From ac08a661753790a7455d95fb6b919c57734f3d14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2021 21:29:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] import openssh-8.6p1-7.el9.1 --- .gitignore | 3 + .openssh.metadata | 3 + SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch | 18 + SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch | 83 + SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch | 12 + SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch | 24 + SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch | 101 + SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch | 16 + SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch | 263 ++ ...h-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch | 14 + .../openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch | 133 + .../openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch | 131 + SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch | 39 + SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch | 280 ++ SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch | 484 ++ SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch | 31 + SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch | 289 ++ SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch | 121 + SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch | 569 +++ .../openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch | 100 + SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch | 12 + .../openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch | 187 + SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch | 87 + SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch | 52 + SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch | 53 + SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch | 213 + SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch | 98 + SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch | 86 + SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch | 2323 ++++++++++ SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch | 283 ++ SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch | 454 ++ SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch | 633 +++ SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch | 117 + SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch | 26 + SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch | 867 ++++ SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch | 16 + SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch | 498 +++ SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch | 3942 +++++++++++++++++ .../openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch | 12 + SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch | 720 +++ SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch | 137 + SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch | 3053 +++++++++++++ .../openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch | 44 + SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch | 320 ++ SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch | 40 + SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch | 30 + SOURCES/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch | 57 + SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc | 16 + SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders | 36 + .../pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch | 992 +++++ ...am_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch | 20 + .../pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch | 37 + .../pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch | 21 + ...ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch | 96 + SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch | 198 + SOURCES/ssh-agent.service | 14 + SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam | 8 + SOURCES/sshd-keygen | 40 + SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target | 5 + SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service | 11 + SOURCES/sshd.pam | 17 + SOURCES/sshd.service | 17 + SOURCES/sshd.socket | 11 + SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig | 7 + SOURCES/sshd@.service | 10 + SPECS/openssh.spec | 2920 ++++++++++++ 66 files changed, 21550 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .gitignore create mode 100644 .openssh.metadata create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/ssh-agent.service create mode 100644 SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd-keygen create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd.pam create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd.service create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd.socket create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig create mode 100644 SOURCES/sshd@.service create mode 100644 SPECS/openssh.spec diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c83f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg +SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz +SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz diff --git a/.openssh.metadata b/.openssh.metadata new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7546aa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/.openssh.metadata @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +dbb35b4e9ae3f72b930a82c6fd5e83e9dcd7b193 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg +8f9f0c94317baeb97747d6258f3997b4542762c0 SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz +66dd8274346fd006ff40f525c082cfb701085b5f SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..120ed1b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200 +@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi + + err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, + GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, +- "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping " +- "on your session.", what); ++ "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n" ++ "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, " ++ "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping " ++ "on your session.\n" ++ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or " ++ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + + gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err)); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff609da --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100 +@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia + return 1; + } + ++static void ++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress) ++{ ++ gdouble step; ++ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++ ++ step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1); ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step); ++ gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++} ++ + static int + passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) + { + const char *failed; + char *passphrase, *local; + int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; + int buttons, default_response; +- GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry; ++ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox; + GdkGrabStatus status; + GdkColor fg, bg; + int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0; +@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) + gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg); + + if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) { ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, ++ FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ + entry = gtk_entry_new(); + if (fg_set) + gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg); + if (bg_set) + gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg); + gtk_box_pack_start( +- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), +- entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0); ++ GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) { +@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) + g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event", + G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog); + } ++ ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), ++ hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ ++ progress = gtk_progress_bar_new(); ++ ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), ++ "Passphrase length hidden intentionally"); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE, ++ TRUE, 5); ++ gtk_widget_show(progress); ++ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed", ++ G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress); ++ + } + + /* Grab focus */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56af045 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c +--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe 2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c 2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200 +@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + fdlim_set(maxfd); + fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); + ++ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); ++ + read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); + read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ece1a73 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 +--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200 +@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information. + .Nm + exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 + if an error occurred. ++.Sh IPV6 ++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr scp 1 , + .Xr sftp 1 , +diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 +--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200 +@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c + started last). + The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. + .El ++.Sh IPV6 ++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell. + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr scp 1 , + .Xr sftp 1 , diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddcb7f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c +--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp 2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100 +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in + + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx + { +- AES_KEY aes_ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ecbctx; + u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + }; + +@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char + { + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + size_t n = 0; +- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; ++ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; + + if (len == 0) + return (1); + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) + return (0); + +- while ((len--) > 0) { ++ for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) { ++ u_int r,a,b; ++ + if (n == 0) { +- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx); +- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ int outl, i, buflen; ++ ++ buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf)); ++ ++ for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { ++ memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ } ++ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl, ++ ctrbuf, buflen); + } +- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n]; +- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a)); ++ memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b)); ++ r = a ^ b; ++ memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r)); ++ src += sizeof(a); ++ dest += sizeof(r); ++ ++ n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf); + } ++ memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf)); ++ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + return (1); + } + +@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co + c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); + } +- if (key != NULL) +- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, +- &c->aes_ctx); ++ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx); ++ ++ if (key != NULL) { ++ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; ++ switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) { ++ case 128: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); ++ break; ++ case 192: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); ++ break; ++ case 256: ++ cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length"); ++ } ++ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL)) ++ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption"); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0); ++ } + if (iv != NULL) + memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return (1); +@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + free(c); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a7d849 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index d98fa67..25d347b 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) + addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); + addargs(&alist, "-x"); + addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); +- addargs(&alist, "-n"); ++ if (isatty(fileno(stdin))) ++ addargs(&alist, "-t"); ++ else ++ addargs(&alist, "-n"); + for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { + addargs(&alist, "%s", + remote_remote_args.list[j]); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf3293f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200 +@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void + log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, + int on_stderr) + { ++ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1); ++} ++ ++void ++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) { + #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; + #endif +@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level + exit(1); + } + +- log_handler = NULL; +- log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ if (reset_handler) { ++ log_handler = NULL; ++ log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ } + + log_on_stderr = on_stderr; + if (on_stderr) +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h 2021-05-06 11:34:22.349925757 +0200 +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum { + typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *); + + void log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); ++void log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int); + LogLevel log_level_get(void); + int log_change_level(LogLevel); + int log_is_on_stderr(void); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-05-06 11:33:37.671575348 +0200 +@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s + close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + ++ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth"; ++ + authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; +@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, + close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); + pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + ++ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth"; ++ + monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); + ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); + ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); +@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito + /* Log it */ + if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) + fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level); +- sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg); ++ sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state); + + sshbuf_free(logmsg); + free(msg); +@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void) + mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); + monitor_openfds(mon, 1); + ++ mon->m_state = ""; ++ + return mon; + } + + void +-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) ++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir) + { +- monitor_openfds(mon, 0); ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; ++ char *dev_log_path; ++ int do_logfds = 0; ++ ++ if (chroot_dir != NULL) { ++ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir); ++ ++ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir); ++ do_logfds = 1; ++ } ++ free(dev_log_path); ++ } ++ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds); + } + + #ifdef GSSAPI +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-05-06 11:32:25.180006819 +0200 +@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor { + int m_log_sendfd; + struct kex **m_pkex; + pid_t m_pid; ++ char *m_state; + }; + + struct monitor *monitor_init(void); +-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); ++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *); + + struct Authctxt; + void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.166006709 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200 +@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc; + + static int is_child = 0; + static int in_chroot = 0; ++static int have_dev_log = 1; + + /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ + static char *auth_info_file = NULL; +@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con + int ret; + const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; + char session_type[1024]; ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; + + if (options.adm_forced_command) { + original_command = command; +@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con + tty += 5; + } + ++ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ have_dev_log = 0; ++ } ++ + verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", + session_type, + tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", +@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) + + /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */ + log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); +- +- /* +- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them +- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after +- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file +- * descriptors open. +- */ +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + } + + /* +@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co + exit(1); + } + +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); +- + do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); + + /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ +@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); ++ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log)); + } + ++ /* ++ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them ++ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after ++ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file ++ * descriptors open. ++ */ ++ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); ++ + fflush(NULL); + + /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200 +@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ + + struct passwd; + +-int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); ++int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int); + void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200 +@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) + } + + int +-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) ++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler) + { + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; +@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, + extern char *__progname; + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + pw = pwcopy(user_pw); + +@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, + } + } + +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + /* + * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200 +@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + return 1; + } + +- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); ++ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0)); + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.177006795 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.182006834 +0200 +@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct + } + + /* New socket pair */ +- monitor_reinit(pmonitor); ++ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory); + + pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); + if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) +@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; ++ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); ++ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; ++ ++ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1) ++ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb55c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +--- a/scp.c ++++ a/scp.c +@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + free(vect[0]); + continue; + } ++ if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') { ++ errno = ENOTDIR; ++ goto bad; ++ } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWUSR; + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { +-- diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa9d591 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ + #include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ + #include "servconf.h" + #include "port-linux.h" ++#include "misc.h" + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" +@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + void + sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + { +- security_context_t *ctx; ++ char *ctx; + + if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; +@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + } + } + ++void ++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg; ++ const char *contexts_path; ++ FILE *contexts_file; ++ struct stat sb; ++ ++ contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path(); ++ if (contexts_path == NULL) { ++ debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 || ++ sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) { ++ logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root" ++ " and not writable by anyone else"); ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) { ++ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ ++ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { ++ if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL) ++ break; ++ line[len] = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ if (line[0] == '\0') ++ continue; ++ ++ cp = line; ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (arg && *arg == '\0') ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ ++ if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) { ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { ++ debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty"); ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ return; ++ } ++ preauth_context = xstrdup(arg); ++ } ++ } ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ ++ if (preauth_context == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in" ++ " SELinux context file"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context); ++ free(preauth_context); ++} ++ + #endif + #endif + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) + strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len); + if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':'))) + strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen); +- debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, ++ debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", + oldctx, newctx); + if (setcon(newctx) < 0) + do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", + __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno)); +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); ++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) + demote_sensitive_data(); + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++ sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(); + #endif + + /* Demote the child */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ee2535 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100 +@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri + FILE *fp; + char file[MAXPATHLEN]; + char *line = NULL; +- char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + int found_principal = 0; +@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri + + snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); + /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ +- if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { ++ if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) { + return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser, + k5login_exists); + } +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100 +@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->use_kuserok = -1; ++ options->enable_k5users = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + #endif + if (options->use_kuserok == -1) + options->use_kuserok = 1; ++ if (options->enable_k5users == -1) ++ options->enable_k5users = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum { + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, + sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, + sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, +@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct { + { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + intptr = &options->use_kuserok; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssEnablek5users: ++ intptr = &options->enable_k5users; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPermitListen: + case sPermitOpen: + if (opcode == sPermitListen) { +@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); + M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); +@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + # endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users); + #endif + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100 +@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will + * be stored in per-session ccache */ + int use_kuserok; ++ int enable_k5users; + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100 +@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr + on logout. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users ++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication ++access control. Further details are described in ++.Xr ksu 1 . ++The default is ++.Cm no . + .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange + Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange + doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100 +@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes + #GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..953d613 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c +--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200 ++++ openssh/sshd.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200 +@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) + + if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { +- text[0] = '\0'; +- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) +- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, +- " %2.2x", opts[i]); +- fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s", +- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); ++ i = 0; ++ do { ++ switch (opts[i]) { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ ++i; ++ break; ++ case 130: ++ case 133: ++ case 134: ++ i += opts[i + 1]; ++ break; ++ default: ++ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict ++ * source routing options. */ ++ text[0] = '\0'; ++ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) ++ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, ++ " %2.2x", opts[i]); ++ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s", ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); ++ } ++ } while (i < option_size); + } + return; + #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90f8322 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 413b845..54dd383 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "sshkey.h" +@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern ServerOptions options; + + #ifdef HEIMDAL +@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + # include + #endif + ++/* all commands are allowed by default */ ++char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ ++static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, ++ int); ++ + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ +@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + krb5_principal princ; + int retval; + const char *errmsg; ++ int k5login_exists; + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return 0; +@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return 0; + } +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { ++ /* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login. ++ * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */ ++ k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists(); ++ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, ++ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials ++ * to access these files aren't available yet. */ ++ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, ++ name, k5login_exists)) { ++ retval = 1; ++ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " ++ "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", ++ name, (char *)client->displayname.value); + } else + retval = 0; + +@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + return retval; + } + ++/* Test for existence of .k5login. ++ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok() ++ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself. ++ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence ++ * of .k5login to authorize self-login. (absence of both is required) ++ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() ++{ ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); ++ return access(file, F_OK) == 0; ++} ++ ++/* check .k5users for login or command authorization ++ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise. ++ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated. ++ */ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, ++ const char *luser, int k5login_exists) ++{ ++ FILE *fp; ++ char file[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ char *line = NULL; ++ char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */ ++ struct stat st; ++ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ int found_principal = 0; ++ int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0; ++ u_long linenum = 0; ++ size_t linesize = 0; ++ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); ++ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ ++ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { ++ return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, ++ sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && ++ (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); ++ } ++ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { ++ int saved_errno = errno; ++ /* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong. ++ * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */ ++ if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) { ++ logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno)); ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */ ++ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) { ++ /* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */ ++ logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s", ++ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno)); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user", ++ pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* .k5users must be a regular file. krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this ++ * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { ++ logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file); ++ fclose(fp); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ ++ /* Check each line. ksu allows unlimited length lines. */ ++ while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) { ++ linenum++; ++ char *token; ++ ++ /* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */ ++ if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL) ++ continue; ++ if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) { ++ /* we matched on client principal */ ++ found_principal = 1; ++ if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) { ++ /* only shell is allowed */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ break; ++ } ++ /* process the allowed commands */ ++ while (token) { ++ if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) { ++ allcommands = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = ++ xstrdup(token); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = ++ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands, ++ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds)); ++ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n"); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ free(line); ++ if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ /* terminate vector */ ++ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL; ++ /* if all commands are allowed, free vector */ ++ if (allcommands) { ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) { ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]); ++ } ++ free(k5users_allowed_cmds); ++ k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ fclose(fp); ++ return found_principal; ++} ++ + + /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated + * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + command = auth_opts->force_command; + forced = "(key-option)"; + } ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */ ++ else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) { ++ const char *match = command; ++ int allowed = 0, i = 0; ++ ++ if (!match) ++ match = s->pw->pw_shell; ++ while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) { ++ if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) { ++ debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match); ++ allowed = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (!allowed) { ++ debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++#endif ++ + s->forced = 0; + if (forced != NULL) { + s->forced = 1; +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index 0374c88..509109a 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ + # endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ + + # endif /* !HEIMDAL */ ++ ++/* .k5users support */ ++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; ++ + #endif /* KRB5 */ + + /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ +diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 +index adcaaf9..824163b 100644 +--- a/sshd.8 ++++ b/sshd.8 +@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. + The client tries to authenticate itself using + host-based authentication, + public key authentication, ++GSSAPI authentication, + challenge-response authentication, + or password authentication. + .Pp +@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as + but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + .Pp ++.It Pa ~/.k5login ++.It Pa ~/.k5users ++These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. ++Further details are described in ++.Xr ksu 1 . ++.Pp + .It Pa ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration + and authentication information. diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2aa14bd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c +--- openssh/misc.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200 ++++ openssh/misc.c 2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200 +@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", ++ strerror(errno)); ++ _exit(127); ++ } ++#endif + if (env != NULL) + execve(av[0], av, env); + else +diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat +--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 ++++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with ++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled. ++ ++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: ++ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat ++ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root ++ ++Do not forget to enable public key authentication: ++ PubkeyAuthentication yes ++ ++ +diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in +--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200 ++++ openssh/Makefile.in 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass + SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server + SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign ++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat + SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper + SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper + PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ + K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ + GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ + SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ ++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@ + LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ + LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@ + AR=@AR@ +@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + + .SUFFIXES: .lo + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + + XMSS_OBJS=\ + ssh-xmss.o \ +@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) + ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) + ++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS) ++ + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) ++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200 +@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); ++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200 +@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern int inetd_flag; + extern int rexeced_flag; + ++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ ++int ++sshd_selinux_enabled(void) ++{ ++ static int enabled = -1; ++ ++ if (enabled == -1) { ++ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); ++ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); ++ } ++ ++ return (enabled); ++} ++ + /* Send audit message */ + static int + sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, +@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) + { + const char *reqlvl; + char *role; +@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + + ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + +- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + + if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); + } + +- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); + + if (role != NULL) + free(role); +@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) + return rv; + } + ++static int ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); ++} ++ ++static int ++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value) ++{ ++ return setenv(name, value, 1); ++} ++ ++int ++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) ++{ ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); ++} ++ + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void + sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw + int r = 0; + security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; + +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + if (options.use_pam) { +@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + { + security_context_t *ctx; + +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { +diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c +--- openssh/platform.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200 ++++ openssh/platform.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200 +@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p + { + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + /* Cache selinux status for later use */ +- (void)ssh_selinux_enabled(); ++ (void)sshd_selinux_enabled(); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS +diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c +--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200 ++++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ ++/* ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, ++ * including the disclaimer of warranties. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote ++ * products derived from this software without specific prior ++ * written permission. ++ * ++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of ++ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are ++ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is ++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and ++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED ++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE ++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, ++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR ++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. ++ * Written by Tomas Mraz ++*/ ++ ++#define _GNU_SOURCE ++ ++#include "config.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "uidswap.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++ ++#define ERR_USAGE 1 ++#define ERR_PAM_START 2 ++#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3 ++#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4 ++#define ERR_PAM_END 5 ++#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6 ++#define ERR_MEMORY 7 ++#define ERR_OPEN 8 ++#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9 ++#define ERR_FDOPEN 10 ++#define ERR_STAT 11 ++#define ERR_WRITE 12 ++#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13 ++#define BUFLEN 4096 ++ ++/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */ ++static int ++dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm, ++ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr) ++{ ++ struct pam_response *rsp; ++ ++ (void)msgm; ++ (void)appdata_ptr; ++ ++ if (num_msg <= 0) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ /* Just allocate the array as empty responses */ ++ rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response)); ++ if (rsp == NULL) ++ return PAM_CONV_ERR; ++ ++ *response = rsp; ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++static struct pam_conv conv = { ++ dummy_conv, ++ NULL ++}; ++ ++char * ++make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd) ++{ ++ char *fname; ++ ++ if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return fname; ++} ++ ++int ++dump_keys(const char *user) ++{ ++ struct passwd *pwd; ++ int fd = -1; ++ FILE *f = NULL; ++ char *fname = NULL; ++ int rv = 0; ++ char buf[BUFLEN]; ++ size_t len; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_GETPWNAM; ++ } ++ ++ if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) { ++ return ERR_MEMORY; ++ } ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(pwd); ++ ++ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_OPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { ++ rv = ERR_STAT; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || ++ (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) { ++ rv = ERR_FILE_MODE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ unset_nonblock(fd); ++ ++ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { ++ rv = ERR_FDOPEN; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ fd = -1; ++ ++ while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) { ++ rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0; ++ } ++ ++fail: ++ if (fd != -1) ++ close(fd); ++ if (f != NULL) ++ fclose(f); ++ free(fname); ++ restore_uid(); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", ++ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE" ++}; ++ ++extern char **environ; ++ ++int ++set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh) ++{ ++ int i; ++ size_t j; ++ ++ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) { ++ int len = strlen(env_names[j]); ++ ++ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) { ++ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 && ++ environ[i][len] == '=') { ++ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ int retval; ++ int ev = 0; ++ ++ if (argc != 2) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s \n", argv[0]); ++ return ERR_USAGE; ++ } ++ ++ retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ return ERR_PAM_START; ++ } ++ ++ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh); ++ if (ev != 0) ++ goto finish; ++ ++ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ ++ ev = dump_keys(argv[1]); ++ ++ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION; ++ } ++ ++finish: ++ retval = pam_end (pamh,retval); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { ++ ev = ERR_PAM_END; ++ } ++ return ev; ++} +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam], + PAM_MSG="yes" + + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" ++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam" + AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], + [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) + +@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@ + ;; + *) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl" + ;; + esac + fi +@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], + fi ] + ) + AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) ++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS]) + + # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support + KRB5_MSG="no" +@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi + if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then + echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" + fi ++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then ++echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}" ++fi + + echo "" + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e06940 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c +--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm 2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c 2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen + #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(filename)) + #endif ++ + if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { ++ if (st.st_mode & 040) { ++ struct group *gr; ++ ++ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) { ++ /* The only additional bit is read ++ * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */ ++ if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) { ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ } + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..407ff4c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100 +@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@ + + extern ServerOptions options; + ++int ++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client, ++ int k5login_exists) ++{ ++ if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists) ++ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client); ++ else { ++ char kuser[65]; ++ ++ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser)) ++ return 0; ++ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0; ++ } ++} ++ + static int + krb5_init(void *context) + { +@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + if (problem) + goto out; + +- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, +- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { ++ /* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not ++ * depend on the existance of .k5login */ ++ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) { + problem = -1; + goto out; + } +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100 +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr + int); + + static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; ++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int); + + /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ + +@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) + * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 + */ + ++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is ++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with ++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are ++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the ++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like ++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos ++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every ++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket. ++ * ++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for ++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos ++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). ++ * ++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to ++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this ++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the ++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name ++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or ++ * not. ++ * ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a ++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It ++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the ++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case ++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than ++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the ++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory, ++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the ++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be ++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g. ++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there ++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the ++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical ++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication ++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and ++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the ++ * given environment. ++ * ++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the ++ * access control behavior: ++ * - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch ++ * - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch ++ * ++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for ++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the ++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used. ++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if ++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can ++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be ++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be ++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does ++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can ++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new ++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7 ++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the ++ * restrictions mentioned above. ++ * ++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when ++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be ++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks ++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and ++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given ++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with ++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch. ++ * ++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g. ++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to ++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it ++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set ++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it ++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login. ++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to ++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable ++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour. ++ * ++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in ++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is ++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via ++ * krb5_kuserok() as well. ++ * ++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some ++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated ++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks ++ * during upgrade: ++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should ++ * be better disabled globally in krb5.conf ++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really ++ * only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users ++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and ++ * .k5users files directly like ksu itself does ++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use ++ * the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name ++ * given at the login prompt might be useful */ ++ + static int + ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + { +@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client + /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, + * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials + * to access these files aren't available yet. */ +- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { ++ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists) ++ && k5login_exists) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); +@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri + snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); + /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ + if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { +- return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal, +- sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) && +- (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0); ++ return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser, ++ k5login_exists); + } + if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { + int saved_errno = errno; +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100 +@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; + options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; ++ options->use_kuserok = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); + #endif ++ if (options->use_kuserok == -1) ++ options->use_kuserok = 1; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, + sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, + sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct { + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif + { "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY; + break; + ++ case sKerberosUseKuserok: ++ intptr = &options->use_kuserok; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPermitListen: + case sPermitOpen: + if (opcode == sPermitListen) { +@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); +@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); + # endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); + #endif + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100 +@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct { + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will + * be stored in per-session ccache */ ++ int use_kuserok; + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100 +@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr + .Cm no + can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same + user account. ++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok ++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. ++The default is ++.Cm yes . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are + .Cm IPQoS , + .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , + .Cm KerberosAuthentication , ++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok , + .Cm LogLevel , + .Cm MaxAuthTries , + .Cm MaxSessions , +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100 +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes + #KerberosTicketCleanup yes + #KerberosGetAFSToken no ++#KerberosUseKuserok yes + + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8047fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 +@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw + debug3_f("done"); + } + ++void ++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) ++{ ++ security_context_t *ctx; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { ++ logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (ctx != NULL) { ++ /* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */ ++ if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0) ++ fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) ++ fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ freecon(ctx); ++ } ++} ++ + #endif + #endif + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 +@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + + platform_setusercontext(pw); + +- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { ++ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) { + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { +@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); + free(tmp); + free(chroot_path); +@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + #endif ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (in_chroot == 0) ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); +@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s) + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, + "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- setexeccon(NULL); +-#endif + #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME + execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); +@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); +-#endif + exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); + } + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100 +@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++#endif ++ + /* Demote the child */ + if (privsep_chroot) { + /* Change our root directory */ +@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + { + #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING + if (1) { ++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX) ++ if (0) { ++ /* even root user can be confined by SELinux */ + #else + if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { + #endif diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9051869 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch @@ -0,0 +1,569 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100 +@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n + if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0) + return -1; + +- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) ++ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) { ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); + return -1; ++ } + + if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + n) == -1) { +@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char * + if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0) + return -1; + +- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) ++ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) { ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); + return -1; ++ } + + if (sa != NULL) { +- if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) ++ if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) { ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); + return -1; ++ } + memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); + } + +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100 +@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, + umask(old_umask); + if (tmpfd == -1) { + logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ free(ccname); + return oerrno; + } + +@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, + oerrno = errno; + logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); + close(tmpfd); ++ free(ccname); + return oerrno; + } + /* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */ +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100 +@@ -409,8 +409,10 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const + errstr = "invalid environment string"; + goto fail; + } +- if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) ++ if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) { ++ free(opt); + goto alloc_fail; ++ } + cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */ + if (!valid_env_name(cp)) { + free(cp); +@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char * + return r; + } + /* success */ ++ sshbuf_free(b); + return 0; + } + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100 +@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, + debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", + c->self, strerror(err)); + /* Try next address, if any */ +- if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { ++ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) { + close(c->sock); + c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; + channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt); +@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int + channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) + { + int r, success = 0, idx = -1; +- char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; ++ char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL; + int port_to_connect, listen_port; + + /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ +@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct + success = 1; + if (success) { + /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ +- host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; + port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); +@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct + host_to_connect, port_to_connect, + listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); + } ++ free(host_to_connect); ++ free(listen_host); ++ free(listen_path); + return idx; + } + +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/compat.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.768968062 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/compat.