diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index ef1f97e..5875943 100644
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff --color -ruNp a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
---- a/auth2.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200
-+++ b/auth2.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.688939755 +0200
+--- a/auth2.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.463830672 +0100
++++ b/auth2.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013559000 +0100
 @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
  extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
  extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
  #endif
  	&method_passwd,
 diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
---- a/auth2-gss.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200
+--- a/auth2-gss.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.464158978 +0100
++++ b/auth2-gss.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.011579476 +0100
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS	2048
  
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
  	&methodcfg_gssapi,
  	userauth_gssapi,
 diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c
---- a/auth2-methods.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth2-methods.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200
+--- a/auth2-methods.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth2-methods.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.011621502 +0100
 @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey =
  	&options.pubkey_authentication
  };
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c
  #endif
  	&methodcfg_passwd,
 diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
---- a/auth.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+--- a/auth.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.971971452 +0100
 @@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
  	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
  		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
  		break;
  	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
 diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
---- a/canohost.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/canohost.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+--- a/canohost.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/canohost.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.971614349 +0100
 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
  #include "canohost.h"
  #include "misc.h"
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
  ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
  {
 diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
---- a/canohost.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/canohost.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+--- a/canohost.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/canohost.h	2026-03-13 12:16:39.973010227 +0100
 @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
  #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
  #define _CANOHOST_H
@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
  int		 get_peer_port(int);
  char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
 diff --color -ruNp a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
---- a/clientloop.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/clientloop.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+--- a/clientloop.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/clientloop.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.973067475 +0100
 @@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
@@ -289,8 +289,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
  		if (conn_in_ready)
  			client_process_net_input(ssh);
 diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
---- a/configure.ac	2024-09-16 11:45:56.870133497 +0200
-+++ b/configure.ac	2024-09-16 11:46:34.691939819 +0200
+--- a/configure.ac	2026-03-13 12:32:48.476497111 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac	2026-03-13 12:16:39.974067978 +0100
 @@ -774,6 +774,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeL
  	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
  	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
  	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
  	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
 diff --color -ruNp a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
---- a/gss-genr.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-genr.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.708940181 +0200
+--- a/gss-genr.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-genr.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012672759 +0100
 @@ -42,9 +42,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
@@ -710,8 +710,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
 diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
---- a/gss-serv.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
+--- a/gss-serv.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-serv.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.978787818 +0100
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
  
@@ -1004,8 +1004,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
  
  /* Privileged */
 diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.978934056 +0100
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
  
@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --color -ruNp a/kex.c b/kex.c
---- a/kex.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kex.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
+--- a/kex.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.978857653 +0100
 @@ -297,17 +297,37 @@ static int
  kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -1200,8 +1200,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.c b/kex.c
  	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
  	free(kex->failed_choice);
 diff --color -ruNp a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
---- a/kexdh.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kexdh.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200
+--- a/kexdh.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kexdh.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.979537228 +0100
 @@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
  {
  	switch (kex->kex_type) {
@@ -1227,8 +1227,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
  		break;
  	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
 diff --color -ruNp a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
---- a/kexgen.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kexgen.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200
+--- a/kexgen.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kexgen.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.979737335 +0100
 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
  static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
      const struct sshbuf *client_version,
 diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 --- a/kexgssc.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/kexgssc.c	2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200
++++ b/kexgssc.c	2026-03-13 12:25:23.115812190 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 +
 +	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
 +
@@ -1592,10 +1592,10 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 +			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
 +		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
 +	} else {
 +		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
 +	}
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
@@ -1731,7 +1731,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 +
 +	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
 +
@@ -1932,10 +1932,10 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 +			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
 +		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
 +	} else {
 +		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
 +	}
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
@@ -1950,8 +1950,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 --- a/kexgsss.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/kexgsss.c	2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
++++ b/kexgsss.c	2026-03-13 12:32:17.556172591 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2083,7 +2083,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 +	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
-+	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 +	size_t hashlen;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
@@ -2167,7 +2167,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
 +	struct sshbuf *empty;
 +	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
-+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
 +	int r;
 +
@@ -2243,7 +2244,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +		      struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
-+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
 +	int r;
 +
@@ -2334,7 +2336,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 +	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
-+	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 +	size_t hashlen;
 +	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
@@ -2475,10 +2477,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max);
 +
 +	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
-+	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+	}
++	if (kex->dh == NULL)
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 ||
@@ -2510,7 +2510,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +		     struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
-+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
 +	int r;
 +
@@ -2537,7 +2538,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +			 struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
-+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
 +	int r;
 +
@@ -2554,8 +2556,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 +
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
---- a/kex.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kex.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200
+--- a/kex.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013688997 +0100
 @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
  #include "mac.h"
  #include "crypto_api.h"
@@ -2567,7 +2569,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  # include <openssl/bn.h>
  # include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -102,6 +106,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+@@ -103,6 +107,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
  	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
  	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
@@ -2583,7 +2585,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  	KEX_MAX
  };
  
-@@ -164,6 +177,13 @@ struct kex {
+@@ -165,6 +178,13 @@ struct kex {
  	u_int	flags;
  	int	hash_alg;
  	int	ec_nid;
@@ -2597,7 +2599,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  	char	*failed_choice;
  	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
  	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
-@@ -189,8 +209,10 @@ int	 kex_hash_from_name(const char *);
+@@ -191,8 +211,10 @@ int	 kex_hash_from_name(const char *);
  int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
  int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
  char	*kex_alg_list(char);
@@ -2608,7 +2610,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
  void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
      const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-@@ -224,6 +246,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+@@ -226,6 +248,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
@@ -2621,7 +2623,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-@@ -256,6 +284,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbu
+@@ -264,6 +292,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbu
      const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
      u_char *, size_t *);
  
@@ -2635,8 +2637,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
 diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
---- a/kex-names.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kex-names.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.694939883 +0200
+--- a/kex-names.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex-names.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.979603048 +0100
 @@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -2648,7 +2650,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
  struct kexalg {
  	char *name;
  	u_int type;
-@@ -83,15 +87,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+@@ -89,15 +93,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
  #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
  	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
  };
@@ -2680,7 +2682,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
  		if (ret != NULL)
  			ret[rlen++] = sep;
  		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -106,6 +123,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -112,6 +129,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -2699,7 +2701,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
  static const struct kexalg *
  kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  {
-@@ -115,6 +144,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+@@ -121,6 +150,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
  			return k;
  	}
@@ -2710,7 +2712,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
  	return NULL;
  }
  
-@@ -328,3 +361,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const c
+@@ -334,3 +367,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const c
  	free(ret);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -2738,8 +2740,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
 +	return 1;
 +}
 diff --color -ruNp a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
---- a/Makefile.in	2024-09-16 11:45:56.868133454 +0200
-+++ b/Makefile.in	2024-09-16 11:46:34.695939904 +0200
+--- a/Makefile.in	2026-03-13 12:32:48.475081074 +0100
++++ b/Makefile.in	2026-03-13 12:16:39.979453307 +0100
 @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
@@ -2767,9 +2769,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
  regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
 diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
---- a/monitor.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200
-@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *
+--- a/monitor.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.467311058 +0100
++++ b/monitor.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012477799 +0100
+@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *
  int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -2778,7 +2780,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  #endif
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -219,11 +221,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
@@ -2797,7 +2799,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
  #endif
-@@ -292,6 +301,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
@@ -2808,7 +2810,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
-@@ -344,8 +357,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+@@ -345,8 +358,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
  			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
  			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
@@ -2825,7 +2827,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  			if (authenticated || partial) {
  				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
  				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
-@@ -413,6 +433,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -414,6 +434,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -2836,7 +2838,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
-@@ -1793,6 +1817,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1803,6 +1827,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
@@ -2854,7 +2856,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
-@@ -1885,8 +1920,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1896,8 +1931,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2865,7 +2867,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-@@ -1918,8 +1953,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -1929,8 +1964,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
@@ -2876,7 +2878,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
-@@ -1939,6 +1974,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -1950,6 +1985,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
@@ -2884,7 +2886,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  	}
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1950,8 +1986,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1961,8 +1997,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  	OM_uint32 ret;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2895,7 +2897,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
-@@ -1977,13 +2013,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1988,13 +2024,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  int
  mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -2917,7 +2919,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
-@@ -1992,7 +2032,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -2003,7 +2043,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
@@ -2930,7 +2932,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -2000,5 +2044,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -2011,5 +2055,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -3016,8 +3018,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
 diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
---- a/monitor.h	2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200
+--- a/monitor.h	2026-03-13 12:32:48.467853845 +0100
++++ b/monitor.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.011929029 +0100
 @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
  	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
@@ -3028,8 +3030,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
  
  struct ssh;
 diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/monitor_wrap.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.468148305 +0100
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.011969272 +0100
 @@ -1075,13 +1075,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
  }
  
