

34
0131-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 6cc511826f09e513b4ec066d9b95acaf4f86d991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:22:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Use correctly formatted ALPN data in tserver
The QUIC test server was using incorrectly formatted ALPN data. With the
previous implementation of SSL_select_next_proto this went unnoticed. With
the new stricter implemenation it was failing.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
index 86187d06ff..15694e723f 100644
--- a/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
+++ b/ssl/quic/quic_tserver.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
if (srv->args.alpn == NULL) {
alpn = alpndeflt;
- alpnlen = sizeof(alpn);
+ alpnlen = sizeof(alpndeflt);
} else {
alpn = srv->args.alpn;
alpnlen = srv->args.alpnlen;
--
2.46.0

78
0132-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From 8e81c57adbbf703dfb63955f65599765fdacc741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:46:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Clarify the SSL_select_next_proto() documentation
We clarify the input preconditions and the expected behaviour in the event
of no overlap.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
index 05fee2fbec..79e1a252f6 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
-B<protos_len>.
+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
+
+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
+SSL_select_next_proto().
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -154,7 +163,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
-B<out>, B<outlen>.
+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
+B<client> is invalid).
=back
--
2.46.0

172
0133-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
From add5c52a25c549cec4a730cdf96e2252f0a1862d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 16:35:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/10] Add a test for SSL_select_next_proto
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/sslapitest.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index ce163322cd..15cb9060cb 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11741,6 +11741,142 @@ static int test_multi_resume(int idx)
return testresult;
}
+static struct next_proto_st {
+ int serverlen;
+ unsigned char server[40];
+ int clientlen;
+ unsigned char client[40];
+ int expected_ret;
+ size_t selectedlen;
+ unsigned char selected[40];
+} next_proto_tests[] = {
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b', },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 7, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 10, { 2, 'b', 'c', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c', 2, 'a', 'b' },
+ 7, { 2, 'a', 'b', 3, 'a', 'b', 'c'},
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'b', 'c', 'd' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 0, { 0 },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ -1, { 0 },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 0, { 0 },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ -1, { 0 },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ },
+ {
+ 3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 3, { 'a', 'b', 'c' }
+ },
+ {
+ 4, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ 3, { 3, 'a', 'b', 'c' },
+ OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP,
+ 0, { 0 }
+ }
+};
+
+static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
+{
+ struct next_proto_st *np = &next_proto_tests[idx];
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *out, *client, *server;
+ unsigned char outlen;
+ unsigned int clientlen, serverlen;
+
+ if (np->clientlen == -1) {
+ client = NULL;
+ clientlen = 0;
+ } else {
+ client = np->client;
+ clientlen = (unsigned int)np->clientlen;
+ }
+ if (np->serverlen == -1) {
+ server = NULL;
+ serverlen = 0;
+ } else {
+ server = np->server;
+ serverlen = (unsigned int)np->serverlen;
+ }
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_select_next_proto(&out, &outlen, server, serverlen,
+ client, clientlen),
+ np->expected_ret))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (np->selectedlen == 0) {
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(out) || !TEST_uchar_eq(outlen, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, outlen, np->selected, np->selectedlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12053,6 +12189,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake_retry, 16);
ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
return 1;
err:
--
2.46.0

1169
0134-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

39
0135-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 53f5677f358c4a4f69830d944ea40e71950673b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:41:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 07/10] Correct return values for
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg
Return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT in the event that we don't send the extension,
rather than EXT_RETURN_SENT. This actually makes no difference at all to
the current control flow since this return value is ignored in this case
anyway. But lets make it correct anyway.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 800654450e..66ed7dacf2 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1501,9 +1501,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif
--
2.46.0

62
0136-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 195e15421df113d7283aab2ccff8b8fb06df5465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 11:51:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Add ALPN validation in the client
The ALPN protocol selected by the server must be one that we originally
advertised. We should verify that it is.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 1ab3c13d57..ff9c009ee5 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1590,6 +1590,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
@@ -1608,6 +1610,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
--
2.46.0