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100 +@@ -191,10 +191,12 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, cha + return p; + debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p); + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) ++ /* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */ + if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p, + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { ++ /* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */ + if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p, + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100 +@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname + &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { + error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); + freerrset(fingerprints); ++ free(dnskey_digest); + return -1; + } + } +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity 2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c 2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100 +@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup + enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2); +- ++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" + cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); ++#pragma pop + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 && +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100 +@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshbuf_free(sect); ++ /* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */ + return r; + } + +@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity 2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c 2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100 +@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, + */ + + /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); + # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); + # endif +@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con + + memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); + /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); + strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line)); + +@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con + ut.ut_pid = getpid(); + + /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); + + if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c 2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100 +@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void) + } + if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO) + close(nullfd); ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ + } + + char * +@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou + } + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ + return ret; + } + +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100 +@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t + else + logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile, + strerror(errno)); ++ /* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */ + } + + static unsigned long +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100 +@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx + mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ +- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + + if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) +@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, + s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; + + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd); +- ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */ + return (0); + + error: +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100 +@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, + if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || + (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { + error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty"); +- if (tmp1 > 0) ++ if (tmp1 >= 0) + close(tmp1); +- if (tmp2 > 0) +- close(tmp2); ++ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0) ++ close(tmp2);*/ + return 0; + } + close(tmp1); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; +- socklen_t salen; ++ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100 +@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos: + } else if (r != 0) { + error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", + filename, linenum, arg2); ++ free(arg2); + return -1; + } + free(arg2); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 +@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + { + if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { + kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); +- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); + } + + if (signo) +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 +@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) { +- arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp); + break; + } + for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) +@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ +- if (intptr != NULL) +- *intptr = *intptr + 1; ++ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) ++ if (intptr != NULL) ++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ + } + break; + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100 +@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void) + static void + notify_parent(void) + { +- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) + (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); + } + static void + notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) + { +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) + FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); + } + static void +@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset) + { + char c; + +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) +- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) ++ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) + debug2_f("reading"); + } + +@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) + debug_f("invalid tun"); + goto done; + } +- if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { ++ if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) { + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && + auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun) + goto done; +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100 +@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s + /* Environment specified by admin */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { + cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); ++ /* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */ + if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) { + /* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */ + fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]); + } + *value++ = '\0'; + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value); ++ free(cp); + } + + /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100 +@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo) + pid = sshpid; + if (pid > 1) { + kill(pid, SIGTERM); +- waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); ++ (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + } + + _exit(1); +@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons + fflag || global_fflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } ++ free(abs_dst); ++ abs_dst = NULL; + } + + out: +@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co + if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { + if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { + error("no stat information for %s", fname); ++ free(fname); + continue; + } + lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100 +@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s + freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i])); + } + free(rks); ++ free(device); + return ret; + } + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100 +@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro + + if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) { + error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + return NULL; + } + /* validate also provider from URI */ +@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* drop */ +- setegid(getgid()); +- setgid(getgid()); ++ (void) setegid(getgid()); ++ (void) setgid(getgid()); + + platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */ + +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100 +@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void) + close(muxserver_sock); + muxserver_sock = -1; + options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/ + muxclient(options.control_path); + /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ + fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100 +@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) + + privsep_preauth_child(ssh); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); +- if (box != NULL) ++ if (box != NULL) { + ssh_sandbox_child(box); ++ free(box); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + } + } ++ ++ if (fdset != NULL) ++ free(fdset); + } + + /* +@@ -2474,7 +2479,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); +- ++ /* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE]*/ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( + ssh, list_hostkey_types()); + +@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + + if (newstr) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; +- else ++ else { + fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ free(gss); ++ } ++ /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/ + } + #endif + +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100 +@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + if (r != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); ++ freezero(blob, blen); ++ blob = NULL; ++ blen = 0; + } else { + if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { + cp += 4; +@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) { + start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) { ++ free(checkpoint); + checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) { + generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum( +@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c + #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + fatal("Moduli screening is not supported"); + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ free(checkpoint); ++ if (in != stdin) ++ fclose(in); + } + + static char * +diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c +--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100 +@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s + oerrno = errno; + error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno)); + ssh_digest_free(ctx); ++ ctx = NULL; + errno = oerrno; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cfa309 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 +--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200 +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ + .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests + .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests + .Op Fl u Ar umask ++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms + .Ek + .Nm + .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature +@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit + .Xr umask 2 + to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the + user's default mask. ++.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms ++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead ++of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include: ++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Using both -m and -u switches makes the ++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m) ++for newly created files. + .El + .Pp + On some systems, +diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c +--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode 2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200 ++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c 2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200 +@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue; + /* Version of client */ + static u_int version; + ++/* Force file permissions */ ++int permforce = 0; ++long permforcemode; ++ + /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ + static int init_done; + +@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) + Attrib a; + char *name; + int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; ++ mode_t old_umask = 0; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ +@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) + debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); + flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); + mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; ++ if (permforce == 1) { /* Force perm if -m is set */ ++ mode = permforcemode; ++ old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */ ++ } + logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", + name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); + if (readonly && +@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) + } + } + } ++ if (permforce == 1) ++ (void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */ + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " + "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] " +- "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n" ++ "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n" + " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", + __progname, __progname); + exit(1); +@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, + pw = pwcopy(user_pw); + + while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, +- "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { ++ "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'Q': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { +@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, + fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); + (void)umask((mode_t)mask); + break; ++ case 'm': ++ /* Force permissions on file received via sftp */ ++ permforce = 1; ++ permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); ++ if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || ++ *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 && ++ errno != 0)) ++ fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg); ++ break; + case 'h': + default: + sftp_server_usage(); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..156e66d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c +--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt 2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200 ++++ openssh/servconf.c 2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200 +@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); + dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers); + dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs); +- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); ++ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none"); + dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); + dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); + dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5895f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100 +@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); + sshbuf_free(m); + } ++ ++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin) ++{ ++ u_char buf[4]; ++ u_int blen, msg_len; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ int r, ret = 0; ++ ++ debug3_f("entering"); ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ do { ++ blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf)); ++ if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */ ++ break; ++ if (blen != sizeof(buf)) { ++ error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child"); ++ ret = -1; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ msg_len = get_u32(buf); ++ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) ++ fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len); ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) { ++ error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child"); ++ ret = -1; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || ++ atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) { ++ error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor"); ++ ret = -1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } while (1); ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ return ret; ++} ++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd) ++{ ++ pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd; ++} + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100 +@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); + void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int); ++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int); + #endif + + struct Session; +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100 +@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL; + login_cap_t *lc; + #endif + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++int paudit[2]; ++#endif ++ + static int is_child = 0; + static int in_chroot = 0; + static int have_dev_log = 1; +@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s) + return 1; + } + ++void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh); ++ + #define USE_PIPES 1 + /* + * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This +@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c + close(err[0]); + #endif + ++ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh); ++ + /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ + do_child(ssh, s, command); + /* NOTREACHED */ +@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm + /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + ++ /* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */ ++ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh); ++ + /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ + #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA + do_login(ssh, s, command); +@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + } + if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) + s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command)); ++ if (pipe(paudit) < 0) ++ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + #endif + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); +@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) + */ + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ close(paudit[1]); ++ if (use_privsep && ret == 0) { ++ /* ++ * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them ++ * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly, ++ * because the messages might get mixed up. ++ * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent). ++ */ ++ ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]); ++ } ++ close(paudit[0]); ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ ++ + return ret; + } + +@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void) + log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); + } + ++void ++child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ int pparent = paudit[1]; ++ close(paudit[0]); ++ /* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */ ++ if (use_privsep) ++ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent); ++#endif ++ ++ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep); ++ /* ++ * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the ++ * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer ++ * which we can't do using one-way pipe. ++ */ ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); ++ /* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */ ++ /* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */ ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ /* Notify parent that we are done */ ++ close(pparent); ++#endif ++} ++ + /* + * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the + * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group +@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command + + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + +- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1); +- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); +- /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the +- monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ +- packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); +- + /* Force a password change */ + if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { + do_setusercontext(pw); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80e7678 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c +index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644 +--- a/auth-krb5.c ++++ b/auth-krb5.c +@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup: + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } + } ++ ++/* ++ * Reads k5login_directory option from the krb5.conf ++ */ ++krb5_error_code ++ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) { ++ profile_t p; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL, ++ k5login_directory); ++} + #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); + + #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) + krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *); ++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, ++ char **k5login_directory); + #endif + + #endif /* AUTH_H */ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() + { + char file[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; ++ char *k5login_directory = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory); ++ debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret); ++ if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) { ++ /* If not set, the library will look for k5login ++ * files in the user's home directory, with the filename .k5login. ++ */ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); ++ } else { ++ /* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file ++ * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the ++ * local username. ++ */ ++ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, ++ k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "", ++ pw->pw_name); ++ } ++ debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file); + +- snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); + return access(file, F_OK) == 0; + } + +diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 +index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644 +--- a/sshd.8 ++++ b/sshd.8 +@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh. + These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. + Further details are described in + .Xr ksu 1 . ++The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option ++.Cm k5login_directory ++in the ++.Xr krb5.conf 5 . + .Pp + .It Pa ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..363538c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open. + +All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new +sshd process to handle a new client connection is +spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem +without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the +files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the +closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop. + +Author: Harald Freudenberger + +--- + openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) + +--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c +@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd) + fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10); + if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' && + fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp)) ++#ifdef __s390__ ++ { ++ /* ++ * the filedescriptors used to communicate with ++ * the device drivers to provide hardware support ++ * should survive. HF ++ */ ++ char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX]; ++ len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s", ++ fdpath, dent->d_name); ++ if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) { ++ len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath)); ++ if (len > 0) { ++ lpath[len] = 0; ++ if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt") ++ || strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt") ++ || strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom") ++ || strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats")) ++ fd = -1; ++ } ++ } ++ if (fd >= 0) ++ (void) close((int) fd); ++ } ++#else + (void) close((int) fd); ++#endif + } + (void) closedir(dirp); + return; + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a19ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c +--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c 2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200 +@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + } + + static int +-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) ++connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len) + { + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un addr; + ++ if (len <= 0) ++ return -1; + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock == -1) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; +- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); +- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) ++ if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path) ++ len = sizeof addr.sun_path; ++ memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len); ++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0) + return sock; + close(sock); +- error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + +@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int + connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) + { + char buf[1024]; +- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); +- return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); ++ int len, ret; ++ len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); ++#ifdef linux ++ /* try abstract socket first */ ++ buf[0] = '\0'; ++ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0) ++ return ret; ++#endif ++ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0) ++ return ret; ++ error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; + } + + #ifdef __APPLE__ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8a147b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100 +@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0; + #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" + + /* -- X11 forwarding */ +-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ +-#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 ++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */ ++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000 + + /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */ + typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, +@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void) + */ + int + x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, +- int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, ++ int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection, + u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) + { + Channel *nc = NULL; +@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + if (chanids == NULL) + return -1; + ++ /* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */ ++ x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset; ++ + for (display_number = x11_display_offset; +- display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; ++ display_number < x11_max_displays; + display_number++) { +- port = 6000 + display_number; ++ port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number; ++ if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */ ++ break; + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; +@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + if (num_socks > 0) + break; + } +- if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { ++ if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) { + error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); + return -1; + } +@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void) + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); ++ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, + ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); +@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void) + /* Connect it to the display. */ + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { + debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, +- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); ++ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; + } +@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void) + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (!ai) { +- error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, +- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); ++ error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, ++ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + set_nodelay(sock); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100 +@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *); + + void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); + int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); +-int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); ++int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); + void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, + const char *, const char *, const char *, int); + +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100 +@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->print_lastlog = -1; + options->x11_forwarding = -1; + options->x11_display_offset = -1; ++ options->x11_max_displays = -1; + options->x11_use_localhost = -1; + options->permit_tty = -1; + options->permit_user_rc = -1; +@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->x11_forwarding = 0; + if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) + options->x11_display_offset = 10; ++ if (options->x11_max_displays == -1) ++ options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS; + if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) + options->x11_use_localhost = 1; + if (options->xauth_location == NULL) +@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, +- sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, ++ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost, + sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, + sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, + sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, +@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct { + { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + *intptr = value; + break; + ++ case sX11MaxDisplays: ++ intptr = &options->x11_max_displays; ++ goto parse_int; ++ + case sX11UseLocalhost: + intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); ++ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); +@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #endif + dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); + dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); ++ dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays); + dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); + dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); + dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100 +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ + + #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ + #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ ++#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ + + /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ + #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" +@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct { + int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ + int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start + * searching at */ ++ int x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */ + int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ + char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ + int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100 +@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) + return 0; + } + if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, +- options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, +- &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { ++ options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays, ++ s->single_connection, &s->display_number, ++ &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { + debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); + return 0; + } +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100 +@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are + .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , + .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , + .Cm X11DisplayOffset , ++.Cm X11MaxDisplays , + .Cm X11Forwarding + and + .Cm X11UseLocalhost . +@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail + X11 forwarding. + This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. + The default is 10. ++.It Cm X11MaxDisplays ++Specifies the maximum number of displays available for ++.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's ++X11 forwarding. ++This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports. ++The default is 1000. + .It Cm X11Forwarding + Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. + The argument must be diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f9e58a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31 +Author: Jakub Jelen +Date: Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100 + + systemd stuff + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], + AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) + AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) + ++# Check whether user wants systemd support ++SYSTEMD_MSG="no" ++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd, ++ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support], ++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then ++ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) ++ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd]) ++ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then ++ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd` ++ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd` ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS" ++ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.]) ++ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes" ++ else ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ++ fi ++ fi ++ fi ] ++) ++ ++ + # Looking for programs, paths and files + + PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" + echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" + echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" + echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" ++echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG" + echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" + echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" + echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" +diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..e0d4923 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/contrib/sshd.service +@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ ++[Unit] ++Description=OpenSSH server daemon ++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5) ++After=network.target ++ ++[Service] ++Type=notify ++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS ++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID ++KillMode=process ++Restart=on-failure ++RestartPreventExitStatus=255 ++ ++[Install] ++WantedBy=multi-user.target ++ +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD ++#include ++#endif ++ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh.h" + #include "ssh2.h" +@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } + } + ++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD ++ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */ ++ sd_notify(0, "READY=1"); ++#endif ++ + /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ + server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, + &newsock, config_s); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7217c64 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock +and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11 +implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the +crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now, +this is only need on s390 architecture. + +Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto +--- + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644 +--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), + #endif ++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__) ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_futex + SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex), + #endif +@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), + #endif ++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__) ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), + #endif +-- +1.9.1 + +getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a +crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica). +Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code. + +Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto +--- + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644 +--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_getuid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_getuid32 ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_geteuid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), + #endif +-- 1.9.1 +1.9.1 +diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox 2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100 +@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ + #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_gettid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), + #endif + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f37ac2b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2323 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200 +@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, + #endif + } + ++int ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { + /* not implemented */ + } + + void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ /* not necessary */ ++} ++ ++void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { + /* not implemented */ +@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li + /* not implemented */ + } + ++int ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ + void + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + { +@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + } + } ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh * ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ ++} + #endif /* BSM */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200 +@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ + #include "log.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" + + /* + * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when +@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ + * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. + */ + extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern ServerOptions options; + + /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ + ssh_audit_event_t +@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) + const char * + audit_username(void) + { +- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; +- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; ++ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; + +- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) ++ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + return (unknownuser); +- if (!the_authctxt->valid) +- return (invaliduser); + return (the_authctxt->user); + } + +@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) + return(event_lookup[i].name); + } + ++void ++audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key) ++{ ++ char *fp; ++ ++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) ++ *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ free(fp); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what)); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) ++{ ++ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid())); ++} ++ + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* + * Null implementations of audit functions. +@@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e + } + + /* ++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, ++ * audit_session_open. ++ */ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), ++ audit_username()); ++} ++ ++/* + * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. + * +@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li + /* + * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows +- * multiple sessions within a single connection. ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for ++ * audit_end_command. + */ +-void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++int ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) + { + debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that ++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from ++ * the corresponding audit_run_command. ++ */ ++void ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), ++ audit_username(), command); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. ++ * ++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. ++ */ ++int ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d", ++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), ++ fp, rv); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. ++ */ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. ++ */ ++void ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, ++ (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard ++ */ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); + } + # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200 +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + # define _SSH_AUDIT_H + + #include "loginrec.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + + struct ssh; + +@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { + SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ + SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN + }; ++ ++enum ssh_audit_kex { ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER, ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC, ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION ++}; + typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; + ++int listening_for_clients(void); ++ + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); + void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); ++void audit_count_session_open(void); + void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); + void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); +-void audit_run_command(const char *); ++int audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *); ++void audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *); + ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); ++int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); ++void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *); ++void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int); ++void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *); ++void audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); ++void audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos); ++void audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + + #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200 +@@ -33,27 +33,40 @@ + + #include "log.h" + #include "audit.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ ++#include "servconf.h" + #include "canohost.h" + #include "packet.h" +- ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "channels.h" ++#include "session.h" ++ ++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern u_int utmp_len; + const char *audit_username(void); + +-int +-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, +- const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) ++static void ++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) + { + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + + if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) +- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else +- return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } +- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", +- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + +@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; + +- return rc >= 0; ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, ++ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) ++{ ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ static const char *event_name[] = { ++ "maxtries exceeded", ++ "root denied", ++ "success", ++ "none", ++ "password", ++ "challenge-response", ++ "pubkey", ++ "hostbased", ++ "gssapi", ++ "invalid user", ++ "nologin", ++ "connection closed", ++ "connection abandoned", ++ "unknown" ++ }; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) ++ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; ++ ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, ++ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ close(audit_fd); ++ /* ++ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non ++ * root user. ++ */ ++ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) ++ rc = 0; ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ if (rc < 0) { ++fatal_report: ++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ } ++} ++ ++int ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ return 0; /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased"); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp); ++ rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); ++out: ++ saved_errno = errno; ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ errno = saved_errno; ++ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); + } + ++static int user_login_count = 0; ++ + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ + + void +@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, + /* not implemented */ + } + ++int ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) ++{ ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); ++ return 0; ++} ++ + void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ user_login_count++; + } + + void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { +- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL, +- li->line, 1) == 0) +- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (!user_login_count++) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + } + + void + audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + { +- /* not implemented */ ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + + void + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + { + switch(event) { +- case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: +- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + case SSH_NOLOGIN: +- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; +- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: ++ if (options.use_pam) ++ break; ++ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: ++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: ++ if (user_login_count) { ++ while (user_login_count--) ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++ } ++ break; ++ ++ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: +- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, +- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0); ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + default: + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + break; + } + } ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; ++ char *s; ++ int audit_fd; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ name[what], ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ++ ssh_local_port(ssh)); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) ++ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ ++ return; ++ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 0); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++} ++ ++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; ++ ++void ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, ++ char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, ++ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ssh_local_port(ssh)); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ else ++ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ ++#endif ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ char *s; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", ++ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), ++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ++ ssh_local_port(ssh)); ++ free(s); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; ++ int audit_fd, audit_ok; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", ++ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); ++ audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && ++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ error("cannot open audit"); ++ return; ++ } ++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, ++ buf, NULL, ++ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ NULL, 1); ++ audit_close(audit_fd); ++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ ++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ error("cannot write into audit"); ++} + #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ ++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima ++ */ ++ ++#include ++ ++struct ssh; ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int n) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) ++{ ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++} +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.305463975 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200 +@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + } else { + /* Invalid user, fake password information */ + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER)); +-#endif + } + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.283463805 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200 +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, + chost, key)) && +- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, ++ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0) + authenticated = 1; + +@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done: + return authenticated; + } + ++int ++hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, ++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(ssh, 0, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ + int + hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.344464277 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200 +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) + /* test for correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && +- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, ++ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, + ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) { +@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done: + return authenticated; + } + ++int ++user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, ++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ ++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_key(ssh, 1, &rv, key); ++#endif ++ return rv; ++} ++ + static int + match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) + { +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.304463967 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200 +@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authentica + # endif + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) ++ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && !partial) + audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method)); + #endif + } +@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha + record_failed_login(ssh, user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); + #endif +-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +- audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); +-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.318464076 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200 +@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh + + char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); + char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); ++int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); + + FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_ty + int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); + int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, + u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); ++int hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); + + /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ + const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200 +@@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx { + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + }; + +-struct sshcipher { +- char *name; +- u_int block_size; +- u_int key_len; +- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ +- u_int auth_len; +- u_int flags; +-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +-#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +-#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +-#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ +-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +-#else +- void *ignored; +-#endif +-}; +- + static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES +@@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx * + void + cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) + { +- if (cc == NULL) ++ if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) + return; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200 +@@ -47,7 +47,25 @@ + #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 + #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 + +-struct sshcipher; ++struct sshcipher { ++ char *name; ++ u_int block_size; ++ u_int key_len; ++ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ ++ u_int auth_len; ++ u_int flags; ++#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) ++#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) ++#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) ++#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) ++#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); ++#else ++ void *ignored; ++#endif ++}; ++ + struct sshcipher_ctx; + + const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.368464462 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200 +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "audit.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + #include "ssh-gss.h" +@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) + } + + static int +-choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) ++choose_enc(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); ++#endif + return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; ++ } + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { + error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name); + free(name); +@@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC); ++#endif + return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; ++ } + if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { + error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name); + free(name); +@@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma + } + + static int +-choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) ++choose_comp(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) + { + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + +- if (name == NULL) ++ if (name == NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION); ++#endif + return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; ++ } + #ifdef WITH_ZLIB + if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; +@@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; + nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; + ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; +- if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], ++ if ((r = choose_enc(ssh, &newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], + sprop[nenc])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; + peer[nenc] = NULL; +@@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + peer[nmac] = NULL; + goto out; + } +- if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], ++ if ((r = choose_comp(ssh, &newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], + sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; + peer[ncomp] = NULL; +@@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); ++ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_kex(ssh, mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); ++#endif + } + /* XXX need runden? */ + kex->we_need = need; +@@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha + } + #endif + ++static void ++enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) ++{ ++ if (enc == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (enc->key) { ++ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); ++ free(enc->key); ++ } ++ ++ if (enc->iv) { ++ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len); ++ free(enc->iv); ++ } ++ ++ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); ++} ++ ++void ++newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); ++ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); ++ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); ++} ++ + /* + * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n. + * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server. +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.306463983 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200 +@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); + int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); + #endif + ++void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); ++ + int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); + int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, + struct sshbuf **); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200 +@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) + mac->umac_ctx = NULL; + } + ++void ++mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac) ++{ ++ if (mac == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ if (mac->key) { ++ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); ++ free(mac->key); ++ } ++ ++ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); ++} ++ + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ + #define MAC_SEP "," + int +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200 +@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3 + int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t); + void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); ++void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); + + #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.352464339 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200 +@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ + kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ +- sshbuf-io.o ++ sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o + + SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o + +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200 +@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ + #include "compat.h" + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "authfd.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "match.h" + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "sk-api.h" +@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; + extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ + ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); ++ + /* State exported from the child */ + static struct sshbuf *child_state; + +@@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + #endif + + static Authctxt *authctxt; +@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + #endif + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + #ifdef BSD_AUTH + {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, +@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; +@@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int + int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0; + int encoded_ret; + struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; ++ int type = 0; + +- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) +@@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int + if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || + !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) + fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed"); ++ if (type != key_blobtype) ++ fatal_f("bad key type"); + + /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ + if (*sigalg == '\0') { +@@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int + case MM_USERKEY: + valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen); + auth_method = "publickey"; ++ ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, ++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, + hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); + auth_method = "hostbased"; ++ ret = hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, ++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); + break; + default: + valid_data = 0; ++ ret = 0; + break; + } + if (!valid_data) +@@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + +- ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, +- sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); + debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key, + (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", + (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : ""); +@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session + } + + static void +-mm_session_close(Session *s) ++mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) + { + debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd); + session_pty_cleanup2(s); + } ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle); ++ session_end_command2(ssh, s); ++ } ++#endif + session_unused(s->self); + } + +@@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, + + error: + if (s != NULL) +- mm_session_close(s); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0"); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); +@@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse tty"); + if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) +- mm_session_close(s); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); + sshbuf_reset(m); + free(tty); + return (0); +@@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock + sshpam_cleanup(); + #endif + ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); ++ + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + exit(1); +@@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, + { + char *cmd; + int r; ++ Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ +- audit_run_command(cmd); ++ s = session_new(); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ fatal_f("error allocating a session"); ++ s->command = cmd; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd); ++#endif ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ sshbuf_put_u32(m, s->self); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ int handle, r; ++ size_t len; ++ u_char *cmd = NULL; ++ Session *s; ++ ++ debug3_f("entering"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ s = session_by_id(handle); ++ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || ++ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) ++ fatal_f("invalid handle"); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); + free(cmd); + return (0); + } +@@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, + void + mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + { ++ struct sshbuf *m; + debug3_f("Waiting for new keys"); + + if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) +@@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, + child_state); + debug3_f("GOT new keys"); ++ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ m = sshbuf_new(); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); ++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++#endif ++ ++ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ ; ++ + } + + +@@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss + + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++int ++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ int what, r; ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ int ctos, r; ++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; ++ u_int64_t tmp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &mac, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ pid = (pid_t) tmp; ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ uid = (pid_t) tmp; ++ ++ audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(cipher); ++ free(mac); ++ free(compress); ++ free(pfs); ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ int ctos, r; ++ u_int64_t tmp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ pid = (pid_t) tmp; ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ uid = (uid_t) tmp; ++ ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ size_t len, r; ++ char *fp; ++ u_int64_t tmp; ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ pid = (pid_t) tmp; ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ uid = (uid_t) tmp; ++ ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); ++ ++ free(fp); ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200 +@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, +- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, + + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200 +@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con + */ + + int +-mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, ++mm_sshkey_verify(enum mm_keytype type, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat, + struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp) + { +@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke + *sig_detailsp = NULL; + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); +- if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0) +@@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke + return 0; + } + ++int ++mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, ++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) ++{ ++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, ++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) ++{ ++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); ++} ++ + void + mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor) + { +@@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi + sshbuf_free(m); + } + +-void +-mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) ++int ++mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) + { + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; ++ int handle; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + +@@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ ++ return (handle); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ debug3_f("entering command %s", command); ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m); + sshbuf_free(m); + } + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc + } + + #endif /* GSSAPI */ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, ++ m); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : ""))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, compress)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, ++ m); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, ++ m); ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++} ++ ++void ++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++} ++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200 +@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st + struct sshauthopt **); + int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *, + const char *, struct sshkey *); +-int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); ++int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); + + #ifdef GSSAPI +@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + #include "audit.h" + void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); +-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); ++int mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *); ++void mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int, const char *); ++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); ++void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + #endif + + struct Session; +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c 2021-05-06 12:07:38.535478683 +0200 +@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ + #endif + + #include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "compat.h" + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "cipher.h" +@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh + return ssh->state->connection_out; + } + ++static int ++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ return state != NULL && ++ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); ++} ++ + /* + * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned + * string must not be freed. +@@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss + { + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int mode; ++ u_int had_keys = packet_state_has_keys(state); + + if (!state->initialized) + return; + state->initialized = 0; +- if (do_close) { +- if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { +- close(state->connection_out); +- } else { +- close(state->connection_in); +- close(state->connection_out); +- } +- } + sshbuf_free(state->input); ++ state->input = NULL; + sshbuf_free(state->output); ++ state->output = NULL; + sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); ++ state->outgoing_packet = NULL; + sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); ++ state->incoming_packet = NULL; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; +@@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss + #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ + cipher_free(state->send_context); + cipher_free(state->receive_context); ++ if (had_keys && state->server_side) { ++ /* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */ ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); ++ } + state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; + if (do_close) { ++ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { ++ close(state->connection_out); ++ } else { ++ close(state->connection_in); ++ close(state->connection_out); ++ } + free(ssh->local_ipaddr); + ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; + free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); +@@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, mode); + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + } + /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ +@@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) + return (void *)ssh->state->output; + } + ++static void ++newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys) ++{ ++ if (newkeys == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ free(newkeys->enc.name); ++ ++ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { ++ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); ++ free(newkeys->mac.name); ++ } ++ ++ free(newkeys->comp.name); ++ ++ newkeys_destroy(newkeys); ++ free(newkeys); ++} ++ ++static void ++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) ++{ ++ if (state == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ cipher_free(state->receive_context); ++ cipher_free(state->send_context); ++ state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; ++ ++ sshbuf_free(state->input); ++ state->input = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(state->output); ++ state->output = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); ++ state->outgoing_packet = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); ++ state->incoming_packet = NULL; ++ if (state->compression_buffer) { ++ sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); ++ state->compression_buffer = NULL; ++ } ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; ++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); ++ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; ++ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); ++// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; ++// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); ++} ++ ++void ++packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, int audit_it, int privsep) ++{ ++ if (audit_it) ++ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys(ssh->state); ++ packet_destroy_state(ssh->state); ++ if (audit_it) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (privsep) ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); ++ else ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid()); ++#endif ++ } ++} ++ + /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ + static int + ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.382464571 +0200 +@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s + # undef EC_POINT + #endif + ++void packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int); + #endif /* PACKET_H */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.340464246 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.383464578 +0200 +@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname; + extern int debug_flag; + extern u_int utmp_len; + extern int startup_pipe; +-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); + extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; + extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ +@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, + /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + ++#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS) ++ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, ++ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely ++ ugly. */ ++ if (command != NULL) ++ audit_count_session_open(); ++#endif ++ + /* Enter interactive session. */ + s->ptymaster = ptymaster; + ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, +@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con + s->self); + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) ++ fatal("do_exec: command already set"); + if (command != NULL) +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(command); + else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { + char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; + + if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ + shell =_PATH_BSHELL; +- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); ++ s->command = xstrdup(shell); + } ++ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) ++ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command)); + #endif + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); +@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1); + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); ++ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the ++ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); + + /* Force a password change */ + if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { +@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id) + sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; + sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; + sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ sessions[id].command_handle = -1; ++#endif + sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; + sessions_first_unused = id; + } +@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha + } + + Session * ++session_by_id(int id) ++{ ++ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { ++ Session *s = &sessions[id]; ++ if (s->used) ++ return s; ++ } ++ debug_f("unknown id %d", id); ++ session_dump(); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++Session * + session_by_tty(char *tty) + { + int i; +@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + } + ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++void ++session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ if (s->command_handle != -1) ++ audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++session_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) ++{ ++ if (s->command != NULL) { ++ if (s->command_handle != -1) ++ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command)); ++ free(s->command); ++ s->command = NULL; ++ s->command_handle = -1; ++ } ++} ++#endif ++ + void + session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) + { +@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session * + + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (s->command) ++ session_end_command(ssh, s); ++#endif + free(s->term); + free(s->display); + free(s->x11_chanids); +@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh + } + + void +-session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) ++session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(struct ssh *ssh, Session *)) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used) { + if (closefunc != NULL) +- closefunc(s); ++ closefunc(ssh, s); + else + session_close(ssh, s); + } +@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc + server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); + } + ++static void ++do_cleanup_one_session(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) ++{ ++ session_pty_cleanup2(s); ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ session_end_command2(ssh, s); ++#endif ++} ++ + void + do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + { +@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au + * or if running in monitor. + */ + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) +- session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); ++ session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session); + } + + /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.384464586 +0200 +@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { + char *name; + char *val; + } *env; ++ ++ /* exec */ ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ int command_handle; ++ char *command; ++#endif + }; + + void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); +@@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void session_unused(int); + int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); + void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); + void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); +-void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); ++void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *)); + void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); ++void session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *); + + Session *session_new(void); ++Session *session_by_id(int); + Session *session_by_tty(char *); + void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); + void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.346464292 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.385464594 +0200 +@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ + #include "ssh-gss.h" + #endif + #include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "audit.h" + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "auth-options.h" + #include "version.h" +@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; + + /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +-void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +-void demote_sensitive_data(void); ++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); ++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); + static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); + + static char *listener_proctitle; +@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) + num_listen_socks = -1; + } + ++/* ++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific ++ * client connection?) ++ */ ++int listening_for_clients(void) ++{ ++ return num_listen_socks >= 0; ++} ++ + static void + close_startup_pipes(void) + { +@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) + ssh_remote_port(the_active_state)); + } + +-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ ++/* ++ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, ++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. ++ */ + void +-destroy_sensitive_data(void) ++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep) + { + u_int i; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); ++#endif + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ if (privsep) ++ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, ++ pid, uid)); ++ else ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, ++ pid, uid); ++#endif ++ free(fp); ++ } + } +- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { ++ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates ++ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } +@@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void) + + /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ + void +-demote_sensitive_data(void) ++demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) + { + struct sshkey *tmp; + u_int i; + int r; ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ pid_t pid; ++ uid_t uid; + ++ pid = getpid(); ++ uid = getuid(); ++#endif + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { ++ char *fp; ++ ++ if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) ++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ else ++ fp = NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_from_private( + sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key", + sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])); + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; ++ if (fp != NULL) { ++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); ++#endif ++ free(fp); ++ } + } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ + } +@@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void) + } + + static void +-privsep_preauth_child(void) ++privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh) + { + gid_t gidset[1]; + +@@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) + reseed_prngs(); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ +- demote_sensitive_data(); ++ demote_sensitive_data(ssh); + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(); +@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) + + if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) + box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); +- pid = fork(); ++ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + } else if (pid != 0) { +@@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) + /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ + set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + +- privsep_preauth_child(); ++ privsep_preauth_child(ssh); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_child(box); +@@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct + set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ +- demote_sensitive_data(); ++ demote_sensitive_data(ssh); + + reseed_prngs(); + +@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void) + * from this function are in a forked subprocess. + */ + static void +-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) ++server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) + { + fd_set *fdset; + int i, j, ret, maxfd; +@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); + close_listen_socks(); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); +@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #endif + + /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ +- server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, ++ server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out, + &newsock, config_s); + } + +@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); + + /* The connection has been terminated. */ ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1); ++ + ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", + (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); +@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + void + cleanup_exit(int i) + { ++ static int in_cleanup = 0; ++ int is_privsep_child; ++ ++ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep ++ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse ++ indefinitely. */ ++ if (in_cleanup) ++ _exit(i); ++ in_cleanup = 1; + if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { + do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && +@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) + } + } + } ++ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; ++ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL) ++ destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child); ++ if (the_active_state != NULL) ++ packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child); + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ +- if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) ++ if (the_active_state != NULL && ++ (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && ++ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) + audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); + #endif + _exit(i); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.364464431 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200 +@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) + } + + int ++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) ++{ ++ switch (k->type) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_RSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *d; ++ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); ++ return d != NULL; ++ } ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_DSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *priv_key; ++ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); ++ return priv_key != NULL; ++ } ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_ECDSA: ++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); ++ default: ++ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ ++ return 0; ++ } ++} ++ ++int + sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) + { + if (k == NULL) +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.365464439 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200 +@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke + int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *); + + int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); ++int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); + int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); + int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *); + int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7cd50f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200 +@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ + + /* import */ + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + + static char * + format_key(const struct sshkey *key) +@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, +- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) ++ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid, ++ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; +@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, +- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) ++ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid, ++ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; +diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c +--- openssh/misc.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200 ++++ openssh/misc.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200 +@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh * + pid_t + subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, +- struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs) ++ struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, ++ privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt) + { + FILE *f = NULL; + struct stat st; +@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw + _exit(1); + } + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) { + error ("failed to copy environment: %s", + strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); +diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h +--- openssh/misc.h.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200 ++++ openssh/misc.h 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200 +@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void); + #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH (1<<3) /* Don't check for safe cmd */ + #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV (1<<4) /* Keep parent environment */ + pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int, +- struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *); ++ struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *); + + typedef struct arglist arglist; + struct arglist { +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200 +@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch + + int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); +-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); +-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); ++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int); ++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *); + void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); + #endif + +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200 +@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@ + #include + #endif + +-extern ServerOptions options; +-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +-extern int inetd_flag; +-extern int rexeced_flag; +- + /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ + int + sshd_selinux_enabled(void) +@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con + } + + static void +-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level, ++ Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + *role = NULL; + *level = NULL; +@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, + + /* Return the default security context for the given username */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, +- security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) ++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc, ++ security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + char *sename, *lvl; + char *role; +@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + int r = 0; + context_t con = NULL; + +- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { +@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + if (r == 0) { + /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ +- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ if (inetd) { + security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; + + if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) +@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) ++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd, ++ Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + const char *reqlvl; + char *role; +@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it + + debug3_f("setting execution context"); + +- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); + + rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + +- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ if (inetd) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; +@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it + } + + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd, ++ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { +- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt); + } + + static int +@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value) + } + + int +-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt) + { +- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); ++ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt); + } + + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void +-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) ++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd, ++ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam) + { + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; + int r = 0; + security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; ++ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; + + if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + +- if (options.use_pam) { ++ if (use_pam) { + /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ +- if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); +@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw + + debug3_f("setting execution context"); + +- r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt); + if (r >= 0) { + r = setexeccon(user_ctx); + if (r < 0) { +diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c +--- openssh/platform.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200 ++++ openssh/platform.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200 +@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ + + extern int use_privsep; + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + + void + platform_pre_listen(void) +@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru + } + #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, ++ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, ++ options.use_pam); + #endif + } + +diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c +--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200 ++++ openssh/sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200 +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0; + static int test_flag = 0; + + /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +-static int inetd_flag = 0; ++int inetd_flag = 0; + + /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ + static int no_daemon_flag = 0; +@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv; + static int saved_argc; + + /* re-exec */ +-static int rexeced_flag = 0; ++int rexeced_flag = 0; + static int rexec_flag = 1; + static int rexec_argc = 0; + static char **rexec_argv; +@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } + #endif + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name, ++ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, ++ options.use_pam); + #endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { +diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c +--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor 2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100 ++++ openssh/sshconnect.c 2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100 +@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h + + if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH| +- SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0) ++ SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0) + goto out; + + load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e72d04 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.423926297 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.497926869 +0200 +@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) + aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; + #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | +- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; ++ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | ++ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; + #endif + return (&aes_ctr); + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c 2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200 +@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max + int best, bestcount, which, linenum; + struct dhgroup dhg; + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode." ++ " Falling back to known groups."); ++ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); ++ } ++ + if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) { + logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus", + get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno)); +@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits) + return 8192; + } + ++/* ++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups, ++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18. ++ */ ++int ++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh) ++{ ++ const BIGNUM *p, *g; ++ const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g; ++ DH *known = NULL; ++ int bits = 0, rv = 0; ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g); ++ bits = BN_num_bits(p); ++ ++ if (bits <= 3072) { ++ known = dh_new_group14(); ++ } else if (bits <= 6144) { ++ known = dh_new_group16(); ++ } else { ++ known = dh_new_group18(); ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g); ++ ++ if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 && ++ BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) { ++ rv = 1; ++ } ++ ++ DH_free(known); ++ return rv; ++} ++ + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h 2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200 +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); + + int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); + int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *); ++int dh_is_known_group(const DH *); + + u_int dh_estimate(int); + void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200 +@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { +- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p); ++ else ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); + free(s); + return 0; + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + ++#include + #include + + #include +@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ++ if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto out; ++ } + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200 +@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@ + "rsa-sha2-256," \ + "ssh-rsa" + ++#define KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-512," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-256," \ ++ "ssh-rsa" ++ + #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ +@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@ + + #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC + ++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ ++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ ++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ ++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \ ++ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512," \ ++ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ++ + /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */ + #define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \ + "ssh-ed25519," \ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200 +@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); + /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ +- def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); +- def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac); +- def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex); +- def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); +- def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); ++ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher); ++ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac); ++ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex); ++ def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key); ++ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig); + #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200 +@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ + #ifdef __NR_open + SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_socket ++ SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), + #endif +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200 +@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); + /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ +- def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); +- def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); +- def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); +- def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); +- def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); ++ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher); ++ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac); ++ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex); ++ def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key); ++ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig); + #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200 +@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ + #include + #include + #endif ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + exit(0); + } + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ debug("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */ + if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' && + strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) { +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200 +@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include ++ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st + + #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { +- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this +- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ +- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; +- +- if (options.gss_server_identity) { +- gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); +- } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { +- gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); +- /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command +- * and can not use DNS on that socket */ +- if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { +- free(gss_host); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); ++ options.gss_keyex = 0; ++ } else { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); ++ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command ++ * and can not use DNS on that socket */ ++ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { ++ free(gss_host); ++ gss_host = xstrdup(host); ++ } ++ } else { + gss_host = xstrdup(host); + } +- } else { +- gss_host = xstrdup(host); +- } + +- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, +- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); +- if (gss) { +- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); +- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], +- "%s,%s", gss, orig); +- +- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the +- * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ +- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; +- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], +- "%s,null", orig); ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ } + } + } + #endif +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200 +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #endif + +@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + ++ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ + saved_argc = ac; + rexec_argc = ac; +@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ debug("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* + * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + * unmounted if desired. +@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) + orig = NULL; + +- if (options.gss_keyex) +- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); +- else +- gss = NULL; ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); ++ options.gss_keyex = 0; ++ } else { ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ } ++ } + + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200 +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #endif + + #include "crypto_api.h" +@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ + #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "match.h" ++#include "log.h" + #include "ssh-sk.h" + + #ifdef WITH_XMSS +@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA + } + if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || + !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method"); + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200 +@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na + #endif + } + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ if (type == KEY_DSA) ++ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ if (type == KEY_ED25519) ++ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ } + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if (*bitsp != 1024) +@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) + first = 1; + printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); + } ++ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); ++ ++ /* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */ ++ if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) { ++ logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode", ++ key_types[i].key_type_display); ++ goto next; ++ } ++ + printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); + fflush(stdout); +- type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); + if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", + prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..151796b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.345143341 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200 +@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt { + krb5_principal krb5_user; + char *krb5_ticket_file; + char *krb5_ccname; ++ int krb5_set_env; + #endif + struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void); + int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); + + #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) +-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); ++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *); + #endif + + #endif /* AUTH_H */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c 2021-05-06 11:28:40.195242317 +0200 +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + extern ServerOptions options; + +@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + #endif + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; +- int len; ++ char *ticket_name = NULL; + char *client, *platform_client; + const char *errmsg; + +@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + goto out; + } + +- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, +- &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); ++ problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ++ &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env); + if (problem) + goto out; + +@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + goto out; + #endif + +- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); ++ problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ++ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name); + +- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; +- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", +- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name); ++ krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name); + + #ifdef USE_PAM +- if (options.use_pam) ++ if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env) + do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); + #endif + +@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + void + krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + { ++ struct stat krb5_ccname_stat; ++ char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end; ++ + debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { +- krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); ++ krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx; ++ krb5_cccol_cursor cursor; ++ krb5_ccache ccache; ++ int ret; ++ ++ krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; ++ ++ ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor); ++ if (ret) ++ goto out; ++ ++ ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache); ++ if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) { ++ /* There is at least one other ccache in collection ++ * we can switch to */ ++ krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache); ++ } else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) { ++ /* Clean up the collection too */ ++ strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10); ++ krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1; ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0'; ++ if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) { ++ ++ strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary"); ++ ++ if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) { ++ if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) { ++ krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/'); ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0'; ++ if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1) ++ debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", ++ krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)); ++ } ++ else ++ debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s", ++ krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor); + } ++out: + if (authctxt->krb5_user) { + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); + authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; +@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + } + +-#ifndef HEIMDAL ++ ++#if !defined(HEIMDAL) ++int ++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) { ++ char *src, *old; ++ va_list ap; ++ int i; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ old = *dsc; ++ ++ i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src); ++ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) { ++ free(src); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ free(old); ++ free(src); ++ ++ return i; ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) { ++ char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template; ++ ++ debug3_f("called, template = %s", template); ++ if (template == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template); ++ r = xstrdup(""); ++ ++ while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) { ++ ++ *p_n++ = '\0'; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 || ++ strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ continue; ++ } ++ else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ continue; ++ } else { ++ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; ++ *p_o = '\0'; ++ debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template); ++ /* unknown token, fallback to the default */ ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ *result = r; ++ free(tmp_template); ++ return 0; ++ ++cleanup: ++ free(r); ++ free(tmp_template); ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++krb5_error_code ++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) { ++ profile_t p; ++ int ret = 0; ++ char *value = NULL; ++ ++ debug3_f("called"); ++ ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value); ++ if (ret || !value) ++ return ret; ++ ++ ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value); ++ ++ debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + krb5_error_code +-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { +- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; +- char ccname[40]; ++ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) { ++ int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len; ++ char *ccname = NULL; + mode_t old_umask; ++ char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL; + +- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), +- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); +- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) +- return ENOMEM; +- +- old_umask = umask(0177); +- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); +- oerrno = errno; +- umask(old_umask); +- if (tmpfd == -1) { +- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); +- return oerrno; +- } ++ debug3_f("called"); ++ if (need_environment) ++ *need_environment = 0; ++ ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname); ++ if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) { ++ /* Otherwise, go with the old method */ ++ if (ccname) ++ free(ccname); ++ ccname = NULL; ++ ++ ret = asprintf(&ccname, ++ "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return ENOMEM; + +- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { ++ old_umask = umask(0177); ++ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); + oerrno = errno; +- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ umask(old_umask); ++ if (tmpfd == -1) { ++ logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ return oerrno; ++ } ++ ++ if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { ++ oerrno = errno; ++ logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ close(tmpfd); ++ return oerrno; ++ } ++ /* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */ ++ if (need_environment) ++ *need_environment = 1; + close(tmpfd); +- return oerrno; + } +- close(tmpfd); + +- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); ++ debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname); ++ /* set the default with already expanded user IDs */ ++ ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) { ++ type_len = colon - ccname; ++ type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char)); ++ if (type == NULL) ++ return ENOMEM; ++ strncpy(type, ccname, type_len); ++ type[type_len] = 0; ++ } else { ++ type = strdup(ccname); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch ++ * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE) ++ */ ++ if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) { ++ debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname); ++ ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache); ++ free(type); ++ if (ret) ++ return ret; ++ ++ debug3_f("calling cc_switch()"); ++ return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache); ++ } else { ++ /* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either ++ * it is already unique from above or the type does not support ++ * collections ++ */ ++ free(type); ++ debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname); ++ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); ++ } + } + #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.374143558 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200 +@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + } + + /* As user */ +-void ++int + ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) + { + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { +- (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); ++ return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); + } else + debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); ++ ++ return 0; + } + + /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based +@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) { + char *envstr; + #endif + +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && +- gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && +- gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) + return; + + ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200 +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri + /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated + * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ + +-static void ++static int + ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + krb5_ccache ccache; +@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; ++ int set_env = 0; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { + debug("No credentials stored"); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) +- return; ++ return 0; + + #ifdef HEIMDAL + # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE +@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); + # endif + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + #else +- if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) { ++ if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); +- logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg); ++ logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + #endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */ + +@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); + logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) { +@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); + krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); +@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + client->creds, ccache))) { + logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); + krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); +- return; ++ return 0; + } + + new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); + new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); +- +- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +-#ifdef USE_CCAPI +- xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); +- client->store.filename = NULL; +-#else +- if (new_ccname[0] == ':') +- new_ccname++; + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); +- if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { +- char *p; +- p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); +- if (p) +- *p = '\0'; ++ ++ if (set_env) { ++ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; + } + if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) + client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); +-#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +- if (options.use_pam) ++ if (options.use_pam && set_env) + do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); + #endif + +@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + + client->store.data = krb_context; + +- return; ++ return set_env; + } + + int +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.388143662 +0200 +@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; ++ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; + options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; +@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; + if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; ++ if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1) ++ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_keyex == -1) +@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum { + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, + sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, ++ sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, +@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct { + #else + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif + { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO + intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sKerberosUniqueCCache: ++ intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssAuthentication: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + # ifdef USE_AFS + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); + # endif ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); + #endif + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200 +@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct { + * file on logout. */ + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ ++ int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will ++ * be stored in per-session ccache */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200 +@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s + /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter + * the child's environment as they see fit + */ +- ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); ++ if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env) ++ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); + #endif + + /* Set basic environment. */ +@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s + } + #endif + #ifdef KRB5 +- if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) ++ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", + s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); + #endif +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200 +@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_authentication) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); +- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); ++ authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); + restore_uid(); + } + #endif +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200 +@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr + file on logout. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache ++Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential ++cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in ++.Pa /etc/krb5.conf . ++The default value ++.Cm no ++can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same ++user account. + .It Cm KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200 +@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *); + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); +- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); + int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + +@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); +-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); + + char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcda6c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config +--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat 2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh/ssh_config 2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100 +@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@ + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com + # RekeyLimit 1G 1h + # UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k ++# ++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. ++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a *.conf ++# file under /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ which will be automatically ++# included below. For more information, see manual page for ++# update-crypto-policies(8) and ssh_config(5). ++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf +diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat +--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat 2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100 ++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat 2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ ++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last ++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration ++Match final all ++ # Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined: ++ Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config ++ ++ GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++ ++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access ++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted ++# mode correctly we set this to yes. ++ ForwardX11Trusted yes ++ ++# Send locale-related environment variables ++ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++ SendEnv XMODIFIERS ++ ++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain ++# Host *.local +diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0 +--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat 2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh/sshd_config.0 2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100 +@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, +- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The +- default is AUTH. ++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, ++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. ++ The default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages +diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat 2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh/sshd_config.5 2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100 +@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined. + .It Cm SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + .Xr sshd 8 . +-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, ++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, + LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + .It Cm TCPKeepAlive +diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config +--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat 2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh/sshd_config 2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100 +@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@ + # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the + # default value. + ++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a *.conf file under ++# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ which will be automatically included below ++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf ++ ++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell ++# SELinux about this change. ++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER ++# + #Port 22 + #AddressFamily any + #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat +--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat 2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100 ++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat 2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to ++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in ++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option, ++# write it before this block or include it before this file. ++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5). ++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ++ ++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV ++ ++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no ++ ++GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no ++ ++UsePAM yes ++ ++X11Forwarding yes ++ ++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd, ++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version. ++PrintMotd no ++ ++# Accept locale-related environment variables ++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..519ee29 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no 2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200 +@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, + cfg, &includes, NULL); + ++ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */ ++ if (! options.use_pam) ++ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems."); ++ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (options.moduli_file != NULL) + dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no 2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config 2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200 +@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. ++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several ++# problems. + #UsePAM no + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..145eac0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch @@ -0,0 +1,867 @@ +diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c +--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth2.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200 +@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role = NULL; ++#endif + int r, authenticated = 0; + double tstart = monotime_double(); + +@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = 0; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + +@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; +- if (use_privsep) ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; ++#endif ++ if (use_privsep) { + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ mm_inform_authrole(role); ++#endif ++ } + userauth_banner(ssh); + if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, +diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth2-gss.c 2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200 +@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + int r, authenticated = 0; ++ char *micuser; + struct sshbuf *b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + const char *displayname; +@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + mic.value = p; + mic.length = len; +- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0) ++ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); ++ else ++#endif ++ micuser = authctxt->user; ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id); + + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) +@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + + sshbuf_free(b); ++ if (micuser != authctxt->user) ++ free(micuser); + free(mic.value); + + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && +diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 +@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) + /* reconstruct packet */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ (authctxt->role ++ ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0) ++ : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) || ++#else + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || ++#endif + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || +diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200 +@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) + goto done; + } + /* reconstruct packet */ +- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, ++ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", +- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); ++ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "", ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role ? "/" : "", ++ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : "" ++#else ++ "", "" ++#endif ++ ); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || +diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h +--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 +@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt { + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role; ++#endif + + /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ + char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ +diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c +--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth-pam.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 +@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ + int +-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) ++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) + { + int ret = 1; + char *compound; +diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h +--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/auth-pam.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200 +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void); + void do_pam_session(struct ssh *); + void do_pam_setcred(int ); + void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); ++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); + char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); + char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); + void free_pam_environment(char **); +diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c +--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/misc.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200 +@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char * + colon(char *cp) + { + int flag = 0; ++ int start = 1; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return NULL; +@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp) + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return NULL; ++ if (start) { ++ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ ++ if (*cp == '/') ++ return (0); ++ if (*cp != '.') ++ start = 0; ++ } + } + return NULL; + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200 +@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st + int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++#endif + int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in + + /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); ++#endif + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, + return found; + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int ++mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ int r; ++ monitor_permit_authentications(1); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0) ++ fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role); ++ ++ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { ++ free(authctxt->role); ++ authctxt->role = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++#endif ++ + int + mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + { +@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, + { + struct sshbuf *b; + const u_char *p; +- char *userstyle, *cp; ++ char *userstyle, *s, *cp; + size_t len; + u_char type; + int r, fail = 0; +@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); ++ if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) ++ *s = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char + { + struct sshbuf *b; + const u_char *p; +- char *cp, *userstyle; ++ char *cp, *s, *userstyle; + size_t len; + int r, fail = 0; + u_char type; +@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); ++ if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) ++ *s = '\0'; + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); +diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h +--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/monitor.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 +@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49, + MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, ++#endif ++ + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, +diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 ++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c 2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200 +@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * + sshbuf_free(m); + } + ++/* Inform the privileged process about role */ ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void ++mm_inform_authrole(char *role) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ ++ debug3_f("entering"); ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0) ++ fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* Do the password authentication */ + int + mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password) +diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 ++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h 2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200 +@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, + const char *, u_int compat); + void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void mm_inform_authrole(char *); ++#endif + struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *); + char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); + int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *); +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 +@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS= port-aix.o \ + port-linux.o \ + port-solaris.o \ + port-net.o \ +- port-uw.o ++ port-uw.o \ ++ port-linux-sshd.o + + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 +@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + return sc; + } + +-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ +-void +-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +-{ +- char *user_ctx = NULL; +- +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) +- return; +- +- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); +- +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); +- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { +- switch (security_getenforce()) { +- case -1: +- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); +- case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); +- break; +- default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " +- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); +- } +- } +- if (user_ctx != NULL) +- freecon(user_ctx); +- +- debug3("%s: done", __func__); +-} +- + /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) +@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons + + debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); ++ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) { ++ error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + + /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ + +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 +@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); + void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); +-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); ++ ++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 ++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh ++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "log.