@@ -3108,8 +3110,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
  
  /*
 diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/monitor_wrap.h	2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h	2026-03-13 12:32:48.468446940 +0100
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012015851 +0100
 @@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(s
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
@@ -3123,8 +3125,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
 diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
---- a/readconf.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200
+--- a/readconf.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012058137 +0100
 @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
  #include "uidswap.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
@@ -3165,7 +3167,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1227,10 +1242,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1256,10 +1271,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3208,7 +3210,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2542,7 +2589,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2576,7 +2623,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
@@ -3222,7 +3224,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2705,8 +2758,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2739,8 +2792,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3241,7 +3243,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -3533,7 +3596,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+@@ -3567,7 +3630,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -3257,8 +3259,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
 diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
---- a/readconf.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200
+--- a/readconf.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.h	2026-03-13 12:16:39.991140430 +0100
 @@ -40,7 +40,13 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
@@ -3274,8 +3276,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
 diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
---- a/servconf.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200
+--- a/servconf.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.c	2026-03-13 12:16:39.991185528 +0100
 @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  #include "auth.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
@@ -3296,7 +3298,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -376,10 +380,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -378,10 +382,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3315,7 +3317,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -558,6 +570,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -564,6 +576,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
@@ -3323,7 +3325,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -643,12 +656,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -649,12 +662,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3346,7 +3348,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
-@@ -1585,6 +1608,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1605,6 +1628,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3357,7 +3359,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1593,6 +1620,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1613,6 +1640,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3380,7 +3382,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3178,6 +3221,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3204,6 +3247,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
@@ -3392,9 +3394,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
---- a/servconf.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200
-@@ -149,8 +149,11 @@ typedef struct {
+--- a/servconf.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.004993534 +0100
+@@ -150,8 +150,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
@@ -3407,8 +3409,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
 diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
---- a/session.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.866133411 +0200
-+++ b/session.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200
+--- a/session.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.472280104 +0100
++++ b/session.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.005034524 +0100
 @@ -2674,13 +2674,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
  
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -3432,9 +3434,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
  
  	/* remove agent socket */
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
---- a/ssh.1	2024-09-16 11:45:56.875133603 +0200
-+++ b/ssh.1	2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200
-@@ -536,7 +536,13 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+--- a/ssh.1	2026-03-13 12:32:48.479681434 +0100
++++ b/ssh.1	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012217780 +0100
+@@ -538,7 +538,13 @@ For full details of the options listed b
  .It GatewayPorts
  .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
  .It GSSAPIAuthentication
@@ -3448,7 +3450,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
  .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-@@ -624,6 +630,8 @@ flag),
+@@ -626,6 +632,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
  (key exchange algorithms),
@@ -3458,8 +3460,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
  (key types),
  .Ar key-ca-sign
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
---- a/ssh.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200
+--- a/ssh.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.012768046 +0100
 @@ -827,6 +827,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
  			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
@@ -3481,8 +3483,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
  			if (cp == NULL)
  				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
---- a/ssh_config	2024-09-16 11:45:56.884133795 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config	2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200
+--- a/ssh_config	2026-03-13 12:32:48.487976307 +0100
++++ b/ssh_config	2026-03-13 12:16:40.007769377 +0100
 @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
@@ -3493,8 +3495,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
  #   CheckHostIP no
  #   AddressFamily any
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
---- a/ssh_config.5	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config.5	2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200
+--- a/ssh_config.5	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh_config.5	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013000257 +0100
 @@ -938,10 +938,68 @@ The default is
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
@@ -3565,8 +3567,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.008053898 +0100
 @@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
@@ -3669,7 +3671,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
  	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
  	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
-@@ -368,6 +439,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int typ
+@@ -369,6 +440,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int typ
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3677,7 +3679,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  #endif
  
  void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-@@ -384,6 +456,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -385,6 +457,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
  
  Authmethod authmethods[] = {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -3689,7 +3691,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  	{"gssapi-with-mic",
  		userauth_gssapi,
  		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
-@@ -755,12 +832,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -756,12 +833,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  	OM_uint32 min;
  	int r, ok = 0;
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
@@ -3723,7 +3725,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  
  	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
  	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
-@@ -769,13 +866,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -770,13 +867,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
  		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
  		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
@@ -3740,7 +3742,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -1009,6 +1108,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
+@@ -1010,6 +1109,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
  	free(lang);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -3797,9 +3799,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
  
  static int
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
-@@ -1551,7 +1551,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+--- a/sshd.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.008426802 +0100
+@@ -1558,7 +1558,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		free(fp);
  	}
  	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
@@ -3810,8 +3812,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
  		exit(1);
  	}
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
---- a/sshd_config	2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
+--- a/sshd_config	2026-03-13 12:32:48.491841092 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config	2026-03-13 12:16:40.008629209 +0100
 @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
@@ -3822,8 +3824,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
---- a/sshd_config.5	2024-09-16 11:45:56.885133816 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2026-03-13 12:32:48.489069461 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013495921 +0100
 @@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  on logout.
  The default is
@@ -3870,9 +3872,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
  authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
---- a/sshd-session.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200
-+++ b/sshd-session.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.705940118 +0200
-@@ -660,8 +660,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+--- a/sshd-session.c	2026-03-13 12:32:48.491392577 +0100
++++ b/sshd-session.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013202390 +0100
+@@ -662,8 +662,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
  	}
  	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
  	if (nkeys == 0)
@@ -3883,7 +3885,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
  		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
  	sshbuf_free(buf);
  }
-@@ -1180,8 +1180,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1182,8 +1182,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			break;
  		}
  	}
@@ -3895,7 +3897,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
  
  	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
  	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
-@@ -1462,6 +1463,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1476,6 +1477,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	free(hkalgs);
  
@@ -3944,7 +3946,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
  		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
-@@ -1479,7 +1522,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1493,7 +1536,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
   #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
   #endif
@@ -3965,8 +3967,8 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
   	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
---- a/ssh-gss.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200
+--- a/ssh-gss.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-gss.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.013453154 +0100
 @@ -61,10 +61,36 @@
  
  #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
@@ -4092,9 +4094,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
  
  #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
---- a/sshkey.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200
-@@ -131,6 +131,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_x
+--- a/sshkey.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2026-03-13 12:16:40.006634461 +0100
+@@ -132,6 +132,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_x
  extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
  #endif
  
@@ -4170,7 +4172,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
  const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
  	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
  	&sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
-@@ -169,6 +238,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpl
+@@ -170,6 +239,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpl
  	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
  	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
  #endif
@@ -4178,7 +4180,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
  	NULL
  };
  
-@@ -324,7 +394,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
+@@ -339,7 +409,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
  
