2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
From a4ca1cac6b38efe0de1d8afb506cea29f8c60aec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 13:12:41 +0200
|
|
|
|
|
Subject: [PATCH 34/46] 0079-RSA-PKCS15-implicit-rejection.patch
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Patch-name: 0079-RSA-PKCS15-implicit-rejection.patch
|
|
|
|
|
Patch-id: 79
|
|
|
|
|
Patch-status: |
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
# # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817
|
|
|
|
|
From-dist-git-commit: 5c67b5adc311af297f425c09e3e1ac7ca8483911
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/cms/cms_env.c | 7 +
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c | 6 +
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 7 +
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 101 +++-
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 252 ++++++++++
|
|
|
|
|
crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 20 +-
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in | 15 +
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in | 5 +
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 9 +
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod | 12 +
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod | 7 +-
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod | 11 +-
|
|
|
|
|
doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod | 9 +
|
|
|
|
|
include/crypto/rsa.h | 4 +
|
|
|
|
|
include/openssl/core_names.h | 2 +
|
|
|
|
|
include/openssl/rsa.h | 5 +
|
|
|
|
|
.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 26 +-
|
|
|
|
|
.../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt | 472 ++++++++++++++++++
|
|
|
|
|
18 files changed, 962 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
index 99cf1dcb39..730f638969 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -590,6 +590,13 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* upper layer CMS code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
|
|
|
|
|
+ * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
|
|
|
|
|
+ * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
|
|
|
|
|
+ * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
|
|
|
|
|
ktri->encryptedKey->data,
|
|
|
|
|
ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
index 80947b0932..b10ba41e85 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -2265,6 +2265,12 @@ static const struct translation_st evp_pkey_ctx_translations[] = {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, NULL,
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, NULL },
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
+ "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection",
|
|
|
|
|
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER,
|
|
|
|
|
+ NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
{ SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN,
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, "rsa_pss_keygen_md", NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, fix_md },
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 1cef67b211..e0094486dd 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
|
|
|
|
|
+ * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
|
|
|
|
|
+ * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
|
|
|
|
|
+ * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
|
|
|
|
|
ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 0fc642e777..e5591cb14a 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
|
|
|
|
|
#include "crypto/bn.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "rsa_local.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -377,8 +380,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
int j, num = 0, r = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
int local_blinding = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
|
|
|
|
|
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -387,6 +395,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * we need the value of the private exponent to perform implicit rejection
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) && (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
|
|
|
|
|
+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -408,6 +422,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (flen < 1) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
/* make data into a big number */
|
|
|
|
|
if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -468,6 +487,81 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-02-09 15:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_free(d);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
|
|
|
|
|
+ * ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
|
|
|
|
|
+ * free before any further use of rsa->d
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (d == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (rsa->d == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
|
|
|
|
|
+ BN_free(d);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ BN_free(d);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ BN_free(d);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
|
|
|
|
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
|
|
|
|
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
|
|
|
|
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
|
|
|
|
+ * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(rsa->libctx, "sha256", NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (md == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (hmac == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (flen < num) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ memset(buf, 0, num - flen);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
2023-07-27 16:50:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (blinding)
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
|
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -477,9 +571,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-07-27 16:50:18 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (padding) {
|
|
|
|
|
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
|
|
|
|
|
+ case RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING:
|
|
|
|
|
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
|
|
|
|
|
+ r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
|
|
|
|
|
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -501,6 +598,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
|
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 51507fc030..5cd2b26879 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@
|
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
|
|
|
/* Just for the SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH value */
|
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/prov_ssl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "rsa_local.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *from, int flen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -273,6 +277,254 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+static int ossl_rsa_prf(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ const char *label, int llen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *kdk,
|
|
|
|
|
+ uint16_t bitlen)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int pos;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ uint16_t iter = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
|
|
|
|
|
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int md_len;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
+ be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (hmac == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
|
|
|
|
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
|
|
|
|
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
|
|
|
|
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
|
|
|
|
+ * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "sha256", NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (md == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
|
|
|
|
|
+ * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
|
|
|
|
|
+ * unaligned block
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos);
|
|
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+err:
|
|
|
|
|
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
|
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2
|
|
|
|
|
+ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the
|
|
|
|
|
+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it
|
|
|
|
|
+ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated
|
|
|
|
|
+ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection
|
|
|
|
|
+ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate
|
|
|
|
|
+ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making
|
|
|
|
|
+ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible
|
|
|
|
|
+ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of
|
|
|
|
|
+ * remaining padding bytes
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ int num, unsigned char *kdk)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid
|
|
|
|
|
+ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare
|
|
|
|
|
+ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size,
|
|
|
|
|
+ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough
|
|
|
|
|
+ * safety margin
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int synthethic_length;
|
|
|
|
|
+ uint16_t len_candidate;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
|
|
|
|
|
+ uint16_t len_mask;
|
|
|
|
|
+ uint16_t max_sep_offset;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int synth_msg_index = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or
|
|
|
|
|
+ * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately.
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just
|
|
|
|
|
+ * sanity checks
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */
|
|
|
|
|
+ synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (synthetic == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* decide how long the random message should be */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
|
|
|
|
|
+ "length", 6, kdk,
|
|
|
|
|
+ MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for
|
|
|
|
|
+ * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8;
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less
|
|
|
|
|
+ * significant than it
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ synthethic_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
|
|
|
|
|
+ i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_candidate &= len_mask;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int(
|
|
|
|
|
+ constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
|
|
|
|
|
+ len_candidate, synthethic_length);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
|
|
|
|
|
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
+ good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */
|
|
|
|
|
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
|
|
|
|
|
+ i, zero_index);
|
|
|
|
|
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into
|
|
|
|
|
+ * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
|
|
|
|
|
+ * also fails.
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
|
|
|
|
|
+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ msg_index = zero_index + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
|
|
|
|
|
+ * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic
|
|
|
|
|
+ * message instead
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
|
|
|
|
|
+ * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
|
|
|
|
|
+ * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
|
|
|
|
|
+ * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
|
|
|
|
|
+ * the value of |good|
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++)
|
|
|
|
|
+ to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
+ ret = j;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+err:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid
|
|
|
|
|
+ * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform
|
|
|
|
|
+ * a side-channel secure raising of the error
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
|
+ OPENSSL_free(synthetic);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS() checks and removes the PKCS1 type 2
|
|
|
|
|
* padding from a decrypted RSA message in a TLS signature. The result is stored
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
index 0bf5ac098a..81b031f81b 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
|
/* OAEP label */
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *oaep_label;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t oaep_labellen;
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
|
|
|
|
|
+ int implicit_rejection;
|
|
|
|
|
} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -72,6 +74,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
|
|
|
|
|
rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
|
|
|
|
rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->data = rctx;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
|
|
|
|
|
dctx->md = sctx->md;
|
|
|
|
|
dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
|
|
|
|
|
dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
|
|
|
|
|
+ dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
|
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->oaep_label) {
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
|
|
|
|
|
dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -347,6 +351,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int pad_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -367,7 +372,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
rctx->oaep_labellen,
|
|
|
|
|
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
|
|
|
|
|
+ rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
+ pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
|
|
+ pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
*outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
|
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -591,6 +601,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
|
|
|
|
|
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
|
|
|
+ return -2;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index b0054ead66..dd87829798 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -240,6 +240,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a
|
|
|
|
|
digest is set then the a B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its the length
|
|
|
|
|
must correspond to the digest type.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack,
|
|
|
|
|
+the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none>
|
|
|
|
|
+and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted
|
|
|
|
|
+value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -267,6 +272,16 @@ explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used.
|
|
|
|
|
Sets the digest used for the OAEP hash function. If not explicitly set then
|
|
|
|
|
SHA1 is used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+=item B<rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:>I<flag>
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Disables (when set to 0) or enables (when set to 1) the use of implicit
|
|
|
|
|
+rejection with PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. When enabled (the default), as a
|
|
|
|
|
+protection against Bleichenbacher attack, the library will generate a
|
|
|
|
|
+deterministic random plaintext that it will return to the caller in case
|
|
|
|
|
+of padding check failure.
|
|
|
|
|
+When disabled, it's the callers' responsibility to handle the returned
|
|
|
|
|
+errors in a side-channel free manner.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
index 0a32fd965b..4c462abc8c 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
|
|
|
|
|
ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
|
|
|
|
|
For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption
|
|
|
|
|
+using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed.
|
|
|
|
|
+Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the
|
|
|
|
|
+padding is correct.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-hexdump>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hex dump the output data.
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 5596b8ccdd..a8cc4ecd9f 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -393,6 +393,15 @@ this behaviour should be tolerated then
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION should be set to the actual
|
|
|
|
|
negotiated protocol version. Otherwise it should be left unset.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
|
|
|
|
|
+3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
|
|
|
|
|
+instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
|
|
|
|
|
+want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
|
|
|
|
|
+handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
|
|
|
|
|
+returned message in a side channel secure manner.
|
|
|
|
|
+This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting
|
|
|
|
|
+the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=head2 DSA parameters
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index b6f9bad5f1..898535a7a2 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a
|
|
|
|
|
return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+=head1 WARNINGS
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
|
|
|
|
|
+both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
|
|
|
|
|
+information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
|
|
|
|
|
+used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
|
|
|
|
|
+v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
|
|
|
|
|
+instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
|
|
|
|
|
+of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 EXAMPLES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 9f7025c497..36ae18563f 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 WARNINGS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive
|
|
|
|
|
-information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
|
|
|
|
|
+The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the
|
|
|
|
|
+information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher
|
|
|
|
|
padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
|
|
|
|
|
v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not
|
|
|
|
|
possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side channel which could be
|
|
|
|
|
used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode
|
|
|
|
|
including PKCS1_OAEP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
|
|
|
|
|
+as they implement the necessary workarounds internally.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 1d38073aea..bd3f835ac6 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
|
|
|
|
|
-based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
|
|
|
|
|
+When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the
|
|
|
|
|
+PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
|
|
|
|
|
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
|
|
|
|
|
When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
|
|
|
|
|
RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
|
|
|
|
|
attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
|
|
|
|
|
design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of
|
|
|
|
|
+returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
|
|
|
|
|
+Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding
|
|
|
|
|
+checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private
|
|
|
|
|
+key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement
|
|
|
|
|
+a side-channel secure error handling.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 CONFORMING TO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 0976a263a8..2a8426a6ed 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ The TLS protocol version first requested by the client.
|
2023-02-09 15:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The negotiated TLS protocol version.
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+=item "implicit-rejection" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION>) <unsigned integer>
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Gets of sets the use of the implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
|
|
|
|
|
+decryption. When set (non zero value), the decryption API will return
|
|
|
|
|
+a deterministically random value if the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check fails.
|
|
|
|
|
+This makes explotation of the Bleichenbacher significantly harder, even
|
|
|
|
|
+if the code using the RSA decryption API is not implemented in side-channel
|
|
|
|
|
+free manner. Set by default.
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_gettable_ctx_params() and OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params()
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 949873d0ee..f267e5d9d1 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/include/crypto/rsa.h
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
|
|
|
|
|
RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
|
|
|
|
|
+ int num, unsigned char *kdk);
|
|
|
|
|
int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *to,
|
|
|
|
|
size_t tlen,
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *from,
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
index 6248dda659..300d1129a4 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ extern "C" {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID "distid"
|
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY "pub"
|
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY "priv"
|
|
|
|
|
+#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION "implicit-rejection"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
|
2023-07-27 16:50:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P "p"
|
2023-10-26 10:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -473,6 +474,7 @@ extern "C" {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL "oaep-label"
|
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION "tls-client-version"
|
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION "tls-negotiated-version"
|
|
|
|
|
+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION "implicit-rejection"
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
|
|
|
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index d0c9599274..e3e1476cda 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14)
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -198,6 +200,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING 7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/* internal RSA_ only */
|
|
|
|
|
+# define RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING 8
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg) RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 666a699d84..d169bfd396 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS padding */
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int client_version;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int alt_version;
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int implicit_rejection;
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
|
|
|
char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ static int rsa_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[],
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
|
|
|
|
|
prsactx->operation = operation;
|
|
|
|
|
+ prsactx->implicit_rejection = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
|
|
|
|
|
case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -237,6 +240,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int pad_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -326,8 +330,12 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa,
|
|
|
|
|
- prsactx->pad_mode);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if ((prsactx->implicit_rejection == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
|
+ (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
|
|
|
|
|
+ pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
|
|
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
|
|
+ pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, pad_mode);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
*outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
|
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), 0, 1);
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -454,6 +462,10 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
|
|
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -465,6 +477,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL, 0),
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -621,6 +634,14 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
prsactx->alt_version = alt_version;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (p != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ unsigned int implicit_rejection;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &implicit_rejection))
|
|
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ prsactx->implicit_rejection = implicit_rejection;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -633,6 +654,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, 0),
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
index 7487684e19..e807c0a2e1 100644
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
|
|
|
|
|
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -268,9 +268,25 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Input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
|
|
|
|
|
Output = "Hello World"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
|
|
|
|
|
+Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
|
|
|
|
|
+Input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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "Hello World"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# Corrupted ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+# Note: output is generated synthethically by the Bleichenbacher workaround
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048
|
|
|
|
|
+Input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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
# Corrupted ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
|
|
|
|
|
Decrypt = RSA-2048
|
|
|
|
|
+Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
|
|
|
|
|
Input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
|
|
|
|
|
Output = "Hello World"
|
|
|
|
|
Result = KEYOP_ERROR
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
@@ -293,6 +309,462 @@ Derive = RSA-2048
|
2023-01-05 17:17:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
|
|
|
|
|
Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivateKey = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAyMyDlxQJjaVsqiNkD5PciZfBY3KWj8Gwxt9RE8HJTosh5IrS
|
|
|
|
|
+KX5lQZARtObY9ec7G3iyV0ADIdHva2AtTsjOjRQclJBetK0wZjmkkgZTS25/JgdC
|
|
|
|
|
+Ppff/RM8iNchOZ3vvH6WzNy9fzquH+iScSv7SSmBfVEWZkQKH6y3ogj16hZZEK3Y
|
|
|
|
|
+o/LUlyAjYMy2MgJPDQcWnBkY8xb3lLFDrvVOyHUipMApePlomYC/+/ZJwwfoGBm/
|
|
|
|
|
++IQJY41IvZS+FStZ/2SfoL1inQ/6GBPDq/S1a9PC6lRl3/oUWJKSqdiiStJr5+4F
|
|
|
|
|
+EHQbY4LUPIPVv6QKRmE9BivkRVF9vK8MtOGnaQIDAQABAoIBABRVAQ4PLVh2Y6Zm
|
|
|
|
|
+pv8czbvw7dgQBkbQKgI5IpCJksStOeVWWSlybvZQjDpxFY7wtv91HTnQdYC7LS8G
|
|
|
|
|
+MhBELQYD/1DbvXs1/iybsZpHoa+FpMJJAeAsqLWLeRmyDt8yqs+/Ua20vEthubfp
|
|
|
|
|
+aMqk1XD3DvGNgGMiiJPkfUOe/KeTJZvPLNEIo9hojN8HjnrHmZafIznSwfUiuWlo
|
|
|
|
|
+RimpM7quwmgWJeq4T05W9ER+nYj7mhmc9xAj4OJXsURBszyE07xnyoAx0mEmGBA6
|
|
|
|
|
+egpAhEJi912IkM1hblH5A1SI/W4Jnej/bWWk/xGCVIB8n1jS+7qLoVHcjGi+NJyX
|
|
|
|
|
+eiBOBMECgYEA+PWta6gokxvqRZuKP23AQdI0gkCcJXHpY/MfdIYColY3GziD7UWe
|
|
|
|
|
+z5cFJkWe3RbgVSL1pF2UdRsuwtrycsf4gWpSwA0YCAFxY02omdeXMiL1G5N2MFSG
|
|
|
|
|
+lqn32MJKWUl8HvzUVc+5fuhtK200lyszL9owPwSZm062tcwLsz53Yd0CgYEAznou
|
|
|
|
|
+O0mpC5YzChLcaCvfvfuujdbcA7YUeu+9V1dD8PbaTYYjUGG3Gv2crS00Al5WrIaw
|
|
|
|
|
+93Q+s14ay8ojeJVCRGW3Bu0iF15XGMjHC2cD6o9rUQ+UW+SOWja7PDyRcytYnfwF
|
|
|
|
|
+1y2AkDGURSvaITSGR+xylD8RqEbmL66+jrU2sP0CgYB2/hXxiuI5zfHfa0RcpLxr
|
|
|
|
|
+uWjXiMIZM6T13NKAAz1nEgYswIpt8gTB+9C+RjB0Q+bdSmRWN1Qp1OA4yiVvrxyb
|
|
|
|
|
+3pHGsXt2+BmV+RxIy768e/DjSUwINZ5OjNalh9e5bWIh/X4PtcVXXwgu5XdpeYBx
|
|
|
|
|
+sru0oyI4FRtHMUu2VHkDEQKBgQCZiEiwVUmaEAnLx9KUs2sf/fICDm5zZAU+lN4a
|
|
|
|
|
+AA3JNAWH9+JydvaM32CNdTtjN3sDtvQITSwCfEs4lgpiM7qe2XOLdvEOp1vkVgeL
|
|
|
|
|
+9wH2fMaz8/3BhuZDNsdrNy6AkQ7ICwrcwj0C+5rhBIaigkgHW06n5W3fzziC5FFW
|
|
|
|
|
+FHGikQKBgGQ790ZCn32DZnoGUwITR++/wF5jUfghqd67YODszeUAWtnp7DHlWPfp
|
|
|
|
|
+LCkyjnRWnXzvfHTKvCs1XtQBoaCRS048uwZITlgZYFEWntFMqi76bqBE4FTSYUTM
|
|
|
|
|
+FinFUBBVigThM/RLfCRNrCW/kTxXuJDuSfVIJZzWNAT+9oWdz5da
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# corresponding public key
|
|
|
|
|
+PublicKey = RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyMyDlxQJjaVsqiNkD5Pc
|
|
|
|
|
+iZfBY3KWj8Gwxt9RE8HJTosh5IrSKX5lQZARtObY9ec7G3iyV0ADIdHva2AtTsjO
|
|
|
|
|
+jRQclJBetK0wZjmkkgZTS25/JgdCPpff/RM8iNchOZ3vvH6WzNy9fzquH+iScSv7
|
|
|
|
|
+SSmBfVEWZkQKH6y3ogj16hZZEK3Yo/LUlyAjYMy2MgJPDQcWnBkY8xb3lLFDrvVO
|
|
|
|
|
+yHUipMApePlomYC/+/ZJwwfoGBm/+IQJY41IvZS+FStZ/2SfoL1inQ/6GBPDq/S1
|
|
|
|
|
+a9PC6lRl3/oUWJKSqdiiStJr5+4FEHQbY4LUPIPVv6QKRmE9BivkRVF9vK8MtOGn
|
|
|
|
|
+aQIDAQAB
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# RSA decrypt
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random positive test case
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test case decrypting to empty
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output =
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# invalid decrypting to max length message
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 0f9b
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 1690ebcceece2ce024f382e467cf8510e74514120937978576caf684d4a02ad569e8d76cbe365a060e00779de2f0865ccf0d923de3b4783a4e2c74f422e2f326086c390b658ba47f31ab013aa80f468c71256e5fa5679b24e83cd82c3d1e05e398208155de2212993cd2b8bab6987cf4cc1293f19909219439d74127545e9ed8a706961b8ee2119f6bfacafbef91b75a789ba65b8b833bc6149cf49b5c4d2c6359f62808659ba6541e1cd24bf7f7410486b5103f6c0ea29334ea6f4975b17387474fe920710ea61568d7b7c0a7916acf21665ad5a31c4eabcde44f8fb6120d8457afa1f3c85d517cda364af620113ae5a3c52a048821731922737307f77a1081
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 4f02
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test with 11 byte long value
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive that generates a 0 byte long synthethic message internally
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive that generates a 245 byte long synthethic message internally
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
|
|
|
|
|
+# (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
|
|
|
|
|
+# (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
|
|
|
|
|
+# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
|
|
|
|
|
+# plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
|
|
|
|
|
+# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
|
|
|
|
|
+# plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 96136621faf36d5290b16bd26295de27f895d1faa51c800dafce73d001d60796cd4e2ac3fa2162131d859cd9da5a0c8a42281d9a63e5f353971b72e36b5722e4ac444d77f892a5443deb3dca49fa732fe855727196e23c26eeac55eeced8267a209ebc0f92f4656d64a6c13f7f7ce544ebeb0f668fe3a6c0f189e4bcd5ea12b73cf63e0c8350ee130dd62f01e5c97a1e13f52fde96a9a1bc9936ce734fdd61f27b18216f1d6de87f49cf4f2ea821fb8efd1f92cdad529baf7e31aff9bff4074f2cad2b4243dd15a711adcf7de900851fbd6bcb53dac399d7c880531d06f25f7002e1aaf1722765865d2c2b902c7736acd27bc6cbd3e38b560e2eecf7d4b576
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
|
|
|
|
|
+# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
|
|
|
|
|
+# plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
|
|
|
|
|
+# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
|
|
|
|
|
+# plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f136c26e88ea9f6519e86a542cec96aad1e5e9013c3cc203b6de15a69183050813af5c9ad79703136d4b92f50ce171eefc6aa7988ecf02f319ffc5eafd6ee7a137f8fce64b255bb1b8dd19cfe767d64fdb468b9b2e9e7a0c24dae03239c8c714d3f40b7ee9c4e59ac15b17e4d328f1100756bce17133e8e7493b54e5006c3cbcdacd134130c5132a1edebdbd01a0c41452d16ed7a0788003c34730d0808e7e14c797a21f2b45a8aa1644357fd5e988f99b017d9df37563a354c788dc0e2f9466045622fa3f3e17db63414d27761f57392623a2bef6467501c63e8d645
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
|
|
|
|
|
+# to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 1786550ce8d8433052e01ecba8b76d3019f1355b212ac9d0f5191b023325a7e7714b7802f8e9a17c4cb3cd3a84041891471b10ca1fcfb5d041d34c82e6d0011cf4dc76b90e9c2e0743590579d55bcd7857057152c4a8040361343d1d22ba677d62b011407c652e234b1d663af25e2386251d7409190f19fc8ec3f9374fdf1254633874ce2ec2bff40ad0cb473f9761ec7b68da45a4bd5e33f5d7dac9b9a20821df9406b653f78a95a6c0ea0a4d57f867e4db22c17bf9a12c150f809a7b72b6db86c22a8732241ebf3c6a4f2cf82671d917aba8bc61052b40ccddd743a94ea9b538175106201971cca9d136d25081739aaf6cd18b2aecf9ad320ea3f89502f955
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
|
|
|
|
|
+# of padding
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
|
|
|
|
|
+# byte of padding
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
|
|
|
|
|
+# byte
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 6f09a0b62699337c497b0b
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround (2049 bit key size)
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivateKey = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGLwoyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCD
|
|
|
|
|
+rD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjIXeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi
|
|
|
|
|
+5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePfYkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES
|
|
|
|
|
+9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+UFVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzssp
|
|
|
|
|
+j/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/krw6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen6
|
|
|
|
|
+3N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQlwIDAQABAoIBAQEZwrP1CnrWFSZ5
|
|
|
|
|
+1/9RCVisLYym8AKFkvMy1VoWc2F4qOZ/F+cFzjAOPodUclEAYBP5dNCj20nvNEyl
|
|
|
|
|
+omo0wEUHBNDkIuDOI6aUJcFf77bybhBu7/ZMyLnXRC5NpOjIUAjq6zZYWaIpT6OT
|
|
|
|
|
+e8Jr5WMy59geLBYO9jXMUoqnvlXmM6cj28Hha6KeUrKa7y+eVlT9wGZrsPwlSsvo
|
|
|
|
|
+DmOHTw9fAgeC48nc/CUg0MnEp7Y05FA/u0k+Gq/us/iL16EzmHJdrm/jmed1zV1M
|
|
|
|
|
+8J/IODR8TJjasaSIPM5iBRNhWvqhCmM2jm17ed9BZqsWJznvUVpEAu4eBgHFpVvH
|
|
|
|
|
+HfDjDt+BAoGBAYj2k2DwHhjZot4pUlPSUsMeRHbOpf97+EE99/3jVlI83JdoBfhP
|
|
|
|
|
+wN3sdw3wbO0GXIETSHVLNGrxaXVod/07PVaGgsh4fQsxTvasZ9ZegTM5i2Kgg8D4
|
|
|
|
|
+dlxa1A1agfm73OJSftfpUAjLECnLTKvR+em+38KGyWVSJV2n6rGSF473AoGBAN7H
|
|
|
|
|
+zxHa3oOkxD0vgBl/If1dRv1XtDH0T+gaHeN/agkf/ARk7ZcdyFCINa3mzF9Wbzll
|
|
|
|
|
+YTqLNnmMkubiP1LvkH6VZ+NBvrxTNxiWJfu+qx87ez+S/7JoHm71p4SowtePfC2J
|
|
|
|
|
+qqok0s7b0GaBz+ZcNse/o8W6E1FiIi71wukUyYNhAoGAEgk/OnPK7dkPYKME5FQC
|
|
|
|
|
++HGrMsjJVbCa9GOjvkNw8tVYSpq7q2n9sDHqRPmEBl0EYehAqyGIhmAONxVUbIsL
|
|
|
|
|
+ha0m04y0MI9S0H+ZRH2R8IfzndNAONsuk46XrQU6cfvtZ3Xh3IcY5U5sr35lRn2c
|
|
|
|
|
+ut3H52XIWJ4smN/cJcpOyoECgYEAjM5hNHnPlgj392wkXPkbtJXWHp3mSISQVLTd
|
|
|
|
|
+G0MW8/mBQg3AlXi/eRb+RpHPrppk5jQLhgMjRSPyXXe2amb8PuWTqfGN6l32PtX3
|
|
|
|
|
+3+udILpppb71Wf+w7JTbcl9v9uq7o9SVR8DKdPA+AeweSQ0TmqCnlHuNZizOSjwP
|
|
|
|
|
+G16GF0ECgYEA+ZWbNMS8qM5IiHgbMbHptdit9dDT4+1UXoNn0/hUW6ZEMriHMDXv
|
|
|
|
|
+iBwrzeANGAn5LEDYeDe1xPms9Is2uNxTpZVhpFZSNALR6Po68wDlTJG2PmzuBv5t
|
|
|
|
|
+5mbzkpWCoD4fRU53ifsHgaTW+7Um74gWIf0erNIUZuTN2YrtEPTnb3k=
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# corresponding public key
|
|
|
|
|
+PublicKey = RSA-2049-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGL
|
|
|
|
|
+woyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCDrD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjI
|
|
|
|
|
+XeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePf
|
|
|
|
|
+YkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+U
|
|
|
|
|
+FVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzsspj/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/kr
|
|
|
|
|
+w6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen63N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQ
|
|
|
|
|
+lwIDAQAB
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# RSA decrypt
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 42
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# simple positive test case
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 013300edbf0bb3571e59889f7ed76970bf6d57e1c89bbb6d1c3991d9df8e65ed54b556d928da7d768facb395bbcc81e9f8573b45cf8195dbd85d83a59281cddf4163aec11b53b4140053e3bd109f787a7c3cec31d535af1f50e0598d85d96d91ea01913d07097d25af99c67464ebf2bb396fb28a9233e56f31f7e105d71a23e9ef3b736d1e80e713d1691713df97334779552fc94b40dd733c7251bc522b673d3ec9354af3dd4ad44fa71c0662213a57ada1d75149697d0eb55c053aaed5ffd0b815832f454179519d3736fb4faf808416071db0d0f801aca8548311ee708c131f4be658b15f6b54256872c2903ac708bd43b017b073b5707bc84c2cd9da70e967
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test case with null padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = f36da3b72d8ff6ded74e7efd08c01908f3f5f0de7b55eab92b5f875190809c39d4162e1e6649618f854fd84aeab03970d16bb814e999852c06de38d82b95c0f32e2a7b5714021fe303389be9c0eac24c90a6b7210f929d390fabf903d44e04110bb7a7fd6c383c275804721efa6d7c93aa64c0bb2b18d97c5220a846c66a4895ae52adddbe2a9996825e013585adcec4b32ba61d782737bd343e5fabd68e8a95b8b1340318559860792dd70dffbe05a1052b54cbfb48cfa7bb3c19cea52076bddac5c25ee276f153a610f6d06ed696d192d8ae4507ffae4e5bdda10a625d6b67f32f7cffcd48dee2431fe66f6105f9d17e611cdcc674868e81692a360f4052
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "lorem ipsum"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-2049
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 1ab287fcef3ff17067914d
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# RSA decrypt with 3072 bit keys
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivateKey = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIG5AIBAAKCAYEAr9ccqtXp9bjGw2cHCkfxnX5mrt4YpbJ0H7PE0zQ0VgaSotkJ
|
|
|
|
|
+72iI7GAv9rk68ljudDA8MBr81O2+xDMR3cjdvwDdu+OG0zuNDiKxtEk23EiYcbhS
|
|
|
|
|
+N7NM50etj9sMTk0dqnqt8HOFxchzLMt9Wkni5QyIPH16wQ7Wp02ayQ35EpkFoX1K
|
|
|
|
|
+CHIQ/Hi20EseuWlILBGm7recUOWxbz8lT3VxUosvFxargW1uygcnveqYBZMpcw64
|
|
|
|
|
+wzznHWHdSsOTtiVuB6wdEk8CANHD4FpMG8fx7S/IPlcZnP5ZCLEAh+J/vZfSwkIU
|
|
|
|
|
+YZxxR8j778o5vCVnYqaCNTH34jTWjq56DZ+vEN0V6VI3gMfVrlgJStUlqQY7TDP5
|
|
|
|
|
+XhAG2i6xLTdDaJSVwfICPkBzU8XrPkyhxIz/gaEJANFIIOuAGvTxpZbEuc6aUx/P
|
|
|
|
|
+ilTZ/9ckJYtu7CAQjfb9/XbUrgO6fqWY3LDkooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5
|
|
|
|
|
+CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAECggGAJRfqyzr+9L/65gOY35lXpdKhVKgzaNjhWEKy
|
|
|
|
|
+9Z7gn3kZe9LvHprdr4eG9rQSdEdAXjBCsh8vULeqc3cWgMO7y2wiWl1f9rVsRxwY
|
|
|
|
|
+gqCjOwrxZaPtbCSdx3g+a8dYrDfmVy0z/jJQeO2VJlDy65YEkC75mlEaERnRPE/J
|
|
|
|
|
+pDoXXc37+xoUAP4XCTtpzTzbiV9lQy6iGV+QURxzNrWKaF2s/y2vTF6S5WWxZlrm
|
|
|
|
|
+DlErqplluAjV/xGc63zWksv5IAZ6+s2An2a+cG2iaBCseQ2xVslI5v5YG8mEkVf0
|
|
|
|
|
+2kk/OmSwxuEZ4DGxB/hDbOKRYLRYuPnxCV/esZJjOE/1OHVXvE8QtANN6EFwO60s
|
|
|
|
|
+HnacI4U+tjCjbRBh3UbipruvdDqX8LMsNvUMGjci3vOjlNkcLgeL8J15Xs3l5WuC
|
|
|
|
|
+Avl0Am91/FbpoN1qiPLny3jvEpjMbGUgfKRb03GIgHtPzbHmDdjluFZI+376i2/d
|
|
|
|
|
+RI85dBqNmAn+Fjrz3kW6wkpahByBAoHBAOSj2DDXPosxxoLidP/J/RKsMT0t0FE9
|
|
|
|
|
+UFcNt+tHYv6hk+e7VAuUqUpd3XQqz3P13rnK4xvSOsVguyeU/WgmH4ID9XGSgpBP
|
|
|
|
|
+Rh6s7izn4KAJeqfI26vTPxvyaZEqB4JxT6k7SerENus95zSn1v/f2MLBQ16EP8cJ
|
|
|
|
|
++QSOVCoZfEhUK+srherQ9eZKpj0OwBUrP4VhLdymv96r8xddWX1AVj4OBi2RywKI
|
|
|
|
|
+gAgv6fjwkb292jFu6x6FjKRNKwKK6c3jqQKBwQDE4c0Oz0KYYV4feJun3iL9UJSv
|
|
|
|
|
+StGsKVDuljA4WiBAmigMZTii/u0DFEjibiLWcJOnH53HTr0avA6c6D1nCwJ2qxyF
|
|
|
|
|
+rHNN2L+cdMx/7L1zLR11+InvRgpIGbpeGwHeIzJVUYG3b6llRJMZimBvAMr9ipM1
|
|
|
|
|
+bkVvIjt1G9W1ypeuKzm6d/t8F0yC7AIYZWDV4nvxiiY8whLZzGawHR2iZz8pfUwb
|
|
|
|
|
+7URbTvxdsGE27Kq9gstU0PzEJpnU1goCJ7/gA1ECgcBA8w5B6ZM5xV0H5z6nPwDm
|
|
|
|
|
+IgYmw/HucgV1hU8exfuoK8wxQvTACW4B0yJKkrK11T1899aGG7VYRn9D4j4OLO48
|
|
|
|
|
+Z9V8esseJXbc1fEezovvymGOci984xiFXtqAQzk44+lmQJJh33VeZApe2eLocvVH
|
|
|
|
|
+ddEmc1kOuJWFpszf3LeCcG69cnKrXsrLrZ8Frz//g3aa9B0sFi5hGeWHWJxISVN2
|
|
|
|
|
+c1Nr9IN/57i/GqVTcztjdCAcdM7Tr8phDg7OvRlnxGkCgcEAuYhMFBuulyiSaTff
|
|
|
|
|
+/3ZvJKYOJ45rPkEFGoD/2ercn+RlvyCYGcoAEjnIYVEGlWwrSH+b0NlbjVkQsD6O
|
|
|
|
|
+to8CeE/RpgqX8hFCqC7NE/RFp8cpDyXy3j/zqnRMUyhCP1KNuScBBZs9V8gikxv6
|
|
|
|
|
+ukBWCk3PYbeTySHKRBbB8vmCrMfhM96jaBIQsQO1CcZnVceDo1/bnsAIwaREVMxr
|
|
|
|
|
+Q8LmG7QOx/Z0x1MMsUFoqzilwccC09/JgxMZPh+h+Nv6jiCxAoHBAOEqQgFAfSdR
|
|
|
|
|