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "port-linux.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; ++ ++/* Send audit message */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, ++ security_context_t selected_context) ++{ ++ int rc=0; ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++ char *msg = NULL; ++ int audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; ++ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; ++ rc = -1; ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ error("Error connecting to audit system."); ++ return rc; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating default context."); ++ default_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating selected context."); ++ selected_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", ++ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), ++ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { ++ error("Error allocating memory."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, ++ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { ++ error("Error sending audit message."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ rc = 0; ++ out: ++ free(msg); ++ freecon(default_raw); ++ freecon(selected_raw); ++ close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static int ++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) ++{ ++ struct av_decision avd; ++ int retval; ++ access_vector_t bit; ++ security_class_t class; ++ ++ debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst); ++ class = string_to_security_class("context"); ++ if (!class) { ++ error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains"); ++ if (!bit) { ++ error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd); ++ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, ++ security_context_t *sc) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his ++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the ++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ ++#endif ++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ } ++#endif ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ context_t con; ++ char *type=NULL; ++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { ++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", ++ role); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_role_set(con, role); ++ context_type_set(con, type); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ if (!*sc) ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { ++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ ++ context_t con; ++ security_context_t obtained_raw; ++ security_context_t requested_raw; ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_range_set(con, lvl); ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", ++ obtained_raw, requested_raw); ++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { ++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++ out: ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static void ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++{ ++ *role = NULL; ++ *level = NULL; ++ if (the_authctxt) { ++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { ++ char *slash; ++ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); ++ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *slash = '\0'; ++ *level = slash + 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++/* Return the default security context for the given username */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, ++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) ++{ ++ char *sename, *lvl; ++ char *role; ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ int r = 0; ++ context_t con = NULL; ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME ++ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { ++ sename = NULL; ++ lvl = NULL; ++ } ++#else ++ sename = pwname; ++ lvl = ""; ++#endif ++ ++ if (r == 0) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); ++#else ++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ if (r == 0) { ++ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; ++ ++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) ++ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); ++ ++ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); ++ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); ++ freecon(sshdsc); ++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) ++ /* we actually don't change level */ ++ reqlvl = ""; ++ ++ debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl); ++ ++ } ++ ++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { ++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); ++ ++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { ++ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) ++ default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ ++ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { ++ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } else { ++ r = -1; ++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } ++ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) ++ freecon(default_level_sc); ++ } ++ } else { ++ *user_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security " ++ "context for %s", pwname); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME ++ free(sename); ++ free(lvl); ++#endif ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ if (con) ++ context_free(con); ++ ++ return (r); ++} ++ ++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ ++static int ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ char *role; ++ char *use_current; ++ int rv; ++ ++ debug3_f("setting execution context"); ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ use_current = "1"; ++ } else { ++ use_current = ""; ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ } ++ ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ free(role); ++ ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ ++void ++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) ++{ ++ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; ++ int r = 0; ++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (options.use_pam) { ++ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); ++ case 0: ++ error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode."); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection."); ++ } ++ } ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ debug3_f("setting execution context"); ++ ++ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ if (r >= 0) { ++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", ++ user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON ++ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", ++ user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ if (user_ctx == NULL) { ++ user_ctx = default_ctx; ++ } ++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { ++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was ++ a failure */ ++ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); ++ } ++ if (r < 0) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); ++ case 0: ++ error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode."); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection."); ++ } ++ } ++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) ++ freecon(user_ctx); ++ if (default_ctx != NULL) ++ freecon(default_ctx); ++ ++ debug3_f("done"); ++} ++ ++#endif ++#endif ++ +diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c +--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/platform.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 +@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru + } + #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); + #endif + } + +diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c +--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200 +@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + restore_uid(); + } + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++#endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ae0948 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 60682c68..9344806e 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv) + addargs(&alist, "%s", host); + addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); + addargs(&alist, "%s", src); +- addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", ++ addargs(&alist, ++ /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */ ++ strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s", + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4baa024 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch @@ -0,0 +1,498 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies 2021-04-19 15:18:32.071920379 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5 2021-04-19 15:21:18.400179265 +0200 +@@ -368,15 +368,13 @@ or + .Qq *.c.example.com + domains. + .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates + by certificate authorities (CAs). +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + .Xr ssh 1 + will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those + specified. +@@ -436,20 +434,25 @@ If the option is set to + (the default), + the check will not be executed. + .It Cm Ciphers ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The supported ciphers are: + .Bd -literal -offset indent +@@ -465,13 +468,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + .Ed + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, +-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q cipher . + .It Cm ClearAllForwardings +@@ -826,6 +822,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to + The default is + .Dq no . + .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI + key exchange. Possible values are + .Bd -literal -offset 3n +@@ -838,10 +839,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-, + gss-curve25519-sha256- + .Ed + .Pp +-The default is +-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, +-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . + This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. ++.Pp + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +@@ -1169,29 +1168,25 @@ it may be zero or more of: + and + .Cm pam . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, +-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, +-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, +-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, +-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 +-.Ed ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q kex . +@@ -1301,37 +1296,33 @@ function, and all code in the + file. + This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. + .It Cm MACs ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms + in order of preference. + The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The algorithms that contain + .Qq -etm + calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). + These are considered safer and their use recommended. + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q mac . + .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +@@ -1503,37 +1494,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas + The default is + .Cm no . + .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key + authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default +-instead of replacing it. ++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default instead of replacing it. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +-.Ed ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies 2021-04-19 15:18:32.062920311 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 2021-04-19 15:20:42.591908243 +0200 +@@ -373,15 +373,13 @@ If the argument is + then no banner is displayed. + By default, no banner is displayed. + .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates + by certificate authorities (CAs). +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for + public key or host-based authentication. + .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +@@ -445,20 +443,25 @@ The default is + indicating not to + .Xr chroot 2 . + .It Cm Ciphers ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the ciphers allowed. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The supported ciphers are: + .Pp +@@ -485,13 +488,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, +-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q cipher . + .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax +@@ -680,21 +676,22 @@ For this to work + .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange + needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. + .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI + key exchange. Possible values are + .Bd -literal -offset 3n +-gss-gex-sha1-, +-gss-group1-sha1-, +-gss-group14-sha1-, +-gss-group14-sha256-, +-gss-group16-sha512-, +-gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-gex-sha1- ++gss-group1-sha1- ++gss-group14-sha1- ++gss-group14-sha256- ++gss-group16-sha512- ++gss-nistp256-sha256- + gss-curve25519-sha256- + .Ed +-.Pp +-The default is +-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, +-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . + This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased +@@ -794,26 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket + .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK + environment variable. + .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the host key signature algorithms + that the server offers. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . + .It Cm IgnoreRhosts +@@ -958,20 +942,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi + The default is + .Cm yes . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + Alternately if the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + The supported algorithms are: + .Pp + .Bl -item -compact -offset indent +@@ -1003,15 +992,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 + sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, +-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, +-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, +-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms . + .It Cm ListenAddress +@@ -1097,21 +1077,26 @@ function, and all code in the + file. + This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. + .It Cm MACs ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. + The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The algorithms that contain + .Qq -etm +@@ -1154,15 +1139,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com + umac-128-etm@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q mac . + .It Cm Match +@@ -1541,37 +1517,25 @@ or equivalent.) + The default is + .Cm yes . + .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. + Alternately if the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +-.Ed ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0eea429 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3942 @@ +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index e7549470..b68c1710 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ + kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ + sshbuf-io.o + +@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ + auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ + monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || +- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: +@@ -724,99 +725,6 @@ fakepw(void) + return (&fake); + } + +-/* +- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not +- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is +- * called. +- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some +- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. +- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? +- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) +- */ +- +-static char * +-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- struct sockaddr_storage from; +- socklen_t fromlen; +- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; +- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; +- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- +- /* Get IP address of client. */ +- fromlen = sizeof(from); +- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); +- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), +- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { +- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +- return xstrdup(ntop); +- } +- +- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); +- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) +- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +- +- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); +- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ +- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), +- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { +- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ +- return xstrdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* +- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, +- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: +- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ +- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { +- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", +- name, ntop); +- freeaddrinfo(ai); +- return xstrdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ +- lowercase(name); +- +- /* +- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given +- * address actually is an address of this host. This is +- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can +- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from +- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be +- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of +- * the domain). +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { +- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " +- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); +- return xstrdup(ntop); +- } +- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ +- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { +- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, +- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && +- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) +- break; +- } +- freeaddrinfo(aitop); +- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ +- if (ai == NULL) { +- /* Address not found for the host name. */ +- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " +- "map back to the address.", ntop, name); +- return xstrdup(ntop); +- } +- return xstrdup(name); +-} +- + /* + * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current + * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); + static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); + static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ++ int r, authenticated = 0; ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_char *p; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parsing"); ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ mic.value = p; ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); ++ ++ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); ++ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 1)); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ free(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 1)); + + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && + (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) +@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 0)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 0e776224..1c217268 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + +@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + &method_passwd, +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@ + #include "canohost.h" + #include "misc.h" + ++/* ++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not ++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is ++ * called. ++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some ++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. ++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? ++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) ++ */ ++ ++char * ++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_storage from; ++ socklen_t fromlen; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; ++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ ++ /* Get IP address of client. */ ++ fromlen = sizeof(from); ++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); ++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { ++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); ++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) ++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ ++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); ++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ ++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { ++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, ++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: ++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { ++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", ++ name, ntop); ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ ++ lowercase(name); ++ ++ /* ++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given ++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is ++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can ++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from ++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be ++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of ++ * the domain). ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { ++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " ++ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ ++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { ++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, ++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && ++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) ++ break; ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(aitop); ++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ ++ if (ai == NULL) { ++ /* Address not found for the host name. */ ++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " ++ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ return xstrdup(name); ++} ++ + void + ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) + { +diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h +index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644 +--- a/canohost.h ++++ b/canohost.h +@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ + #ifndef _CANOHOST_H + #define _CANOHOST_H + ++struct ssh; ++ ++char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *); + char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); + int get_peer_port(int); + char *get_local_ipaddr(int); +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1379,9 +1383,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, + break; + + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ +- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) ++ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { + channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ + /* Buffer input from the connection. */ + client_process_net_input(ssh, readset); + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1], ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1], ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***]) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c +index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 +--- a/gss-genr.c ++++ b/gss-genr.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@ + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "packet.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ + /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ + int + ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) +@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) + return 0; + } + ++/* sshpkt_get of gss_buffer_desc */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_desc *g) ++{ ++ int r; ++ u_char *p; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0) ++ return r; ++ g->value = p; ++ g->length = len; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client, ++ const char *kex) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client, kex); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) { ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ size_t i; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md = NULL; ++ char *s, *cp, *p; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ free(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ s = cp = xstrdup(kex); ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ++ (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_digest_update(md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "digest failed"); ++ ssh_digest_free(md); ++ md = NULL; ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) ++ * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2); ++ ++ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); ++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; ++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { ++ if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 && ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error"); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ free(s); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ free(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++#define SKIP_KEX_NAME(type) \ ++ case type: \ ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(type##_ID)) \ ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; \ ++ name += sizeof(type##_ID) - 1; \ ++ break; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256) ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++#undef SKIP_KEX_NAME ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ + OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id) +@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; +- int len; ++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { +@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); ++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + ++ client->store.data = krb_context; ++ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 +--- a/gss-serv.c ++++ b/gss-serv.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@ + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" + #include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" + + extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = +- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) + return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); + } + ++/* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) { ++ if (supported_oids == NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids, ++ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, ++ options.gss_kex_algorithms)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ + /* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) +@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + void + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + { +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { +- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ +- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", +- gssapi_client.store.filename); +- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { ++ debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { ++ debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else { ++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); ++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + ++ (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ ++ + if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || + gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { + debug("No suitable client data"); + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) { ++ int ok; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ int ret; ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + /* Privileged */ +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index ce85f043..574c7609 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -57,11 +57,16 @@ + #include "misc.h" + #include "dispatch.h" + #include "monitor.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" + + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "digest.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* prototype */ + static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); + static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, + }; ++static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, ++}; + +-char * +-kex_alg_list(char sep) ++static char * ++kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) + { + char *ret = NULL, *tmp; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct kexalg *k; + +- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(k->name); +@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) + return ret; + } + ++char * ++kex_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs); ++} ++ ++char * ++kex_gss_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs); ++} ++ + static const struct kexalg * + kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + { +@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; + } ++ for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) ++ return k; ++ } + return NULL; + } + +@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) + return r; + } + ++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ ++int ++kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names) ++{ ++ char *s, *cp, *p; ++ ++ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ s = cp = xstrdup(names); ++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; ++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { ++ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 ++ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ free(s); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); ++ free(s); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ + int + kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex) + sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); + sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); + sshbuf_free(kex->session_id); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ free(kex->gss_host); ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ + free(kex->failed_choice); + free(kex->hostkey_alg); + free(kex->name); +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_ECDH_SHA2, + KEX_C25519_SHA256, + KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, ++#endif + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex { + u_int flags; + int hash_alg; + int ec_nid; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *failed_choice; + int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); + struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); +@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex { + + int kex_names_valid(const char *); + char *kex_alg_list(char); ++char *kex_gss_alg_list(char); + char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); + int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); ++int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *); + + int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *); + +@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); + int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); ++#endif + + int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); + int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, +@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, + const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, + u_char *, size_t *); + ++int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, ++ const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, ++ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen); ++ + void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); +diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c +index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644 +--- a/kexdh.c ++++ b/kexdh.c +@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) + { + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: +diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c +index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644 +--- a/kexgen.c ++++ b/kexgen.c +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ + static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); + +-static int ++int + kex_gen_hash( + int hash_alg, + const struct sshbuf *client_version, +diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..f6e1405e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgssc.c +@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++int ++kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, ++ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, ++ gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ u_char *msg; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ /* Step 1 */ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, ++ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ char *tmp = NULL; ++ size_t tmp_len = 0; ++ ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (server_host_key_blob) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( ++ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { ++ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); ++ default: ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* compute shared secret */ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80) ++ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); ++ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" ++ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob)); ++ ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); ++ ++ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (r != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ if ((r = kex_gen_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, ++ kex->my, ++ kex->peer, ++ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->client_pub, ++ server_blob, ++ shared_secret, ++ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); ++ sshbuf_free(server_blob); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); ++ kex->client_pub = NULL; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++int ++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, ++ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf, ++ msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ u_char *msg; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); ++ ++ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ kex->nbits = nbits; ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0) ++ fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) ++ fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); ++ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ ++ ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, ++ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ char *tmp = NULL; ++ size_t tmp_len = 0; ++ ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (server_host_key_blob) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( ++ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); ++ default: ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ ++ /* 8. C computes shared secret */ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ buf = NULL; ++ ++ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ if ((r = kexgex_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, ++ kex->my, ++ kex->peer, ++ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, ++ dh_p, dh_g, ++ pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), ++ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++out: ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ sshbuf_free(server_blob); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); ++ return r; ++} ++#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ +diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..60bc02de +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgsss.c +@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++int ++kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { ++ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ free(mechs); ++ } ++ ++ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); ++ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (gssbuf.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, ++ &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, ++ &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, ++ &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ if (r != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ ++ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the ++ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent ++ * buffer state->incoming_packet ++ */ ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ if ((r = kex_gen_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, ++ kex->my, ++ empty, ++ client_pubkey, ++ server_pubkey, ++ shared_secret, ++ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ client_pubkey = NULL; ++ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ break; ++ default: ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (gssbuf.value == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++out: ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ sshbuf_free(server_pubkey); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++int ++kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ ++ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ free(mechs); ++ ++ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ kex->nbits = nbits; ++ kex->min = cmin; ++ kex->max = cmax; ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); ++ nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); ++ nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (kex->dh == NULL) { ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, ++ &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ break; ++ default: ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ /* calculate shared secret */ ++ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ if ((r = kexgex_hash( ++ kex->hash_alg, ++ kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, ++ kex->my, ++ empty, ++ cmin, nbits, cmax, ++ dh_p, dh_g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ pub_key, ++ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), ++ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) ++ fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++out: ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ return r; ++} ++#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + #endif +@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + + /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ + while (!authenticated) { +@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + + if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); +@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; + # endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++# endif + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; +@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + u_char *p; + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); +@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); +@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + OM_uint32 ret; + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) +@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + int + mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + { +- int r, authenticated; ++ int r, authenticated, kex; + const char *displayname; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) +@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); + +- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; ++ if (kex) { ++ auth_method = "gssapi-keyex"; ++ } else { ++ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; ++ } + + if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); +@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ size_t len; ++ u_char *p = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ data.value = p; ++ data.length = len; ++ /* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */ ++ if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64) ++ fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ free(data.value); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int r, ok; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ free(store.filename); ++ free(store.envvar); ++ free(store.envval); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, + }; + + struct ssh; +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, authenticated = 0; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, +@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ ++ return (major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ int r, ok; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ + #include "uidswap.h" + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" + + /* Format of the configuration file: + +@@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, ++ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -204,10 +207,22 @@ static struct { + /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms }, + # else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported }, + #endif + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +@@ -1029,10 +1044,42 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssServerIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssKexAlgorithms: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", ++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); ++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1911,7 +1958,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -2059,8 +2112,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); ++#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -2702,7 +2765,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssTrustDns, o->gss_trust_dns); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssRenewalRekey, o->gss_renewal_rekey); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssClientIdentity, o->gss_client_identity); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssServerIdentity, o->gss_server_identity); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms ? ++ o->gss_kex_algorithms : GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); +diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +index feedb3d2..a8a8870d 100644 +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@ typedef struct { + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ ++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ ++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ + #include "auth.h" + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" + + static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, + const char *, int); +@@ -133,8 +134,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -375,10 +379,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); ++#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum { + sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, + sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, +@@ -607,12 +620,22 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1548,6 +1571,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1556,6 +1583,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssKexAlgorithms: ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", ++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); ++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -2777,6 +2820,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); ++ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); + #endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; ++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + + #ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && +- authctxt->krb5_ctx) ++ authctxt->krb5_ctx) { ++ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); ++ restore_uid(); ++ } + #endif + + #ifdef GSSAPI +- if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) ++ if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) { ++ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); ++ restore_uid(); ++ } + #endif + + /* remove agent socket */ +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" ++ ++#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); + + struct sshbuf; + int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); ++int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *); + + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, +@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *, const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); ++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644 +--- a/ssh.1 ++++ b/ssh.1 +@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + .It GatewayPorts + .It GlobalKnownHostsFile + .It GSSAPIAuthentication ++.It GSSAPIKeyExchange ++.It GSSAPIClientIdentity + .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials ++.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++.It GSSAPIServerIdentity ++.It GSSAPITrustDns + .It HashKnownHosts + .It Host + .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms +@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag), + (supported message integrity codes), + .Ar kex + (key exchange algorithms), ++.Ar kex-gss ++(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms), + .Ar key + (key types), + .Ar key-cert +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || + strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) + cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); ++ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex-gss") == 0) ++ cp = kex_gss_alg_list('\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) +@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { + cp = xstrdup( + "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" +- "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n" +- "protocol-version\nsig"); ++ "kex-gss\nkey\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\n" ++ "key-sig\nmac\nprotocol-version\nsig"); + } + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is + Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is + .Cm no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Cm no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this will delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++.Pp ++Checks are made to ensure that credentials are only propagated when the new ++credentials match the old ones on the originating client and where the ++receiving server still has the old set in its cache. ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.Pp ++For this to work ++.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. ++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the ++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target ++hostname. ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes ++to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no , ++the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI ++key exchange. Possible values are ++.Bd -literal -offset 3n ++gss-gex-sha1-, ++gss-group1-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha256-, ++gss-group16-sha512-, ++gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256- ++.Ed ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . ++This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ + #endif + + /* import */ +-extern char *client_version_string; +-extern char *server_version_string; + extern Options options; + + /* +@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + char *s, *all_key; + int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + xxx_conn_info = cinfo; +@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms); + } + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); ++ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command ++ * and can not use DNS on that socket */ ++ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { ++ free(gss_host); ++ gss_host = xstrdup(host); ++ } ++ } else { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(host); ++ } ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); +@@ -224,16 +256,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; + # endif +-#endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++# endif ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ ssh->kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ ssh->kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ ssh->kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++#endif ++ + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); + + /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = + compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms); ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */ ++ /* ext-info removal above */ ++ if (gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ free(gss); ++ } ++#endif + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf"); + +@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *); + #endif + + void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); +@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_keyex, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + userauth_gssapi_cleanup, +@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + OM_uint32 min; + int r, ok = 0; + gss_OID mech = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); ++ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command ++ * and can not use DNS on that socket */ ++ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { ++ free(gss_host); ++ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host); ++ } ++ } else { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host); ++ } + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, ++ &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) { ++ authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; ++ free(gss_host); ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && +@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- mech, authctxt->host)) { ++ mech, gss_host, options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + authctxt->mech_tried++; + } + } + ++ free(gss_host); ++ + if (!ok || mech == NULL) + return 0; + +@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + free(lang); + return r; + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ int r; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); ++ ++ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); ++ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parsing"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + static int +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) + } + debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); + if (nkeys == 0) +- fatal_f("no hostkeys"); +- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ debug3_f("no hostkeys"); ++ else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); + } +@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + free(fp); + } + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); +- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ ++ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); + } +@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( + ssh, list_hostkey_types()); + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); +@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; + # endif +-#endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++# endif ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Cm no . + .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor + a client authenticates against. +@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . ++.Pp ++For this to work ++.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI ++key exchange. Possible values are ++.Bd -literal -offset 3n ++gss-gex-sha1-, ++gss-group1-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha256-, ++gss-group16-sha512-, ++gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256- ++.Ed ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . ++This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. +diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644 +--- a/sshkey.c ++++ b/sshkey.c +@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { + KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 }, + # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ { "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 }, + { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } + }; + +@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { +- if (kt->name == NULL) ++ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL) + continue; + if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly) + continue; +diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h +index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644 +--- a/sshkey.h ++++ b/sshkey.h +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { + KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, + KEY_ED25519_SK, + KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3117a7a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol 2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100 +@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lnum++; + cp = line; +- cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; ++ cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ade0bbb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,720 @@ +From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jelen +Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures + +--- + digest-openssl.c | 16 ++++ + digest.h | 6 ++ + ssh-dss.c | 65 ++++++++++------ + ssh-ecdsa.c | 69 ++++++++++------- + ssh-rsa.c | 193 +++++++++-------------------------------------- + sshkey.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++ + sshkey.h | 4 + + 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c +index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644 +--- a/digest-openssl.c ++++ b/digest-openssl.c +@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = { + { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, + }; + ++const EVP_MD * ++ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type) ++{ ++ switch (digest_type) { ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: ++ return EVP_sha1(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: ++ return EVP_sha256(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384: ++ return EVP_sha384(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: ++ return EVP_sha512(); ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ + static const struct ssh_digest * + ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) + { +diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h +index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644 +--- a/digest.h ++++ b/digest.h +@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ + struct sshbuf; + struct ssh_digest_ctx; + ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++#include ++/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */ ++const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type); ++#endif ++ + /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */ + int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name); + +diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c +index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644 +--- a/ssh-dss.c ++++ b/ssh-dss.c +@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int + ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; +- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; +- size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); ++ u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; ++ size_t rlen, slen; ++ int len; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ u_char *sigb = NULL; ++ const u_char *psig = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (lenp != NULL) +@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- if (dlen == 0) +- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len, ++ data, datalen); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ if (ret < 0) { + goto out; ++ } + +- if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { ++ psig = sigb; ++ if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } ++ free(sigb); ++ sigb = NULL; + + DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); + rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); +@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: +- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); ++ free(sigb); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; +- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; +- size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); ++ u_char *sigblob = NULL; ++ size_t len, slen; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; ++ u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- if (dlen == 0) +- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* fetch signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) +@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + } + sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ + +- /* sha1 the data */ +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; +- +- switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { +- case 1: +- ret = 0; +- break; +- case 0: +- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; ++ } ++ if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; +- default: ++ } ++ psig = sigb; ++ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, ++ sigb, slen); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ + out: +- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); ++ free(sigb); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + BN_clear_free(sig_r); + BN_clear_free(sig_s); +diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c +index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644 +--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c ++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c +@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int + ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; ++ unsigned char *sigb = NULL; ++ const unsigned char *psig; + const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; + int hash_alg; +- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; +- size_t len, dlen; ++ int len; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + +@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + +- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || +- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) ++ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data, ++ datalen); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ if (ret < 0) { + goto out; ++ } + +- if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { ++ psig = sigb; ++ if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +- + if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; +@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: +- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); ++ free(sigb); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(bb); + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); +@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; +- int hash_alg; +- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; +- size_t dlen; ++ int hash_alg, len; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; ++ unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + +- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || +- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) ++ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* fetch signature */ +@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + } + sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ + +- if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; ++ /* Figure out the length */ ++ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ psig = sigb; ++ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; ++ } + +- switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) { +- case 1: +- ret = 0; +- break; +- case 0: +- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; ++ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; +- default: +- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ++ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + out: +- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); ++ free(sigb); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshbuf_free(b); + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); +diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c +index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644 +--- a/ssh-rsa.c ++++ b/ssh-rsa.c +@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ + + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); ++static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *); + + static const char * + rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) +@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg) + return -1; + } + +-static int +-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) +-{ +- switch (type) { +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: +- return NID_sha1; +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: +- return NID_sha256; +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: +- return NID_sha512; +- default: +- return -1; +- } +-} +- + int + ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp) + { +@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int + ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident) + { +- const BIGNUM *rsa_n; +- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; +- size_t slen = 0; +- u_int dlen, len; +- int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ u_char *sig = NULL; ++ int len, slen = 0; ++ int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) +@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + else + hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident); ++ + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); +- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) +- return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); +- if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) +- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- +- /* hash the data */ +- nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); +- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) +- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) +- goto out; ++ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) ++ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + +- if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data, ++ datalen); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ if (ret < 0) { + goto out; + } + +- if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +- goto out; +- } + if (len < slen) { + size_t diff = slen - len; + memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); +@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } ++ + /* encode signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: +- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + freezero(sig, slen); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg) + { +- const BIGNUM *rsa_n; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + char *sigtype = NULL; + int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen; ++ size_t len = 0, diff, modlen; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; + +@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || + sig == NULL || siglen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); +- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) ++ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) +@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); + len = modlen; + } +- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, +- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) +- goto out; ++ ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + +- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, +- key->rsa); + out: + freezero(sigblob, len); + free(sigtype); +@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + return ret; + } + +-/* +- * See: +- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ +- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn +- */ +- +-/* +- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) +- * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } +- */ +-static const u_char id_sha1[] = { +- 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ +- 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ +- 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ +- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ +- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ +- 