  	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
  		impl = keyimpls[i];
@@ -4188,9 +4190,9 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
  		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
 diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
---- a/sshkey.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200
-@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+--- a/sshkey.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.h	2026-03-13 12:16:40.008972328 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
  	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-first-match-wins.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-first-match-wins.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d76437
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-first-match-wins.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/regress/cfgparse.sh b/regress/cfgparse.sh
+--- a/regress/cfgparse.sh	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/cfgparse.sh	2026-03-05 17:30:54.959690744 +0100
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ listenaddress ::1
+ EOD
+ 
+ ($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+- grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
++ grep '^listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+  diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+  fail "listenaddress order 1"
+ # test 2: listenaddress first
+@@ -67,9 +67,22 @@ listenaddress ::1
+ EOD
+ 
+ ($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+- grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
++ grep '^listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+  diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+  fail "listenaddress order 2"
+ 
++# Check idempotence of MaxStartups
++verbose "maxstartups idempotent"
++echo "maxstartups 1:2:3" > $OBJ/sshd_config.0
++cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
++${SSHD_KEYS}
++MaxStartups 1:2:3
++MaxStartups 8:16:32
++EOD
++($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
++ grep '^maxstartups ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
++ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
++ fail "maxstartups idempotence"
++
+ # cleanup
+ rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012]
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2026-03-05 16:15:49.035275297 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c	2026-03-05 17:13:29.915897329 +0100
+@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+     struct include_list *includes)
+ {
+ 	char *str, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p, *keyword;
+-	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r;
++	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, value3, n, port, oactive, r;
+ 	int ca_only = 0, found = 0;
+ 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+ 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+@@ -2095,25 +2095,27 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ 			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		/* begin:rate:max */
+ 		if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
+-		    &options->max_startups_begin,
+-		    &options->max_startups_rate,
+-		    &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
+-			if (options->max_startups_begin >
+-			    options->max_startups ||
+-			    options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
+-			    options->max_startups_rate < 1)
++		    &value, &value2, &value3)) == 3) {
++			if (value > value3 || value2 > 100 || value2 < 1)
+ 				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+-		} else if (n != 1)
++		} else if (n == 1) {
++			value3 = value;
++			value = value2 = -1;
++		} else {
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ 			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+-		else
+-			options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
+-		if (options->max_startups <= 0 ||
+-		    options->max_startups_begin <= 0)
++		}
++		if (value3 <= 0 || (value2 != -1 && value <= 0))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ 			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		if (*activep && options->max_startups == -1) {
++			options->max_startups_begin = value;
++			options->max_startups_rate = value2;
++			options->max_startups = value3;
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sPerSourceNetBlockSize:
+@@ -2133,7 +2135,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ 		if (n != 1 && n != 2)
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ 			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+-		if (*activep) {
++		if (*activep && options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 == -1) {
+ 			options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = value;
+ 			options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = value2;
+ 		}
+@@ -2621,7 +2623,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ 		else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s",
+ 			    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+-		if (*activep) {
++		if (*activep && options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) {
+ 			options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
+ 			options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
+ 		}
diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-gssapi-s4u.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-gssapi-s4u.patch
index 7e94f6b..31bf5d5 100644
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-gssapi-s4u.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-gssapi-s4u.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index a37be93c3..34f058967 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -465,6 +465,19 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+--- a/auth-krb5.c	2026-03-12 11:51:16.406723629 +0100
++++ b/auth-krb5.c	2026-03-12 12:00:49.464289202 +0100
+@@ -462,6 +462,19 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
  	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
  	 */
  	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
@@ -22,21 +21,19 @@ index a37be93c3..34f058967 100644
  		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
  		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
  		free(type);
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index e33462027..22f806787 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -5102,11 +5102,17 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- # include <gssapi_generic.h>
+diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+--- a/configure.ac	2026-03-12 11:51:16.580313749 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac	2026-03-12 12:00:59.319587937 +0100
+@@ -4949,10 +4949,16 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
  #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-+#endif
+ #endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
 +# include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
 +#endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
 +# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
- #endif
++#endif
  		]])
  		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
 -		LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
@@ -46,11 +43,388 @@ index e33462027..22f806787 100644
  		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
  