267
0137-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
From 7c95191434415d1c9b7fe9b130df13cce630b6b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:09:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Add explicit testing of ALN and NPN in sslapitest
We already had some tests elsewhere - but this extends that testing with
additional tests.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/sslapitest.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 229 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 15cb9060cb..7a55a2b721 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -11877,6 +11877,231 @@ static int test_select_next_proto(int idx)
return ret;
}
+static const unsigned char fooprot[] = {3, 'f', 'o', 'o' };
+static const unsigned char barprot[] = {3, 'b', 'a', 'r' };
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+static int npn_advert_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ default:
+ case 0:
+ *out = fooprot;
+ *outlen = sizeof(fooprot);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 1:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 2:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int npn_select_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *fooprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 3:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *barprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 4:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ default:
+ case 2:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the NPN callbacks
+ * Test 0: advert = foo, select = foo
+ * Test 1: advert = <empty>, select = foo
+ * Test 2: no advert
+ * Test 3: advert = foo, select = bar
+ * Test 4: advert = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
+ */
+static int test_npn(int idx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(), 0, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+ &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(sctx, npn_advert_cb, &idx);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(cctx, npn_select_cb, &idx);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
+ NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 4) {
+ /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
+ if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *prot;
+ unsigned int protlen;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(serverssl, &prot, &protlen);
+ switch (idx) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, barprot + 1, *barprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ default:
+ TEST_error("Should not get here");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) */
+
+static int alpn_select_cb2(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ int *idx = (int *)arg;
+
+ switch (*idx) {
+ case 0:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(fooprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *fooprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 2:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)(barprot + 1);
+ *outlen = *barprot;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ case 3:
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ default:
+ case 1:
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the ALPN callbacks
+ * Test 0: client = foo, select = foo
+ * Test 1: client = <empty>, select = none
+ * Test 2: client = foo, select = bar (should fail)
+ * Test 3: client = foo, select = <empty> (should fail)
+ */
+static int test_alpn(int idx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ const unsigned char *prots = fooprot;
+ unsigned int protslen = sizeof(fooprot);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(), 0, 0,
+ &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb2, &idx);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL,
+ NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 1) {
+ prots = NULL;
+ protslen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success! */
+ if (!TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, prots, protslen)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (idx == 2 || idx == 3) {
+ /* We don't allow empty selection of NPN, so this should fail */
+ if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *prot;
+ unsigned int protlen;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(clientssl, &prot, &protlen);
+ switch (idx) {
+ case 0:
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(prot, protlen, fooprot + 1, *fooprot))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (!TEST_uint_eq(protlen, 0))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+ default:
+ TEST_error("Should not get here");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile srpvfile tmpfile provider config dhfile\n")
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -12190,6 +12415,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_data_retry);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_multi_resume, 5);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_select_next_proto, OSSL_NELEM(next_proto_tests));
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_npn, 5);
+#endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_alpn, 4);
return 1;
err:
--
2.46.0