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ +-}; +- +-/* +- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html +- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) +- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) +- * id-sha256(1) } +- */ +-static const u_char id_sha256[] = { +- 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ +- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ +- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ +- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ +- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ +- 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ +-}; +- +-/* +- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html +- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) +- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) +- * id-sha256(3) } +- */ +-static const u_char id_sha512[] = { +- 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ +- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ +- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ +- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ +- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ +- 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ +-}; +- + static int +-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) ++openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, ++ u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey) + { +- switch (hash_alg) { +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: +- *oidp = id_sha1; +- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); +- break; +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: +- *oidp = id_sha256; +- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); +- break; +- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: +- *oidp = id_sha512; +- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); +- break; +- default: +- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- } +- return 0; +-} ++ size_t rsasize = 0; ++ const RSA *rsa; ++ int ret; + +-static int +-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, +- u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) +-{ +- size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; +- int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; +- const u_char *oid = NULL; +- u_char *decrypted = NULL; +- +- if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) +- return ret; +- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); +- if (hashlen != hlen) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +- goto done; +- } ++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); + rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); + if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || + siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto done; + } +- if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- goto done; +- } +- if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, +- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +- goto done; +- } +- if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +- goto done; +- } +- oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; +- hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; +- if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { +- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; +- goto done; +- } +- ret = 0; ++ ++ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, ++ sigbuf, siglen); ++ + done: +- freezero(decrypted, rsasize); + return ret; + } + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644 +--- a/sshkey.c ++++ b/sshkey.c +@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type) + } + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++int ++sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp, ++ int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) ++{ ++ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ u_char *sig = NULL; ++ int ret, slen, len; ++ ++ if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) { ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } ++ ++ slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); ++ if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ ++ len = slen; ++ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 || ++ EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 || ++ EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto error; ++ } ++ ++ *sigp = sig; ++ *lenp = len; ++ /* Now owned by the caller */ ++ sig = NULL; ++ ret = 0; ++ ++error: ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ++ free(sig); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int ++sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data, ++ size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen) ++{ ++ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ int ret; ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ } ++ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 || ++ EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey); ++ switch (ret) { ++ case 1: ++ ret = 0; ++ break; ++ case 0: ++ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; ++ break; ++ default: ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++done: ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ + int + sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) +diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h +index a91e60436..270901a87 100644 +--- a/sshkey.h ++++ b/sshkey.h +@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); + const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); + int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int); + char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char); ++int sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **, ++ int *, const u_char *, size_t); ++int sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *, ++ size_t, u_char *, int); + + int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); + int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d76a4f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a +Author: Jakub Jelen +Date: Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200 + + Use the new OpenSSL KDF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + HMAC_CTX_init \ + RSA_generate_key_ex \ + RSA_get_default_method \ ++ EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \ + ]) + + # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro. +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include + #include ++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID ++# include ++# endif + #endif + + #include "ssh.h" +@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + return r; + } + ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID ++static const EVP_MD * ++digest_to_md(int digest_type) ++{ ++ switch (digest_type) { ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: ++ return EVP_sha1(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: ++ return EVP_sha256(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384: ++ return EVP_sha384(); ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: ++ return EVP_sha512(); ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static int ++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, ++ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ u_char *key = NULL; ++ int r, key_len; ++ ++ if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len); ++ if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF); ++ if (!ctx) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg)); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, ++ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, ++ sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX ++ fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id); ++ dump_digest("key", key, key_len); ++#endif ++ *keyp = key; ++ key = NULL; ++ r = 0; ++ ++out: ++ free (key); ++ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ return r; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++#else + static int + derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) +@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + ssh_digest_free(hashctx); + return r; + } ++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */ + + #define NKEYS 6 + int + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..000df67 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3053 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.101653187 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac 2021-05-06 11:35:55.111653265 +0200 +@@ -1974,12 +1974,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) + ]) + ++SCARD_MSG="yes" + disable_pkcs11= + AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], + [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + disable_pkcs11=1 ++ SCARD_MSG="no" + fi + ] + ) +@@ -2008,6 +2010,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include ]) + ++# Check whether we have a p11-kit, we got default provider on command line ++DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="no" ++AC_ARG_WITH([default-pkcs11-provider], ++ [ --with-default-pkcs11-provider[[=PATH]] Use default pkcs11 provider (p11-kit detected by default)], ++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then ++ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then ++ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) ++ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about p11-kit]) ++ if "$PKGCONFIG" "p11-kit-1"; then ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit=yes ++ else ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ++ fi ++ fi ++ else ++ PKCS11_PATH="${withval}" ++ fi ++ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit" = "xyes"; then ++ PKCS11_PATH=`$PKGCONFIG --variable=proxy_module p11-kit-1` ++ fi ++ AC_CHECK_FILE("$PKCS11_PATH", ++ [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER], ["$PKCS11_PATH"], [Path to default PKCS#11 provider (p11-kit proxy)]) ++ DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="$PKCS11_PATH" ++ ], ++ [ AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested PKCS11 provided not found]) ] ++ ) ++ else ++ AC_MSG_WARN([Needs PKCS11 support to enable default pkcs11 provider]) ++ fi ] ++) ++ ++ + # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) +@@ -5564,6 +5600,7 @@ echo " BSD Auth support + echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" + echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" + echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11" ++echo " Default PKCS#11 provider: $DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG" + echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk" + + echo "" +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.054652818 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-05-06 11:58:16.895135904 +0200 +@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \ + ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ +- ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ ++ ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \ + ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \ + hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \ +@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ clean: regressclean + rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so +@@ -337,6 +339,8 @@ distclean: regressclean + rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) + if test -d pkg ; then \ + rm -fr pkg ; \ +@@ -511,6 +515,7 @@ regress-prep: + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 ++ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11 + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy + [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ + ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile +@@ -674,6 +679,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + ++UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\ ++ regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o ++ ++regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \ ++ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \ ++ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \ ++ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ ++ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ + # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently. + SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\ + regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \ +@@ -709,6 +724,7 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \ ++ regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \ + + tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit + echo all tests passed +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh +--- openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 +@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ else + done + + trace "remove pkcs11 keys" +- echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r" +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile +--- openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile 2021-05-06 11:59:24.465658383 +0200 +@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* au + known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ + modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ + pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ +- revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ ++ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa-agent-cert.pub \ ++ rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv pkcs11*.crt pkcs11*.key pkcs11.info \ + rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ + scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ + sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ +@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ unit: + V="" ; \ + test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ + V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ ++ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ + -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh +--- openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ ++# ++# Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++# ++# Authors: Jakub Jelen ++# ++# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++# ++# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ ++tid="pkcs11 tests with soft token" ++ ++try_token_libs() { ++ for _lib in "$@" ; do ++ if test -f "$_lib" ; then ++ verbose "Using token library $_lib" ++ TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib" ++ return ++ fi ++ done ++ echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library" ++ exit 0 ++} ++ ++try_token_libs \ ++ /usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \ ++ /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \ ++ /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so ++ ++TEST_SSH_PIN=1234 ++TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678 ++if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then ++ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" ++ export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER ++fi ++ ++test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" ++ ++# setup environment for softhsm token ++DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM ++rm -rf $DIR ++TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir ++mkdir -p $TOKEN ++SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf ++export SOFTHSM2_CONF ++cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF ++# SoftHSM v2 configuration file ++directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN} ++objectstore.backend = file ++# ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG ++log.level = DEBUG ++# If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set ++slots.removable = false ++EOF ++out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN") ++slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //') ++ ++# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass ++SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true ++export SSH_ASKPASS ++unset DISPLAY ++# We need interactive access to test PKCS# since it prompts for PIN ++sed -i 's/.*BatchMode.*//g' $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++# start command w/o tty, so ssh accepts pin from stdin (from agent-pkcs11.sh) ++notty() { ++ perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); ++ if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@" ++} ++ ++trace "generating keys" ++ID1="02" ++ID2="04" ++RSA=${DIR}/RSA ++EC=${DIR}/EC ++openssl genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA ++openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\ ++ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label "SSH RSA Key $ID1" --id $ID1 \ ++ --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin ++openssl genpkey \ ++ -genparam \ ++ -algorithm ec \ ++ -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\ ++ openssl genpkey \ ++ -paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC ++openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\ ++ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label "SSH ECDSA Key $ID2" --id $ID2 \ ++ --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin ++ ++trace "List the keys in the ssh-keygen with PKCS#11 URIs" ++${SSHKEYGEN} -D ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > $OBJ/token_keys ++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: keygen fails to enumerate keys on PKCS#11 token" ++fi ++grep "pkcs11:" $OBJ/token_keys > /dev/null ++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: The keys from ssh-keygen do not contain PKCS#11 URI as a comment" ++fi ++ ++# Set the ECDSA key to authorized keys ++grep "ECDSA" $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ++ ++trace "Simple connect with ssh (without PKCS#11 URI)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \ ++ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with pkcs11 failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with PKCS#11 URI" ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with PKCS#11 URI including PIN should not prompt" ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}&pin-value=${TEST_SSH_PIN}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}&pin-value=${TEST_SSH_PIN}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with various filtering options in PKCS#11 URI" ++trace " (by object label, ECDSA should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20ECDSA%20Key%2004?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by object label, RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20RSA%20Key%2002?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by token label, ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID2};token=token-slot-0?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by wrong token label, should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:token=token-slot-99?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++ ++ ++ ++trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files" ++echo "IdentityFile \"pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}\"" \ ++ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++# Set the RSA key as authorized ++grep "RSA" $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files with bogus spaces" ++echo "IdentityFile \" pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \"" \ ++ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI with bogus spaces in config failed" \ ++ "(exit code $r)" ++fi ++sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++ ++trace "Combination of PKCS11Provider and PKCS11URI on commandline" ++trace " (RSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}" -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI and provider combination" \ ++ "failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Regress: Missing provider in PKCS11URI option" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -o IdentityFile=\"pkcs11:token=segfault\" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 139 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with missing provider_id from configuration option" \ ++ "crashed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++ ++trace "SSH Agent can work with PKCS#11 URI" ++trace "start the agent" ++eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null ++ ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" ++else ++ trace "add whole provider to agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" #> /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 list via agent (all keys)" ++ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -l failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (all keys)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect failed with whole provider (exit code $r)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove pkcs11 keys (all keys)" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add only RSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL ssh-add failed with RSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (RSA key)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect failed with RSA key (exit code $r)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove RSA pkcs11 key" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d failed with RSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add only ECDSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with second key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (ECDSA key should fail)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect passed with ECDSA key (should fail)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add also the RSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with first key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove ECDSA pkcs11 key" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "ssh-add -d failed with ECDSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove already-removed pkcs11 key should fail" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -eq 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d passed with non-existing key (should fail)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (the RSA key should be still usable)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "ssh connect failed with RSA key (after removing ECDSA): exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "kill agent" ++ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null ++fi +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile +--- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 +@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ + + REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes + SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion +-SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig ++SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11 + + .include +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" ++ ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ ++#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ++ ++/* prototypes are not public -- specify them here internally for tests */ ++struct sshbuf *percent_encode(const char *, size_t, char *); ++int percent_decode(char *, char **); ++ ++void ++compare_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *a, struct pkcs11_uri *b) ++{ ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, NULL); ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); ++ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a->id_len, b->id_len); ++ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a->id, b->id, a->id_len); ++ if (b->object != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->object, b->object); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->object, b->object); ++ if (b->module_path != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); ++ if (b->token != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->token, b->token); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->token, b->token); ++ if (b->manuf != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); ++ if (b->lib_manuf != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); ++} ++ ++void ++check_parse_rv(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect, int expect_rv) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *str; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11uri = NULL; ++ int rv; ++ ++ if (expect_rv == 0) ++ str = "Valid"; ++ else ++ str = "Invalid"; ++ asprintf(&buf, "%s PKCS#11 URI parsing: %s", str, uri); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ pkcs11uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ rv = pkcs11_uri_parse(uri, pkcs11uri); ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_rv); ++ if (rv == 0) /* in case of failure result is undefined */ ++ compare_uri(pkcs11uri, expect); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(pkcs11uri); ++ free(expect); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++void ++check_parse(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect) ++{ ++ check_parse_rv(uri, expect, 0); ++} ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri * ++compose_uri(unsigned char *id, size_t id_len, char *token, char *lib_manuf, ++ char *manuf, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (id_len > 0) { ++ uri->id_len = id_len; ++ uri->id = id; ++ } ++ uri->module_path = module_path; ++ uri->token = token; ++ uri->lib_manuf = lib_manuf; ++ uri->manuf = manuf; ++ uri->object = object; ++ uri->pin = pin; ++ return uri; ++} ++ ++static void ++test_parse_valid(void) ++{ ++ /* path arguments */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%01", ++ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%00%01", ++ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:object=SIGN%20Key", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL)); ++ /* query arguments */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?pin-value=123456", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456")); ++ ++ /* combinations */ ++ /* ID SHOULD be percent encoded */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Key;id=0", ++ compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse( ++ "pkcs11:manufacturer=CAC?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC", ++ "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse( ++ "pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ++ "/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", "RSA Key", NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so&pin-value=123456", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456")); ++ ++ /* empty path component matches everything */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); ++ ++ /* empty string is a valid to match against (and different from NULL) */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* Percent character needs to be percent-encoded */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=%25", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_parse_invalid(void) ++{ ++ /* Invalid percent encoding */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%0", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Invalid percent encoding */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%ZZ", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Space MUST be percent encoded -- XXX not enforced yet */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH Keys", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%01;id=%02", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:?pin-value=111111&pin-value=123456", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in path are ignored with log message */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI); ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in query SHOULD be ignored */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI); ++} ++ ++void ++check_gen(char *expect, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *uri_str; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "Valid PKCS#11 URI generation: %s", expect); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ uri_str = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(uri_str, NULL); ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(uri_str, expect); ++ free(uri_str); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_generate_valid(void) ++{ ++ /* path arguments */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%01", ++ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%00%01", ++ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", /* space must be percent encoded */ ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* library-manufacturer is not implmented now */ ++ /*check_gen("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL)); ++ /* query arguments */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ ++ /* combinations */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%02;token=SSH%20Keys", ++ compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%EE%02?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:object=Encryption%20Key;manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL)); ++ ++ /* empty path component matches everything */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); ++ ++} ++ ++void ++check_encode(char *source, size_t len, char *allow_list, char *expect) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *b; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "percent_encode: expected %s", expect); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ ++ b = percent_encode(source, len, allow_list); ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(b), expect); ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_encode_multibyte(void) ++{ ++ /* SHOULD be encoded as octets according to the UTF-8 character encoding */ ++ ++ /* multi-byte characters are "for free" */ ++ check_encode("$", 1, "", "%24"); ++ check_encode("¢", 2, "", "%C2%A2"); ++ check_encode("€", 3, "", "%E2%82%AC"); ++ check_encode("𐍈", 4, "", "%F0%90%8D%88"); ++ ++ /* CK_UTF8CHAR is unsigned char (1 byte) */ ++ /* labels SHOULD be normalized to NFC [UAX15] */ ++ ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_encode(void) ++{ ++ /* Without allow list encodes everything (for CKA_ID) */ ++ check_encode("A*", 2, "", "%41%2A"); ++ check_encode("\x00", 1, "", "%00"); ++ check_encode("\x7F", 1, "", "%7F"); ++ check_encode("\x80", 1, "", "%80"); ++ check_encode("\xff", 1, "", "%FF"); ++ ++ /* Default allow list encodes anything but safe letters */ ++ check_encode("test" "\x00" "0alpha", 11, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "test%000alpha"); ++ check_encode(" ", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%20"); /* Space MUST be percent encoded */ ++ check_encode("/", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%2F"); /* '/' delimiter MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ ++ check_encode("?", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%3F"); /* delimiter '?' MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ ++ check_encode("#", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%23"); /* '#' MUST be always percent encoded */ ++ check_encode("key=value;separator?query&#anch", 35, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "key%3Dvalue%3Bseparator%3Fquery%26amp%3B%23anch"); ++ ++ /* Components in query can have '/' unencoded (useful for paths) */ ++ check_encode("/path/to.file", 13, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/", ++ "/path/to.file"); ++} ++ ++void ++check_decode(char *source, char *expect, int expect_len) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *out = NULL; ++ int rv; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "percent_decode: %s", source); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ ++ rv = percent_decode(source, &out); ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_len); ++ if (rv >= 0) ++ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(out, expect, expect_len); ++ free(out); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_decode(void) ++{ ++ /* simple valid cases */ ++ check_decode("%00", "\x00", 1); ++ check_decode("%FF", "\xFF", 1); ++ ++ /* normal strings shold be kept intact */ ++ check_decode("strings are left", "strings are left", 16); ++ check_decode("10%25 of trees", "10% of trees", 12); ++ ++ /* make sure no more than 2 bytes are parsed */ ++ check_decode("%222", "\x22" "2", 2); ++ ++ /* invalid expects failure */ ++ check_decode("%0", "", -1); ++ check_decode("%Z", "", -1); ++ check_decode("%FG", "", -1); ++} ++ ++void ++tests(void) ++{ ++ test_percent_encode(); ++ test_percent_encode_multibyte(); ++ test_percent_decode(); ++ test_parse_valid(); ++ test_parse_invalid(); ++ test_generate_valid(); ++} +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200 +@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ + #include "digest.h" + #include "ssh-sk.h" + #include "sk-api.h" ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" + + /* argv0 */ + extern char *__progname; +@@ -229,6 +230,32 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag) + return ret; + } + ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++static int update_card(int, int, const char *, int, char *); ++ ++int ++update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag) ++{ ++ char *pin = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ /* dry-run parse to make sure the URI is valid and to report errors */ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse((char *) pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ if (uri->pin != NULL) { ++ pin = strdup(uri->pin); ++ if (pin == NULL) { ++ fatal("Failed to dupplicate string"); ++ } ++ /* pin is freed in the update_card() */ ++ } ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ ++ return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, pin); ++} ++#endif ++ + static int + add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag, + const char *skprovider) +@@ -445,12 +472,11 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen + } + + static int +-update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag) ++update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, char *pin) + { +- char *pin = NULL; + int r, ret = -1; + +- if (add) { ++ if (add && pin == NULL) { + if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) + return -1; +@@ -630,6 +656,13 @@ static int + do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag, + const char *skprovider) + { ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(file, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag); ++ } ++#endif + if (deleting) { + if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) + return -1; +@@ -813,7 +846,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + } + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider, +- qflag) == -1) ++ qflag, NULL) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.113653281 +0200 +@@ -847,10 +847,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e) + } + + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++static char * ++sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; ++ char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */ ++ char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ ++ if (provider == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ /* PKCS#11 URI */ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) { ++ error("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) { ++ error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ /* validate also provider from URI */ ++ if (uri->module_path) ++ module_path = strdup(uri->module_path); ++ } else ++ module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */ ++ ++ if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */ ++ if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) { ++ verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", ++ module_path, strerror(errno)); ++ free(module_path); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ free(module_path); ++ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { ++ verbose("refusing PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": " ++ "not allowed", canonical_provider); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* copy verified and sanitized provider path back to the uri */ ++ if (uri) { ++ free(uri->module_path); ++ uri->module_path = xstrdup(canonical_provider); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (uri) { ++ sane_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return sane_uri; ++ } else { ++ return xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* simple path */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void + process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + { +- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; + char **comments = NULL; + int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; + u_int seconds = 0; +@@ -869,33 +931,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e + error_f("failed to parse constraints"); + goto send; + } +- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { +- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", +- provider, strerror(errno)); +- goto send; +- } +- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { +- verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " +- "provider not allowed", canonical_provider); ++ ++ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); ++ if (sane_uri == NULL) + goto send; +- } +- debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider); ++ + if (lifetime && !death) + death = monotime() + lifetime; + +- count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments); ++ debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri); ++ count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + k = keys[i]; + if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); + id->key = k; + keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ +- id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); ++ id->provider = xstrdup(sane_uri); + if (*comments[i] != '\0') { + id->comment = comments[i]; + comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ + } else { +- id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); ++ id->comment = xstrdup(sane_uri); + } + id->death = death; + id->confirm = confirm; +@@ -910,6 +967,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e + send: + free(pin); + free(provider); ++ free(sane_uri); + free(keys); + free(comments); + send_status(e, success); +@@ -918,7 +976,7 @@ send: + static void + process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + { +- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; + int r, success = 0; + Identity *id, *nxt; + +@@ -930,30 +988,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry + } + free(pin); + +- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { +- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", +- provider, strerror(errno)); ++ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); ++ if (sane_uri == NULL) + goto send; +- } + +- debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider); ++ debug_f("remove %.100s", sane_uri); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + /* Skip file--based keys */ + if (id->provider == NULL) + continue; +- if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { ++ if (!strcmp(sane_uri, id->provider)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + } + } +- if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) ++ if (pkcs11_del_provider(sane_uri) == 0) + success = 1; + else + error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed"); + send: + free(provider); ++ free(sane_uri); + send_status(e, success); + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.061652873 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5 2021-05-06 11:35:55.116653304 +0200 +@@ -1063,6 +1063,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with + .Cm CertificateFile + in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with + the identity. ++.Pp ++The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI ++starting with a string ++.Cm pkcs11: . ++There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined ++in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments ++.Cm id , ++.Cm manufacturer , ++.Cm object , ++.Cm token ++and query arguments ++.Cm module-path ++and ++.Cm pin-value ++). The URI can not be in quotes. + .It Cm IgnoreUnknown + Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are + encountered in configuration parsing. +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.060652865 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c 2021-05-06 12:00:07.129988275 +0200 +@@ -843,6 +843,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; + break; + case 'i': ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); ++ break; ++ } ++#endif + p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); + if (stat(p, &st) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " +@@ -1695,6 +1703,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + (void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider); + #endif ++ pkcs11_terminate(); + + skip_connect: + exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo); +@@ -2211,6 +2220,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru + options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); + } + ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++static void ++load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[], ++ struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids) ++{ ++ int nkeys, i; ++ struct sshkey **keys; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri); ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri); ++ ++ /* we need to merge URI and provider together */ ++ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL) ++ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); ++ ++ if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && ++ (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) { ++ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { ++ if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { ++ sshkey_free(keys[i]); ++ continue; ++ } ++ identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i]; ++ identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ (*n_ids)++; ++ } ++ free(keys); ++ } ++ ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++} ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ ++ + /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ + static void + load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) +@@ -2225,11 +2273,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; +-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +- struct sshkey **keys = NULL; +- char **comments = NULL; +- int nkeys; +-#endif /* PKCS11 */ + + n_ids = n_certs = 0; + memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); +@@ -2242,33 +2285,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct + sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); + + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +- if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && +- options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && +- (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && +- (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, +- &keys, &comments)) > 0) { +- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { +- if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { +- sshkey_free(keys[i]); +- free(comments[i]); +- continue; +- } +- identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; +- identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */ +- n_ids++; +- } +- free(keys); +- free(comments); ++ /* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */ ++ pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode); ++ ++ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) { ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ /* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */ ++ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); ++ ++ /* Add it as any other IdentityFile */ ++ cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1); ++ free(cp); ++ ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { ++ char *name = options.identity_files[i]; + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || +- strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { ++ strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) { + free(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; + continue; + } +- cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files, ++ identity_keys, &n_ids); ++ free(options.identity_files[i]); ++ continue; ++ } ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ ++ cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid()); + filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); + free(cp); + check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 +@@ -860,8 +860,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + free(fp); + } else { + (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ +- fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", +- *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); ++ if (*(comments[i]) != '\0') { ++ fprintf(stdout, " %s", comments[i]); ++ } ++ (void) pkcs11_uri_write(keys[i], stdout); ++ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } + free(comments[i]); + sshkey_free(keys[i]); +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 +@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi + u_int nkeys, i; + struct sshbuf *msg; + ++ debug_f("called, name = %s", name); ++ + if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) + return (-1); + +@@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi + *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + if (labelsp) + *labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *)); ++ debug_f("nkeys = %u", nkeys); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.115653297 +0200 +@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo { + int logged_in; + }; + +-struct pkcs11_provider { +- char *name; ++struct pkcs11_module { ++ char *module_path; + void *handle; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; + CK_INFO info; +@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider { + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; + int valid; + int refcount; ++}; ++ ++struct pkcs11_provider { ++ char *name; ++ struct pkcs11_module *module; /* can be shared between various providers */ ++ int refcount; ++ int valid; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; + }; + +@@ -75,6 +82,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key { + CK_ULONG slotidx; + char *keyid; + int keyid_len; ++ char *label; + }; + + int pkcs11_interactive = 0; +@@ -106,26 +114,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive) + * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. + */ + static void +-pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) ++pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG i; + +- debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", +- p, p->refcount, p->valid); +- if (!p->valid) ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid); ++ if (!m->valid) + return; +- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { +- if (p->slotinfo[i].session && +- (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( +- p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) ++ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { ++ if (m->slotinfo[i].session && ++ (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession( ++ m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + } +- if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) ++ if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); ++ m->valid = 0; ++ m->function_list = NULL; ++ dlclose(m->handle); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module. ++ * called when a provider is unregistered. ++ */ ++static void ++pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m) ++{ ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount); ++ if (--m->refcount <= 0) { ++ pkcs11_module_finalize(m); ++ if (m->valid) ++ error_f("%p still valid", m); ++ free(m->slotlist); ++ free(m->slotinfo); ++ free(m->module_path); ++ free(m); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. ++ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, ++ * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). ++ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. ++ */ ++static void ++pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) ++{ ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); ++ if (!p->valid) ++ return; ++ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); ++ p->module = NULL; + p->valid = 0; +- p->function_list = NULL; +- dlclose(p->handle); + } + + /* +@@ -135,13 +178,11 @@ pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_p + static void + pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) + { +- debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); + if (--p->refcount <= 0) { +- if (p->valid) +- error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); + free(p->name); +- free(p->slotlist); +- free(p->slotinfo); ++ if (p->module) ++ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); + free(p); + } + } +@@ -159,6 +200,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void) + } + } + ++/* lookup provider by module path */ ++static struct pkcs11_module * ++pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_provider *p; ++ ++ TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { ++ debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path); ++ if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path)) ++ return (p->module); ++ } ++ return (NULL); ++} ++ + /* lookup provider by name */ + static struct pkcs11_provider * + pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) +@@ -173,19 +228,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id + return (NULL); + } + ++int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *); ++ + /* unregister provider by name */ + int + pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) + { ++ int rv; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id); ++ ++ if (provider_id == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */ ++int ++pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) ++{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; ++ int rv = -1; ++ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); + +- if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { ++ debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri); ++ ++ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); +- return (0); ++ rv = 0; + } +- return (-1); ++ free(provider_uri); ++ return rv; + } + + static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; +@@ -195,6 +283,55 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; + static int ec_key_idx = 0; + #endif + ++/* ++ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on ++ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication) ++ */ ++int ++pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) ++{ ++ char *p = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_uri uri; ++ struct pkcs11_key *k11; ++ ++ /* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */ ++ switch (key->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA: ++ k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx); ++ break; ++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++ case KEY_ECDSA: ++ k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx); ++ break; ++#endif ++ default: ++ error("Unknown key type %d", key->type); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (k11 == NULL) { ++ error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */ ++ uri.id = k11->keyid; ++ uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len; ++ uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label; ++ uri.object = k11->label; ++ uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path; ++ uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID; ++ uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID; ++ ++ p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri); ++ /* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */ ++ if (p == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ fprintf(f, " %s", p); ++ free(p); ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* release a wrapped object */ + static void + pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, +@@ -208,6 +345,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, + if (k11->provider) + pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); + free(k11->keyid); ++ free(k11->label); + free(k11); + } + +@@ -222,8 +360,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + +- f = p->function_list; +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); + return (-1); +@@ -262,12 +400,12 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider + else { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", + si->token.label); +- if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) { ++ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) { + debug_f("no pin specified"); + return (-1); /* bail out */ + } + } +- rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, ++ rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, + (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); +@@ -297,13 +435,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider + static int + pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type) + { +- if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid || ++ k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + + return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider, +- &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); ++ &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); + } + + +@@ -319,13 +458,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs + + *val = 0; + +- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid || ++ !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + attr.type = type; + attr.pValue = &flag; +@@ -356,13 +496,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C + int always_auth = 0; + int did_login = 0; + +- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid || ++ !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { + if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) { +@@ -439,8 +580,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + tlen = RSA_size(rsa); + + /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ +@@ -484,7 +625,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void) + /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ + static int + pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa) + { + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + +@@ -502,6 +643,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider * + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + } + ++ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { ++ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); ++ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); ++ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; ++ } ++ + RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method); + RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11); + return (0); +@@ -532,8 +679,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, + return (NULL); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + siglen = ECDSA_size(ec); + sig = xmalloc(siglen); +@@ -598,7 +745,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void) + + static int + pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) + { + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + +@@ -614,6 +761,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider + k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + ++ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { ++ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); ++ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); ++ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; ++ } ++ + EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method); + EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11); + +@@ -650,8 +803,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int login_required, ret; + +- f = p->function_list; +- si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; ++ f = p->module->function_list; ++ si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx]; + + login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; + +@@ -661,9 +814,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid + error("pin required"); + return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED); + } +- if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| ++ if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| + CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { +- error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); ++ error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv); + return (-1); + } + if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) { +@@ -699,7 +852,8 @@ static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -713,14 +867,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + + memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); + key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT; +- key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; ++ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT; ++ key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return (NULL); +@@ -731,19 +886,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + * ensure that none of the others are zero length. + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return (NULL); + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -755,8 +910,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + goto fail; + } + +- attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; +- group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); ++ attrp = key_attr[3].pValue; ++ group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen); + if (group == NULL) { + ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -767,13 +922,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + goto fail; + } + +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) { + error("CKA_EC_POINT too small"); + goto fail; + } + +- attrp = key_attr[1].pValue; +- octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen); ++ attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; ++ octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); + if (octet == NULL) { + ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -790,7 +945,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + goto fail; + } + +- if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec)) ++ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], ec)) + goto fail; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -806,7 +961,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ + ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ + + fail: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(key_attr[i].pValue); + if (ec) + EC_KEY_free(ec); +@@ -823,7 +978,8 @@ static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -834,14 +990,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr + + memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); + key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS; +- key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; ++ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS; ++ key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return (NULL); +@@ -852,19 +1009,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr + * ensure that none of the others are zero length. + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return (NULL); + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -876,8 +1033,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr + goto fail; + } + +- rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL); +- rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); ++ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); ++ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL); + if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) { + error("BN_bin2bn failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -886,7 +1043,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr + fatal_f("set key"); + rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ + +- if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa)) ++ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], rsa)) + goto fail; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -901,7 +1058,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr + rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ + + fail: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(key_attr[i].pValue); + RSA_free(rsa); + +@@ -912,7 +1069,8 @@ static int + pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -936,14 +1094,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + + memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr)); + cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT; +- cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE; ++ cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT; ++ cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return -1; +@@ -955,18 +1114,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ + if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return -1; + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto out; +@@ -980,8 +1140,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + subject = xstrdup("invalid subject"); + X509_NAME_free(x509_name); + +- cp = cert_attr[2].pValue; +- if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { ++ cp = cert_attr[3].pValue; ++ if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { + error("d2i_x509 failed"); + goto out; + } +@@ -1001,7 +1161,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + goto out; + } + +- if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa)) ++ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], rsa)) + goto out; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -1031,7 +1191,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + goto out; + } + +- if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec)) ++ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], ec)) + goto out; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -1051,7 +1211,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p + goto out; + } + out: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(cert_attr[i].pValue); + X509_free(x509); + RSA_free(rsa); +@@ -1102,11 +1262,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U + */ + static int + pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) ++ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) + { + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ int nattr = 1; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -1123,10 +1284,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide + key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; + key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ if (uri->id != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ if (uri->object != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + +- rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); ++ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -1207,11 +1381,12 @@ fail: + */ + static int + pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) ++ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) + { + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ int nattr = 1; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -1227,10 +1402,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider + key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; + key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ if (uri->id != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ if (uri->object != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + +- rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); ++ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -1499,16 +1687,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct + } + #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ + +-/* +- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if +- * keyp is provided, fetch keys. +- */ + static int +-pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, +- struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, +- struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) ++pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp) + { +- int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; ++ int need_finalize = 0; + int ret = -1; + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + void *handle = NULL; +@@ -1517,164 +1699,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_ + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; + CK_ULONG i; ++ char *provider_module = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL; + +- if (providerp == NULL) ++ /* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */ ++ if (uri->module_path == NULL) { ++#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER ++ provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER); ++#else ++ error_f("No module path provided"); + goto fail; +- *providerp = NULL; ++#endif ++ } else { ++ provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path); ++ } + +- if (keyp != NULL) +- *keyp = NULL; +- if (labelsp != NULL) +- *labelsp = NULL; ++ p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); ++ p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); + +- if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { +- debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); +- goto fail; ++ if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL ++ && m->valid) { ++ debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module); ++ free(provider_module); ++ /* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */ ++ m->refcount++; ++ p->module = m; ++ p->valid = 1; ++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ ++ *providerp = p; ++ return 0; ++ } else { ++ m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m)); ++ p->module = m; ++ m->refcount++; + } ++ + /* open shared pkcs11-library */ +- if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { +- error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); ++ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { ++ error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { + error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); + goto fail; + } +- p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); +- p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); +- p->handle = handle; ++ ++ p->module->handle = handle; + /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ + if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } +- p->function_list = f; ++ m->function_list = f; + if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } + need_finalize = 1; +- if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } +- rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); +- rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); ++ rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID)); ++ if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL && ++ strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) { ++ debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer", ++ m->info.manufacturerID); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription)); + debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" + " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", +- provider_id, +- p->info.manufacturerID, +- p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, +- p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, +- p->info.libraryDescription, +- p->info.libraryVersion.major, +- p->info.libraryVersion.minor); +- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { ++ provider_module, ++ m->info.manufacturerID, ++ m->info.cryptokiVersion.major, ++ m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, ++ m->info.libraryDescription, ++ m->info.libraryVersion.major, ++ m->info.libraryVersion.minor); ++ ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } +- if (p->nslots == 0) { +- debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id); ++ if (m->nslots == 0) { ++ debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module); + ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS; + goto fail; + } +- p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); +- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) ++ m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } +- p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); + p->valid = 1; +- nkeys = 0; +- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { +- token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; +- if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) ++ m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); ++ m->valid = 1; ++ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { ++ token = &m->slotinfo[i].token; ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " +- "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv); +- continue; +- } +- if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { +- debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in " +- "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i); ++ "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv); ++ token->flags = 0; + continue; + } + rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); + rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); + rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); + rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); ++ } ++ m->module_path = provider_module; ++ provider_module = NULL; ++ ++ /* insert unconditionally -- remove if there will be no keys later */ ++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ ++ *providerp = p; ++ return 0; ++ ++fail: ++ if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) ++ error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", ++ provider_module, rv); ++ free(provider_module); ++ if (m) { ++ free(m->slotlist); ++ free(m); ++ } ++ if (p) { ++ free(p->name); ++ free(p); ++ } ++ if (handle) ++ dlclose(handle); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if ++ * keyp is provided, fetch keys. ++ */ ++static int ++pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, ++ CK_ULONG user) ++{ ++ int nkeys; ++ int ret = -1; ++ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; ++ CK_ULONG i; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; ++ char *provider_uri = NULL; ++ ++ if (providerp == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ *providerp = NULL; ++ ++ if (keyp != NULL) ++ *keyp = NULL; ++ ++ if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) { ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) { ++ pin = uri->pin; ++ } ++ nkeys = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) { ++ token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token; ++ if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in " ++ "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (uri->token != NULL && ++ strcmp(token->label, uri->token) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%s) " ++ "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu", ++ token->label, (unsigned long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (uri->manuf != NULL && ++ strcmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested " ++ "manufacturerID (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in " ++ "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i); ++ continue; ++ } + debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> " + "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx", +- provider_id, (unsigned long)i, ++ provider_uri, (unsigned long)i, + token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, + token->serialNumber, token->flags); + /* +- * open session, login with pin and retrieve public +- * keys (if keyp is provided) ++ * open session if not yet openend, login with pin and ++ * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided) + */ +- if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 || ++ if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 || ++ (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */ + keyp == NULL) + continue; +- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in && ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in && + pkcs11_interactive) { + /* + * Some tokens require login before they will + * expose keys. + */ +- if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i], ++ debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found"); ++ if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i], + CKU_USER) < 0) { + error("login failed"); + continue; + } +- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ } ++ if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) { ++ debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%s) ", ++ uri->object); ++ /* Try once more without the label filter */ ++ char *label = uri->object; ++ uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */ ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ uri->object = label; + } + } ++ pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */ + + /* now owned by caller */ + *providerp = p; + +- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); +- p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ +- ++ free(provider_uri); + return (nkeys); + fail: +- if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) +- error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); + if (p) { +- free(p->name); +- free(p->slotlist); +- free(p->slotinfo); +- free(p); ++ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } +- if (handle) +- dlclose(handle); + if (ret > 0) + ret = -1; + return (ret); + } + +-/* +- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, +- * fails if provider already exists +- */ ++static int ++pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, ++ char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id); ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ ++ return r; ++} ++ + int +-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, +- char ***labelsp) ++pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) + { + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + int nkeys; ++ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri); + +- nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp, +- &p, CKU_USER); ++ nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER); + + /* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */ + if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) { +@@ -1683,7 +1999,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } + if (nkeys == 0) +- debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id); ++ debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri); ++ ++ free(provider_uri); ++ return nkeys; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, ++ * fails if provider already exists ++ */ ++int ++pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ int nkeys; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + + return (nkeys); + } +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h 2021-05-06 11:35:55.115653297 +0200 +@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@ + #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED 4 + #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED 5 + ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ + int pkcs11_init(int); + void pkcs11_terminate(void); + int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***); ++int pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***); + int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); ++int pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); + #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN + struct sshkey * + pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int, +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "log.h" ++ ++#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ ++#define PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR ";" ++#define PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR "&" ++#define PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "=" ++#define PKCS11_URI_ID "id" ++#define PKCS11_URI_TOKEN "token" ++#define PKCS11_URI_OBJECT "object" ++#define PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF "library-manufacturer" ++#define PKCS11_URI_MANUF "manufacturer" ++#define PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH "module-path" ++#define PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE "pin-value" ++ ++/* Keyword tokens. */ ++typedef enum { ++ pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pModulePath, ++ pPinValue, pBadOption ++} pkcs11uriOpCodes; ++ ++/* Textual representation of the tokens. */ ++static struct { ++ const char *name; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++} keywords[] = { ++ { PKCS11_URI_ID, pId }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, pToken }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, pObject }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF, pLibraryManufacturer }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_MANUF, pManufacturer }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, pModulePath }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE, pPinValue }, ++ { NULL, pBadOption } ++}; ++ ++static pkcs11uriOpCodes ++parse_token(const char *cp) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) ++ if (strncasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name, ++ strlen(keywords[i].name)) == 0) ++ return keywords[i].opcode; ++ ++ return pBadOption; ++} ++ ++int ++percent_decode(char *data, char **outp) ++{ ++ char tmp[3]; ++ char *out, *tmp_end; ++ char *p = data; ++ long value; ++ size_t outlen = 0; ++ ++ out = malloc(strlen(data)+1); /* upper bound */ ++ if (out == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ while (*p != '\0') { ++ switch (*p) { ++ case '%': ++ p++; ++ if (*p == '\0') ++ goto fail; ++ tmp[0] = *p++; ++ if (*p == '\0') ++ goto fail; ++ tmp[1] = *p++; ++ tmp[2] = '\0'; ++ tmp_end = NULL; ++ value = strtol(tmp, &tmp_end, 16); ++ if (tmp_end != tmp+2) ++ goto fail; ++ else ++ out[outlen++] = (char) value; ++ break; ++ default: ++ out[outlen++] = *p++; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* zero terminate */ ++ out[outlen] = '\0'; ++ *outp = out; ++ return outlen; ++fail: ++ free(out); ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++struct sshbuf * ++percent_encode(const char *data, size_t length, const char *allow_list) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ char tmp[4], *cp; ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { ++ cp = strchr(allow_list, data[i]); ++ /* if c is specified as '\0' pointer to terminator is returned !! */ ++ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { ++ if (sshbuf_put(b, &data[i], 1) != 0) ++ goto err; ++ } else ++ if (snprintf(tmp, 4, "%%%02X", (unsigned char) data[i]) < 3 ++ || sshbuf_put(b, tmp, 3) != 0) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (sshbuf_put(b, "\0", 1) == 0) ++ return b; ++err: ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++char * ++pkcs11_uri_append(char *part, const char *separator, const char *key, ++ struct sshbuf *value) ++{ ++ char *new_part; ++ size_t size = 0; ++ ++ if (value == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ size = asprintf(&new_part, ++ "%s%s%s" PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "%s", ++ (part != NULL ? part : ""), ++ (part != NULL ? separator : ""), ++ key, sshbuf_ptr(value)); ++ sshbuf_free(value); ++ free(part); ++ ++ if (size <= 0) ++ return NULL; ++ return new_part; ++} ++ ++char * ++pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) ++{ ++ size_t size = 0; ++ char *p = NULL, *path = NULL, *query = NULL; ++ ++ /* compose a percent-encoded ID */ ++ if (uri->id_len > 0) { ++ struct sshbuf *key_id = percent_encode(uri->id, uri->id_len, ""); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_ID, key_id); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write object label */ ++ if (uri->object) { ++ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->object, strlen(uri->object), ++ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, label); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write token label */ ++ if (uri->token) { ++ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->token, strlen(uri->token), ++ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, label); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write manufacturer */ ++ if (uri->manuf) { ++ struct sshbuf *manuf = percent_encode(uri->manuf, ++ strlen(uri->manuf), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_MANUF, manuf); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write module_path */ ++ if (uri->module_path) { ++ struct sshbuf *module = percent_encode(uri->module_path, ++ strlen(uri->module_path), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/"); ++ query = pkcs11_uri_append(query, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, module); ++ if (query == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ size = asprintf(&p, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "%s%s%s", ++ path != NULL ? path : "", ++ query != NULL ? "?" : "", ++ query != NULL ? query : ""); ++err: ++ free(query); ++ free(path); ++ if (size <= 0) ++ return NULL; ++ return p; ++} ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri * ++pkcs11_uri_init() ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *d = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pkcs11_uri)); ++ return d; ++} ++ ++void ++pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) ++{ ++ if (pkcs11 == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ free(pkcs11->id); ++ free(pkcs11->module_path); ++ free(pkcs11->token); ++ free(pkcs11->object); ++ free(pkcs11->lib_manuf); ++ free(pkcs11->manuf); ++ if (pkcs11->pin) ++ freezero(pkcs11->pin, strlen(pkcs11->pin)); ++ free(pkcs11); ++} ++ ++int ++pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) ++{ ++ char *saveptr1, *saveptr2, *str1, *str2, *tok; ++ int rv = 0, len; ++ char *p = NULL; ++ ++ size_t scheme_len = strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME); ++ if (strlen(uri) < scheme_len || /* empty URI matches everything */ ++ strncmp(uri, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, scheme_len) != 0) { ++ error_f("The '%s' does not look like PKCS#11 URI", uri); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (pkcs11 == NULL) { ++ error_f("Bad arguments. The pkcs11 can't be null"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* skip URI schema name */ ++ p = strdup(uri); ++ str1 = p; ++ ++ /* everything before ? */ ++ tok = strtok_r(str1, "?", &saveptr1); ++ if (tok == NULL) { ++ error_f("pk11-path expected, got EOF"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* skip URI schema name: ++ * the scheme ensures that there is at least something before "?" ++ * allowing empty pk11-path. Resulting token at worst pointing to ++ * \0 byte */ ++ tok = tok + scheme_len; ++ ++ /* parse pk11-path */ ++ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { ++ char **charptr, *arg = NULL; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); ++ if (tok == NULL) ++ break; ++ opcode = parse_token(tok); ++ if (opcode != pBadOption) ++ arg = tok + strlen(keywords[opcode].name) + 1; /* separator "=" */ ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case pId: ++ /* CKA_ID */ ++ if (pkcs11->id != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("The id already set in the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ len = percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->id); ++ if (len <= 0) { ++ verbose_f("Failed to percent-decode CKA_ID: %s", arg); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } else ++ pkcs11->id_len = len; ++ debug3_f("Setting CKA_ID = %s from PKCS#11 URI", arg); ++ break; ++ case pToken: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> label */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->token; ++ parse_string: ++ if (*charptr != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("The %s already set in the PKCS#11 URI", ++ keywords[opcode].name); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, charptr); ++ debug3_f("Setting %s = %s from PKCS#11 URI", ++ keywords[opcode].name, *charptr); ++ break; ++ ++ case pObject: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->object; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case pManufacturer: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->manuf; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case pLibraryManufacturer: ++ /* CK_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->lib_manuf; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ default: ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI path SHOULD be error */ ++ verbose_f("Unknown part of path in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ tok = strtok_r(NULL, "?", &saveptr1); ++ if (tok == NULL) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* parse pk11-query (optional) */ ++ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { ++ char *arg; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); ++ if (tok == NULL) ++ break; ++ opcode = parse_token(tok); ++ if (opcode != pBadOption) ++ arg = tok + strlen(keywords[opcode].name) + 1; /* separator "=" */ ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case pModulePath: ++ /* module-path is PKCS11Provider */ ++ if (pkcs11->module_path != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("Multiple module-path attributes are" ++ "not supported the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->module_path); ++ debug3_f("Setting PKCS11Provider = %s from PKCS#11 URI", ++ pkcs11->module_path); ++ break; ++ ++ case pPinValue: ++ /* pin-value */ ++ if (pkcs11->pin != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("Multiple pin-value attributes are" ++ "not supported the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->pin); ++ debug3_f("Setting PIN from PKCS#11 URI"); ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI query SHOULD be ignored */ ++ verbose_f("Unknown part of query in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok); ++ } ++ } ++out: ++ free(p); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h +--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h 2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#define PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "pkcs11:" ++#define PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \ ++ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \ ++ "0123456789_-.()" ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri { ++ /* path */ ++ char *id; ++ size_t id_len; ++ char *token; ++ char *object; ++ char *lib_manuf; ++ char *manuf; ++ /* query */ ++ char *module_path; ++ char *pin; /* Only parsed, but not printed */ ++}; ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); ++void pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *); ++int pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *, struct pkcs11_uri *); ++struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); ++char *pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri); ++ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbdbe93 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c +--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors 2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200 ++++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c 2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200 +@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) + goto auth_fail; + + if (!do_pam_account()) { +- sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; ++ /* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN. ++ * Backward compatibility for other errors. */ ++ if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED ++ && sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ++ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; + goto auth_fail; + } + if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { +@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ +- if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) +- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); ++ if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED ++ || sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN ++ || sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ++ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); + else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); + else +@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha + plen++; + free(msg); + break; ++ case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN: ++ case PAM_PERM_DENIED: + case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: ++ sshpam_account_status = 0; ++ /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case PAM_MAXTRIES: +- if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) +- sshpam_account_status = 0; + if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbdf7ed --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +index 32d1f617..0024f751 100644 +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + #endif + + /* enable nonblocking mode */ +- if (nonblock) { ++ c->restore_block = 0; ++ if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) { ++ /* ++ * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set ++ * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to ++ * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering ++ * with other programs that follow. ++ */ ++ if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) { ++ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD; ++ set_nonblock(rfd); ++ } ++ if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) { ++ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD; ++ set_nonblock(wfd); ++ } ++ if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) { ++ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD; ++ set_nonblock(efd); ++ } ++ } else if (nonblock) { + if (rfd != -1) + set_nonblock(rfd); + if (wfd != -1) +@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc) + } + + int +-channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp) ++channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp) + { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; +- int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; ++ int ret, fd = *fdp; + +- if (fd != -1) { +- ret = close(fd); +- *fdp = -1; +- if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) +- channel_find_maxfd(sc); +- } ++ if (fd == -1) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) || ++ (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) || ++ (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0)) ++ (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0); /* restore blocking */ ++ ++ ret = close(fd); ++ *fdp = -1; ++ if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) ++ channel_find_maxfd(sc); + return ret; + } + +@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) + { + int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd; + +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); + if (rfd != sock) +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd); + if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd) +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd); + if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); + } + + static void +@@ -702,7 +728,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); + channel_free(ssh, c); + break; + } +@@ -1491,7 +1517,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) + + Channel * + channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, +- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) ++ const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, ++ int in, int out, int nonblock) + { + Channel *c; + +@@ -1499,7 +1526,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, + + c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, + -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, +- 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); ++ 0, "stdio-forward", nonblock); + + c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); + c->host_port = port_to_connect; +@@ -1649,7 +1676,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + if (c->single_connection) { + oerrno = errno; + debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + errno = oerrno; + } +@@ -2058,7 +2085,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); +@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); +- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); ++ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); + } else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) + debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); + else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) +diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h +index 378d987c..6bf86b00 100644 +--- a/channels.h ++++ b/channels.h +@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@ + + #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 + ++/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */ ++#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE 0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */ ++#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET 1 /* set non-blocking state */ ++#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO 2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */ ++ ++/* c->restore_block mask flags */ ++#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD 0x01 ++#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD 0x02 ++#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD 0x04 ++ + /* TCP forwarding */ + #define FORWARD_DENY 0 + #define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) +@@ -139,6 +149,7 @@ struct Channel { + * to a matching pre-select handler. + * this way post-select handlers are not + * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ ++ int restore_block; /* fd mask to restore blocking status */ + struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over + * encrypted connection */ + struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for +@@ -266,7 +277,7 @@ void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *, + void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int, + channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); + void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int); +-int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *); ++int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *); + void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *); + + /* mux proxy support */ +@@ -313,7 +324,7 @@ Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, + char *, char *, int *, const char **); + Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); + Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*, +- u_short, int, int); ++ u_short, int, int, int); + Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *, + u_short, char *, char *); + Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *, +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index 219f0e90..bdd67686 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -1405,14 +1405,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, + if (have_pty) + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + +- /* restore blocking io */ +- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) +- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); +- if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) +- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); +- if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) +- unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); +- + /* + * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote + * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the +diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c +index faf4ef1e..9454bfed 100644 +--- a/mux.c ++++ b/mux.c +@@ -452,14 +452,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) + error_f("tcgetattr: %s", strerror(errno)); + +- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ +- if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) +- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); +- if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) +- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); +- if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) +- set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); +- + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (cctx->want_tty) { +@@ -469,7 +461,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + + nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, + new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, +- CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); ++ CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); + + nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ + c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ +@@ -1025,13 +1017,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + } + } + +- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ +- if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) +- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); +- if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) +- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); +- +- nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); ++ nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], ++ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); + free(chost); + + nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ +diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c +index 4a4494b8..7ef3a350 100644 +--- a/nchan.c ++++ b/nchan.c +@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) + c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); + } + } else { +- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) { ++ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) { + logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->wfd, + c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); +@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) + c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); + } + } else { +- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) { ++ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) { + logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->rfd, + c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); +@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) + debug_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd, + channel_format_extended_usage(c)); +- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) { ++ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) { + logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for " + "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->efd, + c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 696dc3bc..6243db76 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -1876,9 +1876,10 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) + + if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || + (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) +- fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); ++ fatal_f("dup() in/out failed"); + if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, +- options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) ++ options.stdio_forward_port, in, out, ++ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL) + fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed"); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); +@@ -2074,14 +2075,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) + if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1) + fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); + +- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ +- if (!isatty(in)) +- set_nonblock(in); +- if (!isatty(out)) +- set_nonblock(out); +- if (!isatty(err)) +- set_nonblock(err); +- + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (tty_flag) { +@@ -2091,7 +2084,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) + c = channel_new(ssh, + "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, + window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, +- "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); ++ "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); + + debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self); + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89c35ef --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c +index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644 +--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c ++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) + #endif + } + +-uint32_t ++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_api_version(void) + { + return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR; +@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options) + return 0; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, + const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, + struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response) +@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, + return ret; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, + uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, +@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, + return ret; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, + struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks) + { diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b83bc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + sock_set_v6only(sock); + if (x11_use_localhost) + set_reuseaddr(sock); + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { + debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port, + strerror(errno)); + close(sock); ++ ++ /* do not remove successfully opened ++ * sockets if the request failed because ++ * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available ++ * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being ++ * supported) ++ */ ++ if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno) ++ continue; ++ + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) + close(socks[n]); + num_socks = 0; + break; + } + socks[num_socks++] = sock; + if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) + break; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1285979 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +--- compat.h.orig 2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700 ++++ compat.h 2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700 +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + + #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 + #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 +-/* #define unused 0x00000004 */ ++#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74 0x00000004 + /* #define unused 0x00000008 */ + #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 + /* #define unused 0x00000020 */ +--- compat.c.orig 2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700 ++++ compat.c 2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700 +@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@ + { "OpenSSH_6.5*," + "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, ++ { "OpenSSH_7.4*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE| ++ SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74}, + { "OpenSSH_7.0*," + "OpenSSH_7.1*," + "OpenSSH_7.2*," + "OpenSSH_7.3*," +- "OpenSSH_7.4*," + "OpenSSH_7.5*," + "OpenSSH_7.6*," + "OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, +--- sshconnect2.c.orig 2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700 ++++ sshconnect2.c 2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700 +@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@ + break; + } + free(oallowed); ++ /* ++ * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its ++ * support. For that release, check the local policy against the ++ * SHA2 signature types. ++ */ ++ if (alg == NULL && ++ (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) { ++ oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos); ++ while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { ++ if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) ++ continue; ++ tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL); ++ if (tmp != NULL) ++ alg = xstrdup(cp); ++ free(tmp); ++ if (alg != NULL) ++ break; ++ } ++ free(oallowed); ++ } + return alg; + } + + diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc b/SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7b48bc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- + +iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEcWi5g4FaXu9ZpK39Kj9BTnNgYLoFAmB5CwgACgkQKj9BTnNg +YLp01RAArXrAALtwTnWDysxBKTxGAUmXsPQOeaBCPd3zND3n0si6iinwwatSbu4d +eYj/EOlzXydJkgMImoq6ErZrP2LyApe9RQDHfn/zEr+k5iflOK4su59TK6Dwuy86 +SPYsSNSBhABiVyH9HQelRyVLJfHwVU+DP/SaUemHGbeDLcczp5wh+mtXQPG7hMLi +yuZ1e9W4pO5HOXwoccS69amO0nhqpLb2qBYhenFjY4lZPmIf7UFkGsqIkYeAqHU4 +/uhM0anxo7y+ezc2YD6eZHLrOZcRj1eYxh9IHGZnDcW2+6twks4aVK1kU+HI7xqt +m9bhB+RTVKit0hvNjyhZP3XrDksgCQyyiWuXOe323ane42noH1NP6W075lmnC11Q +JGueXJ+/vGPq3aYiad2mSZoHS82VfK43cCwXY9psCmZOMuWgARy/rxOWUZa3FBV7 +bIS59Mr4hzjyODXArXc+z98Q3Y0qV8jT7xDHCfmsmivBjNcEWH2fX4KvyPHNogJP +C+4bA4WbOy9X6s3mKfQFgeLKA4MbeIhGTNFKl3Utyt7bl8dBzPU4nzBx5754e6Q2 +2vRuLsTfAAGWTNwu+XfS5wvhjPMLkXBH4IUxY8acUTxLYY4uPnPFS2ZqCC94Ysrr +Af4DzNuqm8lkiglggwRwRLopVCuAHfScyqETdTOA1kLsILWdn8Q= +=Jsrn +-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab5899f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +authfd.c +authfd.h +atomicio.c +atomicio.h +bufaux.c +bufbn.c +buffer.h +buffer.c +cleanup.c +cipher.h +compat.h +entropy.c +entropy.h +fatal.c +includes.h +kex.h +key.c +key.h +log.c +log.h +match.h +misc.c +misc.h +pathnames.h +platform.h +rsa.h +ssh-dss.c +ssh-rsa.c +ssh.h +ssh2.h +uidswap.c +uidswap.h +uuencode.c +uuencode.h +xmalloc.c +xmalloc.h diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0822b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,992 @@ +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + * or implied, of Jamie Beverly. + */ + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv) + case EOF: + case '\0': + if (len > 0) { +- argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv)); +- argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count])); ++ argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv)); ++ argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count])); + strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len); + memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1); + len = 0; +@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char * + { + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++) +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]); ++ free(argv[i]); + +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv); ++ free(argv); + return; + } + +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "log.h" +-#include "buffer.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "authfd.h" + #include + +@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist; + struct identity { + TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; + AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */ +- Key *key; /* public/private key */ ++ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ + char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ + int tried; + int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat 2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "log.h" +-#include "buffer.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "authfd.h" + #include + #include +@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ + #include "get_command_line.h" + extern char **environ; + ++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101 ++ + /* + * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user + * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary +@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count) + if (count == 0) + return NULL; + +- buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf)); ++ buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf)); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'"); + strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG); +@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count) + } + + void +-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count) ++agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count) + { + size_t i; +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf); ++ int r; + +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count); ++ if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + + +-void +-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user, ++static void ++pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user, + const char * ruser, const char * servicename) + { + u_char *cookie = NULL; +@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * + char ** reported_argv = NULL; + size_t count = 0; + char * action_logbuf = NULL; +- Buffer action_agentbuf; ++ struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL; + uint8_t free_logbuf = 0; + char * retc; + int32_t reti; ++ int r; + +- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random(); ++ rnd = arc4random(); + cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd); + while (cookie_len < 16) { + cookie_len += 16; /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */ + } + +- cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len); ++ cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len); + + for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) { +- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random(); ++ rnd = arc4random(); + } + cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd; + rnd >>= 8; +@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * + } + else { + action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform"; +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */ ++ if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */ ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + } + + /* +@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * + retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1); + time(&ts); + +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2); ++ if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */ +- if(retc) +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd); +- else +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ""); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ if (retc) { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (free_logbuf) { +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf); ++ free(action_logbuf); ++ sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf); ++ } ++ /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */ ++ if (reti >= 0) { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */ +- if(reti >= 0) +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname); +- else +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ""); +- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts); ++ /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + free(cookie); + return; +@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui + + auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); + auth->fd = sock; +- buffer_init(&auth->identities); ++ if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + auth->howmany = 0; + + return auth; +@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui + int + pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename) + { +- Buffer session_id2 = { 0 }; ++ struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL; + Identity *id; +- Key *key; ++ struct sshkey *key; + AuthenticationConnection *ac; + char *comment; + uint8_t retval = 0; +@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con + pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename); + + if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); ++ verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) + { + if(key != NULL) { +- id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); ++ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->key = key; + id->filename = comment; + id->ac = ac; +- if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) { ++ if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) { + retval = 1; + } +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename); +- pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key); +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id); ++ free(id->filename); ++ key_free(id->key); ++ free(id); + if(retval == 1) + break; + } + } +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2); ++ sshbuf_free(session_id2); + ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); + } + else { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); ++ verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); + } +- /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */ + EVP_cleanup(); + return retval; + } +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat 2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200 +@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + * a patch 8-) + */ + #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE +- __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename); ++ __progname = xstrdup(servicename); + #endif + + for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) { +@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + #endif + } + +- pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0); ++ log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0); + pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user); + pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr); + +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user); ++ verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user); + + if(ruser_ptr) { + strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1); +@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK + if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) { + strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 ); +- pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser ); ++ verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser ); + } else + #endif + { + if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())"); ++ verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())"); + goto cleanexit; + } + strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1); +@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + + /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */ + if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser); ++ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser); + goto cleanexit; + } + if( ! getpwnam(user) ) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user); ++ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user); + goto cleanexit; + } + +@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + */ + parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input); + } else { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys"); +- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys"); ++ verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys"); ++ authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys"); + } + + /* +@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + */ + + if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); ++ verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + + /* + * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent. +@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0"); + int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1); + if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth); ++ verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth); + if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) { + retval = PAM_SUCCESS; +- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); ++ logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + goto cleanexit; + } + } +@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, + * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user + */ + if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */ +- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); ++ logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + retval = PAM_SUCCESS; + } else { +- pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); ++ logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + } + } else { +- pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" ); ++ logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" ); + } + + cleanexit: +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "match.h" + #include "log.h" +-#include "buffer.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "misc.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ + #include "pathnames.h" + #include "secure_filename.h" + +-#include "identity.h" + #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h" + + extern char *authorized_keys_file; +@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us + } else { + slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/'); + if(!slash_ptr) +- pamsshagentauth_fatal ++ fatal + ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'"); + + owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1; + if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1)) +- pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long"); ++ fatal("Username too long"); + + strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len); + if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid) +@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us + getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid; + } + authorized_keys_file = +- pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, ++ tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, + authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid); + strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, + sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1); +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we ++ free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we + percent_expand + later, we'd step + on this, so free +@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us + strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, ".")); + #endif + authorized_keys_file = +- pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", ++ percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", + getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, + "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL); + } + + int +-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key) ++pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key) + { + return + pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ + #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H + + #include "identity.h" +-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *); ++int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *); + void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *); + + #endif +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh.h" + #include "ssh2.h" +-#include "buffer.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "compat.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "pathnames.h" + #include "misc.h" + #include "secure_filename.h" + #include "uidswap.h" +- +-#include "identity.h" ++#include + + /* return 1 if user allows given key */ + /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */ + static int +-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key) ++pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key) + { +- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; ++ char *line = NULL; + int found_key = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; +- Key *found; ++ struct sshkey *found; + char *fp; ++ size_t linesize = 0; + + found_key = 0; +- found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type); ++ found = sshkey_new(key->type); + +- while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { ++ while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) { + char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */ + ++ linenum++; + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ + for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); + if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + continue; + +- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { ++ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { + /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ + int quoted = 0; + +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); ++ verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); + /* key_options = cp; */ + for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') +@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE + } + /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ + for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); +- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); ++ if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { ++ verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); + /* still no key? advance to next line */ + continue; + } + } +- if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) { ++ if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) { + found_key = 1; +- pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file, ++ logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file, + linenum); +- fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s", +- pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp); +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp); ++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ++ logit("Found matching %s key: %s", ++ sshkey_type(found), fp); ++ free(fp); + break; + } + } +- pamsshagentauth_key_free(found); ++ free(line); ++ sshkey_free(found); + if(!found_key) +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found"); ++ verbose("key not found"); + return found_key; + } + +@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ + int +-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file) ++pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file) + { + FILE *f; + int found_key = 0; + struct stat st; +- char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; ++ char buf[256]; + + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file); ++ verbose("trying public key file %s", file); + + /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */ + if(stat(file, &st) < 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file); ++ verbose("File not found: %s", file); + return 0; + } + +@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct + + if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { + fclose(f); +- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf); ++ logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf); + return 0; + } + +@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct + int + pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command, + char *authorized_keys_command_user, +- struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key) ++ struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key) + { + FILE *f; + int ok, found_key = 0; +@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + else { + pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user); + if(pw == NULL) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s", ++ error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s", + authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + } + +- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw); ++ temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror ++ error + ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", + authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path + (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); ++ error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); + goto out; + } + + /* open the pipe and read the keys */ + if(pipe(p) != 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + +- pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"", ++ debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"", + authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username); + + /* + * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and + * run cleanup_exit() code. + */ +- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid(); ++ restore_uid(); + + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: /* error */ +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + return 0; +@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + + /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */ + if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, ++ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 + || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID) +@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + #else + if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + #endif +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, ++ error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } +@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + #else + if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) { + #endif +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, ++ error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } +@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + + /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we + should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */ +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", ++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", + authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); + default: /* parent */ + break; + } + +- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw); ++ temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + close(p[1]); + if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + /* Don't leave zombie child */ + while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR); +@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed + + while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if(errno != EINTR) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, ++ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + } + if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", ++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", + authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); + goto out; + } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", ++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", + authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + goto out; + } + found_key = ok; + out: +- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid(); ++ restore_uid(); + return found_key; + } +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ + #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H + + #include "identity.h" +-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *); +-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *); ++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *); ++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *); + + #endif +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "match.h" + #include "log.h" +-#include "buffer.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "misc.h" + + +@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c + int comparehome = 0; + struct stat st; + +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid); ++ verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid); + + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, +@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } +- pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); ++ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); ++ verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c + + /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", ++ verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", + buf); + break; + } +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh.h" + #include "ssh2.h" +-#include "buffer.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "compat.