  	fi
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 2c786ef14..64e327917 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -590,6 +590,231 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+--- a/gss-serv.c	2026-03-12 11:51:16.603196888 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv.c	2026-03-12 12:01:44.171014784 +0100
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -486,26 +486,351 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+-/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
++/* Returns non-zero if Kerberos credentials have already been stored. */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_stored(void)
++{
++	return gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL;
++}
++
++/* Returns a pointer to the credential-cache descriptor for this session. */
++ssh_gssapi_ccache *
++ssh_gssapi_get_ccache(void)
++{
++	return &gssapi_client.store;
++}
++
++/* Log human-readable GSSAPI major and minor status strings. */
++static void
++log_gss_error(OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor, const char *label)
++{
++	OM_uint32 lmin, mctx;
++	gss_buffer_desc emsg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++	mctx = 0;
++	do {
++		gss_display_status(&lmin, major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
++		    GSS_C_NO_OID, &mctx, &emsg);
++		logit("%s: %.*s", label, (int)emsg.length, (char *)emsg.value);
++		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &emsg);
++	} while (mctx != 0);
++
++	mctx = 0;
++	do {
++		gss_display_status(&lmin, minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
++		    &gssapi_kerberos_mech.oid, &mctx, &emsg);
++		if (emsg.length > 0)
++			logit("%s: %.*s", label,
++			    (int)emsg.length, (char *)emsg.value);
++		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &emsg);
++	} while (mctx != 0);
++}
++
++/* Log the canonical string form of a GSSAPI name as a debug message. */
++static void
++debug_gss_name(const char *label, gss_name_t name)
++{
++	OM_uint32 lmin;
++	gss_buffer_desc buf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++	if (gss_display_name(&lmin, name, &buf, NULL) == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		debug_f("%s: %.*s", label, (int)buf.length, (char *)buf.value);
++		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &buf);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Check whether the user already has valid GSSAPI initiator credentials
++ * (e.g. a Kerberos TGT) in their default credential store with at least
++ * min_lifetime seconds remaining.  Pass GSS_C_INDEFINITE to accept any
++ * positive remaining lifetime.  Runs as the user.
++ * Returns 1 if sufficient credentials exist, 0 otherwise.
++ */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_tgt(u_int min_lifetime)
++{
++	OM_uint32 major, minor, lifetime = 0;
++	gss_cred_id_t cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	int found = 0;
++
++	major = gss_acquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
++	    GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, GSS_C_INITIATE, &cred, NULL, &lifetime);
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && lifetime > 0 &&
++	    (min_lifetime == GSS_C_INDEFINITE || lifetime >= min_lifetime))
++		found = 1;
++	if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
++		gss_release_cred(&minor, &cred);
++	return found;
++}
++
++
++/*
++ * Perform S4U2Self (protocol transition): acquire a Kerberos service ticket
++ * for the SSH user on behalf of the host principal.  Runs privileged.
++ * Populates gssapi_client.{creds,mech,displayname,exportedname} on success.
++ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
++ */
++/* Privileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_s4u2self(const char *user, u_int lifetime)
++{
++	OM_uint32 major, minor, status;
++	gss_OID_set oidset = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
++	gss_name_t host_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	gss_name_t user_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	gss_cred_id_t host_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	gss_cred_id_t impersonated_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, displayname = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
++	char *val;
++
++	if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname)) != 0) {
++		logit_f("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Acquire acceptor credential for host/ from the keytab */
++	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, &gssapi_kerberos_mech.oid, &oidset);
++
++	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", lname);
++	gssbuf.value = val;
++	gssbuf.length = strlen(val);
++	major = gss_import_name(&minor, &gssbuf,
++	    GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &host_name);
++	free(val);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_import_name (host) failed");
++		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	debug_gss_name("host name parsed as", host_name);
++
++	debug_f("acquiring host credentials as uid=%u euid=%u, principal=host@%s",
++	    (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid(), lname);
++#ifdef HAVE_GSS_ACQUIRE_CRED_FROM
++	{
++		gss_key_value_element_desc store_elements[] = {
++			{ "client_keytab", "/etc/krb5.keytab" },
++			{ "keytab",        "/etc/krb5.keytab" },
++			{ "ccache",        "MEMORY:"          },
++		};
++		const gss_key_value_set_desc cred_store = { 3, store_elements };
++
++		major = gss_acquire_cred_from(&minor, host_name, lifetime,
++		    oidset, GSS_C_BOTH, &cred_store, &host_creds, NULL, NULL);
++	}
++#else
++	major = gss_acquire_cred(&minor, host_name, lifetime,
++	    oidset, GSS_C_BOTH, &host_creds, NULL, NULL);
++#endif
++	gss_release_name(&minor, &host_name);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_acquire_cred(host@%s) failed as uid=%u euid=%u",
++		    lname, (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid());
++		log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Self: gss_acquire_cred");
++		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Import the SSH username as a GSSAPI/Kerberos name */
++	gssbuf.value = (void *)user;
++	gssbuf.length = strlen(user);
++	major = gss_import_name(&minor, &gssbuf,
++	    GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &user_name);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_import_name (user) failed");
++		gss_release_cred(&minor, &host_creds);
++		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	debug_gss_name("user name parsed as", user_name);
++
++	/* S4U2Self: obtain a service ticket for the user without their creds */
++	debug_f("calling gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name for user %.100s", user);
++	major = gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(&minor,
++	    host_creds, user_name, lifetime,
++	    oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++	    &impersonated_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++	gss_release_cred(&minor, &host_creds);
++	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name failed for %.100s",
++		    user);
++		log_gss_error(major, minor,
++		    "S4U2Self: gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name");
++		gss_release_name(&minor, &user_name);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Get the display name (Kerberos principal string) for storecreds */
++	major = gss_display_name(&minor, user_name, &displayname, NULL);
++	gss_release_name(&minor, &user_name);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_display_name failed");
++		gss_release_cred(&minor, &impersonated_creds);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Populate gssapi_client for storecreds_s4u2self and s4u2proxy */
++	gssapi_client.mech = &gssapi_kerberos_mech;
++	gssapi_client.creds = impersonated_creds;
++	gssapi_client.displayname.value = xmalloc(displayname.length + 1);
++	memcpy(gssapi_client.displayname.value,
++	    displayname.value, displayname.length);
++	((char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value)[displayname.length] = '\0';
++	gssapi_client.displayname.length = displayname.length;
++	/*
++	 * exportedname is used by ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds → krb5_parse_name.
++	 * gss_display_name for a user-name returns the canonical principal
++	 * string (e.g. user@REALM) which krb5_parse_name can consume directly.
++	 */
++	gssapi_client.exportedname.value = xmalloc(displayname.length + 1);
++	memcpy(gssapi_client.exportedname.value,
++	    displayname.value, displayname.length);
++	((char *)gssapi_client.exportedname.value)[displayname.length] = '\0';
++	gssapi_client.exportedname.length = displayname.length;
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &displayname);
++	debug_f("S4U2Self succeeded for %.100s", user);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/* As user — write the S4U2Self ticket into a new ccache via mech->storecreds */
+ void
+-ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
++ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self(void)
+ {
+-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+-	krb5_error_code problem;
++	if (gssapi_client.mech == NULL || gssapi_client.mech->storecreds == NULL) {
++		debug_f("no GSSAPI mechanism for storing S4U2Self credentials");
++		return;
++	}
++	(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Perform S4U2Proxy for each configured service principal, then flush all
++ * resulting tickets into the user's ccache.  Runs as user, after
++ * ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self() has created the ccache.
++ *
++ * gssapi_client.creds (the S4U2Self proxy credential) is passed as the
++ * initiator to gss_init_sec_context(); the GSSAPI library presents the TGT
++ * and evidence ticket to the KDC via S4U2Proxy TGS-REQ.  The output token
++ * (AP-REQ) is discarded — we do not connect to the target service.
++ *
++ * After iterating all services, gss_store_cred() flushes the accumulated
++ * proxy service tickets from the credential's internal ccache into the
++ * KRB5CCNAME ccache that storecreds_s4u2self() already created.
++ */
++/* As user */
++void
++ssh_gssapi_s4u2proxy(char **services, u_int nservices, u_int lifetime)
++{
++	OM_uint32 major, minor;
++	gss_buffer_desc service_buf, output_token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_name_t target_name;
++	gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
++	u_int i;
++
++	if (gssapi_client.creds == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
++		debug_f("no proxy credential available");
++		return;
++	}
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) {
++		debug_f("no ccache path set; cannot store proxy tickets");
++		return;
++	}
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
+-		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
+-			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+-				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
+-		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
+-			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
+-				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
+-		} else {
+-			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
+-			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
++	debug_f("starting S4U2Proxy as uid=%u euid=%u, %u service(s), ccache=%s",
++	    (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid(), nservices,
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++	/* Point the GSSAPI library at the user's ccache for ticket storage */
++	setenv("KRB5CCNAME", gssapi_client.store.envval, 1);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < nservices; i++) {
++		ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
++		target_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++
++		service_buf.value = services[i];
++		service_buf.length = strlen(services[i]);
++
++		/*
++		 * GSS_C_NO_OID: let the library determine the name type.
++		 * With Kerberos as the active mechanism, a fully-qualified
++		 * principal like "svc/host@REALM" is parsed correctly.
++		 */
++		major = gss_import_name(&minor, &service_buf,
++		    GSS_C_NO_OID, &target_name);
++		if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++			logit_f("gss_import_name failed for %.200s",
++			    services[i]);
++			log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Proxy: gss_import_name");
++			continue;
+ 		}
++		debug_gss_name("target service name parsed as", target_name);
++
++		debug_f("calling gss_init_sec_context for %.200s", services[i]);
++		major = gss_init_sec_context(&minor,
++		    gssapi_client.creds,		/* proxy credential */
++		    &ctx, target_name,
++		    GSS_C_NO_OID,			/* default mech (Kerberos) */
++		    0,					/* no flags, no mutual auth */
++		    lifetime,
++		    GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
++		    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,			/* no input token */
++		    NULL,				/* actual_mech_type */
++		    &output_token,
++		    NULL,				/* ret_flags */
++		    NULL);				/* time_rec */
++
++		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output_token);
++		gss_release_name(&minor, &target_name);
++		if (ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++			gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++			logit_f("S4U2Proxy for %.200s on behalf of %.200s failed",
++			    services[i],
++			    (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value);
++			log_gss_error(major, minor,
++			    "S4U2Proxy: gss_init_sec_context");
++		} else
++			debug_f("S4U2Proxy ticket obtained for %.200s",
++			    services[i]);
+ 	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Flush all proxy service tickets from the credential's internal
++	 * ccache into the KRB5CCNAME ccache via gss_store_cred().
++	 */
++	major = gss_store_cred(&minor, gssapi_client.creds, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++	    GSS_C_NO_OID, 1 /* overwrite_cred */, 1 /* default_cred */,
++	    NULL, NULL);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++		logit_f("gss_store_cred failed; proxy tickets may be missing");
++		log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Proxy: gss_store_cred");
++	}
++
++	unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
++}
++
++#ifndef KRB5
++/* As user - called on fatal/exit; full implementation in gss-serv-krb5.c */
++void
++ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
++{
++}
++
++/*
++ * Filter the user's ccache; full implementation in gss-serv-krb5.c.
++ */
++void
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(u_int drop_flags,
++    char **proxy_services, u_int nproxy_services)
++{
+ }
++#endif /* !KRB5 */
+ 
+ /* As user */
+ int
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c	2026-03-12 11:51:16.581364233 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c	2026-03-12 12:01:20.402569731 +0100
+@@ -609,6 +609,231 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_c
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -282,401 +656,20 @@ index 2c786ef14..64e327917 100644
  ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
  	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
  	"Kerberos",
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 165484db0..90e2d03ce 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
-     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
--    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
-+    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL, 0};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -484,26 +484,351 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	return (ctx->major);
- }
- 
--/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
-+/* Returns non-zero if Kerberos credentials have already been stored. */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_stored(void)