199
0138-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
From 301b870546d1c7b2d8f0d66e04a2596142f0399f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 14:29:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Add a test for an empty NextProto message
It is valid according to the spec for a NextProto message to have no
protocols listed in it. The OpenSSL implementation however does not allow
us to create such a message. In order to check that we work as expected
when communicating with a client that does generate such messages we have
to use a TLSProxy test.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717)
---
test/recipes/70-test_npn.t | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm | 9 ++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm | 1 +
4 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
create mode 100644 util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f82e71af6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/70-test_npn.t
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+use TLSProxy::Proxy;
+
+my $test_name = "test_npn";
+setup($test_name);
+
+plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
+ if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
+ if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
+ if disabled("sock");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs NPN enabled"
+ if disabled("nextprotoneg");
+
+plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled"
+ if disabled("tls1_2");
+
+my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+ undef,
+ cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
+ srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
+ (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
+);
+
+$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+plan tests => 1;
+
+my $npnseen = 0;
+
+# Test 1: Check sending an empty NextProto message from the client works. This is
+# valid as per the spec, but OpenSSL does not allow you to send it.
+# Therefore we must be prepared to receive such a message but we cannot
+# generate it except via TLSProxy
+$proxy->clear();
+$proxy->filter(\&npn_filter);
+$proxy->clientflags("-nextprotoneg foo -no_tls1_3");
+$proxy->serverflags("-nextprotoneg foo");
+$proxy->start();
+ok($npnseen && TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Empty NPN message");
+
+sub npn_filter
+{
+ my $proxy = shift;
+ my $message;
+
+ # The NextProto message always appears in flight 2
+ return if $proxy->flight != 2;
+
+ foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
+ if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+ # Our TLSproxy NextProto message support doesn't support parsing of
+ # the message. If we repack it just creates an empty NextProto
+ # message - which is exactly the scenario we want to test here.
+ $message->repack();
+ $npnseen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
index ce22187569..fb41b2ffc8 100644
--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
@@ -384,6 +384,15 @@ sub create_message
[@message_frag_lens]
);
$message->parse();
+ } elsif ($mt == MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+ $message = TLSProxy::NextProto->new(
+ $server,
+ $data,
+ [@message_rec_list],
+ $startoffset,
+ [@message_frag_lens]
+ );
+ $message->parse();
} else {
#Unknown message type
$message = TLSProxy::Message->new(
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e18347546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/NextProto.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+use strict;
+
+package TLSProxy::NextProto;
+
+use vars '@ISA';
+push @ISA, 'TLSProxy::Message';
+
+sub new
+{
+ my $class = shift;
+ my ($server,
+ $data,
+ $records,
+ $startoffset,
+ $message_frag_lens) = @_;
+
+ my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
+ $server,
+ TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ $data,
+ $records,
+ $startoffset,
+ $message_frag_lens);
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub parse
+{
+ # We don't support parsing at the moment
+}
+
+# This is supposed to reconstruct the on-the-wire message data following changes.
+# For now though since we don't support parsing we just create an empty NextProto
+# message - this capability is used in test_npn
+sub set_message_contents
+{
+ my $self = shift;
+ my $data;
+
+ $data = pack("C32", 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
+ $self->data($data);
+}
+1;
diff --git a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
index 3de10eccb9..b707722b6b 100644
--- a/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
+++ b/util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use TLSProxy::CertificateRequest;
use TLSProxy::CertificateVerify;
use TLSProxy::ServerKeyExchange;
use TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket;
+use TLSProxy::NextProto;
my $have_IPv6;
my $IP_factory;
--
2.46.0

233
0139-CVE-2024-6119.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
index 1a18174995..a09414c972 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
@@ -916,36 +916,64 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
ASN1_STRING *cstr;
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)) {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
- NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox) {
- san_present = 1;
-
- /*
- * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected and we
- * treat it as no match
- */
- if (gen->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
- cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
-
- /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
- if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, 0, equal, flags,
- chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
- break;
- }
- } else
+ switch (gen->type) {
+ default:
+ continue;
+ case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id)) {
+ default:
continue;
- } else {
- if ((gen->type != check_type) && (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME))
+ case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox:
+ /*-
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8398#section-3
+ *
+ * Due to name constraint compatibility reasons described
+ * in Section 6, SmtpUTF8Mailbox subjectAltName MUST NOT
+ * be used unless the local-part of the email address
+ * contains non-ASCII characters. When the local-part is
+ * ASCII, rfc822Name subjectAltName MUST be used instead
+ * of SmtpUTF8Mailbox. This is compatible with legacy
+ * software that supports only rfc822Name (and not
+ * SmtpUTF8Mailbox). [...]
+ *
+ * SmtpUTF8Mailbox is encoded as UTF8String.
+ *
+ * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected, and
+ * we ignore the invalid SAN (neither set san_present nor
+ * consider it a candidate for equality). This does mean
+ * that the subject CN may be considered, as would be the
+ * case when the malformed SmtpUtf8Mailbox SAN is instead
+ * simply absent.
+ *
+ * When CN-ID matching is not desirable, applications can
+ * choose to turn it off, doing so is at this time a best
+ * practice.
+ */
+ if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL
+ || gen->d.otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+ continue;
+ alt_type = 0;
+ cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case GEN_EMAIL:
+ if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL)
continue;
- }
- san_present = 1;
- if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
- else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
+ break;
+ case GEN_DNS:
+ if (check_type != GEN_DNS)
+ continue;
cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
- else
+ break;
+ case GEN_IPADD:
+ if (check_type != GEN_IPADD)
+ continue;
cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
+ break;
+ }
+ san_present = 1;
/* Positive on success, negative on error! */
if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
index 522982ddfb..e18735d89a 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ setup("test_eai_data");
#./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_leaf.pem
#./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_leaf.pem
-plan tests => 12;
+plan tests => 16;
require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
my $folder = "test/recipes/25-test_eai_data";
my $ascii_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_leaf.pem");
my $utf8_pem = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_leaf.pem");
+my $kdc_pem = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-cert.pem");
my $ascii_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_chain.pem");
my $utf8_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_chain.pem");
+my $kdc_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-root-cert.pem");
my $out;
my $outcnt = 0;
@@ -56,10 +58,18 @@ SKIP: {
ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
+# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an DNS name, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_hostname", 'mx1.example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an email address, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'joe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+# We expect SmtpUTF8Mailbox to be a UTF8 String, not an IA5String.
+ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'moe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+
#Check that we get the expected failure return code
with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
sub {
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8a2c6f55d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a74c96bf31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..7a8dbc719f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env bash
+
+# Create a root CA, signing a leaf cert with a KDC principal otherName SAN, and
+# also a non-UTF8 smtpUtf8Mailbox SAN followed by an rfc822Name SAN and a DNS
+# name SAN. In the vulnerable EAI code, the KDC principal `otherName` should
+# trigger ASAN errors in DNS name checks, while the non-UTF8 `smtpUtf8Mailbox`
+# should likewise lead to ASAN issues with email name checks.
+
+rm -f root-key.pem root-cert.pem
+openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-root-key.pem \
+ -x509 -subj /CN=Root -days 36524 -out kdc-root-cert.pem
+
+exts=$(
+ printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s = " \
+ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
+ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
+ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+ "subjectAltName"
+ printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name"
+ printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9;IA5:moe@example.com"
+ printf "%s, " "email:joe@example.com"
+ printf "%s\n" "DNS:mx1.example.com"
+ printf "[kdc_princ_name]\n"
+ printf "realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
+ printf "principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq\n"
+ printf "[kdc_principal_seq]\n"
+ printf "name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1\n"
+ printf "name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_components\n"
+ printf "[kdc_principal_components]\n"
+ printf "princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt\n"
+ printf "princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
+ )
+
+printf "%s\n" "$exts"
+
+openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-key.pem \
+ -subj "/CN=TEST.EXAMPLE" |
+ openssl x509 -req -out kdc-cert.pem \
+ -CA "kdc-root-cert.pem" -CAkey "kdc-root-key.pem" \
+ -set_serial 2 -days 36524 \
+ -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts")