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" + #include "pathnames.h" + #include "misc.h" + #include "secure_filename.h" +@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@ + #include "identity.h" + #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h" + ++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST 54 ++ + /* extern u_char *session_id2; + extern uint8_t session_id_len; + */ + + int +-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2) ++userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2) + { +- Buffer b = { 0 }; ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *pkalg = NULL; + u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL; +- u_int blen = 0, slen = 0; +- int authenticated = 0; ++ size_t blen = 0, slen = 0; ++ int r, authenticated = 0; + +- pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key); ++ pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key); + + /* first test if this key is even allowed */ + if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key)) +- goto user_auth_clean_exit; ++ goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer; + +- if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0) +- goto user_auth_clean_exit; ++ if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0) ++ goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer; + + /* construct packet to sign and test */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b); ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth"); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +- if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0) ++ if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0) + goto user_auth_clean_exit; + + /* test for correct signature */ +- if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1) ++ if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) + authenticated = 1; + + user_auth_clean_exit: + /* if(&b != NULL) */ +- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b); ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer: + if(sig != NULL) +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig); ++ free(sig); + if(pkblob != NULL) +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob); ++ free(pkblob); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); + return authenticated; + } +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ + #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H + #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H + +-#include +-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *); ++#include "identity.h" ++int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *); + + #endif +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 +@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src + /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ + *p = '\0'; + len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded); ++ xfree(encoded); + return len; + } + +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co + fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n"); + return; + } +- buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len); ++ buf = malloc(2*len); + n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); +@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co + } + if (i % 70 != 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); +- pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf); ++ free(buf); + } +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat 2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c 2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200 +@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ + #include + + #include "defines.h" +-#include "key.h" ++#include ++#include "sshkey.h" + #include "log.h" + + #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h" +@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@ + int authenticated = 0; + const char method[] = "publickey "; + +- char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info); ++ char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info); + char* saveptr; + + char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr); + while (auth_line != NULL) { + if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) { + char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1; +- Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); ++ struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if (key == NULL) { + continue; + } +- int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str); ++ int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str); + if (r == 1) { + if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) { + authenticated = 1; +- pamsshagentauth_key_free(key); ++ sshkey_free(key); + break; + } + } else { +- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r); ++ verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r); + } +- pamsshagentauth_key_free(key); ++ sshkey_free(key); + } + auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf49c37 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c +--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c ++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c +@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, + int + pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key) + { ++ struct passwd *pw; + return +- pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), +- key, authorized_keys_file) +- || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, +- authorized_keys_file) ++ ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) && ++ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file)) ++ || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) && ++ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file)) + || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command, + authorized_keys_command_user, + getpwnam(ruser), key); diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be1f8e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid 2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100 +@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui + } + + errno = 0; +- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat +- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ +- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { ++ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat ++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ ++ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) { + close(sock); +- if(errno == EACCES) +- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); ++ error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s", ++ (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } ++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { ++ close(sock); ++ sock = -1; ++ if(errno == EACCES) ++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); ++ } + +- seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */ +- ++ /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */ ++ if (0 != seteuid(0)) { ++ fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } + return sock; + } + diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aea068d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c +--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility 2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100 +@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char *__progname; + extern char *__progname; + #endif + +-PAM_EXTERN int ++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) + pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) + { + char **argv_ptr; +@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit: + } + + +-PAM_EXTERN int ++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) + pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) + { + UNUSED(pamh); diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f2c02c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h 2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200 +@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ + typedef struct identity Identity; + typedef struct idlist Idlist; + ++typedef struct { ++ int fd; ++ struct sshbuf *identities; ++ int howmany; ++} AuthenticationConnection; ++ + struct identity { + TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; + AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */ +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent 2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200 +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "authfd.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" + #include + #include + #include "ssh2.h" +@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con + { + struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL; + Identity *id; +- struct sshkey *key; + AuthenticationConnection *ac; +- char *comment; + uint8_t retval = 0; + uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid; ++ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; ++ int r; ++ unsigned int i; + + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename); + + if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) { + verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); +- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) +- { +- if(key != NULL) { ++ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) { ++ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) ++ fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for " ++ "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) ++ { ++ if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) { + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); +- id->key = key; +- id->filename = comment; ++ id->key = idlist->keys[i]; ++ id->filename = idlist->comments[i]; + id->ac = ac; + if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) { + retval = 1; + } +- free(id->filename); +- key_free(id->key); + free(id); + if(retval == 1) + break; +- } +- } ++ } ++ } +- sshbuf_free(session_id2); +- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); ++ sshbuf_free(session_id2); ++ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); ++ } ++ ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd); ++ free(ac); + } + else { + verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); +diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c +--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent 2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200 ++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200 +@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +- if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0) ++ if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0) + goto user_auth_clean_exit; + + /* test for correct signature */ diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4018c4d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c +--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100 +@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@ + #include + #include "ssh2.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "ssh.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h" + #include "identity.h" + #include "get_command_line.h" + extern char **environ; + ++/* ++ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user ++ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary ++ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. ++ * ++ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that ++ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a ++ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated. ++ */ ++ + static char * + log_action(char ** action, size_t count) + { +@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void + pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user, + const char * ruser, const char * servicename) + { +- char *cookie = NULL; ++ u_char *cookie = NULL; + uint8_t i = 0; + uint32_t rnd = 0; + uint8_t cookie_len; +@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * + if (i % 4 == 0) { + rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random(); + } +- cookie[i] = (char) rnd; ++ cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd; + rnd >>= 8; + } + +@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * + } + + int ++ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid) ++{ ++ const char *authsocket; ++ int sock; ++ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; ++ struct stat sock_st; ++ ++ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); ++ if (!authsocket) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */ ++ if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) { ++ if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) { ++ fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody ++ * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication. ++ */ ++ if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) { ++ error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; ++ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); ++ ++ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); ++ if (sock < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* close on exec */ ++ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) { ++ close(sock); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ errno = 0; ++ seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat ++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */ ++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { ++ close(sock); ++ if(errno == EACCES) ++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */ ++ ++ return sock; ++} ++ ++AuthenticationConnection * ++ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid) ++{ ++ AuthenticationConnection *auth; ++ int sock; ++ ++ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid); ++ ++ /* ++ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we ++ * exited due to a timeout. ++ */ ++ if (sock < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); ++ auth->fd = sock; ++ buffer_init(&auth->identities); ++ auth->howmany = 0; ++ ++ return auth; ++} ++ ++int + pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename) + { + Buffer session_id2 = { 0 }; +@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename); + +- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) { ++ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) { + pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) + { +diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in +--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in 2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100 +@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS= + CC=@CC@ + LD=@LD@ + CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ ++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ + LIBS=@LIBS@ + AR=@AR@ + AWK=@AWK@ +@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ + PERL=@PERL@ + SED=@SED@ + ENT=@ENT@ +-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ +-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@ ++LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ ++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@ + EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + + INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@ +@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu + + ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o + +-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o ++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o + + + MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod +@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h + .c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a ++LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a + $(LIBCOMPAT): always + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) + always: + +-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o +- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam ++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o ++ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam + + $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) + pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8 diff --git a/SOURCES/ssh-agent.service b/SOURCES/ssh-agent.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c215022 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/ssh-agent.service @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Requires SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ssh-agent.socket" +# set in environment, handled for example in plasma via +# /etc/xdg/plasma-workspace/env/ssh-agent.sh +[Unit] +ConditionEnvironment=!SSH_AGENT_PID +Description=OpenSSH key agent +Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1) + +[Service] +Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket +ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK +PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID +SuccessExitStatus=2 +Type=forking diff --git a/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam b/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7a3f67 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule +session required pam_selinux.so close +session required pam_loginuid.so +# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context +session required pam_selinux.so open env_params +session required pam_namespace.so + diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen new file mode 100644 index 0000000..141814c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server. +KEYTYPE=$1 +case $KEYTYPE in + "dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS + "ed25519") + FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled + if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then + exit 0 + fi ;; + "rsa") ;; # always ok + "ecdsa") ;; + *) # wrong argument + exit 12 ;; +esac +KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key + +KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen +if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then + exit 13 +fi + +# remove old keys +rm -f $KEY{,.pub} + +# create new keys +if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + exit 1 +fi + +# sanitize permissions +/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY +/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY +/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub +if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then + /usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub} +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9efb4e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +[Unit] +Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service +Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service +Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service +PartOf=sshd.service diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f27f729 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH %i Server Key Generation +ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key + +[Service] +Type=oneshot +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd +ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i + +[Install] +WantedBy=sshd-keygen.target diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.pam b/SOURCES/sshd.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..780f62e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.pam @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth substack password-auth +auth include postlogin +account required pam_sepermit.so +account required pam_nologin.so +account include password-auth +password include password-auth +# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule +session required pam_selinux.so close +session required pam_loginuid.so +# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context +session required pam_selinux.so open env_params +session required pam_namespace.so +session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke +session optional pam_motd.so +session include password-auth +session include postlogin diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.service b/SOURCES/sshd.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8afb86 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.service @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH server daemon +Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5) +After=network.target sshd-keygen.target +Wants=sshd-keygen.target + +[Service] +Type=notify +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS +ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID +KillMode=process +Restart=on-failure +RestartSec=42s + +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.socket b/SOURCES/sshd.socket new file mode 100644 index 0000000..caa50c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.socket @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH Server Socket +Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5) +Conflicts=sshd.service + +[Socket] +ListenStream=22 +Accept=yes + +[Install] +WantedBy=sockets.target diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a217ce7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# Configuration file for the sshd service. + +# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing. +# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for +# example using systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service to allow creation +# of DSA key or systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service to disable RSA key +# creation. diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd@.service b/SOURCES/sshd@.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..196c555 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/sshd@.service @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon +Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5) +Wants=sshd-keygen.target +After=sshd-keygen.target + +[Service] +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd +ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS +StandardInput=socket diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8954cba --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,2920 @@ +# Do we want SELinux & Audit +%if 0%{?!noselinux:1} +%global WITH_SELINUX 1 +%else +%global WITH_SELINUX 0 +%endif + +%global _hardened_build 1 + +# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID +%global sshd_uid 74 +%global sshd_gid 74 + +# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%global no_gnome_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) +%global static_libcrypto 0 + +# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass +%global gtk2 1 + +# Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)? +%global pie 1 + +# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) +%global kerberos5 1 + +# Do we want libedit support +%global libedit 1 + +# Whether to build pam_ssh_agent_auth +%if 0%{?!nopam:1} +%global pam_ssh_agent 1 +%else +%global pam_ssh_agent 0 +%endif + +# Reserve options to override askpass settings with: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' +%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1} + +# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. +# Red Hat Linux <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' +%{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0} + +# Options for static OpenSSL link: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" +%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1} + +# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 +%global openssh_ver 8.6p1 +%global openssh_rel 7 +%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4 +%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 3 + +Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2 +Name: openssh +Version: %{openssh_ver} +Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.1 +URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html +#URL1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/ +Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc +Source2: sshd.pam +Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg +Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz +Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders +Source6: ssh-keycat.pam +Source7: sshd.sysconfig +Source9: sshd@.service +Source10: sshd.socket +Source11: sshd.service +Source12: sshd-keygen@.service +Source13: sshd-keygen +Source15: sshd-keygen.target +Source16: ssh-agent.service + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581 +Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402 +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248 +# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event +Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch +# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684) +Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch + +# --- pam_ssh-agent --- +# make it build reusing the openssh sources +Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch +# check return value of seteuid() +# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/23/ +Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch +# explicitly make pam callbacks visible +Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch +# update to current version of agent structure +Patch305: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch +# remove prefixes to be able to build against current openssh library +Patch306: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch +# Fix NULL dereference from getpwuid() return value +# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/22/ +Patch307: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX) +Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634 +Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch +#? +Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644 +Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 (WONTFIX) +Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch +#(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925 +Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch +#? +Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789 +Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch + +#? +Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +#? +Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332 +Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX) +Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch +# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545) +Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch +# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL +Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch + +# GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732) +# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master +Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch +#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html +Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch +# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843) +# CVE-2014-9278 +Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch +# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494) +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775 +Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch +# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243) +Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch + + +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 +Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch +# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650) +Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch +# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580) +Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch +# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681) +Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch +# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223) +Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch +# apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521) +Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch +# Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055) +Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch +# make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom +Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch +# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302) +Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch +# Help systemd to track the running service +Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch +# Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level +Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch +# Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit +Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch +# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration) +# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11 +# git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +# Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333) +Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch +# Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325) +Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch +# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485) +Patch963: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch +# Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761) +Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch +# sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work +Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch +# Do not break X11 without IPv6 +Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213 +Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch +# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518) +Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch +# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503) +Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch +# ssh incorrectly restores the blocking mode on standard output (#1942901) +Patch976: openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch + +License: BSD +Requires: /sbin/nologin + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%if %{gtk2} +BuildRequires: gtk2-devel +BuildRequires: libX11-devel +%else +BuildRequires: gnome-libs-devel +%endif +%endif + +BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel +BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5 +BuildRequires: util-linux, groff +BuildRequires: pam-devel +BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j +BuildRequires: perl-podlators +BuildRequires: systemd-devel +BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros +BuildRequires: gcc make +BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel +BuildRequires: libfido2-devel +Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4 +Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5 + +%if %{kerberos5} +BuildRequires: krb5-devel +%endif + +%if %{libedit} +BuildRequires: libedit-devel ncurses-devel +%endif + +%if %{WITH_SELINUX} +Requires: libselinux >= 2.3-5 +BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 2.3-5 +Requires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8 +BuildRequires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8 +%endif + +BuildRequires: xauth +# for tarball signature verification +BuildRequires: gnupg2 + +%package clients +Summary: An open source SSH client applications +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1 + +%package server +Summary: An open source SSH server daemon +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd +Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3 +Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1 +%{?systemd_requires} + +%package keycat +Summary: A mls keycat backend for openssh +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} + +%package askpass +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} + +%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent +Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.2 +License: BSD + +%description +SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing +commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and +rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two +untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing +it up to date in terms of security and features. + +This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. To make this package useful, you should also +install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. + +%description clients +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes +the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. + +%description server +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to +securely connect to your SSH server. + +%description keycat +OpenSSH mls keycat is backend for using the authorized keys in the +openssh in the mls mode. + +%description askpass +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. + +%description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate +users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the +forwarding of ssh-agent connection it also allows to authenticate with +remote ssh-agent instance. + +The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks. + +%prep +gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0} +%setup -q -a 4 + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +%patch300 -p2 -b .psaa-build +%patch301 -p2 -b .psaa-seteuid +%patch302 -p2 -b .psaa-visibility +%patch306 -p2 -b .psaa-compat +%patch305 -p2 -b .psaa-agent +%patch307 -p2 -b .psaa-deref +# Remove duplicate headers and library files +rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5}) +popd +%endif + +%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls +%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux + +%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat + +%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts +%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm +%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man +%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe +%patch609 -p1 -b .x11 +%patch702 -p1 -b .progress +%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info +%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat +%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no +%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr +# +%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex +%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb +%patch804 -p1 -b .ccache_name +%patch805 -p1 -b .k5login +# +%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok +%patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote +%patch916 -p1 -b .contexts +%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot +%patch919 -p1 -b .scp +%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users +%patch922 -p1 -b .sshdt +%patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode +%patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev +%patch944 -p1 -b .x11max +%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd +%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor +%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox +%patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri +%patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6 +%patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies +%patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp +%patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf +%patch965 -p1 -b .visibility +%patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6 +%patch969 -p0 -b .debian +%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol +%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors +%patch976 -p1 -b .restore-nonblock + +%patch200 -p1 -b .audit +%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race +%patch700 -p1 -b .fips + +%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity + +autoreconf +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +autoreconf +popd + +%build +# the -fvisibility=hidden is needed for clean build of the pam_ssh_agent_auth +# it is needed for lib(open)ssh build too since it is linked to the pam module too +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fvisibility=hidden"; export CFLAGS +%if %{pie} +%ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64 +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC" +%else +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fpic" +%endif +SAVE_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -pie -z relro -z now" + +export CFLAGS +export LDFLAGS + +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} +if test -r /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh ; then + source /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh +fi +krb5_prefix=`krb5-config --prefix` +if test "$krb5_prefix" != "%{_prefix}" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${krb5_prefix}/include -I${krb5_prefix}/include/gssapi"; export CPPFLAGS + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I${krb5_prefix}/include -I${krb5_prefix}/include/gssapi" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${krb5_prefix}/%{_lib}"; export LDFLAGS +else + krb5_prefix= + CPPFLAGS="-I%{_includedir}/gssapi"; export CPPFLAGS + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I%{_includedir}/gssapi" +fi +%endif + +%configure \ + --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ + --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ + --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ + --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \ + --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ + --with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \ + --disable-strip \ + --without-zlib-version-check \ + --with-ssl-engine \ + --with-ipaddr-display \ + --with-pie=no \ + --without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \ + --with-systemd \ + --with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \ + --with-security-key-builtin=yes \ + --with-pam \ +%if %{WITH_SELINUX} + --with-selinux --with-audit=linux \ + --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \ +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} + --with-kerberos5${krb5_prefix:+=${krb5_prefix}} \ +%else + --without-kerberos5 \ +%endif +%if %{libedit} + --with-libedit +%else + --without-libedit +%endif + +%if %{static_libcrypto} +perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile +%endif + +%make_build + +# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary +# because RPM doesn't handle nested %%if statements. +%if %{gtk2} + gtk2=yes +%else + gtk2=no +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +pushd contrib +if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS %{?__global_ldflags}" \ + make gnome-ssh-askpass2 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass +else + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS %{?__global_ldflags}" + make gnome-ssh-askpass1 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass +fi +popd +%endif + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS" +%configure --with-selinux \ + --libexecdir=/%{_libdir}/security \ + --with-mantype=man \ + --without-openssl-header-check `# The check is broken` +%make_build +popd +%endif + +%check +#to run tests use "--with check" +%if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0} +make tests +%endif + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +%make_install + +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +install -m644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat +install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/sshd +install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf +install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf +install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir} +install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service +install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket +install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service +install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service +install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target +install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir} +install -m644 %{SOURCE16} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service +install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen +install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ +install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ +install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +%endif + +%if %{no_gnome_askpass} +rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* +%endif + +perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +%make_install +popd +%endif +%pre +getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || : + +%pre server +getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || : +getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ + useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \ + -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : + +%post server +%systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket +# Migration scriptlet for Fedora 31 and 32 installations to sshd_config +# drop-in directory (in F32+). +# Do this only if the file generated by anaconda exists, contains our config +# directive and sshd_config contains include directive as shipped in our package +%global sysconfig_anaconda /etc/sysconfig/sshd-permitrootlogin +test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ + test ! -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/01-permitrootlogin.conf && \ + grep -q '^PERMITROOTLOGIN="-oPermitRootLogin=yes"' %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ + grep -q '^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/\*.conf' /etc/ssh/sshd_config && \ + echo "PermitRootLogin yes" >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/25-permitrootlogin.conf && \ + rm %{sysconfig_anaconda} || : + +%preun server +%systemd_preun sshd.service sshd.socket + +%postun server +%systemd_postun_with_restart sshd.service + +%post clients +%systemd_user_post ssh-agent.service + +%preun clients +%systemd_user_preun ssh-agent.service + +%files +%license LICENCE +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh +%attr(2555,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* + +%files clients +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config +%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/ +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-copy-id +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service + +%files server +%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config +%dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/ +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/sshd +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd@.service +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target + +%files keycat +%doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keycat +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%files askpass +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if %{pam_ssh_agent} +%files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth +%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8* +%endif + +%changelog +* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu - 8.6p1-7.1 +- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags + Related: rhbz#1991688 + +* Wed Jul 28 2021 Florian Weimer - 8.6p1-7 +- Rebuild to pick up OpenSSL 3.0 Beta ABI (#1984097) + +* Mon Jun 21 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-6 +- rebuilt + +* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu - 8.6p1-5.1 +- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0 + Related: rhbz#1971065 + +* Thu Jun 03 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-5 +- Remove recommendation of p11-kit (#1947904) + +* Tue Jun 01 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-4 +- rebuilt + +* Fri May 21 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-3 +- Hostbased ssh authentication fails if session ID contains a '/' (#1963058) + +* Mon May 10 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-2 +- rebuilt + +* Thu May 06 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.6p1-1 + 0.10.4-3 +- New upstream release (#1952957) +- GSS KEX broken beginning with (GSI-)OpenSSH 8.0p1 (#1957306) + +* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu - 8.5p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937 + +* Tue Apr 13 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.5p1-3 +- Coverity fixes for 8.5p1 (#1938831) + +* Tue Mar 09 2021 Rex Dieter - 8.5p1-2 +- ssh-agent.serivce is user unit (#1761817#27) + +* Wed Mar 03 2021 Jakub Jelen - 8.5p1-1 + 0.10.4-2 +- New upstream release (#1934336) + +* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek - 8.4p1-5.2 +- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros + See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583. + +* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.4p1-5.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jan 22 2021 Jakub Jelen - 8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1 +- Use /usr/share/empty.sshd instead of /var/empty/sshd +- Allow emptu labels in PKCS#11 tokens (#1919007) +- Drop openssh-cavs subpackage + +* Tue Dec 01 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.4p1-4 + 0.10.4-1 +- Remove "PasswordAuthentication yes" from vendor configuration as it is + already default and it might be hard to override. +- Fix broken obsoletes for openssh-ldap (#1902084) + +* Thu Nov 19 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.4p1-3 + 0.10.4-1 +- Unbreak seccomp filter on arm (#1897712) +- Add a workaround for Debian's broken OpenSSH (#1881301) + +* Tue Oct 06 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.4p1-2 + 0.10.4-1 +- Unbreak ssh-copy-id after a release (#1884231) +- Remove misleading comment from sysconfig + +* Tue Sep 29 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.4p1-1 + 0.10.4-1 +- New upstream release of OpenSSH and pam_ssh_agent_auth (#1882995) + +* Fri Aug 21 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.3p1-4 + 0.10.3-10 +- Remove openssh-ldap subpackage (#1871025) +- pkcs11: Do not crash with invalid paths in ssh-agent (#1868996) +- Clarify documentation about sftp-server -m (#1862504) + +* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.3p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Jun 10 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.3p1-3 + 0.10.3-10 +- Do not lose PIN when more slots match PKCS#11 URI (#1843372) +- Update to new crypto-policies version on server (using sshd_config include) +- Move redhat configuraion files to larger number to allow simpler override +- Move sshd_config include before any other definitions (#1824913) + +* Mon Jun 01 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.3p1-2 + 0.10.3-10 +- Fix crash on cleanup (#1842281) + +* Wed May 27 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.3p1-1 + 0.10.3-10 +- New upstream release (#1840503) +- Unbreak corner cases of sshd_config include +- Fix order of gssapi key exchange algorithms + +* Wed Apr 08 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.2p1-3 + 0.10.3-9 +- Simplify reference to crypto policies in configuration files +- Unbreak gssapi authentication with GSSAPITrustDNS over jump hosts +- Correctly print FIPS mode initialized in debug mode +- Enable SHA2-based GSSAPI key exchange methods (#1666781) +- Do not break X11 forwarding when IPv6 is disabled +- Remove fipscheck dependency as OpenSSH is no longer FIPS module +- Improve documentation about crypto policies defaults in manual pages + +* Thu Feb 20 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.2p1-2 + 0.10.3-9 +- Build against libfido2 to unbreak internal u2f support + +* Mon Feb 17 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.2p1-1 + 0.10.3-9 +- New upstrem reelase (#1803290) +- New /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d drop in directory +- Support for U2F security keys +- Correctly report invalid key permissions (#1801459) +- Do not write bogus information on stderr in FIPS mode (#1778224) + +* Mon Feb 03 2020 Jakub Jelen - 8.1p1-4 + 0.10.3-8 +- Unbreak seccomp filter on ARM (#1796267) + +* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.1p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Nov 27 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.1p1-3 + 0.10.3-8 +- Unbreak seccomp filter also on ARM (#1777054) + +* Thu Nov 14 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.1p1-2 + 0.10.3-8 +- Unbreak seccomp filter with latest glibc (#1771946) + +* Wed Oct 09 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.1p1-1 + 0.10.3-8 +- New upstream release (#1759750) + +* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.0p1-8.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Jul 23 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-8 + 0.10.3-7 +- Use the upstream-accepted version of the PKCS#8 PEM support (#1722285) + +* Fri Jul 12 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-7 + 0.10.3-7 +- Use the environment file under /etc/sysconfig for anaconda configuration (#1722928) + +* Wed Jul 03 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-6 + 0.10.3-7 +- Provide the entry point for anaconda configuration in service file (#1722928) + +* Wed Jun 26 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-5 + 0.10.3-7 +- Disable root password logins (#1722928) +- Fix typo in manual pages related to crypto-policies +- Fix the gating test to make sure it removes the test user +- Cleanu up spec file and get rid of some rpmlint warnings + +* Mon Jun 17 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-4 + 0.10.3-7 +- Compatibility with ibmca engine for ECC +- Generate more modern PEM files using new OpenSSL API +- Provide correct signature types for RSA keys using SHA2 from agent + +* Mon May 27 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-3 + 0.10.3-7 +- Remove problematic patch updating cached pw structure +- Do not require the labels on the public objects (#1710832) + +* Tue May 14 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-2 + 0.10.3-7 +- Use OpenSSL KDF +- Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures handling +- Mention crypto-policies in manual pages instead of hardcoded defaults +- Verify in package testsuite that SCP vulnerabilities are fixed +- Do not fail in FIPS mode, when unsupported algorithm is listed in configuration + +* Fri Apr 26 2019 Jakub Jelen - 8.0p1-1 + 0.10.3-7 +- New upstream release (#1701072) +- Removed support for VendroPatchLevel configuration option +- Significant rework of GSSAPI Key Exchange +- Significant rework of PKCS#11 URI support + +* Mon Mar 11 2019 Jakub Jelen - 7.9p1-5 + 0.10.3.6 +- Fix kerberos cleanup procedures with GSSAPI +- Update cached passwd structure after PAM authentication +- Do not fall back to sshd_net_t SELinux context +- Fix corner cases of PKCS#11 URI implementation +- Do not negotiate arbitrary primes with DH GEX in FIPS + +* Wed Feb 06 2019 Jakub Jelen - 7.9p1-4 + 0.10.3.6 +- Log when a client requests an interactive session and only sftp is allowed +- Fix minor issues in ssh-copy-id +- Enclose redhat specific configuration with Match final block + +* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.9p1-3.2 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser - 7.9p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033) + +* Mon Jan 14 2019 Jakub Jelen - 7.9p1-3 + 0.10.3.6 +- Backport Match final to unbreak canonicalization with crypto-policies (#1630166) +- gsskex: Dump correct option +- Backport several fixes from 7_9 branch, mostly related to certificate authentication (#1665611) +- Backport patch for CVE-2018-20685 (#1665786) +- Correctly initialize ECDSA key structures from PKCS#11 + +* Wed Nov 14 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.9p1-2 + 0.10.3-6 +- Fix LDAP configure test (#1642414) +- Avoid segfault on kerberos authentication failure +- Reference correct file in configuration example (#1643274) +- Dump missing GSSAPI configuration options +- Allow to disable RSA signatures with SHA-1 + +* Fri Oct 19 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.9p1-1 + 0.10.3-6 +- New upstream release OpenSSH 7.9p1 (#1632902, #1630166) +- Honor GSSAPIServerIdentity option for GSSAPI key exchange +- Do not break gsssapi-keyex authentication method when specified in + AuthenticationMethods +- Follow the system-wide PATH settings (#1633756) +- Address some coverity issues + +* Mon Sep 24 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.8p1-3 + 0.10.3-5 +- Disable OpenSSH hardening flags and use the ones provided by system +- Ignore unknown parts of PKCS#11 URI +- Do not fail with GSSAPI enabled in match blocks (#1580017) +- Fix the segfaulting cavs test (#1628962) + +* Fri Aug 31 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.8p1-2 + 0.10.3-5 +- New upstream release fixing CVE 2018-15473 +- Remove unused patches +- Remove reference to unused enviornment variable SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +- Address coverity issues +- Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts +- Unbreak GSSAPI key exchange (#1624344) +- Unbreak rekeying with GSSAPI key exchange (#1624344) + +* Thu Aug 09 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-6 + 0.10.3-4 +- Fix listing of kex algoritms in FIPS mode +- Allow aes-gcm cipher modes in FIPS mode +- Coverity fixes + +* Fri Jul 13 2018 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.7p1-5.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Jul 03 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-5 + 0.10.3-4 +- Disable manual printing of motd by default (#1591381) + +* Wed Jun 27 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-4 + 0.10.3-4 +- Better handling of kerberos tickets storage (#1566494) +- Add pam_motd to pam stack (#1591381) + +* Mon Apr 16 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-3 + 0.10.3-4 +- Fix tun devices and other issues fixed after release upstream (#1567775) + +* Thu Apr 12 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-2 + 0.10.3-4 +- Do not break quotes parsing in configuration file (#1566295) + +* Wed Apr 04 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.7p1-1 + 0.10.3-4 +- New upstream release (#1563223) +- Add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 (#1354510) +- Add support for PKCS#11 URIs + +* Tue Mar 06 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-7 + 0.10.3-3 +- Require crypto-policies version and new path +- Remove bogus NSS linking + +* Thu Feb 08 2018 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.6p1-6.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jan 26 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-6 + 0.10.3-3 +- Rebuild for gcc bug on i386 (#1536555) + +* Thu Jan 25 2018 Florian Weimer - 7.6p1-5.2 +- Rebuild to work around gcc bug leading to sshd miscompilation (#1538648) + +* Sat Jan 20 2018 Björn Esser - 7.6p1-5.1.1 +- Rebuilt for switch to libxcrypt + +* Wed Jan 17 2018 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-5 + 0.10.3-3 +- Drop support for TCP wrappers (#1530163) +- Do not pass hostnames to audit -- UseDNS is usually disabled (#1534577) + +* Thu Dec 14 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-4 + 0.10.3-3 +- Whitelist gettid() syscall in seccomp filter (#1524392) + +* Mon Dec 11 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-3 + 0.10.3-3 +- Do not segfault during audit cleanup (#1524233) +- Avoid gcc warnings about uninitialized variables + +* Wed Nov 22 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-2 + 0.10.3-3 +- Do not build everything against libldap +- Do not segfault for ECC keys in PKCS#11 + +* Thu Oct 19 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.6p1-1 + 0.10.3-3 +- New upstream release OpenSSH 7.6 +- Addressing review remarks for OpenSSL 1.1.0 patch +- Fix PermitOpen bug in OpenSSH 7.6 +- Drop support for ExposeAuthenticationMethods option + +* Mon Sep 11 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-6 + 0.10.3-2 +- Do not export KRB5CCNAME if the default path is used (#1199363) +- Add enablement for openssl-ibmca and openssl-ibmpkcs11 (#1477636) +- Add new GSSAPI kex algorithms with SHA-2, but leave them disabled for now +- Enforce pam_sepermit for all logins in SSH (#1492313) +- Remove pam_reauthorize, since it is not needed by cockpit anymore (#1492313) + +* Mon Aug 14 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-5 + 0.10.3-2 +- Another less-intrusive approach to crypto policy (#1479271) + +* Tue Aug 01 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-4 + 0.10.3-2 +- Remove SSH-1 subpackage for Fedora 27 (#1474942) +- Follow system-wide crypto policy in server (#1479271) + +* Thu Jul 27 2017 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.5p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jun 30 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-2 + 0.10.3-2 +- Sync downstream patches with RHEL (FIPS) +- Resolve potential issues with OpenSSL 1.1.0 patch + +* Wed Mar 22 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-2 + 0.10.3-2 +- Fix various after-release typos including failed build in s390x (#1434341) +- Revert chroot magic with SELinux + +* Mon Mar 20 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.5p1-1 + 0.10.3-2 +- New upstream release + +* Fri Mar 03 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.4p1-4 + 0.10.3-1 +- Avoid sending the SD_NOTIFY messages from wrong processes (#1427526) +- Address reports by coverity + +* Mon Feb 20 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.4p1-3 + 0.10.3-1 +- Properly report errors from included files (#1408558) +- New pam_ssh_agent_auth 0.10.3 release +- Switch to SD_NOTIFY to make systemd happy + +* Mon Feb 06 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.4p1-2 + 0.10.2-5 +- Fix ssh-agent cert signing error (#1416584) +- Fix wrong path to crypto policies +- Attempt to resolve issue with systemd + +* Tue Jan 03 2017 Jakub Jelen - 7.4p1-1 + 0.10.2-5 +- New upstream release (#1406204) +- Cache supported OIDs for GSSAPI key exchange (#1395288) +- Fix typo causing heap corruption (use-after-free) (#1409433) +- Prevent hangs with long MOTD + +* Thu Dec 08 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-7 + 0.10.2-4 +- Properly deserialize received RSA certificates in ssh-agent (#1402029) +- Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option + +* Wed Nov 16 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-6 + 0.10.2-4 +- GSSAPI requires futex syscall in privsep child (#1395288) + +* Thu Oct 27 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-5 + 0.10.2-4 +- Build against OpenSSL 1.1.0 with compat changes +- Recommend crypto-policies +- Fix chroot dropping capabilities (#1386755) + +* Thu Sep 29 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-4 + 0.10.2-4 +- Fix NULL dereference (#1380297) +- Include client Crypto Policy (#1225752) + +* Mon Aug 15 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-3 + 0.10.2-4 +- Proper content of included configuration file + +* Tue Aug 09 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-2 + 0.10.2-4 +- Fix permissions on the include directory (#1365270) + +* Tue Aug 02 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.3p1-1 + 0.10.2-4 +- New upstream release (#1362156) + +* Tue Jul 26 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-11 + 0.10.2-3 +- Remove slogin and sshd-keygen (#1359762) +- Prevent guest_t from running sudo (#1357860) + +* Mon Jul 18 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-10 + 0.10.2-3 +- CVE-2016-6210: User enumeration via covert timing channel (#1357443) +- Expose more information about authentication to PAM +- Make closefrom() ignore softlinks to the /dev/ devices on s390 + +* Fri Jul 01 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-9 + 0.10.2-3 +- Fix wrong detection of UseLogin in server configuration (#1350347) + +* Fri Jun 24 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-8 + 0.10.2-3 +- Enable seccomp filter for MIPS architectures +- UseLogin=yes is not supported in Fedora +- SFTP server forced permissions should restore umask +- pam_ssh_agent_auth: Fix conflict bewteen two getpwuid() calls (#1349551) + +* Mon Jun 06 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-7 +- Fix regression in certificate-based authentication (#1333498) +- Check for real location of .k5login file (#1328243) +- Fix unchecked dereference in pam_ssh_agent_auth +- Clean up old patches +- Build with seccomp filter on ppc64(le) (#1195065) + +* Fri Apr 29 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-6 + 0.10.2-3 +- Add legacy sshd-keygen for anaconda (#1331077) + +* Fri Apr 22 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-5 + 0.10.2-3 +- CVE-2015-8325: ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes (#1328013) +- Fix typo in sysconfig/sshd (#1325535) + +* Fri Apr 15 2016 Jakub Jelen - 7.2p2-4 + 0.10.2-3 +- Revise socket activation and services dependencies (#1325535) +- Drop unused init script + +* Wed Apr 13 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.2p2-3 + 0.10.2-3 +- Make sshd-keygen comply with packaging guidelines (#1325535) +- Soft-deny socket() syscall in seccomp sandbox (#1324493) +- Remove *sha1 Kex in FIPS mode (#1324493) +- Remove *gcm ciphers in FIPS mode (#1324493) + +* Wed Apr 06 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.2p2-2 + 0.10.2-3 +- Fix GSSAPI Key Exchange according to RFC (#1323622) +- Remove init.d/functions dependency from sshd-keygen (#1317722) +- Do not use MD5 in pam_ssh_agent_auth in FIPS mode + +* Thu Mar 10 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.2p2-1 + 0.10.2-3 +- New upstream (security) release (#1316529) +- Clean up audit patch + +* Thu Mar 03 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.2p1-2 + 0.10.2-2 +- Restore slogin symlinks to preserve backward compatibility + +* Mon Feb 29 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.2p1-1 + 0.10.2-2 +- New upstream release (#1312870) + +* Wed Feb 24 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.1p2-4.1 + 0.10.2-1 +- Fix race condition in auditing events when using multiplexing (#1308295) +- Fix X11 forwarding CVE according to upstream +- Fix problem when running without privsep (#1303910) +- Remove hard glob limit in SFTP + +* Thu Feb 04 2016 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.1p2-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_24_Mass_Rebuild + +* Sat Jan 30 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.1p2-3 + 0.10.2-1 +- Fix segfaults with pam_ssh_agent_auth (#1303036) +- Silently disable X11 forwarding on problems +- Systemd service should be forking to detect immediate failures + +* Mon Jan 25 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.1p2-2 + 0.10.2-1 +- Rebased to recent version of pam_ssh_agent_auth +- Upstream fix for CVE-2016-1908 +- Remove useless defattr + +* Thu Jan 14 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.1p2-1 + 0.9.2-9 +- New security upstream release for CVE-2016-0777 + +* Tue Jan 12 2016 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-7 + 0.9.2-8 +- Change RPM define macros to global according to packaging guidelines +- Fix wrong handling of SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY environment variable +- Update ssh-agent and ssh-keysign permissions (#1296724) +- Fix few problems with alternative builds without GSSAPI or openSSL +- Fix condition to run sshd-keygen + +* Fri Dec 18 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-6 + 0.9.2-8 +- Preserve IUTF8 tty mode flag over ssh connections (#1270248) +- Do not require sysconfig file to start service (#1279521) +- Update ssh-copy-id to upstream version +- GSSAPI Key Exchange documentation improvements +- Remove unused patches + +* Wed Nov 04 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-5 + 0.9.2-8 +- Do not set user context too many times for root logins (#1269072) + +* Thu Oct 22 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-4 + 0.9.2-8 +- Review SELinux user context handling after authentication (#1269072) +- Handle root logins the same way as other users (#1269072) +- Audit implicit mac, if mac is covered in cipher (#1271694) +- Increase size limit for remote glob over sftp + +* Fri Sep 25 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-3 + 0.9.2-8 +- Fix FIPS mode for DH kex (#1260253) +- Provide full RELRO and PIE form askpass helper (#1264036) +- Fix gssapi key exchange on server and client (#1261414) +- Allow gss-keyex root login when without-password is set (upstream #2456) +- Fix obsolete usage of SELinux constants (#1261496) + +* Wed Sep 09 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-2 + 0.9.2-8 +- Fix warnings reported by gcc related to keysign and keyAlgorithms + +* Sat Aug 22 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.1p1-1 + 0.9.2-8 +- New upstream release + +* Wed Aug 19 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.0p1-2 + 0.9.3-7 +- Fix problem with DSA keys using pam_ssh_agent_auth (#1251777) +- Add GSSAPIKexAlgorithms option for server and client application +- Possibility to validate legacy systems by more fingerprints (#1249626) + +* Wed Aug 12 2015 Jakub Jelen 7.0p1-1 + 0.9.3-7 +- New upstream release (#1252639) +- Fix pam_ssh_agent_auth package (#1251777) +- Security: Use-after-free bug related to PAM support (#1252853) +- Security: Privilege separation weakness related to PAM support (#1252854) +- Security: Incorrectly set TTYs to be world-writable (#1252862) + +* Tue Jul 28 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.9p1-4 + 0.9.3-6 +- Handle terminal control characters in scp progressmeter (#1247204) + +* Thu Jul 23 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.9p1-3 + 0.9.3-6 +- CVE-2015-5600: only query each keyboard-interactive device once (#1245971) + +* Wed Jul 15 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.9p1-2 + 0.9.3-6 +- Enable SECCOMP filter for s390* architecture (#1195065) +- Fix race condition when multiplexing connection (#1242682) + +* Wed Jul 01 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.9p1-1 + 0.9.3-6 +- New upstream release (#1238253) +- Increase limitation number of files which can be listed using glob in sftp +- Correctly revert "PermitRootLogin no" option from upstream sources (#89216) + +* Wed Jun 24 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-9 + 0.9.3-5 +- Allow socketcall(SYS_SHUTDOWN) for net_child on ix86 architecture + +* Thu Jun 18 2015 Fedora Release Engineering - 6.8p1-8.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Jun 08 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-8 + 0.9.3-5 +- Return stat syscall to seccomp filter (#1228323) + +* Wed Jun 03 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-7 + 0.9.3-5 +- Handle pam_ssh_agent_auth memory, buffers and variable sizes (#1225106) + +* Thu May 28 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-6 + 0.9.3-5 +- Resolve problem with pam_ssh_agent_auth after rebase (#1225106) +- ssh-copy-id: tcsh doesnt work with multiline strings +- Fix upstream memory problems +- Add missing options in testmode output and manual pages +- Provide LDIF version of LPK schema +- Document required selinux boolean for working ssh-ldap-helper + +* Mon Apr 20 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-5 + 0.9.3-5 +- Fix segfault on daemon exit caused by API change (#1213423) + +* Thu Apr 02 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-4 + 0.9.3-5 +- Fix audit_end_command to restore ControlPersist function (#1203900) + +* Tue Mar 31 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-3 + 0.9.3-5 +- Fixed issue with GSSAPI key exchange (#1207719) +- Add pam_namespace to sshd pam stack (based on #1125110) +- Remove krb5-config workaround for #1203900 +- Fix handling SELinux context in MLS systems +- Regression: solve sshd segfaults if other instance already running + +* Thu Mar 26 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-2 + 0.9.3-5 +- Update audit and gss patches after rebase +- Fix reintroduced upstrem bug #1878 + +* Tue Mar 24 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.8p1-1 + 0.9.3-5 +- new upstream release openssh-6.8p1 (#1203245) +- Resolve segfault with auditing commands (#1203900) +- Workaround krb5-config bug (#1204646) + +* Thu Mar 12 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-11 + 0.9.3-4 +- Ability to specify LDAP filter in ldap.conf for ssh-ldap-helper +- Fix auditing when using combination of ForceCommand and PTY +- Add sftp option to force mode of created files (from rhel) +- Fix tmpfiles.d entries to be more consistent (#1196807) + +* Mon Mar 02 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-10 + 0.9.3-4 +- Add tmpfiles.d entries (#1196807) + +* Fri Feb 27 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-9 + 0.9.3-4 +- Adjust seccomp filter for primary architectures and solve aarch64 issue (#1197051) +- Solve issue with ssh-copy-id and keys without trailing newline (#1093168) + +* Tue Feb 24 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-8 + 0.9.3-4 +- Add AArch64 support for seccomp_filter sandbox (#1195065) + +* Mon Feb 23 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-7 + 0.9.3-4 +- Fix seccomp filter on architectures without getuid32 + +* Mon Feb 23 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-6 + 0.9.3-4 +- Update seccomp filter to work on i686 architectures (#1194401) +- Fix previous failing build (#1195065) + +* Sun Feb 22 2015 Peter Robinson 6.7p1-5 + 0.9.3-4 +- Only use seccomp for sandboxing on supported platforms + +* Fri Feb 20 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-4 + 0.9.3-4 +- Move cavs tests into subpackage -cavs (#1194320) + +* Wed Feb 18 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-3 + 0.9.3-4 +- update coverity patch +- make output of sshd -T more consistent (#1187521) +- enable seccomp for sandboxing instead of rlimit (#1062953) +- update hardening to compile on gcc5 +- Add SSH KDF CAVS test driver (#1193045) +- Fix ssh-copy-id on non-sh remote shells (#1045191) + +* Tue Jan 27 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.7p1-2 + 0.9.3-4 +- fixed audit patch after rebase + +* Tue Jan 20 2015 Petr Lautrbach 6.7p1-1 + 0.9.3-4 +- new upstream release openssh-6.7p1 + +* Thu Jan 15 2015 Jakub Jelen 6.6.1p1-11.1 + 0.9.3-3 +- error message if scp when directory doesn't exist (#1142223) +- parsing configuration file values (#1130733) +- documentation in service and socket files for systemd (#1181593) +- updated ldap patch (#981058) +- fixed vendor-patchlevel +- add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default CVE-2014-9278 (#1170745) + +* Fri Dec 19 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-10 + 0.9.3-3 +- log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log + +* Wed Dec 03 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-9 + 0.9.3-3 +- the .local domain example should be in ssh_config, not in sshd_config +- use different values for DH for Cisco servers (#1026430) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-8 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix gsskex patch to correctly handle MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN request (#1118005) + +* Fri Nov 07 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-7 + 0.9.3-3 +- correct the calculation of bytes for authctxt->krb5_ccname (#1161073) + +* Tue Nov 04 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-6 + 0.9.3-3 +- privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580) +- change audit trail for unknown users (mindrot#2245) +- fix kuserok patch which checked for the existence of .k5login + unconditionally and hence prevented other mechanisms to be used properly +- revert the default of KerberosUseKuserok back to yes (#1153076) +- ignore SIGXFSZ in postauth monitor (mindrot#2263) +- sshd-keygen - don't generate DSA and ED25519 host keys in FIPS mode + +* Mon Sep 08 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-5 + 0.9.3-3 +- set a client's address right after a connection is set (mindrot#2257) +- apply RFC3454 stringprep to banners when possible (mindrot#2058) +- don't consider a partial success as a failure (mindrot#2270) + +* Sun Aug 17 2014 Fedora Release Engineering - 6.6.1p1-4.