diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c --- openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.180582615 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-09-10 17:56:35.753521139 +0200 @@ -408,4 +408,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char { /* not implemented */ } + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} #endif /* BSM */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c --- openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.293583578 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c 2011-09-10 17:56:35.841521317 +0200 @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what) #endif } +const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + void audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) @@ -299,7 +301,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; int audit_fd, audit_ok; - const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", @@ -323,4 +324,30 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char #endif } +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), + get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()), + get_local_port()); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit.c --- openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.412583151 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.c 2011-09-10 17:56:35.946521612 +0200 @@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid())); } +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); +} + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* * Null implementations of audit functions. @@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); } + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull session key discard + */ +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit.h --- openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.522585448 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.h 2011-09-10 17:56:36.060648282 +0200 @@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void audit_unsupported(int); void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *); void audit_unsupported_body(int); void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); +void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c --- openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.630460554 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c 2011-09-10 17:56:36.169523019 +0200 @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima */ +#include + void audit_unsupported(int n) { @@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac { } +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +} diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/kex.c --- openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:34.933645761 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.c 2011-09-10 17:56:36.276583128 +0200 @@ -624,3 +624,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif + +static void +enc_destroy(Enc *enc) +{ + if (enc == NULL) + return; + + if (enc->key) { + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); + xfree(enc->key); + } + + if (enc->iv) { + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); + xfree(enc->iv); + } + + memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); +} + +void +newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); +} + diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/kex.h --- openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.audit4 2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.h 2011-09-10 17:56:36.400497848 +0200 @@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); void kexecdh_client(Kex *); void kexecdh_server(Kex *); +void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); + void kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/mac.c --- openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.audit4 2011-08-17 02:29:03.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.c 2011-09-10 17:56:36.527459063 +0200 @@ -168,6 +168,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac) mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } +void +mac_destroy(Mac *mac) +{ + if (mac == NULL) + return; + + if (mac->key) { + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); + xfree(mac->key); + } + + memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); +} + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/mac.h --- openssh-5.9p1/mac.h.audit4 2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.h 2011-09-10 17:56:36.655459377 +0200 @@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *); int mac_init(Mac *); u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); void mac_clear(Mac *); +void mac_destroy(Mac *); diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c --- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:35.047521239 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c 2011-09-10 17:56:36.784458672 +0200 @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); @@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, @@ -282,6 +284,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -315,6 +318,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -329,6 +333,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -1925,11 +1930,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); xfree(blob); debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); xfree(blob); /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ @@ -1975,6 +1982,18 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor } buffer_free(&m); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (compat20) { +#if BUG_AUDIT4 + buffer_init(&m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); + buffer_free(&m); +#endif + } +#endif } @@ -2429,4 +2448,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe return 0; } +int +mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h --- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:35.164646113 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h 2011-09-10 17:56:36.885481883 +0200 @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c --- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:35.291471815 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-09-10 17:56:37.052459705 +0200 @@ -653,12 +653,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); xfree(blob); if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); xfree(blob); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); @@ -1542,4 +1544,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher buffer_free(&m); } + +void +mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h --- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:35.422523742 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-09-10 17:56:37.199468524 +0200 @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); #endif struct Session; diff -up openssh-5.9p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/packet.c --- openssh-5.9p1/packet.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:28.073580010 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/packet.c 2011-09-10 17:56:37.350459743 +0200 @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "crc32.h" @@ -472,6 +473,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void) return active_state->connection_out; } +static int +packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) +{ + return state != NULL && + (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); +} + /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ void @@ -480,13 +488,6 @@ packet_close(void) if (!active_state->initialized) return; active_state->initialized = 0; - if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { - shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); - close(active_state->connection_out); - } else { - close(active_state->connection_in); - close(active_state->connection_out); - } buffer_free(&active_state->input); buffer_free(&active_state->output); buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); @@ -495,8 +496,18 @@ packet_close(void) buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_compress_uninit(); } - cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); - cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); + if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) { + cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); + cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); + audit_session_key_free(2); + } + if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { + shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); + close(active_state->connection_out); + } else { + close(active_state->connection_in); + close(active_state->connection_out); + } } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ @@ -731,6 +742,23 @@ packet_send1(void) */ } +static void +newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + xfree(newkeys->enc.name); + + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); + xfree(newkeys->mac.name); + + xfree(newkeys->comp.name); + + newkeys_destroy(newkeys); + xfree(newkeys); +} + void set_newkeys(int mode) { @@ -756,18 +784,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode) } if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); + audit_session_key_free(mode); cipher_cleanup(cc); - enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; - mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; - comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; - mac_clear(mac); - xfree(enc->name); - xfree(enc->iv); - xfree(enc->key); - xfree(mac->name); - xfree(mac->key); - xfree(comp->name); - xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]); + newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); } active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode); if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) @@ -1927,6 +1946,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; } +static void +packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) +{ + if (state == NULL) + return; + + cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); + cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); + + buffer_free(&state->input); + buffer_free(&state->output); + buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet); + buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet); + buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer); + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); +// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; +// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); +} + +void +packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) +{ + if (audit_it) + audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) || + packet_state_has_keys (backup_state); + packet_destroy_state(active_state); + packet_destroy_state(backup_state); + if (audit_it) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) + audit_session_key_free(2); + else + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); +#endif + } +} + /* * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when * resuming a suspended connection. @@ -1934,18 +1994,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) void packet_backup_state(void) { - struct session_state *tmp; - close(active_state->connection_in); active_state->connection_in = -1; close(active_state->connection_out); active_state->connection_out = -1; - if (backup_state) - tmp = backup_state; - else - tmp = alloc_session_state(); backup_state = active_state; - active_state = tmp; + active_state = alloc_session_state(); } /* @@ -1962,9 +2016,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void) backup_state = active_state; active_state = tmp; active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; - backup_state->connection_in = -1; active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; - backup_state->connection_out = -1; len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); if (len > 0) { buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); @@ -1972,4 +2024,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void) buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); add_recv_bytes(len); } + backup_state->connection_in = -1; + backup_state->connection_out = -1; + packet_destroy_state(backup_state); + xfree(backup_state); + backup_state = NULL; } + diff -up openssh-5.9p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/packet.h --- openssh-5.9p1/packet.h.audit4 2011-05-15 00:43:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/packet.h 2011-09-10 17:56:37.454521424 +0200 @@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void); void *packet_get_input(void); void *packet_get_output(void); +void packet_destroy_all(int, int); #endif /* PACKET_H */ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/session.c --- openssh-5.9p1/session.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:30.865577814 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/session.c 2011-09-10 17:56:37.945521116 +0200 @@ -1634,6 +1634,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); + /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the + monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ + packet_destroy_all(0, 1); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c --- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit4 2011-09-10 17:56:35.553521092 +0200 +++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c 2011-09-10 18:02:58.379521115 +0200 @@ -684,6 +684,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) } } +extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; + static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { @@ -708,6 +710,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); + newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]); + newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]); + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); + packet_destroy_all(0, 0); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ @@ -1999,6 +2005,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); +#if 1 /*BUG_AUDIT4*/ + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); +#endif exit(0); } @@ -2051,6 +2060,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", @@ -2368,8 +2379,20 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) void cleanup_exit(int i) { + static int in_cleanup = 0; + int is_privsep_child; + + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse + indefinitely. */ + if (in_cleanup) + _exit(i); + in_cleanup = 1; + if (the_authctxt) do_cleanup(the_authctxt); + is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor(); + packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&