24
openssl.spec
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 3.2.2
Release: 10%{?dist}.alma.1
Release: 12%{?dist}.alma.1
Epoch: 1
Source: openssl-%{version}.tar.gz
Source2: Makefile.certificate
@ -169,6 +169,18 @@ Patch126: 0126-pkeyutl-encap.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/25056
Patch127: 0127-speedup-SSL_add_cert_subjects_to_stack.patch
Patch128: 0128-SAST-findings.patch
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717
Patch129: 0129-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Patch130: 0130-More-correctly-handle-a-selected_len-of-0-when-proce.patch
Patch131: 0131-Use-correctly-formatted-ALPN-data-in-tserver.patch
Patch132: 0132-Clarify-the-SSL_select_next_proto-documentation.patch
Patch133: 0133-Add-a-test-for-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Patch134: 0134-Allow-an-empty-NPN-ALPN-protocol-list-in-the-tests.patch
Patch135: 0135-Correct-return-values-for-tls_construct_stoc_next_pr.patch
Patch136: 0136-Add-ALPN-validation-in-the-client.patch
Patch137: 0137-Add-explicit-testing-of-ALN-and-NPN-in-sslapitest.patch
Patch138: 0138-Add-a-test-for-an-empty-NextProto-message.patch
Patch139: 0139-CVE-2024-6119.patch
License: Apache-2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -517,9 +529,17 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Mon Sep 02 2024 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.2.2-10.alma.1
* Mon Sep 09 2024 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 1:3.2.2-12.alma.1
- Redefine sslarch for x86_64_v2 arch
* Wed Sep 04 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-12
- Fix CVE-2024-6119: Possible denial of service in X.509 name checks
Resolves: RHEL-55303
* Wed Aug 21 2024 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-11
- Fix CVE-2024-5535: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread
Resolves: RHEL-45692
* Wed Aug 14 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.2.2-10
- Use PBMAC1 by default when creating PKCS#12 files in FIPS mode
Related: RHEL-36659