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jul 18 2014 Tom Callaway 6.6.1p1-4 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix license handling (both) + +* Fri Jul 18 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-3 + 0.9.3-2 +- standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths (#1051490) + +* Mon Jul 14 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-2 + 0.9.3-2 +- add pam_reauthorize.so to sshd.pam (#1115977) +- spec file and patches clenup + +* Sat Jun 07 2014 Fedora Release Engineering - 6.6.1p1-1.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Jun 03 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6.1p1-1 + 0.9.3-2 +- disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6 +- add support for ED25519 keys to sshd-keygen and sshd.sysconfig +- drop openssh-server-sysvinit subpackage +- slightly change systemd units logic - use sshd-keygen.service (#1066615) + +* Tue Jun 03 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.6p1-1 + 0.9.3-2 +- new upstream release openssh-6.6p1 + +* Thu May 15 2014 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-4 + 0.9.3-1 +- use SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY variable to run ssh-copy-id in the legacy mode +- make /etc/ssh/moduli file public (#1043661) +- test existence of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key in sshd-keygen.service +- don't clean up gssapi credentials by default (#1055016) +- ssh-agent - try CLOCK_BOOTTIME with fallback (#1091992) +- prevent a server from skipping SSHFP lookup - CVE-2014-2653 (#1081338) +- ignore environment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters - CVE-2014-2532 + (#1077843) + +* Wed Dec 11 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-3 + 0.9.3-1 +- sshd-keygen - use correct permissions on ecdsa host key (#1023945) +- use only rsa and ecdsa host keys by default + +* Tue Nov 26 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-2 + 0.9.3-1 +- fix fatal() cleanup in the audit patch (#1029074) +- fix parsing logic of ldap.conf file (#1033662) + +* Fri Nov 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.4p1-1 + 0.9.3-1 +- new upstream release + +* Fri Nov 01 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-5 + 0.9.3-7 +- adjust gss kex mechanism to the upstream changes (#1024004) +- don't use xfree in pam_ssh_agent_auth sources (#1024965) + +* Fri Oct 25 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-4 + 0.9.3-6 +- rebuild with the openssl with the ECC support + +* Thu Oct 24 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-3 + 0.9.3-6 +- don't use SSH_FP_MD5 for fingerprints in FIPS mode + +* Wed Oct 23 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-2 + 0.9.3-6 +- use default_ccache_name from /etc/krb5.conf for a kerberos cache (#991186) +- increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups (#1010607) +- sshd-keygen to generate ECDSA keys (#1019222) + +* Tue Oct 15 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.3p1-1.1 + 0.9.3-6 +- new upstream release (#1007769) + +* Tue Oct 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-9 + 0.9.3-5 +- use dracut-fips package to determine if a FIPS module is installed +- revert -fips subpackages and hmac files suffixes + +* Wed Sep 25 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-8 + 0.9.3-5 +- sshd-keygen: generate only RSA keys by default (#1010092) +- use dist tag in suffixes for hmac checksum files + +* Wed Sep 11 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-7 + 0.9.3-5 +- use hmac_suffix for ssh{,d} hmac checksums +- bump the minimum value of SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG to 14 according to SP800-131A +- automatically restart sshd.service on-failure after 42s interval + +* Thu Aug 29 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-6.1 + 0.9.3-5 +- add -fips subpackages that contains the FIPS module files + +* Wed Jul 31 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-5 + 0.9.3-5 +- gssapi credentials need to be stored before a pam session opened (#987792) + +* Tue Jul 23 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-4 + 0.9.3-5 +- don't show Success for EAI_SYSTEM (#985964) +- make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware (#841771) + +* Mon Jun 17 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-3 + 0.9.3-5 +- move default gssapi cache to /run/user/ (#848228) + +* Tue May 21 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-2 + 0.9.3-5 +- add socket activated sshd units to the package (#963268) +- fix the example in the HOWTO.ldap-keys + +* Mon May 20 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p2-1 + 0.9.3-5 +- new upstream release (#963582) + +* Wed Apr 17 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-4 + 0.9.3-4 +- don't use export in sysconfig file (#953111) + +* Tue Apr 16 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-3 + 0.9.3-4 +- sshd.service: use KillMode=process (#890376) +- add latest config.{sub,guess} to support aarch64 (#926284) + +* Tue Apr 09 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-2 + 0.9.3-4 +- keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and + which were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. + (mindrot#2084) + +* Tue Apr 09 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.2p1-1 + 0.9.3-4 +- new upstream release (#924727) + +* Wed Mar 06 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-7 + 0.9.3-3 +- use SELinux type sshd_net_t for [net] childs (#915085) + +* Thu Feb 14 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-6 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix AuthorizedKeysCommand option + +* Fri Feb 08 2013 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-5 + 0.9.3-3 +- change default value of MaxStartups - CVE-2010-5107 (#908707) + +* Mon Dec 03 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-4 + 0.9.3-3 +- fix segfault in openssh-5.8p2-force_krb.patch (#882541) + +* Mon Dec 03 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-3 + 0.9.3-3 +- replace RequiredAuthentications2 with AuthenticationMethods based on upstream +- obsolete RequiredAuthentications[12] options +- fix openssh-6.1p1-privsep-selinux.patch + +* Fri Oct 26 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-2 +- add SELinux comment to /etc/ssh/sshd_config about SELinux command to modify port (#861400) +- drop required chkconfig (#865498) +- drop openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch (#830237) + +* Sat Sep 15 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.1p1-1 + 0.9.3-3 +- new upstream release (#852651) +- use DIR: kerberos type cache (#848228) +- don't use chroot_user_t for chrooted users (#830237) +- replace scriptlets with systemd macros (#850249) +- don't use /bin and /sbin paths (#856590) + +* Mon Aug 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 6.0p1-1 + 0.9.3-2 +- new upstream release + +* Mon Aug 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-26 + 0.9.3-1 +- change SELinux context also for root user (#827109) + +* Fri Jul 27 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-25 + 0.9.3-1 +- fix various issues in openssh-5.9p1-required-authentications.patch + +* Tue Jul 17 2012 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-24 + 0.9.3-1 +- allow sha256 and sha512 hmacs in the FIPS mode + +* Fri Jun 22 2012 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-23 + 0.9.3-1 +- fix segfault in su when pam_ssh_agent_auth is used and the ssh-agent + is not running, most probably not exploitable +- update pam_ssh_agent_auth to 0.9.3 upstream version + +* Fri Apr 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-22 + 0.9.2-32 +- don't create RSA1 key in FIPS mode +- don't install sshd-keygen.service (#810419) + +* Fri Mar 30 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-21 + 0.9.2-32 +- fix various issues in openssh-5.9p1-required-authentications.patch + +* Wed Mar 21 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-20 + 0.9.2-32 +- Fix dependencies in systemd units, don't enable sshd-keygen.service (#805338) + +* Wed Feb 22 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-19 + 0.9.2-32 +- Look for x11 forward sockets with AI_ADDRCONFIG flag getaddrinfo (#735889) + +* Mon Feb 06 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-18 + 0.9.2-32 +- replace TwoFactorAuth with RequiredAuthentications[12] + https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=983 + +* Tue Jan 31 2012 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-17 + 0.9.2-32 +- run privsep slave process as the users SELinux context (#781634) + +* Tue Dec 13 2011 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-16 + 0.9.2-32 +- add CAVS test driver for the aes-ctr ciphers + +* Sun Dec 11 2011 Tomas Mraz 5.9p1-15 + 0.9.2-32 +- enable aes-ctr ciphers use the EVP engines from OpenSSL such as the AES-NI + +* Tue Dec 06 2011 Petr Lautrbach 5.9p1-14 + 0.9.2-32 +- warn about unsupported option UsePAM=no (#757545) + +* Mon Nov 21 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-13 + 0.9.2-32 +- add back the restorecon call to ssh-copy-id - it might be needed on older + distributions (#739989) + +* Fri Nov 18 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-12 + 0.9.2-32 +- still support /etc/sysconfig/sshd loading in sshd service (#754732) +- fix incorrect key permissions generated by sshd-keygen script (#754779) + +* Fri Oct 14 2011 Tomas Mraz - 5.9p1-11 + 0.9.2-32 +- remove unnecessary requires on initscripts +- set VerifyHostKeyDNS to ask in the default configuration (#739856) + +* Mon Sep 19 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-10 + 0.9.2-32 +- selinux sandbox rewrite +- two factor authentication tweaking + +* Wed Sep 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-9 + 0.9.2-32 +- coverity upgrade +- wipe off nonfunctional nss +- selinux sandbox tweaking + +* Tue Sep 13 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-8 + 0.9.2-32 +- coverity upgrade +- experimental selinux sandbox + +* Tue Sep 13 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-7 + 0.9.2-32 +- fully reanable auditing + +* Mon Sep 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-6 + 0.9.2-32 +- repair signedness in akc patch + +* Mon Sep 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-5 + 0.9.2-32 +- temporarily disable part of audit4 patch + +* Fri Sep 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-3 + 0.9.2-32 +- Coverity second pass +- Reenable akc patch + +* Thu Sep 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-2 + 0.9.2-32 +- Coverity first pass + +* Wed Sep 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.9p1-1 + 0.9.2-32 +- Rebase to 5.9p1 +- Add chroot sftp patch +- Add two factor auth patch + +* Tue Aug 23 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-21 + 0.9.2-31 +- ignore SIGPIPE in ssh keyscan + +* Tue Aug 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-20 + 0.9.2-31 +- save ssh-askpass's debuginfo + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-19 + 0.9.2-31 +- compile ssh-askpass with corect CFLAGS + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-18 + 0.9.2-31 +- improve selinux's change context log + +* Mon Aug 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-17 + 0.9.2-31 +- repair broken man pages + +* Mon Jul 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-16 + 0.9.2-31 +- rebuild due to broken rpmbiild + +* Thu Jul 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-15 + 0.9.2-31 +- Do not change context when run under unconfined_t + +* Thu Jul 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-14 + 0.9.2-31 +- Add postlogin to pam. (#718807) + +* Tue Jun 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-12 + 0.9.2-31 +- Systemd compatibility according to Mathieu Bridon +- Split out the host keygen into their own command, to ease future migration + to systemd. Compatitbility with the init script was kept. +- Migrate the package to full native systemd unit files, according to the Fedora + packaging guidelines. +- Prepate the unit files for running an ondemand server. (do not add it actually) + +* Tue Jun 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-10 + 0.9.2-31 +- Mention IPv6 usage in man pages + +* Mon Jun 20 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-9 + 0.9.2-31 +- Improve init script + +* Thu Jun 16 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-7 + 0.9.2-31 +- Add possibility to compile openssh without downstream patches + +* Thu Jun 9 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-6 + 0.9.2-31 +- remove stale control sockets (#706396) + +* Tue May 31 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-5 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove entropy manuals + +* Fri May 27 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-4 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove entropy handling +- concat ldap patches + +* Tue May 24 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-3 + 0.9.2-31 +- improove ldap manuals + +* Mon May 23 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-2 + 0.9.2-31 +- add gssapi forced command + +* Tue May 3 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p2-1 + 0.9.2-31 +- update the openssh version + +* Thu Apr 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-34 + 0.9.2-30 +- temporarily disabling systemd units + +* Wed Apr 27 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-33 + 0.9.2-30 +- add flags AI_V4MAPPED and AI_ADDRCONFIG to getaddrinfo + +* Tue Apr 26 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-32 + 0.9.2-30 +- update scriptlets + +* Fri Apr 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-30 + 0.9.2-30 +- add systemd units + +* Fri Apr 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-28 + 0.9.2-30 +- improving sshd -> passwd transation +- add template for .local domain to sshd_config + +* Thu Apr 21 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-27 + 0.9.2-30 +- the private keys may be 640 root:ssh_keys ssh_keysign is sgid + +* Wed Apr 20 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-26 + 0.9.2-30 +- improving sshd -> passwd transation + +* Tue Apr 5 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-25 + 0.9.2-30 +- the intermediate context is set to sshd_sftpd_t +- do not crash in packet.c if no connection + +* Thu Mar 31 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-24 + 0.9.2-30 +- resolve warnings in port_linux.c + +* Tue Mar 29 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-23 + 0.9.2-30 +- add /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +* Mon Mar 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-22 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve reseeding and seed source (documentation) + +* Tue Mar 22 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-20 + 0.9.2-30 +- use /dev/random or /dev/urandom for seeding prng +- improve periodical reseeding of random generator + +* Thu Mar 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-18 + 0.9.2-30 +- add periodical reseeding of random generator +- change selinux contex for internal sftp in do_usercontext +- exit(0) after sigterm + +* Thu Mar 10 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-17 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssh-ldap (documentation) + +* Tue Mar 8 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-16 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve session keys audit + +* Mon Mar 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-15 + 0.9.2-30 +- CVE-2010-4755 + +* Fri Mar 4 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-14 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssh-keycat (documentation) + +* Thu Mar 3 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-13 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of logins and auths + +* Tue Mar 1 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-12 + 0.9.2-30 +- improove ssk-keycat + +* Mon Feb 28 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-11 + 0.9.2-30 +- add ssk-keycat + +* Fri Feb 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-10 + 0.9.2-30 +- reenable auth-keys ldap backend + +* Fri Feb 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-9 + 0.9.2-30 +- another audit improovements + +* Thu Feb 24 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-8 + 0.9.2-30 +- another audit improovements +- switchable fingerprint mode + +* Thu Feb 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-4 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of server key management + +* Wed Feb 16 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-3 + 0.9.2-30 +- improve audit of logins and auths + +* Mon Feb 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.8p1-1 + 0.9.2-30 +- bump openssh version to 5.8p1 + +* Tue Feb 08 2011 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.6p1-30.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Feb 7 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-30 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures in the non privileged process +- clean the data structures when roaming + +* Wed Feb 2 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-28 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures in the privileged process + +* Tue Jan 25 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-25 + 0.9.2-29 +- clean the data structures before exit net process + +* Mon Jan 17 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-24 + 0.9.2-29 +- make audit compatible with the fips mode + +* Fri Jan 14 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-23 + 0.9.2-29 +- add audit of destruction the server keys + +* Wed Jan 12 2011 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-22 + 0.9.2-29 +- add audit of destruction the session keys + +* Fri Dec 10 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-21 + 0.9.2-29 +- reenable run sshd as non root user +- renable rekeying + +* Wed Nov 24 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-20 + 0.9.2-29 +- reapair clientloop crash (#627332) +- properly restore euid in case connect to the ssh-agent socket fails + +* Mon Nov 22 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-19 + 0.9.2-28 +- striped read permissions from suid and sgid binaries + +* Mon Nov 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-18 + 0.9.2-27 +- used upstream version of the biguid patch + +* Mon Nov 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-17 + 0.9.2-27 +- improoved kuserok patch + +* Fri Nov 5 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-16 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the host based key ussage +- repait X11 abstract layer socket (#648896) + +* Wed Nov 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-15 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the kex result + +* Tue Nov 2 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-14 + 0.9.2-27 +- add auditing the key ussage + +* Wed Oct 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-12 + 0.9.2-27 +- update gsskex patch (#645389) + +* Wed Oct 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-11 + 0.9.2-27 +- rebase linux audit according to upstream + +* Fri Oct 1 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-10 + 0.9.2-27 +- add missing headers to linux audit + +* Wed Sep 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-9 + 0.9.2-27 +- audit module now uses openssh audit framevork + +* Wed Sep 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-8 + 0.9.2-27 +- Add the GSSAPI kuserok switch to the kuserok patch + +* Wed Sep 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-7 + 0.9.2-27 +- Repaired the kuserok patch + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-6 + 0.9.2-27 +- Repaired the problem with puting entries with very big uid into lastlog + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-5 + 0.9.2-27 +- Merging selabel patch with the upstream version. (#632914) + +* Mon Sep 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-4 + 0.9.2-27 +- Tweaking selabel patch to work properly without selinux rules loaded. (#632914) + +* Wed Sep 8 2010 Tomas Mraz - 5.6p1-3 + 0.9.2-27 +- Make fipscheck hmacs compliant with FHS - requires new fipscheck + +* Fri Sep 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-2 + 0.9.2-27 +- Added -z relro -z now to LDFLAGS + +* Fri Sep 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.6p1-1 + 0.9.2-27 +- Rebased to openssh5.6p1 + +* Wed Jul 7 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-18 + 0.9.2-26 +- merged with newer bugzilla's version of authorized keys command patch + +* Wed Jun 30 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-17 + 0.9.2-26 +- improved the x11 patch according to upstream (#598671) + +* Fri Jun 25 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-16 + 0.9.2-26 +- improved the x11 patch (#598671) + +* Thu Jun 24 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-15 + 0.9.2-26 +- changed _PATH_UNIX_X to unexistent file name (#598671) + +* Wed Jun 23 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-14 + 0.9.2-26 +- sftp works in deviceless chroot again (broken from 5.5p1-3) + +* Tue Jun 8 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-13 + 0.9.2-26 +- add option to switch out krb5_kuserok + +* Fri May 21 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-12 + 0.9.2-26 +- synchronize uid and gid for the user sshd + +* Thu May 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-11 + 0.9.2-26 +- Typo in ssh-ldap.conf(5) and ssh-ladap-helper(8) + +* Fri May 14 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-10 + 0.9.2-26 +- Repair the reference in man ssh-ldap-helper(8) +- Repair the PubkeyAgent section in sshd_config(5) +- Provide example ldap.conf + +* Thu May 13 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-9 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make the Ldap configuration widely compatible +- create the aditional docs for LDAP support. + +* Thu May 6 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-8 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make LDAP config elements TLS_CACERT and TLS_REQCERT compatiple with pam_ldap (#589360) + +* Thu May 6 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-7 + 0.9.2-26 +- Make LDAP config element tls_checkpeer compatiple with nss_ldap (#589360) + +* Tue May 4 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-6 + 0.9.2-26 +- Comment spec.file +- Sync patches from upstream + +* Mon May 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-5 + 0.9.2-26 +- Create separate ldap package +- Tweak the ldap patch +- Rename stderr patch properly + +* Thu Apr 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-4 + 0.9.2-26 +- Added LDAP support + +* Mon Apr 26 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-3 + 0.9.2-26 +- Ignore .bashrc output to stderr in the subsystems + +* Tue Apr 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-2 + 0.9.2-26 +- Drop dependency on man + +* Fri Apr 16 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.5p1-1 + 0.9.2-26 +- Update to 5.5p1 + +* Fri Mar 12 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-3 + 0.9.2-25 +- repair configure script of pam_ssh_agent +- repair error mesage in ssh-keygen + +* Fri Mar 12 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-2 +- source krb5-devel profile script only if exists + +* Tue Mar 9 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-1 +- Update to 5.4p1 +- discontinued support for nss-keys +- discontinued support for scard + +* Wed Mar 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-0.snap20100302.1 +- Prepare update to 5.4p1 + +* Mon Feb 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-22 +- ImplicitDSOLinking (#564824) + +* Fri Jan 29 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-21 +- Allow to use hardware crypto if awailable (#559555) + +* Mon Jan 25 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-20 +- optimized FD_CLOEXEC on accept socket (#541809) + +* Mon Jan 25 2010 Tomas Mraz - 5.3p1-19 +- updated pam_ssh_agent_auth to new version from upstream (just + a licence change) + +* Thu Jan 21 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-18 +- optimized RAND_cleanup patch (#557166) + +* Wed Jan 20 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-17 +- add RAND_cleanup at the exit of each program using RAND (#557166) + +* Tue Jan 19 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-16 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on accepted socket (#541809) + +* Fri Jan 8 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-15 +- replaced define by global in macros + +* Tue Jan 5 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-14 +- Update the pka patch + +* Mon Dec 21 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-13 +- Update the audit patch + +* Fri Dec 4 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-12 +- Add possibility to autocreate only RSA key into initscript (#533339) + +* Fri Nov 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-11 +- Prepare NSS key patch for future SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD (#537411) + +* Tue Nov 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-10 +- Update NSS key patch (#537411, #356451) + +* Fri Nov 20 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-9 +- Add gssapi key exchange patch (#455351) + +* Fri Nov 20 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-8 +- Add public key agent patch (#455350) + +* Mon Nov 2 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-7 +- Repair canohost patch to allow gssapi to work when host is acessed via pipe proxy (#531849) + +* Thu Oct 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-6 +- Modify the init script to prevent it to hang during generating the keys (#515145) + +* Tue Oct 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-5 +- Add README.nss + +* Mon Oct 19 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.3p1-4 +- Add pam_ssh_agent_auth module to a subpackage. + +* Fri Oct 16 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-3 +- Reenable audit. + +* Fri Oct 2 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-2 +- Upgrade to new wersion 5.3p1 + +* Tue Sep 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-29 +- Resolve locking in ssh-add (#491312) + +* Thu Sep 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-28 +- Repair initscript to be acord to guidelines (#521860) +- Add bugzilla# to application of edns and xmodifiers patch + +* Wed Sep 16 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-26 +- Changed pam stack to password-auth + +* Fri Sep 11 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-25 +- Dropped homechroot patch + +* Mon Sep 7 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-24 +- Add check for nosuid, nodev in homechroot + +* Tue Sep 1 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-23 +- add correct patch for ip-opts + +* Tue Sep 1 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-22 +- replace ip-opts patch by an upstream candidate version + +* Mon Aug 31 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-21 +- rearange selinux patch to be acceptable for upstream +- replace seftp patch by an upstream version + +* Fri Aug 28 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-20 +- merged xmodifiers to redhat patch +- merged gssapi-role to selinux patch +- merged cve-2007_3102 to audit patch +- sesftp patch only with WITH_SELINUX flag +- rearange sesftp patch according to upstream request + +* Wed Aug 26 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-19 +- minor change in sesftp patch + +* Fri Aug 21 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-18 +- rebuilt with new openssl + +* Thu Jul 30 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-17 +- Added dnssec support. (#205842) + +* Sat Jul 25 2009 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.2p1-16 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_12_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jul 24 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-15 +- only INTERNAL_SFTP can be home-chrooted +- save _u and _r parts of context changing to sftpd_t + +* Fri Jul 17 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-14 +- changed internal-sftp context to sftpd_t + +* Fri Jul 3 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-13 +- changed home length path patch to upstream version + +* Tue Jun 30 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-12 +- create '~/.ssh/known_hosts' within proper context + +* Mon Jun 29 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-11 +- length of home path in ssh now limited by PATH_MAX +- correct timezone with daylight processing + +* Sat Jun 27 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-10 +- final version chroot %%h (sftp only) + +* Tue Jun 23 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-9 +- repair broken ls in chroot %%h + +* Fri Jun 12 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-8 +- add XMODIFIERS to exported environment (#495690) + +* Fri May 15 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-6 +- allow only protocol 2 in the FIPS mode + +* Thu Apr 30 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-5 +- do integrity verification only on binaries which are part + of the OpenSSH FIPS modules + +* Mon Apr 20 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-4 +- log if FIPS mode is initialized +- make aes-ctr cipher modes work in the FIPS mode + +* Fri Apr 3 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-3 +- fix logging after chroot +- enable non root users to use chroot %%h in internal-sftp + +* Fri Mar 13 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.2p1-2 +- add AES-CTR ciphers to the FIPS mode proposal + +* Mon Mar 9 2009 Jan F. Chadima - 5.2p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream release + +* Thu Feb 26 2009 Fedora Release Engineering - 5.1p1-8 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_11_Mass_Rebuild + +* Thu Feb 12 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-7 +- drop obsolete triggers +- add testing FIPS mode support +- LSBize the initscript (#247014) + +* Fri Jan 30 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-6 +- enable use of ssl engines (#481100) + +* Thu Jan 15 2009 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-5 +- remove obsolete --with-rsh (#478298) +- add pam_sepermit to allow blocking confined users in permissive mode + (#471746) +- move system-auth after pam_selinux in the session stack + +* Thu Dec 11 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-4 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on channel sockets (#475866) +- adjust summary +- adjust nss-keys patch so it is applicable without selinux patches (#470859) + +* Fri Oct 17 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-3 +- fix compatibility with some servers (#466818) + +* Thu Jul 31 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-2 +- fixed zero length banner problem (#457326) + +* Wed Jul 23 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.1p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream release +- fixed a problem with public key authentication and explicitely + specified SELinux role + +* Wed May 21 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-3 +- pass the connection socket to ssh-keysign (#447680) + +* Mon May 19 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-2 +- add LANGUAGE to accepted/sent environment variables (#443231) +- use pam_selinux to obtain the user context instead of doing it itself +- unbreak server keep alive settings (patch from upstream) +- small addition to scp manpage + +* Mon Apr 7 2008 Tomas Mraz - 5.0p1-1 +- upgrade to new upstream (#441066) +- prevent initscript from killing itself on halt with upstart (#438449) +- initscript status should show that the daemon is running + only when the main daemon is still alive (#430882) + +* Thu Mar 6 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-10 +- fix race on control master and cleanup stale control socket (#436311) + patches by David Woodhouse + +* Fri Feb 29 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-9 +- set FD_CLOEXEC on client socket +- apply real fix for window size problem (#286181) from upstream +- apply fix for the spurious failed bind from upstream +- apply open handle leak in sftp fix from upstream + +* Tue Feb 12 2008 Dennis Gilmore - 4.7p1-8 +- we build for sparcv9 now and it needs -fPIE + +* Thu Jan 3 2008 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-7 +- fix gssapi auth with explicit selinux role requested (#427303) - patch + by Nalin Dahyabhai + +* Tue Dec 4 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-6 +- explicitly source krb5-devel profile script + +* Tue Dec 04 2007 Release Engineering - 4.7p1-5 +- Rebuild for openssl bump + +* Tue Nov 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-4 +- do not copy /etc/localtime into the chroot as it is not + necessary anymore (#193184) +- call setkeycreatecon when selinux context is established +- test for NULL privk when freeing key (#391871) - patch by + Pierre Ossman + +* Mon Sep 17 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-2 +- revert default window size adjustments (#286181) + +* Thu Sep 6 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.7p1-1 +- upgrade to latest upstream +- use libedit in sftp (#203009) +- fixed audit log injection problem (CVE-2007-3102) + +* Thu Aug 9 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-8 +- fix sftp client problems on write error (#247802) +- allow disabling autocreation of server keys (#235466) + +* Wed Jun 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-7 +- experimental NSS keys support +- correctly setup context when empty level requested (#234951) + +* Tue Mar 20 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-6 +- mls level check must be done with default role same as requested + +* Mon Mar 19 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-5 +- make profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* regular files (#226218) + +* Tue Feb 27 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-4 +- reject connection if requested mls range is not obtained (#229278) + +* Thu Feb 22 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-3 +- improve Buildroot +- remove duplicate /etc/ssh from files + +* Tue Jan 16 2007 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-2 +- support mls on labeled networks (#220487) +- support mls level selection on unlabeled networks +- allow / in usernames in scp (only beginning /, ./, and ../ is special) + +* Thu Dec 21 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.5p1-1 +- update to 4.5p1 (#212606) + +* Thu Nov 30 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-14 +- fix gssapi with DNS loadbalanced clusters (#216857) + +* Tue Nov 28 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-13 +- improved pam_session patch so it doesn't regress, the patch is necessary + for the pam_session_close to be called correctly as uid 0 + +* Fri Nov 10 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-12 +- CVE-2006-5794 - properly detect failed key verify in monitor (#214641) + +* Thu Nov 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-11 +- merge sshd initscript patches +- kill all ssh sessions when stop is called in halt or reboot runlevel +- remove -TERM option from killproc so we don't race on sshd restart + +* Mon Oct 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-10 +- improve gssapi-no-spnego patch (#208102) +- CVE-2006-4924 - prevent DoS on deattack detector (#207957) +- CVE-2006-5051 - don't call cleanups from signal handler (#208459) + +* Wed Aug 23 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-9 +- don't report duplicate syslog messages, use correct local time (#189158) +- don't allow spnego as gssapi mechanism (from upstream) +- fixed memleaks found by Coverity (from upstream) +- allow ip options except source routing (#202856) (patch by HP) + +* Tue Aug 8 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-8 +- drop the pam-session patch from the previous build (#201341) +- don't set IPV6_V6ONLY sock opt when listening on wildcard addr (#201594) + +* Thu Jul 20 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-7 +- dropped old ssh obsoletes +- call the pam_session_open/close from the monitor when privsep is + enabled so it is always called as root (patch by Darren Tucker) + +* Mon Jul 17 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-6 +- improve selinux patch (by Jan Kiszka) +- upstream patch for buffer append space error (#191940) +- fixed typo in configure.ac (#198986) +- added pam_keyinit to pam configuration (#198628) +- improved error message when askpass dialog cannot grab + keyboard input (#198332) +- buildrequires xauth instead of xorg-x11-xauth +- fixed a few rpmlint warnings + +* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating - 4.3p2-5.1 +- rebuild + +* Fri Apr 14 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-5 +- don't request pseudoterminal allocation if stdin is not tty (#188983) + +* Thu Mar 2 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-4 +- allow access if audit is not compiled in kernel (#183243) + +* Fri Feb 24 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-3 +- enable the subprocess in chroot to send messages to system log +- sshd should prevent login if audit call fails + +* Tue Feb 21 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-2 +- print error from scp if not remote (patch by Bjorn Augustsson #178923) + +* Mon Feb 13 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p2-1 +- new version + +* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating - 4.3p1-2.1 +- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64) + +* Mon Feb 6 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p1-2 +- fixed another place where syslog was called in signal handler +- pass locale environment variables to server, accept them there (#179851) + +* Wed Feb 1 2006 Tomas Mraz - 4.3p1-1 +- new version, dropped obsolete patches + +* Tue Dec 20 2005 Tomas Mraz - 4.2p1-10 +- hopefully make the askpass dialog less confusing (#174765) + +* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating +- rebuilt + +* Tue Nov 22 2005 Tomas Mraz - 4.2p1-9 +- drop x11-ssh-askpass from the package +- drop old build_6x ifs from spec file +- improve gnome-ssh-askpass so it doesn't reveal number of passphrase + characters to person looking at the display +- less hackish fix for the __USE_GNU problem + +* Fri Nov 18 2005 Nalin Dahyabhai - 4.2p1-8 +- work around missing gccmakedep by wrapping makedepend in a local script +- remove now-obsolete build dependency on "xauth" + +* Thu Nov 17 2005 Warren Togami - 4.2p1-7 +- xorg-x11-devel -> libXt-devel +- rebuild for new xauth location so X forwarding works +- buildreq audit-libs-devel +- buildreq automake for aclocal +- buildreq imake for xmkmf +- -D_GNU_SOURCE in flags in order to get it to build + Ugly hack to workaround openssh defining __USE_GNU which is + not allowed and causes problems according to Ulrich Drepper + fix this the correct way after FC5test1 + +* Wed Nov 9 2005 Jeremy Katz - 4.2p1-6 +- rebuild against new openssl + +* Fri Oct 28 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-5 +- put back the possibility to skip SELinux patch +- add patch for user login auditing by Steve Grubb + +* Tue Oct 18 2005 Dan Walsh 4.2p1-4 +- Change selinux patch to use get_default_context_with_rolelevel in libselinux. + +* Thu Oct 13 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-3 +- Update selinux patch to use getseuserbyname + +* Fri Oct 7 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-2 +- use include instead of pam_stack in pam config +- use fork+exec instead of system in scp - CVE-2006-0225 (#168167) +- upstream patch for displaying authentication errors + +* Tue Sep 06 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.2p1-1 +- upgrade to a new upstream version + +* Tue Aug 16 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-5 +- use x11-ssh-askpass if openssh-askpass-gnome is not installed (#165207) +- install ssh-copy-id from contrib (#88707) + +* Wed Jul 27 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-4 +- don't deadlock on exit with multiple X forwarded channels (#152432) +- don't use X11 port which can't be bound on all IP families (#163732) + +* Wed Jun 29 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-3 +- fix small regression caused by the nologin patch (#161956) +- fix race in getpeername error checking (mindrot #1054) + +* Thu Jun 9 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-2 +- use only pam_nologin for nologin testing + +* Mon Jun 6 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.1p1-1 +- upgrade to a new upstream version +- call pam_loginuid as a pam session module + +* Mon May 16 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-3 +- link libselinux only to sshd (#157678) + +* Mon Apr 4 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-2 +- fixed Local/RemoteForward in ssh_config.5 manpage +- fix fatal when Local/RemoteForward is used and scp run (#153258) +- don't leak user validity when using krb5 authentication + +* Thu Mar 24 2005 Tomas Mraz 4.0p1-1 +- upgrade to 4.0p1 +- remove obsolete groups patch + +* Wed Mar 16 2005 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Mon Feb 28 2005 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-12 +- rebuild so that configure can detect that krb5_init_ets is gone now + +* Mon Feb 21 2005 Tomas Mraz 3.9p1-11 +- don't call syslog in signal handler +- allow password authentication when copying from remote + to remote machine (#103364) + +* Wed Feb 9 2005 Tomas Mraz +- add spaces to messages in initscript (#138508) + +* Tue Feb 8 2005 Tomas Mraz 3.9p1-10 +- enable trusted forwarding by default if X11 forwarding is + required by user (#137685 and duplicates) +- disable protocol 1 support by default in sshd server config (#88329) +- keep the gnome-askpass dialog above others (#69131) + +* Fri Feb 4 2005 Tomas Mraz +- change permissions on pam.d/sshd to 0644 (#64697) +- patch initscript so it doesn't kill opened sessions if + the sshd daemon isn't running anymore (#67624) + +* Mon Jan 3 2005 Bill Nottingham 3.9p1-9 +- don't use initlog + +* Mon Nov 29 2004 Thomas Woerner 3.9p1-8.1 +- fixed PIE build for all architectures + +* Mon Oct 4 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-8 +- add a --enable-vendor-patchlevel option which allows a ShowPatchLevel option + to enable display of a vendor patch level during version exchange (#120285) +- configure with --disable-strip to build useful debuginfo subpackages + +* Mon Sep 20 2004 Bill Nottingham 3.9p1-7 +- when using gtk2 for askpass, don't buildprereq gnome-libs-devel + +* Tue Sep 14 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.9p1-6 +- build + +* Mon Sep 13 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai +- disable ACSS support + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-5 +- Change selinux patch to use get_default_context_with_role in libselinux. + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-4 +- Fix patch + * Bad debug statement. + * Handle root/sysadm_r:kerberos + +* Thu Sep 2 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-3 +- Modify Colin Walter's patch to allow specifying rule during connection + +* Tue Aug 31 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-2 +- Fix TTY handling for SELinux + +* Tue Aug 24 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.9p1-1 +- Update to upstream + +* Sun Aug 1 2004 Alan Cox 3.8.1p1-5 +- Apply buildreq fixup patch (#125296) + +* Tue Jun 15 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.8.1p1-4 +- Clean up patch for upstream submission. + +* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Wed Jun 9 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.8.1p1-2 +- Remove use of pam_selinux and patch selinux in directly. + +* Mon Jun 7 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.8.1p1-1 +- request gssapi-with-mic by default but not delegation (flag day for anyone + who used previous gssapi patches) +- no longer request x11 forwarding by default + +* Thu Jun 3 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-36 +- Change pam file to use open and close with pam_selinux + +* Tue Jun 1 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.8.1p1-0 +- update to 3.8.1p1 +- add workaround from CVS to reintroduce passwordauth using pam + +* Tue Jun 1 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-35 +- Remove CLOSEXEC on STDERR + +* Tue Mar 16 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-34 + +* Wed Mar 03 2004 Phil Knirsch 3.6.1p2-33.30.1 +- Built RHLE3 U2 update package. + +* Wed Mar 3 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-33 +- Close file descriptors on exec + +* Mon Mar 1 2004 Thomas Woerner 3.6.1p2-32 +- fixed pie build + +* Thu Feb 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-31 +- Add restorecon to startup scripts + +* Thu Feb 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-30 +- Add multiple qualified to openssh + +* Mon Feb 23 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-29 +- Eliminate selinux code and use pam_selinux + +* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee +- rebuilt + +* Mon Jan 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-27 +- turn off pie on ppc + +* Mon Jan 26 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-26 +- fix is_selinux_enabled + +* Wed Jan 14 2004 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-25 +- Rebuild to grab shared libselinux + +* Wed Dec 3 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-24 +- turn on selinux + +* Tue Nov 18 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- un#ifdef out code for reporting password expiration in non-privsep + mode (#83585) + +* Mon Nov 10 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add machinery to build with/without -fpie/-pie, default to doing so + +* Thu Nov 06 2003 David Woodhouse 3.6.1p2-23 +- Don't whinge about getsockopt failing (#109161) + +* Fri Oct 24 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add missing buildprereq on zlib-devel (#104558) + +* Mon Oct 13 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-22 +- turn selinux off + +* Mon Oct 13 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-21.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-21 +- turn selinux off + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-20.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Fri Sep 19 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai +- additional fix for apparently-never-happens double-free in buffer_free() +- extend fix for #103998 to cover SSH1 + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-19 +- rebuild + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-18 +- additional buffer manipulation cleanups from Solar Designer + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-17 +- turn selinux off + +* Wed Sep 17 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-16.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Bill Nottingham 3.6.1p2-15 +- rebuild + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Bill Nottingham 3.6.1p2-14 +- additional buffer manipulation fixes (CAN-2003-0695) + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-13.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-12 +- rebuild + +* Tue Sep 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-11 +- apply patch to store the correct buffer size in allocated buffers + (CAN-2003-0693) +- skip the initial PAM authentication attempt with an empty password if + empty passwords are not permitted in our configuration (#103998) + +* Fri Sep 5 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-10 +- turn selinux off + +* Fri Sep 5 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-9.sel +- turn selinux on + +* Tue Aug 26 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-8 +- Add BuildPreReq gtk2-devel if gtk2 + +* Tue Aug 12 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-7 +- rebuild + +* Tue Aug 12 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-6 +- modify patch which clears the supplemental group list at startup to only + complain if setgroups() fails if sshd has euid == 0 +- handle krb5 installed in %%{_prefix} or elsewhere by using krb5-config + +* Mon Jul 28 2003 Daniel Walsh 3.6.1p2-5 +- Add SELinux patch + +* Tue Jul 22 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-4 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jul 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-3 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jul 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-2 +- rebuild + +* Thu Jun 5 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.6.1p2-1 +- update to 3.6.1p2 + +* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee +6 rebuilt + +* Mon Mar 24 2003 Florian La Roche +- add patch for getsockopt() call to work on bigendian 64bit archs + +* Fri Feb 14 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-6 +- move scp to the -clients subpackage, because it directly depends on ssh + which is also in -clients (#84329) + +* Mon Feb 10 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-5 +- rebuild + +* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers +- rebuilt + +* Tue Jan 7 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-3 +- rebuild + +* Tue Nov 12 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-2 +- patch PAM configuration to use relative path names for the modules, allowing + us to not worry about which arch the modules are built for on multilib systems + +* Tue Oct 15 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.5p1-1 +- update to 3.5p1, merging in filelist/perm changes from the upstream spec + +* Fri Oct 4 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-3 +- merge + +* Thu Sep 12 2002 Than Ngo 3.4p1-2.1 +- fix to build on multilib systems + +* Thu Aug 29 2002 Curtis Zinzilieta 3.4p1-2gss +- added gssapi patches and uncommented patch here + +* Wed Aug 14 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-2 +- pull patch from CVS to fix too-early free in ssh-keysign (#70009) + +* Thu Jun 27 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.4p1-1 +- 3.4p1 +- drop anon mmap patch + +* Tue Jun 25 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.3p1-2 +- rework the close-on-exit docs +- include configuration file man pages +- make use of nologin as the privsep shell optional + +* Mon Jun 24 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.3p1-1 +- update to 3.3p1 +- merge in spec file changes from upstream (remove setuid from ssh, ssh-keysign) +- disable gtk2 askpass +- require pam-devel by filename rather than by package for erratum +- include patch from Solar Designer to work around anonymous mmap failures + +* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers +- automated rebuild + +* Fri Jun 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-3 +- don't require autoconf any more + +* Fri May 31 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-2 +- build gnome-ssh-askpass with gtk2 + +* Tue May 28 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.3p1-1 +- update to 3.2.3p1 +- merge in spec file changes from upstream + +* Fri May 17 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.2.2p1-1 +- update to 3.2.2p1 + +* Fri May 17 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-4 +- drop buildreq on db1-devel +- require pam-devel by package name +- require autoconf instead of autoconf253 again + +* Tue Apr 2 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-3 +- pull patch from CVS to avoid printing error messages when some of the + default keys aren't available when running ssh-add +- refresh to current revisions of Simon's patches + +* Thu Mar 21 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2gss +- reintroduce Simon's gssapi patches +- add buildprereq for autoconf253, which is needed to regenerate configure + after applying the gssapi patches +- refresh to the latest version of Markus's patch to build properly with + older versions of OpenSSL + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 +- bump and grind (through the build system) + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 +- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) +- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't + work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck +- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again +- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from + http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're + building for 6.x + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 +- update to 3.1p1 + +* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 +- update to SNAP-20020305 +- drop debug patch, fixed upstream + +* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 +- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's + anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) + +* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 +- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key + exchange, authentication, and named key support + +* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 +- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole + by gnome-libs-devel + +* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix + from Hugo van der Kooij) + +* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 +- update to 3.0.2p1 + +* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 +- update to 3.0.1p1 + +* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) + +* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 +- merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream + 3.0p1 spec file and init script + +* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 3.0p1 +- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 +- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package +- replace primes with moduli + +* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 +- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs + +* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 +- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd + +* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 +- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper + preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. + (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) +- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) +- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) +- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) +- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug +- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) +- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) +- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) + +* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 +- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) + +* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 + +* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions +- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) + +* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) + +* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) + +* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 + +* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- disable the gssapi patch + +* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9p2 +- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch + +* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD +- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem + so that we can verify it +- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) +- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate +- clear supplemental groups list at startup + +* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config +- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not + dealing with comments right + +* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, + to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure + from the upstream version + +* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- finish marking strings in the init script for translation +- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd + at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by + Pekka Savola) +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed + +* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9 +- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS + +* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) + +* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown +- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue +- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid + races in condrestart + +* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't + limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) +- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, + because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like + open connections) +- require the version of openssl we had when we were built + +* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and + when to reinitialize them +- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata + +* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p2 +- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually + be group memberships + +* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) +- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not + have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to + three password attempts as it is) +- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely + +* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise + +* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. +- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) +- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) + +* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Chuck the closing patch. +- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that + configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we + specify any other HostKey values, which we do. + +* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. +- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. + +* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.1p1. +- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. +- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. +- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try + adding id_rsa. + +* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.0p1. +- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including + update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. +- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init + script now. + +* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). +- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which + host the user is attempting a login from. +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. +- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). +- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). + +* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd +- i18n-tweak to initscript. + +* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- More gettextizing. +- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. + +* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Finish with the gettextizing. + +* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) +- Gettextize the init script. + +* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. + +* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. + +* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has + succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" + authentication. (#21268) + +* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) +- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) + +* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when + doing keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. +- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and + enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client + will try it when the server disallows password authentication. +- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. + +* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. +- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. + +* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). +- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). +- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. + +* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. +- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. + +* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. +- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. +- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). + +* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files + it generates. + +* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add BuildPreReq on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always + build PAM authentication in. +- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. +- Clean out no-longer-used patches. +- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only + when neither exists. + +* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) +- Add BuildPreReqs for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will + always find them in the right place. (#17909) +- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but + add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) +- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names + are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) + +* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) +- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) + +* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 20000823 snapshot. +- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} +- Back out the pipe patch. + +* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. +- Move the init script back. +- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. + +* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). + +* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Move condrestart to server postun. +- Move key generation to init script. +- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. +- Clean up the init script a bit. + +* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. + +* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p2. +- Use of strtok() considered harmful. + +* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Get the build root out of the man pages. + +* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add and use condrestart support in the init script. +- Add newer initscripts as a prereq. + +* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Build in new environment (release 2) +- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group + +* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.1p1 + +* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. +- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. +- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. + +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build + +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller +- Added Jim Knoble's askpass + +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble + +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives + +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages + +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages + +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script + +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names + +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names + +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec.