openssl/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch

From bdf751d87be5dfb3164264ebcdbc0c0374d3eabf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 09:41:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 20/35] 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch

Patch-name: 0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch
Patch-id: 44
Patch-status: |
    # Extra public/private key checks required by FIPS-140-3
From-dist-git-commit: 9409bc7044cf4b5773639cce20f51399888c45fd
---
 crypto/dh/dh_key.c                            | 28 ++++++++++++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c                          | 44 ++++++++-----------
 .../implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c      | 19 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 4e9705beef..cb9e641f54 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
     BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
     int ret = -1;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    int validate = 0;
+#endif
 
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
         return 0;
     }
 
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -262,6 +272,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
 #endif
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    int validate = 0;
+#endif
 
     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -354,8 +367,23 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
     if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, priv_key, pub_key))
         goto err;
 
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
     dh->pub_key = pub_key;
     dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) <= 0) {
+        dh->pub_key = dh->priv_key = NULL;
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
     dh->dirty_cnt++;
     ok = 1;
  err:
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index e0d139d312..de9cedb64b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <time.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "rsa_local.h"
@@ -478,52 +479,43 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
 static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
 {
     int ret = 0;
-    unsigned int ciphertxt_len;
-    unsigned char *ciphertxt = NULL;
-    const unsigned char plaintxt[16] = {0};
-    unsigned char *decoded = NULL;
-    unsigned int decoded_len;
-    unsigned int plaintxt_len = (unsigned int)sizeof(plaintxt_len);
-    int padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+    unsigned int signature_len;
+    unsigned char *signature = NULL;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
+    static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
+        0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
+        0x48, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x5d, 0xfc, 0x2d, 0x4b, 0x1f, 0xa3, 0xd6, 0x77, 0x28,
+        0x4a, 0xdd, 0xd2, 0x00, 0x12, 0x6d, 0x90, 0x69
+    };
 
     st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
     if (st == NULL)
         goto err;
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
+                           /* No special name for RSA signature PCT*/
                            OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_RSA_PKCS1);
 
-    ciphertxt_len = RSA_size(rsa);
-    /*
-     * RSA_private_encrypt() and RSA_private_decrypt() requires the 'to'
-     * parameter to be a maximum of RSA_size() - allocate space for both.
-     */
-    ciphertxt = OPENSSL_zalloc(ciphertxt_len * 2);
-    if (ciphertxt == NULL)
+    signature_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+    signature = OPENSSL_zalloc(signature_len);
+    if (signature == NULL)
         goto err;
-    decoded = ciphertxt + ciphertxt_len;
 
-    ciphertxt_len = RSA_public_encrypt(plaintxt_len, plaintxt, ciphertxt, rsa,
-                                       padding);
-    if (ciphertxt_len <= 0)
+    if (RSA_sign(NID_sha256, dgst, sizeof(dgst), signature, &signature_len, rsa) <= 0)
         goto err;
-    if (ciphertxt_len == plaintxt_len
-        && memcmp(ciphertxt, plaintxt, plaintxt_len) == 0)
+
+    if (signature_len <= 0)
         goto err;
 
-    OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, ciphertxt);
+    OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, signature);
 
-    decoded_len = RSA_private_decrypt(ciphertxt_len, ciphertxt, decoded, rsa,
-                                      padding);
-    if (decoded_len != plaintxt_len
-        || memcmp(decoded, plaintxt,  decoded_len) != 0)
+    if (RSA_verify(NID_sha256, dgst, sizeof(dgst), signature, signature_len, rsa) <= 0)
         goto err;
 
     ret = 1;
 err:
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
-    OPENSSL_free(ciphertxt);
+    OPENSSL_free(signature);
 
     return ret;
 }
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
index 43caedb6df..73873f9758 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
@@ -489,6 +489,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, unsigned char *secret,
     }
 
     ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    {
+        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(privk));
+        int check = 0;
+
+        if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        check = ossl_ec_key_public_check(pecdhctx->peerk, bn_ctx);
+        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+        if (check <= 0) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
 
     retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
 
-- 
2.41.0