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openssl/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch

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Synchronize patches from CentOS stream
2023-08-22 14:39:12 +00:00
From 9b02ad7225b74a5b9088b361caead0a41e570e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:40:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 48/48] 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
Patch-name: 0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
Patch-id: 114
Patch-status: |
# We believe that some changes present in CentOS are not necessary
# because ustream has a check for FIPS version
---
doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod | 3 +++
doc/man5/fips_config.pod | 13 +++++++++++
include/openssl/fips_names.h | 8 +++++++
include/openssl/ssl.h.in | 1 +
providers/fips/fipsprov.c | 2 +-
providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
ssl/ssl_conf.c | 1 +
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 8 ++++++-
ssl/t1_enc.c | 11 ++++++++--
.../30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt | 10 +++++++++
test/sslapitest.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
index ae6ca43282..b83c04a308 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended master secret extension, enabled by
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
+B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
+This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
+
B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
diff --git a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
index 1c15e32a5c..f2cedaf88d 100644
--- a/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+++ b/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ for more information.
This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
+OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
+should have format
+
+ [fips_sect]
+ tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
+ activate = 1
+
+The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
+presence of extended master secret or not.
+
+The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2019-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
index 5c77f6d691..8cdd5a6bf7 100644
--- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ extern "C" {
*/
# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_DRBG_TRUNC_DIGEST "drbg-no-trunc-md"
+/*
+ * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
+ * This is disabled by default.
+ *
+ * Type: OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
+ */
+# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"
+
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
# endif
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
index 0b6de603e2..26a69ca282 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL *s, void *arg);
* interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
*/
# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG SSL_OP_BIT(31)
+# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS SSL_OP_BIT(48)
/*
* Option "collections."
diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
index 5ff9872bd8..eb9653a9df 100644
--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
if (fgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_security_checks, 1);
- init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 0); /* Disabled by default */
+ init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 1); /* Enabled by default */
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 0);
return fgbl;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
index 25a6c79a2e..79bc7a9719 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
if (ctx != NULL) {
kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
@@ -222,6 +223,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
}
}
+ /*
+ * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
+ * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
+ * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
+ * as "extended master secret".
+ */
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
+ && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
+ if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
+ && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 5146cedb96..086db98c33 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
+ SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 00b1ee531e..22cdabb308 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 1
@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 91238e6457..e8ad8ecd9e 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
}
err:
- if (fatal)
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (fatal) {
+ /* The calls to this function are local so it's safe to implement the check */
+ if (FIPS_mode() && seed1_len >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
+ && memcmp(seed1, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
else
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
index 44040ff66b..deb6bf3fcb 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587c
Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Availablein = fips
+KDF = TLS1-PRF
+Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
+Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
+Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
+Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
+
FIPSversion = <=3.1.0
KDF = TLS1-PRF
Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 169e3c7466..e67b5bb44c 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int test_client_cert_verify_cb(void)
STACK_OF(X509) *server_chain;
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
- int testresult = 0;
+ int testresult = 0, status;
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(), TLS1_VERSION, 0,
--
2.41.0
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