+ya60LLH55q803NRFMamuKiPbVJLzwiKfbjOiiopmQOS/LxxqIzeMXlYV4OsSvxTo
|
|
|
|
|
+G7mcTOFRtU5hKCK+t8qeQQpa/dsMpiHllwArnRyBjIVgL5lFKRpHUGLsavU/T1IH
|
|
|
|
|
+mtgaxZo32dXvcAh1+ndCHVBwbHTOF4conA+g+Usp4bZSSWn5nU4oIizvSVpG7SGe
|
|
|
|
|
+0GngdxH9Usdqbvzcip1EKeHRTZrHIEYmB+x0LaRIB3dwZNidK3TkKw==
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PublicKey = RSA-3072-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+MIIBojANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAY8AMIIBigKCAYEAr9ccqtXp9bjGw2cHCkfx
|
|
|
|
|
+nX5mrt4YpbJ0H7PE0zQ0VgaSotkJ72iI7GAv9rk68ljudDA8MBr81O2+xDMR3cjd
|
|
|
|
|
+vwDdu+OG0zuNDiKxtEk23EiYcbhSN7NM50etj9sMTk0dqnqt8HOFxchzLMt9Wkni
|
|
|
|
|
+5QyIPH16wQ7Wp02ayQ35EpkFoX1KCHIQ/Hi20EseuWlILBGm7recUOWxbz8lT3Vx
|
|
|
|
|
+UosvFxargW1uygcnveqYBZMpcw64wzznHWHdSsOTtiVuB6wdEk8CANHD4FpMG8fx
|
|
|
|
|
+7S/IPlcZnP5ZCLEAh+J/vZfSwkIUYZxxR8j778o5vCVnYqaCNTH34jTWjq56DZ+v
|
|
|
|
|
+EN0V6VI3gMfVrlgJStUlqQY7TDP5XhAG2i6xLTdDaJSVwfICPkBzU8XrPkyhxIz/
|
|
|
|
|
+gaEJANFIIOuAGvTxpZbEuc6aUx/PilTZ/9ckJYtu7CAQjfb9/XbUrgO6fqWY3LDk
|
|
|
|
|
+ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAE=
|
|
|
|
|
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output =
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
|
|
|
|
|
+# in the last value
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 6c60845a854b4571f678941ae35a2ac03f67c21e21146f9db1f2306be9f136453b86ad55647d4f7b5c9e62197aaff0c0e40a3b54c4cde14e774b1c5959b6c2a2302896ffae1f73b00b862a20ff4304fe06cea7ff30ecb3773ca9af27a0b54547350d7c07dfb0a39629c7e71e83fc5af9b2adbaf898e037f1de696a3f328cf45af7ec9aff7173854087fb8fbf34be981efbd8493f9438d1b2ba2a86af082662aa46ae9adfbec51e5f3d9550a4dd1dcb7c8969c9587a6edc82a8cabbc785c40d9fbd12064559fb769450ac3e47e87bc046148130d7eaa843e4b3ccef3675d0630500803cb7ffee3882378c1a404e850c3e20707bb745e42b13c18786c4976076ed9fa8fd0ff15e571bef02cbbe2f90c908ac3734a433b73e778d4d17fcc28f49185ebc6e8536a06d293202d94496453bfdf1c2c7833a3f99fa38ca8a81f42eaa529d603b890308a319c0ab63a35ff8ebac965f6278f5a7e5d622be5d5fe55f0ca3ec993d55430d2bf59c5d3e860e90c16d91a04596f6fdf60d89ed95d88c036dde
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "forty two"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "forty two"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "forty two"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "forty two"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+# a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = "forty two"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 257906ca6de8307728
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
|
|
|
|
|
+# second to last value from PRF
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 043383c929060374ed
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
|
|
|
|
|
+# PRF
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 8542c626fe533467acffcd4e617692244c9b5a3bf0a215c5d64891ced4bf4f9591b4b2aedff9843057986d81631b0acb3704ec2180e5696e8bd15b217a0ec36d2061b0e2182faa3d1c59bd3f9086a10077a3337a3f5da503ec3753535ffd25b837a12f2541afefd0cffb0224b8f874e4bed13949e105c075ed44e287c5ae03b155e06b90ed247d2c07f1ef3323e3508cce4e4074606c54172ad74d12f8c3a47f654ad671104bf7681e5b061862747d9afd37e07d8e0e2291e01f14a95a1bb4cbb47c304ef067595a3947ee2d722067e38a0f046f43ec29cac6a8801c6e3e9a2331b1d45a7aa2c6af3205be382dd026e389614ee095665a611ab2e8dced2ee1c9d08ac9de11aef5b3803fc9a9ce8231ec87b5fed386fb92ee3db995a89307bcba844bd0a691c29ae51216e949dfc813133cb06a07265fd807bcb3377f6adb0a481d9b7f442003115895939773e6b95371c4febef29edae946fa245e7c50729e2e558cfaad773d1fd5f67b457a6d9d17a847c6fcbdb103a86f35f228cefc06cea0
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+Availablein = default
|
|
|
|
|
+# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
|
|
|
|
|
+Decrypt = RSA-3072
|
|
|
|
|
+Input = 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
|
|
|
|
|
+Output = aa2de6cde4e2442884
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
# RSA PSS key tests
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# PSS only key, no parameter restrictions
|
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
|
2.41.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