-+{
-+	return gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/* Returns a pointer to the credential-cache descriptor for this session. */
-+ssh_gssapi_ccache *
-+ssh_gssapi_get_ccache(void)
-+{
-+	return &gssapi_client.store;
-+}
-+
-+/* Log human-readable GSSAPI major and minor status strings. */
-+static void
-+log_gss_error(OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor, const char *label)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 lmin, mctx;
-+	gss_buffer_desc emsg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+	mctx = 0;
-+	do {
-+		gss_display_status(&lmin, major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
-+		    GSS_C_NO_OID, &mctx, &emsg);
-+		logit("%s: %.*s", label, (int)emsg.length, (char *)emsg.value);
-+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &emsg);
-+	} while (mctx != 0);
-+
-+	mctx = 0;
-+	do {
-+		gss_display_status(&lmin, minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
-+		    &gssapi_kerberos_mech.oid, &mctx, &emsg);
-+		if (emsg.length > 0)
-+			logit("%s: %.*s", label,
-+			    (int)emsg.length, (char *)emsg.value);
-+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &emsg);
-+	} while (mctx != 0);
-+}
-+
-+/* Log the canonical string form of a GSSAPI name as a debug message. */
-+static void
-+debug_gss_name(const char *label, gss_name_t name)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 lmin;
-+	gss_buffer_desc buf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+	if (gss_display_name(&lmin, name, &buf, NULL) == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+		debug_f("%s: %.*s", label, (int)buf.length, (char *)buf.value);
-+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &buf);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check whether the user already has valid GSSAPI initiator credentials
-+ * (e.g. a Kerberos TGT) in their default credential store with at least
-+ * min_lifetime seconds remaining.  Pass GSS_C_INDEFINITE to accept any
-+ * positive remaining lifetime.  Runs as the user.
-+ * Returns 1 if sufficient credentials exist, 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_tgt(u_int min_lifetime)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor, lifetime = 0;
-+	gss_cred_id_t cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+	int found = 0;
-+
-+	major = gss_acquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
-+	    GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, GSS_C_INITIATE, &cred, NULL, &lifetime);
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && lifetime > 0 &&
-+	    (min_lifetime == GSS_C_INDEFINITE || lifetime >= min_lifetime))
-+		found = 1;
-+	if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
-+		gss_release_cred(&minor, &cred);
-+	return found;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Perform S4U2Self (protocol transition): acquire a Kerberos service ticket
-+ * for the SSH user on behalf of the host principal.  Runs privileged.
-+ * Populates gssapi_client.{creds,mech,displayname,exportedname} on success.
-+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
-+ */
-+/* Privileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_s4u2self(const char *user, u_int lifetime)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor, status;
-+	gss_OID_set oidset = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
-+	gss_name_t host_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+	gss_name_t user_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+	gss_cred_id_t host_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+	gss_cred_id_t impersonated_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, displayname = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
-+	char *val;
-+
-+	if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname)) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Acquire acceptor credential for host/ from the keytab */
-+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, &gssapi_kerberos_mech.oid, &oidset);
-+
-+	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", lname);
-+	gssbuf.value = val;
-+	gssbuf.length = strlen(val);
-+	major = gss_import_name(&minor, &gssbuf,
-+	    GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &host_name);
-+	free(val);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_import_name (host) failed");
-+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	debug_gss_name("host name parsed as", host_name);
-+
-+	debug_f("acquiring host credentials as uid=%u euid=%u, principal=host@%s",
-+	    (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid(), lname);
-+#ifdef HAVE_GSS_ACQUIRE_CRED_FROM
-+	{
-+		gss_key_value_element_desc store_elements[] = {
-+			{ "client_keytab", "/etc/krb5.keytab" },
-+			{ "keytab",        "/etc/krb5.keytab" },
-+			{ "ccache",        "MEMORY:"          },
-+		};
-+		const gss_key_value_set_desc cred_store = { 3, store_elements };
-+
-+		major = gss_acquire_cred_from(&minor, host_name, lifetime,
-+		    oidset, GSS_C_BOTH, &cred_store, &host_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+	}
-+#else
-+	major = gss_acquire_cred(&minor, host_name, lifetime,
-+	    oidset, GSS_C_BOTH, &host_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+#endif
-+	gss_release_name(&minor, &host_name);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_acquire_cred(host@%s) failed as uid=%u euid=%u",
-+		    lname, (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid());
-+		log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Self: gss_acquire_cred");
-+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Import the SSH username as a GSSAPI/Kerberos name */
-+	gssbuf.value = (void *)user;
-+	gssbuf.length = strlen(user);
-+	major = gss_import_name(&minor, &gssbuf,
-+	    GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &user_name);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_import_name (user) failed");
-+		gss_release_cred(&minor, &host_creds);
-+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	debug_gss_name("user name parsed as", user_name);
-+
-+	/* S4U2Self: obtain a service ticket for the user without their creds */
-+	debug_f("calling gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name for user %.100s", user);
-+	major = gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(&minor,
-+	    host_creds, user_name, lifetime,
-+	    oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+	    &impersonated_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+	gss_release_cred(&minor, &host_creds);
-+	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name failed for %.100s",
-+		    user);
-+		log_gss_error(major, minor,
-+		    "S4U2Self: gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name");
-+		gss_release_name(&minor, &user_name);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Get the display name (Kerberos principal string) for storecreds */
-+	major = gss_display_name(&minor, user_name, &displayname, NULL);
-+	gss_release_name(&minor, &user_name);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_display_name failed");
-+		gss_release_cred(&minor, &impersonated_creds);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Populate gssapi_client for storecreds_s4u2self and s4u2proxy */
-+	gssapi_client.mech = &gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-+	gssapi_client.creds = impersonated_creds;
-+	gssapi_client.displayname.value = xmalloc(displayname.length + 1);
-+	memcpy(gssapi_client.displayname.value,
-+	    displayname.value, displayname.length);
-+	((char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value)[displayname.length] = '\0';
-+	gssapi_client.displayname.length = displayname.length;
-+	/*
-+	 * exportedname is used by ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds → krb5_parse_name.
-+	 * gss_display_name for a user-name returns the canonical principal
-+	 * string (e.g. user@REALM) which krb5_parse_name can consume directly.
-+	 */
-+	gssapi_client.exportedname.value = xmalloc(displayname.length + 1);
-+	memcpy(gssapi_client.exportedname.value,
-+	    displayname.value, displayname.length);
-+	((char *)gssapi_client.exportedname.value)[displayname.length] = '\0';
-+	gssapi_client.exportedname.length = displayname.length;
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &displayname);
-+	debug_f("S4U2Self succeeded for %.100s", user);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* As user — write the S4U2Self ticket into a new ccache via mech->storecreds */
- void
--ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-+ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self(void)
- {
--	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
--	krb5_error_code problem;
--
--	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
--		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
--			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
--				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
--		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
--			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
--				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
--		} else {
--			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
--			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
-+	if (gssapi_client.mech == NULL || gssapi_client.mech->storecreds == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("no GSSAPI mechanism for storing S4U2Self credentials");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Perform S4U2Proxy for each configured service principal, then flush all
-+ * resulting tickets into the user's ccache.  Runs as user, after
-+ * ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self() has created the ccache.
-+ *
-+ * gssapi_client.creds (the S4U2Self proxy credential) is passed as the
-+ * initiator to gss_init_sec_context(); the GSSAPI library presents the TGT
-+ * and evidence ticket to the KDC via S4U2Proxy TGS-REQ.  The output token
-+ * (AP-REQ) is discarded — we do not connect to the target service.
-+ *
-+ * After iterating all services, gss_store_cred() flushes the accumulated
-+ * proxy service tickets from the credential's internal ccache into the
-+ * KRB5CCNAME ccache that storecreds_s4u2self() already created.
-+ */
-+/* As user */
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_s4u2proxy(char **services, u_int nservices, u_int lifetime)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+	gss_buffer_desc service_buf, output_token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	gss_name_t target_name;
-+	gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	if (gssapi_client.creds == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
-+		debug_f("no proxy credential available");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("no ccache path set; cannot store proxy tickets");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	debug_f("starting S4U2Proxy as uid=%u euid=%u, %u service(s), ccache=%s",
-+	    (unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid(), nservices,
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+	/* Point the GSSAPI library at the user's ccache for ticket storage */
-+	setenv("KRB5CCNAME", gssapi_client.store.envval, 1);
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < nservices; i++) {
-+		ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
-+		target_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+
-+		service_buf.value = services[i];
-+		service_buf.length = strlen(services[i]);
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * GSS_C_NO_OID: let the library determine the name type.
-+		 * With Kerberos as the active mechanism, a fully-qualified
-+		 * principal like "svc/host@REALM" is parsed correctly.
-+		 */
-+		major = gss_import_name(&minor, &service_buf,
-+		    GSS_C_NO_OID, &target_name);
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+			logit_f("gss_import_name failed for %.200s",
-+			    services[i]);
-+			log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Proxy: gss_import_name");
-+			continue;
- 		}
-+		debug_gss_name("target service name parsed as", target_name);
-+
-+		debug_f("calling gss_init_sec_context for %.200s", services[i]);
-+		major = gss_init_sec_context(&minor,
-+		    gssapi_client.creds,		/* proxy credential */
-+		    &ctx, target_name,
-+		    GSS_C_NO_OID,			/* default mech (Kerberos) */
-+		    0,					/* no flags, no mutual auth */
-+		    lifetime,
-+		    GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
-+		    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,			/* no input token */
-+		    NULL,				/* actual_mech_type */
-+		    &output_token,
-+		    NULL,				/* ret_flags */
-+		    NULL);				/* time_rec */
-+
-+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output_token);
-+		gss_release_name(&minor, &target_name);
-+		if (ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+			gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
-+
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+			logit_f("S4U2Proxy for %.200s on behalf of %.200s failed",
-+			    services[i],
-+			    (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value);
-+			log_gss_error(major, minor,
-+			    "S4U2Proxy: gss_init_sec_context");
-+		} else
-+			debug_f("S4U2Proxy ticket obtained for %.200s",
-+			    services[i]);
- 	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Flush all proxy service tickets from the credential's internal
-+	 * ccache into the KRB5CCNAME ccache via gss_store_cred().
-+	 */
-+	major = gss_store_cred(&minor, gssapi_client.creds, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+	    GSS_C_NO_OID, 1 /* overwrite_cred */, 1 /* default_cred */,
-+	    NULL, NULL);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+		logit_f("gss_store_cred failed; proxy tickets may be missing");
-+		log_gss_error(major, minor, "S4U2Proxy: gss_store_cred");
-+	}
-+
-+	unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
-+}
-+
-+#ifndef KRB5
-+/* As user - called on fatal/exit; full implementation in gss-serv-krb5.c */
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Filter the user's ccache; full implementation in gss-serv-krb5.c.
-+ */
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(u_int drop_flags,
-+    char **proxy_services, u_int nproxy_services)
-+{
- }
-+#endif /* !KRB5 */
- 
- /* As user */
- int
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2026-03-12 11:51:16.603765849 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c	2026-03-12 12:07:51.450992249 +0100
+@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
 +	options->gss_allow_s4u2self = -1;
 +	options->gss_proxy_services = NULL;
 +	options->num_gss_proxy_services = 0;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
-@@ -404,6 +407,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -407,6 +410,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
  	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
  		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
@@ -685,7 +678,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
  		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -599,7 +604,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -603,7 +608,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssDelegateCreds,
  	sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
@@ -694,7 +687,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -697,6 +702,8 @@ static struct {
+@@ -701,6 +706,8 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -703,7 +696,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -708,6 +715,8 @@ static struct {
+@@ -712,6 +719,8 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -712,7 +705,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1748,6 +1757,44 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1742,6 +1751,44 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
  		break;
  
@@ -757,7 +750,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3026,6 +3073,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+@@ -3010,6 +3057,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  
  	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
@@ -765,7 +758,7 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
-@@ -3379,6 +3427,15 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3364,6 +3412,15 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
  	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
  	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
@@ -781,10 +774,9 @@ index 1093dcbac..019070505 100644
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 6bfdf6305..40dcd29d8 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+--- a/servconf.h	2026-03-12 11:51:16.604292877 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h	2026-03-12 12:02:44.689745248 +0100
 @@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
  	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* If true, accept delegated GSS credentials */
@@ -795,7 +787,7 @@ index 6bfdf6305..40dcd29d8 100644
  	int 	gss_store_rekey;
  	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
  	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
-@@ -313,6 +316,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+@@ -314,6 +317,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
  		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
  		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
  		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
@@ -803,42 +795,90 @@ index 6bfdf6305..40dcd29d8 100644
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 1506719a9..a0d51c9be 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int used;
- 	int updated;
- 	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
-+	int allow_self; /* allow protocol transition */
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -199,6 +200,18 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int  ssh_gssapi_credentials_stored(void);
-+ssh_gssapi_ccache *ssh_gssapi_get_ccache(void);
-+int  ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_tgt(u_int);
-+int  ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_proxy_tickets(char **, u_int, u_int);
-+int  ssh_gssapi_s4u2self(const char *, u_int);
-+void ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self(void);
-+void ssh_gssapi_s4u2proxy(char **, u_int, u_int);
-+/* Flags for ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(): which ticket classes to remove */
-+#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_TGT    (1u << 0) /* krbtgt/... entries */
-+#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_SELF   (1u << 1) /* S4U2Self evidence ticket */
-+#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_PROXY  (1u << 2) /* S4U2Proxy service tickets */
-+void ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(u_int, char **, u_int);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index a558bbc33..d8b6af13f 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1425,6 +1425,104 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2026-03-12 11:51:16.604904588 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2026-03-12 12:10:03.542653814 +0100
+@@ -834,6 +834,76 @@ FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIP
+ The default
+ .Dq none
+ is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
++.It Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self
++Controls whether the SSH server performs a Kerberos protocol transition
++(S4U2Self) after a successful authentication using any other method.
++Accepted values are
++.Cm no ,
++.Cm yes ,
++or a time interval (see
++.Sx TIME FORMATS
++below).
++.Cm no
++disables S4U2Self entirely.
++.Cm yes
++enables S4U2Self and requests a ticket with the maximum lifetime
++permitted by the KDC.
++A time interval (e.g.\&
++.Cm 8h ,
++.Cm 1d )
++enables S4U2Self and requests a ticket valid for at most that duration.
++The option is a no-op when delegated GSSAPI credentials are already available.
++The obtained service ticket is stored in the default credentials cache and is
++accessible to any application that has access to the Kerberos host principal
++.Pq host/machine.fqdn@REALM
++credentials on the same host.
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Cm no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIS42UProxyServices
++Specifies a list of Kerberos service principals for which constrained
++delegation (S4U2Proxy) tickets should be obtained after a successful
++S4U2Self protocol transition.
++Each entry must be a fully-qualified Kerberos principal name of the form
++.Ar service/host@REALM .
++Multiple principals may be listed, separated by whitespace.
++The keyword
++.Cm none
++clears any previously set list.
++.Pp
++This option may be used independently of
++.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self .
++When S4U2Self succeeds, the server iterates the list and calls
++.Xr gss_init_sec_context 3
++for each principal with the proxy credential obtained by S4U2Self as
++the initiator.
++The GSSAPI library presents the evidence ticket to the KDC via an
++S4U2Proxy TGS-REQ; if the host service holds the necessary constrained-
++delegation permission in the KDC, a service ticket from the user to
++the target service is issued.
++These tickets are accumulated and then flushed into the user's ccache
++via
++.Xr gss_store_cred 3 ,
++so that any application running in the user's session can use them
++without further interaction.
++The AP-REQ output token of each
++.Xr gss_init_sec_context 3
++call is discarded; no network connection to the target service is made.
++.Pp
++When used together with
++.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self ,
++the TGT and S4U2Self ticket are also stored in the user's ccache in
++addition to the S4U2Proxy service tickets.
++When used alone (without
++.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self ) ,
++only the S4U2Proxy service tickets are stored; the intermediate S4U2Self
++credential is not placed in the user's ccache.
++.Pp
++This option supports
++.Cm Match
++blocks, allowing per-user or per-host lists of delegation targets.
++.Pp
++The default is empty (no S4U2Proxy delegation is performed).
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c	2026-03-12 11:51:16.597852696 +0100
++++ b/sshd-session.c	2026-03-12 12:03:24.375297257 +0100
+@@ -1489,6 +1489,104 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
  		restore_uid();
  	}
@@ -943,84 +983,33 @@ index a558bbc33..d8b6af13f 100644
  #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 3dbce55fc..d25b406fb 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -832,6 +832,76 @@ FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
- .El
- .Pp
- The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self
-+Controls whether the SSH server performs a Kerberos protocol transition
-+(S4U2Self) after a successful authentication using any other method.
-+Accepted values are
-+.Cm no ,
-+.Cm yes ,
-+or a time interval (see
-+.Sx TIME FORMATS
-+below).
-+.Cm no
-+disables S4U2Self entirely.
-+.Cm yes
-+enables S4U2Self and requests a ticket with the maximum lifetime
-+permitted by the KDC.
-+A time interval (e.g.\&
-+.Cm 8h ,
-+.Cm 1d )
-+enables S4U2Self and requests a ticket valid for at most that duration.
-+The option is a no-op when delegated GSSAPI credentials are already available.
-+The obtained service ticket is stored in the default credentials cache and is
-+accessible to any application that has access to the Kerberos host principal
-+.Pq host/machine.fqdn@REALM
-+credentials on the same host.
-+.Pp
-+The default is
-+.Cm no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIS42UProxyServices
-+Specifies a list of Kerberos service principals for which constrained
-+delegation (S4U2Proxy) tickets should be obtained after a successful
-+S4U2Self protocol transition.
-+Each entry must be a fully-qualified Kerberos principal name of the form
-+.Ar service/host@REALM .
-+Multiple principals may be listed, separated by whitespace.
-+The keyword
-+.Cm none
-+clears any previously set list.
-+.Pp
-+This option may be used independently of
-+.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self .
-+When S4U2Self succeeds, the server iterates the list and calls
-+.Xr gss_init_sec_context 3
-+for each principal with the proxy credential obtained by S4U2Self as
-+the initiator.
-+The GSSAPI library presents the evidence ticket to the KDC via an
-+S4U2Proxy TGS-REQ; if the host service holds the necessary constrained-
-+delegation permission in the KDC, a service ticket from the user to
-+the target service is issued.
-+These tickets are accumulated and then flushed into the user's ccache
-+via
-+.Xr gss_store_cred 3 ,
-+so that any application running in the user's session can use them
-+without further interaction.
-+The AP-REQ output token of each
-+.Xr gss_init_sec_context 3
-+call is discarded; no network connection to the target service is made.
-+.Pp
-+When used together with
-+.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self ,
-+the TGT and S4U2Self ticket are also stored in the user's ccache in
-+addition to the S4U2Proxy service tickets.
-+When used alone (without
-+.Cm GSSAPIAllowS4U2Self ) ,
-+only the S4U2Proxy service tickets are stored; the intermediate S4U2Self
-+credential is not placed in the user's ccache.
-+.Pp
-+This option supports
-+.Cm Match
-+blocks, allowing per-user or per-host lists of delegation targets.
-+.Pp
-+The default is empty (no S4U2Proxy delegation is performed).
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- The default is handled system-wide by
- .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+--- a/ssh-gss.h	2026-03-12 11:51:16.583291666 +0100
++++ b/ssh-gss.h	2026-03-12 12:03:11.541329687 +0100
+@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
+ 	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
++	int allow_self; /* allow protocol transition */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -199,6 +200,18 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *,
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int  ssh_gssapi_credentials_stored(void);
++ssh_gssapi_ccache *ssh_gssapi_get_ccache(void);
++int  ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_tgt(u_int);
++int  ssh_gssapi_user_has_valid_proxy_tickets(char **, u_int, u_int);
++int  ssh_gssapi_s4u2self(const char *, u_int);
++void ssh_gssapi_storecreds_s4u2self(void);
++void ssh_gssapi_s4u2proxy(char **, u_int, u_int);
++/* Flags for ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(): which ticket classes to remove */
++#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_TGT    (1u << 0) /* krbtgt/... entries */
++#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_SELF   (1u << 1) /* S4U2Self evidence ticket */
++#define SSH_GSSAPI_CCFILTER_PROXY  (1u << 2) /* S4U2Proxy service tickets */
++void ssh_gssapi_krb5_filter_ccache(u_int, char **, u_int);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-maxstartups-mistracking.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-maxstartups-mistracking.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e92903
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-maxstartups-mistracking.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/srclimit.c b/srclimit.c
+--- a/srclimit.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/srclimit.c	2026-03-06 13:30:48.408309619 +0100
+@@ -427,7 +427,9 @@ srclimit_penalise(struct xaddr *addr, in
+ 			penalty->active = 1;
+ 		if (RB_INSERT(penalties_by_expiry, by_expiry, penalty) != NULL)
+ 			fatal_f("internal error: %s penalty tables corrupt", t);
+-		verbose_f("%s: new %s %s penalty of %d seconds for %s", t,
++		do_log2_f(penalty->active ?
++		    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
++		    "%s: new %s %s penalty of %d seconds for %s", t,
+ 		    addrnetmask, penalty->active ? "active" : "deferred",
+ 		    penalty_secs, reason);
+ 		if (++(*npenaltiesp) > (size_t)max_sources)
+@@ -446,7 +448,7 @@ srclimit_penalise(struct xaddr *addr, in
+ 		existing->expiry = now + penalty_cfg.penalty_max;
+ 	if (existing->expiry - now > penalty_cfg.penalty_min &&
+ 	    !existing->active) {
+-		verbose_f("%s: activating %s penalty of %lld seconds for %s",
++		logit_f("%s: activating %s penalty of %lld seconds for %s",
+ 		    addrnetmask, t, (long long)(existing->expiry - now),
+ 		    reason);
+ 		existing->active = 1;
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c	2026-03-06 13:10:52.653617548 +0100
++++ b/sshd.c	2026-03-06 13:24:50.865079998 +0100
+@@ -291,8 +291,10 @@ child_finish(struct early_child *child)
+ {
+ 	if (children_active == 0)
+ 		fatal_f("internal error: children_active underflow");
+-	if (child->pipefd != -1)
++	if (child->pipefd != -1) {
++		srclimit_done(child->pipefd);
+ 		close(child->pipefd);
++	}
+ 	free(child->id);
+ 	memset(child, '\0', sizeof(*child));
+ 	child->pipefd = -1;
+@@ -311,6 +313,7 @@ child_close(struct early_child *child, i
+ 	if (!quiet)
+ 		debug_f("enter%s", force_final ? " (forcing)" : "");
+ 	if (child->pipefd != -1) {
++		srclimit_done(child->pipefd);
+ 		close(child->pipefd);
+ 		child->pipefd = -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -978,10 +981,11 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 				}
+ 				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ 			case 0:
+-				/* child exited preauth */
++				/* child closed pipe */
+ 				if (children[i].early)
+ 					listening--;
+-				srclimit_done(children[i].pipefd);
++				debug3_f("child %lu for %s closed pipe",
++				    (long)children[i].pid, children[i].id);
+ 				child_close(&(children[i]), 0, 0);
+ 				break;
+ 			case 1:
+@@ -1003,6 +1007,12 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 					    "child %ld for %s in state %d",
+ 					    (int)c, (long)children[i].pid,
+ 					    children[i].id, children[i].early);
++
++					if (children[i].early)
++						listening--;
++					if (children[i].pid > 0)
++						kill(children[i].pid, SIGTERM);
++					child_close(&(children[i]), 0, 0);
+ 				}
+ 				break;
+ 			}
diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch
index 2b70103..59d0120 100644
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 5c0491cf1..e2c501d0c 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -509,6 +509,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+--- a/gss-serv.c	2026-03-11 13:54:53.076924823 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv.c	2026-03-11 14:10:41.232855086 +0100
+@@ -493,6 +493,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  int
  ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
  {
@@ -14,19 +13,18 @@ index 5c0491cf1..e2c501d0c 100644
  	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
  		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
  	} else
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index aab653244..02a9888c9 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2026-03-11 13:54:53.086263187 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c	2026-03-11 14:03:10.708713524 +0100
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
 +	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-@@ -403,6 +404,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->gss_keyex = 0;
  	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
  		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
@@ -61,7 +59,7 @@ index aab653244..02a9888c9 100644
  	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1713,6 +1719,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1703,6 +1709,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -72,7 +70,7 @@ index aab653244..02a9888c9 100644
  	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3359,6 +3369,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3348,6 +3358,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
@@ -80,10 +78,9 @@ index aab653244..02a9888c9 100644
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 7c41df417..6bfdf6305 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+--- a/servconf.h	2026-03-11 13:54:53.086763709 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h	2026-03-11 14:13:51.130708769 +0100
 @@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
@@ -92,11 +89,10 @@ index 7c41df417..6bfdf6305 100644
  	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
  	int 	gss_store_rekey;
  	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
-diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
-index 49349bb30..e798f4df5 100644
---- a/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+--- a/sshd_config.0	2026-03-11 13:54:52.904233471 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.0	2026-03-11 14:12:35.341170737 +0100
+@@ -451,6 +451,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
               Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
               cache on logout.  The default is yes.
  
@@ -106,11 +102,10 @@ index 49349bb30..e798f4df5 100644
       GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
               Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
               acceptor a client authenticates against.  If set to yes then the
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 90ab87edd..8c677bfd0 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2026-03-11 13:54:53.087046352 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2026-03-11 14:05:15.657248031 +0100
+@@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
index 237e45d..6c55a66 100644
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@@ -1,38 +1,7 @@
-From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
-
-RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
-associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
-name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
-to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
-may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
-issuance process.
-
-Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
-GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
-that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
-on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
-
-Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
-
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
----
- configure.ac    |   1 +
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
- servconf.h      |   2 +
- ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
- sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
- 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+--- a/configure.ac	2026-03-10 12:43:36.860784813 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac	2026-03-10 12:46:27.022297835 +0100
+@@ -4932,6 +4932,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
  		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
  		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
  		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
@@ -40,113 +9,10 @@ index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
  
  		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
  			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "match.h"
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
-@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
-+ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
-+ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
-+ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
-+ */
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
-+{
-+	int ret;
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	/* Check indicators */
-+	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
-+					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
-+		/* negative or positive match */
-+		if (ret != 0) {
-+			*matched = i;
-+			return ret;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	/* No rule matched */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
-  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
-  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
-@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
- 	krb5_principal princ;
--	int retval;
-+	int retval, matched;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 	int k5login_exists;
- 
-@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 	if (k5login_exists &&
- 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
--		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
--		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
- 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
- 		name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
--		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
--		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
--		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
- 	} else
- 		retval = 0;
- 
-+	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
-+		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
-+		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
-+		retval = 0;
-+		if (client->indicators) {
-+			matched = -1;
-+			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
-+			if (retval != 0) {
-+				retval = (retval == 1);
-+				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
-+					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
-+					client->indicators[matched],
-+					(char *)client->displayname.value,
-+				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
-+				goto cont;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (retval == 0) {
-+			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
-+				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
-+			(char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		}
-+	}
-+cont:
-+	if (retval == 1) {
-+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
-+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
-+	}
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 	return retval;
- }
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+--- a/gss-serv.c	2026-03-10 12:43:36.802443034 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv.c	2026-03-12 10:04:37.520993330 +0100
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  
  static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
      { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
@@ -155,7 +21,7 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
  
  ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
      { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+@@ -295,6 +295,95 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
  	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
  }
  
@@ -163,9 +29,10 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
 +/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
 + * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
 + * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
-+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
++ * Each indicator is an utf8 string. */
 +
 +#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
++#define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS 64
 +
 +/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
 +static OM_uint32
@@ -188,24 +55,7 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
 +		return (0);
 +	}
 +
-+	count = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
-+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
-+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+		count++;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (count == 0) {
-+		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
-+		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++	client->indicators = NULL;
 +	count = 0;
 +	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
 +		authenticated = 0;
@@ -213,22 +63,33 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
 +		more = -1;
 +		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
 +		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++		    memcmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			   attrs->elements[i].value,
++			   sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
 +			continue;
 +		/* retrieve all indicators */
 +		while (more != 0) {
 +			value.value = NULL;
 +			display_value.value = NULL;
 +			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
-+					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
-+					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
-+			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++							    &attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
++							    &complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
++			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
 +				goto out;
-+			}
 +
 +			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
++				if (count >= SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS) {
++					logit("ssh_gssapi_getindicators: too many "
++					    "indicators, truncating at %d",
++					    SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_INDICATORS);
++					/* value/display_value released at out: */
++					goto done;
++				}
++
++				client->indicators = xrecallocarray(client->indicators, count, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++				if (client->indicators == NULL) {
++					fatal("ssh_gssapi_getindicators failed to allocate memory");
++				}
 +				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
 +				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
 +				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
@@ -237,18 +98,26 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
 +		}
 +	}
 +
++done:
++	/* slot [count] is zeroed by recallocarray, serves as NULL sentinel */
++
 +out:
++	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && client->indicators != NULL) {
++		for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
++			free(client->indicators[i]);
++		free(client->indicators);
++		client->indicators = NULL;
++	}
 +	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
 +	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
 +	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
 +	return (ctx->major);
 +}
-+
 +
  /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
   * be called once for a context */
  
-@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -384,6 +473,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
  	}
  
  	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
@@ -261,7 +130,7 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
  
  	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
  	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+@@ -446,6 +541,7 @@ int
  ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
  {
  	OM_uint32 lmin;
@@ -269,34 +138,174 @@ index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
  
  	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
  
-@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+@@ -464,8 +560,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct pas
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
  			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+-			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+-			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
 +
 +			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
-+				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++				for (i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++)
 +					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
-+				}
 +				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
 +			}
 +
- 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
++			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
  			return 0;
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		}
+ 	else
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c	2026-03-10 12:43:36.823015336 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c	2026-03-11 12:58:56.024455238 +0100
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,33 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
++ */
++
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
++{
++	int ret;
++	u_int i;
++	*matched = -1;
++
++	/* Check indicators */
++	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
++					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
++		/* negative or positive match */
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			*matched = i;
++			return ret;
++		}
++	}
++	/* No rule matched */
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,15 +221,15 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
++	int retval, matched, success;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value,
+-	    &princ))) {
++	retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ);
++	if (retval) {
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval);
+ 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+@@ -216,17 +244,60 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+-	} else
++		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
++	} else {
++		retval = 0;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* At this point we are good if no indicators were defined */
++	if (options.gss_indicators == NULL) {
++		retval = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* At this point we have indicators defined in the configuration,
++	 * if clientt did not provide any indicators, we reject */
++	if (!client->indicators) {
++		retval = 0;
++		logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
++		      "but indicators not provided by the client. "
++		      "krb5 principal %s denied",
++		      (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
++	 * check the match */
++	matched = -1;
++	success = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
++
++	switch (success) {
++	case 1:
++		logit("Provided indicator %s allowed by the configuration",
++		      client->indicators[matched]);
++		retval = 1;
++		break;
++	case -1:
++		logit("Provided indicator %s rejected by the configuration",
++		      client->indicators[matched]);
++		retval = 0;
++		break;
++	default:
++		logit("Provided indicators do not match the configuration");
+ 		retval = 0;
++		break;
++	}
+ 
++out:
++	if (retval == 1) {
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
++		      name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
++	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2026-03-10 12:43:36.928060353 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c	2026-03-11 13:20:09.725354925 +0100
+@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
-@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain);
+ 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent);
+ 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->per_source_penalty_exempt);
++	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->gss_indicators);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
+ 		CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
+@@ -594,7 +596,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
@@ -305,7 +314,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -690,6 +692,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -313,7 +322,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -699,6 +702,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -321,7 +330,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1715,6 +1719,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
  		break;
  
@@ -337,7 +346,7 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3329,6 +3342,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
  	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
@@ -345,10 +354,9 @@ index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+--- a/servconf.h	2026-03-10 12:43:36.833119920 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h	2026-03-11 13:21:36.742117033 +0100
 @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	char   **allow_groups;
  	u_int num_deny_groups;
@@ -357,7 +365,7 @@ index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
  
  	u_int num_subsystems;
  	char   **subsystem_name;
-@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+@@ -309,6 +310,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
  		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
  		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
  		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
@@ -365,36 +373,10 @@ index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
  		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
-+#include <gssapi_ext.h>
-+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
-+#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef KRB5
- # ifndef HEIMDAL
- #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
- 	int used;
- 	int updated;
-+	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2026-03-10 12:43:36.859313302 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2026-03-11 13:28:04.541970063 +0100
+@@ -785,6 +785,52 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
@@ -441,10 +423,33 @@ index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
 +FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
 +.El
 +.Pp
-+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
++The default
++.Dq none
++is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
  The default is handled system-wide by
  .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
--- 
-2.49.0
-
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+--- a/ssh-gss.h	2026-03-10 12:43:36.898148309 +0100
++++ b/ssh-gss.h	2026-03-11 13:23:07.601956965 +0100
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
++#include <gssapi_ext.h>
++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
++#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -112,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
++	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index f354a01..f19714e 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: 21%{?dist}.alma.1
+Release: 22%{?dist}.alma.1
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
@@ -228,6 +228,15 @@ Patch1033: openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
 Patch1034: openssh-9.9p1-sshd-no-delegate-credentials.patch
 Patch1035: openssh-10.0-mlkem-nist-fips.patch
 Patch1036: openssh-9.9p1-gssapi-s4u.patch
+# upstream 683d0abe596b069a896f1688f86256f1beeb0cdc
+# upstream 9313233a735733821dfd170b70782fb7da492962
+# upstream 2b0f4a72bd87bef7cc9f0a1889cfc98545cbb158
+# upstream 19f7cb39eecb4b8f768f37e8294dc3a9142e022b
+# upstream 97b32fa2af25c16aec4de85c5cbb63fd038b4dfa
+Patch1037: openssh-9.9p1-first-match-wins.patch
+# upstream eddd1d2daa64a6ab1a915ca88436fa41aede44d4
+# upstream bc328144f149af07139a0f2c1329018cd85b86b7
+Patch1038: openssh-9.9p1-maxstartups-mistracking.patch
 
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@@ -252,7 +261,6 @@ BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
-Recommends: p11-kit
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
 Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5
 
@@ -429,6 +437,8 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch -P 1034 -p1 -b .sshd-nogsscreds
 %patch -P 1035 -p1 -b .mlkem-nist-fips
 %patch -P 1036 -p1 -b .gssapi-s4u
+%patch -P 1037 -p1 -b .first-match-wins
+%patch -P 1038 -p1 -b .maxstartups-mistracking
 
 %patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
 
@@ -709,9 +719,23 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Mar 12 2026 Koichiro Iwao <meta@almalinux.org> - 9.9p1-21.alma.1
+* Wed Mar 18 2026 Koichiro Iwao <meta@almalinux.org> - 9.9p1-22.alma.1
 - Unpatch Red Hat help message
 
+* Thu Mar 12 2026 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-22
+- Remove recommendation of p11-kit
+  Resolves: RHEL-139070
+- Only the first value of MaxStartups, PerSourceNetBlockSize and IPQoS
+  in sshd_config should count when defined multiple times
+  Resolves: RHEL-150365
+- Fix mistracking of MaxStartups process exits in some situations
+  Resolves: RHEL-121768
+- Fix GSSAPI authentication indicator issues found by AI
+  Resolves: RHEL-154309
+- CVE-2026-3497: Fix information disclosure or denial of service due
+  to uninitialized variables in gssapi-keyex
+  Resolves: RHEL-155813
+
 * Wed Mar 11 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-21
 - Implement obtaining Kerberos tickets on behalf of user on SSH authentication
   Resolves: RHEL-92932